2 * IEEE 802.11 RSN / WPA Authenticator
3 * Copyright (c) 2004-2011, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
6 * See README for more details.
9 #include "utils/includes.h"
11 #include "utils/common.h"
12 #include "utils/eloop.h"
13 #include "utils/state_machine.h"
14 #include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
15 #include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
16 #include "crypto/crypto.h"
17 #include "crypto/sha1.h"
18 #include "crypto/sha256.h"
19 #include "crypto/random.h"
20 #include "eapol_auth/eapol_auth_sm.h"
21 #include "ap_config.h"
22 #include "ieee802_11.h"
24 #include "pmksa_cache_auth.h"
25 #include "wpa_auth_i.h"
26 #include "wpa_auth_ie.h"
28 #define STATE_MACHINE_DATA struct wpa_state_machine
29 #define STATE_MACHINE_DEBUG_PREFIX "WPA"
30 #define STATE_MACHINE_ADDR sm->addr
33 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx);
34 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
35 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(struct wpa_ptk *PTK, u8 *data, size_t data_len);
36 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx);
37 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
38 struct wpa_group *group);
39 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
40 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
41 struct wpa_group *group);
42 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
43 struct wpa_group *group);
45 static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount = 4;
46 static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount = 4;
47 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first = 100; /* ms */
48 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq = 1000; /* ms */
49 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group = 500; /* ms */
51 /* TODO: make these configurable */
52 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime = 43200;
53 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold = 70;
54 static const int dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout = 60;
57 static inline void wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(
58 struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr)
60 if (wpa_auth->cb.mic_failure_report)
61 wpa_auth->cb.mic_failure_report(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr);
65 static inline void wpa_auth_set_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
66 const u8 *addr, wpa_eapol_variable var,
69 if (wpa_auth->cb.set_eapol)
70 wpa_auth->cb.set_eapol(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, var, value);
74 static inline int wpa_auth_get_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
75 const u8 *addr, wpa_eapol_variable var)
77 if (wpa_auth->cb.get_eapol == NULL)
79 return wpa_auth->cb.get_eapol(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, var);
83 static inline const u8 * wpa_auth_get_psk(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
84 const u8 *addr, const u8 *prev_psk)
86 if (wpa_auth->cb.get_psk == NULL)
88 return wpa_auth->cb.get_psk(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, prev_psk);
92 static inline int wpa_auth_get_msk(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
93 const u8 *addr, u8 *msk, size_t *len)
95 if (wpa_auth->cb.get_msk == NULL)
97 return wpa_auth->cb.get_msk(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, msk, len);
101 static inline int wpa_auth_set_key(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
103 enum wpa_alg alg, const u8 *addr, int idx,
104 u8 *key, size_t key_len)
106 if (wpa_auth->cb.set_key == NULL)
108 return wpa_auth->cb.set_key(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, vlan_id, alg, addr, idx,
113 static inline int wpa_auth_get_seqnum(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
114 const u8 *addr, int idx, u8 *seq)
116 if (wpa_auth->cb.get_seqnum == NULL)
118 return wpa_auth->cb.get_seqnum(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, idx, seq);
123 wpa_auth_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
124 const u8 *data, size_t data_len, int encrypt)
126 if (wpa_auth->cb.send_eapol == NULL)
128 return wpa_auth->cb.send_eapol(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, data, data_len,
133 int wpa_auth_for_each_sta(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
134 int (*cb)(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, void *ctx),
137 if (wpa_auth->cb.for_each_sta == NULL)
139 return wpa_auth->cb.for_each_sta(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, cb, cb_ctx);
143 int wpa_auth_for_each_auth(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
144 int (*cb)(struct wpa_authenticator *a, void *ctx),
147 if (wpa_auth->cb.for_each_auth == NULL)
149 return wpa_auth->cb.for_each_auth(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, cb, cb_ctx);
153 void wpa_auth_logger(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
154 logger_level level, const char *txt)
156 if (wpa_auth->cb.logger == NULL)
158 wpa_auth->cb.logger(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, level, txt);
162 void wpa_auth_vlogger(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
163 logger_level level, const char *fmt, ...)
169 if (wpa_auth->cb.logger == NULL)
172 maxlen = os_strlen(fmt) + 100;
173 format = os_malloc(maxlen);
178 vsnprintf(format, maxlen, fmt, ap);
181 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, addr, level, format);
187 static void wpa_sta_disconnect(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
190 if (wpa_auth->cb.disconnect == NULL)
192 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "wpa_sta_disconnect STA " MACSTR, MAC2STR(addr));
193 wpa_auth->cb.disconnect(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr,
194 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID);
198 static int wpa_use_aes_cmac(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
201 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
202 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
204 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
205 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
206 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
208 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
213 static void wpa_rekey_gmk(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
215 struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx;
217 if (random_get_bytes(wpa_auth->group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN)) {
218 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
221 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, NULL, LOGGER_DEBUG, "GMK rekeyd");
222 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GMK",
223 wpa_auth->group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN);
226 if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey) {
227 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey, 0,
228 wpa_rekey_gmk, wpa_auth, NULL);
233 static void wpa_rekey_gtk(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
235 struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx;
236 struct wpa_group *group;
238 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, NULL, LOGGER_DEBUG, "rekeying GTK");
239 for (group = wpa_auth->group; group; group = group->next) {
240 group->GTKReKey = TRUE;
242 group->changed = FALSE;
243 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
244 } while (group->changed);
247 if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey) {
248 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey,
249 0, wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
254 static void wpa_rekey_ptk(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
256 struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx;
257 struct wpa_state_machine *sm = timeout_ctx;
259 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, "rekeying PTK");
260 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm);
265 static int wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, void *ctx)
267 if (sm->pmksa == ctx)
273 static void wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry,
276 struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = ctx;
277 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb, entry);
281 static void wpa_group_set_key_len(struct wpa_group *group, int cipher)
284 case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP:
287 case WPA_CIPHER_TKIP:
290 case WPA_CIPHER_WEP104:
293 case WPA_CIPHER_WEP40:
300 static int wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
301 struct wpa_group *group)
303 u8 buf[ETH_ALEN + 8 + sizeof(group)];
306 if (random_get_bytes(group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN) < 0)
308 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GMK", group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN);
311 * Counter = PRF-256(Random number, "Init Counter",
312 * Local MAC Address || Time)
314 os_memcpy(buf, wpa_auth->addr, ETH_ALEN);
315 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(buf + ETH_ALEN);
316 os_memcpy(buf + ETH_ALEN + 8, &group, sizeof(group));
317 if (random_get_bytes(rkey, sizeof(rkey)) < 0)
320 if (sha1_prf(rkey, sizeof(rkey), "Init Counter", buf, sizeof(buf),
321 group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN) < 0)
323 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Key Counter",
324 group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
330 static struct wpa_group * wpa_group_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
331 int vlan_id, int delay_init)
333 struct wpa_group *group;
335 group = os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_group));
339 group->GTKAuthenticator = TRUE;
340 group->vlan_id = vlan_id;
342 wpa_group_set_key_len(group, wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group);
344 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
345 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
346 "for secure operations - update keys later when "
347 "the first station connects");
351 * Set initial GMK/Counter value here. The actual values that will be
352 * used in negotiations will be set once the first station tries to
353 * connect. This allows more time for collecting additional randomness
354 * on embedded devices.
356 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth, group) < 0) {
357 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
365 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Delay group state machine start "
366 "until Beacon frames have been configured");
367 /* Initialization is completed in wpa_init_keys(). */
369 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
370 group->GInit = FALSE;
371 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
379 * wpa_init - Initialize WPA authenticator
380 * @addr: Authenticator address
381 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
382 * @cb: Callback functions for WPA authenticator
383 * Returns: Pointer to WPA authenticator data or %NULL on failure
385 struct wpa_authenticator * wpa_init(const u8 *addr,
386 struct wpa_auth_config *conf,
387 struct wpa_auth_callbacks *cb)
389 struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth;
391 wpa_auth = os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_authenticator));
392 if (wpa_auth == NULL)
394 os_memcpy(wpa_auth->addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
395 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth->conf, conf, sizeof(*conf));
396 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth->cb, cb, sizeof(*cb));
398 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth)) {
399 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
404 wpa_auth->group = wpa_group_init(wpa_auth, 0, 1);
405 if (wpa_auth->group == NULL) {
406 os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie);
411 wpa_auth->pmksa = pmksa_cache_auth_init(wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb,
413 if (wpa_auth->pmksa == NULL) {
414 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "PMKSA cache initialization failed.");
415 os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie);
420 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
421 wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache = wpa_ft_pmk_cache_init();
422 if (wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache == NULL) {
423 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "FT PMK cache initialization failed.");
424 os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie);
425 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth->pmksa);
429 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
431 if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey) {
432 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey, 0,
433 wpa_rekey_gmk, wpa_auth, NULL);
436 if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey) {
437 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey, 0,
438 wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
445 int wpa_init_keys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
447 struct wpa_group *group = wpa_auth->group;
449 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Start group state machine to set initial "
451 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
452 group->GInit = FALSE;
453 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
459 * wpa_deinit - Deinitialize WPA authenticator
460 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
462 void wpa_deinit(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
464 struct wpa_group *group, *prev;
466 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gmk, wpa_auth, NULL);
467 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
469 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
470 while (wpa_auth->stsl_negotiations)
471 wpa_stsl_remove(wpa_auth, wpa_auth->stsl_negotiations);
472 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
474 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth->pmksa);
476 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
477 wpa_ft_pmk_cache_deinit(wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache);
478 wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache = NULL;
479 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
481 os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie);
483 group = wpa_auth->group;
495 * wpa_reconfig - Update WPA authenticator configuration
496 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
497 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
499 int wpa_reconfig(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
500 struct wpa_auth_config *conf)
502 struct wpa_group *group;
503 if (wpa_auth == NULL)
506 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth->conf, conf, sizeof(*conf));
507 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth)) {
508 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
513 * Reinitialize GTK to make sure it is suitable for the new
516 group = wpa_auth->group;
517 wpa_group_set_key_len(group, wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group);
519 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
520 group->GInit = FALSE;
521 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
527 struct wpa_state_machine *
528 wpa_auth_sta_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr)
530 struct wpa_state_machine *sm;
532 sm = os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_state_machine));
535 os_memcpy(sm->addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
537 sm->wpa_auth = wpa_auth;
538 sm->group = wpa_auth->group;
544 int wpa_auth_sta_associated(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
545 struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
547 if (wpa_auth == NULL || !wpa_auth->conf.wpa || sm == NULL)
550 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
551 if (sm->ft_completed) {
552 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
553 "FT authentication already completed - do not "
554 "start 4-way handshake");
557 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
560 os_memset(&sm->key_replay, 0, sizeof(sm->key_replay));
561 sm->ReAuthenticationRequest = TRUE;
562 return wpa_sm_step(sm);
565 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
566 "start authentication");
570 if (wpa_sm_step(sm) == 1)
571 return 1; /* should not really happen */
573 sm->AuthenticationRequest = TRUE;
574 return wpa_sm_step(sm);
578 void wpa_auth_sta_no_wpa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
580 /* WPA/RSN was not used - clear WPA state. This is needed if the STA
581 * reassociates back to the same AP while the previous entry for the
582 * STA has not yet been removed. */
586 sm->wpa_key_mgmt = 0;
590 static void wpa_free_sta_sm(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
592 if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys) {
593 sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
594 sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
596 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
597 os_free(sm->assoc_resp_ftie);
598 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
599 os_free(sm->last_rx_eapol_key);
605 void wpa_auth_sta_deinit(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
610 if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_strict_rekey && sm->has_GTK) {
611 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
612 "strict rekeying - force GTK rekey since STA "
614 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk, sm->wpa_auth, NULL);
615 eloop_register_timeout(0, 500000, wpa_rekey_gtk, sm->wpa_auth,
619 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
620 sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
621 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_call_step, sm, NULL);
622 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
623 if (sm->in_step_loop) {
624 /* Must not free state machine while wpa_sm_step() is running.
625 * Freeing will be completed in the end of wpa_sm_step(). */
626 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Registering pending STA state "
627 "machine deinit for " MACSTR, MAC2STR(sm->addr));
628 sm->pending_deinit = 1;
634 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
639 sm->PTKRequest = TRUE;
644 static int wpa_replay_counter_valid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter *ctr,
645 const u8 *replay_counter)
648 for (i = 0; i < RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES; i++) {
651 if (os_memcmp(replay_counter, ctr[i].counter,
652 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) == 0)
659 static void wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter *ctr,
660 const u8 *replay_counter)
663 for (i = 0; i < RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES; i++) {
665 (replay_counter == NULL ||
666 os_memcmp(replay_counter, ctr[i].counter,
667 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) == 0))
668 ctr[i].valid = FALSE;
673 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
674 static int ft_check_msg_2_of_4(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
675 struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
676 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *kde)
678 struct wpa_ie_data ie;
679 struct rsn_mdie *mdie;
681 if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(kde->rsn_ie, kde->rsn_ie_len, &ie) < 0 ||
682 ie.num_pmkid != 1 || ie.pmkid == NULL) {
683 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: No PMKR1Name in "
684 "FT 4-way handshake message 2/4");
688 os_memcpy(sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, ie.pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
689 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMKR1Name from Supplicant",
690 sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, PMKID_LEN);
692 if (!kde->mdie || !kde->ftie) {
693 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: No %s in FT 4-way handshake "
694 "message 2/4", kde->mdie ? "FTIE" : "MDIE");
698 mdie = (struct rsn_mdie *) (kde->mdie + 2);
699 if (kde->mdie[1] < sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) ||
700 os_memcmp(wpa_auth->conf.mobility_domain, mdie->mobility_domain,
701 MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN) != 0) {
702 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: MDIE mismatch");
706 if (sm->assoc_resp_ftie &&
707 (kde->ftie[1] != sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1] ||
708 os_memcmp(kde->ftie, sm->assoc_resp_ftie,
709 2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1]) != 0)) {
710 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTIE mismatch");
711 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTIE in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4",
712 kde->ftie, kde->ftie_len);
713 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTIE in (Re)AssocResp",
714 sm->assoc_resp_ftie, 2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1]);
720 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
723 static void wpa_receive_error_report(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
724 struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int group)
726 /* Supplicant reported a Michael MIC error */
727 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
728 "received EAPOL-Key Error Request "
729 "(STA detected Michael MIC failure (group=%d))",
732 if (group && wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group != WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) {
733 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
734 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
735 "group cipher is not TKIP");
736 } else if (!group && sm->pairwise != WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) {
737 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
738 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
739 "pairwise cipher is not TKIP");
741 wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(wpa_auth, sm->addr);
742 sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures++;
743 wpa_auth->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures++;
747 * Error report is not a request for a new key handshake, but since
748 * Authenticator may do it, let's change the keys now anyway.
750 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm);
754 void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
755 struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
756 u8 *data, size_t data_len)
758 struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
759 struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
760 u16 key_info, key_data_length;
761 enum { PAIRWISE_2, PAIRWISE_4, GROUP_2, REQUEST,
762 SMK_M1, SMK_M3, SMK_ERROR } msg;
764 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde;
766 const u8 *eapol_key_ie;
767 size_t eapol_key_ie_len;
769 if (wpa_auth == NULL || !wpa_auth->conf.wpa || sm == NULL)
772 if (data_len < sizeof(*hdr) + sizeof(*key))
775 hdr = (struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) data;
776 key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
777 key_info = WPA_GET_BE16(key->key_info);
778 key_data_length = WPA_GET_BE16(key->key_data_length);
779 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Received EAPOL-Key from " MACSTR
780 " key_info=0x%x type=%u key_data_length=%u",
781 MAC2STR(sm->addr), key_info, key->type, key_data_length);
782 if (key_data_length > data_len - sizeof(*hdr) - sizeof(*key)) {
783 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key frame - "
784 "key_data overflow (%d > %lu)",
786 (unsigned long) (data_len - sizeof(*hdr) -
791 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) {
792 if (key->type == EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA) {
794 * Some deployed station implementations seem to send
795 * msg 4/4 with incorrect type value in WPA2 mode.
797 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Workaround: Allow EAPOL-Key "
798 "with unexpected WPA type in RSN mode");
799 } else if (key->type != EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN) {
800 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
801 "unexpected type %d in RSN mode",
806 if (key->type != EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA) {
807 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
808 "unexpected type %d in WPA mode",
814 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Received Key Nonce", key->key_nonce,
816 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Received Replay Counter",
817 key->replay_counter, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
819 /* FIX: verify that the EAPOL-Key frame was encrypted if pairwise keys
822 if ((key_info & (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE | WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST)) ==
823 (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE | WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST)) {
824 if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR) {
826 msgtxt = "SMK Error";
831 } else if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE) {
834 } else if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) {
837 } else if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE)) {
839 msgtxt = "2/2 Group";
840 } else if (key_data_length == 0) {
842 msgtxt = "4/4 Pairwise";
845 msgtxt = "2/4 Pairwise";
848 /* TODO: key_info type validation for PeerKey */
849 if (msg == REQUEST || msg == PAIRWISE_2 || msg == PAIRWISE_4 ||
851 u16 ver = key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK;
852 if (sm->pairwise == WPA_CIPHER_CCMP) {
853 if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm) &&
854 ver != WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) {
855 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
857 "advertised support for "
858 "AES-128-CMAC, but did not "
863 if (!wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm) &&
864 ver != WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES) {
865 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
867 "did not use HMAC-SHA1-AES "
874 if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) {
875 if (sm->req_replay_counter_used &&
876 os_memcmp(key->replay_counter, sm->req_replay_counter,
877 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) <= 0) {
878 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_WARNING,
879 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
885 if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) &&
886 !wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm->key_replay, key->replay_counter)) {
889 if (msg == PAIRWISE_2 &&
890 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm->prev_key_replay,
891 key->replay_counter) &&
892 sm->wpa_ptk_state == WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING &&
893 os_memcmp(sm->SNonce, key->key_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0)
896 * Some supplicant implementations (e.g., Windows XP
897 * WZC) update SNonce for each EAPOL-Key 2/4. This
898 * breaks the workaround on accepting any of the
899 * pending requests, so allow the SNonce to be updated
900 * even if we have already sent out EAPOL-Key 3/4.
902 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
903 "Process SNonce update from STA "
904 "based on retransmitted EAPOL-Key "
906 sm->update_snonce = 1;
907 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm->prev_key_replay,
908 key->replay_counter);
909 goto continue_processing;
912 if (msg == PAIRWISE_2 &&
913 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm->prev_key_replay,
914 key->replay_counter) &&
915 sm->wpa_ptk_state == WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING) {
916 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
917 "ignore retransmitted EAPOL-Key %s - "
918 "SNonce did not change", msgtxt);
920 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
921 "received EAPOL-Key %s with "
922 "unexpected replay counter", msgtxt);
924 for (i = 0; i < RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES; i++) {
925 if (!sm->key_replay[i].valid)
927 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "pending replay counter",
928 sm->key_replay[i].counter,
929 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
931 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "received replay counter",
932 key->replay_counter, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
939 if (sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKSTART &&
940 sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING &&
941 (!sm->update_snonce ||
942 sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING)) {
943 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
944 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 in "
945 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
949 random_add_randomness(key->key_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
950 if (sm->group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy) {
952 * The system did not have enough entropy to generate
953 * strong random numbers. Reject the first 4-way
954 * handshake(s) and collect some entropy based on the
955 * information from it. Once enough entropy is
956 * available, the next atempt will trigger GMK/Key
957 * Counter update and the station will be allowed to
960 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Reject 4-way handshake to "
961 "collect more entropy for random number "
963 random_mark_pool_ready();
964 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr);
967 if (wpa_parse_kde_ies((u8 *) (key + 1), key_data_length,
969 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
970 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 with "
971 "invalid Key Data contents");
975 eapol_key_ie = kde.rsn_ie;
976 eapol_key_ie_len = kde.rsn_ie_len;
978 eapol_key_ie = kde.wpa_ie;
979 eapol_key_ie_len = kde.wpa_ie_len;
981 ft = sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 &&
982 wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt);
983 if (sm->wpa_ie == NULL ||
984 wpa_compare_rsn_ie(ft,
985 sm->wpa_ie, sm->wpa_ie_len,
986 eapol_key_ie, eapol_key_ie_len)) {
987 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
988 "WPA IE from (Re)AssocReq did not "
989 "match with msg 2/4");
991 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA IE in AssocReq",
992 sm->wpa_ie, sm->wpa_ie_len);
994 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA IE in msg 2/4",
995 eapol_key_ie, eapol_key_ie_len);
996 /* MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
997 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr);
1000 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1001 if (ft && ft_check_msg_2_of_4(wpa_auth, sm, &kde) < 0) {
1002 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr);
1005 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1008 if (sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING ||
1010 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1011 "received EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 in "
1012 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1018 if (sm->wpa_ptk_group_state != WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
1019 || !sm->PTK_valid) {
1020 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1021 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/2 in "
1022 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1023 sm->wpa_ptk_group_state);
1027 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1031 if (!wpa_auth->conf.peerkey) {
1032 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: SMK M1/M3/Error, but "
1033 "PeerKey use disabled - ignoring message");
1036 if (!sm->PTK_valid) {
1037 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1038 "received EAPOL-Key msg SMK in "
1039 "invalid state - dropped");
1043 #else /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1047 return; /* STSL disabled - ignore SMK messages */
1048 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1053 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
1054 "received EAPOL-Key frame (%s)", msgtxt);
1056 if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK) {
1057 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1058 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key Ack set");
1062 if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) {
1063 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1064 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC not set");
1068 sm->MICVerified = FALSE;
1069 if (sm->PTK_valid && !sm->update_snonce) {
1070 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(&sm->PTK, data, data_len)) {
1071 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1072 "received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
1075 sm->MICVerified = TRUE;
1076 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
1077 sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
1080 if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) {
1081 if (sm->MICVerified) {
1082 sm->req_replay_counter_used = 1;
1083 os_memcpy(sm->req_replay_counter, key->replay_counter,
1084 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
1086 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1087 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1093 * TODO: should decrypt key data field if encryption was used;
1094 * even though MAC address KDE is not normally encrypted,
1095 * supplicant is allowed to encrypt it.
1097 if (msg == SMK_ERROR) {
1098 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1099 wpa_smk_error(wpa_auth, sm, key);
1100 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1102 } else if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR) {
1103 wpa_receive_error_report(
1105 !(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE));
1106 } else if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE) {
1107 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1108 "received EAPOL-Key Request for new "
1110 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm);
1111 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1112 } else if (msg == SMK_M1) {
1113 wpa_smk_m1(wpa_auth, sm, key);
1114 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1115 } else if (key_data_length > 0 &&
1116 wpa_parse_kde_ies((const u8 *) (key + 1),
1117 key_data_length, &kde) == 0 &&
1120 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1121 "received EAPOL-Key Request for GTK "
1123 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
1124 wpa_rekey_gtk(wpa_auth, NULL);
1127 /* Do not allow the same key replay counter to be reused. */
1128 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm->key_replay,
1129 key->replay_counter);
1131 if (msg == PAIRWISE_2) {
1133 * Maintain a copy of the pending EAPOL-Key frames in
1134 * case the EAPOL-Key frame was retransmitted. This is
1135 * needed to allow EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 reply to another
1136 * pending msg 1/4 to update the SNonce to work around
1137 * unexpected supplicant behavior.
1139 os_memcpy(sm->prev_key_replay, sm->key_replay,
1140 sizeof(sm->key_replay));
1142 os_memset(sm->prev_key_replay, 0,
1143 sizeof(sm->prev_key_replay));
1147 * Make sure old valid counters are not accepted anymore and
1148 * do not get copied again.
1150 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm->key_replay, NULL);
1153 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1154 if (msg == SMK_M3) {
1155 wpa_smk_m3(wpa_auth, sm, key);
1158 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1160 os_free(sm->last_rx_eapol_key);
1161 sm->last_rx_eapol_key = os_malloc(data_len);
1162 if (sm->last_rx_eapol_key == NULL)
1164 os_memcpy(sm->last_rx_eapol_key, data, data_len);
1165 sm->last_rx_eapol_key_len = data_len;
1167 sm->rx_eapol_key_secure = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE);
1168 sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = TRUE;
1169 sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE);
1170 sm->EAPOLKeyRequest = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST);
1171 os_memcpy(sm->SNonce, key->key_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
1176 static int wpa_gmk_to_gtk(const u8 *gmk, const char *label, const u8 *addr,
1177 const u8 *gnonce, u8 *gtk, size_t gtk_len)
1179 u8 data[ETH_ALEN + WPA_NONCE_LEN + 8 + 16];
1183 /* GTK = PRF-X(GMK, "Group key expansion",
1184 * AA || GNonce || Time || random data)
1185 * The example described in the IEEE 802.11 standard uses only AA and
1186 * GNonce as inputs here. Add some more entropy since this derivation
1187 * is done only at the Authenticator and as such, does not need to be
1190 os_memcpy(data, addr, ETH_ALEN);
1191 os_memcpy(data + ETH_ALEN, gnonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
1192 pos = data + ETH_ALEN + WPA_NONCE_LEN;
1193 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(pos);
1195 if (random_get_bytes(pos, 16) < 0)
1198 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1199 sha256_prf(gmk, WPA_GMK_LEN, label, data, sizeof(data), gtk, gtk_len);
1200 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1201 if (sha1_prf(gmk, WPA_GMK_LEN, label, data, sizeof(data), gtk, gtk_len)
1204 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1210 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
1212 struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx;
1213 struct wpa_state_machine *sm = timeout_ctx;
1215 sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
1216 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, "EAPOL-Key timeout");
1217 sm->TimeoutEvt = TRUE;
1222 void __wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
1223 struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int key_info,
1224 const u8 *key_rsc, const u8 *nonce,
1225 const u8 *kde, size_t kde_len,
1226 int keyidx, int encr, int force_version)
1228 struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
1229 struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
1232 int key_data_len, pad_len = 0;
1234 int version, pairwise;
1237 len = sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_hdr) + sizeof(struct wpa_eapol_key);
1240 version = force_version;
1241 else if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm))
1242 version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC;
1243 else if (sm->pairwise == WPA_CIPHER_CCMP)
1244 version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES;
1246 version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4;
1248 pairwise = key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE;
1250 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Send EAPOL(version=%d secure=%d mic=%d "
1251 "ack=%d install=%d pairwise=%d kde_len=%lu keyidx=%d "
1254 (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE) ? 1 : 0,
1255 (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC) ? 1 : 0,
1256 (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK) ? 1 : 0,
1257 (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL) ? 1 : 0,
1258 pairwise, (unsigned long) kde_len, keyidx, encr);
1260 key_data_len = kde_len;
1262 if ((version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES ||
1263 version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) && encr) {
1264 pad_len = key_data_len % 8;
1266 pad_len = 8 - pad_len;
1267 key_data_len += pad_len + 8;
1270 len += key_data_len;
1272 hdr = os_zalloc(len);
1275 hdr->version = wpa_auth->conf.eapol_version;
1276 hdr->type = IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY;
1277 hdr->length = host_to_be16(len - sizeof(*hdr));
1278 key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
1280 key->type = sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 ?
1281 EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN : EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA;
1282 key_info |= version;
1283 if (encr && sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2)
1284 key_info |= WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA;
1285 if (sm->wpa != WPA_VERSION_WPA2)
1286 key_info |= keyidx << WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_INDEX_SHIFT;
1287 WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_info, key_info);
1289 alg = pairwise ? sm->pairwise : wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group;
1291 case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP:
1292 WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_length, 16);
1294 case WPA_CIPHER_TKIP:
1295 WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_length, 32);
1297 case WPA_CIPHER_WEP40:
1298 WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_length, 5);
1300 case WPA_CIPHER_WEP104:
1301 WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_length, 13);
1304 if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE)
1305 WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_length, 0);
1307 /* FIX: STSL: what to use as key_replay_counter? */
1308 for (i = RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES - 1; i > 0; i--) {
1309 sm->key_replay[i].valid = sm->key_replay[i - 1].valid;
1310 os_memcpy(sm->key_replay[i].counter,
1311 sm->key_replay[i - 1].counter,
1312 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
1314 inc_byte_array(sm->key_replay[0].counter, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
1315 os_memcpy(key->replay_counter, sm->key_replay[0].counter,
1316 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
1317 sm->key_replay[0].valid = TRUE;
1320 os_memcpy(key->key_nonce, nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
1323 os_memcpy(key->key_rsc, key_rsc, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
1326 os_memcpy(key + 1, kde, kde_len);
1327 WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_data_length, kde_len);
1328 } else if (encr && kde) {
1329 buf = os_zalloc(key_data_len);
1335 os_memcpy(pos, kde, kde_len);
1341 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
1343 if (version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES ||
1344 version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) {
1345 if (aes_wrap(sm->PTK.kek, (key_data_len - 8) / 8, buf,
1346 (u8 *) (key + 1))) {
1351 WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_data_length, key_data_len);
1354 os_memcpy(key->key_iv,
1355 sm->group->Counter + WPA_NONCE_LEN - 16, 16);
1356 inc_byte_array(sm->group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
1357 os_memcpy(ek, key->key_iv, 16);
1358 os_memcpy(ek + 16, sm->PTK.kek, 16);
1359 os_memcpy(key + 1, buf, key_data_len);
1360 rc4_skip(ek, 32, 256, (u8 *) (key + 1), key_data_len);
1361 WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_data_length, key_data_len);
1366 if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC) {
1367 if (!sm->PTK_valid) {
1368 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
1369 "PTK not valid when sending EAPOL-Key "
1374 wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->PTK.kck, version, (u8 *) hdr, len,
1378 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_inc_EapolFramesTx,
1380 wpa_auth_send_eapol(wpa_auth, sm->addr, (u8 *) hdr, len,
1386 static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
1387 struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int key_info,
1388 const u8 *key_rsc, const u8 *nonce,
1389 const u8 *kde, size_t kde_len,
1390 int keyidx, int encr)
1393 int pairwise = key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE;
1399 __wpa_send_eapol(wpa_auth, sm, key_info, key_rsc, nonce, kde, kde_len,
1402 ctr = pairwise ? sm->TimeoutCtr : sm->GTimeoutCtr;
1403 if (ctr == 1 && wpa_auth->conf.tx_status)
1404 timeout_ms = pairwise ? eapol_key_timeout_first :
1405 eapol_key_timeout_first_group;
1407 timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_subseq;
1408 if (pairwise && ctr == 1 && !(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC))
1409 sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 1;
1410 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry "
1411 "counter %d)", timeout_ms, ctr);
1412 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms / 1000, (timeout_ms % 1000) * 1000,
1413 wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
1417 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(struct wpa_ptk *PTK, u8 *data, size_t data_len)
1419 struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
1420 struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
1425 if (data_len < sizeof(*hdr) + sizeof(*key))
1428 hdr = (struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) data;
1429 key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
1430 key_info = WPA_GET_BE16(key->key_info);
1431 os_memcpy(mic, key->key_mic, 16);
1432 os_memset(key->key_mic, 0, 16);
1433 if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(PTK->kck, key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK,
1434 data, data_len, key->key_mic) ||
1435 os_memcmp(mic, key->key_mic, 16) != 0)
1437 os_memcpy(key->key_mic, mic, 16);
1442 void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
1444 sm->PTK_valid = FALSE;
1445 os_memset(&sm->PTK, 0, sizeof(sm->PTK));
1446 wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0, WPA_ALG_NONE, sm->addr, 0, NULL, 0);
1447 sm->pairwise_set = FALSE;
1448 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
1452 int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, wpa_event event)
1459 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
1460 "event %d notification", event);
1468 sm->DeauthenticationRequest = TRUE;
1471 case WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL:
1474 * When using WPS, we may end up here if the STA
1475 * manages to re-associate without the previous STA
1476 * entry getting removed. Consequently, we need to make
1477 * sure that the WPA state machines gets initialized
1478 * properly at this point.
1480 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA state machine had not been "
1481 "started - initialize now");
1484 if (wpa_sm_step(sm) == 1)
1485 return 1; /* should not really happen */
1487 sm->AuthenticationRequest = TRUE;
1490 if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys) {
1492 * Reauthentication cancels the pending group key
1493 * update for this STA.
1495 sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
1496 sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
1497 sm->PtkGroupInit = TRUE;
1499 sm->ReAuthenticationRequest = TRUE;
1502 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1503 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Retry PTK configuration "
1504 "after association");
1505 wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm);
1507 /* Using FT protocol, not WPA auth state machine */
1508 sm->ft_completed = 1;
1510 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1512 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1515 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1516 sm->ft_completed = 0;
1517 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1519 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1520 if (sm->mgmt_frame_prot && event == WPA_AUTH)
1522 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1525 sm->PTK_valid = FALSE;
1526 os_memset(&sm->PTK, 0, sizeof(sm->PTK));
1528 if (event != WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL)
1532 return wpa_sm_step(sm);
1536 static enum wpa_alg wpa_alg_enum(int alg)
1539 case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP:
1540 return WPA_ALG_CCMP;
1541 case WPA_CIPHER_TKIP:
1542 return WPA_ALG_TKIP;
1543 case WPA_CIPHER_WEP104:
1544 case WPA_CIPHER_WEP40:
1547 return WPA_ALG_NONE;
1552 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE)
1554 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE, wpa_ptk);
1556 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
1557 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
1558 sm->changed = FALSE;
1562 if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys)
1563 sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
1564 sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
1565 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA)
1566 sm->PInitAKeys = FALSE;
1567 if (1 /* Unicast cipher supported AND (ESS OR ((IBSS or WDS) and
1568 * Local AA > Remote AA)) */) {
1571 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled, 0);
1573 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portValid, 0);
1575 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
1576 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
1577 WPA_EAPOL_authorized, 0);
1582 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT)
1584 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT, wpa_ptk);
1585 sm->Disconnect = FALSE;
1586 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr);
1590 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED)
1592 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED, wpa_ptk);
1593 sm->DeauthenticationRequest = FALSE;
1597 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION)
1599 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION, wpa_ptk);
1600 os_memset(&sm->PTK, 0, sizeof(sm->PTK));
1601 sm->PTK_valid = FALSE;
1602 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portControl_Auto,
1604 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled, 1);
1605 sm->AuthenticationRequest = FALSE;
1609 static void wpa_group_ensure_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
1610 struct wpa_group *group)
1612 if (group->first_sta_seen)
1615 * System has run bit further than at the time hostapd was started
1616 * potentially very early during boot up. This provides better chances
1617 * of collecting more randomness on embedded systems. Re-initialize the
1618 * GMK and Counter here to improve their strength if there was not
1619 * enough entropy available immediately after system startup.
1621 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Re-initialize GMK/Counter on first "
1623 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
1624 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
1625 "to proceed - reject first 4-way handshake");
1626 group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy = TRUE;
1628 group->first_sta_seen = TRUE;
1629 group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy = FALSE;
1632 wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth, group);
1633 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group);
1634 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group);
1638 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2)
1640 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2, wpa_ptk);
1642 wpa_group_ensure_init(sm->wpa_auth, sm->group);
1645 * Definition of ANonce selection in IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 is somewhat
1646 * ambiguous. The Authenticator state machine uses a counter that is
1647 * incremented by one for each 4-way handshake. However, the security
1648 * analysis of 4-way handshake points out that unpredictable nonces
1649 * help in preventing precomputation attacks. Instead of the state
1650 * machine definition, use an unpredictable nonce value here to provide
1651 * stronger protection against potential precomputation attacks.
1653 if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
1654 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "WPA: Failed to get random data for "
1656 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr);
1659 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign ANonce", sm->ANonce,
1661 sm->ReAuthenticationRequest = FALSE;
1662 /* IEEE 802.11i does not clear TimeoutCtr here, but this is more
1663 * logical place than INITIALIZE since AUTHENTICATION2 can be
1664 * re-entered on ReAuthenticationRequest without going through
1670 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK)
1672 u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN];
1673 size_t len = 2 * PMK_LEN;
1675 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, INITPMK, wpa_ptk);
1676 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1678 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1680 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PMK from PMKSA cache");
1681 os_memcpy(sm->PMK, sm->pmksa->pmk, PMK_LEN);
1682 } else if (wpa_auth_get_msk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, msk, &len) == 0) {
1683 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PMK from EAPOL state machine "
1684 "(len=%lu)", (unsigned long) len);
1685 os_memcpy(sm->PMK, msk, PMK_LEN);
1686 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1687 if (len >= 2 * PMK_LEN) {
1688 os_memcpy(sm->xxkey, msk + PMK_LEN, PMK_LEN);
1689 sm->xxkey_len = PMK_LEN;
1691 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1693 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Could not get PMK");
1696 sm->req_replay_counter_used = 0;
1697 /* IEEE 802.11i does not set keyRun to FALSE, but not doing this
1698 * will break reauthentication since EAPOL state machines may not be
1699 * get into AUTHENTICATING state that clears keyRun before WPA state
1700 * machine enters AUTHENTICATION2 state and goes immediately to INITPMK
1701 * state and takes PMK from the previously used AAA Key. This will
1702 * eventually fail in 4-Way Handshake because Supplicant uses PMK
1703 * derived from the new AAA Key. Setting keyRun = FALSE here seems to
1704 * be good workaround for this issue. */
1705 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_keyRun, 0);
1709 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPSK)
1712 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, INITPSK, wpa_ptk);
1713 psk = wpa_auth_get_psk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, NULL);
1715 os_memcpy(sm->PMK, psk, PMK_LEN);
1716 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1717 os_memcpy(sm->xxkey, psk, PMK_LEN);
1718 sm->xxkey_len = PMK_LEN;
1719 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1721 sm->req_replay_counter_used = 0;
1725 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART)
1727 u8 buf[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + PMKID_LEN], *pmkid = NULL;
1728 size_t pmkid_len = 0;
1730 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART, wpa_ptk);
1731 sm->PTKRequest = FALSE;
1732 sm->TimeoutEvt = FALSE;
1735 if (sm->TimeoutCtr > (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) {
1736 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
1737 * immediately following this. */
1741 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
1742 "sending 1/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
1744 * TODO: Could add PMKID even with WPA2-PSK, but only if there is only
1745 * one possible PSK for this STA.
1747 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 &&
1748 wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
1750 pmkid_len = 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + PMKID_LEN;
1751 pmkid[0] = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
1752 pmkid[1] = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + PMKID_LEN;
1753 RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(&pmkid[2], RSN_KEY_DATA_PMKID);
1755 os_memcpy(&pmkid[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN],
1756 sm->pmksa->pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
1759 * Calculate PMKID since no PMKSA cache entry was
1760 * available with pre-calculated PMKID.
1762 rsn_pmkid(sm->PMK, PMK_LEN, sm->wpa_auth->addr,
1763 sm->addr, &pmkid[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN],
1764 wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm->wpa_key_mgmt));
1767 wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm,
1768 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK | WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE, NULL,
1769 sm->ANonce, pmkid, pmkid_len, 0, 0);
1773 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *pmk,
1774 struct wpa_ptk *ptk)
1776 size_t ptk_len = sm->pairwise == WPA_CIPHER_CCMP ? 48 : 64;
1777 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1778 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
1779 return wpa_auth_derive_ptk_ft(sm, pmk, ptk, ptk_len);
1780 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1782 wpa_pmk_to_ptk(pmk, PMK_LEN, "Pairwise key expansion",
1783 sm->wpa_auth->addr, sm->addr, sm->ANonce, sm->SNonce,
1784 (u8 *) ptk, ptk_len,
1785 wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm->wpa_key_mgmt));
1791 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING)
1795 const u8 *pmk = NULL;
1797 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk);
1798 sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = FALSE;
1799 sm->update_snonce = FALSE;
1801 /* WPA with IEEE 802.1X: use the derived PMK from EAP
1802 * WPA-PSK: iterate through possible PSKs and select the one matching
1805 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
1806 pmk = wpa_auth_get_psk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, pmk);
1812 wpa_derive_ptk(sm, pmk, &PTK);
1814 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(&PTK, sm->last_rx_eapol_key,
1815 sm->last_rx_eapol_key_len) == 0) {
1820 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
1825 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
1826 "invalid MIC in msg 2/4 of 4-Way Handshake");
1830 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1831 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 && wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
1833 * Verify that PMKR1Name from EAPOL-Key message 2/4 matches
1834 * with the value we derived.
1836 if (os_memcmp(sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, sm->pmk_r1_name,
1837 WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN) != 0) {
1838 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
1839 "PMKR1Name mismatch in FT 4-way "
1841 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMKR1Name from "
1843 sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN);
1844 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Derived PMKR1Name",
1845 sm->pmk_r1_name, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN);
1849 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1851 sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
1852 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
1854 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
1855 /* PSK may have changed from the previous choice, so update
1856 * state machine data based on whatever PSK was selected here.
1858 os_memcpy(sm->PMK, pmk, PMK_LEN);
1861 sm->MICVerified = TRUE;
1863 os_memcpy(&sm->PTK, &PTK, sizeof(PTK));
1864 sm->PTK_valid = TRUE;
1868 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2)
1870 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2, wpa_ptk);
1875 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1877 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
1879 if (sm->mgmt_frame_prot) {
1880 return 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + sizeof(struct wpa_igtk_kde);
1887 static u8 * ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
1889 struct wpa_igtk_kde igtk;
1890 struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
1892 if (!sm->mgmt_frame_prot)
1895 igtk.keyid[0] = gsm->GN_igtk;
1897 if (gsm->wpa_group_state != WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE ||
1898 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN_igtk, igtk.pn) < 0)
1899 os_memset(igtk.pn, 0, sizeof(igtk.pn));
1900 os_memcpy(igtk.igtk, gsm->IGTK[gsm->GN_igtk - 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN);
1901 if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.disable_gtk) {
1903 * Provide unique random IGTK to each STA to prevent use of
1906 if (random_get_bytes(igtk.igtk, WPA_IGTK_LEN) < 0)
1909 pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_IGTK,
1910 (const u8 *) &igtk, sizeof(igtk), NULL, 0);
1915 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1917 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
1923 static u8 * ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
1928 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1931 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING)
1933 u8 rsc[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN], *_rsc, *gtk, *kde, *pos, dummy_gtk[32];
1934 size_t gtk_len, kde_len;
1935 struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
1937 int wpa_ie_len, secure, keyidx, encr = 0;
1939 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk);
1940 sm->TimeoutEvt = FALSE;
1943 if (sm->TimeoutCtr > (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) {
1944 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
1945 * immediately following this. */
1949 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE],
1950 GTK[GN], IGTK, [FTIE], [TIE * 2])
1952 os_memset(rsc, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
1953 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN, rsc);
1954 /* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */
1955 wpa_ie = sm->wpa_auth->wpa_ie;
1956 wpa_ie_len = sm->wpa_auth->wpa_ie_len;
1957 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA &&
1958 (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa & WPA_PROTO_RSN) &&
1959 wpa_ie_len > wpa_ie[1] + 2 && wpa_ie[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN) {
1960 /* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE */
1961 wpa_ie = wpa_ie + wpa_ie[1] + 2;
1962 wpa_ie_len = wpa_ie[1] + 2;
1964 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
1965 "sending 3/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
1966 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) {
1967 /* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */
1969 gtk = gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1];
1970 gtk_len = gsm->GTK_len;
1971 if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.disable_gtk) {
1973 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
1974 * of GTK in the BSS.
1976 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk, gtk_len) < 0)
1984 /* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */
1990 if (sm->rx_eapol_key_secure) {
1992 * It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use
1993 * Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael
1994 * MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake
1995 * if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this
1996 * by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of
1997 * WPA if the supplicant used it first.
1999 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
2000 "STA used Secure bit in WPA msg 2/4 - "
2001 "set Secure for 3/4 as workaround");
2006 kde_len = wpa_ie_len + ieee80211w_kde_len(sm);
2008 kde_len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + gtk_len;
2009 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2010 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
2011 kde_len += 2 + PMKID_LEN; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */
2012 kde_len += 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */
2014 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2015 kde = os_malloc(kde_len);
2020 os_memcpy(pos, wpa_ie, wpa_ie_len);
2022 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2023 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
2024 int res = wpa_insert_pmkid(kde, pos - kde, sm->pmk_r1_name);
2026 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "FT: Failed to insert "
2027 "PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
2033 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2036 hdr[0] = keyidx & 0x03;
2038 pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY, hdr, 2,
2041 pos = ieee80211w_kde_add(sm, pos);
2043 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2044 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
2046 struct wpa_auth_config *conf;
2048 conf = &sm->wpa_auth->conf;
2049 res = wpa_write_ftie(conf, conf->r0_key_holder,
2050 conf->r0_key_holder_len,
2051 NULL, NULL, pos, kde + kde_len - pos,
2054 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "FT: Failed to insert FTIE "
2055 "into EAPOL-Key Key Data");
2061 /* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */
2062 *pos++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL;
2064 *pos++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE;
2065 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos, conf->reassociation_deadline);
2068 /* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */
2069 *pos++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL;
2071 *pos++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME;
2072 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos, conf->r0_key_lifetime * 60);
2075 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2077 wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm,
2078 (secure ? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE : 0) | WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC |
2079 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK | WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL |
2080 WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE,
2081 _rsc, sm->ANonce, kde, pos - kde, keyidx, encr);
2086 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE)
2088 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE, wpa_ptk);
2089 sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = FALSE;
2093 if (sm->pairwise == WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) {
2100 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0, alg, sm->addr, 0,
2101 sm->PTK.tk1, klen)) {
2102 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr);
2105 /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
2106 sm->pairwise_set = TRUE;
2108 if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_ptk_rekey) {
2109 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
2110 eloop_register_timeout(sm->wpa_auth->conf.
2111 wpa_ptk_rekey, 0, wpa_rekey_ptk,
2115 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
2116 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
2117 WPA_EAPOL_authorized, 1);
2121 if (0 /* IBSS == TRUE */) {
2123 if (sm->keycount == 2) {
2124 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
2125 WPA_EAPOL_portValid, 1);
2128 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portValid,
2131 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable, 0);
2132 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_keyDone, 1);
2133 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA)
2134 sm->PInitAKeys = TRUE;
2137 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
2138 "pairwise key handshake completed (%s)",
2139 sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA ? "WPA" : "RSN");
2141 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2142 wpa_ft_push_pmk_r1(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr);
2143 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2149 struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = sm->wpa_auth;
2152 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE);
2153 else if (sm->Disconnect
2154 /* || FIX: dot11RSNAConfigSALifetime timeout */) {
2155 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
2156 "WPA_PTK: sm->Disconnect");
2157 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
2159 else if (sm->DeauthenticationRequest)
2160 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
2161 else if (sm->AuthenticationRequest)
2162 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION);
2163 else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest)
2164 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
2165 else if (sm->PTKRequest)
2166 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
2167 else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
2168 case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE:
2170 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT:
2171 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
2173 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECTED:
2174 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE);
2176 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION:
2177 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
2179 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION2:
2180 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
2181 wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
2182 WPA_EAPOL_keyRun) > 0)
2183 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITPMK);
2184 else if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)
2185 /* FIX: && 802.1X::keyRun */)
2186 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITPSK);
2188 case WPA_PTK_INITPMK:
2189 if (wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
2190 WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable) > 0)
2191 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
2193 wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
2194 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
2195 "INITPMK - keyAvailable = false");
2196 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
2199 case WPA_PTK_INITPSK:
2200 if (wpa_auth_get_psk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, NULL))
2201 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
2203 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
2204 "no PSK configured for the STA");
2205 wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
2206 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
2209 case WPA_PTK_PTKSTART:
2210 if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
2211 sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise)
2212 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING);
2213 else if (sm->TimeoutCtr >
2214 (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) {
2215 wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
2216 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
2217 "PTKSTART: Retry limit %d reached",
2218 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount);
2219 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
2220 } else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
2221 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
2223 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING:
2224 if (sm->MICVerified)
2225 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2);
2226 else if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
2227 sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise)
2228 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING);
2229 else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
2230 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
2232 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2:
2233 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING);
2235 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING:
2236 if (sm->update_snonce)
2237 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING);
2238 else if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
2239 sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified)
2240 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE);
2241 else if (sm->TimeoutCtr >
2242 (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) {
2243 wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
2244 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
2245 "PTKINITNEGOTIATING: Retry limit %d "
2247 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount);
2248 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
2249 } else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
2250 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING);
2252 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE:
2258 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE)
2260 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE, wpa_ptk_group);
2262 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
2263 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
2264 sm->changed = FALSE;
2266 sm->GTimeoutCtr = 0;
2270 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING)
2272 u8 rsc[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN];
2273 struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
2274 u8 *kde, *pos, hdr[2];
2276 u8 *gtk, dummy_gtk[32];
2278 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk_group);
2281 if (sm->GTimeoutCtr > (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount) {
2282 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2283 * immediately following this. */
2287 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA)
2288 sm->PInitAKeys = FALSE;
2289 sm->TimeoutEvt = FALSE;
2290 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */
2291 os_memset(rsc, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
2292 if (gsm->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE)
2293 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN, rsc);
2294 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
2295 "sending 1/2 msg of Group Key Handshake");
2297 gtk = gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1];
2298 if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.disable_gtk) {
2300 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2301 * of GTK in the BSS.
2303 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk, gsm->GTK_len) < 0)
2307 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) {
2308 kde_len = 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + gsm->GTK_len +
2309 ieee80211w_kde_len(sm);
2310 kde = os_malloc(kde_len);
2315 hdr[0] = gsm->GN & 0x03;
2317 pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY, hdr, 2,
2319 pos = ieee80211w_kde_add(sm, pos);
2322 pos = kde + gsm->GTK_len;
2325 wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm,
2326 WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE | WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC |
2328 (!sm->Pair ? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL : 0),
2329 rsc, gsm->GNonce, kde, pos - kde, gsm->GN, 1);
2330 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2)
2335 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED)
2337 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED, wpa_ptk_group);
2338 sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = FALSE;
2339 if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys)
2340 sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
2341 sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
2342 sm->GTimeoutCtr = 0;
2343 /* FIX: MLME.SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
2344 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
2345 "group key handshake completed (%s)",
2346 sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA ? "WPA" : "RSN");
2351 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR)
2353 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR, wpa_ptk_group);
2354 if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys)
2355 sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
2356 sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
2357 sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
2361 SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP)
2363 if (sm->Init || sm->PtkGroupInit) {
2364 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE);
2365 sm->PtkGroupInit = FALSE;
2366 } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_group_state) {
2367 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_IDLE:
2368 if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys ||
2369 (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA && sm->PInitAKeys))
2370 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING);
2372 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING:
2373 if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
2374 !sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified)
2375 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED);
2376 else if (sm->GTimeoutCtr >
2377 (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount)
2378 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR);
2379 else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
2380 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING);
2382 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_KEYERROR:
2383 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE);
2385 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYESTABLISHED:
2386 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE);
2392 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
2393 struct wpa_group *group)
2397 os_memcpy(group->GNonce, group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
2398 inc_byte_array(group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
2399 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group->GMK, "Group key expansion",
2400 wpa_auth->addr, group->GNonce,
2401 group->GTK[group->GN - 1], group->GTK_len) < 0)
2403 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GTK",
2404 group->GTK[group->GN - 1], group->GTK_len);
2406 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2407 if (wpa_auth->conf.ieee80211w != NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION) {
2408 os_memcpy(group->GNonce, group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
2409 inc_byte_array(group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
2410 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group->GMK, "IGTK key expansion",
2411 wpa_auth->addr, group->GNonce,
2412 group->IGTK[group->GN_igtk - 4],
2415 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "IGTK",
2416 group->IGTK[group->GN_igtk - 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN);
2418 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2424 static void wpa_group_gtk_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
2425 struct wpa_group *group)
2427 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2428 "GTK_INIT (VLAN-ID %d)", group->vlan_id);
2429 group->changed = FALSE; /* GInit is not cleared here; avoid loop */
2430 group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT;
2433 os_memset(group->GTK, 0, sizeof(group->GTK));
2436 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2439 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2440 /* GTK[GN] = CalcGTK() */
2441 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group);
2445 static int wpa_group_update_sta(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, void *ctx)
2447 if (sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE) {
2448 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
2449 "Not in PTKINITDONE; skip Group Key update");
2450 sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
2453 if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys) {
2455 * This should not really happen, so add a debug log entry.
2456 * Since we clear the GKeyDoneStations before the loop, the
2457 * station needs to be counted here anyway.
2459 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
2460 "GUpdateStationKeys was already set when "
2461 "marking station for GTK rekeying");
2464 sm->group->GKeyDoneStations++;
2465 sm->GUpdateStationKeys = TRUE;
2472 static void wpa_group_setkeys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
2473 struct wpa_group *group)
2477 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2478 "SETKEYS (VLAN-ID %d)", group->vlan_id);
2479 group->changed = TRUE;
2480 group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS;
2481 group->GTKReKey = FALSE;
2483 group->GM = group->GN;
2485 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2486 tmp = group->GM_igtk;
2487 group->GM_igtk = group->GN_igtk;
2488 group->GN_igtk = tmp;
2489 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2490 /* "GKeyDoneStations = GNoStations" is done in more robust way by
2491 * counting the STAs that are marked with GUpdateStationKeys instead of
2492 * including all STAs that could be in not-yet-completed state. */
2493 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group);
2495 if (group->GKeyDoneStations) {
2496 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "wpa_group_setkeys: Unexpected "
2497 "GKeyDoneStations=%d when starting new GTK rekey",
2498 group->GKeyDoneStations);
2499 group->GKeyDoneStations = 0;
2501 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth, wpa_group_update_sta, NULL);
2502 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "wpa_group_setkeys: GKeyDoneStations=%d",
2503 group->GKeyDoneStations);
2507 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
2508 struct wpa_group *group)
2512 if (wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth, group->vlan_id,
2513 wpa_alg_enum(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group),
2514 broadcast_ether_addr, group->GN,
2515 group->GTK[group->GN - 1], group->GTK_len) < 0)
2518 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2519 if (wpa_auth->conf.ieee80211w != NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION &&
2520 wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth, group->vlan_id, WPA_ALG_IGTK,
2521 broadcast_ether_addr, group->GN_igtk,
2522 group->IGTK[group->GN_igtk - 4],
2525 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2531 static int wpa_group_setkeysdone(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
2532 struct wpa_group *group)
2534 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2535 "SETKEYSDONE (VLAN-ID %d)", group->vlan_id);
2536 group->changed = TRUE;
2537 group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE;
2539 if (wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group) < 0)
2546 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
2547 struct wpa_group *group)
2550 wpa_group_gtk_init(wpa_auth, group);
2551 } else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT &&
2552 group->GTKAuthenticator) {
2553 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth, group);
2554 } else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE &&
2556 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth, group);
2557 } else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS) {
2558 if (group->GKeyDoneStations == 0)
2559 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth, group);
2560 else if (group->GTKReKey)
2561 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth, group);
2566 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
2571 if (sm->in_step_loop) {
2572 /* This should not happen, but if it does, make sure we do not
2573 * end up freeing the state machine too early by exiting the
2574 * recursive call. */
2575 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "WPA: wpa_sm_step() called recursively");
2579 sm->in_step_loop = 1;
2581 if (sm->pending_deinit)
2584 sm->changed = FALSE;
2585 sm->wpa_auth->group->changed = FALSE;
2587 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK);
2588 if (sm->pending_deinit)
2590 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK_GROUP);
2591 if (sm->pending_deinit)
2593 wpa_group_sm_step(sm->wpa_auth, sm->group);
2594 } while (sm->changed || sm->wpa_auth->group->changed);
2595 sm->in_step_loop = 0;
2597 if (sm->pending_deinit) {
2598 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Completing pending STA state "
2599 "machine deinit for " MACSTR, MAC2STR(sm->addr));
2600 wpa_free_sta_sm(sm);
2607 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
2609 struct wpa_state_machine *sm = eloop_ctx;
2614 void wpa_auth_sm_notify(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
2618 eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_sm_call_step, sm, NULL);
2622 void wpa_gtk_rekey(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
2625 struct wpa_group *group;
2627 if (wpa_auth == NULL)
2630 group = wpa_auth->group;
2632 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
2634 group->GM = group->GN;
2636 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2637 tmp = group->GM_igtk;
2638 group->GM_igtk = group->GN_igtk;
2639 group->GN_igtk = tmp;
2640 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2641 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group);
2642 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group);
2647 static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int bool)
2649 return bool ? "TRUE" : "FALSE";
2653 static int wpa_cipher_bits(int cipher)
2656 case WPA_CIPHER_CCMP:
2658 case WPA_CIPHER_TKIP:
2660 case WPA_CIPHER_WEP104:
2662 case WPA_CIPHER_WEP40:
2670 #define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d"
2671 #define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \
2672 ((s) >> 24) & 0xff, ((s) >> 16) & 0xff, ((s) >> 8) & 0xff, (s) & 0xff
2674 int wpa_get_mib(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, char *buf, size_t buflen)
2677 char pmkid_txt[PMKID_LEN * 2 + 1];
2678 #ifdef CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH
2679 const int preauth = 1;
2680 #else /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
2681 const int preauth = 0;
2682 #endif /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
2684 if (wpa_auth == NULL)
2687 ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len,
2688 "dot11RSNAOptionImplemented=TRUE\n"
2689 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationImplemented=%s\n"
2690 "dot11RSNAEnabled=%s\n"
2691 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationEnabled=%s\n",
2692 wpa_bool_txt(preauth),
2693 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth->conf.wpa & WPA_PROTO_RSN),
2694 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth->conf.rsn_preauth));
2695 if (ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= buflen - len)
2699 wpa_snprintf_hex(pmkid_txt, sizeof(pmkid_txt),
2700 wpa_auth->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed, PMKID_LEN);
2703 buf + len, buflen - len,
2704 "dot11RSNAConfigVersion=%u\n"
2705 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseKeysSupported=9999\n"
2706 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipher */
2707 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyMethod */
2708 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyTime */
2709 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyPackets */
2710 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyStrict=%u\n"
2711 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount=%u\n"
2712 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount=%u\n"
2713 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipherSize=%u\n"
2714 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime=%u\n"
2715 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold=%u\n"
2716 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfPTKSAReplayCounters=0\n"
2717 "dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout=%u\n"
2718 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
2719 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
2720 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
2721 "dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed=%s\n"
2722 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
2723 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
2724 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
2725 "dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked=%u\n"
2726 "dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures=%u\n"
2727 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfGTKSAReplayCounters=0\n",
2729 !!wpa_auth->conf.wpa_strict_rekey,
2730 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount,
2731 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount,
2732 wpa_cipher_bits(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group),
2733 dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime,
2734 dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold,
2735 dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout,
2736 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected),
2737 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected),
2738 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected),
2740 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested),
2741 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested),
2742 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested),
2743 wpa_auth->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked,
2744 wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures);
2745 if (ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= buflen - len)
2749 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseCiphersTable */
2750 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigAuthenticationSuitesTable */
2753 ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len, "hostapdWPAGroupState=%d\n",
2754 wpa_auth->group->wpa_group_state);
2755 if (ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= buflen - len)
2763 int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, char *buf, size_t buflen)
2771 /* TODO: FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF entry for broadcast/multicast stats */
2773 /* dot11RSNAStatsEntry */
2775 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA) {
2776 if (sm->pairwise == WPA_CIPHER_CCMP)
2777 pairwise = WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP;
2778 else if (sm->pairwise == WPA_CIPHER_TKIP)
2779 pairwise = WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP;
2780 else if (sm->pairwise == WPA_CIPHER_WEP104)
2781 pairwise = WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104;
2782 else if (sm->pairwise == WPA_CIPHER_WEP40)
2783 pairwise = WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40;
2784 else if (sm->pairwise == WPA_CIPHER_NONE)
2785 pairwise = WPA_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE;
2786 } else if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) {
2787 if (sm->pairwise == WPA_CIPHER_CCMP)
2788 pairwise = RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP;
2789 else if (sm->pairwise == WPA_CIPHER_TKIP)
2790 pairwise = RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP;
2791 else if (sm->pairwise == WPA_CIPHER_WEP104)
2792 pairwise = RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104;
2793 else if (sm->pairwise == WPA_CIPHER_WEP40)
2794 pairwise = RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40;
2795 else if (sm->pairwise == WPA_CIPHER_NONE)
2796 pairwise = RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_NONE;
2801 buf + len, buflen - len,
2802 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsIndex */
2803 "dot11RSNAStatsSTAAddress=" MACSTR "\n"
2804 "dot11RSNAStatsVersion=1\n"
2805 "dot11RSNAStatsSelectedPairwiseCipher=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
2806 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPICVErrors */
2807 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures=%u\n"
2808 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures=%u\n"
2809 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
2810 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors */
2811 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPReplays */,
2813 RSN_SUITE_ARG(pairwise),
2814 sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures,
2815 sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures);
2816 if (ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= buflen - len)
2821 ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len,
2822 "hostapdWPAPTKState=%d\n"
2823 "hostapdWPAPTKGroupState=%d\n",
2825 sm->wpa_ptk_group_state);
2826 if (ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= buflen - len)
2834 void wpa_auth_countermeasures_start(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
2837 wpa_auth->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked++;
2841 int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
2843 return sm && sm->pairwise_set;
2847 int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
2849 return sm->pairwise;
2853 int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
2857 return sm->wpa_key_mgmt;
2861 int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
2869 int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
2870 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
2872 if (sm == NULL || sm->pmksa != entry)
2879 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
2880 wpa_auth_sta_get_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
2882 return sm ? sm->pmksa : NULL;
2886 void wpa_auth_sta_local_mic_failure_report(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
2889 sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures++;
2893 const u8 * wpa_auth_get_wpa_ie(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, size_t *len)
2895 if (wpa_auth == NULL)
2897 *len = wpa_auth->wpa_ie_len;
2898 return wpa_auth->wpa_ie;
2902 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *pmk,
2903 int session_timeout, struct eapol_state_machine *eapol)
2905 if (sm == NULL || sm->wpa != WPA_VERSION_WPA2 ||
2906 sm->wpa_auth->conf.disable_pmksa_caching)
2909 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(sm->wpa_auth->pmksa, pmk, PMK_LEN,
2910 sm->wpa_auth->addr, sm->addr, session_timeout,
2911 eapol, sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
2918 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_preauth(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
2919 const u8 *pmk, size_t len, const u8 *sta_addr,
2920 int session_timeout,
2921 struct eapol_state_machine *eapol)
2923 if (wpa_auth == NULL)
2926 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth->pmksa, pmk, len, wpa_auth->addr,
2927 sta_addr, session_timeout, eapol,
2928 WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X))
2935 static struct wpa_group *
2936 wpa_auth_add_group(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, int vlan_id)
2938 struct wpa_group *group;
2940 if (wpa_auth == NULL || wpa_auth->group == NULL)
2943 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Add group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
2945 group = wpa_group_init(wpa_auth, vlan_id, 0);
2949 group->next = wpa_auth->group->next;
2950 wpa_auth->group->next = group;
2956 int wpa_auth_sta_set_vlan(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int vlan_id)
2958 struct wpa_group *group;
2960 if (sm == NULL || sm->wpa_auth == NULL)
2963 group = sm->wpa_auth->group;
2965 if (group->vlan_id == vlan_id)
2967 group = group->next;
2970 if (group == NULL) {
2971 group = wpa_auth_add_group(sm->wpa_auth, vlan_id);
2976 if (sm->group == group)
2979 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Moving STA " MACSTR " to use group state "
2980 "machine for VLAN ID %d", MAC2STR(sm->addr), vlan_id);
2987 void wpa_auth_eapol_key_tx_status(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
2988 struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int ack)
2990 if (wpa_auth == NULL || sm == NULL)
2992 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: EAPOL-Key TX status for STA " MACSTR
2993 " ack=%d", MAC2STR(sm->addr), ack);
2994 if (sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout && ack) {
2996 * Some deployed supplicant implementations update their SNonce
2997 * for each EAPOL-Key 2/4 message even within the same 4-way
2998 * handshake and then fail to use the first SNonce when
2999 * deriving the PTK. This results in unsuccessful 4-way
3000 * handshake whenever the relatively short initial timeout is
3001 * reached and EAPOL-Key 1/4 is retransmitted. Try to work
3002 * around this by increasing the timeout now that we know that
3003 * the station has received the frame.
3005 int timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_subseq;
3006 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Increase initial EAPOL-Key 1/4 "
3007 "timeout by %u ms because of acknowledged frame",
3009 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
3010 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms / 1000,
3011 (timeout_ms % 1000) * 1000,
3012 wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);