2 * IEEE 802.11 RSN / WPA Authenticator
3 * Copyright (c) 2004-2013, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
5 * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
6 * See README for more details.
9 #include "utils/includes.h"
11 #include "utils/common.h"
12 #include "utils/eloop.h"
13 #include "utils/state_machine.h"
14 #include "utils/bitfield.h"
15 #include "common/ieee802_11_defs.h"
16 #include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
17 #include "crypto/crypto.h"
18 #include "crypto/sha1.h"
19 #include "crypto/sha256.h"
20 #include "crypto/random.h"
21 #include "eapol_auth/eapol_auth_sm.h"
22 #include "ap_config.h"
23 #include "ieee802_11.h"
25 #include "pmksa_cache_auth.h"
26 #include "wpa_auth_i.h"
27 #include "wpa_auth_ie.h"
29 #define STATE_MACHINE_DATA struct wpa_state_machine
30 #define STATE_MACHINE_DEBUG_PREFIX "WPA"
31 #define STATE_MACHINE_ADDR sm->addr
34 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx);
35 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
36 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(struct wpa_ptk *PTK, u8 *data, size_t data_len);
37 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx);
38 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
39 struct wpa_group *group);
40 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
41 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
42 struct wpa_group *group);
43 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
44 struct wpa_group *group);
46 static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount = 4;
47 static const u32 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount = 4;
48 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first = 100; /* ms */
49 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_subseq = 1000; /* ms */
50 static const u32 eapol_key_timeout_first_group = 500; /* ms */
52 /* TODO: make these configurable */
53 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime = 43200;
54 static const int dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold = 70;
55 static const int dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout = 60;
58 static inline int wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(
59 struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr)
61 if (wpa_auth->cb.mic_failure_report)
62 return wpa_auth->cb.mic_failure_report(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr);
67 static inline void wpa_auth_set_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
68 const u8 *addr, wpa_eapol_variable var,
71 if (wpa_auth->cb.set_eapol)
72 wpa_auth->cb.set_eapol(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, var, value);
76 static inline int wpa_auth_get_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
77 const u8 *addr, wpa_eapol_variable var)
79 if (wpa_auth->cb.get_eapol == NULL)
81 return wpa_auth->cb.get_eapol(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, var);
85 static inline const u8 * wpa_auth_get_psk(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
87 const u8 *p2p_dev_addr,
90 if (wpa_auth->cb.get_psk == NULL)
92 return wpa_auth->cb.get_psk(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, p2p_dev_addr,
97 static inline int wpa_auth_get_msk(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
98 const u8 *addr, u8 *msk, size_t *len)
100 if (wpa_auth->cb.get_msk == NULL)
102 return wpa_auth->cb.get_msk(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, msk, len);
106 static inline int wpa_auth_set_key(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
108 enum wpa_alg alg, const u8 *addr, int idx,
109 u8 *key, size_t key_len)
111 if (wpa_auth->cb.set_key == NULL)
113 return wpa_auth->cb.set_key(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, vlan_id, alg, addr, idx,
118 static inline int wpa_auth_get_seqnum(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
119 const u8 *addr, int idx, u8 *seq)
121 if (wpa_auth->cb.get_seqnum == NULL)
123 return wpa_auth->cb.get_seqnum(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, idx, seq);
128 wpa_auth_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
129 const u8 *data, size_t data_len, int encrypt)
131 if (wpa_auth->cb.send_eapol == NULL)
133 return wpa_auth->cb.send_eapol(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, data, data_len,
138 int wpa_auth_for_each_sta(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
139 int (*cb)(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, void *ctx),
142 if (wpa_auth->cb.for_each_sta == NULL)
144 return wpa_auth->cb.for_each_sta(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, cb, cb_ctx);
148 int wpa_auth_for_each_auth(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
149 int (*cb)(struct wpa_authenticator *a, void *ctx),
152 if (wpa_auth->cb.for_each_auth == NULL)
154 return wpa_auth->cb.for_each_auth(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, cb, cb_ctx);
158 void wpa_auth_logger(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
159 logger_level level, const char *txt)
161 if (wpa_auth->cb.logger == NULL)
163 wpa_auth->cb.logger(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr, level, txt);
167 void wpa_auth_vlogger(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
168 logger_level level, const char *fmt, ...)
174 if (wpa_auth->cb.logger == NULL)
177 maxlen = os_strlen(fmt) + 100;
178 format = os_malloc(maxlen);
183 vsnprintf(format, maxlen, fmt, ap);
186 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, addr, level, format);
192 static void wpa_sta_disconnect(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
195 if (wpa_auth->cb.disconnect == NULL)
197 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "wpa_sta_disconnect STA " MACSTR, MAC2STR(addr));
198 wpa_auth->cb.disconnect(wpa_auth->cb.ctx, addr,
199 WLAN_REASON_PREV_AUTH_NOT_VALID);
203 static int wpa_use_aes_cmac(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
206 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
207 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
209 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
210 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
211 if (wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
213 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
214 if (sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN)
220 static void wpa_rekey_gmk(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
222 struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx;
224 if (random_get_bytes(wpa_auth->group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN)) {
225 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
228 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, NULL, LOGGER_DEBUG, "GMK rekeyd");
229 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GMK",
230 wpa_auth->group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN);
233 if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey) {
234 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey, 0,
235 wpa_rekey_gmk, wpa_auth, NULL);
240 static void wpa_rekey_gtk(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
242 struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx;
243 struct wpa_group *group;
245 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, NULL, LOGGER_DEBUG, "rekeying GTK");
246 for (group = wpa_auth->group; group; group = group->next) {
247 group->GTKReKey = TRUE;
249 group->changed = FALSE;
250 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
251 } while (group->changed);
254 if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey) {
255 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey,
256 0, wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
261 static void wpa_rekey_ptk(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
263 struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx;
264 struct wpa_state_machine *sm = timeout_ctx;
266 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, "rekeying PTK");
267 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm);
272 static int wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, void *ctx)
274 if (sm->pmksa == ctx)
280 static void wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb(struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry,
283 struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = ctx;
284 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth, wpa_auth_pmksa_clear_cb, entry);
288 static int wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
289 struct wpa_group *group)
291 u8 buf[ETH_ALEN + 8 + sizeof(unsigned long)];
295 if (random_get_bytes(group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN) < 0)
297 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GMK", group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN);
300 * Counter = PRF-256(Random number, "Init Counter",
301 * Local MAC Address || Time)
303 os_memcpy(buf, wpa_auth->addr, ETH_ALEN);
304 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(buf + ETH_ALEN);
305 ptr = (unsigned long) group;
306 os_memcpy(buf + ETH_ALEN + 8, &ptr, sizeof(ptr));
307 if (random_get_bytes(rkey, sizeof(rkey)) < 0)
310 if (sha1_prf(rkey, sizeof(rkey), "Init Counter", buf, sizeof(buf),
311 group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN) < 0)
313 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Key Counter",
314 group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
320 static struct wpa_group * wpa_group_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
321 int vlan_id, int delay_init)
323 struct wpa_group *group;
325 group = os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_group));
329 group->GTKAuthenticator = TRUE;
330 group->vlan_id = vlan_id;
331 group->GTK_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group);
333 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
334 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
335 "for secure operations - update keys later when "
336 "the first station connects");
340 * Set initial GMK/Counter value here. The actual values that will be
341 * used in negotiations will be set once the first station tries to
342 * connect. This allows more time for collecting additional randomness
343 * on embedded devices.
345 if (wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth, group) < 0) {
346 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Failed to get random data for WPA "
354 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Delay group state machine start "
355 "until Beacon frames have been configured");
356 /* Initialization is completed in wpa_init_keys(). */
358 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
359 group->GInit = FALSE;
360 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
368 * wpa_init - Initialize WPA authenticator
369 * @addr: Authenticator address
370 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
371 * @cb: Callback functions for WPA authenticator
372 * Returns: Pointer to WPA authenticator data or %NULL on failure
374 struct wpa_authenticator * wpa_init(const u8 *addr,
375 struct wpa_auth_config *conf,
376 struct wpa_auth_callbacks *cb)
378 struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth;
380 wpa_auth = os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_authenticator));
381 if (wpa_auth == NULL)
383 os_memcpy(wpa_auth->addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
384 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth->conf, conf, sizeof(*conf));
385 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth->cb, cb, sizeof(*cb));
387 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth)) {
388 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
393 wpa_auth->group = wpa_group_init(wpa_auth, 0, 1);
394 if (wpa_auth->group == NULL) {
395 os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie);
400 wpa_auth->pmksa = pmksa_cache_auth_init(wpa_auth_pmksa_free_cb,
402 if (wpa_auth->pmksa == NULL) {
403 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "PMKSA cache initialization failed.");
404 os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie);
409 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
410 wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache = wpa_ft_pmk_cache_init();
411 if (wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache == NULL) {
412 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "FT PMK cache initialization failed.");
413 os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie);
414 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth->pmksa);
418 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
420 if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey) {
421 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey, 0,
422 wpa_rekey_gmk, wpa_auth, NULL);
425 if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey) {
426 eloop_register_timeout(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group_rekey, 0,
427 wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
431 if (WPA_GET_BE32(conf->ip_addr_start)) {
432 int count = WPA_GET_BE32(conf->ip_addr_end) -
433 WPA_GET_BE32(conf->ip_addr_start) + 1;
437 wpa_auth->ip_pool = bitfield_alloc(count);
439 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
445 int wpa_init_keys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
447 struct wpa_group *group = wpa_auth->group;
449 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Start group state machine to set initial "
451 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
452 group->GInit = FALSE;
453 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
454 if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE)
461 * wpa_deinit - Deinitialize WPA authenticator
462 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
464 void wpa_deinit(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
466 struct wpa_group *group, *prev;
468 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gmk, wpa_auth, NULL);
469 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
471 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
472 while (wpa_auth->stsl_negotiations)
473 wpa_stsl_remove(wpa_auth, wpa_auth->stsl_negotiations);
474 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
476 pmksa_cache_auth_deinit(wpa_auth->pmksa);
478 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
479 wpa_ft_pmk_cache_deinit(wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache);
480 wpa_auth->ft_pmk_cache = NULL;
481 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
484 bitfield_free(wpa_auth->ip_pool);
485 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
488 os_free(wpa_auth->wpa_ie);
490 group = wpa_auth->group;
502 * wpa_reconfig - Update WPA authenticator configuration
503 * @wpa_auth: Pointer to WPA authenticator data from wpa_init()
504 * @conf: Configuration for WPA authenticator
506 int wpa_reconfig(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
507 struct wpa_auth_config *conf)
509 struct wpa_group *group;
510 if (wpa_auth == NULL)
513 os_memcpy(&wpa_auth->conf, conf, sizeof(*conf));
514 if (wpa_auth_gen_wpa_ie(wpa_auth)) {
515 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Could not generate WPA IE.");
520 * Reinitialize GTK to make sure it is suitable for the new
523 group = wpa_auth->group;
524 group->GTK_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group);
526 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
527 group->GInit = FALSE;
528 wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
534 struct wpa_state_machine *
535 wpa_auth_sta_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, const u8 *addr,
536 const u8 *p2p_dev_addr)
538 struct wpa_state_machine *sm;
540 if (wpa_auth->group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE)
543 sm = os_zalloc(sizeof(struct wpa_state_machine));
546 os_memcpy(sm->addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
548 os_memcpy(sm->p2p_dev_addr, p2p_dev_addr, ETH_ALEN);
550 sm->wpa_auth = wpa_auth;
551 sm->group = wpa_auth->group;
557 int wpa_auth_sta_associated(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
558 struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
560 if (wpa_auth == NULL || !wpa_auth->conf.wpa || sm == NULL)
563 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
564 if (sm->ft_completed) {
565 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
566 "FT authentication already completed - do not "
567 "start 4-way handshake");
570 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
573 os_memset(&sm->key_replay, 0, sizeof(sm->key_replay));
574 sm->ReAuthenticationRequest = TRUE;
575 return wpa_sm_step(sm);
578 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
579 "start authentication");
583 if (wpa_sm_step(sm) == 1)
584 return 1; /* should not really happen */
586 sm->AuthenticationRequest = TRUE;
587 return wpa_sm_step(sm);
591 void wpa_auth_sta_no_wpa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
593 /* WPA/RSN was not used - clear WPA state. This is needed if the STA
594 * reassociates back to the same AP while the previous entry for the
595 * STA has not yet been removed. */
599 sm->wpa_key_mgmt = 0;
603 static void wpa_free_sta_sm(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
606 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm->ip_addr)) {
608 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "P2P: Free assigned IP "
609 "address %u.%u.%u.%u from " MACSTR,
610 sm->ip_addr[0], sm->ip_addr[1],
611 sm->ip_addr[2], sm->ip_addr[3],
613 start = WPA_GET_BE32(sm->wpa_auth->conf.ip_addr_start);
614 bitfield_clear(sm->wpa_auth->ip_pool,
615 WPA_GET_BE32(sm->ip_addr) - start);
617 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
618 if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys) {
619 sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
620 sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
622 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
623 os_free(sm->assoc_resp_ftie);
624 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
625 os_free(sm->last_rx_eapol_key);
631 void wpa_auth_sta_deinit(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
636 if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_strict_rekey && sm->has_GTK) {
637 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
638 "strict rekeying - force GTK rekey since STA "
640 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk, sm->wpa_auth, NULL);
641 eloop_register_timeout(0, 500000, wpa_rekey_gtk, sm->wpa_auth,
645 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
646 sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
647 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_call_step, sm, NULL);
648 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
649 if (sm->in_step_loop) {
650 /* Must not free state machine while wpa_sm_step() is running.
651 * Freeing will be completed in the end of wpa_sm_step(). */
652 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Registering pending STA state "
653 "machine deinit for " MACSTR, MAC2STR(sm->addr));
654 sm->pending_deinit = 1;
660 static void wpa_request_new_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
665 sm->PTKRequest = TRUE;
670 static int wpa_replay_counter_valid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter *ctr,
671 const u8 *replay_counter)
674 for (i = 0; i < RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES; i++) {
677 if (os_memcmp(replay_counter, ctr[i].counter,
678 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) == 0)
685 static void wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(struct wpa_key_replay_counter *ctr,
686 const u8 *replay_counter)
689 for (i = 0; i < RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES; i++) {
691 (replay_counter == NULL ||
692 os_memcmp(replay_counter, ctr[i].counter,
693 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) == 0))
694 ctr[i].valid = FALSE;
699 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
700 static int ft_check_msg_2_of_4(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
701 struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
702 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *kde)
704 struct wpa_ie_data ie;
705 struct rsn_mdie *mdie;
707 if (wpa_parse_wpa_ie_rsn(kde->rsn_ie, kde->rsn_ie_len, &ie) < 0 ||
708 ie.num_pmkid != 1 || ie.pmkid == NULL) {
709 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: No PMKR1Name in "
710 "FT 4-way handshake message 2/4");
714 os_memcpy(sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, ie.pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
715 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMKR1Name from Supplicant",
716 sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, PMKID_LEN);
718 if (!kde->mdie || !kde->ftie) {
719 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: No %s in FT 4-way handshake "
720 "message 2/4", kde->mdie ? "FTIE" : "MDIE");
724 mdie = (struct rsn_mdie *) (kde->mdie + 2);
725 if (kde->mdie[1] < sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) ||
726 os_memcmp(wpa_auth->conf.mobility_domain, mdie->mobility_domain,
727 MOBILITY_DOMAIN_ID_LEN) != 0) {
728 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: MDIE mismatch");
732 if (sm->assoc_resp_ftie &&
733 (kde->ftie[1] != sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1] ||
734 os_memcmp(kde->ftie, sm->assoc_resp_ftie,
735 2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1]) != 0)) {
736 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTIE mismatch");
737 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTIE in EAPOL-Key msg 2/4",
738 kde->ftie, kde->ftie_len);
739 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: FTIE in (Re)AssocResp",
740 sm->assoc_resp_ftie, 2 + sm->assoc_resp_ftie[1]);
746 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
749 static int wpa_receive_error_report(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
750 struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int group)
752 /* Supplicant reported a Michael MIC error */
753 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
754 "received EAPOL-Key Error Request "
755 "(STA detected Michael MIC failure (group=%d))",
758 if (group && wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group != WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) {
759 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
760 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
761 "group cipher is not TKIP");
762 } else if (!group && sm->pairwise != WPA_CIPHER_TKIP) {
763 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
764 "ignore Michael MIC failure report since "
765 "pairwise cipher is not TKIP");
767 if (wpa_auth_mic_failure_report(wpa_auth, sm->addr) > 0)
768 return 1; /* STA entry was removed */
769 sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures++;
770 wpa_auth->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures++;
774 * Error report is not a request for a new key handshake, but since
775 * Authenticator may do it, let's change the keys now anyway.
777 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm);
782 void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
783 struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
784 u8 *data, size_t data_len)
786 struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
787 struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
788 u16 key_info, key_data_length;
789 enum { PAIRWISE_2, PAIRWISE_4, GROUP_2, REQUEST,
790 SMK_M1, SMK_M3, SMK_ERROR } msg;
792 struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse kde;
794 const u8 *eapol_key_ie;
795 size_t eapol_key_ie_len;
797 if (wpa_auth == NULL || !wpa_auth->conf.wpa || sm == NULL)
800 if (data_len < sizeof(*hdr) + sizeof(*key))
803 hdr = (struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) data;
804 key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
805 key_info = WPA_GET_BE16(key->key_info);
806 key_data_length = WPA_GET_BE16(key->key_data_length);
807 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Received EAPOL-Key from " MACSTR
808 " key_info=0x%x type=%u key_data_length=%u",
809 MAC2STR(sm->addr), key_info, key->type, key_data_length);
810 if (key_data_length > data_len - sizeof(*hdr) - sizeof(*key)) {
811 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPA: Invalid EAPOL-Key frame - "
812 "key_data overflow (%d > %lu)",
814 (unsigned long) (data_len - sizeof(*hdr) -
819 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) {
820 if (key->type == EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA) {
822 * Some deployed station implementations seem to send
823 * msg 4/4 with incorrect type value in WPA2 mode.
825 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Workaround: Allow EAPOL-Key "
826 "with unexpected WPA type in RSN mode");
827 } else if (key->type != EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN) {
828 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
829 "unexpected type %d in RSN mode",
834 if (key->type != EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA) {
835 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Ignore EAPOL-Key with "
836 "unexpected type %d in WPA mode",
842 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Received Key Nonce", key->key_nonce,
844 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Received Replay Counter",
845 key->replay_counter, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
847 /* FIX: verify that the EAPOL-Key frame was encrypted if pairwise keys
850 if ((key_info & (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE | WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST)) ==
851 (WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE | WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST)) {
852 if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR) {
854 msgtxt = "SMK Error";
859 } else if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE) {
862 } else if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) {
865 } else if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE)) {
867 msgtxt = "2/2 Group";
868 } else if (key_data_length == 0) {
870 msgtxt = "4/4 Pairwise";
873 msgtxt = "2/4 Pairwise";
876 /* TODO: key_info type validation for PeerKey */
877 if (msg == REQUEST || msg == PAIRWISE_2 || msg == PAIRWISE_4 ||
879 u16 ver = key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK;
880 if (sm->pairwise == WPA_CIPHER_CCMP ||
881 sm->pairwise == WPA_CIPHER_GCMP) {
882 if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm) &&
883 sm->wpa_key_mgmt != WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN &&
884 ver != WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) {
885 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
887 "advertised support for "
888 "AES-128-CMAC, but did not "
893 if (!wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm) &&
894 ver != WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES) {
895 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr,
897 "did not use HMAC-SHA1-AES "
904 if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) {
905 if (sm->req_replay_counter_used &&
906 os_memcmp(key->replay_counter, sm->req_replay_counter,
907 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN) <= 0) {
908 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_WARNING,
909 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
915 if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) &&
916 !wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm->key_replay, key->replay_counter)) {
919 if (msg == PAIRWISE_2 &&
920 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm->prev_key_replay,
921 key->replay_counter) &&
922 sm->wpa_ptk_state == WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING &&
923 os_memcmp(sm->SNonce, key->key_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0)
926 * Some supplicant implementations (e.g., Windows XP
927 * WZC) update SNonce for each EAPOL-Key 2/4. This
928 * breaks the workaround on accepting any of the
929 * pending requests, so allow the SNonce to be updated
930 * even if we have already sent out EAPOL-Key 3/4.
932 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
933 "Process SNonce update from STA "
934 "based on retransmitted EAPOL-Key "
936 sm->update_snonce = 1;
937 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm->prev_key_replay,
938 key->replay_counter);
939 goto continue_processing;
942 if (msg == PAIRWISE_2 &&
943 wpa_replay_counter_valid(sm->prev_key_replay,
944 key->replay_counter) &&
945 sm->wpa_ptk_state == WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING) {
946 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
947 "ignore retransmitted EAPOL-Key %s - "
948 "SNonce did not change", msgtxt);
950 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
951 "received EAPOL-Key %s with "
952 "unexpected replay counter", msgtxt);
954 for (i = 0; i < RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES; i++) {
955 if (!sm->key_replay[i].valid)
957 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "pending replay counter",
958 sm->key_replay[i].counter,
959 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
961 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "received replay counter",
962 key->replay_counter, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
969 if (sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKSTART &&
970 sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING &&
971 (!sm->update_snonce ||
972 sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING)) {
973 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
974 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 in "
975 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
979 random_add_randomness(key->key_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
980 if (sm->group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy) {
982 * The system did not have enough entropy to generate
983 * strong random numbers. Reject the first 4-way
984 * handshake(s) and collect some entropy based on the
985 * information from it. Once enough entropy is
986 * available, the next atempt will trigger GMK/Key
987 * Counter update and the station will be allowed to
990 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Reject 4-way handshake to "
991 "collect more entropy for random number "
993 random_mark_pool_ready();
994 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr);
997 if (wpa_parse_kde_ies((u8 *) (key + 1), key_data_length,
999 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1000 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 with "
1001 "invalid Key Data contents");
1005 eapol_key_ie = kde.rsn_ie;
1006 eapol_key_ie_len = kde.rsn_ie_len;
1007 } else if (kde.osen) {
1008 eapol_key_ie = kde.osen;
1009 eapol_key_ie_len = kde.osen_len;
1011 eapol_key_ie = kde.wpa_ie;
1012 eapol_key_ie_len = kde.wpa_ie_len;
1014 ft = sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 &&
1015 wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt);
1016 if (sm->wpa_ie == NULL ||
1017 wpa_compare_rsn_ie(ft,
1018 sm->wpa_ie, sm->wpa_ie_len,
1019 eapol_key_ie, eapol_key_ie_len)) {
1020 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1021 "WPA IE from (Re)AssocReq did not "
1022 "match with msg 2/4");
1024 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA IE in AssocReq",
1025 sm->wpa_ie, sm->wpa_ie_len);
1027 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA IE in msg 2/4",
1028 eapol_key_ie, eapol_key_ie_len);
1029 /* MLME-DEAUTHENTICATE.request */
1030 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr);
1033 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1034 if (ft && ft_check_msg_2_of_4(wpa_auth, sm, &kde) < 0) {
1035 wpa_sta_disconnect(wpa_auth, sm->addr);
1038 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1040 if (kde.ip_addr_req && kde.ip_addr_req[0] &&
1041 wpa_auth->ip_pool && WPA_GET_BE32(sm->ip_addr) == 0) {
1043 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "P2P: IP address requested in "
1044 "EAPOL-Key exchange");
1045 idx = bitfield_get_first_zero(wpa_auth->ip_pool);
1047 u32 start = WPA_GET_BE32(wpa_auth->conf.
1049 bitfield_set(wpa_auth->ip_pool, idx);
1050 WPA_PUT_BE32(sm->ip_addr, start + idx);
1051 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "P2P: Assigned IP "
1052 "address %u.%u.%u.%u to " MACSTR,
1053 sm->ip_addr[0], sm->ip_addr[1],
1054 sm->ip_addr[2], sm->ip_addr[3],
1058 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
1061 if (sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING ||
1063 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1064 "received EAPOL-Key msg 4/4 in "
1065 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1071 if (sm->wpa_ptk_group_state != WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING
1072 || !sm->PTK_valid) {
1073 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1074 "received EAPOL-Key msg 2/2 in "
1075 "invalid state (%d) - dropped",
1076 sm->wpa_ptk_group_state);
1080 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1084 if (!wpa_auth->conf.peerkey) {
1085 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "RSN: SMK M1/M3/Error, but "
1086 "PeerKey use disabled - ignoring message");
1089 if (!sm->PTK_valid) {
1090 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1091 "received EAPOL-Key msg SMK in "
1092 "invalid state - dropped");
1096 #else /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1100 return; /* STSL disabled - ignore SMK messages */
1101 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1106 wpa_auth_vlogger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
1107 "received EAPOL-Key frame (%s)", msgtxt);
1109 if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK) {
1110 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1111 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key Ack set");
1115 if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) {
1116 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1117 "received invalid EAPOL-Key: Key MIC not set");
1121 sm->MICVerified = FALSE;
1122 if (sm->PTK_valid && !sm->update_snonce) {
1123 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(&sm->PTK, data, data_len)) {
1124 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1125 "received EAPOL-Key with invalid MIC");
1128 sm->MICVerified = TRUE;
1129 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
1130 sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
1133 if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST) {
1134 if (sm->MICVerified) {
1135 sm->req_replay_counter_used = 1;
1136 os_memcpy(sm->req_replay_counter, key->replay_counter,
1137 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
1139 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1140 "received EAPOL-Key request with "
1146 * TODO: should decrypt key data field if encryption was used;
1147 * even though MAC address KDE is not normally encrypted,
1148 * supplicant is allowed to encrypt it.
1150 if (msg == SMK_ERROR) {
1151 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1152 wpa_smk_error(wpa_auth, sm, key);
1153 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1155 } else if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ERROR) {
1156 if (wpa_receive_error_report(
1158 !(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE)) > 0)
1159 return; /* STA entry was removed */
1160 } else if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE) {
1161 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1162 "received EAPOL-Key Request for new "
1164 wpa_request_new_ptk(sm);
1165 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1166 } else if (msg == SMK_M1) {
1167 wpa_smk_m1(wpa_auth, sm, key);
1168 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1169 } else if (key_data_length > 0 &&
1170 wpa_parse_kde_ies((const u8 *) (key + 1),
1171 key_data_length, &kde) == 0 &&
1174 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1175 "received EAPOL-Key Request for GTK "
1177 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_gtk, wpa_auth, NULL);
1178 wpa_rekey_gtk(wpa_auth, NULL);
1181 /* Do not allow the same key replay counter to be reused. */
1182 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm->key_replay,
1183 key->replay_counter);
1185 if (msg == PAIRWISE_2) {
1187 * Maintain a copy of the pending EAPOL-Key frames in
1188 * case the EAPOL-Key frame was retransmitted. This is
1189 * needed to allow EAPOL-Key msg 2/4 reply to another
1190 * pending msg 1/4 to update the SNonce to work around
1191 * unexpected supplicant behavior.
1193 os_memcpy(sm->prev_key_replay, sm->key_replay,
1194 sizeof(sm->key_replay));
1196 os_memset(sm->prev_key_replay, 0,
1197 sizeof(sm->prev_key_replay));
1201 * Make sure old valid counters are not accepted anymore and
1202 * do not get copied again.
1204 wpa_replay_counter_mark_invalid(sm->key_replay, NULL);
1207 #ifdef CONFIG_PEERKEY
1208 if (msg == SMK_M3) {
1209 wpa_smk_m3(wpa_auth, sm, key);
1212 #endif /* CONFIG_PEERKEY */
1214 os_free(sm->last_rx_eapol_key);
1215 sm->last_rx_eapol_key = os_malloc(data_len);
1216 if (sm->last_rx_eapol_key == NULL)
1218 os_memcpy(sm->last_rx_eapol_key, data, data_len);
1219 sm->last_rx_eapol_key_len = data_len;
1221 sm->rx_eapol_key_secure = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE);
1222 sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = TRUE;
1223 sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE);
1224 sm->EAPOLKeyRequest = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_REQUEST);
1225 os_memcpy(sm->SNonce, key->key_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
1230 static int wpa_gmk_to_gtk(const u8 *gmk, const char *label, const u8 *addr,
1231 const u8 *gnonce, u8 *gtk, size_t gtk_len)
1233 u8 data[ETH_ALEN + WPA_NONCE_LEN + 8 + 16];
1237 /* GTK = PRF-X(GMK, "Group key expansion",
1238 * AA || GNonce || Time || random data)
1239 * The example described in the IEEE 802.11 standard uses only AA and
1240 * GNonce as inputs here. Add some more entropy since this derivation
1241 * is done only at the Authenticator and as such, does not need to be
1244 os_memcpy(data, addr, ETH_ALEN);
1245 os_memcpy(data + ETH_ALEN, gnonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
1246 pos = data + ETH_ALEN + WPA_NONCE_LEN;
1247 wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(pos);
1249 if (random_get_bytes(pos, 16) < 0)
1252 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1253 sha256_prf(gmk, WPA_GMK_LEN, label, data, sizeof(data), gtk, gtk_len);
1254 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1255 if (sha1_prf(gmk, WPA_GMK_LEN, label, data, sizeof(data), gtk, gtk_len)
1258 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1264 static void wpa_send_eapol_timeout(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
1266 struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = eloop_ctx;
1267 struct wpa_state_machine *sm = timeout_ctx;
1269 sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
1270 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG, "EAPOL-Key timeout");
1271 sm->TimeoutEvt = TRUE;
1276 void __wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
1277 struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int key_info,
1278 const u8 *key_rsc, const u8 *nonce,
1279 const u8 *kde, size_t kde_len,
1280 int keyidx, int encr, int force_version)
1282 struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
1283 struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
1286 int key_data_len, pad_len = 0;
1288 int version, pairwise;
1291 len = sizeof(struct ieee802_1x_hdr) + sizeof(struct wpa_eapol_key);
1294 version = force_version;
1295 else if (sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN)
1296 version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AKM_DEFINED;
1297 else if (wpa_use_aes_cmac(sm))
1298 version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC;
1299 else if (sm->pairwise != WPA_CIPHER_TKIP)
1300 version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES;
1302 version = WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_MD5_RC4;
1304 pairwise = !!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE);
1306 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Send EAPOL(version=%d secure=%d mic=%d "
1307 "ack=%d install=%d pairwise=%d kde_len=%lu keyidx=%d "
1310 (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE) ? 1 : 0,
1311 (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC) ? 1 : 0,
1312 (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK) ? 1 : 0,
1313 (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL) ? 1 : 0,
1314 pairwise, (unsigned long) kde_len, keyidx, encr);
1316 key_data_len = kde_len;
1318 if ((version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES ||
1319 sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN ||
1320 version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) && encr) {
1321 pad_len = key_data_len % 8;
1323 pad_len = 8 - pad_len;
1324 key_data_len += pad_len + 8;
1327 len += key_data_len;
1329 hdr = os_zalloc(len);
1332 hdr->version = wpa_auth->conf.eapol_version;
1333 hdr->type = IEEE802_1X_TYPE_EAPOL_KEY;
1334 hdr->length = host_to_be16(len - sizeof(*hdr));
1335 key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
1337 key->type = sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 ?
1338 EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_RSN : EAPOL_KEY_TYPE_WPA;
1339 key_info |= version;
1340 if (encr && sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2)
1341 key_info |= WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA;
1342 if (sm->wpa != WPA_VERSION_WPA2)
1343 key_info |= keyidx << WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_INDEX_SHIFT;
1344 WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_info, key_info);
1346 alg = pairwise ? sm->pairwise : wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group;
1347 WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_length, wpa_cipher_key_len(alg));
1348 if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_SMK_MESSAGE)
1349 WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_length, 0);
1351 /* FIX: STSL: what to use as key_replay_counter? */
1352 for (i = RSNA_MAX_EAPOL_RETRIES - 1; i > 0; i--) {
1353 sm->key_replay[i].valid = sm->key_replay[i - 1].valid;
1354 os_memcpy(sm->key_replay[i].counter,
1355 sm->key_replay[i - 1].counter,
1356 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
1358 inc_byte_array(sm->key_replay[0].counter, WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
1359 os_memcpy(key->replay_counter, sm->key_replay[0].counter,
1360 WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN);
1361 sm->key_replay[0].valid = TRUE;
1364 os_memcpy(key->key_nonce, nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
1367 os_memcpy(key->key_rsc, key_rsc, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
1370 os_memcpy(key + 1, kde, kde_len);
1371 WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_data_length, kde_len);
1372 } else if (encr && kde) {
1373 buf = os_zalloc(key_data_len);
1379 os_memcpy(pos, kde, kde_len);
1385 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Plaintext EAPOL-Key Key Data",
1387 if (version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_HMAC_SHA1_AES ||
1388 sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN ||
1389 version == WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_AES_128_CMAC) {
1390 if (aes_wrap(sm->PTK.kek, (key_data_len - 8) / 8, buf,
1391 (u8 *) (key + 1))) {
1396 WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_data_length, key_data_len);
1399 os_memcpy(key->key_iv,
1400 sm->group->Counter + WPA_NONCE_LEN - 16, 16);
1401 inc_byte_array(sm->group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
1402 os_memcpy(ek, key->key_iv, 16);
1403 os_memcpy(ek + 16, sm->PTK.kek, 16);
1404 os_memcpy(key + 1, buf, key_data_len);
1405 rc4_skip(ek, 32, 256, (u8 *) (key + 1), key_data_len);
1406 WPA_PUT_BE16(key->key_data_length, key_data_len);
1411 if (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC) {
1412 if (!sm->PTK_valid) {
1413 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
1414 "PTK not valid when sending EAPOL-Key "
1419 wpa_eapol_key_mic(sm->PTK.kck, version, (u8 *) hdr, len,
1421 #ifdef CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS
1423 wpa_auth->conf.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability > 0.0d &&
1425 wpa_auth->conf.corrupt_gtk_rekey_mic_probability) {
1426 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
1427 "Corrupting group EAPOL-Key Key MIC");
1430 #endif /* CONFIG_TESTING_OPTIONS */
1433 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_inc_EapolFramesTx,
1435 wpa_auth_send_eapol(wpa_auth, sm->addr, (u8 *) hdr, len,
1441 static void wpa_send_eapol(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
1442 struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int key_info,
1443 const u8 *key_rsc, const u8 *nonce,
1444 const u8 *kde, size_t kde_len,
1445 int keyidx, int encr)
1448 int pairwise = key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE;
1454 __wpa_send_eapol(wpa_auth, sm, key_info, key_rsc, nonce, kde, kde_len,
1457 ctr = pairwise ? sm->TimeoutCtr : sm->GTimeoutCtr;
1458 if (ctr == 1 && wpa_auth->conf.tx_status)
1459 timeout_ms = pairwise ? eapol_key_timeout_first :
1460 eapol_key_timeout_first_group;
1462 timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_subseq;
1463 if (pairwise && ctr == 1 && !(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC))
1464 sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 1;
1465 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Use EAPOL-Key timeout of %u ms (retry "
1466 "counter %d)", timeout_ms, ctr);
1467 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms / 1000, (timeout_ms % 1000) * 1000,
1468 wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
1472 static int wpa_verify_key_mic(struct wpa_ptk *PTK, u8 *data, size_t data_len)
1474 struct ieee802_1x_hdr *hdr;
1475 struct wpa_eapol_key *key;
1480 if (data_len < sizeof(*hdr) + sizeof(*key))
1483 hdr = (struct ieee802_1x_hdr *) data;
1484 key = (struct wpa_eapol_key *) (hdr + 1);
1485 key_info = WPA_GET_BE16(key->key_info);
1486 os_memcpy(mic, key->key_mic, 16);
1487 os_memset(key->key_mic, 0, 16);
1488 if (wpa_eapol_key_mic(PTK->kck, key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_TYPE_MASK,
1489 data, data_len, key->key_mic) ||
1490 os_memcmp(mic, key->key_mic, 16) != 0)
1492 os_memcpy(key->key_mic, mic, 16);
1497 void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
1499 sm->PTK_valid = FALSE;
1500 os_memset(&sm->PTK, 0, sizeof(sm->PTK));
1501 wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0, WPA_ALG_NONE, sm->addr, 0, NULL, 0);
1502 sm->pairwise_set = FALSE;
1503 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
1507 int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, wpa_event event)
1514 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
1515 "event %d notification", event);
1523 sm->DeauthenticationRequest = TRUE;
1526 case WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL:
1529 * When using WPS, we may end up here if the STA
1530 * manages to re-associate without the previous STA
1531 * entry getting removed. Consequently, we need to make
1532 * sure that the WPA state machines gets initialized
1533 * properly at this point.
1535 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA state machine had not been "
1536 "started - initialize now");
1539 if (wpa_sm_step(sm) == 1)
1540 return 1; /* should not really happen */
1542 sm->AuthenticationRequest = TRUE;
1545 if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys) {
1547 * Reauthentication cancels the pending group key
1548 * update for this STA.
1550 sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
1551 sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
1552 sm->PtkGroupInit = TRUE;
1554 sm->ReAuthenticationRequest = TRUE;
1557 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1558 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Retry PTK configuration "
1559 "after association");
1560 wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm);
1562 /* Using FT protocol, not WPA auth state machine */
1563 sm->ft_completed = 1;
1565 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1567 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1570 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1571 sm->ft_completed = 0;
1572 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1574 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1575 if (sm->mgmt_frame_prot && event == WPA_AUTH)
1577 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1580 sm->PTK_valid = FALSE;
1581 os_memset(&sm->PTK, 0, sizeof(sm->PTK));
1583 if (event != WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL)
1587 return wpa_sm_step(sm);
1591 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE)
1593 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE, wpa_ptk);
1595 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
1596 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
1597 sm->changed = FALSE;
1601 if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys)
1602 sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
1603 sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
1604 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA)
1605 sm->PInitAKeys = FALSE;
1606 if (1 /* Unicast cipher supported AND (ESS OR ((IBSS or WDS) and
1607 * Local AA > Remote AA)) */) {
1610 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled, 0);
1612 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portValid, 0);
1614 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
1615 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
1616 WPA_EAPOL_authorized, 0);
1621 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT)
1623 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT, wpa_ptk);
1624 sm->Disconnect = FALSE;
1625 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr);
1629 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED)
1631 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED, wpa_ptk);
1632 sm->DeauthenticationRequest = FALSE;
1636 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION)
1638 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION, wpa_ptk);
1639 os_memset(&sm->PTK, 0, sizeof(sm->PTK));
1640 sm->PTK_valid = FALSE;
1641 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portControl_Auto,
1643 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portEnabled, 1);
1644 sm->AuthenticationRequest = FALSE;
1648 static void wpa_group_ensure_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
1649 struct wpa_group *group)
1651 if (group->first_sta_seen)
1654 * System has run bit further than at the time hostapd was started
1655 * potentially very early during boot up. This provides better chances
1656 * of collecting more randomness on embedded systems. Re-initialize the
1657 * GMK and Counter here to improve their strength if there was not
1658 * enough entropy available immediately after system startup.
1660 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Re-initialize GMK/Counter on first "
1662 if (random_pool_ready() != 1) {
1663 wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPA: Not enough entropy in random pool "
1664 "to proceed - reject first 4-way handshake");
1665 group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy = TRUE;
1667 group->first_sta_seen = TRUE;
1668 group->reject_4way_hs_for_entropy = FALSE;
1671 wpa_group_init_gmk_and_counter(wpa_auth, group);
1672 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group);
1673 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group);
1677 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2)
1679 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2, wpa_ptk);
1681 wpa_group_ensure_init(sm->wpa_auth, sm->group);
1682 sm->ReAuthenticationRequest = FALSE;
1685 * Definition of ANonce selection in IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 is somewhat
1686 * ambiguous. The Authenticator state machine uses a counter that is
1687 * incremented by one for each 4-way handshake. However, the security
1688 * analysis of 4-way handshake points out that unpredictable nonces
1689 * help in preventing precomputation attacks. Instead of the state
1690 * machine definition, use an unpredictable nonce value here to provide
1691 * stronger protection against potential precomputation attacks.
1693 if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
1694 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "WPA: Failed to get random data for "
1696 sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
1699 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign ANonce", sm->ANonce,
1701 /* IEEE 802.11i does not clear TimeoutCtr here, but this is more
1702 * logical place than INITIALIZE since AUTHENTICATION2 can be
1703 * re-entered on ReAuthenticationRequest without going through
1709 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK)
1711 u8 msk[2 * PMK_LEN];
1712 size_t len = 2 * PMK_LEN;
1714 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, INITPMK, wpa_ptk);
1715 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1717 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1719 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PMK from PMKSA cache");
1720 os_memcpy(sm->PMK, sm->pmksa->pmk, PMK_LEN);
1721 } else if (wpa_auth_get_msk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, msk, &len) == 0) {
1722 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: PMK from EAPOL state machine "
1723 "(len=%lu)", (unsigned long) len);
1724 os_memcpy(sm->PMK, msk, PMK_LEN);
1725 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1726 if (len >= 2 * PMK_LEN) {
1727 os_memcpy(sm->xxkey, msk + PMK_LEN, PMK_LEN);
1728 sm->xxkey_len = PMK_LEN;
1730 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1732 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Could not get PMK");
1735 sm->req_replay_counter_used = 0;
1736 /* IEEE 802.11i does not set keyRun to FALSE, but not doing this
1737 * will break reauthentication since EAPOL state machines may not be
1738 * get into AUTHENTICATING state that clears keyRun before WPA state
1739 * machine enters AUTHENTICATION2 state and goes immediately to INITPMK
1740 * state and takes PMK from the previously used AAA Key. This will
1741 * eventually fail in 4-Way Handshake because Supplicant uses PMK
1742 * derived from the new AAA Key. Setting keyRun = FALSE here seems to
1743 * be good workaround for this issue. */
1744 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_keyRun, 0);
1748 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPSK)
1751 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, INITPSK, wpa_ptk);
1752 psk = wpa_auth_get_psk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, sm->p2p_dev_addr, NULL);
1754 os_memcpy(sm->PMK, psk, PMK_LEN);
1755 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1756 os_memcpy(sm->xxkey, psk, PMK_LEN);
1757 sm->xxkey_len = PMK_LEN;
1758 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1760 sm->req_replay_counter_used = 0;
1764 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART)
1766 u8 buf[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + PMKID_LEN], *pmkid = NULL;
1767 size_t pmkid_len = 0;
1769 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART, wpa_ptk);
1770 sm->PTKRequest = FALSE;
1771 sm->TimeoutEvt = FALSE;
1774 if (sm->TimeoutCtr > (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) {
1775 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
1776 * immediately following this. */
1780 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
1781 "sending 1/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
1783 * TODO: Could add PMKID even with WPA2-PSK, but only if there is only
1784 * one possible PSK for this STA.
1786 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 &&
1787 wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
1788 sm->wpa_key_mgmt != WPA_KEY_MGMT_OSEN) {
1790 pmkid_len = 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + PMKID_LEN;
1791 pmkid[0] = WLAN_EID_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
1792 pmkid[1] = RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + PMKID_LEN;
1793 RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(&pmkid[2], RSN_KEY_DATA_PMKID);
1795 os_memcpy(&pmkid[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN],
1796 sm->pmksa->pmkid, PMKID_LEN);
1799 * Calculate PMKID since no PMKSA cache entry was
1800 * available with pre-calculated PMKID.
1802 rsn_pmkid(sm->PMK, PMK_LEN, sm->wpa_auth->addr,
1803 sm->addr, &pmkid[2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN],
1804 wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm->wpa_key_mgmt));
1807 wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm,
1808 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK | WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE, NULL,
1809 sm->ANonce, pmkid, pmkid_len, 0, 0);
1813 static int wpa_derive_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *pmk,
1814 struct wpa_ptk *ptk)
1816 size_t ptk_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise) + 32;
1817 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1818 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
1819 return wpa_auth_derive_ptk_ft(sm, pmk, ptk, ptk_len);
1820 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1822 wpa_pmk_to_ptk(pmk, PMK_LEN, "Pairwise key expansion",
1823 sm->wpa_auth->addr, sm->addr, sm->ANonce, sm->SNonce,
1824 (u8 *) ptk, ptk_len,
1825 wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(sm->wpa_key_mgmt));
1831 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING)
1835 const u8 *pmk = NULL;
1837 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk);
1838 sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = FALSE;
1839 sm->update_snonce = FALSE;
1841 /* WPA with IEEE 802.1X: use the derived PMK from EAP
1842 * WPA-PSK: iterate through possible PSKs and select the one matching
1845 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
1846 pmk = wpa_auth_get_psk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
1847 sm->p2p_dev_addr, pmk);
1853 wpa_derive_ptk(sm, pmk, &PTK);
1855 if (wpa_verify_key_mic(&PTK, sm->last_rx_eapol_key,
1856 sm->last_rx_eapol_key_len) == 0) {
1861 if (!wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
1866 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
1867 "invalid MIC in msg 2/4 of 4-Way Handshake");
1871 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
1872 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 && wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
1874 * Verify that PMKR1Name from EAPOL-Key message 2/4 matches
1875 * with the value we derived.
1877 if (os_memcmp(sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, sm->pmk_r1_name,
1878 WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN) != 0) {
1879 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
1880 "PMKR1Name mismatch in FT 4-way "
1882 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: PMKR1Name from "
1884 sm->sup_pmk_r1_name, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN);
1885 wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Derived PMKR1Name",
1886 sm->pmk_r1_name, WPA_PMK_NAME_LEN);
1890 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
1892 sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout = 0;
1893 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
1895 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
1896 /* PSK may have changed from the previous choice, so update
1897 * state machine data based on whatever PSK was selected here.
1899 os_memcpy(sm->PMK, pmk, PMK_LEN);
1902 sm->MICVerified = TRUE;
1904 os_memcpy(&sm->PTK, &PTK, sizeof(PTK));
1905 sm->PTK_valid = TRUE;
1909 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2)
1911 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2, wpa_ptk);
1916 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
1918 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
1920 if (sm->mgmt_frame_prot) {
1922 len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->wpa_auth->conf.group_mgmt_cipher);
1923 return 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len;
1930 static u8 * ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
1932 struct wpa_igtk_kde igtk;
1933 struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
1934 u8 rsc[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN];
1935 size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->wpa_auth->conf.group_mgmt_cipher);
1937 if (!sm->mgmt_frame_prot)
1940 igtk.keyid[0] = gsm->GN_igtk;
1942 if (gsm->wpa_group_state != WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE ||
1943 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN_igtk, rsc) < 0)
1944 os_memset(igtk.pn, 0, sizeof(igtk.pn));
1946 os_memcpy(igtk.pn, rsc, sizeof(igtk.pn));
1947 os_memcpy(igtk.igtk, gsm->IGTK[gsm->GN_igtk - 4], len);
1948 if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.disable_gtk) {
1950 * Provide unique random IGTK to each STA to prevent use of
1953 if (random_get_bytes(igtk.igtk, len) < 0)
1956 pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_IGTK,
1957 (const u8 *) &igtk, WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len,
1963 #else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1965 static int ieee80211w_kde_len(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
1971 static u8 * ieee80211w_kde_add(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
1976 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
1979 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING)
1981 u8 rsc[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN], *_rsc, *gtk, *kde, *pos, dummy_gtk[32];
1982 size_t gtk_len, kde_len;
1983 struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
1985 int wpa_ie_len, secure, keyidx, encr = 0;
1987 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk);
1988 sm->TimeoutEvt = FALSE;
1991 if (sm->TimeoutCtr > (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) {
1992 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
1993 * immediately following this. */
1997 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, Pair, P, RSC, ANonce, MIC(PTK), RSNIE, [MDIE],
1998 GTK[GN], IGTK, [FTIE], [TIE * 2])
2000 os_memset(rsc, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
2001 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN, rsc);
2002 /* If FT is used, wpa_auth->wpa_ie includes both RSNIE and MDIE */
2003 wpa_ie = sm->wpa_auth->wpa_ie;
2004 wpa_ie_len = sm->wpa_auth->wpa_ie_len;
2005 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA &&
2006 (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa & WPA_PROTO_RSN) &&
2007 wpa_ie_len > wpa_ie[1] + 2 && wpa_ie[0] == WLAN_EID_RSN) {
2008 /* WPA-only STA, remove RSN IE */
2009 wpa_ie = wpa_ie + wpa_ie[1] + 2;
2010 wpa_ie_len = wpa_ie[1] + 2;
2012 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
2013 "sending 3/4 msg of 4-Way Handshake");
2014 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) {
2015 /* WPA2 send GTK in the 4-way handshake */
2017 gtk = gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1];
2018 gtk_len = gsm->GTK_len;
2019 if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.disable_gtk) {
2021 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2022 * of GTK in the BSS.
2024 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk, gtk_len) < 0)
2032 /* WPA does not include GTK in msg 3/4 */
2038 if (sm->rx_eapol_key_secure) {
2040 * It looks like Windows 7 supplicant tries to use
2041 * Secure bit in msg 2/4 after having reported Michael
2042 * MIC failure and it then rejects the 4-way handshake
2043 * if msg 3/4 does not set Secure bit. Work around this
2044 * by setting the Secure bit here even in the case of
2045 * WPA if the supplicant used it first.
2047 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
2048 "STA used Secure bit in WPA msg 2/4 - "
2049 "set Secure for 3/4 as workaround");
2054 kde_len = wpa_ie_len + ieee80211w_kde_len(sm);
2056 kde_len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + gtk_len;
2057 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2058 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
2059 kde_len += 2 + PMKID_LEN; /* PMKR1Name into RSN IE */
2060 kde_len += 300; /* FTIE + 2 * TIE */
2062 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2064 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm->ip_addr) > 0)
2065 kde_len += 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 3 * 4;
2066 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2067 kde = os_malloc(kde_len);
2072 os_memcpy(pos, wpa_ie, wpa_ie_len);
2074 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2075 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
2076 int res = wpa_insert_pmkid(kde, pos - kde, sm->pmk_r1_name);
2078 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "FT: Failed to insert "
2079 "PMKR1Name into RSN IE in EAPOL-Key data");
2085 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2088 hdr[0] = keyidx & 0x03;
2090 pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY, hdr, 2,
2093 pos = ieee80211w_kde_add(sm, pos);
2095 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2096 if (wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
2098 struct wpa_auth_config *conf;
2100 conf = &sm->wpa_auth->conf;
2101 res = wpa_write_ftie(conf, conf->r0_key_holder,
2102 conf->r0_key_holder_len,
2103 NULL, NULL, pos, kde + kde_len - pos,
2106 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "FT: Failed to insert FTIE "
2107 "into EAPOL-Key Key Data");
2113 /* TIE[ReassociationDeadline] (TU) */
2114 *pos++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL;
2116 *pos++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_REASSOC_DEADLINE;
2117 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos, conf->reassociation_deadline);
2120 /* TIE[KeyLifetime] (seconds) */
2121 *pos++ = WLAN_EID_TIMEOUT_INTERVAL;
2123 *pos++ = WLAN_TIMEOUT_KEY_LIFETIME;
2124 WPA_PUT_LE32(pos, conf->r0_key_lifetime * 60);
2127 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2129 if (WPA_GET_BE32(sm->ip_addr) > 0) {
2131 os_memcpy(addr, sm->ip_addr, 4);
2132 os_memcpy(addr + 4, sm->wpa_auth->conf.ip_addr_mask, 4);
2133 os_memcpy(addr + 8, sm->wpa_auth->conf.ip_addr_go, 4);
2134 pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, WFA_KEY_DATA_IP_ADDR_ALLOC,
2135 addr, sizeof(addr), NULL, 0);
2137 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */
2139 wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm,
2140 (secure ? WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE : 0) | WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC |
2141 WPA_KEY_INFO_ACK | WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL |
2142 WPA_KEY_INFO_KEY_TYPE,
2143 _rsc, sm->ANonce, kde, pos - kde, keyidx, encr);
2148 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE)
2150 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE, wpa_ptk);
2151 sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = FALSE;
2153 enum wpa_alg alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->pairwise);
2154 int klen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->pairwise);
2155 if (wpa_auth_set_key(sm->wpa_auth, 0, alg, sm->addr, 0,
2156 sm->PTK.tk1, klen)) {
2157 wpa_sta_disconnect(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr);
2160 /* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
2161 sm->pairwise_set = TRUE;
2163 if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.wpa_ptk_rekey) {
2164 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_rekey_ptk, sm->wpa_auth, sm);
2165 eloop_register_timeout(sm->wpa_auth->conf.
2166 wpa_ptk_rekey, 0, wpa_rekey_ptk,
2170 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)) {
2171 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
2172 WPA_EAPOL_authorized, 1);
2176 if (0 /* IBSS == TRUE */) {
2178 if (sm->keycount == 2) {
2179 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
2180 WPA_EAPOL_portValid, 1);
2183 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_portValid,
2186 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable, 0);
2187 wpa_auth_set_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, WPA_EAPOL_keyDone, 1);
2188 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA)
2189 sm->PInitAKeys = TRUE;
2192 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
2193 "pairwise key handshake completed (%s)",
2194 sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA ? "WPA" : "RSN");
2196 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
2197 wpa_ft_push_pmk_r1(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr);
2198 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
2204 struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth = sm->wpa_auth;
2207 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE);
2208 else if (sm->Disconnect
2209 /* || FIX: dot11RSNAConfigSALifetime timeout */) {
2210 wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
2211 "WPA_PTK: sm->Disconnect");
2212 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
2214 else if (sm->DeauthenticationRequest)
2215 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
2216 else if (sm->AuthenticationRequest)
2217 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION);
2218 else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest)
2219 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
2220 else if (sm->PTKRequest)
2221 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
2222 else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
2223 case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE:
2225 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT:
2226 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
2228 case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECTED:
2229 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITIALIZE);
2231 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION:
2232 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
2234 case WPA_PTK_AUTHENTICATION2:
2235 if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_ieee8021x(sm->wpa_key_mgmt) &&
2236 wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
2237 WPA_EAPOL_keyRun) > 0)
2238 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITPMK);
2239 else if (wpa_key_mgmt_wpa_psk(sm->wpa_key_mgmt)
2240 /* FIX: && 802.1X::keyRun */)
2241 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, INITPSK);
2243 case WPA_PTK_INITPMK:
2244 if (wpa_auth_get_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr,
2245 WPA_EAPOL_keyAvailable) > 0)
2246 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
2248 wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
2249 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
2250 "INITPMK - keyAvailable = false");
2251 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
2254 case WPA_PTK_INITPSK:
2255 if (wpa_auth_get_psk(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, sm->p2p_dev_addr,
2257 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
2259 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
2260 "no PSK configured for the STA");
2261 wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
2262 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
2265 case WPA_PTK_PTKSTART:
2266 if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
2267 sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise)
2268 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING);
2269 else if (sm->TimeoutCtr >
2270 (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) {
2271 wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
2272 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
2273 "PTKSTART: Retry limit %d reached",
2274 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount);
2275 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
2276 } else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
2277 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
2279 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING:
2280 if (sm->MICVerified)
2281 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2);
2282 else if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
2283 sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise)
2284 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING);
2285 else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
2286 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
2288 case WPA_PTK_PTKCALCNEGOTIATING2:
2289 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING);
2291 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITNEGOTIATING:
2292 if (sm->update_snonce)
2293 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKCALCNEGOTIATING);
2294 else if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
2295 sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified)
2296 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITDONE);
2297 else if (sm->TimeoutCtr >
2298 (int) dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount) {
2299 wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures++;
2300 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
2301 "PTKINITNEGOTIATING: Retry limit %d "
2303 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount);
2304 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECT);
2305 } else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
2306 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKINITNEGOTIATING);
2308 case WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE:
2314 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE)
2316 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE, wpa_ptk_group);
2318 /* Init flag is not cleared here, so avoid busy
2319 * loop by claiming nothing changed. */
2320 sm->changed = FALSE;
2322 sm->GTimeoutCtr = 0;
2326 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING)
2328 u8 rsc[WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN];
2329 struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
2330 u8 *kde, *pos, hdr[2];
2332 u8 *gtk, dummy_gtk[32];
2334 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING, wpa_ptk_group);
2337 if (sm->GTimeoutCtr > (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount) {
2338 /* No point in sending the EAPOL-Key - we will disconnect
2339 * immediately following this. */
2343 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA)
2344 sm->PInitAKeys = FALSE;
2345 sm->TimeoutEvt = FALSE;
2346 /* Send EAPOL(1, 1, 1, !Pair, G, RSC, GNonce, MIC(PTK), GTK[GN]) */
2347 os_memset(rsc, 0, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
2348 if (gsm->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE)
2349 wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN, rsc);
2350 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
2351 "sending 1/2 msg of Group Key Handshake");
2353 gtk = gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1];
2354 if (sm->wpa_auth->conf.disable_gtk) {
2356 * Provide unique random GTK to each STA to prevent use
2357 * of GTK in the BSS.
2359 if (random_get_bytes(dummy_gtk, gsm->GTK_len) < 0)
2363 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2) {
2364 kde_len = 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 + gsm->GTK_len +
2365 ieee80211w_kde_len(sm);
2366 kde = os_malloc(kde_len);
2371 hdr[0] = gsm->GN & 0x03;
2373 pos = wpa_add_kde(pos, RSN_KEY_DATA_GROUPKEY, hdr, 2,
2375 pos = ieee80211w_kde_add(sm, pos);
2378 pos = kde + gsm->GTK_len;
2381 wpa_send_eapol(sm->wpa_auth, sm,
2382 WPA_KEY_INFO_SECURE | WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC |
2384 (!sm->Pair ? WPA_KEY_INFO_INSTALL : 0),
2385 rsc, gsm->GNonce, kde, pos - kde, gsm->GN, 1);
2386 if (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2)
2391 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED)
2393 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED, wpa_ptk_group);
2394 sm->EAPOLKeyReceived = FALSE;
2395 if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys)
2396 sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
2397 sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
2398 sm->GTimeoutCtr = 0;
2399 /* FIX: MLME.SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
2400 wpa_auth_vlogger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_INFO,
2401 "group key handshake completed (%s)",
2402 sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA ? "WPA" : "RSN");
2407 SM_STATE(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR)
2409 SM_ENTRY_MA(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR, wpa_ptk_group);
2410 if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys)
2411 sm->group->GKeyDoneStations--;
2412 sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
2413 sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
2417 SM_STEP(WPA_PTK_GROUP)
2419 if (sm->Init || sm->PtkGroupInit) {
2420 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE);
2421 sm->PtkGroupInit = FALSE;
2422 } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_group_state) {
2423 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_IDLE:
2424 if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys ||
2425 (sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA && sm->PInitAKeys))
2426 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING);
2428 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYNEGOTIATING:
2429 if (sm->EAPOLKeyReceived && !sm->EAPOLKeyRequest &&
2430 !sm->EAPOLKeyPairwise && sm->MICVerified)
2431 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYESTABLISHED);
2432 else if (sm->GTimeoutCtr >
2433 (int) dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount)
2434 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, KEYERROR);
2435 else if (sm->TimeoutEvt)
2436 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, REKEYNEGOTIATING);
2438 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_KEYERROR:
2439 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE);
2441 case WPA_PTK_GROUP_REKEYESTABLISHED:
2442 SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK_GROUP, IDLE);
2448 static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
2449 struct wpa_group *group)
2453 os_memcpy(group->GNonce, group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
2454 inc_byte_array(group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
2455 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group->GMK, "Group key expansion",
2456 wpa_auth->addr, group->GNonce,
2457 group->GTK[group->GN - 1], group->GTK_len) < 0)
2459 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GTK",
2460 group->GTK[group->GN - 1], group->GTK_len);
2462 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2463 if (wpa_auth->conf.ieee80211w != NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION) {
2465 len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.group_mgmt_cipher);
2466 os_memcpy(group->GNonce, group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
2467 inc_byte_array(group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
2468 if (wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group->GMK, "IGTK key expansion",
2469 wpa_auth->addr, group->GNonce,
2470 group->IGTK[group->GN_igtk - 4], len) < 0)
2472 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "IGTK",
2473 group->IGTK[group->GN_igtk - 4], len);
2475 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2481 static void wpa_group_gtk_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
2482 struct wpa_group *group)
2484 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2485 "GTK_INIT (VLAN-ID %d)", group->vlan_id);
2486 group->changed = FALSE; /* GInit is not cleared here; avoid loop */
2487 group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT;
2490 os_memset(group->GTK, 0, sizeof(group->GTK));
2493 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2496 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2497 /* GTK[GN] = CalcGTK() */
2498 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group);
2502 static int wpa_group_update_sta(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, void *ctx)
2504 if (ctx != NULL && ctx != sm->group)
2507 if (sm->wpa_ptk_state != WPA_PTK_PTKINITDONE) {
2508 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
2509 "Not in PTKINITDONE; skip Group Key update");
2510 sm->GUpdateStationKeys = FALSE;
2513 if (sm->GUpdateStationKeys) {
2515 * This should not really happen, so add a debug log entry.
2516 * Since we clear the GKeyDoneStations before the loop, the
2517 * station needs to be counted here anyway.
2519 wpa_auth_logger(sm->wpa_auth, sm->addr, LOGGER_DEBUG,
2520 "GUpdateStationKeys was already set when "
2521 "marking station for GTK rekeying");
2524 /* Do not rekey GTK/IGTK when STA is in WNM-Sleep Mode */
2525 if (sm->is_wnmsleep)
2528 sm->group->GKeyDoneStations++;
2529 sm->GUpdateStationKeys = TRUE;
2537 /* update GTK when exiting WNM-Sleep Mode */
2538 void wpa_wnmsleep_rekey_gtk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
2540 if (sm == NULL || sm->is_wnmsleep)
2543 wpa_group_update_sta(sm, NULL);
2547 void wpa_set_wnmsleep(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int flag)
2550 sm->is_wnmsleep = !!flag;
2554 int wpa_wnmsleep_gtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
2556 struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
2561 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | Key Info[2] | Key Length[1] | RSC[8] |
2564 *pos++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_GTK;
2565 *pos++ = 11 + gsm->GTK_len;
2566 /* Key ID in B0-B1 of Key Info */
2567 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, gsm->GN & 0x03);
2569 *pos++ = gsm->GTK_len;
2570 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN, pos) != 0)
2573 os_memcpy(pos, gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1], gsm->GTK_len);
2574 pos += gsm->GTK_len;
2576 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: GTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
2578 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: GTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
2579 gsm->GTK[gsm->GN - 1], gsm->GTK_len);
2585 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2586 int wpa_wnmsleep_igtk_subelem(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *pos)
2588 struct wpa_group *gsm = sm->group;
2590 size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->wpa_auth->conf.group_mgmt_cipher);
2594 * Sub-elem ID[1] | Length[1] | KeyID[2] | PN[6] | Key[16]
2596 *pos++ = WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK;
2597 *pos++ = 2 + 6 + len;
2598 WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, gsm->GN_igtk);
2600 if (wpa_auth_get_seqnum(sm->wpa_auth, NULL, gsm->GN_igtk, pos) != 0)
2604 os_memcpy(pos, gsm->IGTK[gsm->GN_igtk - 4], len);
2607 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: IGTK Key ID %u in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
2609 wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: IGTK in WNM-Sleep Mode exit",
2610 gsm->IGTK[gsm->GN_igtk - 4], len);
2614 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2615 #endif /* CONFIG_WNM */
2618 static void wpa_group_setkeys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
2619 struct wpa_group *group)
2623 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2624 "SETKEYS (VLAN-ID %d)", group->vlan_id);
2625 group->changed = TRUE;
2626 group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS;
2627 group->GTKReKey = FALSE;
2629 group->GM = group->GN;
2631 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2632 tmp = group->GM_igtk;
2633 group->GM_igtk = group->GN_igtk;
2634 group->GN_igtk = tmp;
2635 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2636 /* "GKeyDoneStations = GNoStations" is done in more robust way by
2637 * counting the STAs that are marked with GUpdateStationKeys instead of
2638 * including all STAs that could be in not-yet-completed state. */
2639 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group);
2641 if (group->GKeyDoneStations) {
2642 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "wpa_group_setkeys: Unexpected "
2643 "GKeyDoneStations=%d when starting new GTK rekey",
2644 group->GKeyDoneStations);
2645 group->GKeyDoneStations = 0;
2647 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth, wpa_group_update_sta, group);
2648 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "wpa_group_setkeys: GKeyDoneStations=%d",
2649 group->GKeyDoneStations);
2653 static int wpa_group_config_group_keys(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
2654 struct wpa_group *group)
2658 if (wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth, group->vlan_id,
2659 wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group),
2660 broadcast_ether_addr, group->GN,
2661 group->GTK[group->GN - 1], group->GTK_len) < 0)
2664 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2665 if (wpa_auth->conf.ieee80211w != NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION) {
2669 alg = wpa_cipher_to_alg(wpa_auth->conf.group_mgmt_cipher);
2670 len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.group_mgmt_cipher);
2673 wpa_auth_set_key(wpa_auth, group->vlan_id, alg,
2674 broadcast_ether_addr, group->GN_igtk,
2675 group->IGTK[group->GN_igtk - 4], len) < 0)
2678 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2684 static int wpa_group_disconnect_cb(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, void *ctx)
2686 if (sm->group == ctx) {
2687 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Mark STA " MACSTR
2688 " for discconnection due to fatal failure",
2690 sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
2697 static void wpa_group_fatal_failure(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
2698 struct wpa_group *group)
2700 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: group state machine entering state FATAL_FAILURE");
2701 group->changed = TRUE;
2702 group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE;
2703 wpa_auth_for_each_sta(wpa_auth, wpa_group_disconnect_cb, group);
2707 static int wpa_group_setkeysdone(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
2708 struct wpa_group *group)
2710 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: group state machine entering state "
2711 "SETKEYSDONE (VLAN-ID %d)", group->vlan_id);
2712 group->changed = TRUE;
2713 group->wpa_group_state = WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE;
2715 if (wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group) < 0) {
2716 wpa_group_fatal_failure(wpa_auth, group);
2724 static void wpa_group_sm_step(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
2725 struct wpa_group *group)
2728 wpa_group_gtk_init(wpa_auth, group);
2729 } else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE) {
2730 /* Do not allow group operations */
2731 } else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_GTK_INIT &&
2732 group->GTKAuthenticator) {
2733 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth, group);
2734 } else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_SETKEYSDONE &&
2736 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth, group);
2737 } else if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_SETKEYS) {
2738 if (group->GKeyDoneStations == 0)
2739 wpa_group_setkeysdone(wpa_auth, group);
2740 else if (group->GTKReKey)
2741 wpa_group_setkeys(wpa_auth, group);
2746 static int wpa_sm_step(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
2751 if (sm->in_step_loop) {
2752 /* This should not happen, but if it does, make sure we do not
2753 * end up freeing the state machine too early by exiting the
2754 * recursive call. */
2755 wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "WPA: wpa_sm_step() called recursively");
2759 sm->in_step_loop = 1;
2761 if (sm->pending_deinit)
2764 sm->changed = FALSE;
2765 sm->wpa_auth->group->changed = FALSE;
2767 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK);
2768 if (sm->pending_deinit)
2770 SM_STEP_RUN(WPA_PTK_GROUP);
2771 if (sm->pending_deinit)
2773 wpa_group_sm_step(sm->wpa_auth, sm->group);
2774 } while (sm->changed || sm->wpa_auth->group->changed);
2775 sm->in_step_loop = 0;
2777 if (sm->pending_deinit) {
2778 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Completing pending STA state "
2779 "machine deinit for " MACSTR, MAC2STR(sm->addr));
2780 wpa_free_sta_sm(sm);
2787 static void wpa_sm_call_step(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
2789 struct wpa_state_machine *sm = eloop_ctx;
2794 void wpa_auth_sm_notify(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
2798 eloop_register_timeout(0, 0, wpa_sm_call_step, sm, NULL);
2802 void wpa_gtk_rekey(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
2805 struct wpa_group *group;
2807 if (wpa_auth == NULL)
2810 group = wpa_auth->group;
2812 for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
2814 group->GM = group->GN;
2816 #ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
2817 tmp = group->GM_igtk;
2818 group->GM_igtk = group->GN_igtk;
2819 group->GN_igtk = tmp;
2820 #endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
2821 wpa_gtk_update(wpa_auth, group);
2822 wpa_group_config_group_keys(wpa_auth, group);
2827 static const char * wpa_bool_txt(int bool)
2829 return bool ? "TRUE" : "FALSE";
2833 #define RSN_SUITE "%02x-%02x-%02x-%d"
2834 #define RSN_SUITE_ARG(s) \
2835 ((s) >> 24) & 0xff, ((s) >> 16) & 0xff, ((s) >> 8) & 0xff, (s) & 0xff
2837 int wpa_get_mib(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, char *buf, size_t buflen)
2840 char pmkid_txt[PMKID_LEN * 2 + 1];
2841 #ifdef CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH
2842 const int preauth = 1;
2843 #else /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
2844 const int preauth = 0;
2845 #endif /* CONFIG_RSN_PREAUTH */
2847 if (wpa_auth == NULL)
2850 ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len,
2851 "dot11RSNAOptionImplemented=TRUE\n"
2852 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationImplemented=%s\n"
2853 "dot11RSNAEnabled=%s\n"
2854 "dot11RSNAPreauthenticationEnabled=%s\n",
2855 wpa_bool_txt(preauth),
2856 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth->conf.wpa & WPA_PROTO_RSN),
2857 wpa_bool_txt(wpa_auth->conf.rsn_preauth));
2858 if (ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= buflen - len)
2862 wpa_snprintf_hex(pmkid_txt, sizeof(pmkid_txt),
2863 wpa_auth->dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed, PMKID_LEN);
2866 buf + len, buflen - len,
2867 "dot11RSNAConfigVersion=%u\n"
2868 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseKeysSupported=9999\n"
2869 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipher */
2870 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyMethod */
2871 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyTime */
2872 /* FIX: dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyPackets */
2873 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupRekeyStrict=%u\n"
2874 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount=%u\n"
2875 "dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount=%u\n"
2876 "dot11RSNAConfigGroupCipherSize=%u\n"
2877 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime=%u\n"
2878 "dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold=%u\n"
2879 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfPTKSAReplayCounters=0\n"
2880 "dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout=%u\n"
2881 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
2882 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
2883 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
2884 "dot11RSNAPMKIDUsed=%s\n"
2885 "dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
2886 "dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
2887 "dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
2888 "dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked=%u\n"
2889 "dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures=%u\n"
2890 "dot11RSNAConfigNumberOfGTKSAReplayCounters=0\n",
2892 !!wpa_auth->conf.wpa_strict_rekey,
2893 dot11RSNAConfigGroupUpdateCount,
2894 dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseUpdateCount,
2895 wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_auth->conf.wpa_group) * 8,
2896 dot11RSNAConfigPMKLifetime,
2897 dot11RSNAConfigPMKReauthThreshold,
2898 dot11RSNAConfigSATimeout,
2899 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteSelected),
2900 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherSelected),
2901 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAGroupCipherSelected),
2903 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAAuthenticationSuiteRequested),
2904 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAPairwiseCipherRequested),
2905 RSN_SUITE_ARG(wpa_auth->dot11RSNAGroupCipherRequested),
2906 wpa_auth->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked,
2907 wpa_auth->dot11RSNA4WayHandshakeFailures);
2908 if (ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= buflen - len)
2912 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigPairwiseCiphersTable */
2913 /* TODO: dot11RSNAConfigAuthenticationSuitesTable */
2916 ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len, "hostapdWPAGroupState=%d\n",
2917 wpa_auth->group->wpa_group_state);
2918 if (ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= buflen - len)
2926 int wpa_get_mib_sta(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, char *buf, size_t buflen)
2934 /* TODO: FF-FF-FF-FF-FF-FF entry for broadcast/multicast stats */
2936 /* dot11RSNAStatsEntry */
2938 pairwise = wpa_cipher_to_suite(sm->wpa == WPA_VERSION_WPA2 ?
2939 WPA_PROTO_RSN : WPA_PROTO_WPA,
2945 buf + len, buflen - len,
2946 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsIndex */
2947 "dot11RSNAStatsSTAAddress=" MACSTR "\n"
2948 "dot11RSNAStatsVersion=1\n"
2949 "dot11RSNAStatsSelectedPairwiseCipher=" RSN_SUITE "\n"
2950 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPICVErrors */
2951 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures=%u\n"
2952 "dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures=%u\n"
2953 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPReplays */
2954 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsCCMPDecryptErrors */
2955 /* TODO: dot11RSNAStatsTKIPReplays */,
2957 RSN_SUITE_ARG(pairwise),
2958 sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures,
2959 sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPRemoteMICFailures);
2960 if (ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= buflen - len)
2965 ret = os_snprintf(buf + len, buflen - len,
2966 "hostapdWPAPTKState=%d\n"
2967 "hostapdWPAPTKGroupState=%d\n",
2969 sm->wpa_ptk_group_state);
2970 if (ret < 0 || (size_t) ret >= buflen - len)
2978 void wpa_auth_countermeasures_start(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth)
2981 wpa_auth->dot11RSNATKIPCounterMeasuresInvoked++;
2985 int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
2987 return sm && sm->pairwise_set;
2991 int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
2993 return sm->pairwise;
2997 int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
3001 return sm->wpa_key_mgmt;
3005 int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
3013 int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
3014 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
3016 if (sm == NULL || sm->pmksa != entry)
3023 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
3024 wpa_auth_sta_get_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
3026 return sm ? sm->pmksa : NULL;
3030 void wpa_auth_sta_local_mic_failure_report(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
3033 sm->dot11RSNAStatsTKIPLocalMICFailures++;
3037 const u8 * wpa_auth_get_wpa_ie(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, size_t *len)
3039 if (wpa_auth == NULL)
3041 *len = wpa_auth->wpa_ie_len;
3042 return wpa_auth->wpa_ie;
3046 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, const u8 *pmk,
3047 int session_timeout, struct eapol_state_machine *eapol)
3049 if (sm == NULL || sm->wpa != WPA_VERSION_WPA2 ||
3050 sm->wpa_auth->conf.disable_pmksa_caching)
3053 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(sm->wpa_auth->pmksa, pmk, PMK_LEN,
3054 sm->wpa_auth->addr, sm->addr, session_timeout,
3055 eapol, sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
3062 int wpa_auth_pmksa_add_preauth(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
3063 const u8 *pmk, size_t len, const u8 *sta_addr,
3064 int session_timeout,
3065 struct eapol_state_machine *eapol)
3067 if (wpa_auth == NULL)
3070 if (pmksa_cache_auth_add(wpa_auth->pmksa, pmk, len, wpa_auth->addr,
3071 sta_addr, session_timeout, eapol,
3072 WPA_KEY_MGMT_IEEE8021X))
3079 void wpa_auth_pmksa_remove(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
3082 struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *pmksa;
3084 if (wpa_auth == NULL || wpa_auth->pmksa == NULL)
3086 pmksa = pmksa_cache_auth_get(wpa_auth->pmksa, sta_addr, NULL);
3088 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Remove PMKSA cache entry for "
3089 MACSTR " based on request", MAC2STR(sta_addr));
3090 pmksa_cache_free_entry(wpa_auth->pmksa, pmksa);
3095 static struct wpa_group *
3096 wpa_auth_add_group(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth, int vlan_id)
3098 struct wpa_group *group;
3100 if (wpa_auth == NULL || wpa_auth->group == NULL)
3103 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Add group state machine for VLAN-ID %d",
3105 group = wpa_group_init(wpa_auth, vlan_id, 0);
3109 group->next = wpa_auth->group->next;
3110 wpa_auth->group->next = group;
3116 int wpa_auth_sta_set_vlan(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int vlan_id)
3118 struct wpa_group *group;
3120 if (sm == NULL || sm->wpa_auth == NULL)
3123 group = sm->wpa_auth->group;
3125 if (group->vlan_id == vlan_id)
3127 group = group->next;
3130 if (group == NULL) {
3131 group = wpa_auth_add_group(sm->wpa_auth, vlan_id);
3136 if (sm->group == group)
3139 if (group->wpa_group_state == WPA_GROUP_FATAL_FAILURE)
3142 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Moving STA " MACSTR " to use group state "
3143 "machine for VLAN ID %d", MAC2STR(sm->addr), vlan_id);
3150 void wpa_auth_eapol_key_tx_status(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
3151 struct wpa_state_machine *sm, int ack)
3153 if (wpa_auth == NULL || sm == NULL)
3155 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: EAPOL-Key TX status for STA " MACSTR
3156 " ack=%d", MAC2STR(sm->addr), ack);
3157 if (sm->pending_1_of_4_timeout && ack) {
3159 * Some deployed supplicant implementations update their SNonce
3160 * for each EAPOL-Key 2/4 message even within the same 4-way
3161 * handshake and then fail to use the first SNonce when
3162 * deriving the PTK. This results in unsuccessful 4-way
3163 * handshake whenever the relatively short initial timeout is
3164 * reached and EAPOL-Key 1/4 is retransmitted. Try to work
3165 * around this by increasing the timeout now that we know that
3166 * the station has received the frame.
3168 int timeout_ms = eapol_key_timeout_subseq;
3169 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Increase initial EAPOL-Key 1/4 "
3170 "timeout by %u ms because of acknowledged frame",
3172 eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
3173 eloop_register_timeout(timeout_ms / 1000,
3174 (timeout_ms % 1000) * 1000,
3175 wpa_send_eapol_timeout, wpa_auth, sm);
3180 int wpa_auth_uses_sae(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
3184 return wpa_key_mgmt_sae(sm->wpa_key_mgmt);
3188 int wpa_auth_uses_ft_sae(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
3192 return sm->wpa_key_mgmt == WPA_KEY_MGMT_FT_SAE;
3197 int wpa_auth_get_ip_addr(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, u8 *addr)
3199 if (sm == NULL || WPA_GET_BE32(sm->ip_addr) == 0)
3201 os_memcpy(addr, sm->ip_addr, 4);
3204 #endif /* CONFIG_P2P */