2 * radius.c Functions to send/receive radius packets.
6 * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
7 * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
8 * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
9 * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
11 * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
12 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
13 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
14 * Lesser General Public License for more details.
16 * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
17 * License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
18 * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
20 * Copyright 2000-2003,2006 The FreeRADIUS server project
23 #include <freeradius-devel/ident.h>
26 #include <freeradius-devel/libradius.h>
27 #include <freeradius-devel/md5.h>
33 #include <freeradius-devel/udpfromto.h>
41 #define VP_TRACE if (fr_debug_flag) printf
43 #define VP_TRACE(_x, ...)
48 * The RFC says 4096 octets max, and most packets are less than 256.
50 #define MAX_PACKET_LEN 4096
53 * The maximum number of attributes which we allow in an incoming
54 * request. If there are more attributes than this, the request
57 * This helps to minimize the potential for a DoS, when an
58 * attacker spoofs Access-Request packets, which don't have a
59 * Message-Authenticator attribute. This means that the packet
60 * is unsigned, and the attacker can use resources on the server,
61 * even if the end request is rejected.
63 int fr_max_attributes = 0;
64 FILE *fr_log_fp = NULL;
66 typedef struct radius_packet_t {
70 uint8_t vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
74 static fr_randctx fr_rand_pool; /* across multiple calls */
75 static int fr_rand_initialized = 0;
76 static unsigned int salt_offset = 0;
78 const char *fr_packet_codes[FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE] = {
84 "Accounting-Response",
100 "Resource-Free-Request",
101 "Resource-Free-Response",
102 "Resource-Query-Request",
103 "Resource-Query-Response",
104 "Alternate-Resource-Reclaim-Request",
105 "NAS-Reboot-Request",
106 "NAS-Reboot-Response",
119 "Disconnect-Request",
129 "IP-Address-Allocate",
134 void fr_printf_log(const char *fmt, ...)
139 if ((fr_debug_flag == 0) || !fr_log_fp) {
144 vfprintf(fr_log_fp, fmt, ap);
150 void rad_print_hex(RADIUS_PACKET *packet)
154 if (!packet->data) return;
156 printf(" Code:\t\t%u\n", packet->data[0]);
157 printf(" Id:\t\t%u\n", packet->data[1]);
158 printf(" Length:\t%u\n", ((packet->data[2] << 8) |
160 printf(" Vector:\t");
161 for (i = 4; i < 20; i++) {
162 printf("%02x", packet->data[i]);
166 if (packet->data_len > 20) {
171 total = packet->data_len - 20;
172 ptr = packet->data + 20;
178 if (total < 2) { /* too short */
179 printf("%02x\n", *ptr);
183 if (ptr[1] > total) { /* too long */
184 for (i = 0; i < total; i++) {
185 printf("%02x ", ptr[i]);
190 printf("%02x %02x ", ptr[0], ptr[1]);
191 attrlen = ptr[1] - 2;
195 for (i = 0; i < attrlen; i++) {
196 if ((i > 0) && ((i & 0x0f) == 0x00))
198 printf("%02x ", ptr[i]);
199 if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x0f) printf("\n");
202 if ((attrlen & 0x0f) != 0x00) printf("\n");
212 * Wrapper for sendto which handles sendfromto, IPv6, and all
213 * possible combinations.
215 static int rad_sendto(int sockfd, void *data, size_t data_len, int flags,
216 fr_ipaddr_t *src_ipaddr, int src_port,
217 fr_ipaddr_t *dst_ipaddr, int dst_port)
220 struct sockaddr_storage dst;
221 socklen_t sizeof_dst;
223 #ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
224 struct sockaddr_storage src;
225 socklen_t sizeof_src;
227 fr_ipaddr2sockaddr(src_ipaddr, src_port, &src, &sizeof_src);
229 src_port = src_port; /* -Wunused */
232 if (!fr_ipaddr2sockaddr(dst_ipaddr, dst_port, &dst, &sizeof_dst)) {
236 #ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
238 * And if they don't specify a source IP address, don't
241 if (((dst_ipaddr->af == AF_INET) || (dst_ipaddr->af == AF_INET6)) &&
242 (src_ipaddr->af != AF_UNSPEC) &&
243 !fr_inaddr_any(src_ipaddr)) {
244 rcode = sendfromto(sockfd, data, data_len, flags,
245 (struct sockaddr *)&src, sizeof_src,
246 (struct sockaddr *)&dst, sizeof_dst);
250 src_ipaddr = src_ipaddr; /* -Wunused */
254 * No udpfromto, fail gracefully.
256 rcode = sendto(sockfd, data, data_len, flags,
257 (struct sockaddr *) &dst, sizeof_dst);
259 DEBUG("rad_send() failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
266 void rad_recv_discard(int sockfd)
269 struct sockaddr_storage src;
270 socklen_t sizeof_src = sizeof(src);
272 recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), 0,
273 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
277 ssize_t rad_recv_header(int sockfd, fr_ipaddr_t *src_ipaddr, int *src_port,
280 ssize_t data_len, packet_len;
282 struct sockaddr_storage src;
283 socklen_t sizeof_src = sizeof(src);
285 data_len = recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), MSG_PEEK,
286 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
288 if ((errno == EAGAIN) || (errno == EINTR)) return 0;
293 * Too little data is available, discard the packet.
296 recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), 0,
297 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
300 } else { /* we got 4 bytes of data. */
302 * See how long the packet says it is.
304 packet_len = (header[2] * 256) + header[3];
307 * The length in the packet says it's less than
308 * a RADIUS header length: discard it.
310 if (packet_len < AUTH_HDR_LEN) {
311 recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), 0,
312 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
316 * Enforce RFC requirements, for sanity.
317 * Anything after 4k will be discarded.
319 } else if (packet_len > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
320 recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), 0,
321 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
327 * Convert AF. If unknown, discard packet.
329 if (!fr_sockaddr2ipaddr(&src, sizeof_src, src_ipaddr, src_port)) {
330 recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), 0,
331 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
338 * The packet says it's this long, but the actual UDP
339 * size could still be smaller.
346 * wrapper for recvfrom, which handles recvfromto, IPv6, and all
347 * possible combinations.
349 static ssize_t rad_recvfrom(int sockfd, uint8_t **pbuf, int flags,
350 fr_ipaddr_t *src_ipaddr, uint16_t *src_port,
351 fr_ipaddr_t *dst_ipaddr, uint16_t *dst_port)
353 struct sockaddr_storage src;
354 struct sockaddr_storage dst;
355 socklen_t sizeof_src = sizeof(src);
356 socklen_t sizeof_dst = sizeof(dst);
363 memset(&src, 0, sizeof_src);
364 memset(&dst, 0, sizeof_dst);
367 * Get address family, etc. first, so we know if we
368 * need to do udpfromto.
370 * FIXME: udpfromto also does this, but it's not
371 * a critical problem.
373 if (getsockname(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&dst,
374 &sizeof_dst) < 0) return -1;
377 * Read the length of the packet, from the packet.
378 * This lets us allocate the buffer to use for
379 * reading the rest of the packet.
381 data_len = recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), MSG_PEEK,
382 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
384 if ((errno == EAGAIN) || (errno == EINTR)) return 0;
389 * Too little data is available, discard the packet.
392 recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), flags,
393 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
396 } else { /* we got 4 bytes of data. */
398 * See how long the packet says it is.
400 len = (header[2] * 256) + header[3];
403 * The length in the packet says it's less than
404 * a RADIUS header length: discard it.
406 if (len < AUTH_HDR_LEN) {
407 recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), flags,
408 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
412 * Enforce RFC requirements, for sanity.
413 * Anything after 4k will be discarded.
415 } else if (len > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
416 recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), flags,
417 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
426 * Receive the packet. The OS will discard any data in the
427 * packet after "len" bytes.
429 #ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
430 if ((dst.ss_family == AF_INET) || (dst.ss_family == AF_INET6)) {
431 data_len = recvfromto(sockfd, buf, len, flags,
432 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src,
433 (struct sockaddr *)&dst, &sizeof_dst);
437 * No udpfromto, fail gracefully.
439 data_len = recvfrom(sockfd, buf, len, flags,
440 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
446 if (!fr_sockaddr2ipaddr(&src, sizeof_src, src_ipaddr, &port)) {
448 return -1; /* Unknown address family, Die Die Die! */
452 fr_sockaddr2ipaddr(&dst, sizeof_dst, dst_ipaddr, &port);
456 * Different address families should never happen.
458 if (src.ss_family != dst.ss_family) {
464 * Tell the caller about the data
472 #define AUTH_PASS_LEN (AUTH_VECTOR_LEN)
473 /*************************************************************************
475 * Function: make_secret
477 * Purpose: Build an encrypted secret value to return in a reply
478 * packet. The secret is hidden by xoring with a MD5 digest
479 * created from the shared secret and the authentication
480 * vector. We put them into MD5 in the reverse order from
481 * that used when encrypting passwords to RADIUS.
483 *************************************************************************/
484 static void make_secret(uint8_t *digest, const uint8_t *vector,
485 const char *secret, const uint8_t *value)
490 fr_MD5Init(&context);
491 fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
492 fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret, strlen(secret));
493 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
495 for ( i = 0; i < AUTH_VECTOR_LEN; i++ ) {
496 digest[i] ^= value[i];
500 #define MAX_PASS_LEN (128)
501 static void make_passwd(uint8_t *output, ssize_t *outlen,
502 const uint8_t *input, size_t inlen,
503 const char *secret, const uint8_t *vector)
505 FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
506 uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
507 uint8_t passwd[MAX_PASS_LEN];
512 * If the length is zero, round it up.
516 if (len > MAX_PASS_LEN) len = MAX_PASS_LEN;
518 memcpy(passwd, input, len);
519 memset(passwd + len, 0, sizeof(passwd) - len);
525 else if ((len & 0x0f) != 0) {
531 fr_MD5Init(&context);
532 fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret, strlen(secret));
538 fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
540 for (n = 0; n < len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
543 fr_MD5Update(&context,
544 passwd + n - AUTH_PASS_LEN,
548 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
549 for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
550 passwd[i + n] ^= digest[i];
554 memcpy(output, passwd, len);
557 static void make_tunnel_passwd(uint8_t *output, ssize_t *outlen,
558 const uint8_t *input, size_t inlen, size_t room,
559 const char *secret, const uint8_t *vector)
561 FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
562 uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
563 uint8_t passwd[MAX_STRING_LEN + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
570 if (room > 253) room = 253;
573 * Account for 2 bytes of the salt, and round the room
574 * available down to the nearest multiple of 16. Then,
575 * subtract one from that to account for the length byte,
576 * and the resulting number is the upper bound on the data
579 * We could short-cut this calculation just be forcing
580 * inlen to be no more than 239. It would work for all
581 * VSA's, as we don't pack multiple VSA's into one
584 * However, this calculation is more general, if a little
585 * complex. And it will work in the future for all possible
586 * kinds of weird attribute packing.
589 room -= (room & 0x0f);
592 if (inlen > room) inlen = room;
595 * Length of the encrypted data is password length plus
596 * one byte for the length of the password.
599 if ((len & 0x0f) != 0) {
603 *outlen = len + 2; /* account for the salt */
606 * Copy the password over.
608 memcpy(passwd + 3, input, inlen);
609 memset(passwd + 3 + inlen, 0, sizeof(passwd) - 3 - inlen);
612 * Generate salt. The RFC's say:
614 * The high bit of salt[0] must be set, each salt in a
615 * packet should be unique, and they should be random
617 * So, we set the high bit, add in a counter, and then
618 * add in some CSPRNG data. should be OK..
620 passwd[0] = (0x80 | ( ((salt_offset++) & 0x0f) << 3) |
622 passwd[1] = fr_rand();
623 passwd[2] = inlen; /* length of the password string */
625 fr_MD5Init(&context);
626 fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret, strlen(secret));
629 fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
630 fr_MD5Update(&context, &passwd[0], 2);
632 for (n = 0; n < len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
635 fr_MD5Update(&context,
636 passwd + 2 + n - AUTH_PASS_LEN,
640 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
642 for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
643 passwd[i + 2 + n] ^= digest[i];
646 memcpy(output, passwd, len + 2);
649 extern int fr_attr_max_tlv;
650 extern int fr_attr_shift[];
651 extern int fr_attr_mask[];
653 static int do_next_tlv(const VALUE_PAIR *vp, int nest)
655 unsigned int tlv1, tlv2;
657 if (nest > fr_attr_max_tlv) return 0;
662 * Keep encoding TLVs which have the same scope.
663 * e.g. two attributes of:
664 * ATTR.TLV1.TLV2.TLV3 = data1
665 * ATTR.TLV1.TLV2.TLV4 = data2
666 * both get put into a container of "ATTR.TLV1.TLV2"
670 * Nothing to follow, we're done.
672 if (!vp->next) return 0;
675 * Not from the same vendor, skip it.
677 if (vp->vendor != vp->next->vendor) return 0;
680 * In a different TLV space, skip it.
682 tlv1 = vp->attribute;
683 tlv2 = vp->next->attribute;
685 tlv1 &= ((1 << fr_attr_shift[nest]) - 1);
686 tlv2 &= ((1 << fr_attr_shift[nest]) - 1);
688 if (tlv1 != tlv2) return 0;
694 static ssize_t vp2data_any(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
695 const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
696 const char *secret, int nest,
697 const VALUE_PAIR **pvp,
698 uint8_t *start, size_t room);
700 static ssize_t vp2attr_rfc(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
701 const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
702 const char *secret, const VALUE_PAIR **pvp,
703 unsigned int attribute, uint8_t *ptr, size_t room);
706 * This is really a sub-function of vp2data_any. It encodes
707 * the *data* portion of the TLV, and assumes that the encapsulating
708 * attribute has already been encoded.
710 static ssize_t vp2data_tlvs(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
711 const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
712 const char *secret, int nest,
713 const VALUE_PAIR **pvp,
714 uint8_t *start, size_t room)
718 uint8_t *ptr = start;
719 const VALUE_PAIR *old_vp;
720 const VALUE_PAIR *vp = *pvp;
723 if (nest > fr_attr_max_tlv) {
724 fr_strerror_printf("vp2data_tlvs: attribute nesting overflow");
730 if (room < 2) return ptr - start;
733 ptr[0] = (vp->attribute >> fr_attr_shift[nest]) & fr_attr_mask[nest];
736 VP_TRACE("TLV encoded %s %u\n", vp->name, start[0]);
739 if (room > 255) my_room = 255;
741 len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, nest,
742 &vp, ptr + 2, my_room - 2);
743 if (len < 0) return len;
744 if (len == 0) return ptr - start;
745 /* len can NEVER be more than 253 */
752 if (!do_next_tlv(old_vp, nest)) break;
760 * Encodes the data portion of an attribute.
761 * Returns -1 on error, or the length of the data portion.
763 static ssize_t vp2data_any(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
764 const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
765 const char *secret, int nest,
766 const VALUE_PAIR **pvp,
767 uint8_t *start, size_t room)
772 uint8_t *ptr = start;
774 const VALUE_PAIR *vp = *pvp;
777 * See if we need to encode a TLV. The low portion of
778 * the attribute has already been placed into the packer.
779 * If there are still attribute bytes left, then go
780 * encode them as TLVs.
782 * If we cared about the stack, we could unroll the loop.
784 VP_TRACE("vp2data_any: %u attr %u -> %u\n",
785 nest, vp->attribute, vp->attribute >> fr_attr_shift[nest + 1]);
786 if (vp->flags.is_tlv && (nest < fr_attr_max_tlv) &&
787 ((vp->attribute >> fr_attr_shift[nest + 1]) != 0)) {
788 return vp2data_tlvs(packet, original, secret, nest + 1, pvp,
791 VP_TRACE("vp2data_any: Encoding %s\n", vp->name);
794 * Set up the default sources for the data.
796 data = vp->vp_octets;
803 case PW_TYPE_IPV6ADDR:
804 case PW_TYPE_IPV6PREFIX:
805 case PW_TYPE_ABINARY:
806 /* nothing more to do */
810 len = 1; /* just in case */
811 array[0] = vp->vp_integer & 0xff;
816 len = 2; /* just in case */
817 array[0] = (vp->vp_integer >> 8) & 0xff;
818 array[1] = vp->vp_integer & 0xff;
822 case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
823 len = 4; /* just in case */
824 lvalue = htonl(vp->vp_integer);
825 memcpy(array, &lvalue, sizeof(lvalue));
830 data = (const uint8_t *) &vp->vp_ipaddr;
831 len = 4; /* just in case */
835 * There are no tagged date attributes.
838 lvalue = htonl(vp->vp_date);
839 data = (const uint8_t *) &lvalue;
840 len = 4; /* just in case */
847 len = 4; /* just in case */
848 slvalue = htonl(vp->vp_signed);
849 memcpy(array, &slvalue, sizeof(slvalue));
856 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot encode NULL TLV");
862 default: /* unknown type: ignore it */
863 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Unknown attribute type %d", vp->type);
868 * Bound the data to the calling size
870 if (len > (ssize_t) room) len = room;
873 * Encrypt the various password styles
875 * Attributes with encrypted values MUST be less than
878 switch (vp->flags.encrypt) {
879 case FLAG_ENCRYPT_USER_PASSWORD:
880 make_passwd(ptr, &len, data, len,
881 secret, packet->vector);
884 case FLAG_ENCRYPT_TUNNEL_PASSWORD:
886 if (vp->flags.has_tag) lvalue = 1;
889 * Check if there's enough room. If there isn't,
890 * we discard the attribute.
892 * This is ONLY a problem if we have multiple VSA's
893 * in one Vendor-Specific, though.
895 if (room < (18 + lvalue)) return 0;
897 switch (packet->code) {
898 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
899 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
900 case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
903 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: No request packet, cannot encrypt %s attribute in the vp.", vp->name);
907 if (lvalue) ptr[0] = vp->flags.tag;
908 make_tunnel_passwd(ptr + lvalue, &len, data, len,
910 secret, original->vector);
912 case PW_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
913 case PW_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
915 ptr[0] = vp->flags.tag;
916 make_tunnel_passwd(ptr + 1, &len, data, len - 1, room,
917 secret, packet->vector);
923 * The code above ensures that this attribute
926 case FLAG_ENCRYPT_ASCEND_SECRET:
927 make_secret(ptr, packet->vector, secret, data);
928 len = AUTH_VECTOR_LEN;
933 if (vp->flags.has_tag && TAG_VALID(vp->flags.tag)) {
934 if (vp->type == PW_TYPE_STRING) {
935 if (len > ((ssize_t) (room - 1))) len = room - 1;
936 ptr[0] = vp->flags.tag;
938 } else if (vp->type == PW_TYPE_INTEGER) {
939 array[0] = vp->flags.tag;
940 } /* else it can't be any other type */
942 memcpy(ptr, data, len);
944 } /* switch over encryption flags */
947 return len + (ptr - start);;
950 static ssize_t attr_shift(const uint8_t *start, const uint8_t *end,
951 uint8_t *ptr, int hdr_len, ssize_t len,
952 int flag_offset, int vsa_offset)
954 int check_len = len - ptr[1];
955 int total = len + hdr_len;
958 * Pass 1: Check if the addition of the headers
959 * overflows the available room. If so, return
960 * what we were capable of encoding.
963 while (check_len > (255 - hdr_len)) {
965 check_len -= (255 - hdr_len);
969 * Note that this results in a number of attributes maybe
970 * being marked as "encoded", but which aren't in the
971 * packet. Oh well. The solution is to fix the
972 * "vp2data_any" function to take into account the header
975 if ((ptr + ptr[1] + total) > end) {
976 return (ptr + ptr[1]) - start;
980 * Pass 2: Now that we know there's enough room,
981 * re-arrange the data to form a set of valid
985 int sublen = 255 - ptr[1];
992 memmove(ptr + 255 + hdr_len, ptr + 255, sublen);
993 memcpy(ptr + 255, ptr, hdr_len);
995 if (vsa_offset) ptr[vsa_offset] += sublen;
996 ptr[flag_offset] |= 0x80;
1000 if (vsa_offset) ptr[vsa_offset] = 3;
1004 if (vsa_offset) ptr[vsa_offset] += len;
1006 return (ptr + ptr[1]) - start;
1011 * Encode an "extended" attribute.
1013 int rad_vp2extended(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
1014 const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
1015 const char *secret, const VALUE_PAIR **pvp,
1016 uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
1021 uint8_t *start = ptr;
1022 const VALUE_PAIR *vp = *pvp;
1024 VP_TRACE("rad_vp2extended %s\n", vp->name);
1025 if (vp->vendor < VENDORPEC_EXTENDED) {
1026 fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2extended called for non-extended attribute");
1030 if (room < 3) return 0;
1032 ptr[0] = vp->attribute & 0xff;
1035 if (vp->flags.extended) {
1036 ptr[2] = (vp->attribute & 0xff00) >> 8;
1038 } else if (vp->flags.extended_flags) {
1039 if (room < 4) return 0;
1042 ptr[2] = (vp->attribute & 0xff00) >> 8;
1047 * Only "flagged" attributes can be longer than one
1050 if (!vp->flags.extended_flags && (room > 255)) {
1057 if (vp->flags.evs) {
1058 uint8_t *evs = ptr + ptr[1];
1060 if (room < (size_t) (ptr[1] + 5)) return 0;
1063 * RADIUS Attribute Type is packed into the high byte
1064 * of the Vendor Id. So over-write it in the packet.
1066 * And hard-code Extended-Type to Vendor-Specific.
1068 ptr[0] = (vp->vendor >> 24) & 0xff;
1071 evs[0] = 0; /* always zero */
1072 evs[1] = (vp->vendor >> 16) & 0xff;
1073 evs[2] = (vp->vendor >> 8) & 0xff;
1074 evs[3] = vp->vendor & 0xff;
1075 evs[4] = vp->attribute & 0xff;
1082 len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, nest,
1083 pvp, ptr + ptr[1], room - hdr_len);
1084 if (len < 0) return len;
1087 * There may be more than 252 octets of data encoded in
1088 * the attribute. If so, move the data up in the packet,
1089 * and copy the existing header over. Set the "M" flag ONLY
1090 * after copying the rest of the data.
1092 if (vp->flags.extended_flags && (len > (255 - ptr[1]))) {
1093 return attr_shift(start, start + room, ptr, 4, len, 3, 0);
1098 return (ptr + ptr[1]) - start;
1103 * Encode a WiMAX attribute.
1105 int rad_vp2wimax(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
1106 const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
1107 const char *secret, const VALUE_PAIR **pvp,
1108 uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
1113 uint8_t *start = ptr;
1114 const VALUE_PAIR *vp = *pvp;
1117 * Double-check for WiMAX format.
1119 if (!vp->flags.wimax) {
1120 fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2wimax called for non-WIMAX VSA");
1125 * Not enough room for:
1126 * attr, len, vendor-id, vsa, vsalen, continuation
1128 if (room < 9) return 0;
1131 * Build the Vendor-Specific header
1134 ptr[0] = PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
1136 lvalue = htonl(vp->vendor);
1137 memcpy(ptr + 2, &lvalue, 4);
1138 ptr[6] = (vp->attribute & fr_attr_mask[1]);
1140 ptr[8] = 0; /* continuation byte */
1144 len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, 0, pvp, ptr + ptr[1],
1146 if (len <= 0) return len;
1149 * There may be more than 252 octets of data encoded in
1150 * the attribute. If so, move the data up in the packet,
1151 * and copy the existing header over. Set the "C" flag
1152 * ONLY after copying the rest of the data.
1154 if (len > (255 - ptr[1])) {
1155 return attr_shift(start, start + room, ptr, hdr_len, len, 8, 7);
1161 return (ptr + ptr[1]) - start;
1165 * Encode an RFC format TLV. This could be a standard attribute,
1166 * or a TLV data type. If it's a standard attribute, then
1167 * vp->attribute == attribute. Otherwise, attribute may be
1170 static ssize_t vp2attr_rfc(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
1171 const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
1172 const char *secret, const VALUE_PAIR **pvp,
1173 unsigned int attribute, uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
1177 if (room < 2) return 0;
1179 ptr[0] = attribute & 0xff;
1182 if (room > ((unsigned) 255 - ptr[1])) room = 255 - ptr[1];
1184 len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, 0, pvp, ptr + ptr[1], room);
1185 if (len < 0) return len;
1194 * Encode a VSA which is a TLV. If it's in the RFC format, call
1195 * vp2attr_rfc. Otherwise, encode it here.
1197 static ssize_t vp2attr_vsa(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
1198 const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
1199 const char *secret, const VALUE_PAIR **pvp,
1200 unsigned int attribute, unsigned int vendor,
1201 uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
1205 const VALUE_PAIR *vp = *pvp;
1208 * Unknown vendor: RFC format.
1209 * Known vendor and RFC format: go do that.
1211 VP_TRACE("Encoding VSA %u.%u\n", vendor, attribute);
1212 dv = dict_vendorbyvalue(vendor);
1213 VP_TRACE("Flags %d %d\n", vp->flags.is_tlv, vp->flags.has_tlv);
1215 (!vp->flags.is_tlv && (dv->type == 1) && (dv->length == 1))) {
1216 VP_TRACE("Encoding RFC %u.%u\n", vendor, attribute);
1217 return vp2attr_rfc(packet, original, secret, pvp,
1218 attribute, ptr, room);
1223 fr_strerror_printf("vp2attr_vsa: Internal sanity check failed,"
1224 " type %u", (unsigned) dv->type);
1228 ptr[0] = 0; /* attr must be 24-bit */
1229 ptr[1] = (attribute >> 16) & 0xff;
1230 ptr[2] = (attribute >> 8) & 0xff;
1231 ptr[3] = attribute & 0xff;
1235 ptr[0] = (attribute >> 8) & 0xff;
1236 ptr[1] = attribute & 0xff;
1240 ptr[0] = attribute & 0xff;
1244 switch (dv->length) {
1246 fr_strerror_printf("vp2attr_vsa: Internal sanity check failed,"
1247 " length %u", (unsigned) dv->length);
1258 ptr[dv->type + dv->length - 1] = dv->type + dv->length;
1263 if (room > ((unsigned) 255 - (dv->type + dv->length))) {
1264 room = 255 - (dv->type + dv->length);
1267 len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, 0, pvp,
1268 ptr + dv->type + dv->length, room);
1269 if (len < 0) return len;
1271 if (dv->length) ptr[dv->type + dv->length - 1] += len;
1273 return dv->type + dv->length + len;
1278 * Encode a Vendor-Specific attribute.
1280 int rad_vp2vsa(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
1281 const char *secret, const VALUE_PAIR **pvp, uint8_t *ptr,
1286 const VALUE_PAIR *vp = *pvp;
1289 * Double-check for WiMAX format.
1291 if (vp->flags.wimax) {
1292 return rad_vp2wimax(packet, original, secret, pvp,
1296 if (vp->vendor > FR_MAX_VENDOR) {
1297 fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2vsa: Invalid arguments");
1302 * Not enough room for:
1303 * attr, len, vendor-id
1305 if (room < 6) return 0;
1308 * Build the Vendor-Specific header
1310 ptr[0] = PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
1312 lvalue = htonl(vp->vendor);
1313 memcpy(ptr + 2, &lvalue, 4);
1315 if (room > ((unsigned) 255 - ptr[1])) room = 255 - ptr[1];
1317 len = vp2attr_vsa(packet, original, secret, pvp,
1318 vp->attribute, vp->vendor,
1319 ptr + ptr[1], room);
1320 if (len < 0) return len;
1329 * Encode an RFC standard attribute 1..255
1331 int rad_vp2rfc(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
1332 const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
1333 const char *secret, const VALUE_PAIR **pvp,
1334 uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
1336 const VALUE_PAIR *vp = *pvp;
1338 if (vp->vendor != 0) {
1339 fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2rfc called with VSA");
1343 if ((vp->attribute == 0) || (vp->attribute > 255)) {
1344 fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2rfc called with non-standard attribute %u", vp->attribute);
1348 if ((vp->length == 0) &&
1349 (vp->attribute != PW_CHARGEABLE_USER_IDENTITY)) {
1353 return vp2attr_rfc(packet, original, secret, pvp, vp->attribute,
1359 * Parse a data structure into a RADIUS attribute.
1361 int rad_vp2attr(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
1362 const char *secret, const VALUE_PAIR **pvp, uint8_t *start,
1365 const VALUE_PAIR *vp;
1367 if (!pvp || !*pvp || !start || (room <= 2)) return -1;
1372 * RFC format attributes take the fast path.
1374 if (vp->vendor == 0) {
1375 if (vp->attribute > 255) return 0;
1378 * Message-Authenticator is hard-coded.
1380 if (vp->attribute == PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR) {
1381 if (room < 18) return -1;
1383 start[0] = PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR;
1385 memset(start + 2, 0, 16);
1386 *pvp = (*pvp)->next;
1390 return rad_vp2rfc(packet, original, secret, pvp,
1394 if (vp->vendor > FR_MAX_VENDOR) {
1395 return rad_vp2extended(packet, original, secret, pvp,
1399 if (vp->flags.wimax) {
1400 return rad_vp2wimax(packet, original, secret, pvp,
1404 return rad_vp2vsa(packet, original, secret, pvp,
1412 int rad_encode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
1415 radius_packet_t *hdr;
1417 uint16_t total_length;
1419 const VALUE_PAIR *reply;
1421 char ip_buffer[128];
1424 * A 4K packet, aligned on 64-bits.
1426 uint64_t data[MAX_PACKET_LEN / sizeof(uint64_t)];
1428 if ((packet->code > 0) && (packet->code < FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
1429 what = fr_packet_codes[packet->code];
1434 DEBUG("Sending %s of id %d to %s port %d\n",
1436 inet_ntop(packet->dst_ipaddr.af,
1437 &packet->dst_ipaddr.ipaddr,
1438 ip_buffer, sizeof(ip_buffer)),
1442 * Double-check some things based on packet code.
1444 switch (packet->code) {
1445 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
1446 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
1447 case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
1449 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot sign response packet without a request packet.");
1455 * These packet vectors start off as all zero.
1457 case PW_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
1458 case PW_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
1459 case PW_COA_REQUEST:
1460 memset(packet->vector, 0, sizeof(packet->vector));
1468 * Use memory on the stack, until we know how
1469 * large the packet will be.
1471 hdr = (radius_packet_t *) data;
1474 * Build standard header
1476 hdr->code = packet->code;
1477 hdr->id = packet->id;
1479 memcpy(hdr->vector, packet->vector, sizeof(hdr->vector));
1481 total_length = AUTH_HDR_LEN;
1484 * Load up the configuration values for the user
1490 * FIXME: Loop twice over the reply list. The first time,
1491 * calculate the total length of data. The second time,
1492 * allocate the memory, and fill in the VP's.
1494 * Hmm... this may be slower than just doing a small
1499 * Loop over the reply attributes for the packet.
1501 reply = packet->vps;
1504 * Ignore non-wire attributes, but allow extended
1507 if ((reply->vendor == 0) &&
1508 ((reply->attribute & 0xFFFF) >= 256) &&
1509 !reply->flags.extended && !reply->flags.extended_flags) {
1512 * Permit the admin to send BADLY formatted
1513 * attributes with a debug build.
1515 if (reply->attribute == PW_RAW_ATTRIBUTE) {
1516 memcpy(ptr, reply->vp_octets, reply->length);
1517 len = reply->length;
1518 reply = reply->next;
1522 reply = reply->next;
1527 * Set the Message-Authenticator to the correct
1528 * length and initial value.
1530 if (reply->attribute == PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR) {
1532 * Cache the offset to the
1533 * Message-Authenticator
1535 packet->offset = total_length;
1539 * Print out ONLY the attributes which
1540 * we're sending over the wire, and print
1541 * them out BEFORE they're encrypted.
1545 len = rad_vp2attr(packet, original, secret, &reply, ptr,
1546 ((uint8_t *) data) + sizeof(data) - ptr);
1547 if (len < 0) return -1;
1550 * Failed to encode the attribute, likely because
1551 * the packet is full.
1554 (total_length > (sizeof(data) - 2 - reply->length))) {
1555 DEBUG("WARNING: Attributes are too long for packet. Discarding data past %d bytes", total_length);
1560 next: /* Used only for Raw-Attribute */
1563 total_length += len;
1564 } /* done looping over all attributes */
1567 * Fill in the rest of the fields, and copy the data over
1568 * from the local stack to the newly allocated memory.
1570 * Yes, all this 'memcpy' is slow, but it means
1571 * that we only allocate the minimum amount of
1572 * memory for a request.
1574 packet->data_len = total_length;
1575 packet->data = (uint8_t *) malloc(packet->data_len);
1576 if (!packet->data) {
1577 fr_strerror_printf("Out of memory");
1581 memcpy(packet->data, hdr, packet->data_len);
1582 hdr = (radius_packet_t *) packet->data;
1584 total_length = htons(total_length);
1585 memcpy(hdr->length, &total_length, sizeof(total_length));
1592 * Sign a previously encoded packet.
1594 int rad_sign(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
1597 radius_packet_t *hdr = (radius_packet_t *)packet->data;
1600 * It wasn't assigned an Id, this is bad!
1602 if (packet->id < 0) {
1603 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: RADIUS packets must be assigned an Id.");
1607 if (!packet->data || (packet->data_len < AUTH_HDR_LEN) ||
1608 (packet->offset < 0)) {
1609 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: You must call rad_encode() before rad_sign()");
1614 * If there's a Message-Authenticator, update it
1615 * now, BEFORE updating the authentication vector.
1617 if (packet->offset > 0) {
1618 uint8_t calc_auth_vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
1620 switch (packet->code) {
1621 case PW_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
1622 case PW_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE:
1623 case PW_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
1624 case PW_DISCONNECT_ACK:
1625 case PW_DISCONNECT_NAK:
1626 case PW_COA_REQUEST:
1629 memset(hdr->vector, 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
1632 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
1633 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
1634 case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
1636 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot sign response packet without a request packet.");
1639 memcpy(hdr->vector, original->vector,
1643 default: /* others have vector already set to zero */
1649 * Set the authentication vector to zero,
1650 * calculate the signature, and put it
1651 * into the Message-Authenticator
1654 fr_hmac_md5(packet->data, packet->data_len,
1655 (const uint8_t *) secret, strlen(secret),
1657 memcpy(packet->data + packet->offset + 2,
1658 calc_auth_vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
1661 * Copy the original request vector back
1662 * to the raw packet.
1664 memcpy(hdr->vector, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
1668 * Switch over the packet code, deciding how to
1671 switch (packet->code) {
1673 * Request packets are not signed, bur
1674 * have a random authentication vector.
1676 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REQUEST:
1677 case PW_STATUS_SERVER:
1681 * Reply packets are signed with the
1682 * authentication vector of the request.
1689 fr_MD5Init(&context);
1690 fr_MD5Update(&context, packet->data, packet->data_len);
1691 fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret,
1693 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
1695 memcpy(hdr->vector, digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
1696 memcpy(packet->vector, digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
1699 }/* switch over packet codes */
1705 * Reply to the request. Also attach
1706 * reply attribute value pairs and any user message provided.
1708 int rad_send(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
1713 char ip_buffer[128];
1716 * Maybe it's a fake packet. Don't send it.
1718 if (!packet || (packet->sockfd < 0)) {
1722 if ((packet->code > 0) && (packet->code < FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
1723 what = fr_packet_codes[packet->code];
1729 * First time through, allocate room for the packet
1731 if (!packet->data) {
1733 * Encode the packet.
1735 if (rad_encode(packet, original, secret) < 0) {
1740 * Re-sign it, including updating the
1741 * Message-Authenticator.
1743 if (rad_sign(packet, original, secret) < 0) {
1748 * If packet->data points to data, then we print out
1749 * the VP list again only for debugging.
1751 } else if (fr_debug_flag) {
1752 DEBUG("Sending %s of id %d to %s port %d\n", what, packet->id,
1753 inet_ntop(packet->dst_ipaddr.af,
1754 &packet->dst_ipaddr.ipaddr,
1755 ip_buffer, sizeof(ip_buffer)),
1758 for (reply = packet->vps; reply; reply = reply->next) {
1759 if ((reply->vendor == 0) &&
1760 ((reply->attribute & 0xFFFF) > 0xff)) continue;
1766 if (fr_debug_flag > 3) rad_print_hex(packet);
1770 * And send it on it's way.
1772 return rad_sendto(packet->sockfd, packet->data, packet->data_len, 0,
1773 &packet->src_ipaddr, packet->src_port,
1774 &packet->dst_ipaddr, packet->dst_port);
1778 * Do a comparison of two authentication digests by comparing
1779 * the FULL digest. Otehrwise, the server can be subject to
1780 * timing attacks that allow attackers find a valid message
1783 * http://www.cs.rice.edu/~dwallach/pub/crosby-timing2009.pdf
1785 int rad_digest_cmp(const uint8_t *a, const uint8_t *b, size_t length)
1790 for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
1791 result |= a[i] ^ b[i];
1794 return result; /* 0 is OK, !0 is !OK, just like memcmp */
1799 * Validates the requesting client NAS. Calculates the
1800 * signature based on the clients private key.
1802 static int calc_acctdigest(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const char *secret)
1804 uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
1808 * Zero out the auth_vector in the received packet.
1809 * Then append the shared secret to the received packet,
1810 * and calculate the MD5 sum. This must be the same
1811 * as the original MD5 sum (packet->vector).
1813 memset(packet->data + 4, 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
1816 * MD5(packet + secret);
1818 fr_MD5Init(&context);
1819 fr_MD5Update(&context, packet->data, packet->data_len);
1820 fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret, strlen(secret));
1821 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
1824 * Return 0 if OK, 2 if not OK.
1826 if (rad_digest_cmp(digest, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) != 0) return 2;
1832 * Validates the requesting client NAS. Calculates the
1833 * signature based on the clients private key.
1835 static int calc_replydigest(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET *original,
1838 uint8_t calc_digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
1844 if (original == NULL) {
1849 * Copy the original vector in place.
1851 memcpy(packet->data + 4, original->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
1854 * MD5(packet + secret);
1856 fr_MD5Init(&context);
1857 fr_MD5Update(&context, packet->data, packet->data_len);
1858 fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret, strlen(secret));
1859 fr_MD5Final(calc_digest, &context);
1862 * Copy the packet's vector back to the packet.
1864 memcpy(packet->data + 4, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
1867 * Return 0 if OK, 2 if not OK.
1869 if (rad_digest_cmp(packet->vector, calc_digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) != 0) return 2;
1875 * Check if a set of RADIUS formatted TLVs are OK.
1877 int rad_tlv_ok(const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
1878 size_t dv_type, size_t dv_length)
1880 const uint8_t *end = data + length;
1882 if ((dv_length > 2) || (dv_type == 0) || (dv_type > 4)) {
1883 fr_strerror_printf("rad_tlv_ok: Invalid arguments");
1887 while (data < end) {
1890 if ((data + dv_type + dv_length) > end) {
1891 fr_strerror_printf("Attribute header overflow");
1897 if ((data[0] == 0) && (data[1] == 0) &&
1898 (data[2] == 0) && (data[3] == 0)) {
1900 fr_strerror_printf("Invalid attribute 0");
1905 fr_strerror_printf("Invalid attribute > 2^24");
1911 if ((data[1] == 0) && (data[1] == 0)) goto zero;
1915 if (data[0] == 0) goto zero;
1919 fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check failed");
1923 switch (dv_length) {
1928 if (data[dv_type + 1] != 0) {
1929 fr_strerror_printf("Attribute is longer than 256 octets");
1934 attrlen = data[dv_type + dv_length - 1];
1939 fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check failed");
1943 if (attrlen < (dv_type + dv_length)) {
1944 fr_strerror_printf("Attribute header has invalid length");
1948 if (attrlen > length) {
1949 fr_strerror_printf("Attribute overflows container");
1962 * See if the data pointed to by PTR is a valid RADIUS packet.
1964 * packet is not 'const * const' because we may update data_len,
1965 * if there's more data in the UDP packet than in the RADIUS packet.
1967 int rad_packet_ok(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, int flags)
1972 radius_packet_t *hdr;
1973 char host_ipaddr[128];
1979 * Check for packets smaller than the packet header.
1981 * RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
1983 * "The minimum length is 20 ..."
1985 if (packet->data_len < AUTH_HDR_LEN) {
1986 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too short (received %d < minimum %d)",
1987 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
1988 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
1989 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
1990 (int) packet->data_len, AUTH_HDR_LEN);
1995 * RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
1997 * " ... and maximum length is 4096."
1999 if (packet->data_len > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
2000 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too long (received %d > maximum %d)",
2001 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2002 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2003 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2004 (int) packet->data_len, MAX_PACKET_LEN);
2009 * Check for packets with mismatched size.
2010 * i.e. We've received 128 bytes, and the packet header
2011 * says it's 256 bytes long.
2013 totallen = (packet->data[2] << 8) | packet->data[3];
2014 hdr = (radius_packet_t *)packet->data;
2017 * Code of 0 is not understood.
2018 * Code of 16 or greate is not understood.
2020 if ((hdr->code == 0) ||
2021 (hdr->code >= FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
2022 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Bad RADIUS packet from host %s: unknown packet code%d ",
2023 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2024 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2025 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2031 * Message-Authenticator is required in Status-Server
2032 * packets, otherwise they can be trivially forged.
2034 if (hdr->code == PW_STATUS_SERVER) require_ma = 1;
2037 * It's also required if the caller asks for it.
2039 if (flags) require_ma = 1;
2042 * Repeat the length checks. This time, instead of
2043 * looking at the data we received, look at the value
2044 * of the 'length' field inside of the packet.
2046 * Check for packets smaller than the packet header.
2048 * RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
2050 * "The minimum length is 20 ..."
2052 if (totallen < AUTH_HDR_LEN) {
2053 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too short (length %d < minimum %d)",
2054 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2055 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2056 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2057 totallen, AUTH_HDR_LEN);
2062 * And again, for the value of the 'length' field.
2064 * RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
2066 * " ... and maximum length is 4096."
2068 if (totallen > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
2069 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too long (length %d > maximum %d)",
2070 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2071 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2072 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2073 totallen, MAX_PACKET_LEN);
2078 * RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
2080 * "If the packet is shorter than the Length field
2081 * indicates, it MUST be silently discarded."
2083 * i.e. No response to the NAS.
2085 if (packet->data_len < totallen) {
2086 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: received %d octets, packet length says %d",
2087 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2088 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2089 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2090 (int) packet->data_len, totallen);
2095 * RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
2097 * "Octets outside the range of the Length field MUST be
2098 * treated as padding and ignored on reception."
2100 if (packet->data_len > totallen) {
2102 * We're shortening the packet below, but just
2103 * to be paranoid, zero out the extra data.
2105 memset(packet->data + totallen, 0, packet->data_len - totallen);
2106 packet->data_len = totallen;
2110 * Walk through the packet's attributes, ensuring that
2111 * they add up EXACTLY to the size of the packet.
2113 * If they don't, then the attributes either under-fill
2114 * or over-fill the packet. Any parsing of the packet
2115 * is impossible, and will result in unknown side effects.
2117 * This would ONLY happen with buggy RADIUS implementations,
2118 * or with an intentional attack. Either way, we do NOT want
2119 * to be vulnerable to this problem.
2122 count = totallen - AUTH_HDR_LEN;
2127 * We need at least 2 bytes to check the
2131 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: attribute header overflows the packet",
2132 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2133 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2134 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
2139 * Attribute number zero is NOT defined.
2142 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: Invalid attribute 0",
2143 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2144 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2145 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
2150 * Attributes are at LEAST as long as the ID & length
2151 * fields. Anything shorter is an invalid attribute.
2154 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: attribute %u too short",
2155 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2156 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2157 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2163 * If there are fewer bytes in the packet than in the
2164 * attribute, it's a bad packet.
2166 if (count < attr[1]) {
2167 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: attribute %u data overflows the packet",
2168 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2169 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2170 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2176 * Sanity check the attributes for length.
2179 default: /* don't do anything by default */
2183 * If there's an EAP-Message, we require
2184 * a Message-Authenticator.
2186 case PW_EAP_MESSAGE:
2190 case PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR:
2191 if (attr[1] != 2 + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) {
2192 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: Message-Authenticator has invalid length %d",
2193 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2194 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2195 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2204 * FIXME: Look up the base 255 attributes in the
2205 * dictionary, and switch over their type. For
2206 * integer/date/ip, the attribute length SHOULD
2209 count -= attr[1]; /* grab the attribute length */
2211 num_attributes++; /* seen one more attribute */
2215 * If the attributes add up to a packet, it's allowed.
2217 * If not, we complain, and throw the packet away.
2220 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: packet attributes do NOT exactly fill the packet",
2221 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2222 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2223 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
2228 * If we're configured to look for a maximum number of
2229 * attributes, and we've seen more than that maximum,
2230 * then throw the packet away, as a possible DoS.
2232 if ((fr_max_attributes > 0) &&
2233 (num_attributes > fr_max_attributes)) {
2234 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Possible DoS attack from host %s: Too many attributes in request (received %d, max %d are allowed).",
2235 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2236 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2237 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2238 num_attributes, fr_max_attributes);
2243 * http://www.freeradius.org/rfc/rfc2869.html#EAP-Message
2245 * A packet with an EAP-Message attribute MUST also have
2246 * a Message-Authenticator attribute.
2248 * A Message-Authenticator all by itself is OK, though.
2250 * Similarly, Status-Server packets MUST contain
2251 * Message-Authenticator attributes.
2253 if (require_ma && ! seen_ma) {
2254 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Insecure packet from host %s: Packet does not contain required Message-Authenticator attribute",
2255 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2256 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2257 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
2262 * Fill RADIUS header fields
2264 packet->code = hdr->code;
2265 packet->id = hdr->id;
2266 memcpy(packet->vector, hdr->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2273 * Receive UDP client requests, and fill in
2274 * the basics of a RADIUS_PACKET structure.
2276 RADIUS_PACKET *rad_recv(int fd, int flags)
2279 RADIUS_PACKET *packet;
2282 * Allocate the new request data structure
2284 if ((packet = malloc(sizeof(*packet))) == NULL) {
2285 fr_strerror_printf("out of memory");
2288 memset(packet, 0, sizeof(*packet));
2291 sock_flags = MSG_PEEK;
2295 packet->data_len = rad_recvfrom(fd, &packet->data, sock_flags,
2296 &packet->src_ipaddr, &packet->src_port,
2297 &packet->dst_ipaddr, &packet->dst_port);
2300 * Check for socket errors.
2302 if (packet->data_len < 0) {
2303 fr_strerror_printf("Error receiving packet: %s", strerror(errno));
2304 /* packet->data is NULL */
2310 * If the packet is too big, then rad_recvfrom did NOT
2311 * allocate memory. Instead, it just discarded the
2314 if (packet->data_len > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
2315 fr_strerror_printf("Discarding packet: Larger than RFC limitation of 4096 bytes.");
2316 /* packet->data is NULL */
2322 * Read no data. Continue.
2323 * This check is AFTER the MAX_PACKET_LEN check above, because
2324 * if the packet is larger than MAX_PACKET_LEN, we also have
2325 * packet->data == NULL
2327 if ((packet->data_len == 0) || !packet->data) {
2328 fr_strerror_printf("Empty packet: Socket is not ready.");
2334 * See if it's a well-formed RADIUS packet.
2336 if (!rad_packet_ok(packet, flags)) {
2342 * Remember which socket we read the packet from.
2344 packet->sockfd = fd;
2347 * FIXME: Do even more filtering by only permitting
2348 * certain IP's. The problem is that we don't know
2349 * how to do this properly for all possible clients...
2353 * Explicitely set the VP list to empty.
2357 if (fr_debug_flag) {
2358 char host_ipaddr[128];
2360 if ((packet->code > 0) && (packet->code < FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
2361 DEBUG("rad_recv: %s packet from host %s port %d",
2362 fr_packet_codes[packet->code],
2363 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2364 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2365 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2368 DEBUG("rad_recv: Packet from host %s port %d code=%d",
2369 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2370 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2371 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2375 DEBUG(", id=%d, length=%d\n",
2376 packet->id, (int) packet->data_len);
2380 if (fr_debug_flag > 3) rad_print_hex(packet);
2388 * Verify the signature of a packet.
2390 int rad_verify(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET *original,
2397 if (!packet || !packet->data) return -1;
2400 * Before we allocate memory for the attributes, do more
2403 ptr = packet->data + AUTH_HDR_LEN;
2404 length = packet->data_len - AUTH_HDR_LEN;
2405 while (length > 0) {
2406 uint8_t msg_auth_vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
2407 uint8_t calc_auth_vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
2412 default: /* don't do anything. */
2416 * Note that more than one Message-Authenticator
2417 * attribute is invalid.
2419 case PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR:
2420 memcpy(msg_auth_vector, &ptr[2], sizeof(msg_auth_vector));
2421 memset(&ptr[2], 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2423 switch (packet->code) {
2427 case PW_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
2428 case PW_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE:
2429 case PW_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
2430 case PW_DISCONNECT_ACK:
2431 case PW_DISCONNECT_NAK:
2432 case PW_COA_REQUEST:
2435 memset(packet->data + 4, 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2438 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
2439 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
2440 case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
2442 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot validate Message-Authenticator in response packet without a request packet.");
2445 memcpy(packet->data + 4, original->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2449 fr_hmac_md5(packet->data, packet->data_len,
2450 (const uint8_t *) secret, strlen(secret),
2452 if (rad_digest_cmp(calc_auth_vector, msg_auth_vector,
2453 sizeof(calc_auth_vector)) != 0) {
2455 fr_strerror_printf("Received packet from %s with invalid Message-Authenticator! (Shared secret is incorrect.)",
2456 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2457 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2458 buffer, sizeof(buffer)));
2459 /* Silently drop packet, according to RFC 3579 */
2461 } /* else the message authenticator was good */
2464 * Reinitialize Authenticators.
2466 memcpy(&ptr[2], msg_auth_vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2467 memcpy(packet->data + 4, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2469 } /* switch over the attributes */
2473 } /* loop over the packet, sanity checking the attributes */
2476 * It looks like a RADIUS packet, but we can't validate
2479 if ((packet->code == 0) || (packet->code >= FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
2481 fr_strerror_printf("Received Unknown packet code %d "
2482 "from client %s port %d: Cannot validate signature.",
2484 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2485 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2486 buffer, sizeof(buffer)),
2492 * Calculate and/or verify digest.
2494 switch(packet->code) {
2498 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REQUEST:
2499 case PW_STATUS_SERVER:
2501 * The authentication vector is random
2502 * nonsense, invented by the client.
2506 case PW_COA_REQUEST:
2507 case PW_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
2508 case PW_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
2509 if (calc_acctdigest(packet, secret) > 1) {
2510 fr_strerror_printf("Received %s packet "
2511 "from client %s with invalid signature! (Shared secret is incorrect.)",
2512 fr_packet_codes[packet->code],
2513 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2514 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2515 buffer, sizeof(buffer)));
2520 /* Verify the reply digest */
2521 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
2522 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
2523 case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
2524 case PW_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE:
2525 case PW_DISCONNECT_ACK:
2526 case PW_DISCONNECT_NAK:
2529 rcode = calc_replydigest(packet, original, secret);
2531 fr_strerror_printf("Received %s packet "
2532 "from home server %s port %d with invalid signature! (Shared secret is incorrect.)",
2533 fr_packet_codes[packet->code],
2534 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2535 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2536 buffer, sizeof(buffer)),
2543 fr_strerror_printf("Received Unknown packet code %d "
2544 "from client %s port %d: Cannot validate signature",
2546 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2547 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2548 buffer, sizeof(buffer)),
2558 * Create a "raw" attribute from the attribute contents.
2560 static ssize_t data2vp_raw(UNUSED const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
2561 UNUSED const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
2562 UNUSED const char *secret,
2563 unsigned int attribute, unsigned int vendor,
2564 const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
2570 * Keep the next function happy.
2572 vp = pairalloc(NULL);
2573 vp = paircreate_raw(attribute, vendor, PW_TYPE_OCTETS, vp);
2575 fr_strerror_printf("data2vp_raw: Failed creating attribute");
2579 vp->length = length;
2582 * If the data is too large, mark it as a "TLV".
2584 if (length <= sizeof(vp->vp_octets)) {
2585 memcpy(vp->vp_octets, data, length);
2587 vp->type = PW_TYPE_TLV;
2588 vp->vp_tlv = malloc(length);
2593 memcpy(vp->vp_tlv, data, length);
2602 static ssize_t data2vp_tlvs(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
2603 const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
2605 unsigned int attribute, unsigned int vendor,
2607 const uint8_t *start, size_t length,
2611 * Create any kind of VP from the attribute contents.
2613 * Will return -1 on error, or "length".
2615 static ssize_t data2vp_any(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
2616 const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
2617 const char *secret, int nest,
2618 unsigned int attribute, unsigned int vendor,
2619 const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
2622 int data_offset = 0;
2624 VALUE_PAIR *vp = NULL;
2628 * Hacks for CUI. The WiMAX spec says that it
2629 * can be zero length, even though this is
2630 * forbidden by the RADIUS specs. So... we make
2631 * a special case for it.
2633 if ((vendor == 0) &&
2634 (attribute == PW_CHARGEABLE_USER_IDENTITY)) {
2635 data = (const uint8_t *) "";
2643 da = dict_attrbyvalue(attribute, vendor);
2646 * Unknown attribute. Create it as a "raw" attribute.
2649 VP_TRACE("Not found %u.%u\n", vendor, attribute);
2651 if (vp) pairfree(&vp);
2652 return data2vp_raw(packet, original, secret,
2653 attribute, vendor, data, length, pvp);
2657 * TLVs are handled first. They can't be tagged, and
2658 * they can't be encrypted.
2660 if (da->type == PW_TYPE_TLV) {
2661 VP_TRACE("Found TLV %u.%u\n", vendor, attribute);
2662 return data2vp_tlvs(packet, original, secret,
2663 attribute, vendor, nest,
2668 * The attribute is known, and well formed. We can now
2669 * create it. The main failure from here on in is being
2678 if (vp->flags.has_tag) {
2679 if (TAG_VALID(data[0]) ||
2680 (vp->flags.encrypt == FLAG_ENCRYPT_TUNNEL_PASSWORD)) {
2682 * Tunnel passwords REQUIRE a tag, even
2683 * if don't have a valid tag.
2685 vp->flags.tag = data[0];
2687 if ((vp->type == PW_TYPE_STRING) ||
2688 (vp->type == PW_TYPE_OCTETS)) {
2689 if (length == 0) goto raw;
2696 * Copy the data to be decrypted
2698 vp->length = length - data_offset;
2699 memcpy(&vp->vp_octets[0], data + data_offset, vp->length);
2702 * Decrypt the attribute.
2704 switch (vp->flags.encrypt) {
2708 case FLAG_ENCRYPT_USER_PASSWORD:
2710 rad_pwdecode(vp->vp_strvalue,
2714 rad_pwdecode(vp->vp_strvalue,
2718 if (vp->attribute == PW_USER_PASSWORD) {
2719 vp->length = strlen(vp->vp_strvalue);
2724 * Tunnel-Password's may go ONLY
2725 * in response packets.
2727 case FLAG_ENCRYPT_TUNNEL_PASSWORD:
2728 if (!original) goto raw;
2730 if (rad_tunnel_pwdecode(vp->vp_octets, &vp->length,
2731 secret, original->vector) < 0) {
2737 * Ascend-Send-Secret
2738 * Ascend-Receive-Secret
2740 case FLAG_ENCRYPT_ASCEND_SECRET:
2744 uint8_t my_digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
2745 make_secret(my_digest,
2748 memcpy(vp->vp_strvalue, my_digest,
2750 vp->vp_strvalue[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN] = '\0';
2751 vp->length = strlen(vp->vp_strvalue);
2757 } /* switch over encryption flags */
2761 case PW_TYPE_STRING:
2762 case PW_TYPE_OCTETS:
2763 case PW_TYPE_ABINARY:
2764 /* nothing more to do */
2768 if (vp->length != 1) goto raw;
2770 vp->vp_integer = vp->vp_octets[0];
2775 if (vp->length != 2) goto raw;
2777 vp->vp_integer = (vp->vp_octets[0] << 8) | vp->vp_octets[1];
2780 case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
2781 if (vp->length != 4) goto raw;
2783 memcpy(&vp->vp_integer, vp->vp_octets, 4);
2784 vp->vp_integer = ntohl(vp->vp_integer);
2786 if (vp->flags.has_tag) vp->vp_integer &= 0x00ffffff;
2789 * Try to get named VALUEs
2793 dval = dict_valbyattr(vp->attribute, vp->vendor,
2796 strlcpy(vp->vp_strvalue,
2798 sizeof(vp->vp_strvalue));
2804 if (vp->length != 4) goto raw;
2806 memcpy(&vp->vp_date, vp->vp_octets, 4);
2807 vp->vp_date = ntohl(vp->vp_date);
2811 case PW_TYPE_IPADDR:
2812 if (vp->length != 4) goto raw;
2814 memcpy(&vp->vp_ipaddr, vp->vp_octets, 4);
2818 * IPv6 interface ID is 8 octets long.
2821 if (vp->length != 8) goto raw;
2822 /* vp->vp_ifid == vp->vp_octets */
2826 * IPv6 addresses are 16 octets long
2828 case PW_TYPE_IPV6ADDR:
2829 if (vp->length != 16) goto raw;
2830 /* vp->vp_ipv6addr == vp->vp_octets */
2834 * IPv6 prefixes are 2 to 18 octets long.
2836 * RFC 3162: The first octet is unused.
2837 * The second is the length of the prefix
2838 * the rest are the prefix data.
2840 * The prefix length can have value 0 to 128.
2842 case PW_TYPE_IPV6PREFIX:
2843 if (vp->length < 2 || vp->length > 18) goto raw;
2844 if (vp->vp_octets[1] > 128) goto raw;
2847 * FIXME: double-check that
2848 * (vp->vp_octets[1] >> 3) matches vp->length + 2
2850 if (vp->length < 18) {
2851 memset(vp->vp_octets + vp->length, 0,
2856 case PW_TYPE_SIGNED:
2857 if (vp->length != 4) goto raw;
2860 * Overload vp_integer for ntohl, which takes
2861 * uint32_t, not int32_t
2863 memcpy(&vp->vp_integer, vp->vp_octets, 4);
2864 vp->vp_integer = ntohl(vp->vp_integer);
2865 memcpy(&vp->vp_signed, &vp->vp_integer, 4);
2870 fr_strerror_printf("data2vp_any: Internal sanity check failed");
2873 case PW_TYPE_COMBO_IP:
2874 if (vp->length == 4) {
2875 vp->type = PW_TYPE_IPADDR;
2876 memcpy(&vp->vp_ipaddr, vp->vp_octets, 4);
2879 } else if (vp->length == 16) {
2880 vp->type = PW_TYPE_IPV6ADDR;
2881 /* vp->vp_ipv6addr == vp->vp_octets */
2898 * Convert a top-level VSA to a VP.
2900 static ssize_t attr2vp_vsa(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
2901 const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
2902 const char *secret, unsigned int vendor,
2903 size_t dv_type, size_t dv_length,
2904 const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
2907 unsigned int attribute;
2908 ssize_t attrlen, my_len;
2911 if (length <= (dv_type + dv_length)) {
2912 fr_strerror_printf("attr2vp_vsa: Failure to call rad_tlv_ok");
2919 /* data[0] must be zero */
2920 attribute = data[1] << 16;
2921 attribute |= data[2] << 8;
2922 attribute |= data[3];
2926 attribute = data[0] << 8;
2927 attribute |= data[1];
2931 attribute = data[0];
2935 fr_strerror_printf("attr2vp_vsa: Internal sanity check failed");
2939 switch (dv_length) {
2941 /* data[dv_type] must be zero */
2942 attrlen = data[dv_type + 1];
2946 attrlen = data[dv_type];
2954 fr_strerror_printf("attr2vp_vsa: Internal sanity check failed");
2959 if (attrlen <= (ssize_t) (dv_type + dv_length)) {
2960 fr_strerror_printf("attr2vp_vsa: Failure to call rad_tlv_ok");
2965 attrlen -= (dv_type + dv_length);
2967 my_len = data2vp_any(packet, original, secret, 0,
2969 data + dv_type + dv_length, attrlen, pvp);
2970 if (my_len < 0) return my_len;
2973 if (my_len != attrlen) {
2975 fr_strerror_printf("attr2vp_vsa: Incomplete decode %d != %d",
2976 (int) my_len, (int) attrlen);
2981 return dv_type + dv_length + attrlen;
2985 * Convert one or more TLVs to VALUE_PAIRs. This function can
2986 * be called recursively...
2988 static ssize_t data2vp_tlvs(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
2989 const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
2991 unsigned int attribute, unsigned int vendor,
2993 const uint8_t *start, size_t length,
2996 size_t dv_type, dv_length;
2997 const uint8_t *data, *end;
2998 VALUE_PAIR *head, **last, *vp;
3003 * The default format for a VSA is the RFC recommended
3010 * Top-level TLVs can be of a weird format. TLVs
3011 * encapsulated in a TLV can only be in the RFC format.
3015 dv = dict_vendorbyvalue(vendor);
3018 dv_length = dv->length;
3019 /* dict.c enforces sane values on the above fields */
3023 if (nest >= fr_attr_max_tlv) {
3024 fr_strerror_printf("data2vp_tlvs: Internal sanity check failed in recursion");
3029 * The VSAs do not exactly fill the data,
3030 * The *entire* TLV is malformed.
3032 if (rad_tlv_ok(data, length, dv_type, dv_length) < 0) {
3033 VP_TRACE("TLV malformed %u.%u\n", vendor, attribute);
3034 return data2vp_raw(packet, original, secret,
3035 attribute, vendor, data, length, pvp);
3038 end = data + length;
3042 while (data < end) {
3043 unsigned int my_attr;
3044 unsigned int my_len;
3047 if ((data + dv_type + dv_length) > end) {
3048 fr_strerror_printf("data2vp_tlvs: Internal sanity check failed in tlvs: Insufficient data");
3056 my_attr = attribute;
3057 my_attr |= ((data[0] & fr_attr_mask[nest + 1])
3058 << fr_attr_shift[nest + 1]);
3061 my_attr = (data[0] << 8) | data[1];
3065 my_attr = (data[1] << 16) | (data[1] << 8) | data[3];
3069 fr_strerror_printf("data2vp_tlvs: Internal sanity check failed");
3073 switch (dv_length) {
3080 my_len = data[dv_type + dv_length - 1];
3084 fr_strerror_printf("data2vp_tlvs: Internal sanity check failed");
3089 if (my_len < (dv_type + dv_length)) {
3090 fr_strerror_printf("data2vp_tlvs: Internal sanity check failed in tlvs: underflow");
3095 if ((data + my_len) > end) {
3096 fr_strerror_printf("data2vp_tlvs: Internal sanity check failed in tlvs: overflow");
3102 my_len -= dv_type + dv_length;
3105 * If this returns > 0, it returns "my_len"
3107 if (data2vp_any(packet, original, secret, nest + 1,
3109 data + dv_type + dv_length, my_len, &vp) < 0) {
3114 data += my_len + dv_type + dv_length;
3124 return data - start;
3129 * Group "continued" attributes together, and create VPs from them.
3130 * The caller ensures that the RADIUS packet is OK, and that the
3131 * continuations have all been checked.
3133 static ssize_t data2vp_continued(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
3134 const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
3136 const uint8_t *start, size_t length,
3137 VALUE_PAIR **pvp, int nest,
3138 unsigned int attribute, unsigned int vendor,
3139 int first_offset, int later_offset,
3143 uint8_t *attr, *ptr;
3144 const uint8_t *data;
3146 attr = malloc(attrlen);
3148 fr_strerror_printf("Out of memory");
3159 memcpy(ptr, data + first_offset, data[1] - first_offset);
3160 ptr += data[1] - first_offset;
3161 left -= data[1] - first_offset;
3166 if (data >= (start + length)) {
3167 fr_strerror_printf("data2vp_continued: Internal sanity check failed");
3171 memcpy(ptr, data + later_offset, data[1] - later_offset);
3172 ptr += data[1] - later_offset;
3173 left -= data[1] - later_offset;
3177 left = data2vp_any(packet, original, secret, nest,
3179 attr, attrlen, pvp);
3181 if (left < 0) return left;
3183 return data - start;
3188 * Create a "raw" VALUE_PAIR from a RADIUS attribute.
3190 ssize_t rad_attr2vp_raw(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
3191 const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
3193 const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
3198 if ((length < 2) || (data[1] < 2) || (data[1] > length)) {
3199 fr_strerror_printf("rad_attr2vp_raw: Invalid length");
3203 my_len = data2vp_raw(packet, original, secret, data[0], 0,
3204 data + 2, data[1] - 2, pvp);
3205 if (my_len < 0) return my_len;
3212 * Get the length of the data portion of all of the contiguous
3213 * continued attributes.
3215 * 0 for "no continuation"
3216 * -1 on malformed packets (continuation followed by non-wimax, etc.)
3218 static ssize_t wimax_attrlen(uint32_t vendor,
3219 const uint8_t *start, const uint8_t *end)
3222 const uint8_t *data = start;
3224 if ((data[8] & 0x80) == 0) return 0;
3225 total = data[7] - 3;
3228 while (data < end) {
3230 if ((data + 9) > end) return -1;
3232 if ((data[0] != PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) ||
3234 (memcmp(data + 2, &vendor, 4) != 0) ||
3235 (data[6] != start[6]) ||
3236 ((data[7] + 6) != data[1])) return -1;
3238 total += data[7] - 3;
3239 if ((data[8] & 0x80) == 0) break;
3248 * Get the length of the data portion of all of the contiguous
3249 * continued attributes.
3251 * 0 for "no continuation"
3252 * -1 on malformed packets (continuation followed by non-wimax, etc.)
3254 static ssize_t extended_attrlen(const uint8_t *start, const uint8_t *end)
3257 const uint8_t *data = start;
3259 if ((data[3] & 0x80) == 0) return 0;
3260 total = data[1] - 4;
3263 while (data < end) {
3264 if ((data + 4) > end) return -1;
3266 if ((data[0] != start[0]) ||
3268 (data[2] != start[2])) return -1;
3270 total += data[1] - 4;
3271 if ((data[3] & 0x80) == 0) break;
3280 * Create WiMAX VALUE_PAIRs from a RADIUS attribute.
3282 ssize_t rad_attr2vp_wimax(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
3283 const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
3285 const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
3289 unsigned int attribute;
3292 if ((length < 2) || (data[1] < 2) || (data[1] > length)) {
3293 fr_strerror_printf("rad_attr2vp_wimax: Invalid length");
3297 if (data[0] != PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) {
3298 fr_strerror_printf("rad_attr2vp_wimax: Invalid attribute");
3303 * Not enough room for a Vendor-Id. + WiMAX header
3306 return rad_attr2vp_raw(packet, original, secret,
3310 memcpy(&lvalue, data + 2, 4);
3311 lvalue = ntohl(lvalue);
3316 if (lvalue != VENDORPEC_WIMAX) {
3319 dv = dict_vendorbyvalue(lvalue);
3320 if (!dv || !dv->flags) {
3321 fr_strerror_printf("rad_attr2vp_wimax: Not a WiMAX attribute");
3327 * The WiMAX attribute is encapsulated in a VSA. If the
3328 * WiMAX length disagrees with the VSA length, it's malformed.
3330 if ((data[7] + 6) != data[1]) {
3331 return rad_attr2vp_raw(packet, original, secret,
3335 attribute = data[6];
3338 * Attribute is continued. Do some more work.
3341 my_len = wimax_attrlen(htonl(lvalue), data, data + length);
3343 return rad_attr2vp_raw(packet, original, secret,
3347 return data2vp_continued(packet, original, secret,
3348 data, length, pvp, 0,
3353 my_len = data2vp_any(packet, original, secret, 0, attribute, lvalue,
3354 data + 9, data[1] - 9, pvp);
3355 if (my_len < 0) return my_len;
3361 * Create Vendor-Specifc VALUE_PAIRs from a RADIUS attribute.
3363 ssize_t rad_attr2vp_vsa(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
3364 const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
3366 const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
3369 size_t dv_type, dv_length;
3374 if ((length < 2) || (data[1] < 2) || (data[1] > length)) {
3375 fr_strerror_printf("rad_attr2vp_vsa: Invalid length");
3379 if (data[0] != PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) {
3380 fr_strerror_printf("rad_attr2vp_vsa: Invalid attribute");
3385 * Not enough room for a Vendor-Id.
3386 * Or the high octet of the Vendor-Id is set.
3388 if ((data[1] < 6) || (data[2] != 0)) {
3389 return rad_attr2vp_raw(packet, original, secret,
3393 memcpy(&lvalue, data + 2, 4);
3394 lvalue = ntohl(lvalue);
3397 * WiMAX gets its own set of magic.
3399 if (lvalue == VENDORPEC_WIMAX) {
3401 return rad_attr2vp_wimax(packet, original, secret,
3405 dv_type = dv_length = 1;
3406 dv = dict_vendorbyvalue(lvalue);
3409 dv_length = dv->length;
3411 if (dv->flags) goto wimax;
3415 * Attribute is not in the correct form.
3417 if (rad_tlv_ok(data + 6, data[1] - 6, dv_type, dv_length) < 0) {
3418 return rad_attr2vp_raw(packet, original, secret,
3422 my_len = attr2vp_vsa(packet, original, secret,
3423 lvalue, dv_type, dv_length,
3424 data + 6, data[1] - 6, pvp);
3425 if (my_len < 0) return my_len;
3428 * Incomplete decode means that something is wrong
3429 * with the attribute. Back up, and make it "raw".
3431 if (my_len != (data[1] - 6)) {
3433 return rad_attr2vp_raw(packet, original, secret,
3441 * Create an "extended" VALUE_PAIR from a RADIUS attribute.
3443 ssize_t rad_attr2vp_extended(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
3444 const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
3446 const uint8_t *start, size_t length,
3449 unsigned int attribute;
3452 unsigned int vendor = VENDORPEC_EXTENDED;
3453 size_t data_len = length;
3454 const uint8_t *data;
3459 if ((length < 2) || (data[1] < 2) || (data[1] > length)) {
3460 fr_strerror_printf("rad_attr2vp_extended: Invalid length");
3464 da = dict_attrbyvalue(data[0], vendor);
3466 (!da->flags.extended && !da->flags.extended_flags)) {
3467 fr_strerror_printf("rad_attr2vp_extended: Attribute is not extended format");
3474 * No Extended-Type. It's a raw attribute.
3475 * Also, if there's no data following the Extended-Type,
3476 * it's a raw attribute.
3480 return rad_attr2vp_raw(packet, original, secret, start,
3485 * The attribute is "241.1", for example. Go look that
3486 * up to see what type it is.
3488 attribute = data[0];
3489 attribute |= (data[2] << fr_attr_shift[1]);
3491 da = dict_attrbyvalue(attribute, vendor);
3494 vendor = VENDORPEC_EXTENDED;
3497 if (data[1] < length) data_len = data[1];
3503 * If there's supposed to be a flag octet. If not, it's
3504 * a raw attribute. If the flag is set, it's supposed to
3507 if (da->flags.extended_flags) {
3508 if (data_len == 0) goto raw;
3510 continued = ((data[0] & 0x80) != 0);
3516 * Extended VSAs have 4 octets of
3517 * Vendor-Id followed by one octet of
3520 if (da->flags.evs) {
3521 if (data_len < 5) goto raw;
3524 * Vendor Ids can only be 24-bit.
3526 if (data[0] != 0) goto raw;
3528 vendor = ((data[1] << 16) |
3533 * Pack the *encapsulating* attribute number into
3534 * the vendor id. This number should be >= 241.
3536 vendor |= start[0] * FR_MAX_VENDOR;
3540 * Over-write the attribute with the
3543 attribute = data[4];
3549 int first_offset = 4;
3552 if (vendor != VENDORPEC_EXTENDED) first_offset += 5;
3554 my_len = extended_attrlen(start, start + length);
3555 if (my_len < 0) goto raw;
3557 if (vendor != VENDORPEC_EXTENDED) my_len -= 5;
3559 return data2vp_continued(packet, original, secret,
3560 start, length, pvp, shift,
3562 first_offset, 4, my_len);
3565 if (data2vp_any(packet, original, secret, shift,
3566 attribute, vendor, data, data_len, pvp) < 0) {
3570 return (data + data_len) - start;
3575 * Create a "standard" RFC VALUE_PAIR from the given data.
3577 ssize_t rad_attr2vp_rfc(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
3578 const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
3580 const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
3583 if ((length < 2) || (data[1] < 2) || (data[1] > length)) {
3584 fr_strerror_printf("rad_attr2vp_rfc: Insufficient data");
3588 if (data2vp_any(packet, original, secret, 0,
3589 data[0], 0, data + 2, data[1] - 2, pvp) < 0) {
3597 * Create a "normal" VALUE_PAIR from the given data.
3599 ssize_t rad_attr2vp(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
3600 const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
3602 const uint8_t *data, size_t length,
3605 if ((length < 2) || (data[1] < 2) || (data[1] > length)) {
3606 fr_strerror_printf("rad_attr2vp: Insufficient data");
3611 * VSAs get their own handler.
3613 if (data[0] == PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) {
3614 return rad_attr2vp_vsa(packet, original, secret,
3619 * Extended attribute format gets their own handler.
3621 if (dict_attrbyvalue(data[0], VENDORPEC_EXTENDED) != NULL) {
3622 return rad_attr2vp_extended(packet, original, secret,
3626 return rad_attr2vp_rfc(packet, original, secret, data, length, pvp);
3631 * Calculate/check digest, and decode radius attributes.
3633 * -1 on decoding error
3636 int rad_decode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET *original,
3642 radius_packet_t *hdr;
3643 VALUE_PAIR *head, **tail, *vp;
3646 * Extract attribute-value pairs
3648 hdr = (radius_packet_t *)packet->data;
3650 packet_length = packet->data_len - AUTH_HDR_LEN;
3657 * Loop over the attributes, decoding them into VPs.
3659 while (packet_length > 0) {
3663 * This may return many VPs
3665 my_len = rad_attr2vp(packet, original, secret,
3666 ptr, packet_length, &vp);
3681 * VSA's may not have been counted properly in
3682 * rad_packet_ok() above, as it is hard to count
3683 * then without using the dictionary. We
3684 * therefore enforce the limits here, too.
3686 if ((fr_max_attributes > 0) &&
3687 (num_attributes > fr_max_attributes)) {
3688 char host_ipaddr[128];
3691 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Possible DoS attack from host %s: Too many attributes in request (received %d, max %d are allowed).",
3692 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
3693 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
3694 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
3695 num_attributes, fr_max_attributes);
3700 packet_length -= my_len;
3704 * Merge information from the outside world into our
3707 fr_rand_seed(packet->data, AUTH_HDR_LEN);
3710 * There may be VP's already in the packet. Don't
3711 * destroy them. Instead, add the decoded attributes to
3712 * the tail of the list.
3714 for (tail = &packet->vps; *tail != NULL; tail = &((*tail)->next)) {
3726 * We assume that the passwd buffer passed is big enough.
3727 * RFC2138 says the password is max 128 chars, so the size
3728 * of the passwd buffer must be at least 129 characters.
3729 * Preferably it's just MAX_STRING_LEN.
3731 * int *pwlen is updated to the new length of the encrypted
3732 * password - a multiple of 16 bytes.
3734 int rad_pwencode(char *passwd, size_t *pwlen, const char *secret,
3735 const uint8_t *vector)
3737 FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
3738 uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
3739 int i, n, secretlen;
3743 * RFC maximum is 128 bytes.
3745 * If length is zero, pad it out with zeros.
3747 * If the length isn't aligned to 16 bytes,
3748 * zero out the extra data.
3752 if (len > 128) len = 128;
3755 memset(passwd, 0, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
3756 len = AUTH_PASS_LEN;
3757 } else if ((len % AUTH_PASS_LEN) != 0) {
3758 memset(&passwd[len], 0, AUTH_PASS_LEN - (len % AUTH_PASS_LEN));
3759 len += AUTH_PASS_LEN - (len % AUTH_PASS_LEN);
3764 * Use the secret to setup the decryption digest
3766 secretlen = strlen(secret);
3768 fr_MD5Init(&context);
3769 fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret, secretlen);
3770 old = context; /* save intermediate work */
3773 * Encrypt it in place. Don't bother checking
3774 * len, as we've ensured above that it's OK.
3776 for (n = 0; n < len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
3778 fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
3779 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
3782 fr_MD5Update(&context,
3783 (uint8_t *) passwd + n - AUTH_PASS_LEN,
3785 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
3788 for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
3789 passwd[i + n] ^= digest[i];
3799 int rad_pwdecode(char *passwd, size_t pwlen, const char *secret,
3800 const uint8_t *vector)
3802 FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
3803 uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
3805 size_t n, secretlen;
3808 * The RFC's say that the maximum is 128.
3809 * The buffer we're putting it into above is 254, so
3810 * we don't need to do any length checking.
3812 if (pwlen > 128) pwlen = 128;
3817 if (pwlen == 0) goto done;
3820 * Use the secret to setup the decryption digest
3822 secretlen = strlen(secret);
3824 fr_MD5Init(&context);
3825 fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret, secretlen);
3826 old = context; /* save intermediate work */
3829 * The inverse of the code above.
3831 for (n = 0; n < pwlen; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
3833 fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
3834 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
3837 if (pwlen > AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
3838 fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t *) passwd,
3842 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
3845 if (pwlen > (n + AUTH_PASS_LEN)) {
3846 fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t *) passwd + n,
3851 for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
3852 passwd[i + n] ^= digest[i];
3857 passwd[pwlen] = '\0';
3858 return strlen(passwd);
3863 * Encode Tunnel-Password attributes when sending them out on the wire.
3865 * int *pwlen is updated to the new length of the encrypted
3866 * password - a multiple of 16 bytes.
3868 * This is per RFC-2868 which adds a two char SALT to the initial intermediate
3871 int rad_tunnel_pwencode(char *passwd, size_t *pwlen, const char *secret,
3872 const uint8_t *vector)
3874 uint8_t buffer[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN + MAX_STRING_LEN + 3];
3875 unsigned char digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
3877 int i, n, secretlen;
3882 if (len > 127) len = 127;
3885 * Shift the password 3 positions right to place a salt and original
3886 * length, tag will be added automatically on packet send
3888 for (n=len ; n>=0 ; n--) passwd[n+3] = passwd[n];
3892 * save original password length as first password character;
3899 * Generate salt. The RFC's say:
3901 * The high bit of salt[0] must be set, each salt in a
3902 * packet should be unique, and they should be random
3904 * So, we set the high bit, add in a counter, and then
3905 * add in some CSPRNG data. should be OK..
3907 salt[0] = (0x80 | ( ((salt_offset++) & 0x0f) << 3) |
3908 (fr_rand() & 0x07));
3909 salt[1] = fr_rand();
3912 * Padd password to multiple of AUTH_PASS_LEN bytes.
3914 n = len % AUTH_PASS_LEN;
3916 n = AUTH_PASS_LEN - n;
3917 for (; n > 0; n--, len++)
3920 /* set new password length */
3924 * Use the secret to setup the decryption digest
3926 secretlen = strlen(secret);
3927 memcpy(buffer, secret, secretlen);
3929 for (n2 = 0; n2 < len; n2+=AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
3931 memcpy(buffer + secretlen, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
3932 memcpy(buffer + secretlen + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN, salt, 2);
3933 fr_md5_calc(digest, buffer, secretlen + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN + 2);
3935 memcpy(buffer + secretlen, passwd + n2 - AUTH_PASS_LEN, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
3936 fr_md5_calc(digest, buffer, secretlen + AUTH_PASS_LEN);
3939 for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
3940 passwd[i + n2] ^= digest[i];
3948 * Decode Tunnel-Password encrypted attributes.
3950 * Defined in RFC-2868, this uses a two char SALT along with the
3951 * initial intermediate value, to differentiate it from the
3954 int rad_tunnel_pwdecode(uint8_t *passwd, size_t *pwlen, const char *secret,
3955 const uint8_t *vector)
3957 FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
3958 uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
3960 unsigned i, n, len, reallen;
3965 * We need at least a salt.
3968 fr_strerror_printf("tunnel password is too short");
3973 * There's a salt, but no password. Or, there's a salt
3974 * and a 'data_len' octet. It's wrong, but at least we
3975 * can figure out what it means: the password is empty.
3977 * Note that this means we ignore the 'data_len' field,
3978 * if the attribute length tells us that there's no
3979 * more data. So the 'data_len' field may be wrong,
3988 len -= 2; /* discount the salt */
3991 * Use the secret to setup the decryption digest
3993 secretlen = strlen(secret);
3995 fr_MD5Init(&context);
3996 fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret, secretlen);
3997 old = context; /* save intermediate work */
4000 * Set up the initial key:
4002 * b(1) = MD5(secret + vector + salt)
4004 fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
4005 fr_MD5Update(&context, passwd, 2);
4008 for (n = 0; n < len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
4012 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
4017 * A quick check: decrypt the first octet
4018 * of the password, which is the
4019 * 'data_len' field. Ensure it's sane.
4021 reallen = passwd[2] ^ digest[0];
4022 if (reallen >= len) {
4023 fr_strerror_printf("tunnel password is too long for the attribute");
4027 fr_MD5Update(&context, passwd + 2, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
4031 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
4034 fr_MD5Update(&context, passwd + n + 2, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
4037 for (i = base; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
4038 passwd[n + i - 1] = passwd[n + i + 2] ^ digest[i];
4043 * See make_tunnel_password, above.
4045 if (reallen > 239) reallen = 239;
4048 passwd[reallen] = 0;
4054 * Encode a CHAP password
4056 * FIXME: might not work with Ascend because
4057 * we use vp->length, and Ascend gear likes
4058 * to send an extra '\0' in the string!
4060 int rad_chap_encode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, uint8_t *output, int id,
4061 VALUE_PAIR *password)
4065 uint8_t string[MAX_STRING_LEN * 2 + 1];
4066 VALUE_PAIR *challenge;
4069 * Sanity check the input parameters
4071 if ((packet == NULL) || (password == NULL)) {
4076 * Note that the password VP can be EITHER
4077 * a User-Password attribute (from a check-item list),
4078 * or a CHAP-Password attribute (the client asking
4079 * the library to encode it).
4087 memcpy(ptr, password->vp_strvalue, password->length);
4088 ptr += password->length;
4089 i += password->length;
4092 * Use Chap-Challenge pair if present,
4093 * Request-Authenticator otherwise.
4095 challenge = pairfind(packet->vps, PW_CHAP_CHALLENGE, 0);
4097 memcpy(ptr, challenge->vp_strvalue, challenge->length);
4098 i += challenge->length;
4100 memcpy(ptr, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
4101 i += AUTH_VECTOR_LEN;
4105 fr_md5_calc((uint8_t *)output + 1, (uint8_t *)string, i);
4112 * Seed the random number generator.
4114 * May be called any number of times.
4116 void fr_rand_seed(const void *data, size_t size)
4121 * Ensure that the pool is initialized.
4123 if (!fr_rand_initialized) {
4126 memset(&fr_rand_pool, 0, sizeof(fr_rand_pool));
4128 fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
4134 while (total < sizeof(fr_rand_pool.randrsl)) {
4135 this = read(fd, fr_rand_pool.randrsl,
4136 sizeof(fr_rand_pool.randrsl) - total);
4137 if ((this < 0) && (errno != EINTR)) break;
4138 if (this > 0) total += this;
4142 fr_rand_pool.randrsl[0] = fd;
4143 fr_rand_pool.randrsl[1] = time(NULL);
4144 fr_rand_pool.randrsl[2] = errno;
4147 fr_randinit(&fr_rand_pool, 1);
4148 fr_rand_pool.randcnt = 0;
4149 fr_rand_initialized = 1;
4155 * Hash the user data
4158 if (!hash) hash = fr_rand();
4159 hash = fr_hash_update(data, size, hash);
4161 fr_rand_pool.randmem[fr_rand_pool.randcnt] ^= hash;
4166 * Return a 32-bit random number.
4168 uint32_t fr_rand(void)
4173 * Ensure that the pool is initialized.
4175 if (!fr_rand_initialized) {
4176 fr_rand_seed(NULL, 0);
4179 num = fr_rand_pool.randrsl[fr_rand_pool.randcnt++];
4180 if (fr_rand_pool.randcnt >= 256) {
4181 fr_rand_pool.randcnt = 0;
4182 fr_isaac(&fr_rand_pool);
4190 * Allocate a new RADIUS_PACKET
4192 RADIUS_PACKET *rad_alloc(int newvector)
4196 if ((rp = malloc(sizeof(RADIUS_PACKET))) == NULL) {
4197 fr_strerror_printf("out of memory");
4200 memset(rp, 0, sizeof(*rp));
4206 uint32_t hash, base;
4209 * Don't expose the actual contents of the random
4213 for (i = 0; i < AUTH_VECTOR_LEN; i += sizeof(uint32_t)) {
4214 hash = fr_rand() ^ base;
4215 memcpy(rp->vector + i, &hash, sizeof(hash));
4218 fr_rand(); /* stir the pool again */
4223 RADIUS_PACKET *rad_alloc_reply(RADIUS_PACKET *packet)
4225 RADIUS_PACKET *reply;
4227 if (!packet) return NULL;
4229 reply = rad_alloc(0);
4230 if (!reply) return NULL;
4233 * Initialize the fields from the request.
4235 reply->sockfd = packet->sockfd;
4236 reply->dst_ipaddr = packet->src_ipaddr;
4237 reply->src_ipaddr = packet->dst_ipaddr;
4238 reply->dst_port = packet->src_port;
4239 reply->src_port = packet->dst_port;
4240 reply->id = packet->id;
4241 reply->code = 0; /* UNKNOWN code */
4242 memcpy(reply->vector, packet->vector,
4243 sizeof(reply->vector));
4246 reply->data_len = 0;
4253 * Free a RADIUS_PACKET
4255 void rad_free(RADIUS_PACKET **radius_packet_ptr)
4257 RADIUS_PACKET *radius_packet;
4259 if (!radius_packet_ptr || !*radius_packet_ptr) return;
4260 radius_packet = *radius_packet_ptr;
4262 free(radius_packet->data);
4264 pairfree(&radius_packet->vps);
4266 free(radius_packet);
4268 *radius_packet_ptr = NULL;