FR-GV-301 - handle malformed WiMAX attributes

[freeradius.git] / src / lib / radius.c

/*
 *   This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
 *   modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
 *   License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
 *   version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
 *
 *   This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
 *   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
 *   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
 *   Lesser General Public License for more details.
 *
 *   You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
 *   License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
 *   Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
 */

/**
 * $Id$
 *
 * @file radius.c
 * @brief Functions to send/receive radius packets.
 *
 * @copyright 2000-2003,2006  The FreeRADIUS server project
 */

RCSID("$Id$")

#include        <freeradius-devel/libradius.h>

#include        <freeradius-devel/md5.h>

#include        <fcntl.h>
#include        <ctype.h>

#ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
#include        <freeradius-devel/udpfromto.h>
#endif

/*
 *      Some messages get printed out only in debugging mode.
 */
#define FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF if (fr_debug_lvl) fr_strerror_printf

#if 0
#define VP_TRACE printf

static void VP_HEXDUMP(char const *msg, uint8_t const *data, size_t len)
{
        size_t i;

        printf("--- %s ---\n", msg);
        for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
                if ((i & 0x0f) == 0) printf("%04x: ", (unsigned int) i);
                printf("%02x ", data[i]);
                if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x0f) printf("\n");
        }
        if ((len == 0x0f) || ((len & 0x0f) != 0x0f)) printf("\n");
        fflush(stdout);
}

#else
#define VP_TRACE(_x, ...)
#define VP_HEXDUMP(_x, _y, _z)
#endif


/*
 *      The maximum number of attributes which we allow in an incoming
 *      request.  If there are more attributes than this, the request
 *      is rejected.
 *
 *      This helps to minimize the potential for a DoS, when an
 *      attacker spoofs Access-Request packets, which don't have a
 *      Message-Authenticator attribute.  This means that the packet
 *      is unsigned, and the attacker can use resources on the server,
 *      even if the end request is rejected.
 */
uint32_t fr_max_attributes = 0;
FILE *fr_log_fp = NULL;

typedef struct radius_packet_t {
  uint8_t       code;
  uint8_t       id;
  uint8_t       length[2];
  uint8_t       vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
  uint8_t       data[1];
} radius_packet_t;

static fr_randctx fr_rand_pool; /* across multiple calls */
static int fr_rand_initialized = 0;
static unsigned int salt_offset = 0;
static uint8_t nullvector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; /* for CoA decode */

char const *fr_packet_codes[FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE] = {
  "",                                   //!< 0
  "Access-Request",
  "Access-Accept",
  "Access-Reject",
  "Accounting-Request",
  "Accounting-Response",
  "Accounting-Status",
  "Password-Request",
  "Password-Accept",
  "Password-Reject",
  "Accounting-Message",                 //!< 10
  "Access-Challenge",
  "Status-Server",
  "Status-Client",
  "14",
  "15",
  "16",
  "17",
  "18",
  "19",
  "20",                                 //!< 20
  "Resource-Free-Request",
  "Resource-Free-Response",
  "Resource-Query-Request",
  "Resource-Query-Response",
  "Alternate-Resource-Reclaim-Request",
  "NAS-Reboot-Request",
  "NAS-Reboot-Response",
  "28",
  "Next-Passcode",
  "New-Pin",                            //!< 30
  "Terminate-Session",
  "Password-Expired",
  "Event-Request",
  "Event-Response",
  "35",
  "36",
  "37",
  "38",
  "39",
  "Disconnect-Request",                 //!< 40
  "Disconnect-ACK",
  "Disconnect-NAK",
  "CoA-Request",
  "CoA-ACK",
  "CoA-NAK",
  "46",
  "47",
  "48",
  "49",
  "IP-Address-Allocate",
  "IP-Address-Release",                 //!< 50
};


void fr_printf_log(char const *fmt, ...)
{
        va_list ap;

        va_start(ap, fmt);
        if ((fr_debug_lvl == 0) || !fr_log_fp) {
                va_end(ap);
                return;
        }

        vfprintf(fr_log_fp, fmt, ap);
        va_end(ap);

        return;
}

static char const tabs[] = "\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t";

static void print_hex_data(uint8_t const *ptr, int attrlen, int depth)
{
        int i;

        for (i = 0; i < attrlen; i++) {
                if ((i > 0) && ((i & 0x0f) == 0x00))
                        fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%.*s", depth, tabs);
                fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x ", ptr[i]);
                if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x0f) fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\n");
        }
        if ((i & 0x0f) != 0) fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\n");
}


void rad_print_hex(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet)
{
        int i;

        if (!packet->data || !fr_log_fp) return;

        fprintf(fr_log_fp, "  Socket:\t%d\n", packet->sockfd);
#ifdef WITH_TCP
        fprintf(fr_log_fp, "  Proto:\t%d\n", packet->proto);
#endif

        if (packet->src_ipaddr.af == AF_INET) {
                char buffer[32];

                fprintf(fr_log_fp, "  Src IP:\t%s\n",
                        inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
                                  &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
                                  buffer, sizeof(buffer)));
                fprintf(fr_log_fp, "    port:\t%u\n", packet->src_port);

                fprintf(fr_log_fp, "  Dst IP:\t%s\n",
                        inet_ntop(packet->dst_ipaddr.af,
                                  &packet->dst_ipaddr.ipaddr,
                                  buffer, sizeof(buffer)));
                fprintf(fr_log_fp, "    port:\t%u\n", packet->dst_port);
        }

        if (packet->data[0] < FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE) {
                fprintf(fr_log_fp, "  Code:\t\t(%d) %s\n", packet->data[0], fr_packet_codes[packet->data[0]]);
        } else {
                fprintf(fr_log_fp, "  Code:\t\t%u\n", packet->data[0]);
        }
        fprintf(fr_log_fp, "  Id:\t\t%u\n", packet->data[1]);
        fprintf(fr_log_fp, "  Length:\t%u\n", ((packet->data[2] << 8) |
                                   (packet->data[3])));
        fprintf(fr_log_fp, "  Vector:\t");
        for (i = 4; i < 20; i++) {
                fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x", packet->data[i]);
        }
        fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\n");

        if (packet->data_len > 20) {
                int total;
                uint8_t const *ptr;
                fprintf(fr_log_fp, "  Data:");

                total = packet->data_len - 20;
                ptr = packet->data + 20;

                while (total > 0) {
                        int attrlen;
                        unsigned int vendor = 0;

                        fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t");
                        if (total < 2) { /* too short */
                                fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x\n", *ptr);
                                break;
                        }

                        if (ptr[1] > total) { /* too long */
                                for (i = 0; i < total; i++) {
                                        fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x ", ptr[i]);
                                }
                                break;
                        }

                        fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x  %02x  ", ptr[0], ptr[1]);
                        attrlen = ptr[1] - 2;

                        if ((ptr[0] == PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) &&
                            (attrlen > 4)) {
                                vendor = (ptr[3] << 16) | (ptr[4] << 8) | ptr[5];
                                fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x%02x%02x%02x (%u)  ",
                                       ptr[2], ptr[3], ptr[4], ptr[5], vendor);
                                attrlen -= 4;
                                ptr += 6;
                                total -= 6;

                        } else {
                                ptr += 2;
                                total -= 2;
                        }

                        print_hex_data(ptr, attrlen, 3);

                        ptr += attrlen;
                        total -= attrlen;
                }
        }
        fflush(stdout);
}

/** Wrapper for sendto which handles sendfromto, IPv6, and all possible combinations
 *
 */
static int rad_sendto(int sockfd, void *data, size_t data_len, int flags,
#ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
                      fr_ipaddr_t *src_ipaddr, uint16_t src_port,
#else
                      UNUSED fr_ipaddr_t *src_ipaddr, UNUSED uint16_t src_port,
#endif
                      fr_ipaddr_t *dst_ipaddr, uint16_t dst_port)
{
        int rcode;
        struct sockaddr_storage dst;
        socklen_t               sizeof_dst;

#ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
        struct sockaddr_storage src;
        socklen_t               sizeof_src;

        fr_ipaddr2sockaddr(src_ipaddr, src_port, &src, &sizeof_src);
#endif

        if (!fr_ipaddr2sockaddr(dst_ipaddr, dst_port, &dst, &sizeof_dst)) {
                return -1;
        }

#ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
        /*
         *      And if they don't specify a source IP address, don't
         *      use udpfromto.
         */
        if (((dst_ipaddr->af == AF_INET) || (dst_ipaddr->af == AF_INET6)) &&
            (src_ipaddr->af != AF_UNSPEC) &&
            !fr_inaddr_any(src_ipaddr)) {
                rcode = sendfromto(sockfd, data, data_len, flags,
                                   (struct sockaddr *)&src, sizeof_src,
                                   (struct sockaddr *)&dst, sizeof_dst);
                goto done;
        }
#endif

        /*
         *      No udpfromto, fail gracefully.
         */
        rcode = sendto(sockfd, data, data_len, flags,
                       (struct sockaddr *) &dst, sizeof_dst);
#ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
done:
#endif
        if (rcode < 0) {
                fr_strerror_printf("sendto failed: %s", fr_syserror(errno));
        }

        return rcode;
}


void rad_recv_discard(int sockfd)
{
        uint8_t                 header[4];
        struct sockaddr_storage src;
        socklen_t               sizeof_src = sizeof(src);

        (void) recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), 0,
                        (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
}

/** Basic validation of RADIUS packet header
 *
 * @note fr_strerror errors are only available if fr_debug_lvl > 0. This is to reduce CPU time
 *      consumed when discarding malformed packet.
 *
 * @param[in] sockfd we're reading from.
 * @param[out] src_ipaddr of the packet.
 * @param[out] src_port of the packet.
 * @param[out] code Pointer to where to write the packet code.
 * @return
 *      - -1 on failure.
 *      - 1 on decode error.
 *      - >= RADIUS_HDR_LEN on success. This is the packet length as specified in the header.
 */
ssize_t rad_recv_header(int sockfd, fr_ipaddr_t *src_ipaddr, uint16_t *src_port, int *code)
{
        ssize_t                 data_len, packet_len;
        uint8_t                 header[4];
        struct sockaddr_storage src;
        socklen_t               sizeof_src = sizeof(src);

        data_len = recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), MSG_PEEK, (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
        if (data_len < 0) {
                if ((errno == EAGAIN) || (errno == EINTR)) return 0;
                return -1;
        }

        /*
         *      Convert AF.  If unknown, discard packet.
         */
        if (!fr_sockaddr2ipaddr(&src, sizeof_src, src_ipaddr, src_port)) {
                FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Unknown address family");
                rad_recv_discard(sockfd);

                return 1;
        }

        /*
         *      Too little data is available, discard the packet.
         */
        if (data_len < 4) {
                FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Expected at least 4 bytes of header data, got %zu bytes", data_len);
invalid:
                FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Invalid data from %s: %s",
                                         fr_inet_ntop(src_ipaddr->af, &src_ipaddr->ipaddr),
                                         fr_strerror());
                rad_recv_discard(sockfd);

                return 1;
        }

        /*
         *      See how long the packet says it is.
         */
        packet_len = (header[2] * 256) + header[3];

        /*
         *      The length in the packet says it's less than
         *      a RADIUS header length: discard it.
         */
        if (packet_len < RADIUS_HDR_LEN) {
                FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Expected at least " STRINGIFY(RADIUS_HDR_LEN)  " bytes of packet "
                                         "data, got %zu bytes", packet_len);
                goto invalid;
        }

        /*
         *      Enforce RFC requirements, for sanity.
         *      Anything after 4k will be discarded.
         */
        if (packet_len > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
                FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Length field value too large, expected maximum of "
                                         STRINGIFY(MAX_PACKET_LEN) " bytes, got %zu bytes", packet_len);
                goto invalid;
        }

        *code = header[0];

        /*
         *      The packet says it's this long, but the actual UDP
         *      size could still be smaller.
         */
        return packet_len;
}


/** Wrapper for recvfrom, which handles recvfromto, IPv6, and all possible combinations
 *
 */
static ssize_t rad_recvfrom(int sockfd, RADIUS_PACKET *packet, int flags,
                            fr_ipaddr_t *src_ipaddr, uint16_t *src_port,
                            fr_ipaddr_t *dst_ipaddr, uint16_t *dst_port)
{
        struct sockaddr_storage src;
        struct sockaddr_storage dst;
        socklen_t               sizeof_src = sizeof(src);
        socklen_t               sizeof_dst = sizeof(dst);
        ssize_t                 data_len;
        uint8_t                 header[4];
        size_t                  len;
        uint16_t                port;

        memset(&src, 0, sizeof_src);
        memset(&dst, 0, sizeof_dst);

        /*
         *      Read the length of the packet, from the packet.
         *      This lets us allocate the buffer to use for
         *      reading the rest of the packet.
         */
        data_len = recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), MSG_PEEK,
                            (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
        if (data_len < 0) {
                if ((errno == EAGAIN) || (errno == EINTR)) return 0;
                return -1;
        }

        /*
         *      Too little data is available, discard the packet.
         */
        if (data_len < 4) {
                rad_recv_discard(sockfd);

                return 0;

        } else {                /* we got 4 bytes of data. */
                /*
                 *      See how long the packet says it is.
                 */
                len = (header[2] * 256) + header[3];

                /*
                 *      The length in the packet says it's less than
                 *      a RADIUS header length: discard it.
                 */
                if (len < RADIUS_HDR_LEN) {
                        recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), flags,
                                 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
                        return 0;

                        /*
                         *      Enforce RFC requirements, for sanity.
                         *      Anything after 4k will be discarded.
                         */
                } else if (len > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
                        recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), flags,
                                 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
                        return len;
                }
        }

        packet->data = talloc_array(packet, uint8_t, len);
        if (!packet->data) return -1;

        /*
         *      Receive the packet.  The OS will discard any data in the
         *      packet after "len" bytes.
         */
#ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
        data_len = recvfromto(sockfd, packet->data, len, flags,
                              (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src,
                              (struct sockaddr *)&dst, &sizeof_dst);
#else
        data_len = recvfrom(sockfd, packet->data, len, flags,
                            (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);

        /*
         *      Get the destination address, too.
         */
        if (getsockname(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&dst,
                        &sizeof_dst) < 0) return -1;
#endif
        if (data_len < 0) {
                return data_len;
        }

        if (!fr_sockaddr2ipaddr(&src, sizeof_src, src_ipaddr, &port)) {
                return -1;      /* Unknown address family, Die Die Die! */
        }
        *src_port = port;

        fr_sockaddr2ipaddr(&dst, sizeof_dst, dst_ipaddr, &port);
        *dst_port = port;

        /*
         *      Different address families should never happen.
         */
        if (src.ss_family != dst.ss_family) {
                return -1;
        }

        return data_len;
}


#define AUTH_PASS_LEN (AUTH_VECTOR_LEN)
/** Build an encrypted secret value to return in a reply packet
 *
 * The secret is hidden by xoring with a MD5 digest created from
 * the shared secret and the authentication vector.
 * We put them into MD5 in the reverse order from that used when
 * encrypting passwords to RADIUS.
 */
static void make_secret(uint8_t *digest, uint8_t const *vector,
                        char const *secret, uint8_t const *value, size_t length)
{
        FR_MD5_CTX context;
        size_t       i;

        fr_md5_init(&context);
        fr_md5_update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
        fr_md5_update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret));
        fr_md5_final(digest, &context);

        for ( i = 0; i < length; i++ ) {
                digest[i] ^= value[i];
        }
}

#define MAX_PASS_LEN (128)
static void make_passwd(uint8_t *output, ssize_t *outlen,
                        uint8_t const *input, size_t inlen,
                        char const *secret, uint8_t const *vector)
{
        FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
        uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
        uint8_t passwd[MAX_PASS_LEN];
        size_t  i, n;
        size_t  len;

        /*
         *      If the length is zero, round it up.
         */
        len = inlen;

        if (len > MAX_PASS_LEN) len = MAX_PASS_LEN;

        memcpy(passwd, input, len);
        if (len < sizeof(passwd)) memset(passwd + len, 0, sizeof(passwd) - len);

        if (len == 0) {
                len = AUTH_PASS_LEN;
        }

        else if ((len & 0x0f) != 0) {
                len += 0x0f;
                len &= ~0x0f;
        }
        *outlen = len;

        fr_md5_init(&context);
        fr_md5_update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret));
        old = context;

        /*
         *      Do first pass.
         */
        fr_md5_update(&context, vector, AUTH_PASS_LEN);

        for (n = 0; n < len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
                if (n > 0) {
                        context = old;
                        fr_md5_update(&context,
                                       passwd + n - AUTH_PASS_LEN,
                                       AUTH_PASS_LEN);
                }

                fr_md5_final(digest, &context);
                for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
                        passwd[i + n] ^= digest[i];
                }
        }

        memcpy(output, passwd, len);
}


static void make_tunnel_passwd(uint8_t *output, ssize_t *outlen,
                               uint8_t const *input, size_t inlen, size_t room,
                               char const *secret, uint8_t const *vector)
{
        FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
        uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
        size_t  i, n;
        size_t  encrypted_len;

        /*
         *      The password gets encoded with a 1-byte "length"
         *      field.  Ensure that it doesn't overflow.
         */
        if (room > 253) room = 253;

        /*
         *      Limit the maximum size of the input password.  2 bytes
         *      are taken up by the salt, and one by the encoded
         *      "length" field.  Note that if we have a tag, the
         *      "room" will be 252 octets, not 253 octets.
         */
        if (inlen > (room - 3)) inlen = room - 3;

        /*
         *      Length of the encrypted data is the clear-text
         *      password length plus one byte which encodes the length
         *      of the password.  We round up to the nearest encoding
         *      block.  Note that this can result in the encoding
         *      length being more than 253 octets.
         */
        encrypted_len = inlen + 1;
        if ((encrypted_len & 0x0f) != 0) {
                encrypted_len += 0x0f;
                encrypted_len &= ~0x0f;
        }

        /*
         *      We need 2 octets for the salt, followed by the actual
         *      encrypted data.
         */
        if (encrypted_len > (room - 2)) encrypted_len = room - 2;

        *outlen = encrypted_len + 2;    /* account for the salt */

        /*
         *      Copy the password over, and zero-fill the remainder.
         */
        memcpy(output + 3, input, inlen);
        memset(output + 3 + inlen, 0, *outlen - 3 - inlen);

        /*
         *      Generate salt.  The RFCs say:
         *
         *      The high bit of salt[0] must be set, each salt in a
         *      packet should be unique, and they should be random
         *
         *      So, we set the high bit, add in a counter, and then
         *      add in some CSPRNG data.  should be OK..
         */
        output[0] = (0x80 | ( ((salt_offset++) & 0x0f) << 3) |
                     (fr_rand() & 0x07));
        output[1] = fr_rand();
        output[2] = inlen;      /* length of the password string */

        fr_md5_init(&context);
        fr_md5_update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret));
        old = context;

        fr_md5_update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
        fr_md5_update(&context, &output[0], 2);

        for (n = 0; n < encrypted_len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
                size_t block_len;

                if (n > 0) {
                        context = old;
                        fr_md5_update(&context,
                                       output + 2 + n - AUTH_PASS_LEN,
                                       AUTH_PASS_LEN);
                }

                fr_md5_final(digest, &context);

                if ((2 + n + AUTH_PASS_LEN) < room) {
                        block_len = AUTH_PASS_LEN;
                } else {
                        block_len = room - 2 - n;
                }

                for (i = 0; i < block_len; i++) {
                        output[i + 2 + n] ^= digest[i];
                }
        }
}

static int do_next_tlv(VALUE_PAIR const *vp, VALUE_PAIR const *next, int nest)
{
        unsigned int tlv1, tlv2;

        if (nest > fr_attr_max_tlv) return 0;

        if (!vp) return 0;

        /*
         *      Keep encoding TLVs which have the same scope.
         *      e.g. two attributes of:
         *              ATTR.TLV1.TLV2.TLV3 = data1
         *              ATTR.TLV1.TLV2.TLV4 = data2
         *      both get put into a container of "ATTR.TLV1.TLV2"
         */

        /*
         *      Nothing to follow, we're done.
         */
        if (!next) return 0;

        /*
         *      Not from the same vendor, skip it.
         */
        if (vp->da->vendor != next->da->vendor) return 0;

        /*
         *      In a different TLV space, skip it.
         */
        tlv1 = vp->da->attr;
        tlv2 = next->da->attr;

        tlv1 &= ((1 << fr_attr_shift[nest]) - 1);
        tlv2 &= ((1 << fr_attr_shift[nest]) - 1);

        if (tlv1 != tlv2) return 0;

        return 1;
}


static ssize_t vp2data_any(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
                           RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
                           char const *secret, int nest,
                           VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
                           uint8_t *start, size_t room);

static ssize_t vp2attr_rfc(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
                           RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
                           char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
                           unsigned int attribute, uint8_t *ptr, size_t room);

/** Encode the *data* portion of the TLV
 *
 * This is really a sub-function of vp2data_any().  It encodes the *data* portion
 * of the TLV, and assumes that the encapsulating attribute has already been encoded.
 */
static ssize_t vp2data_tlvs(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
                            RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
                            char const *secret, int nest,
                            VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
                            uint8_t *start, size_t room)
{
        ssize_t len;
        size_t my_room;
        uint8_t *ptr = start;
        VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;
        VALUE_PAIR const *svp = vp;

        if (!svp) return 0;

#ifndef NDEBUG
        if (nest > fr_attr_max_tlv) {
                fr_strerror_printf("vp2data_tlvs: attribute nesting overflow");
                return -1;
        }
#endif

        while (vp) {
                VERIFY_VP(vp);

                if (room <= 2) return ptr - start;

                ptr[0] = (vp->da->attr >> fr_attr_shift[nest]) & fr_attr_mask[nest];
                ptr[1] = 2;

                my_room = room;
                if (room > 255) my_room = 255;

                len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, nest,
                                  &vp, ptr + 2, my_room - 2);
                if (len < 0) return len;
                if (len == 0) return ptr - start;
                /* len can NEVER be more than 253 */

                ptr[1] += len;

#ifndef NDEBUG
                if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
                        fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x %02x  ", ptr[0], ptr[1]);
                        print_hex_data(ptr + 2, len, 3);
                }
#endif

                room -= ptr[1];
                ptr += ptr[1];
                *pvp = vp;

                if (!do_next_tlv(svp, vp, nest)) break;
        }

#ifndef NDEBUG
        if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
                DICT_ATTR const *da;

                da = dict_attrbyvalue(svp->da->attr & ((1 << fr_attr_shift[nest ]) - 1), svp->da->vendor);
                if (da) fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t%s = ...\n", da->name);
        }
#endif

        return ptr - start;
}

/** Encodes the data portion of an attribute
 *
 * @return -1 on error, or the length of the data portion.
 */
static ssize_t vp2data_any(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
                           RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
                           char const *secret, int nest,
                           VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
                           uint8_t *start, size_t room)
{
        uint32_t lvalue;
        ssize_t len;
        uint8_t const *data;
        uint8_t *ptr = start;
        uint8_t array[4];
        uint64_t lvalue64;
        VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;

        VERIFY_VP(vp);

        /*
         *      See if we need to encode a TLV.  The low portion of
         *      the attribute has already been placed into the packer.
         *      If there are still attribute bytes left, then go
         *      encode them as TLVs.
         *
         *      If we cared about the stack, we could unroll the loop.
         */
        if (vp->da->flags.is_tlv && (nest < fr_attr_max_tlv) &&
            ((vp->da->attr >> fr_attr_shift[nest + 1]) != 0)) {
                return vp2data_tlvs(packet, original, secret, nest + 1, pvp,
                                    start, room);
        }

        /*
         *      Set up the default sources for the data.
         */
        len = vp->vp_length;

        switch (vp->da->type) {
        case PW_TYPE_STRING:
        case PW_TYPE_OCTETS:
                data = vp->data.ptr;
                if (!data) return 0;
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_IFID:
        case PW_TYPE_IPV4_ADDR:
        case PW_TYPE_IPV6_ADDR:
        case PW_TYPE_IPV6_PREFIX:
        case PW_TYPE_IPV4_PREFIX:
        case PW_TYPE_ABINARY:
        case PW_TYPE_ETHERNET:  /* just in case */
                data = (uint8_t const *) &vp->data;
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_BYTE:
                len = 1;        /* just in case */
                array[0] = vp->vp_byte;
                data = array;
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_SHORT:
                len = 2;        /* just in case */
                array[0] = (vp->vp_short >> 8) & 0xff;
                array[1] = vp->vp_short & 0xff;
                data = array;
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
                len = 4;        /* just in case */
                lvalue = htonl(vp->vp_integer);
                memcpy(array, &lvalue, sizeof(lvalue));
                data = array;
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_INTEGER64:
                len = 8;        /* just in case */
                lvalue64 = htonll(vp->vp_integer64);
                data = (uint8_t *) &lvalue64;
                break;

                /*
                 *  There are no tagged date attributes.
                 */
        case PW_TYPE_DATE:
                lvalue = htonl(vp->vp_date);
                data = (uint8_t const *) &lvalue;
                len = 4;        /* just in case */
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_SIGNED:
        {
                int32_t slvalue;

                len = 4;        /* just in case */
                slvalue = htonl(vp->vp_signed);
                memcpy(array, &slvalue, sizeof(slvalue));
                data = array;
                break;
        }

        default:                /* unknown type: ignore it */
                fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Unknown attribute type %d", vp->da->type);
                return -1;
        }

        /*
         *      No data: skip it.
         */
        if (len == 0) {
                *pvp = vp->next;
                return 0;
        }

        /*
         *      Bound the data to the calling size
         */
        if (len > (ssize_t) room) len = room;

        /*
         *      Encrypt the various password styles
         *
         *      Attributes with encrypted values MUST be less than
         *      128 bytes long.
         */
        switch (vp->da->flags.encrypt) {
        case FLAG_ENCRYPT_USER_PASSWORD:
                make_passwd(ptr, &len, data, len,
                            secret, packet->vector);
                break;

        case FLAG_ENCRYPT_TUNNEL_PASSWORD:
                lvalue = 0;
                if (vp->da->flags.has_tag) lvalue = 1;

                /*
                 *      Check if there's enough room.  If there isn't,
                 *      we discard the attribute.
                 *
                 *      This is ONLY a problem if we have multiple VSA's
                 *      in one Vendor-Specific, though.
                 */
                if (room < (18 + lvalue)) return 0;

                switch (packet->code) {
                case PW_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT:
                case PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT:
                case PW_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
                default:
                        if (!original) {
                                fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: No request packet, cannot encrypt %s attribute in the vp.", vp->da->name);
                                return -1;
                        }

                        if (lvalue) ptr[0] = TAG_VALID(vp->tag) ? vp->tag : TAG_NONE;
                        make_tunnel_passwd(ptr + lvalue, &len, data, len,
                                           room - lvalue,
                                           secret, original->vector);
                        len += lvalue;
                        break;
                case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
                case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
                case PW_CODE_COA_REQUEST:
                        ptr[0] = TAG_VALID(vp->tag) ? vp->tag : TAG_NONE;
                        make_tunnel_passwd(ptr + 1, &len, data, len, room - 1,
                                           secret, packet->vector);
                        len += lvalue;
                        break;
                }
                break;

                /*
                 *      The code above ensures that this attribute
                 *      always fits.
                 */
        case FLAG_ENCRYPT_ASCEND_SECRET:
                if (len > AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) len = AUTH_VECTOR_LEN;
                make_secret(ptr, packet->vector, secret, data, len);
                len = AUTH_VECTOR_LEN;
                break;


        default:
                if (vp->da->flags.has_tag && TAG_VALID(vp->tag)) {
                        if (vp->da->type == PW_TYPE_STRING) {
                                if (len > ((ssize_t) (room - 1))) len = room - 1;
                                ptr[0] = vp->tag;
                                ptr++;
                        } else if (vp->da->type == PW_TYPE_INTEGER) {
                                array[0] = vp->tag;
                        } /* else it can't be any other type */
                }
                memcpy(ptr, data, len);
                break;
        } /* switch over encryption flags */

        *pvp = vp->next;
        return len + (ptr - start);
}

static ssize_t attr_shift(uint8_t const *start, uint8_t const *end,
                          uint8_t *ptr, int hdr_len, ssize_t len,
                          int flag_offset, int vsa_offset)
{
        int check_len = len - ptr[1];
        int total = len + hdr_len;

        /*
         *      Pass 1: Check if the addition of the headers
         *      overflows the available room.  If so, return
         *      what we were capable of encoding.
         */

        while (check_len > (255 - hdr_len)) {
                total += hdr_len;
                check_len -= (255 - hdr_len);
        }

        /*
         *      Note that this results in a number of attributes maybe
         *      being marked as "encoded", but which aren't in the
         *      packet.  Oh well.  The solution is to fix the
         *      "vp2data_any" function to take into account the header
         *      lengths.
         */
        if ((ptr + ptr[1] + total) > end) {
                return (ptr + ptr[1]) - start;
        }

        /*
         *      Pass 2: Now that we know there's enough room,
         *      re-arrange the data to form a set of valid
         *      RADIUS attributes.
         */
        while (1) {
                int sublen = 255 - ptr[1];

                if (len <= sublen) {
                        break;
                }

                len -= sublen;
                memmove(ptr + 255 + hdr_len, ptr + 255, sublen);
                memmove(ptr + 255, ptr, hdr_len);
                ptr[1] += sublen;
                if (vsa_offset) ptr[vsa_offset] += sublen;
                ptr[flag_offset] |= 0x80;

                ptr += 255;
                ptr[1] = hdr_len;
                if (vsa_offset) ptr[vsa_offset] = 3;
        }

        ptr[1] += len;
        if (vsa_offset) ptr[vsa_offset] += len;

        return (ptr + ptr[1]) - start;
}


/** Encode an "extended" attribute
 */
int rad_vp2extended(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
                    RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
                    char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
                    uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
{
        int len;
        int hdr_len;
        uint8_t *start = ptr;
        VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;

        VERIFY_VP(vp);

        if (!vp->da->flags.extended) {
                fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2extended called for non-extended attribute");
                return -1;
        }

        /*
         *      The attribute number is encoded into the upper 8 bits
         *      of the vendor ID.
         */
        ptr[0] = (vp->da->vendor / FR_MAX_VENDOR) & 0xff;

        if (!vp->da->flags.long_extended) {
                if (room < 3) return 0;

                ptr[1] = 3;
                ptr[2] = vp->da->attr & fr_attr_mask[0];

        } else {
                if (room < 4) return 0;

                ptr[1] = 4;
                ptr[2] = vp->da->attr & fr_attr_mask[0];
                ptr[3] = 0;
        }

        /*
         *      Only "flagged" attributes can be longer than one
         *      attribute.
         */
        if (!vp->da->flags.long_extended && (room > 255)) {
                room = 255;
        }

        /*
         *      Handle EVS VSAs.
         */
        if (vp->da->flags.evs) {
                uint8_t *evs = ptr + ptr[1];

                if (room < (size_t) (ptr[1] + 5)) return 0;

                ptr[2] = 26;

                evs[0] = 0;     /* always zero */
                evs[1] = (vp->da->vendor >> 16) & 0xff;
                evs[2] = (vp->da->vendor >> 8) & 0xff;
                evs[3] = vp->da->vendor & 0xff;
                evs[4] = vp->da->attr & fr_attr_mask[0];

                ptr[1] += 5;
        }
        hdr_len = ptr[1];

        len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, 0,
                          pvp, ptr + ptr[1], room - hdr_len);
        if (len <= 0) return len;

        /*
         *      There may be more than 252 octets of data encoded in
         *      the attribute.  If so, move the data up in the packet,
         *      and copy the existing header over.  Set the "M" flag ONLY
         *      after copying the rest of the data.
         */
        if (vp->da->flags.long_extended && (len > (255 - ptr[1]))) {
                return attr_shift(start, start + room, ptr, 4, len, 3, 0);
        }

        ptr[1] += len;

#ifndef NDEBUG
        if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
                int jump = 3;

                fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x %02x  ", ptr[0], ptr[1]);
                if (!vp->da->flags.long_extended) {
                        fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x  ", ptr[2]);

                } else {
                        fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x %02x  ", ptr[2], ptr[3]);
                        jump = 4;
                }

                if (vp->da->flags.evs) {
                        fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x%02x%02x%02x (%u)  %02x  ",
                                ptr[jump], ptr[jump + 1],
                                ptr[jump + 2], ptr[jump + 3],
                                ((ptr[jump + 1] << 16) |
                                 (ptr[jump + 2] << 8) |
                                 ptr[jump + 3]),
                                ptr[jump + 4]);
                        jump += 5;
                }

                print_hex_data(ptr + jump, len, 3);
        }
#endif

        return (ptr + ptr[1]) - start;
}


/** Encode a WiMAX attribute
 *
 */
int rad_vp2wimax(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
                 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
                 char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
                 uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
{
        int len;
        uint32_t lvalue;
        int hdr_len;
        uint8_t *start = ptr;
        VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;

        VERIFY_VP(vp);

        /*
         *      Double-check for WiMAX format.
         */
        if (!vp->da->flags.wimax) {
                fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2wimax called for non-WIMAX VSA");
                return -1;
        }

        /*
         *      Not enough room for:
         *              attr, len, vendor-id, vsa, vsalen, continuation
         */
        if (room < 9) return 0;

        /*
         *      Build the Vendor-Specific header
         */
        ptr = start;
        ptr[0] = PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
        ptr[1] = 9;
        lvalue = htonl(vp->da->vendor);
        memcpy(ptr + 2, &lvalue, 4);
        ptr[6] = (vp->da->attr & fr_attr_mask[1]);
        ptr[7] = 3;
        ptr[8] = 0;             /* continuation byte */

        hdr_len = 9;

        len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, 0, pvp, ptr + ptr[1],
                          room - hdr_len);
        if (len <= 0) return len;

        /*
         *      There may be more than 252 octets of data encoded in
         *      the attribute.  If so, move the data up in the packet,
         *      and copy the existing header over.  Set the "C" flag
         *      ONLY after copying the rest of the data.
         */
        if (len > (255 - ptr[1])) {
                return attr_shift(start, start + room, ptr, hdr_len, len, 8, 7);
        }

        ptr[1] += len;
        ptr[7] += len;

#ifndef NDEBUG
        if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
                fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x %02x  %02x%02x%02x%02x (%u)  %02x %02x %02x   ",
                       ptr[0], ptr[1],
                       ptr[2], ptr[3], ptr[4], ptr[5],
                       (ptr[3] << 16) | (ptr[4] << 8) | ptr[5],
                       ptr[6], ptr[7], ptr[8]);
                print_hex_data(ptr + 9, len, 3);
        }
#endif

        return (ptr + ptr[1]) - start;
}

/** Encode an RFC format attribute, with the "concat" flag set
 *
 * If there isn't enough room in the packet, the data is
 * truncated to fit.
 */
static ssize_t vp2attr_concat(UNUSED RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
                              UNUSED RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
                              UNUSED char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
                              unsigned int attribute, uint8_t *start, size_t room)
{
        uint8_t *ptr = start;
        uint8_t const *p;
        size_t len, left;
        VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;

        VERIFY_VP(vp);

        p = vp->vp_octets;
        len = vp->vp_length;

        while (len > 0) {
                if (room <= 2) break;

                ptr[0] = attribute;
                ptr[1] = 2;

                left = len;

                /* no more than 253 octets */
                if (left > 253) left = 253;

                /* no more than "room" octets */
                if (room < (left + 2)) left = room - 2;

                memcpy(ptr + 2, p, left);

#ifndef NDEBUG
                if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
                        fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x %02x  ", ptr[0], ptr[1]);
                        print_hex_data(ptr + 2, len, 3);
                }
#endif
                ptr[1] += left;
                ptr += ptr[1];
                p += left;
                room -= left;
                len -= left;
        }

        *pvp = vp->next;
        return ptr - start;
}

/** Encode an RFC format TLV.
 *
 * This could be a standard attribute, or a TLV data type.
 * If it's a standard attribute, then vp->da->attr == attribute.
 * Otherwise, attribute may be something else.
 */
static ssize_t vp2attr_rfc(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
                           RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
                           char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
                           unsigned int attribute, uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
{
        ssize_t len;

        if (room <= 2) return 0;

        ptr[0] = attribute & 0xff;
        ptr[1] = 2;

        if (room > 255) room = 255;

        len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, 0, pvp, ptr + ptr[1], room - ptr[1]);
        if (len <= 0) return len;

        ptr[1] += len;

#ifndef NDEBUG
        if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
                fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x %02x  ", ptr[0], ptr[1]);
                print_hex_data(ptr + 2, len, 3);
        }
#endif

        return ptr[1];
}


/** Encode a VSA which is a TLV
 *
 * If it's in the RFC format, call vp2attr_rfc.  Otherwise, encode it here.
 */
static ssize_t vp2attr_vsa(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
                           RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
                           char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
                           unsigned int attribute, unsigned int vendor,
                           uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
{
        ssize_t len;
        DICT_VENDOR *dv;
        VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;

        VERIFY_VP(vp);
        /*
         *      Unknown vendor: RFC format.
         *      Known vendor and RFC format: go do that.
         */
        dv = dict_vendorbyvalue(vendor);
        if (!dv ||
            (!vp->da->flags.is_tlv && (dv->type == 1) && (dv->length == 1))) {
                return vp2attr_rfc(packet, original, secret, pvp,
                                   attribute, ptr, room);
        }

        switch (dv->type) {
        default:
                fr_strerror_printf("vp2attr_vsa: Internal sanity check failed,"
                                   " type %u", (unsigned) dv->type);
                return -1;

        case 4:
                ptr[0] = 0;     /* attr must be 24-bit */
                ptr[1] = (attribute >> 16) & 0xff;
                ptr[2] = (attribute >> 8) & 0xff;
                ptr[3] = attribute & 0xff;
                break;

        case 2:
                ptr[0] = (attribute >> 8) & 0xff;
                ptr[1] = attribute & 0xff;
                break;

        case 1:
                ptr[0] = attribute & 0xff;
                break;
        }

        switch (dv->length) {
        default:
                fr_strerror_printf("vp2attr_vsa: Internal sanity check failed,"
                                   " length %u", (unsigned) dv->length);
                return -1;

        case 0:
                break;

        case 2:
                ptr[dv->type] = 0;
                ptr[dv->type + 1] = dv->type + 2;
                break;

        case 1:
                ptr[dv->type] = dv->type + 1;
                break;

        }

        if (room > 255) room = 255;

        len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, 0, pvp,
                          ptr + dv->type + dv->length, room - (dv->type + dv->length));
        if (len <= 0) return len;

        if (dv->length) ptr[dv->type + dv->length - 1] += len;

#ifndef NDEBUG
        if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
                switch (dv->type) {
                default:
                        break;

                case 4:
                        if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp)
                                fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x%02x%02x%02x ",
                                        ptr[0], ptr[1], ptr[2], ptr[3]);
                        break;

                case 2:
                        if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp)
                                fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x%02x ",
                                        ptr[0], ptr[1]);
                break;

                case 1:
                        if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp)
                                fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x ", ptr[0]);
                        break;
                }

                switch (dv->length) {
                default:
                        break;

                case 0:
                        fprintf(fr_log_fp, "  ");
                        break;

                case 1:
                        fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x  ",
                                ptr[dv->type]);
                        break;

                case 2:
                        fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x%02x  ",
                                ptr[dv->type], ptr[dv->type] + 1);
                        break;
                }

                print_hex_data(ptr + dv->type + dv->length, len, 3);
        }
#endif

        return dv->type + dv->length + len;
}


/** Encode a Vendor-Specific attribute
 *
 */
int rad_vp2vsa(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
                char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp, uint8_t *ptr,
                size_t room)
{
        ssize_t len;
        uint32_t lvalue;
        VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;

        VERIFY_VP(vp);

        if (vp->da->vendor == 0) {
                fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2vsa called with rfc attribute");
                return -1;
        }

        /*
         *      Double-check for WiMAX format.
         */
        if (vp->da->flags.wimax) {
                return rad_vp2wimax(packet, original, secret, pvp, ptr, room);
        }

        if (vp->da->vendor > FR_MAX_VENDOR) {
                fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2vsa: Invalid arguments");
                return -1;
        }

        /*
         *      Not enough room for:
         *              attr, len, vendor-id
         */
        if (room < 6) return 0;

        /*
         *      Build the Vendor-Specific header
         */
        ptr[0] = PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
        ptr[1] = 6;
        lvalue = htonl(vp->da->vendor);
        memcpy(ptr + 2, &lvalue, 4);

        if (room > 255) room = 255;

        len = vp2attr_vsa(packet, original, secret, pvp,
                          vp->da->attr, vp->da->vendor,
                          ptr + ptr[1], room - ptr[1]);
        if (len < 0) return len;

#ifndef NDEBUG
        if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
                fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x %02x  %02x%02x%02x%02x (%u)  ",
                       ptr[0], ptr[1],
                       ptr[2], ptr[3], ptr[4], ptr[5],
                       (ptr[3] << 16) | (ptr[4] << 8) | ptr[5]);
                print_hex_data(ptr + 6, len, 3);
        }
#endif

        ptr[1] += len;

        return ptr[1];
}


/** Encode an RFC standard attribute 1..255
 *
 */
int rad_vp2rfc(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
               RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
               char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
               uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
{
        VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;

        VERIFY_VP(vp);

        if (vp->da->vendor != 0) {
                fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2rfc called with VSA");
                return -1;
        }

        if ((vp->da->attr == 0) || (vp->da->attr > 255)) {
                fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2rfc called with non-standard attribute %u", vp->da->attr);
                return -1;
        }

        /*
         *      Only CUI is allowed to have zero length.
         *      Thank you, WiMAX!
         */
        if ((vp->vp_length == 0) &&
            (vp->da->attr == PW_CHARGEABLE_USER_IDENTITY)) {
                ptr[0] = PW_CHARGEABLE_USER_IDENTITY;
                ptr[1] = 2;

                *pvp = vp->next;
                return 2;
        }

        /*
         *      Message-Authenticator is hard-coded.
         */
        if (vp->da->attr == PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR) {
                if (room < 18) return -1;

                ptr[0] = PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR;
                ptr[1] = 18;
                memset(ptr + 2, 0, 16);
#ifndef NDEBUG
                if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
                        fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t50 12 ...\n");
                }
#endif

                *pvp = (*pvp)->next;
                return 18;
        }

        /*
         *      EAP-Message is special.
         */
        if (vp->da->flags.concat && (vp->vp_length > 253)) {
                return vp2attr_concat(packet, original, secret, pvp, vp->da->attr,
                                      ptr, room);
        }

        return vp2attr_rfc(packet, original, secret, pvp, vp->da->attr,
                           ptr, room);
}

static ssize_t rad_vp2rfctlv(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
                             RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
                             char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
                             uint8_t *start, size_t room)
{
        ssize_t len;
        VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;

        VERIFY_VP(vp);

        if (!vp->da->flags.is_tlv) {
                fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2rfctlv: attr is not a TLV");
                return -1;
        }

        if ((vp->da->vendor & (FR_MAX_VENDOR - 1)) != 0) {
                fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2rfctlv: attr is not an RFC TLV");
                return -1;
        }

        if (room < 5) return 0;

        /*
         *      Encode the first level of TLVs
         */
        start[0] = (vp->da->vendor / FR_MAX_VENDOR) & 0xff;
        start[1] = 4;
        start[2] = vp->da->attr & fr_attr_mask[0];
        start[3] = 2;

        len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, 0, pvp,
                          start + 4, room - 4);
        if (len <= 0) return len;

        if (len > 253) {
                return -1;
        }

        start[1] += len;
        start[3] += len;

        return start[1];
}

/** Parse a data structure into a RADIUS attribute
 *
 */
int rad_vp2attr(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
                char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp, uint8_t *start,
                size_t room)
{
        VALUE_PAIR const *vp;

        if (!pvp || !*pvp || !start || (room <= 2)) return -1;

        vp = *pvp;

        VERIFY_VP(vp);

        /*
         *      RFC format attributes take the fast path.
         */
        if (!vp->da->vendor) {
                if (vp->da->attr > 255) {
                        *pvp = vp->next;
                        return 0;
                }

                return rad_vp2rfc(packet, original, secret, pvp,
                                  start, room);
        }

        if (vp->da->flags.extended) {
                return rad_vp2extended(packet, original, secret, pvp,
                                       start, room);
        }

        /*
         *      The upper 8 bits of the vendor number are the standard
         *      space attribute which is a TLV.
         */
        if ((vp->da->vendor & (FR_MAX_VENDOR - 1)) == 0) {
                return rad_vp2rfctlv(packet, original, secret, pvp,
                                     start, room);
        }

        if (vp->da->flags.wimax) {
                return rad_vp2wimax(packet, original, secret, pvp,
                                    start, room);
        }

        return rad_vp2vsa(packet, original, secret, pvp, start, room);
}


/** Encode a packet
 *
 */
int rad_encode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
               char const *secret)
{
        radius_packet_t         *hdr;
        uint8_t                 *ptr;
        uint16_t                total_length;
        int                     len;
        VALUE_PAIR const        *reply;

        /*
         *      A 4K packet, aligned on 64-bits.
         */
        uint64_t        data[MAX_PACKET_LEN / sizeof(uint64_t)];

        /*
         *      Double-check some things based on packet code.
         */
        switch (packet->code) {
        case PW_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT:
        case PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT:
        case PW_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
                if (!original) {
                        fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot sign response packet without a request packet");
                        return -1;
                }
                break;

                /*
                 *      These packet vectors start off as all zero.
                 */
        case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
        case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
        case PW_CODE_COA_REQUEST:
                memset(packet->vector, 0, sizeof(packet->vector));
                break;

        default:
                break;
        }

        /*
         *      Use memory on the stack, until we know how
         *      large the packet will be.
         */
        hdr = (radius_packet_t *) data;

        /*
         *      Build standard header
         */
        hdr->code = packet->code;
        hdr->id = packet->id;

        memcpy(hdr->vector, packet->vector, sizeof(hdr->vector));

        total_length = RADIUS_HDR_LEN;

        /*
         *      Load up the configuration values for the user
         */
        ptr = hdr->data;
        packet->offset = 0;

        /*
         *      FIXME: Loop twice over the reply list.  The first time,
         *      calculate the total length of data.  The second time,
         *      allocate the memory, and fill in the VP's.
         *
         *      Hmm... this may be slower than just doing a small
         *      memcpy.
         */

        /*
         *      Loop over the reply attributes for the packet.
         */
        reply = packet->vps;
        while (reply) {
                size_t last_len, room;
                char const *last_name = NULL;

                VERIFY_VP(reply);

                /*
                 *      Ignore non-wire attributes, but allow extended
                 *      attributes.
                 */
                if ((reply->da->vendor == 0) &&
                    ((reply->da->attr & 0xFFFF) >= 256) &&
                    !reply->da->flags.extended && !reply->da->flags.long_extended) {
#ifndef NDEBUG
                        /*
                         *      Permit the admin to send BADLY formatted
                         *      attributes with a debug build.
                         */
                        if (reply->da->attr == PW_RAW_ATTRIBUTE) {
                                memcpy(ptr, reply->vp_octets, reply->vp_length);
                                len = reply->vp_length;
                                reply = reply->next;
                                goto next;
                        }
#endif
                        reply = reply->next;
                        continue;
                }

                /*
                 *      We allow zero-length strings in "unlang", but
                 *      skip them (except for CUI, thanks WiMAX!) on
                 *      all other attributes.
                 */
                if (reply->vp_length == 0) {
                        if ((reply->da->vendor != 0) ||
                            ((reply->da->attr != PW_CHARGEABLE_USER_IDENTITY) &&
                             (reply->da->attr != PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR))) {
                                reply = reply->next;
                                continue;
                        }
                }

                /*
                 *      Set the Message-Authenticator to the correct
                 *      length and initial value.
                 */
                if (!reply->da->vendor && (reply->da->attr == PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR)) {
                        /*
                         *      Cache the offset to the
                         *      Message-Authenticator
                         */
                        packet->offset = total_length;
                        last_len = 16;
                } else {
                        last_len = reply->vp_length;
                }
                last_name = reply->da->name;

                room = ((uint8_t *) data) + sizeof(data) - ptr;

                if (room <= 2) break;

                len = rad_vp2attr(packet, original, secret, &reply, ptr, room);
                if (len < 0) return -1;

                /*
                 *      Failed to encode the attribute, likely because
                 *      the packet is full.
                 */
                if (len == 0) {
                        if (last_len != 0) {
                                fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Failed encoding attribute %s\n", last_name);
                                break;
                        } else {
                                fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Skipping zero-length attribute %s\n", last_name);
                        }
                }

#ifndef NDEBUG
        next:                   /* Used only for Raw-Attribute */
#endif
                ptr += len;
                total_length += len;
        } /* done looping over all attributes */

        /*
         *      Fill in the rest of the fields, and copy the data over
         *      from the local stack to the newly allocated memory.
         *
         *      Yes, all this 'memcpy' is slow, but it means
         *      that we only allocate the minimum amount of
         *      memory for a request.
         */
        packet->data_len = total_length;
        packet->data = talloc_array(packet, uint8_t, packet->data_len);
        if (!packet->data) {
                fr_strerror_printf("Out of memory");
                return -1;
        }

        memcpy(packet->data, hdr, packet->data_len);
        hdr = (radius_packet_t *) packet->data;

        total_length = htons(total_length);
        memcpy(hdr->length, &total_length, sizeof(total_length));

        return 0;
}


/** Sign a previously encoded packet
 *
 */
int rad_sign(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
             char const *secret)
{
        radius_packet_t *hdr = (radius_packet_t *)packet->data;

        /*
         *      It wasn't assigned an Id, this is bad!
         */
        if (packet->id < 0) {
                fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: RADIUS packets must be assigned an Id");
                return -1;
        }

        if (!packet->data || (packet->data_len < RADIUS_HDR_LEN) ||
            (packet->offset < 0)) {
                fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: You must call rad_encode() before rad_sign()");
                return -1;
        }

        /*
         *      Set up the authentication vector with zero, or with
         *      the original vector, prior to signing.
         */
        switch (packet->code) {
        case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
        case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
        case PW_CODE_COA_REQUEST:
                memset(packet->vector, 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
                break;

        case PW_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT:
        case PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT:
        case PW_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
        case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE:
        case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_ACK:
        case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_NAK:
        case PW_CODE_COA_ACK:
        case PW_CODE_COA_NAK:
                if (!original) {
                        fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot sign response packet without a request packet");
                        return -1;
                }
                memcpy(packet->vector, original->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
                break;

        case PW_CODE_ACCESS_REQUEST:
        case PW_CODE_STATUS_SERVER:
        default:
                break;          /* packet->vector is already random bytes */
        }

#ifndef NDEBUG
        if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp) rad_print_hex(packet);
#endif

        /*
         *      If there's a Message-Authenticator, update it
         *      now.
         */
        if (packet->offset > 0) {
                uint8_t calc_auth_vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];

                switch (packet->code) {
                case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE:
                        if (original && original->code == PW_CODE_STATUS_SERVER) {
                                goto do_ack;
                        }

                case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
                case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
                case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_ACK:
                case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_NAK:
                case PW_CODE_COA_REQUEST:
                case PW_CODE_COA_ACK:
                case PW_CODE_COA_NAK:
                        memset(hdr->vector, 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
                        break;

                do_ack:
                case PW_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT:
                case PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT:
                case PW_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
                        memcpy(hdr->vector, original->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
                        break;

                default:
                        break;
                }

                /*
                 *      Set the authentication vector to zero,
                 *      calculate the HMAC, and put it
                 *      into the Message-Authenticator
                 *      attribute.
                 */
                fr_hmac_md5(calc_auth_vector, packet->data, packet->data_len,
                            (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret));
                memcpy(packet->data + packet->offset + 2,
                       calc_auth_vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
        }

        /*
         *      Copy the request authenticator over to the packet.
         */
        memcpy(hdr->vector, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);

        /*
         *      Switch over the packet code, deciding how to
         *      sign the packet.
         */
        switch (packet->code) {
                /*
                 *      Request packets are not signed, but
                 *      have a random authentication vector.
                 */
        case PW_CODE_ACCESS_REQUEST:
        case PW_CODE_STATUS_SERVER:
                break;

                /*
                 *      Reply packets are signed with the
                 *      authentication vector of the request.
                 */
        default:
                {
                        uint8_t digest[16];

                        FR_MD5_CTX      context;
                        fr_md5_init(&context);
                        fr_md5_update(&context, packet->data, packet->data_len);
                        fr_md5_update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret,
                                     strlen(secret));
                        fr_md5_final(digest, &context);

                        memcpy(hdr->vector, digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
                        memcpy(packet->vector, digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
                        break;
                }
        }/* switch over packet codes */

        return 0;
}

/** Reply to the request
 *
 * Also attach reply attribute value pairs and any user message provided.
 */
int rad_send(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
             char const *secret)
{
        /*
         *      Maybe it's a fake packet.  Don't send it.
         */
        if (!packet || (packet->sockfd < 0)) {
                return 0;
        }

        /*
         *  First time through, allocate room for the packet
         */
        if (!packet->data) {
                /*
                 *      Encode the packet.
                 */
                if (rad_encode(packet, original, secret) < 0) {
                        return -1;
                }

                /*
                 *      Re-sign it, including updating the
                 *      Message-Authenticator.
                 */
                if (rad_sign(packet, original, secret) < 0) {
                        return -1;
                }

                /*
                 *      If packet->data points to data, then we print out
                 *      the VP list again only for debugging.
                 */
        }

#ifndef NDEBUG
        if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp) rad_print_hex(packet);
#endif

#ifdef WITH_TCP
        /*
         *      If the socket is TCP, call write().  Calling sendto()
         *      is allowed on some platforms, but it's not nice.  Even
         *      worse, if UDPFROMTO is defined, we *can't* use it on
         *      TCP sockets.  So... just call write().
         */
        if (packet->proto == IPPROTO_TCP) {
                ssize_t rcode;

                rcode = write(packet->sockfd, packet->data, packet->data_len);
                if (rcode >= 0) return rcode;

                fr_strerror_printf("sendto failed: %s", fr_syserror(errno));
                return -1;
        }
#endif

        /*
         *      And send it on it's way.
         */
        return rad_sendto(packet->sockfd, packet->data, packet->data_len, 0,
                          &packet->src_ipaddr, packet->src_port,
                          &packet->dst_ipaddr, packet->dst_port);
}

/** Do a comparison of two authentication digests by comparing the FULL digest
 *
 * Otherwise, the server can be subject to timing attacks that allow attackers
 * find a valid message authenticator.
 *
 * http://www.cs.rice.edu/~dwallach/pub/crosby-timing2009.pdf
 */
int rad_digest_cmp(uint8_t const *a, uint8_t const *b, size_t length)
{
        int result = 0;
        size_t i;

        for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
                result |= a[i] ^ b[i];
        }

        return result;          /* 0 is OK, !0 is !OK, just like memcmp */
}


/** Validates the requesting client NAS
 *
 * Calculates the request Authenticator based on the clients private key.
 */
static int calc_acctdigest(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, char const *secret)
{
        uint8_t         digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
        FR_MD5_CTX              context;

        /*
         *      Zero out the auth_vector in the received packet.
         *      Then append the shared secret to the received packet,
         *      and calculate the MD5 sum. This must be the same
         *      as the original MD5 sum (packet->vector).
         */
        memset(packet->data + 4, 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);

        /*
         *  MD5(packet + secret);
         */
        fr_md5_init(&context);
        fr_md5_update(&context, packet->data, packet->data_len);
        fr_md5_update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret));
        fr_md5_final(digest, &context);

        /*
         *      Return 0 if OK, 2 if not OK.
         */
        if (rad_digest_cmp(digest, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) != 0) return 2;
        return 0;
}


/** Validates the requesting client NAS
 *
 * Calculates the response Authenticator based on the clients
 * private key.
 */
static int calc_replydigest(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET *original,
                            char const *secret)
{
        uint8_t         calc_digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
        FR_MD5_CTX              context;

        /*
         *      Very bad!
         */
        if (original == NULL) {
                return 3;
        }

        /*
         *  Copy the original vector in place.
         */
        memcpy(packet->data + 4, original->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);

        /*
         *  MD5(packet + secret);
         */
        fr_md5_init(&context);
        fr_md5_update(&context, packet->data, packet->data_len);
        fr_md5_update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret));
        fr_md5_final(calc_digest, &context);

        /*
         *  Copy the packet's vector back to the packet.
         */
        memcpy(packet->data + 4, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);

        /*
         *      Return 0 if OK, 2 if not OK.
         */
        if (rad_digest_cmp(packet->vector, calc_digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) != 0) return 2;
        return 0;
}

/** Check if a set of RADIUS formatted TLVs are OK
 *
 */
int rad_tlv_ok(uint8_t const *data, size_t length,
               size_t dv_type, size_t dv_length)
{
        uint8_t const *end = data + length;

        VP_TRACE("checking TLV %u/%u\n", (unsigned int) dv_type, (unsigned int) dv_length);

        VP_HEXDUMP("tlv_ok", data, length);

        if ((dv_length > 2) || (dv_type == 0) || (dv_type > 4)) {
                fr_strerror_printf("rad_tlv_ok: Invalid arguments");
                return -1;
        }

        while (data < end) {
                size_t attrlen;

                if ((data + dv_type + dv_length) > end) {
                        fr_strerror_printf("Attribute header overflow");
                        return -1;
                }

                switch (dv_type) {
                case 4:
                        if ((data[0] == 0) && (data[1] == 0) &&
                            (data[2] == 0) && (data[3] == 0)) {
                        zero:
                                fr_strerror_printf("Invalid attribute 0");
                                return -1;
                        }

                        if (data[0] != 0) {
                                fr_strerror_printf("Invalid attribute > 2^24");
                                return -1;
                        }
                        break;

                case 2:
                        if ((data[0] == 0) && (data[1] == 0)) goto zero;
                        break;

                case 1:
                        /*
                         *      Zero is allowed, because the Colubris
                         *      people are dumb and use it.
                         */
                        break;

                default:
                        fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check failed");
                        return -1;
                }

                switch (dv_length) {
                case 0:
                        return 0;

                case 2:
                        if (data[dv_type] != 0) {
                                fr_strerror_printf("Attribute is longer than 256 octets");
                                return -1;
                        }
                        /* FALL-THROUGH */
                case 1:
                        attrlen = data[dv_type + dv_length - 1];
                        break;


                default:
                        fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check failed");
                        return -1;
                }

                if (attrlen < (dv_type + dv_length)) {
                        fr_strerror_printf("Attribute header has invalid length");
                        return -1;
                }

                if (attrlen > length) {
                        fr_strerror_printf("Attribute overflows container");
                        return -1;
                }

                data += attrlen;
                length -= attrlen;
        }

        return 0;
}


/** See if the data pointed to by PTR is a valid RADIUS packet.
 *
 * Packet is not 'const * const' because we may update data_len, if there's more data
 * in the UDP packet than in the RADIUS packet.
 *
 * @param packet to check
 * @param flags to control decoding
 * @param reason if not NULL, will have the failure reason written to where it points.
 * @return bool, true on success, false on failure.
 */
bool rad_packet_ok(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, int flags, decode_fail_t *reason)
{
        uint8_t                 *attr;
        size_t                  totallen;
        int                     count;
        radius_packet_t         *hdr;
        char                    host_ipaddr[128];
        bool                    require_ma = false;
        bool                    seen_ma = false;
        uint32_t                num_attributes;
        decode_fail_t           failure = DECODE_FAIL_NONE;
        bool                    eap = false;
        bool                    non_eap = false;

        /*
         *      Check for packets smaller than the packet header.
         *
         *      RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
         *
         *      "The minimum length is 20 ..."
         */
        if (packet->data_len < RADIUS_HDR_LEN) {
                FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too short (received %zu < minimum %d)",
                           inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
                                     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
                                     host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
                                     packet->data_len, RADIUS_HDR_LEN);
                failure = DECODE_FAIL_MIN_LENGTH_PACKET;
                goto finish;
        }


        /*
         *      Check for packets with mismatched size.
         *      i.e. We've received 128 bytes, and the packet header
         *      says it's 256 bytes long.
         */
        totallen = (packet->data[2] << 8) | packet->data[3];
        hdr = (radius_packet_t *)packet->data;

        /*
         *      Code of 0 is not understood.
         *      Code of 16 or greate is not understood.
         */
        if ((hdr->code == 0) ||
            (hdr->code >= FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
                FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Bad RADIUS packet from host %s: unknown packet code %d",
                           inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
                                     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
                                     host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
                           hdr->code);
                failure = DECODE_FAIL_UNKNOWN_PACKET_CODE;
                goto finish;
        }

        /*
         *      Message-Authenticator is required in Status-Server
         *      packets, otherwise they can be trivially forged.
         */
        if (hdr->code == PW_CODE_STATUS_SERVER) require_ma = true;

        /*
         *      It's also required if the caller asks for it.
         */
        if (flags) require_ma = true;

        /*
         *      Repeat the length checks.  This time, instead of
         *      looking at the data we received, look at the value
         *      of the 'length' field inside of the packet.
         *
         *      Check for packets smaller than the packet header.
         *
         *      RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
         *
         *      "The minimum length is 20 ..."
         */
        if (totallen < RADIUS_HDR_LEN) {
                FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too short (length %zu < minimum %d)",
                           inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
                                     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
                                     host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
                                     totallen, RADIUS_HDR_LEN);
                failure = DECODE_FAIL_MIN_LENGTH_FIELD;
                goto finish;
        }

        /*
         *      And again, for the value of the 'length' field.
         *
         *      RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
         *
         *      " ... and maximum length is 4096."
         *
         *      HOWEVER.  This requirement is for the network layer.
         *      If the code gets here, we assume that a well-formed
         *      packet is an OK packet.
         *
         *      We allow both the UDP data length, and the RADIUS
         *      "length" field to contain up to 64K of data.
         */

        /*
         *      RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
         *
         *      "If the packet is shorter than the Length field
         *      indicates, it MUST be silently discarded."
         *
         *      i.e. No response to the NAS.
         */
        if (packet->data_len < totallen) {
                FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: received %zu octets, packet length says %zu",
                           inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
                                     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
                                     host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
                                     packet->data_len, totallen);
                failure = DECODE_FAIL_MIN_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
                goto finish;
        }

        /*
         *      RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
         *
         *      "Octets outside the range of the Length field MUST be
         *      treated as padding and ignored on reception."
         */
        if (packet->data_len > totallen) {
                /*
                 *      We're shortening the packet below, but just
                 *      to be paranoid, zero out the extra data.
                 */
                memset(packet->data + totallen, 0, packet->data_len - totallen);
                packet->data_len = totallen;
        }

        /*
         *      Walk through the packet's attributes, ensuring that
         *      they add up EXACTLY to the size of the packet.
         *
         *      If they don't, then the attributes either under-fill
         *      or over-fill the packet.  Any parsing of the packet
         *      is impossible, and will result in unknown side effects.
         *
         *      This would ONLY happen with buggy RADIUS implementations,
         *      or with an intentional attack.  Either way, we do NOT want
         *      to be vulnerable to this problem.
         */
        attr = hdr->data;
        count = totallen - RADIUS_HDR_LEN;
        num_attributes = 0;

        while (count > 0) {
                /*
                 *      We need at least 2 bytes to check the
                 *      attribute header.
                 */
                if (count < 2) {
                        FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: attribute header overflows the packet",
                                   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
                                             &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
                                             host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
                        failure = DECODE_FAIL_HEADER_OVERFLOW;
                        goto finish;
                }

                /*
                 *      Attribute number zero is NOT defined.
                 */
                if (attr[0] == 0) {
                        FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: Invalid attribute 0",
                                   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
                                             &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
                                             host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
                        failure = DECODE_FAIL_INVALID_ATTRIBUTE;
                        goto finish;
                }

                /*
                 *      Attributes are at LEAST as long as the ID & length
                 *      fields.  Anything shorter is an invalid attribute.
                 */
                if (attr[1] < 2) {
                        FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: attribute %u too short",
                                   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
                                             &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
                                             host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
                                   attr[0]);
                        failure = DECODE_FAIL_ATTRIBUTE_TOO_SHORT;
                        goto finish;
                }

                /*
                 *      If there are fewer bytes in the packet than in the
                 *      attribute, it's a bad packet.
                 */
                if (count < attr[1]) {
                        FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: attribute %u data overflows the packet",
                                   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
                                             &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
                                             host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
                                           attr[0]);
                        failure = DECODE_FAIL_ATTRIBUTE_OVERFLOW;
                        goto finish;
                }

                /*
                 *      Sanity check the attributes for length.
                 */
                switch (attr[0]) {
                default:        /* don't do anything by default */
                        break;

                        /*
                         *      If there's an EAP-Message, we require
                         *      a Message-Authenticator.
                         */
                case PW_EAP_MESSAGE:
                        require_ma = true;
                        eap = true;
                        break;

                case PW_USER_PASSWORD:
                case PW_CHAP_PASSWORD:
                case PW_ARAP_PASSWORD:
                        non_eap = true;
                        break;

                case PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR:
                        if (attr[1] != 2 + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) {
                                FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: Message-Authenticator has invalid length %d",
                                           inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
                                                     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
                                                     host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
                                           attr[1] - 2);
                                failure = DECODE_FAIL_MA_INVALID_LENGTH;
                                goto finish;
                        }
                        seen_ma = true;
                        break;
                }

                /*
                 *      FIXME: Look up the base 255 attributes in the
                 *      dictionary, and switch over their type.  For
                 *      integer/date/ip, the attribute length SHOULD
                 *      be 6.
                 */
                count -= attr[1];       /* grab the attribute length */
                attr += attr[1];
                num_attributes++;       /* seen one more attribute */
        }

        /*
         *      If the attributes add up to a packet, it's allowed.
         *
         *      If not, we complain, and throw the packet away.
         */
        if (count != 0) {
                FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: packet attributes do NOT exactly fill the packet",
                           inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
                                     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
                                     host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
                failure = DECODE_FAIL_ATTRIBUTE_UNDERFLOW;
                goto finish;
        }

        /*
         *      If we're configured to look for a maximum number of
         *      attributes, and we've seen more than that maximum,
         *      then throw the packet away, as a possible DoS.
         */
        if ((fr_max_attributes > 0) &&
            (num_attributes > fr_max_attributes)) {
                FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Possible DoS attack from host %s: Too many attributes in request (received %d, max %d are allowed).",
                           inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
                                     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
                                     host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
                           num_attributes, fr_max_attributes);
                failure = DECODE_FAIL_TOO_MANY_ATTRIBUTES;
                goto finish;
        }

        /*
         *      http://www.freeradius.org/rfc/rfc2869.html#EAP-Message
         *
         *      A packet with an EAP-Message attribute MUST also have
         *      a Message-Authenticator attribute.
         *
         *      A Message-Authenticator all by itself is OK, though.
         *
         *      Similarly, Status-Server packets MUST contain
         *      Message-Authenticator attributes.
         */
        if (require_ma && !seen_ma) {
                FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Insecure packet from host %s:  Packet does not contain required Message-Authenticator attribute",
                           inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
                                     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
                                     host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
                failure = DECODE_FAIL_MA_MISSING;
                goto finish;
        }

        if (eap && non_eap) {
                FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Bad packet from host %s:  Packet contains EAP-Message and non-EAP authentication attribute",
                           inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
                                     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
                                     host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
                failure = DECODE_FAIL_TOO_MANY_AUTH;
                goto finish;
        }

        /*
         *      Fill RADIUS header fields
         */
        packet->code = hdr->code;
        packet->id = hdr->id;
        memcpy(packet->vector, hdr->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);


        finish:

        if (reason) {
                *reason = failure;
        }
        return (failure == DECODE_FAIL_NONE);
}


/** Receive UDP client requests, and fill in the basics of a RADIUS_PACKET structure
 *
 */
RADIUS_PACKET *rad_recv(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, int fd, int flags)
{
        int sock_flags = 0;
        ssize_t data_len;
        RADIUS_PACKET           *packet;

        /*
         *      Allocate the new request data structure
         */
        packet = rad_alloc(ctx, false);
        if (!packet) {
                fr_strerror_printf("out of memory");
                return NULL;
        }

        if (flags & 0x02) {
                sock_flags = MSG_PEEK;
                flags &= ~0x02;
        }

        data_len = rad_recvfrom(fd, packet, sock_flags,
                                &packet->src_ipaddr, &packet->src_port,
                                &packet->dst_ipaddr, &packet->dst_port);

        /*
         *      Check for socket errors.
         */
        if (data_len < 0) {
                FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Error receiving packet: %s", fr_syserror(errno));
                /* packet->data is NULL */
                rad_free(&packet);
                return NULL;
        }
        packet->data_len = data_len; /* unsigned vs signed */

        /*
         *      If the packet is too big, then rad_recvfrom did NOT
         *      allocate memory.  Instead, it just discarded the
         *      packet.
         */
        if (packet->data_len > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
                FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Discarding packet: Larger than RFC limitation of 4096 bytes");
                /* packet->data is NULL */
                rad_free(&packet);
                return NULL;
        }

        /*
         *      Read no data.  Continue.
         *      This check is AFTER the MAX_PACKET_LEN check above, because
         *      if the packet is larger than MAX_PACKET_LEN, we also have
         *      packet->data == NULL
         */
        if ((packet->data_len == 0) || !packet->data) {
                FR_DEBUG_STRERROR_PRINTF("Empty packet: Socket is not ready");
                rad_free(&packet);
                return NULL;
        }

        /*
         *      See if it's a well-formed RADIUS packet.
         */
        if (!rad_packet_ok(packet, flags, NULL)) {
                rad_free(&packet);
                return NULL;
        }

        /*
         *      Remember which socket we read the packet from.
         */
        packet->sockfd = fd;

        /*
         *      FIXME: Do even more filtering by only permitting
         *      certain IP's.  The problem is that we don't know
         *      how to do this properly for all possible clients...
         */

        /*
         *      Explicitely set the VP list to empty.
         */
        packet->vps = NULL;

#ifndef NDEBUG
        if ((fr_debug_lvl > 3) && fr_log_fp) rad_print_hex(packet);
#endif

        return packet;
}


/** Verify the Request/Response Authenticator (and Message-Authenticator if present) of a packet
 *
 */
int rad_verify(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET *original, char const *secret)
{
        uint8_t         *ptr;
        int             length;
        int             attrlen;
        int             rcode;
        char            buffer[32];

        if (!packet || !packet->data) return -1;

        /*
         *      Before we allocate memory for the attributes, do more
         *      sanity checking.
         */
        ptr = packet->data + RADIUS_HDR_LEN;
        length = packet->data_len - RADIUS_HDR_LEN;
        while (length > 0) {
                uint8_t msg_auth_vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
                uint8_t calc_auth_vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];

                attrlen = ptr[1];

                switch (ptr[0]) {
                default:        /* don't do anything. */
                        break;

                        /*
                         *      Note that more than one Message-Authenticator
                         *      attribute is invalid.
                         */
                case PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR:
                        memcpy(msg_auth_vector, &ptr[2], sizeof(msg_auth_vector));
                        memset(&ptr[2], 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);

                        switch (packet->code) {
                        default:
                                break;

                        case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE:
                                if (original &&
                                    (original->code == PW_CODE_STATUS_SERVER)) {
                                        goto do_ack;
                                }

                        case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
                        case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
                        case PW_CODE_COA_REQUEST:
                                memset(packet->data + 4, 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
                                break;

                        do_ack:
                        case PW_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT:
                        case PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT:
                        case PW_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
                        case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_ACK:
                        case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_NAK:
                        case PW_CODE_COA_ACK:
                        case PW_CODE_COA_NAK:
                                if (!original) {
                                        fr_strerror_printf("Cannot validate Message-Authenticator in response "
                                                           "packet without a request packet");
                                        return -1;
                                }
                                memcpy(packet->data + 4, original->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
                                break;
                        }

                        fr_hmac_md5(calc_auth_vector, packet->data, packet->data_len,
                                    (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret));
                        if (rad_digest_cmp(calc_auth_vector, msg_auth_vector,
                                   sizeof(calc_auth_vector)) != 0) {
                                fr_strerror_printf("Received packet from %s with invalid Message-Authenticator!  "
                                                   "(Shared secret is incorrect.)",
                                                   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
                                                             &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
                                                             buffer, sizeof(buffer)));
                                /* Silently drop packet, according to RFC 3579 */
                                return -1;
                        } /* else the message authenticator was good */

                        /*
                         *      Reinitialize Authenticators.
                         */
                        memcpy(&ptr[2], msg_auth_vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
                        memcpy(packet->data + 4, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
                        break;
                } /* switch over the attributes */

                ptr += attrlen;
                length -= attrlen;
        } /* loop over the packet, sanity checking the attributes */

        /*
         *      It looks like a RADIUS packet, but we don't know what it is
         *      so can't validate the authenticators.
         */
        if ((packet->code == 0) || (packet->code >= FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
                fr_strerror_printf("Received Unknown packet code %d "
                                   "from client %s port %d: Cannot validate Request/Response Authenticator.",
                                   packet->code,
                                   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
                                             &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
                                             buffer, sizeof(buffer)),
                                   packet->src_port);
                return -1;
        }

        /*
         *      Calculate and/or verify Request or Response Authenticator.
         */
        switch (packet->code) {
        case PW_CODE_ACCESS_REQUEST:
        case PW_CODE_STATUS_SERVER:
                /*
                 *      The authentication vector is random
                 *      nonsense, invented by the client.
                 */
                break;

        case PW_CODE_COA_REQUEST:
        case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
        case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
                if (calc_acctdigest(packet, secret) > 1) {
                        fr_strerror_printf("Received %s packet "
                                           "from client %s with invalid Request Authenticator!  "
                                           "(Shared secret is incorrect.)",
                                           fr_packet_codes[packet->code],
                                           inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
                                                     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
                                                     buffer, sizeof(buffer)));
                        return -1;
                }
                break;

                /* Verify the reply digest */
        case PW_CODE_ACCESS_ACCEPT:
        case PW_CODE_ACCESS_REJECT:
        case PW_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
        case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE:
        case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_ACK:
        case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_NAK:
        case PW_CODE_COA_ACK:
        case PW_CODE_COA_NAK:
                rcode = calc_replydigest(packet, original, secret);
                if (rcode > 1) {
                        fr_strerror_printf("Received %s packet "
                                           "from home server %s port %d with invalid Response Authenticator!  "
                                           "(Shared secret is incorrect.)",
                                           fr_packet_codes[packet->code],
                                           inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
                                                     &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
                                                     buffer, sizeof(buffer)),
                                           packet->src_port);
                        return -1;
                }
                break;

        default:
                fr_strerror_printf("Received Unknown packet code %d "
                                   "from client %s port %d: Cannot validate Request/Response Authenticator",
                                   packet->code,
                                   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
                                             &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
                                             buffer, sizeof(buffer)),
                                   packet->src_port);
                return -1;
        }

        return 0;
}


/** Convert a "concatenated" attribute to one long VP
 *
 */
static ssize_t data2vp_concat(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
                              DICT_ATTR const *da, uint8_t const *start,
                              size_t const packetlen, VALUE_PAIR **pvp)
{
        size_t total;
        uint8_t attr;
        uint8_t const *ptr = start;
        uint8_t const *end = start + packetlen;
        uint8_t *p;
        VALUE_PAIR *vp;

        total = 0;
        attr = ptr[0];

        /*
         *      The packet has already been sanity checked, so we
         *      don't care about walking off of the end of it.
         */
        while (ptr < end) {
                total += ptr[1] - 2;

                ptr += ptr[1];

                /*
                 *      Attributes MUST be consecutive.
                 */
                if (ptr[0] != attr) break;
        }

        vp = fr_pair_afrom_da(ctx, da);
        if (!vp) return -1;

        vp->vp_length = total;
        vp->vp_octets = p = talloc_array(vp, uint8_t, vp->vp_length);
        if (!p) {
                fr_pair_list_free(&vp);
                return -1;
        }

        total = 0;
        ptr = start;
        while (total < vp->vp_length) {
                memcpy(p, ptr + 2, ptr[1] - 2);
                p += ptr[1] - 2;
                total += ptr[1] - 2;
                ptr += ptr[1];
        }

        *pvp = vp;
        return ptr - start;
}


/** Convert TLVs to one or more VPs
 *
 */
ssize_t rad_data2vp_tlvs(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
                            RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
                            char const *secret, DICT_ATTR const *da,
                            uint8_t const *start, size_t length,
                            VALUE_PAIR **pvp)
{
        uint8_t const *data = start;
        DICT_ATTR const *child;
        VALUE_PAIR *head, **tail;

        if (length < 3) return -1; /* type, length, value */

        VP_HEXDUMP("tlvs", data, length);

        if (rad_tlv_ok(data, length, 1, 1) < 0) return -1;

        head = NULL;
        tail = &head;

        while (data < (start + length)) {
                ssize_t tlv_len;

                child = dict_attrbyparent(da, data[0], da->vendor);
                if (!child) {
                        unsigned int my_attr, my_vendor;

                        VP_TRACE("Failed to find child %u of TLV %s\n",
                                 data[0], da->name);

                        /*
                         *      Get child attr/vendor so that
                         *      we can call unknown attr.
                         */
                        my_attr = data[0];
                        my_vendor = da->vendor;

                        if (!dict_attr_child(da, &my_attr, &my_vendor)) {
                                fr_pair_list_free(&head);
                                return -1;
                        }

                        child = dict_unknown_afrom_fields(ctx, my_attr, my_vendor);
                        if (!child) {
                                fr_pair_list_free(&head);
                                return -1;
                        }
                }

                tlv_len = data2vp(ctx, packet, original, secret, child,
                                  data + 2, data[1] - 2, data[1] - 2, tail);
                if (tlv_len < 0) {
                        fr_pair_list_free(&head);
                        return -1;
                }
                if (*tail) tail = &((*tail)->next);
                data += data[1];
        }

        *pvp = head;
        return length;
}

/** Convert a top-level VSA to a VP.
 *
 * "length" can be LONGER than just this sub-vsa.
 */
static ssize_t data2vp_vsa(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
                           RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
                           char const *secret, DICT_VENDOR *dv,
                           uint8_t const *data, size_t length,
                           VALUE_PAIR **pvp)
{
        unsigned int attribute;
        ssize_t attrlen, my_len;
        DICT_ATTR const *da;

        VP_TRACE("data2vp_vsa: length %u\n", (unsigned int) length);

#ifndef NDEBUG
        if (length <= (dv->type + dv->length)) {
                fr_strerror_printf("data2vp_vsa: Failure to call rad_tlv_ok");
                return -1;
        }
#endif

        switch (dv->type) {
        case 4:
                /* data[0] must be zero */
                attribute = data[1] << 16;
                attribute |= data[2] << 8;
                attribute |= data[3];
                break;

        case 2:
                attribute = data[0] << 8;
                attribute |= data[1];
                break;

        case 1:
                attribute = data[0];
                break;

        default:
                fr_strerror_printf("data2vp_vsa: Internal sanity check failed");
                return -1;
        }

        switch (dv->length) {
        case 2:
                /* data[dv->type] must be zero, from rad_tlv_ok() */
                attrlen = data[dv->type + 1];
                break;

        case 1:
                attrlen = data[dv->type];
                break;

        case 0:
                attrlen = length;
                break;

        default:
                fr_strerror_printf("data2vp_vsa: Internal sanity check failed");
                return -1;
        }

        /*
         *      See if the VSA is known.
         */
        da = dict_attrbyvalue(attribute, dv->vendorpec);
        if (!da) da = dict_unknown_afrom_fields(ctx, attribute, dv->vendorpec);
        if (!da) return -1;

        my_len = data2vp(ctx, packet, original, secret, da,
                         data + dv->type + dv->length,
                         attrlen - (dv->type + dv->length),
                         attrlen - (dv->type + dv->length),
                         pvp);
        if (my_len < 0) return my_len;

        return attrlen;
}


/** Convert a fragmented extended attr to a VP
 *
 * Format is:
 *
 * attr
 * length
 * extended-attr
 * flag
 * data...
 *
 * But for the first fragment, we get passed a pointer to the "extended-attr"
 */
static ssize_t data2vp_extended(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
                                RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
                                char const *secret, DICT_ATTR const *da,
                                uint8_t const *data,
                                size_t attrlen, size_t packetlen,
                                VALUE_PAIR **pvp)
{
        ssize_t rcode;
        size_t fraglen;
        uint8_t *head, *tail;
        uint8_t const *frag, *end;
        uint8_t const *attr;
        int fragments;
        bool last_frag;

        if (attrlen < 3) return -1;

        /*
         *      Calculate the length of all of the fragments.  For
         *      now, they MUST be contiguous in the packet, and they
         *      MUST be all of the same TYPE and EXTENDED-TYPE
         */
        attr = data - 2;
        fraglen = attrlen - 2;
        frag = data + attrlen;
        end = data + packetlen;
        fragments = 1;
        last_frag = false;

        while (frag < end) {
                if (last_frag ||
                    (frag[0] != attr[0]) ||
                    (frag[1] < 4) ||                   /* too short for long-extended */
                    (frag[2] != attr[2]) ||
                    ((frag + frag[1]) > end)) {         /* overflow */
                        end = frag;
                        break;
                }

                last_frag = ((frag[3] & 0x80) == 0);

                fraglen += frag[1] - 4;
                frag += frag[1];
                fragments++;
        }

        head = tail = malloc(fraglen);
        if (!head) return -1;

        VP_TRACE("Fragments %d, total length %d\n", fragments, (int) fraglen);

        /*
         *      And again, but faster and looser.
         *
         *      We copy the first fragment, followed by the rest of
         *      the fragments.
         */
        frag = attr;

        while (fragments >  0) {
                memcpy(tail, frag + 4, frag[1] - 4);
                tail += frag[1] - 4;
                frag += frag[1];
                fragments--;
        }

        VP_HEXDUMP("long-extended fragments", head, fraglen);

        rcode = data2vp(ctx, packet, original, secret, da,
                        head, fraglen, fraglen, pvp);
        free(head);
        if (rcode < 0) return rcode;

        return end - data;
}

/** Convert a Vendor-Specific WIMAX to VPs
 *
 * @note Called ONLY for Vendor-Specific
 */
static ssize_t data2vp_wimax(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
                             RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
                             char const *secret, uint32_t vendor,
                             uint8_t const *data,
                             size_t attrlen, size_t packetlen,
                             VALUE_PAIR **pvp)
{
        ssize_t rcode;
        size_t wimax_len;
        bool more;
        uint8_t *head, *tail;
        uint8_t const *attr, *end;
        DICT_ATTR const *child;

        /*
         *      data = VID VID VID VID WiMAX-Attr WimAX-Len Continuation ...
         */

        /*
         *      Not enough room for WiMAX Vendor + Wimax attr + length
         *      + continuation, it's a bad attribute.
         */
        if (attrlen < 8) {
        raw:            
                /*
                 *      It's not a Vendor-Specific, it's unknown...
                 */
                child = dict_unknown_afrom_fields(ctx, PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC, 0);
                if (!child) {
                        fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check %d", __LINE__);
                        return -1;
                }

                rcode = data2vp(ctx, packet, original, secret, child,
                                data, attrlen, attrlen, pvp);
                if (rcode < 0) return rcode;
                return attrlen;
        }

        if (data[5] < 3) goto raw;              /* WiMAX-Length is too small */

        child = dict_attrbyvalue(data[4], vendor);
        if (!child) goto raw;

        /*
         *      No continued data, just decode the attribute in place.
         */
        if ((data[6] & 0x80) == 0) {
                if ((data[5] + 4) != attrlen) goto raw; /* WiMAX attribute doesn't fill Vendor-Specific */

                rcode = data2vp(ctx, packet, original, secret, child,
                                data + 7, data[5] - 3, data[5] - 3,
                                pvp);

                if ((rcode < 0) || (((size_t) rcode + 7) != attrlen)) goto raw; /* didn't decode all of the data */
                return attrlen;
        }

        /*
         *      Calculate the length of all of the fragments.  For
         *      now, they MUST be contiguous in the packet, and they
         *      MUST be all of the same VSA, WiMAX, and WiMAX-attr.
         *
         *      The first fragment doesn't have a RADIUS attribute
         *      header.
         */
        wimax_len = 0;
        attr = data + 4;
        end = data + packetlen;

        while (attr < end) {
                /*
                 *      Not enough room for Attribute + length +
                 *      continuation, it's bad.
                 */
                if ((end - attr) < 3) goto raw;

                /*
                 *      Must have non-zero data in the attribute.
                 */
                if (attr[1] <= 3) goto raw;

                /*
                 *      If the WiMAX attribute overflows the packet,
                 *      it's bad.
                 */
                if ((attr + attr[1]) > end) goto raw;

                /*
                 *      Check the continuation flag.
                 */
                more = ((attr[2] & 0x80) != 0);

                /*
                 *      Or, there's no more data, in which case we
                 *      shorten "end" to finish at this attribute.
                 */
                if (!more) end = attr + attr[1];

                /*
                 *      There's more data, but we're at the end of the
                 *      packet.  The attribute is malformed!
                 */
                if (more && ((attr + attr[1]) == end)) goto raw;

                /*
                 *      Add in the length of the data we need to
                 *      concatenate together.
                 */
                wimax_len += attr[1] - 3;

                /*
                 *      Go to the next attribute, and stop if there's
                 *      no more.
                 */
                attr += attr[1];
                if (!more) break;

                /*
                 *      data = VID VID VID VID WiMAX-Attr WimAX-Len Continuation ...
                 *
                 *      attr = Vendor-Specific VSA-Length VID VID VID VID WiMAX-Attr WimAX-Len Continuation ...
                 *
                 */

                /*
                 *      No room for Vendor-Specific + length +
                 *      Vendor(4) + attr + length + continuation + data
                 */
                if ((end - attr) < 9) goto raw;

                if (attr[0] != PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) goto raw;
                if (attr[1] < 9) goto raw;
                if ((attr + attr[1]) > end) goto raw;
                if (memcmp(data, attr + 2, 4) != 0) goto raw; /* not WiMAX Vendor ID */

                if (attr[1] != (attr[7] + 6)) goto raw; /* WiMAX attr doesn't exactly fill the VSA */

                if (data[4] != attr[6]) goto raw; /* different WiMAX attribute */

                /*
                 *      Skip over the Vendor-Specific header, and
                 *      continue with the WiMAX attributes.
                 */
                attr += 6;
        }

        /*
         *      No data in the WiMAX attribute, make a "raw" one.
         */
        if (!wimax_len) goto raw;

        head = tail = malloc(wimax_len);
        if (!head) return -1;

        /*
         *      Copy the data over, this time trusting the attribute
         *      contents.
         */
        attr = data;
        while (attr < end) {
                memcpy(tail, attr + 4 + 3, attr[4 + 1] - 3);
                tail += attr[4 + 1] - 3;
                attr += 4 + attr[4 + 1]; /* skip VID+WiMax header */
                attr += 2;               /* skip Vendor-Specific header */
        }

        VP_HEXDUMP("wimax fragments", head, wimax_len);

        rcode = data2vp(ctx, packet, original, secret, child,
                        head, wimax_len, wimax_len, pvp);
        free(head);
        if (rcode < 0) goto raw;

        return end - data;
}


/** Convert a top-level VSA to one or more VPs
 *
 */
static ssize_t data2vp_vsas(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
                            RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
                            char const *secret, uint8_t const *data,
                            size_t attrlen, size_t packetlen,
                            VALUE_PAIR **pvp)
{
        size_t total;
        ssize_t rcode;
        uint32_t vendor;
        DICT_VENDOR *dv;
        VALUE_PAIR *head, **tail;
        DICT_VENDOR my_dv;

        if (attrlen > packetlen) return -1;
        if (attrlen < 5) return -1; /* vid, value */
        if (data[0] != 0) return -1; /* we require 24-bit VIDs */

        VP_TRACE("data2vp_vsas\n");

        memcpy(&vendor, data, 4);
        vendor = ntohl(vendor);
        dv = dict_vendorbyvalue(vendor);
        if (!dv) {
                /*
                 *      RFC format is 1 octet type, 1 octet length
                 */
                if (rad_tlv_ok(data + 4, attrlen - 4, 1, 1) < 0) {
                        VP_TRACE("data2vp_vsas: unknown tlvs not OK: %s\n", fr_strerror());
                        return -1;
                }

                /*
                 *      It's a known unknown.
                 */
                memset(&my_dv, 0, sizeof(my_dv));
                dv = &my_dv;

                /*
                 *      Fill in the fields.  Note that the name is empty!
                 */
                dv->vendorpec = vendor;
                dv->type = 1;
                dv->length = 1;

                goto create_attrs;
        }

        /*
         *      WiMAX craziness
         */
        if ((vendor == VENDORPEC_WIMAX) && dv->flags) {
                rcode = data2vp_wimax(ctx, packet, original, secret, vendor,
                                      data, attrlen, packetlen, pvp);
                return rcode;
        }

        /*
         *      VSAs should normally be in TLV format.
         */
        if (rad_tlv_ok(data + 4, attrlen - 4,
                       dv->type, dv->length) < 0) {
                VP_TRACE("data2vp_vsas: tlvs not OK: %s\n", fr_strerror());
                return -1;
        }

        /*
         *      There may be more than one VSA in the
         *      Vendor-Specific.  If so, loop over them all.
         */
create_attrs:
        data += 4;
        attrlen -= 4;
        packetlen -= 4;
        total = 4;
        head = NULL;
        tail = &head;

        while (attrlen > 0) {
                ssize_t vsa_len;

                vsa_len = data2vp_vsa(ctx, packet, original, secret, dv,
                                      data, attrlen, tail);
                if (vsa_len < 0) {
                        fr_pair_list_free(&head);
                        fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check %d", __LINE__);
                        return -1;
                }

                /*
                 *      Vendors can send zero-length VSAs.
                 */
                if (*tail) tail = &((*tail)->next);

                data += vsa_len;
                attrlen -= vsa_len;
                packetlen -= vsa_len;
                total += vsa_len;
        }

        *pvp = head;
        return total;
}

/** Create any kind of VP from the attribute contents
 *
 * "length" is AT LEAST the length of this attribute, as we
 * expect the caller to have verified the data with
 * rad_packet_ok().  "length" may be up to the length of the
 * packet.
 *
 * @return -1 on error, or "length".
 */
ssize_t data2vp(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
                RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
                char const *secret,
                DICT_ATTR const *da, uint8_t const *start,
                size_t const attrlen, size_t const packetlen,
                VALUE_PAIR **pvp)
{
        int8_t tag = TAG_NONE;
        size_t datalen;
        ssize_t rcode;
        uint32_t vendor;
        DICT_ATTR const *child;
        VALUE_PAIR *vp;
        uint8_t const *data = start;
        char *p;
        uint8_t buffer[256];

        /*
         *      FIXME: Attrlen can be larger than 253 for extended attrs!
         */
        if (!da || (attrlen > packetlen) ||
            ((attrlen > 253) && (attrlen != packetlen)) ||
            (attrlen > 128*1024)) {
                fr_strerror_printf("data2vp: invalid arguments");
                return -1;
        }

        VP_HEXDUMP("data2vp", start, attrlen);

        VP_TRACE("parent %s len %zu ... %zu\n", da->name, attrlen, packetlen);

        datalen = attrlen;

        /*
         *      Hacks for CUI.  The WiMAX spec says that it can be
         *      zero length, even though this is forbidden by the
         *      RADIUS specs.  So... we make a special case for it.
         */
        if (attrlen == 0) {
                if (!((da->vendor == 0) &&
                      (da->attr == PW_CHARGEABLE_USER_IDENTITY))) {
                        *pvp = NULL;
                        return 0;
                }

#ifndef NDEBUG
                /*
                 *      Hacks for Coverity.  Editing the dictionary
                 *      will break assumptions about CUI.  We know
                 *      this, but Coverity doesn't.
                 */
                if (da->type != PW_TYPE_OCTETS) return -1;
#endif

                data = NULL;
                datalen = 0;
                goto alloc_cui; /* skip everything */
        }

        /*
         *      Hacks for tags.  If the attribute is capable of
         *      encoding a tag, and there's room for the tag, and
         *      there is a tag, or it's encrypted with Tunnel-Password,
         *      then decode the tag.
         */
        if (da->flags.has_tag && (datalen > 1) &&
            ((data[0] < 0x20) ||
             (da->flags.encrypt == FLAG_ENCRYPT_TUNNEL_PASSWORD))) {
                /*
                 *      Only "short" attributes can be encrypted.
                 */
                if (datalen >= sizeof(buffer)) return -1;

                if (da->type == PW_TYPE_STRING) {
                        memcpy(buffer, data + 1, datalen - 1);
                        tag = data[0];
                        datalen -= 1;

                } else if (da->type == PW_TYPE_INTEGER) {
                        memcpy(buffer, data, attrlen);
                        tag = buffer[0];
                        buffer[0] = 0;

                } else {
                        return -1; /* only string and integer can have tags */
                }

                data = buffer;
        }

        /*
         *      Decrypt the attribute.
         */
        if (secret && packet && (da->flags.encrypt != FLAG_ENCRYPT_NONE)) {
                VP_TRACE("data2vp: decrypting type %u\n", da->flags.encrypt);
                /*
                 *      Encrypted attributes can only exist for the
                 *      old-style format.  Extended attributes CANNOT
                 *      be encrypted.
                 */
                if (attrlen > 253) {
                        return -1;
                }

                if (data == start) {
                        memcpy(buffer, data, attrlen);
                }
                data = buffer;

                switch (da->flags.encrypt) { /* can't be tagged */
                /*
                 *  User-Password
                 */
                case FLAG_ENCRYPT_USER_PASSWORD:
                        if (original) {
                                rad_pwdecode((char *) buffer,
                                             attrlen, secret,
                                             original->vector);
                        } else {
                                rad_pwdecode((char *) buffer,
                                             attrlen, secret,
                                             packet->vector);
                        }
                        buffer[253] = '\0';

                        /*
                         *      MS-CHAP-MPPE-Keys are 24 octets, and
                         *      encrypted.  Since it's binary, we can't
                         *      look for trailing zeros.
                         */
                        if (da->flags.length) {
                                if (datalen > da->flags.length) {
                                        datalen = da->flags.length;
                                } /* else leave datalen alone */
                        } else {
                                /*
                                 *      Take off trailing zeros from the END.
                                 *      This allows passwords to have zeros in
                                 *      the middle of a field.
                                 *
                                 *      However, if the password has a zero at
                                 *      the end, it will get mashed by this
                                 *      code.  There's really no way around
                                 *      that.
                                 */
                                while ((datalen > 0) && (buffer[datalen - 1] == '\0')) datalen--;
                        }
                        break;

                /*
                 *      Tunnel-Password's may go ONLY in response
                 *      packets.  They can have a tag, so datalen is
                 *      not the same as attrlen.
                 */
                case FLAG_ENCRYPT_TUNNEL_PASSWORD:
                        if (rad_tunnel_pwdecode(buffer, &datalen, secret,
                                                original ? original->vector : nullvector) < 0) {
                                goto raw;
                        }
                        break;

                /*
                 *  Ascend-Send-Secret
                 *  Ascend-Receive-Secret
                 */
                case FLAG_ENCRYPT_ASCEND_SECRET:
                        if (!original) {
                                goto raw;
                        } else {
                                uint8_t my_digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
                                size_t secret_len;

                                secret_len = datalen;
                                if (secret_len > AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) secret_len = AUTH_VECTOR_LEN;

                                make_secret(my_digest,
                                            original->vector,
                                            secret, data, secret_len);
                                memcpy(buffer, my_digest,
                                       AUTH_VECTOR_LEN );
                                buffer[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN] = '\0';
                                datalen = strlen((char *) buffer);
                        }
                        break;

                default:
                        break;
                } /* switch over encryption flags */
        }

        /*
         *      Double-check the length after decrypting the
         *      attribute.
         */
        VP_TRACE("data2vp: type %u\n", da->type);
        switch (da->type) {
        case PW_TYPE_STRING:
        case PW_TYPE_OCTETS:
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_ABINARY:
                if (datalen > sizeof(vp->vp_filter)) goto raw;
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
        case PW_TYPE_IPV4_ADDR:
        case PW_TYPE_DATE:
        case PW_TYPE_SIGNED:
                if (datalen != 4) goto raw;
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_INTEGER64:
        case PW_TYPE_IFID:
                if (datalen != 8) goto raw;
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_IPV6_ADDR:
                if (datalen != 16) goto raw;
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_IPV6_PREFIX:
                if ((datalen < 2) || (datalen > 18)) goto raw;
                if (data[1] > 128) goto raw;
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_BYTE:
                if (datalen != 1) goto raw;
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_SHORT:
                if (datalen != 2) goto raw;
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_ETHERNET:
                if (datalen != 6) goto raw;
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_COMBO_IP_ADDR:
                if (datalen == 4) {
                        child = dict_attrbytype(da->attr, da->vendor,
                                                PW_TYPE_IPV4_ADDR);
                } else if (datalen == 16) {
                        child = dict_attrbytype(da->attr, da->vendor,
                                             PW_TYPE_IPV6_ADDR);
                } else {
                        goto raw;
                }
                if (!child) goto raw;
                da = child;     /* re-write it */
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_IPV4_PREFIX:
                if (datalen != 6) goto raw;
                if ((data[1] & 0x3f) > 32) goto raw;
                break;

                /*
                 *      The rest of the data types can cause
                 *      recursion!  Ask yourself, "is recursion OK?"
                 */

        case PW_TYPE_EXTENDED:
                if (datalen < 2) goto raw; /* etype, value */

                child = dict_attrbyparent(da, data[0], 0);
                if (!child) goto raw;

                /*
                 *      Recurse to decode the contents, which could be
                 *      a TLV, IPaddr, etc.  Note that we decode only
                 *      the current attribute, and we ignore any extra
                 *      data after it.
                 */
                rcode = data2vp(ctx, packet, original, secret, child,
                                data + 1, attrlen - 1, attrlen - 1, pvp);
                if (rcode < 0) goto raw;
                return 1 + rcode;

        case PW_TYPE_LONG_EXTENDED:
                if (datalen < 3) goto raw; /* etype, flags, value */

                child = dict_attrbyparent(da, data[0], 0);
                if (!child) {
                        if ((data[0] != PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) ||
                            (datalen < (3 + 4 + 1))) {
                                /* da->attr < 255, da->vendor == 0 */
                                child = dict_unknown_afrom_fields(ctx, data[0], da->attr * FR_MAX_VENDOR);
                        } else {
                                /*
                                 *      Try to find the VSA.
                                 */
                                memcpy(&vendor, data + 3, 4);
                                vendor = ntohl(vendor);

                                if (vendor == 0) goto raw;

                                child = dict_unknown_afrom_fields(ctx, data[7], vendor | (da->attr * FR_MAX_VENDOR));
                        }

                        if (!child) {
                                fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check %d", __LINE__);
                                return -1;
                        }
                }

                /*
                 *      If there no more fragments, then the contents
                 *      have to be a well-known data type.
                 *
                 */
                if ((data[1] & 0x80) == 0) {
                        rcode = data2vp(ctx, packet, original, secret, child,
                                        data + 2, attrlen - 2, attrlen - 2,
                                        pvp);
                        if (rcode < 0) goto raw;
                        return 2 + rcode;
                }

                /*
                 *      This requires a whole lot more work.
                 */
                return data2vp_extended(ctx, packet, original, secret, child,
                                        start, attrlen, packetlen, pvp);

        case PW_TYPE_EVS:
                if (datalen < 6) goto raw; /* vid, vtype, value */

                if (data[0] != 0) goto raw; /* we require 24-bit VIDs */

                memcpy(&vendor, data, 4);
                vendor = ntohl(vendor);
                vendor |= da->vendor;

                child = dict_attrbyvalue(data[4], vendor);
                if (!child) {
                        /*
                         *      Create a "raw" attribute from the
                         *      contents of the EVS VSA.
                         */
                        da = dict_unknown_afrom_fields(ctx, data[4], vendor);
                        data += 5;
                        datalen -= 5;
                        break;
                }

                rcode = data2vp(ctx, packet, original, secret, child,
                                data + 5, attrlen - 5, attrlen - 5, pvp);
                if (rcode < 0) goto raw;
                return 5 + rcode;

        case PW_TYPE_TLV:
                /*
                 *      We presume that the TLVs all fit into one
                 *      attribute, OR they've already been grouped
                 *      into a contiguous memory buffer.
                 */
                rcode = rad_data2vp_tlvs(ctx, packet, original, secret, da,
                                         data, attrlen, pvp);
                if (rcode < 0) goto raw;
                return rcode;

        case PW_TYPE_VSA:
                /*
                 *      VSAs can be WiMAX, in which case they don't
                 *      fit into one attribute.
                 */
                rcode = data2vp_vsas(ctx, packet, original, secret,
                                     data, attrlen, packetlen, pvp);
                if (rcode < 0) goto raw;
                return rcode;

        default:
        raw:
                /*
                 *      Re-write the attribute to be "raw".  It is
                 *      therefore of type "octets", and will be
                 *      handled below.
                 */
                da = dict_unknown_afrom_fields(ctx, da->attr, da->vendor);
                if (!da) {
                        fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check %d", __LINE__);
                        return -1;
                }
                tag = TAG_NONE;
#ifndef NDEBUG
                /*
                 *      Fix for Coverity.
                 */
                if (da->type != PW_TYPE_OCTETS) {
                        dict_attr_free(&da);
                        return -1;
                }
#endif
                break;
        }

        /*
         *      And now that we've verified the basic type
         *      information, decode the actual data.
         */
 alloc_cui:
        vp = fr_pair_afrom_da(ctx, da);
        if (!vp) return -1;

        vp->vp_length = datalen;
        vp->tag = tag;

        switch (da->type) {
        case PW_TYPE_STRING:
                p = talloc_array(vp, char, vp->vp_length + 1);
                memcpy(p, data, vp->vp_length);
                p[vp->vp_length] = '\0';
                vp->vp_strvalue = p;
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_OCTETS:
                fr_pair_value_memcpy(vp, data, vp->vp_length);
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_ABINARY:
                if (vp->vp_length > sizeof(vp->vp_filter)) {
                        vp->vp_length = sizeof(vp->vp_filter);
                }
                memcpy(vp->vp_filter, data, vp->vp_length);
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_BYTE:
                vp->vp_byte = data[0];
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_SHORT:
                vp->vp_short = (data[0] << 8) | data[1];
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
                memcpy(&vp->vp_integer, data, 4);
                vp->vp_integer = ntohl(vp->vp_integer);
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_INTEGER64:
                memcpy(&vp->vp_integer64, data, 8);
                vp->vp_integer64 = ntohll(vp->vp_integer64);
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_DATE:
                memcpy(&vp->vp_date, data, 4);
                vp->vp_date = ntohl(vp->vp_date);
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_ETHERNET:
                memcpy(vp->vp_ether, data, 6);
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_IPV4_ADDR:
                memcpy(&vp->vp_ipaddr, data, 4);
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_IFID:
                memcpy(vp->vp_ifid, data, 8);
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_IPV6_ADDR:
                memcpy(&vp->vp_ipv6addr, data, 16);
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_IPV6_PREFIX:
                /*
                 *      FIXME: double-check that
                 *      (vp->vp_octets[1] >> 3) matches vp->vp_length + 2
                 */
                memcpy(vp->vp_ipv6prefix, data, vp->vp_length);
                if (vp->vp_length < 18) {
                        memset(((uint8_t *)vp->vp_ipv6prefix) + vp->vp_length, 0,
                               18 - vp->vp_length);
                }
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_IPV4_PREFIX:
                /* FIXME: do the same double-check as for IPv6Prefix */
                memcpy(vp->vp_ipv4prefix, data, vp->vp_length);

                /*
                 *      /32 means "keep all bits".  Otherwise, mask
                 *      them out.
                 */
                if ((data[1] & 0x3f) > 32) {
                        uint32_t addr, mask;

                        memcpy(&addr, vp->vp_octets + 2, sizeof(addr));
                        mask = 1;
                        mask <<= (32 - (data[1] & 0x3f));
                        mask--;
                        mask = ~mask;
                        mask = htonl(mask);
                        addr &= mask;
                        memcpy(vp->vp_ipv4prefix + 2, &addr, sizeof(addr));
                }
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_SIGNED:    /* overloaded with vp_integer */
                memcpy(&vp->vp_integer, buffer, 4);
                vp->vp_integer = ntohl(vp->vp_integer);
                break;

        default:
                fr_pair_list_free(&vp);
                fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check %d", __LINE__);
                return -1;
        }
        vp->type = VT_DATA;
        *pvp = vp;

        return attrlen;
}


/** Create a "normal" VALUE_PAIR from the given data
 *
 */
ssize_t rad_attr2vp(TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
                    RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
                    char const *secret,
                    uint8_t const *data, size_t length,
                    VALUE_PAIR **pvp)
{
        ssize_t rcode;

        DICT_ATTR const *da;

        if ((length < 2) || (data[1] < 2) || (data[1] > length)) {
                fr_strerror_printf("rad_attr2vp: Insufficient data");
                return -1;
        }

        da = dict_attrbyvalue(data[0], 0);
        if (!da) {
                VP_TRACE("attr2vp: unknown attribute %u\n", data[0]);
                da = dict_unknown_afrom_fields(ctx, data[0], 0);
        }
        if (!da) return -1;

        /*
         *      Pass the entire thing to the decoding function
         */
        if (da->flags.concat) {
                VP_TRACE("attr2vp: concat attribute\n");
                return data2vp_concat(ctx, da, data, length, pvp);
        }

        /*
         *      Note that we pass the entire length, not just the
         *      length of this attribute.  The Extended or WiMAX
         *      attributes may have the "continuation" bit set, and
         *      will thus be more than one attribute in length.
         */
        rcode = data2vp(ctx, packet, original, secret, da,
                        data + 2, data[1] - 2, length - 2, pvp);
        if (rcode < 0) return rcode;

        return 2 + rcode;
}

fr_thread_local_setup(uint8_t *, rad_vp2data_buff)

/** Converts vp_data to network byte order
 *
 * Provide a pointer to a buffer which contains the value of the VALUE_PAIR
 * in an architecture independent format.
 *
 * The pointer is only guaranteed to be valid between calls to rad_vp2data, and so long
 * as the source VALUE_PAIR is not freed.
 *
 * @param out where to write the pointer to the value.
 * @param vp to get the value from.
 * @return -1 on error, or the length of the value
 */
ssize_t rad_vp2data(uint8_t const **out, VALUE_PAIR const *vp)
{
        uint8_t         *buffer;
        uint32_t        lvalue;
        uint64_t        lvalue64;

        *out = NULL;

        buffer = fr_thread_local_init(rad_vp2data_buff, free);
        if (!buffer) {
                int ret;

                buffer = malloc(sizeof(uint8_t) * sizeof(value_data_t));
                if (!buffer) {
                        fr_strerror_printf("Failed allocating memory for rad_vp2data buffer");
                        return -1;
                }

                ret = fr_thread_local_set(rad_vp2data_buff, buffer);
                if (ret != 0) {
                        fr_strerror_printf("Failed setting up TLS for rad_vp2data buffer: %s", strerror(errno));
                        free(buffer);
                        return -1;
                }
        }

        VERIFY_VP(vp);

        switch (vp->da->type) {
        case PW_TYPE_STRING:
        case PW_TYPE_OCTETS:
                memcpy(out, &vp->data.ptr, sizeof(*out));
                break;

        /*
         *      All of these values are at the same location.
         */
        case PW_TYPE_IFID:
        case PW_TYPE_IPV4_ADDR:
        case PW_TYPE_IPV6_ADDR:
        case PW_TYPE_IPV6_PREFIX:
        case PW_TYPE_IPV4_PREFIX:
        case PW_TYPE_ABINARY:
        case PW_TYPE_ETHERNET:
        case PW_TYPE_COMBO_IP_ADDR:
        case PW_TYPE_COMBO_IP_PREFIX:
        {
                void const *p = &vp->data;
                memcpy(out, &p, sizeof(*out));
                break;
        }

        case PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN:
                buffer[0] = vp->vp_byte & 0x01;
                *out = buffer;
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_BYTE:
                buffer[0] = vp->vp_byte & 0xff;
                *out = buffer;
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_SHORT:
                buffer[0] = (vp->vp_short >> 8) & 0xff;
                buffer[1] = vp->vp_short & 0xff;
                *out = buffer;
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
                lvalue = htonl(vp->vp_integer);
                memcpy(buffer, &lvalue, sizeof(lvalue));
                *out = buffer;
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_INTEGER64:
                lvalue64 = htonll(vp->vp_integer64);
                memcpy(buffer, &lvalue64, sizeof(lvalue64));
                *out = buffer;
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_DATE:
                lvalue = htonl(vp->vp_date);
                memcpy(buffer, &lvalue, sizeof(lvalue));
                *out = buffer;
                break;

        case PW_TYPE_SIGNED:
        {
                int32_t slvalue = htonl(vp->vp_signed);
                memcpy(buffer, &slvalue, sizeof(slvalue));
                *out = buffer;
                break;
        }

        case PW_TYPE_INVALID:
        case PW_TYPE_EXTENDED:
        case PW_TYPE_LONG_EXTENDED:
        case PW_TYPE_EVS:
        case PW_TYPE_VSA:
        case PW_TYPE_TLV:
        case PW_TYPE_TIMEVAL:
        case PW_TYPE_MAX:
                fr_strerror_printf("Cannot get data for VALUE_PAIR type %i", vp->da->type);
                return -1;

        /* Don't add default */
        }

        return vp->vp_length;
}

/** Calculate/check digest, and decode radius attributes
 *
 * @return -1 on decoding error, 0 on success
 */
int rad_decode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET *original,
               char const *secret)
{
        int                     packet_length;
        uint32_t                num_attributes;
        uint8_t                 *ptr;
        radius_packet_t         *hdr;
        VALUE_PAIR *head, **tail, *vp;

        /*
         *      Extract attribute-value pairs
         */
        hdr = (radius_packet_t *)packet->data;
        ptr = hdr->data;
        packet_length = packet->data_len - RADIUS_HDR_LEN;

        head = NULL;
        tail = &head;
        num_attributes = 0;

        /*
         *      Loop over the attributes, decoding them into VPs.
         */
        while (packet_length > 0) {
                ssize_t my_len;

                /*
                 *      This may return many VPs
                 */
                my_len = rad_attr2vp(packet, packet, original, secret,
                                     ptr, packet_length, &vp);
                if (my_len < 0) {
                        fr_pair_list_free(&head);
                        return -1;
                }

                *tail = vp;
                while (vp) {
                        num_attributes++;
                        tail = &(vp->next);
                        vp = vp->next;
                }

                /*
                 *      VSA's may not have been counted properly in
                 *      rad_packet_ok() above, as it is hard to count
                 *      then without using the dictionary.  We
                 *      therefore enforce the limits here, too.
                 */
                if ((fr_max_attributes > 0) &&
                    (num_attributes > fr_max_attributes)) {
                        char host_ipaddr[128];

                        fr_pair_list_free(&head);
                        fr_strerror_printf("Possible DoS attack from host %s: Too many attributes in request (received %d, max %d are allowed).",
                                   inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
                                             &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
                                             host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
                                   num_attributes, fr_max_attributes);
                        return -1;
                }

                ptr += my_len;
                packet_length -= my_len;
        }

        /*
         *      Merge information from the outside world into our
         *      random pool.
         */
        fr_rand_seed(packet->data, RADIUS_HDR_LEN);

        /*
         *      There may be VP's already in the packet.  Don't
         *      destroy them.  Instead, add the decoded attributes to
         *      the tail of the list.
         */
        for (tail = &packet->vps; *tail != NULL; tail = &((*tail)->next)) {
                /* nothing */
        }
        *tail = head;

        return 0;
}


/** Encode password
 *
 * We assume that the passwd buffer passed is big enough.
 * RFC2138 says the password is max 128 chars, so the size
 * of the passwd buffer must be at least 129 characters.
 * Preferably it's just MAX_STRING_LEN.
 *
 * int *pwlen is updated to the new length of the encrypted
 * password - a multiple of 16 bytes.
 */
int rad_pwencode(char *passwd, size_t *pwlen, char const *secret,
                 uint8_t const *vector)
{
        FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
        uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
        int     i, n, secretlen;
        int     len;

        /*
         *      RFC maximum is 128 bytes.
         *
         *      If length is zero, pad it out with zeros.
         *
         *      If the length isn't aligned to 16 bytes,
         *      zero out the extra data.
         */
        len = *pwlen;

        if (len > 128) len = 128;

        if (len == 0) {
                memset(passwd, 0, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
                len = AUTH_PASS_LEN;
        } else if ((len % AUTH_PASS_LEN) != 0) {
                memset(&passwd[len], 0, AUTH_PASS_LEN - (len % AUTH_PASS_LEN));
                len += AUTH_PASS_LEN - (len % AUTH_PASS_LEN);
        }
        *pwlen = len;

        /*
         *      Use the secret to setup the decryption digest
         */
        secretlen = strlen(secret);

        fr_md5_init(&context);
        fr_md5_update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, secretlen);
        old = context;          /* save intermediate work */

        /*
         *      Encrypt it in place.  Don't bother checking
         *      len, as we've ensured above that it's OK.
         */
        for (n = 0; n < len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
                if (n == 0) {
                        fr_md5_update(&context, vector, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
                        fr_md5_final(digest, &context);
                } else {
                        context = old;
                        fr_md5_update(&context,
                                     (uint8_t *) passwd + n - AUTH_PASS_LEN,
                                     AUTH_PASS_LEN);
                        fr_md5_final(digest, &context);
                }

                for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
                        passwd[i + n] ^= digest[i];
                }
        }

        return 0;
}

/** Decode password
 *
 */
int rad_pwdecode(char *passwd, size_t pwlen, char const *secret,
                 uint8_t const *vector)
{
        FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
        uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
        int     i;
        size_t  n, secretlen;

        /*
         *      The RFC's say that the maximum is 128.
         *      The buffer we're putting it into above is 254, so
         *      we don't need to do any length checking.
         */
        if (pwlen > 128) pwlen = 128;

        /*
         *      Catch idiots.
         */
        if (pwlen == 0) goto done;

        /*
         *      Use the secret to setup the decryption digest
         */
        secretlen = strlen(secret);

        fr_md5_init(&context);
        fr_md5_update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, secretlen);
        old = context;          /* save intermediate work */

        /*
         *      The inverse of the code above.
         */
        for (n = 0; n < pwlen; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
                if (n == 0) {
                        fr_md5_update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
                        fr_md5_final(digest, &context);

                        context = old;
                        if (pwlen > AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
                                fr_md5_update(&context, (uint8_t *) passwd,
                                             AUTH_PASS_LEN);
                        }
                } else {
                        fr_md5_final(digest, &context);

                        context = old;
                        if (pwlen > (n + AUTH_PASS_LEN)) {
                                fr_md5_update(&context, (uint8_t *) passwd + n,
                                             AUTH_PASS_LEN);
                        }
                }

                for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
                        passwd[i + n] ^= digest[i];
                }
        }

 done:
        passwd[pwlen] = '\0';
        return strlen(passwd);
}


/** Encode Tunnel-Password attributes when sending them out on the wire
 *
 * int *pwlen is updated to the new length of the encrypted
 * password - a multiple of 16 bytes.
 *
 * This is per RFC-2868 which adds a two char SALT to the initial intermediate
 * value MD5 hash.
 */
ssize_t rad_tunnel_pwencode(char *passwd, size_t *pwlen, char const *secret, uint8_t const *vector)
{
        uint8_t buffer[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN + MAX_STRING_LEN + 3];
        unsigned char   digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
        char*   salt;
        int     i, n, secretlen;
        unsigned len, n2;

        len = *pwlen;

        if (len > 127) len = 127;

        /*
         *      Shift the password 3 positions right to place a salt and original
         *      length, tag will be added automatically on packet send.
         */
        for (n = len ; n >= 0 ; n--) passwd[n + 3] = passwd[n];
        salt = passwd;
        passwd += 2;

        /*
         *      save original password length as first password character;
         */
        *passwd = len;
        len += 1;


        /*
         *      Generate salt.  The RFC's say:
         *
         *      The high bit of salt[0] must be set, each salt in a
         *      packet should be unique, and they should be random
         *
         *      So, we set the high bit, add in a counter, and then
         *      add in some CSPRNG data.  should be OK..
         */
        salt[0] = (0x80 | ( ((salt_offset++) & 0x0f) << 3) |
                   (fr_rand() & 0x07));
        salt[1] = fr_rand();

        /*
         *      Padd password to multiple of AUTH_PASS_LEN bytes.
         */
        n = len % AUTH_PASS_LEN;
        if (n) {
                n = AUTH_PASS_LEN - n;
                for (; n > 0; n--, len++)
                        passwd[len] = 0;
        }
        /* set new password length */
        *pwlen = len + 2;

        /*
         *      Use the secret to setup the decryption digest
         */
        secretlen = strlen(secret);
        memcpy(buffer, secret, secretlen);

        for (n2 = 0; n2 < len; n2+=AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
                if (!n2) {
                        memcpy(buffer + secretlen, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
                        memcpy(buffer + secretlen + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN, salt, 2);
                        fr_md5_calc(digest, buffer, secretlen + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN + 2);
                } else {
                        memcpy(buffer + secretlen, passwd + n2 - AUTH_PASS_LEN, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
                        fr_md5_calc(digest, buffer, secretlen + AUTH_PASS_LEN);
                }

                for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
                        passwd[i + n2] ^= digest[i];
                }
        }
        passwd[n2] = 0;
        return 0;
}

/** Decode Tunnel-Password encrypted attributes
 *
 * Defined in RFC-2868, this uses a two char SALT along with the
 * initial intermediate value, to differentiate it from the
 * above.
 */
ssize_t rad_tunnel_pwdecode(uint8_t *passwd, size_t *pwlen, char const *secret, uint8_t const *vector)
{
        FR_MD5_CTX  context, old;
        uint8_t         digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
        int             secretlen;
        size_t          i, n, encrypted_len, reallen;

        encrypted_len = *pwlen;

        /*
         *      We need at least a salt.
         */
        if (encrypted_len < 2) {
                fr_strerror_printf("tunnel password is too short");
                return -1;
        }

        /*
         *      There's a salt, but no password.  Or, there's a salt
         *      and a 'data_len' octet.  It's wrong, but at least we
         *      can figure out what it means: the password is empty.
         *
         *      Note that this means we ignore the 'data_len' field,
         *      if the attribute length tells us that there's no
         *      more data.  So the 'data_len' field may be wrong,
         *      but that's ok...
         */
        if (encrypted_len <= 3) {
                passwd[0] = 0;
                *pwlen = 0;
                return 0;
        }

        encrypted_len -= 2;             /* discount the salt */

        /*
         *      Use the secret to setup the decryption digest
         */
        secretlen = strlen(secret);

        fr_md5_init(&context);
        fr_md5_update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, secretlen);
        old = context;          /* save intermediate work */

        /*
         *      Set up the initial key:
         *
         *       b(1) = MD5(secret + vector + salt)
         */
        fr_md5_update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
        fr_md5_update(&context, passwd, 2);

        reallen = 0;
        for (n = 0; n < encrypted_len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
                size_t base;
                size_t block_len = AUTH_PASS_LEN;

                /*
                 *      Ensure we don't overflow the input on MD5
                 */
                if ((n + 2 + AUTH_PASS_LEN) > *pwlen) {
                        block_len = *pwlen - n - 2;
                }

                if (n == 0) {
                        base = 1;

                        fr_md5_final(digest, &context);

                        context = old;

                        /*
                         *      A quick check: decrypt the first octet
                         *      of the password, which is the
                         *      'data_len' field.  Ensure it's sane.
                         */
                        reallen = passwd[2] ^ digest[0];
                        if (reallen > encrypted_len) {
                                fr_strerror_printf("tunnel password is too long for the attribute");
                                return -1;
                        }

                        fr_md5_update(&context, passwd + 2, block_len);

                } else {
                        base = 0;

                        fr_md5_final(digest, &context);

                        context = old;
                        fr_md5_update(&context, passwd + n + 2, block_len);
                }

                for (i = base; i < block_len; i++) {
                        passwd[n + i - 1] = passwd[n + i + 2] ^ digest[i];
                }
        }

        *pwlen = reallen;
        passwd[reallen] = 0;

        return reallen;
}

/** Encode a CHAP password
 *
 * @bug FIXME: might not work with Ascend because
 * we use vp->vp_length, and Ascend gear likes
 * to send an extra '\0' in the string!
 */
int rad_chap_encode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, uint8_t *output, int id,
                    VALUE_PAIR *password)
{
        int             i;
        uint8_t         *ptr;
        uint8_t         string[MAX_STRING_LEN * 2 + 1];
        VALUE_PAIR      *challenge;

        /*
         *      Sanity check the input parameters
         */
        if ((packet == NULL) || (password == NULL)) {
                return -1;
        }

        /*
         *      Note that the password VP can be EITHER
         *      a User-Password attribute (from a check-item list),
         *      or a CHAP-Password attribute (the client asking
         *      the library to encode it).
         */

        i = 0;
        ptr = string;
        *ptr++ = id;

        i++;
        memcpy(ptr, password->vp_strvalue, password->vp_length);
        ptr += password->vp_length;
        i += password->vp_length;

        /*
         *      Use Chap-Challenge pair if present,
         *      Request Authenticator otherwise.
         */
        challenge = fr_pair_find_by_num(packet->vps, PW_CHAP_CHALLENGE, 0, TAG_ANY);
        if (challenge) {
                memcpy(ptr, challenge->vp_strvalue, challenge->vp_length);
                i += challenge->vp_length;
        } else {
                memcpy(ptr, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
                i += AUTH_VECTOR_LEN;
        }

        *output = id;
        fr_md5_calc((uint8_t *)output + 1, (uint8_t *)string, i);

        return 0;
}


/** Seed the random number generator
 *
 * May be called any number of times.
 */
void fr_rand_seed(void const *data, size_t size)
{
        uint32_t hash;

        /*
         *      Ensure that the pool is initialized.
         */
        if (!fr_rand_initialized) {
                int fd;

                memset(&fr_rand_pool, 0, sizeof(fr_rand_pool));

                fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
                if (fd >= 0) {
                        size_t total;
                        ssize_t this;

                        total = 0;
                        while (total < sizeof(fr_rand_pool.randrsl)) {
                                this = read(fd, fr_rand_pool.randrsl,
                                            sizeof(fr_rand_pool.randrsl) - total);
                                if ((this < 0) && (errno != EINTR)) break;
                                if (this > 0) total += this;
                        }
                        close(fd);
                } else {
                        fr_rand_pool.randrsl[0] = fd;
                        fr_rand_pool.randrsl[1] = time(NULL);
                        fr_rand_pool.randrsl[2] = errno;
                }

                fr_randinit(&fr_rand_pool, 1);
                fr_rand_pool.randcnt = 0;
                fr_rand_initialized = 1;
        }

        if (!data) return;

        /*
         *      Hash the user data
         */
        hash = fr_rand();
        if (!hash) hash = fr_rand();
        hash = fr_hash_update(data, size, hash);

        fr_rand_pool.randmem[fr_rand_pool.randcnt] ^= hash;
}


/** Return a 32-bit random number
 *
 */
uint32_t fr_rand(void)
{
        uint32_t num;

        /*
         *      Ensure that the pool is initialized.
         */
        if (!fr_rand_initialized) {
                fr_rand_seed(NULL, 0);
        }

        num = fr_rand_pool.randrsl[fr_rand_pool.randcnt++];
        if (fr_rand_pool.randcnt >= 256) {
                fr_rand_pool.randcnt = 0;
                fr_isaac(&fr_rand_pool);
        }

        return num;
}


/** Allocate a new RADIUS_PACKET
 *
 * @param ctx the context in which the packet is allocated. May be NULL if
 *      the packet is not associated with a REQUEST.
 * @param new_vector if true a new request authenticator will be generated.
 * @return a new RADIUS_PACKET or NULL on error.
 */
RADIUS_PACKET *rad_alloc(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, bool new_vector)
{
        RADIUS_PACKET   *rp;

        rp = talloc_zero(ctx, RADIUS_PACKET);
        if (!rp) {
                fr_strerror_printf("out of memory");
                return NULL;
        }
        rp->id = -1;
        rp->offset = -1;

        if (new_vector) {
                int i;
                uint32_t hash, base;

                /*
                 *      Don't expose the actual contents of the random
                 *      pool.
                 */
                base = fr_rand();
                for (i = 0; i < AUTH_VECTOR_LEN; i += sizeof(uint32_t)) {
                        hash = fr_rand() ^ base;
                        memcpy(rp->vector + i, &hash, sizeof(hash));
                }
        }
        fr_rand();              /* stir the pool again */

        return rp;
}

/** Allocate a new RADIUS_PACKET response
 *
 * @param ctx the context in which the packet is allocated. May be NULL if
 *      the packet is not associated with a REQUEST.
 * @param packet The request packet.
 * @return a new RADIUS_PACKET or NULL on error.
 */
RADIUS_PACKET *rad_alloc_reply(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, RADIUS_PACKET *packet)
{
        RADIUS_PACKET *reply;

        if (!packet) return NULL;

        reply = rad_alloc(ctx, false);
        if (!reply) return NULL;

        /*
         *      Initialize the fields from the request.
         */
        reply->sockfd = packet->sockfd;
        reply->dst_ipaddr = packet->src_ipaddr;
        reply->src_ipaddr = packet->dst_ipaddr;
        reply->dst_port = packet->src_port;
        reply->src_port = packet->dst_port;
        reply->id = packet->id;
        reply->code = 0; /* UNKNOWN code */
        memcpy(reply->vector, packet->vector,
               sizeof(reply->vector));
        reply->vps = NULL;
        reply->data = NULL;
        reply->data_len = 0;

#ifdef WITH_TCP
        reply->proto = packet->proto;
#endif
        return reply;
}


/** Free a RADIUS_PACKET
 *
 */
void rad_free(RADIUS_PACKET **radius_packet_ptr)
{
        RADIUS_PACKET *radius_packet;

        if (!radius_packet_ptr || !*radius_packet_ptr) return;
        radius_packet = *radius_packet_ptr;

        VERIFY_PACKET(radius_packet);

        fr_pair_list_free(&radius_packet->vps);

        talloc_free(radius_packet);
        *radius_packet_ptr = NULL;
}

/** Duplicate a RADIUS_PACKET
 *
 * @param ctx the context in which the packet is allocated. May be NULL if
 *      the packet is not associated with a REQUEST.
 * @param in The packet to copy
 * @return a new RADIUS_PACKET or NULL on error.
 */
RADIUS_PACKET *rad_copy_packet(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, RADIUS_PACKET const *in)
{
        RADIUS_PACKET *out;

        out = rad_alloc(ctx, false);
        if (!out) return NULL;

        /*
         *      Bootstrap by copying everything.
         */
        memcpy(out, in, sizeof(*out));

        /*
         *      Then reset necessary fields
         */
        out->sockfd = -1;

        out->data = NULL;
        out->data_len = 0;

        out->vps = fr_pair_list_copy(out, in->vps);
        out->offset = 0;

        return out;
}