2 * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
3 * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
4 * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
5 * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
7 * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
8 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
9 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
10 * Lesser General Public License for more details.
12 * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
13 * License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
14 * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
21 * @brief Functions to send/receive radius packets.
23 * @copyright 2000-2003,2006 The FreeRADIUS server project
28 #include <freeradius-devel/libradius.h>
30 #include <freeradius-devel/md5.h>
36 #include <freeradius-devel/udpfromto.h>
40 #define VP_TRACE if (fr_debug_flag) printf
42 static void VP_HEXDUMP(char const *msg, uint8_t const *data, size_t len)
46 printf("--- %s ---\n", msg);
47 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
48 if ((i & 0x0f) == 0) printf("%04x: ", (unsigned int) i);
49 printf("%02x ", data[i]);
50 if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x0f) printf("\n");
52 if ((len == 0x0f) || ((len & 0x0f) != 0x0f)) printf("\n");
56 #define VP_TRACE(_x, ...)
57 #define VP_HEXDUMP(_x, _y, _z)
62 * The RFC says 4096 octets max, and most packets are less than 256.
64 #define MAX_PACKET_LEN 4096
67 * The maximum number of attributes which we allow in an incoming
68 * request. If there are more attributes than this, the request
71 * This helps to minimize the potential for a DoS, when an
72 * attacker spoofs Access-Request packets, which don't have a
73 * Message-Authenticator attribute. This means that the packet
74 * is unsigned, and the attacker can use resources on the server,
75 * even if the end request is rejected.
77 int fr_max_attributes = 0;
78 FILE *fr_log_fp = NULL;
80 typedef struct radius_packet_t {
84 uint8_t vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
88 static fr_randctx fr_rand_pool; /* across multiple calls */
89 static int fr_rand_initialized = 0;
90 static unsigned int salt_offset = 0;
91 static uint8_t nullvector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; /* for CoA decode */
93 char const *fr_packet_codes[FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE] = {
99 "Accounting-Response",
104 "Accounting-Message",
115 "Resource-Free-Request",
116 "Resource-Free-Response",
117 "Resource-Query-Request",
118 "Resource-Query-Response",
119 "Alternate-Resource-Reclaim-Request",
120 "NAS-Reboot-Request",
121 "NAS-Reboot-Response",
134 "Disconnect-Request",
144 "IP-Address-Allocate",
149 void fr_printf_log(char const *fmt, ...)
154 if ((fr_debug_flag == 0) || !fr_log_fp) {
159 vfprintf(fr_log_fp, fmt, ap);
165 static char const *tabs = "\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t";
167 static void print_hex_data(uint8_t const *ptr, int attrlen, int depth)
171 for (i = 0; i < attrlen; i++) {
172 if ((i > 0) && ((i & 0x0f) == 0x00))
173 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%.*s", depth, tabs);
174 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x ", ptr[i]);
175 if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x0f) fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\n");
177 if ((i & 0x0f) != 0) fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\n");
181 void rad_print_hex(RADIUS_PACKET *packet)
185 if (!packet->data || !fr_log_fp) return;
187 fprintf(fr_log_fp, " Code:\t\t%u\n", packet->data[0]);
188 fprintf(fr_log_fp, " Id:\t\t%u\n", packet->data[1]);
189 fprintf(fr_log_fp, " Length:\t%u\n", ((packet->data[2] << 8) |
191 fprintf(fr_log_fp, " Vector:\t");
192 for (i = 4; i < 20; i++) {
193 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x", packet->data[i]);
195 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\n");
197 if (packet->data_len > 20) {
200 fprintf(fr_log_fp, " Data:");
202 total = packet->data_len - 20;
203 ptr = packet->data + 20;
207 unsigned int vendor = 0;
209 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t");
210 if (total < 2) { /* too short */
211 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x\n", *ptr);
215 if (ptr[1] > total) { /* too long */
216 for (i = 0; i < total; i++) {
217 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x ", ptr[i]);
222 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x %02x ", ptr[0], ptr[1]);
223 attrlen = ptr[1] - 2;
225 if ((ptr[0] == PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) &&
227 vendor = (ptr[3] << 16) | (ptr[4] << 8) | ptr[5];
228 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x%02x%02x%02x (%u) ",
229 ptr[2], ptr[3], ptr[4], ptr[5], vendor);
239 print_hex_data(ptr, attrlen, 3);
249 * @brief Wrapper for sendto which handles sendfromto, IPv6, and all
250 * possible combinations.
252 static int rad_sendto(int sockfd, void *data, size_t data_len, int flags,
253 #ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
254 fr_ipaddr_t *src_ipaddr, int src_port,
256 UNUSED fr_ipaddr_t *src_ipaddr, UNUSED int src_port,
258 fr_ipaddr_t *dst_ipaddr, int dst_port)
261 struct sockaddr_storage dst;
262 socklen_t sizeof_dst;
264 #ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
265 struct sockaddr_storage src;
266 socklen_t sizeof_src;
268 fr_ipaddr2sockaddr(src_ipaddr, src_port, &src, &sizeof_src);
271 if (!fr_ipaddr2sockaddr(dst_ipaddr, dst_port, &dst, &sizeof_dst)) {
275 #ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
277 * And if they don't specify a source IP address, don't
280 if (((dst_ipaddr->af == AF_INET) || (dst_ipaddr->af == AF_INET6)) &&
281 (src_ipaddr->af != AF_UNSPEC) &&
282 !fr_inaddr_any(src_ipaddr)) {
283 rcode = sendfromto(sockfd, data, data_len, flags,
284 (struct sockaddr *)&src, sizeof_src,
285 (struct sockaddr *)&dst, sizeof_dst);
291 * No udpfromto, fail gracefully.
293 rcode = sendto(sockfd, data, data_len, flags,
294 (struct sockaddr *) &dst, sizeof_dst);
295 #ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
299 DEBUG("rad_send() failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
306 void rad_recv_discard(int sockfd)
309 struct sockaddr_storage src;
310 socklen_t sizeof_src = sizeof(src);
312 (void) recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), 0,
313 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
317 ssize_t rad_recv_header(int sockfd, fr_ipaddr_t *src_ipaddr, int *src_port,
320 ssize_t data_len, packet_len;
322 struct sockaddr_storage src;
323 socklen_t sizeof_src = sizeof(src);
325 data_len = recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), MSG_PEEK,
326 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
328 if ((errno == EAGAIN) || (errno == EINTR)) return 0;
333 * Too little data is available, discard the packet.
336 rad_recv_discard(sockfd);
340 } else { /* we got 4 bytes of data. */
342 * See how long the packet says it is.
344 packet_len = (header[2] * 256) + header[3];
347 * The length in the packet says it's less than
348 * a RADIUS header length: discard it.
350 if (packet_len < AUTH_HDR_LEN) {
351 rad_recv_discard(sockfd);
356 * Enforce RFC requirements, for sanity.
357 * Anything after 4k will be discarded.
359 } else if (packet_len > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
360 rad_recv_discard(sockfd);
367 * Convert AF. If unknown, discard packet.
369 if (!fr_sockaddr2ipaddr(&src, sizeof_src, src_ipaddr, src_port)) {
370 rad_recv_discard(sockfd);
378 * The packet says it's this long, but the actual UDP
379 * size could still be smaller.
386 * @brief wrapper for recvfrom, which handles recvfromto, IPv6, and all
387 * possible combinations.
389 static ssize_t rad_recvfrom(int sockfd, RADIUS_PACKET *packet, int flags,
390 fr_ipaddr_t *src_ipaddr, uint16_t *src_port,
391 fr_ipaddr_t *dst_ipaddr, uint16_t *dst_port)
393 struct sockaddr_storage src;
394 struct sockaddr_storage dst;
395 socklen_t sizeof_src = sizeof(src);
396 socklen_t sizeof_dst = sizeof(dst);
402 memset(&src, 0, sizeof_src);
403 memset(&dst, 0, sizeof_dst);
406 * Get address family, etc. first, so we know if we
407 * need to do udpfromto.
409 * FIXME: udpfromto also does this, but it's not
410 * a critical problem.
412 if (getsockname(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&dst,
413 &sizeof_dst) < 0) return -1;
416 * Read the length of the packet, from the packet.
417 * This lets us allocate the buffer to use for
418 * reading the rest of the packet.
420 data_len = recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), MSG_PEEK,
421 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
423 if ((errno == EAGAIN) || (errno == EINTR)) return 0;
428 * Too little data is available, discard the packet.
431 rad_recv_discard(sockfd);
435 } else { /* we got 4 bytes of data. */
437 * See how long the packet says it is.
439 len = (header[2] * 256) + header[3];
442 * The length in the packet says it's less than
443 * a RADIUS header length: discard it.
445 if (len < AUTH_HDR_LEN) {
446 recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), flags,
447 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
451 * Enforce RFC requirements, for sanity.
452 * Anything after 4k will be discarded.
454 } else if (len > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
455 recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), flags,
456 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
461 packet->data = talloc_array(packet, uint8_t, len);
462 if (!packet->data) return -1;
465 * Receive the packet. The OS will discard any data in the
466 * packet after "len" bytes.
468 #ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
469 if ((dst.ss_family == AF_INET) || (dst.ss_family == AF_INET6)) {
470 data_len = recvfromto(sockfd, packet->data, len, flags,
471 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src,
472 (struct sockaddr *)&dst, &sizeof_dst);
476 * No udpfromto, fail gracefully.
478 data_len = recvfrom(sockfd, packet->data, len, flags,
479 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
484 if (!fr_sockaddr2ipaddr(&src, sizeof_src, src_ipaddr, &port)) {
485 return -1; /* Unknown address family, Die Die Die! */
489 fr_sockaddr2ipaddr(&dst, sizeof_dst, dst_ipaddr, &port);
493 * Different address families should never happen.
495 if (src.ss_family != dst.ss_family) {
503 #define AUTH_PASS_LEN (AUTH_VECTOR_LEN)
505 * @brief Build an encrypted secret value to return in a reply packet
507 * The secret is hidden by xoring with a MD5 digest
508 * created from the shared secret and the authentication
509 * vector. We put them into MD5 in the reverse order from
510 * that used when encrypting passwords to RADIUS.
513 static void make_secret(uint8_t *digest, uint8_t const *vector,
514 char const *secret, uint8_t const *value)
519 fr_MD5Init(&context);
520 fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
521 fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret));
522 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
524 for ( i = 0; i < AUTH_VECTOR_LEN; i++ ) {
525 digest[i] ^= value[i];
529 #define MAX_PASS_LEN (128)
530 static void make_passwd(uint8_t *output, ssize_t *outlen,
531 uint8_t const *input, size_t inlen,
532 char const *secret, uint8_t const *vector)
534 FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
535 uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
536 uint8_t passwd[MAX_PASS_LEN];
541 * If the length is zero, round it up.
545 if (len > MAX_PASS_LEN) len = MAX_PASS_LEN;
547 memcpy(passwd, input, len);
548 if (len < sizeof(passwd)) memset(passwd + len, 0, sizeof(passwd) - len);
554 else if ((len & 0x0f) != 0) {
560 fr_MD5Init(&context);
561 fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret));
567 fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
569 for (n = 0; n < len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
572 fr_MD5Update(&context,
573 passwd + n - AUTH_PASS_LEN,
577 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
578 for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
579 passwd[i + n] ^= digest[i];
583 memcpy(output, passwd, len);
586 static void make_tunnel_passwd(uint8_t *output, ssize_t *outlen,
587 uint8_t const *input, size_t inlen, size_t room,
588 char const *secret, uint8_t const *vector)
590 FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
591 uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
592 uint8_t passwd[MAX_STRING_LEN + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
599 if (room > 253) room = 253;
602 * Account for 2 bytes of the salt, and round the room
603 * available down to the nearest multiple of 16. Then,
604 * subtract one from that to account for the length byte,
605 * and the resulting number is the upper bound on the data
608 * We could short-cut this calculation just be forcing
609 * inlen to be no more than 239. It would work for all
610 * VSA's, as we don't pack multiple VSA's into one
613 * However, this calculation is more general, if a little
614 * complex. And it will work in the future for all possible
615 * kinds of weird attribute packing.
618 room -= (room & 0x0f);
621 if (inlen > room) inlen = room;
624 * Length of the encrypted data is password length plus
625 * one byte for the length of the password.
628 if ((len & 0x0f) != 0) {
632 *outlen = len + 2; /* account for the salt */
635 * Copy the password over.
637 memcpy(passwd + 3, input, inlen);
638 memset(passwd + 3 + inlen, 0, sizeof(passwd) - 3 - inlen);
641 * Generate salt. The RFC's say:
643 * The high bit of salt[0] must be set, each salt in a
644 * packet should be unique, and they should be random
646 * So, we set the high bit, add in a counter, and then
647 * add in some CSPRNG data. should be OK..
649 passwd[0] = (0x80 | ( ((salt_offset++) & 0x0f) << 3) |
651 passwd[1] = fr_rand();
652 passwd[2] = inlen; /* length of the password string */
654 fr_MD5Init(&context);
655 fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret));
658 fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
659 fr_MD5Update(&context, &passwd[0], 2);
661 for (n = 0; n < len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
664 fr_MD5Update(&context,
665 passwd + 2 + n - AUTH_PASS_LEN,
669 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
671 for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
672 passwd[i + 2 + n] ^= digest[i];
675 memcpy(output, passwd, len + 2);
678 extern int fr_attr_max_tlv;
679 extern int fr_attr_shift[];
680 extern int fr_attr_mask[];
682 static int do_next_tlv(VALUE_PAIR const *vp, VALUE_PAIR const *next, int nest)
684 unsigned int tlv1, tlv2;
686 if (nest > fr_attr_max_tlv) return 0;
691 * Keep encoding TLVs which have the same scope.
692 * e.g. two attributes of:
693 * ATTR.TLV1.TLV2.TLV3 = data1
694 * ATTR.TLV1.TLV2.TLV4 = data2
695 * both get put into a container of "ATTR.TLV1.TLV2"
699 * Nothing to follow, we're done.
704 * Not from the same vendor, skip it.
706 if (vp->da->vendor != next->da->vendor) return 0;
709 * In a different TLV space, skip it.
712 tlv2 = next->da->attr;
714 tlv1 &= ((1 << fr_attr_shift[nest]) - 1);
715 tlv2 &= ((1 << fr_attr_shift[nest]) - 1);
717 if (tlv1 != tlv2) return 0;
723 static ssize_t vp2data_any(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
724 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
725 char const *secret, int nest,
726 VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
727 uint8_t *start, size_t room);
729 static ssize_t vp2attr_rfc(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
730 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
731 char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
732 unsigned int attribute, uint8_t *ptr, size_t room);
735 * @brief This is really a sub-function of vp2data_any(). It encodes
736 * the *data* portion of the TLV, and assumes that the encapsulating
737 * attribute has already been encoded.
739 static ssize_t vp2data_tlvs(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
740 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
741 char const *secret, int nest,
742 VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
743 uint8_t *start, size_t room)
747 uint8_t *ptr = start;
748 const VALUE_PAIR *vp = *pvp;
749 const VALUE_PAIR *svp = vp;
754 if (nest > fr_attr_max_tlv) {
755 fr_strerror_printf("vp2data_tlvs: attribute nesting overflow");
761 if (room <= 2) return ptr - start;
763 ptr[0] = (vp->da->attr >> fr_attr_shift[nest]) & fr_attr_mask[nest];
767 if (room > 255) my_room = 255;
769 len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, nest,
770 &vp, ptr + 2, my_room - 2);
771 if (len < 0) return len;
772 if (len == 0) return ptr - start;
773 /* len can NEVER be more than 253 */
778 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
779 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x %02x ", ptr[0], ptr[1]);
780 print_hex_data(ptr + 2, len, 3);
788 if (!do_next_tlv(svp, vp, nest)) break;
792 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
795 da = dict_attrbyvalue(svp->da->attr & ((1 << fr_attr_shift[nest ]) - 1), svp->da->vendor);
796 if (da) fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t%s = ...\n", da->name);
804 * @brief Encodes the data portion of an attribute.
805 * @return -1 on error, or the length of the data portion.
807 static ssize_t vp2data_any(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
808 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
809 char const *secret, int nest,
810 VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
811 uint8_t *start, size_t room)
816 uint8_t *ptr = start;
819 const VALUE_PAIR *vp = *pvp;
822 * See if we need to encode a TLV. The low portion of
823 * the attribute has already been placed into the packer.
824 * If there are still attribute bytes left, then go
825 * encode them as TLVs.
827 * If we cared about the stack, we could unroll the loop.
829 if (vp->da->flags.is_tlv && (nest < fr_attr_max_tlv) &&
830 ((vp->da->attr >> fr_attr_shift[nest + 1]) != 0)) {
831 return vp2data_tlvs(packet, original, secret, nest + 1, pvp,
838 * Set up the default sources for the data.
840 data = vp->vp_octets;
844 * Short-circuit it for long attributes. They can't be
845 * encrypted, tagged, etc.
847 if ((vp->da->type & PW_FLAG_LONG) != 0) goto do_tlv;
849 switch(vp->da->type) {
853 case PW_TYPE_IPV6ADDR:
854 case PW_TYPE_IPV6PREFIX:
855 case PW_TYPE_IPV4PREFIX:
856 case PW_TYPE_ABINARY:
857 /* nothing more to do */
861 len = 1; /* just in case */
862 array[0] = vp->vp_integer & 0xff;
867 len = 2; /* just in case */
868 array[0] = (vp->vp_integer >> 8) & 0xff;
869 array[1] = vp->vp_integer & 0xff;
873 case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
874 len = 4; /* just in case */
875 lvalue = htonl(vp->vp_integer);
876 memcpy(array, &lvalue, sizeof(lvalue));
880 case PW_TYPE_INTEGER64:
881 len = 8; /* just in case */
882 lvalue64 = htonll(vp->vp_integer64);
883 data = (uint8_t *) &lvalue64;
887 data = (uint8_t const *) &vp->vp_ipaddr;
888 len = 4; /* just in case */
892 * There are no tagged date attributes.
895 lvalue = htonl(vp->vp_date);
896 data = (uint8_t const *) &lvalue;
897 len = 4; /* just in case */
904 len = 4; /* just in case */
905 slvalue = htonl(vp->vp_signed);
906 memcpy(array, &slvalue, sizeof(slvalue));
915 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot encode NULL TLV");
920 default: /* unknown type: ignore it */
921 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Unknown attribute type %d",
935 * Bound the data to the calling size
937 if (len > (ssize_t) room) len = room;
940 * Encrypt the various password styles
942 * Attributes with encrypted values MUST be less than
945 switch (vp->da->flags.encrypt) {
946 case FLAG_ENCRYPT_USER_PASSWORD:
947 make_passwd(ptr, &len, data, len,
948 secret, packet->vector);
951 case FLAG_ENCRYPT_TUNNEL_PASSWORD:
953 if (vp->da->flags.has_tag) lvalue = 1;
956 * Check if there's enough room. If there isn't,
957 * we discard the attribute.
959 * This is ONLY a problem if we have multiple VSA's
960 * in one Vendor-Specific, though.
962 if (room < (18 + lvalue)) return 0;
964 switch (packet->code) {
965 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
966 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
967 case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
970 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: No request packet, cannot encrypt %s attribute in the vp.", vp->da->name);
974 if (lvalue) ptr[0] = vp->tag;
975 make_tunnel_passwd(ptr + lvalue, &len, data, len,
977 secret, original->vector);
979 case PW_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
980 case PW_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
983 make_tunnel_passwd(ptr + 1, &len, data, len - 1, room,
984 secret, packet->vector);
990 * The code above ensures that this attribute
993 case FLAG_ENCRYPT_ASCEND_SECRET:
994 if (len != 16) return 0;
995 make_secret(ptr, packet->vector, secret, data);
996 len = AUTH_VECTOR_LEN;
1001 if (vp->da->flags.has_tag && TAG_VALID(vp->tag)) {
1002 if (vp->da->type == PW_TYPE_STRING) {
1003 if (len > ((ssize_t) (room - 1))) len = room - 1;
1006 } else if (vp->da->type == PW_TYPE_INTEGER) {
1008 } /* else it can't be any other type */
1010 memcpy(ptr, data, len);
1012 } /* switch over encryption flags */
1015 return len + (ptr - start);
1018 static ssize_t attr_shift(uint8_t const *start, uint8_t const *end,
1019 uint8_t *ptr, int hdr_len, ssize_t len,
1020 int flag_offset, int vsa_offset)
1022 int check_len = len - ptr[1];
1023 int total = len + hdr_len;
1026 * Pass 1: Check if the addition of the headers
1027 * overflows the available room. If so, return
1028 * what we were capable of encoding.
1031 while (check_len > (255 - hdr_len)) {
1033 check_len -= (255 - hdr_len);
1037 * Note that this results in a number of attributes maybe
1038 * being marked as "encoded", but which aren't in the
1039 * packet. Oh well. The solution is to fix the
1040 * "vp2data_any" function to take into account the header
1043 if ((ptr + ptr[1] + total) > end) {
1044 return (ptr + ptr[1]) - start;
1048 * Pass 2: Now that we know there's enough room,
1049 * re-arrange the data to form a set of valid
1050 * RADIUS attributes.
1053 int sublen = 255 - ptr[1];
1055 if (len <= sublen) {
1060 memmove(ptr + 255 + hdr_len, ptr + 255, sublen);
1061 memcpy(ptr + 255, ptr, hdr_len);
1063 if (vsa_offset) ptr[vsa_offset] += sublen;
1064 ptr[flag_offset] |= 0x80;
1068 if (vsa_offset) ptr[vsa_offset] = 3;
1072 if (vsa_offset) ptr[vsa_offset] += len;
1074 return (ptr + ptr[1]) - start;
1079 * @brief Encode an "extended" attribute.
1081 int rad_vp2extended(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
1082 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
1083 char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
1084 uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
1088 uint8_t *start = ptr;
1089 const VALUE_PAIR *vp = *pvp;
1091 if (!vp->da->flags.extended) {
1092 fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2extended called for non-extended attribute");
1097 * The attribute number is encoded into the upper 8 bits
1100 ptr[0] = (vp->da->vendor / FR_MAX_VENDOR) & 0xff;
1102 if (!vp->da->flags.long_extended) {
1103 if (room < 3) return 0;
1106 ptr[2] = vp->da->attr & fr_attr_mask[0];
1109 if (room < 4) return 0;
1112 ptr[2] = vp->da->attr & fr_attr_mask[0];
1117 * Only "flagged" attributes can be longer than one
1120 if (!vp->da->flags.long_extended && (room > 255)) {
1127 if (vp->da->flags.evs) {
1128 uint8_t *evs = ptr + ptr[1];
1130 if (room < (size_t) (ptr[1] + 5)) return 0;
1134 evs[0] = 0; /* always zero */
1135 evs[1] = (vp->da->vendor >> 16) & 0xff;
1136 evs[2] = (vp->da->vendor >> 8) & 0xff;
1137 evs[3] = vp->da->vendor & 0xff;
1138 evs[4] = vp->da->attr & fr_attr_mask[0];
1144 len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, 0,
1145 pvp, ptr + ptr[1], room - hdr_len);
1146 if (len <= 0) return len;
1149 * There may be more than 252 octets of data encoded in
1150 * the attribute. If so, move the data up in the packet,
1151 * and copy the existing header over. Set the "M" flag ONLY
1152 * after copying the rest of the data.
1154 if (vp->da->flags.long_extended && (len > (255 - ptr[1]))) {
1155 return attr_shift(start, start + room, ptr, 4, len, 3, 0);
1161 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
1164 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x %02x ", ptr[0], ptr[1]);
1165 if (!vp->da->flags.long_extended) {
1166 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x ", ptr[2]);
1169 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x %02x ", ptr[2], ptr[3]);
1173 if (vp->da->flags.evs) {
1174 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x%02x%02x%02x (%u) %02x ",
1175 ptr[jump], ptr[jump + 1],
1176 ptr[jump + 2], ptr[jump + 3],
1177 ((ptr[jump + 1] << 16) |
1178 (ptr[jump + 2] << 8) |
1184 print_hex_data(ptr + jump, len, 3);
1188 return (ptr + ptr[1]) - start;
1193 * @brief Encode a WiMAX attribute.
1195 int rad_vp2wimax(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
1196 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
1197 char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
1198 uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
1203 uint8_t *start = ptr;
1204 const VALUE_PAIR *vp = *pvp;
1207 * Double-check for WiMAX format.
1209 if (!vp->da->flags.wimax) {
1210 fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2wimax called for non-WIMAX VSA");
1215 * Not enough room for:
1216 * attr, len, vendor-id, vsa, vsalen, continuation
1218 if (room < 9) return 0;
1221 * Build the Vendor-Specific header
1224 ptr[0] = PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
1226 lvalue = htonl(vp->da->vendor);
1227 memcpy(ptr + 2, &lvalue, 4);
1228 ptr[6] = (vp->da->attr & fr_attr_mask[1]);
1230 ptr[8] = 0; /* continuation byte */
1234 len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, 0, pvp, ptr + ptr[1],
1236 if (len <= 0) return len;
1239 * There may be more than 252 octets of data encoded in
1240 * the attribute. If so, move the data up in the packet,
1241 * and copy the existing header over. Set the "C" flag
1242 * ONLY after copying the rest of the data.
1244 if (len > (255 - ptr[1])) {
1245 return attr_shift(start, start + room, ptr, hdr_len, len, 8, 7);
1252 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
1253 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x %02x %02x%02x%02x%02x (%u) %02x %02x %02x ",
1255 ptr[2], ptr[3], ptr[4], ptr[5],
1256 (ptr[3] << 16) | (ptr[4] << 8) | ptr[5],
1257 ptr[6], ptr[7], ptr[8]);
1258 print_hex_data(ptr + 9, len, 3);
1262 return (ptr + ptr[1]) - start;
1266 * @brief Encode an RFC format attribute, with the "concat" flag set.
1268 * If there isn't enough room in the packet, the data is
1271 static ssize_t vp2attr_concat(UNUSED RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
1272 UNUSED RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
1273 UNUSED char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
1274 unsigned int attribute, uint8_t *start, size_t room)
1276 uint8_t *ptr = start;
1279 VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;
1287 if (room <= 2) break;
1294 /* no more than 253 octets */
1295 if (left > 253) left = 253;
1297 /* no more than "room" octets */
1298 if (room < (left + 2)) left = room - 2;
1300 memcpy(ptr + 2, p, left);
1303 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
1304 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x %02x ", ptr[0], ptr[1]);
1305 print_hex_data(ptr + 2, len, 3);
1320 * @brief Encode an RFC format TLV.
1322 * This could be a standard attribute,
1323 * or a TLV data type. If it's a standard attribute, then
1324 * vp->da->attr == attribute. Otherwise, attribute may be
1327 static ssize_t vp2attr_rfc(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
1328 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
1329 char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
1330 unsigned int attribute, uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
1334 if (room <= 2) return 0;
1336 ptr[0] = attribute & 0xff;
1339 if (room > ((unsigned) 255 - ptr[1])) room = 255 - ptr[1];
1341 len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, 0, pvp, ptr + ptr[1], room);
1342 if (len <= 0) return len;
1347 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
1348 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x %02x ", ptr[0], ptr[1]);
1349 print_hex_data(ptr + 2, len, 3);
1358 * @brief Encode a VSA which is a TLV. If it's in the RFC format, call
1359 * vp2attr_rfc. Otherwise, encode it here.
1361 static ssize_t vp2attr_vsa(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
1362 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
1363 char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
1364 unsigned int attribute, unsigned int vendor,
1365 uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
1369 const VALUE_PAIR *vp = *pvp;
1372 * Unknown vendor: RFC format.
1373 * Known vendor and RFC format: go do that.
1375 dv = dict_vendorbyvalue(vendor);
1377 (!vp->da->flags.is_tlv && (dv->type == 1) && (dv->length == 1))) {
1378 return vp2attr_rfc(packet, original, secret, pvp,
1379 attribute, ptr, room);
1384 fr_strerror_printf("vp2attr_vsa: Internal sanity check failed,"
1385 " type %u", (unsigned) dv->type);
1389 ptr[0] = 0; /* attr must be 24-bit */
1390 ptr[1] = (attribute >> 16) & 0xff;
1391 ptr[2] = (attribute >> 8) & 0xff;
1392 ptr[3] = attribute & 0xff;
1396 ptr[0] = (attribute >> 8) & 0xff;
1397 ptr[1] = attribute & 0xff;
1401 ptr[0] = attribute & 0xff;
1405 switch (dv->length) {
1407 fr_strerror_printf("vp2attr_vsa: Internal sanity check failed,"
1408 " length %u", (unsigned) dv->length);
1416 ptr[dv->type + 1] = dv->type + 2;
1420 ptr[dv->type] = dv->type + 1;
1425 if (room > ((unsigned) 255 - (dv->type + dv->length))) {
1426 room = 255 - (dv->type + dv->length);
1429 len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, 0, pvp,
1430 ptr + dv->type + dv->length, room);
1431 if (len <= 0) return len;
1433 if (dv->length) ptr[dv->type + dv->length - 1] += len;
1436 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
1442 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp)
1443 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x%02x%02x%02x ",
1444 ptr[0], ptr[1], ptr[2], ptr[3]);
1448 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp)
1449 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x%02x ",
1454 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp)
1455 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x ", ptr[0]);
1459 switch (dv->length) {
1464 fprintf(fr_log_fp, " ");
1468 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x ",
1473 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x%02x ",
1474 ptr[dv->type], ptr[dv->type] + 1);
1478 print_hex_data(ptr + dv->type + dv->length, len, 3);
1482 return dv->type + dv->length + len;
1487 * @brief Encode a Vendor-Specific attribute.
1489 int rad_vp2vsa(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
1490 char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp, uint8_t *ptr,
1495 const VALUE_PAIR *vp = *pvp;
1498 * Double-check for WiMAX format.
1500 if (vp->da->flags.wimax) {
1501 return rad_vp2wimax(packet, original, secret, pvp,
1505 if (vp->da->vendor > FR_MAX_VENDOR) {
1506 fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2vsa: Invalid arguments");
1511 * Not enough room for:
1512 * attr, len, vendor-id
1514 if (room < 6) return 0;
1517 * Build the Vendor-Specific header
1519 ptr[0] = PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
1521 lvalue = htonl(vp->da->vendor);
1522 memcpy(ptr + 2, &lvalue, 4);
1524 if (room > ((unsigned) 255 - ptr[1])) room = 255 - ptr[1];
1526 len = vp2attr_vsa(packet, original, secret, pvp,
1527 vp->da->attr, vp->da->vendor,
1528 ptr + ptr[1], room);
1529 if (len < 0) return len;
1532 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
1533 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x %02x %02x%02x%02x%02x (%u) ",
1535 ptr[2], ptr[3], ptr[4], ptr[5],
1536 (ptr[3] << 16) | (ptr[4] << 8) | ptr[5]);
1537 print_hex_data(ptr + 6, len, 3);
1548 * @brief Encode an RFC standard attribute 1..255
1550 int rad_vp2rfc(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
1551 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
1552 char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
1553 uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
1555 const VALUE_PAIR *vp = *pvp;
1557 if (vp->da->vendor != 0) {
1558 fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2rfc called with VSA");
1562 if ((vp->da->attr == 0) || (vp->da->attr > 255)) {
1563 fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2rfc called with non-standard attribute %u", vp->da->attr);
1568 * Only CUI is allowed to have zero length.
1571 if ((vp->length == 0) &&
1572 (vp->da->attr == PW_CHARGEABLE_USER_IDENTITY)) {
1573 ptr[0] = PW_CHARGEABLE_USER_IDENTITY;
1581 * Message-Authenticator is hard-coded.
1583 if (vp->da->attr == PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR) {
1584 if (room < 18) return -1;
1587 ptr[0] = PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR;
1589 memset(ptr + 2, 0, 16);
1591 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
1592 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t50 12 ...\n");
1596 *pvp = (*pvp)->next;
1601 * EAP-Message is special.
1603 if (vp->da->flags.concat && (vp->length > 253)) {
1604 return vp2attr_concat(packet, original, secret, pvp, vp->da->attr,
1608 return vp2attr_rfc(packet, original, secret, pvp, vp->da->attr,
1612 static ssize_t rad_vp2rfctlv(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
1613 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
1614 char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
1615 uint8_t *start, size_t room)
1618 const VALUE_PAIR *vp = *pvp;
1620 if (!vp->da->flags.is_tlv) {
1621 fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2rfctlv: attr is not a TLV");
1625 if ((vp->da->vendor & (FR_MAX_VENDOR - 1)) != 0) {
1626 fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2rfctlv: attr is not an RFC TLV");
1630 if (room < 5) return 0;
1633 * Encode the first level of TLVs
1635 start[0] = (vp->da->vendor / FR_MAX_VENDOR) & 0xff;
1637 start[2] = vp->da->attr & fr_attr_mask[0];
1640 len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, 0, pvp,
1641 start + 4, room - 4);
1642 if (len <= 0) return len;
1655 * @brief Parse a data structure into a RADIUS attribute.
1657 int rad_vp2attr(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
1658 char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp, uint8_t *start,
1661 const VALUE_PAIR *vp;
1663 if (!pvp || !*pvp || !start || (room <= 2)) return -1;
1668 * RFC format attributes take the fast path.
1670 if (!vp->da->vendor) {
1671 if (vp->da->attr > 255) return 0;
1673 return rad_vp2rfc(packet, original, secret, pvp,
1677 if (vp->da->flags.extended) {
1678 return rad_vp2extended(packet, original, secret, pvp,
1683 * The upper 8 bits of the vendor number are the standard
1684 * space attribute which is a TLV.
1686 if ((vp->da->vendor & (FR_MAX_VENDOR - 1)) == 0) {
1687 return rad_vp2rfctlv(packet, original, secret, pvp,
1691 if (vp->da->flags.wimax) {
1692 return rad_vp2wimax(packet, original, secret, pvp,
1696 return rad_vp2vsa(packet, original, secret, pvp,
1702 * @brief Encode a packet.
1704 int rad_encode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
1707 radius_packet_t *hdr;
1709 uint16_t total_length;
1711 const VALUE_PAIR *reply;
1713 char ip_src_buffer[128];
1714 char ip_dst_buffer[128];
1717 * A 4K packet, aligned on 64-bits.
1719 uint64_t data[MAX_PACKET_LEN / sizeof(uint64_t)];
1721 if ((packet->code > 0) && (packet->code < FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
1722 what = fr_packet_codes[packet->code];
1727 DEBUG("Sending %s of id %d from %s port %u to %s port %u\n",
1729 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
1730 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
1731 ip_src_buffer, sizeof(ip_src_buffer)),
1733 inet_ntop(packet->dst_ipaddr.af,
1734 &packet->dst_ipaddr.ipaddr,
1735 ip_dst_buffer, sizeof(ip_dst_buffer)),
1739 * Double-check some things based on packet code.
1741 switch (packet->code) {
1742 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
1743 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
1744 case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
1746 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot sign response packet without a request packet.");
1752 * These packet vectors start off as all zero.
1754 case PW_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
1755 case PW_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
1756 case PW_COA_REQUEST:
1757 memset(packet->vector, 0, sizeof(packet->vector));
1765 * Use memory on the stack, until we know how
1766 * large the packet will be.
1768 hdr = (radius_packet_t *) data;
1771 * Build standard header
1773 hdr->code = packet->code;
1774 hdr->id = packet->id;
1776 memcpy(hdr->vector, packet->vector, sizeof(hdr->vector));
1778 total_length = AUTH_HDR_LEN;
1781 * Load up the configuration values for the user
1787 * FIXME: Loop twice over the reply list. The first time,
1788 * calculate the total length of data. The second time,
1789 * allocate the memory, and fill in the VP's.
1791 * Hmm... this may be slower than just doing a small
1796 * Loop over the reply attributes for the packet.
1798 reply = packet->vps;
1801 char const *last_name = NULL;
1804 * Ignore non-wire attributes, but allow extended
1807 if ((reply->da->vendor == 0) &&
1808 ((reply->da->attr & 0xFFFF) >= 256) &&
1809 !reply->da->flags.extended && !reply->da->flags.long_extended) {
1812 * Permit the admin to send BADLY formatted
1813 * attributes with a debug build.
1815 if (reply->da->attr == PW_RAW_ATTRIBUTE) {
1816 memcpy(ptr, reply->vp_octets, reply->length);
1817 len = reply->length;
1818 reply = reply->next;
1822 reply = reply->next;
1827 * Set the Message-Authenticator to the correct
1828 * length and initial value.
1830 if (reply->da->attr == PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR) {
1832 * Cache the offset to the
1833 * Message-Authenticator
1835 packet->offset = total_length;
1838 last_len = reply->length;
1840 last_name = reply->da->name;
1842 len = rad_vp2attr(packet, original, secret, &reply, ptr,
1843 ((uint8_t *) data) + sizeof(data) - ptr);
1844 if (len < 0) return -1;
1847 * Failed to encode the attribute, likely because
1848 * the packet is full.
1851 if (last_len != 0) {
1852 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Failed encoding attribute %s\n", last_name);
1854 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Skipping zero-length attribute %s\n", last_name);
1859 next: /* Used only for Raw-Attribute */
1862 total_length += len;
1863 } /* done looping over all attributes */
1866 * Fill in the rest of the fields, and copy the data over
1867 * from the local stack to the newly allocated memory.
1869 * Yes, all this 'memcpy' is slow, but it means
1870 * that we only allocate the minimum amount of
1871 * memory for a request.
1873 packet->data_len = total_length;
1874 packet->data = talloc_array(packet, uint8_t, packet->data_len);
1875 if (!packet->data) {
1876 fr_strerror_printf("Out of memory");
1880 memcpy(packet->data, hdr, packet->data_len);
1881 hdr = (radius_packet_t *) packet->data;
1883 total_length = htons(total_length);
1884 memcpy(hdr->length, &total_length, sizeof(total_length));
1891 * @brief Sign a previously encoded packet.
1893 int rad_sign(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
1896 radius_packet_t *hdr = (radius_packet_t *)packet->data;
1899 * It wasn't assigned an Id, this is bad!
1901 if (packet->id < 0) {
1902 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: RADIUS packets must be assigned an Id.");
1906 if (!packet->data || (packet->data_len < AUTH_HDR_LEN) ||
1907 (packet->offset < 0)) {
1908 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: You must call rad_encode() before rad_sign()");
1913 * If there's a Message-Authenticator, update it
1914 * now, BEFORE updating the authentication vector.
1916 if (packet->offset > 0) {
1917 uint8_t calc_auth_vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
1919 switch (packet->code) {
1920 case PW_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE:
1921 if (original && original->code == PW_STATUS_SERVER) {
1925 case PW_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
1926 case PW_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
1927 case PW_DISCONNECT_ACK:
1928 case PW_DISCONNECT_NAK:
1929 case PW_COA_REQUEST:
1932 memset(hdr->vector, 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
1936 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
1937 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
1938 case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
1940 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot sign response packet without a request packet.");
1943 memcpy(hdr->vector, original->vector,
1947 default: /* others have vector already set to zero */
1953 * Set the authentication vector to zero,
1954 * calculate the HMAC, and put it
1955 * into the Message-Authenticator
1958 fr_hmac_md5(packet->data, packet->data_len,
1959 (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret),
1961 memcpy(packet->data + packet->offset + 2,
1962 calc_auth_vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
1965 * Copy the original request vector back
1966 * to the raw packet.
1968 memcpy(hdr->vector, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
1972 * Switch over the packet code, deciding how to
1975 switch (packet->code) {
1977 * Request packets are not signed, bur
1978 * have a random authentication vector.
1980 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REQUEST:
1981 case PW_STATUS_SERVER:
1985 * Reply packets are signed with the
1986 * authentication vector of the request.
1993 fr_MD5Init(&context);
1994 fr_MD5Update(&context, packet->data, packet->data_len);
1995 fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret,
1997 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
1999 memcpy(hdr->vector, digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2000 memcpy(packet->vector, digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2003 }/* switch over packet codes */
2009 * @brief Reply to the request. Also attach
2010 * reply attribute value pairs and any user message provided.
2012 int rad_send(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
2017 char ip_src_buffer[128];
2018 char ip_dst_buffer[128];
2021 * Maybe it's a fake packet. Don't send it.
2023 if (!packet || (packet->sockfd < 0)) {
2027 if ((packet->code > 0) && (packet->code < FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
2028 what = fr_packet_codes[packet->code];
2034 * First time through, allocate room for the packet
2036 if (!packet->data) {
2038 * Encode the packet.
2040 if (rad_encode(packet, original, secret) < 0) {
2045 * Re-sign it, including updating the
2046 * Message-Authenticator.
2048 if (rad_sign(packet, original, secret) < 0) {
2053 * If packet->data points to data, then we print out
2054 * the VP list again only for debugging.
2056 } else if (fr_debug_flag) {
2057 DEBUG("Sending %s of id %d from %s port %u to %s port %u\n", what,
2059 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2060 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2061 ip_src_buffer, sizeof(ip_src_buffer)),
2063 inet_ntop(packet->dst_ipaddr.af,
2064 &packet->dst_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2065 ip_dst_buffer, sizeof(ip_dst_buffer)),
2068 for (reply = packet->vps; reply; reply = reply->next) {
2069 if ((reply->da->vendor == 0) &&
2070 ((reply->da->attr & 0xFFFF) > 0xff)) continue;
2076 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp) rad_print_hex(packet);
2080 * And send it on it's way.
2082 return rad_sendto(packet->sockfd, packet->data, packet->data_len, 0,
2083 &packet->src_ipaddr, packet->src_port,
2084 &packet->dst_ipaddr, packet->dst_port);
2088 * @brief Do a comparison of two authentication digests by comparing
2091 * Otherwise, the server can be subject to
2092 * timing attacks that allow attackers find a valid message
2095 * http://www.cs.rice.edu/~dwallach/pub/crosby-timing2009.pdf
2097 int rad_digest_cmp(uint8_t const *a, uint8_t const *b, size_t length)
2102 for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
2103 result |= a[i] ^ b[i];
2106 return result; /* 0 is OK, !0 is !OK, just like memcmp */
2111 * @brief Validates the requesting client NAS. Calculates the
2112 * Request Authenticator based on the clients private key.
2114 static int calc_acctdigest(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, char const *secret)
2116 uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
2120 * Zero out the auth_vector in the received packet.
2121 * Then append the shared secret to the received packet,
2122 * and calculate the MD5 sum. This must be the same
2123 * as the original MD5 sum (packet->vector).
2125 memset(packet->data + 4, 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2128 * MD5(packet + secret);
2130 fr_MD5Init(&context);
2131 fr_MD5Update(&context, packet->data, packet->data_len);
2132 fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret));
2133 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
2136 * Return 0 if OK, 2 if not OK.
2138 if (rad_digest_cmp(digest, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) != 0) return 2;
2144 * @brief Validates the requesting client NAS. Calculates the
2145 * Response Authenticator based on the clients private key.
2147 static int calc_replydigest(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET *original,
2150 uint8_t calc_digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
2156 if (original == NULL) {
2161 * Copy the original vector in place.
2163 memcpy(packet->data + 4, original->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2166 * MD5(packet + secret);
2168 fr_MD5Init(&context);
2169 fr_MD5Update(&context, packet->data, packet->data_len);
2170 fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret));
2171 fr_MD5Final(calc_digest, &context);
2174 * Copy the packet's vector back to the packet.
2176 memcpy(packet->data + 4, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2179 * Return 0 if OK, 2 if not OK.
2181 if (rad_digest_cmp(packet->vector, calc_digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) != 0) return 2;
2187 * @brief Check if a set of RADIUS formatted TLVs are OK.
2189 int rad_tlv_ok(uint8_t const *data, size_t length,
2190 size_t dv_type, size_t dv_length)
2192 const uint8_t *end = data + length;
2194 if ((dv_length > 2) || (dv_type == 0) || (dv_type > 4)) {
2195 fr_strerror_printf("rad_tlv_ok: Invalid arguments");
2199 while (data < end) {
2202 if ((data + dv_type + dv_length) > end) {
2203 fr_strerror_printf("Attribute header overflow");
2209 if ((data[0] == 0) && (data[1] == 0) &&
2210 (data[2] == 0) && (data[3] == 0)) {
2212 fr_strerror_printf("Invalid attribute 0");
2217 fr_strerror_printf("Invalid attribute > 2^24");
2223 if ((data[0] == 0) && (data[1] == 0)) goto zero;
2227 if (data[0] == 0) goto zero;
2231 fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check failed");
2235 switch (dv_length) {
2240 if (data[dv_type + 1] != 0) {
2241 fr_strerror_printf("Attribute is longer than 256 octets");
2246 attrlen = data[dv_type + dv_length - 1];
2251 fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check failed");
2255 if (attrlen < (dv_type + dv_length)) {
2256 fr_strerror_printf("Attribute header has invalid length");
2260 if (attrlen > length) {
2261 fr_strerror_printf("Attribute overflows container");
2274 * @brief See if the data pointed to by PTR is a valid RADIUS packet.
2276 * packet is not 'const * const' because we may update data_len,
2277 * if there's more data in the UDP packet than in the RADIUS packet.
2279 int rad_packet_ok(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, int flags)
2284 radius_packet_t *hdr;
2285 char host_ipaddr[128];
2291 * Check for packets smaller than the packet header.
2293 * RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
2295 * "The minimum length is 20 ..."
2297 if (packet->data_len < AUTH_HDR_LEN) {
2298 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too short (received %zu < minimum %d)",
2299 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2300 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2301 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2302 packet->data_len, AUTH_HDR_LEN);
2308 * Check for packets with mismatched size.
2309 * i.e. We've received 128 bytes, and the packet header
2310 * says it's 256 bytes long.
2312 totallen = (packet->data[2] << 8) | packet->data[3];
2313 hdr = (radius_packet_t *)packet->data;
2316 * Code of 0 is not understood.
2317 * Code of 16 or greate is not understood.
2319 if ((hdr->code == 0) ||
2320 (hdr->code >= FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
2321 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Bad RADIUS packet from host %s: unknown packet code %d",
2322 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2323 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2324 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2330 * Message-Authenticator is required in Status-Server
2331 * packets, otherwise they can be trivially forged.
2333 if (hdr->code == PW_STATUS_SERVER) require_ma = 1;
2336 * It's also required if the caller asks for it.
2338 if (flags) require_ma = 1;
2341 * Repeat the length checks. This time, instead of
2342 * looking at the data we received, look at the value
2343 * of the 'length' field inside of the packet.
2345 * Check for packets smaller than the packet header.
2347 * RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
2349 * "The minimum length is 20 ..."
2351 if (totallen < AUTH_HDR_LEN) {
2352 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too short (length %zu < minimum %d)",
2353 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2354 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2355 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2356 totallen, AUTH_HDR_LEN);
2361 * And again, for the value of the 'length' field.
2363 * RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
2365 * " ... and maximum length is 4096."
2367 * HOWEVER. This requirement is for the network layer.
2368 * If the code gets here, we assume that a well-formed
2369 * packet is an OK packet.
2371 * We allow both the UDP data length, and the RADIUS
2372 * "length" field to contain up to 64K of data.
2376 * RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
2378 * "If the packet is shorter than the Length field
2379 * indicates, it MUST be silently discarded."
2381 * i.e. No response to the NAS.
2383 if (packet->data_len < totallen) {
2384 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: received %zu octets, packet length says %zu",
2385 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2386 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2387 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2388 packet->data_len, totallen);
2393 * RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
2395 * "Octets outside the range of the Length field MUST be
2396 * treated as padding and ignored on reception."
2398 if (packet->data_len > totallen) {
2400 * We're shortening the packet below, but just
2401 * to be paranoid, zero out the extra data.
2403 memset(packet->data + totallen, 0, packet->data_len - totallen);
2404 packet->data_len = totallen;
2408 * Walk through the packet's attributes, ensuring that
2409 * they add up EXACTLY to the size of the packet.
2411 * If they don't, then the attributes either under-fill
2412 * or over-fill the packet. Any parsing of the packet
2413 * is impossible, and will result in unknown side effects.
2415 * This would ONLY happen with buggy RADIUS implementations,
2416 * or with an intentional attack. Either way, we do NOT want
2417 * to be vulnerable to this problem.
2420 count = totallen - AUTH_HDR_LEN;
2425 * We need at least 2 bytes to check the
2429 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: attribute header overflows the packet",
2430 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2431 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2432 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
2437 * Attribute number zero is NOT defined.
2440 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: Invalid attribute 0",
2441 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2442 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2443 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
2448 * Attributes are at LEAST as long as the ID & length
2449 * fields. Anything shorter is an invalid attribute.
2452 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: attribute %u too short",
2453 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2454 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2455 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2461 * If there are fewer bytes in the packet than in the
2462 * attribute, it's a bad packet.
2464 if (count < attr[1]) {
2465 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: attribute %u data overflows the packet",
2466 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2467 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2468 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2474 * Sanity check the attributes for length.
2477 default: /* don't do anything by default */
2481 * If there's an EAP-Message, we require
2482 * a Message-Authenticator.
2484 case PW_EAP_MESSAGE:
2488 case PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR:
2489 if (attr[1] != 2 + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) {
2490 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: Message-Authenticator has invalid length %d",
2491 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2492 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2493 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2502 * FIXME: Look up the base 255 attributes in the
2503 * dictionary, and switch over their type. For
2504 * integer/date/ip, the attribute length SHOULD
2507 count -= attr[1]; /* grab the attribute length */
2509 num_attributes++; /* seen one more attribute */
2513 * If the attributes add up to a packet, it's allowed.
2515 * If not, we complain, and throw the packet away.
2518 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: packet attributes do NOT exactly fill the packet",
2519 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2520 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2521 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
2526 * If we're configured to look for a maximum number of
2527 * attributes, and we've seen more than that maximum,
2528 * then throw the packet away, as a possible DoS.
2530 if ((fr_max_attributes > 0) &&
2531 (num_attributes > fr_max_attributes)) {
2532 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Possible DoS attack from host %s: Too many attributes in request (received %d, max %d are allowed).",
2533 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2534 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2535 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2536 num_attributes, fr_max_attributes);
2541 * http://www.freeradius.org/rfc/rfc2869.html#EAP-Message
2543 * A packet with an EAP-Message attribute MUST also have
2544 * a Message-Authenticator attribute.
2546 * A Message-Authenticator all by itself is OK, though.
2548 * Similarly, Status-Server packets MUST contain
2549 * Message-Authenticator attributes.
2551 if (require_ma && ! seen_ma) {
2552 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Insecure packet from host %s: Packet does not contain required Message-Authenticator attribute",
2553 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2554 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2555 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
2560 * Fill RADIUS header fields
2562 packet->code = hdr->code;
2563 packet->id = hdr->id;
2564 memcpy(packet->vector, hdr->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2571 * @brief Receive UDP client requests, and fill in
2572 * the basics of a RADIUS_PACKET structure.
2574 RADIUS_PACKET *rad_recv(int fd, int flags)
2578 RADIUS_PACKET *packet;
2581 * Allocate the new request data structure
2583 packet = rad_alloc(NULL, 0);
2585 fr_strerror_printf("out of memory");
2590 sock_flags = MSG_PEEK;
2594 data_len = rad_recvfrom(fd, packet, sock_flags,
2595 &packet->src_ipaddr, &packet->src_port,
2596 &packet->dst_ipaddr, &packet->dst_port);
2599 * Check for socket errors.
2602 fr_strerror_printf("Error receiving packet: %s", strerror(errno));
2603 /* packet->data is NULL */
2607 packet->data_len = data_len; /* unsigned vs signed */
2610 * If the packet is too big, then rad_recvfrom did NOT
2611 * allocate memory. Instead, it just discarded the
2614 if (packet->data_len > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
2615 fr_strerror_printf("Discarding packet: Larger than RFC limitation of 4096 bytes.");
2616 /* packet->data is NULL */
2622 * Read no data. Continue.
2623 * This check is AFTER the MAX_PACKET_LEN check above, because
2624 * if the packet is larger than MAX_PACKET_LEN, we also have
2625 * packet->data == NULL
2627 if ((packet->data_len == 0) || !packet->data) {
2628 fr_strerror_printf("Empty packet: Socket is not ready.");
2634 * See if it's a well-formed RADIUS packet.
2636 if (!rad_packet_ok(packet, flags)) {
2642 * Remember which socket we read the packet from.
2644 packet->sockfd = fd;
2647 * FIXME: Do even more filtering by only permitting
2648 * certain IP's. The problem is that we don't know
2649 * how to do this properly for all possible clients...
2653 * Explicitely set the VP list to empty.
2657 if (fr_debug_flag) {
2658 char host_ipaddr[128];
2660 if ((packet->code > 0) && (packet->code < FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
2661 DEBUG("rad_recv: %s packet from host %s port %d",
2662 fr_packet_codes[packet->code],
2663 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2664 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2665 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2668 DEBUG("rad_recv: Packet from host %s port %d code=%d",
2669 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2670 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2671 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2675 DEBUG(", id=%d, length=%d\n",
2676 packet->id, (int) packet->data_len);
2680 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp) rad_print_hex(packet);
2688 * @brief Verify the Request/Response Authenticator
2689 * (and Message-Authenticator if present) of a packet.
2691 int rad_verify(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET *original,
2698 if (!packet || !packet->data) return -1;
2701 * Before we allocate memory for the attributes, do more
2704 ptr = packet->data + AUTH_HDR_LEN;
2705 length = packet->data_len - AUTH_HDR_LEN;
2706 while (length > 0) {
2707 uint8_t msg_auth_vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
2708 uint8_t calc_auth_vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
2713 default: /* don't do anything. */
2717 * Note that more than one Message-Authenticator
2718 * attribute is invalid.
2720 case PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR:
2721 memcpy(msg_auth_vector, &ptr[2], sizeof(msg_auth_vector));
2722 memset(&ptr[2], 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2724 switch (packet->code) {
2728 case PW_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE:
2730 (original->code == PW_STATUS_SERVER)) {
2734 case PW_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
2735 case PW_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
2736 case PW_DISCONNECT_ACK:
2737 case PW_DISCONNECT_NAK:
2738 case PW_COA_REQUEST:
2741 memset(packet->data + 4, 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2745 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
2746 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
2747 case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
2749 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot validate Message-Authenticator in response packet without a request packet.");
2752 memcpy(packet->data + 4, original->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2756 fr_hmac_md5(packet->data, packet->data_len,
2757 (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret),
2759 if (rad_digest_cmp(calc_auth_vector, msg_auth_vector,
2760 sizeof(calc_auth_vector)) != 0) {
2762 fr_strerror_printf("Received packet from %s with invalid Message-Authenticator! (Shared secret is incorrect.)",
2763 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2764 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2765 buffer, sizeof(buffer)));
2766 /* Silently drop packet, according to RFC 3579 */
2768 } /* else the message authenticator was good */
2771 * Reinitialize Authenticators.
2773 memcpy(&ptr[2], msg_auth_vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2774 memcpy(packet->data + 4, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2776 } /* switch over the attributes */
2780 } /* loop over the packet, sanity checking the attributes */
2783 * It looks like a RADIUS packet, but we don't know what it is
2784 * so can't validate the authenticators.
2786 if ((packet->code == 0) || (packet->code >= FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
2788 fr_strerror_printf("Received Unknown packet code %d "
2789 "from client %s port %d: Cannot validate Request/Response Authenticator.",
2791 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2792 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2793 buffer, sizeof(buffer)),
2799 * Calculate and/or verify Request or Response Authenticator.
2801 switch(packet->code) {
2805 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REQUEST:
2806 case PW_STATUS_SERVER:
2808 * The authentication vector is random
2809 * nonsense, invented by the client.
2813 case PW_COA_REQUEST:
2814 case PW_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
2815 case PW_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
2816 if (calc_acctdigest(packet, secret) > 1) {
2817 fr_strerror_printf("Received %s packet "
2818 "from client %s with invalid Request Authenticator! (Shared secret is incorrect.)",
2819 fr_packet_codes[packet->code],
2820 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2821 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2822 buffer, sizeof(buffer)));
2827 /* Verify the reply digest */
2828 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
2829 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
2830 case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
2831 case PW_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE:
2832 case PW_DISCONNECT_ACK:
2833 case PW_DISCONNECT_NAK:
2836 rcode = calc_replydigest(packet, original, secret);
2838 fr_strerror_printf("Received %s packet "
2839 "from home server %s port %d with invalid Response Authenticator! (Shared secret is incorrect.)",
2840 fr_packet_codes[packet->code],
2841 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2842 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2843 buffer, sizeof(buffer)),
2850 fr_strerror_printf("Received Unknown packet code %d "
2851 "from client %s port %d: Cannot validate Request/Response Authenticator",
2853 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2854 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2855 buffer, sizeof(buffer)),
2864 static ssize_t data2vp(RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
2865 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
2867 DICT_ATTR const *da, uint8_t const *start,
2868 size_t const attrlen, size_t const packetlen,
2872 * @brief convert a "concatenated" attribute to one long VP.
2874 static ssize_t data2vp_concat(RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
2875 DICT_ATTR const *da, uint8_t const *start,
2876 size_t const packetlen, VALUE_PAIR **pvp)
2880 uint8_t const *ptr = start;
2881 uint8_t const *end = start + packetlen;
2889 * The packet has already been sanity checked, so we
2890 * don't care about walking off of the end of it.
2893 total += ptr[1] - 2;
2898 * Attributes MUST be consecutive.
2900 if (ptr[0] != attr) break;
2903 vp = pairalloc(packet, da);
2907 vp->vp_octets = p = talloc_array(vp, uint8_t, vp->length);
2915 while (total < vp->length) {
2916 memcpy(p, ptr + 2, ptr[1] - 2);
2918 total += ptr[1] - 2;
2928 * @brief convert TLVs to one or more VPs
2930 static ssize_t data2vp_tlvs(RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
2931 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
2932 char const *secret, DICT_ATTR const *da,
2933 uint8_t const *start, size_t length,
2936 const uint8_t *data = start;
2937 const DICT_ATTR *child;
2938 VALUE_PAIR *head, **tail;
2940 if (length < 3) return -1; /* type, length, value */
2942 VP_HEXDUMP("tlvs", data, length);
2944 if (rad_tlv_ok(data, length, 1, 1) < 0) return -1;
2949 while (data < (start + length)) {
2952 child = dict_attrbyparent(da, data[0], da->vendor);
2954 unsigned int my_attr, my_vendor;
2956 VP_TRACE("Failed to find child %u of TLV %s\n",
2960 * Get child attr/vendor so that
2961 * we can call unknown attr.
2964 my_vendor = da->vendor;
2966 if (!dict_attr_child(da, &my_attr, &my_vendor)) {
2971 child = dict_attrunknown(my_attr, my_vendor, true);
2978 tlv_len = data2vp(packet, original, secret, child,
2979 data + 2, data[1] - 2, data[1] - 2, tail);
2984 tail = &((*tail)->next);
2993 * @brief Convert a top-level VSA to a VP.
2995 * "length" can be LONGER than just this sub-vsa
2997 static ssize_t data2vp_vsa(RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
2998 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
2999 char const *secret, DICT_VENDOR *dv,
3000 uint8_t const *data, size_t length,
3003 unsigned int attribute;
3004 ssize_t attrlen, my_len;
3005 const DICT_ATTR *da;
3008 if (length <= (dv->type + dv->length)) {
3009 fr_strerror_printf("data2vp_vsa: Failure to call rad_tlv_ok");
3016 /* data[0] must be zero */
3017 attribute = data[1] << 16;
3018 attribute |= data[2] << 8;
3019 attribute |= data[3];
3023 attribute = data[0] << 8;
3024 attribute |= data[1];
3028 attribute = data[0];
3032 fr_strerror_printf("data2vp_vsa: Internal sanity check failed");
3036 switch (dv->length) {
3038 /* data[dv->type] must be zero, from rad_tlv_ok() */
3039 attrlen = data[dv->type + 1];
3043 attrlen = data[dv->type];
3051 fr_strerror_printf("data2vp_vsa: Internal sanity check failed");
3056 if (attrlen <= (ssize_t) (dv->type + dv->length)) {
3057 fr_strerror_printf("data2vp_vsa: Failure to call rad_tlv_ok");
3063 * See if the VSA is known.
3065 da = dict_attrbyvalue(attribute, dv->vendorpec);
3066 if (!da) da = dict_attrunknown(attribute, dv->vendorpec, true);
3069 my_len = data2vp(packet, original, secret, da,
3070 data + dv->type + dv->length,
3071 attrlen - (dv->type + dv->length),
3072 attrlen - (dv->type + dv->length),
3074 if (my_len < 0) return my_len;
3081 * @brief Convert a Vendor-Specific WIMAX to vps
3083 * Called ONLY for Vendor-Specific
3085 static ssize_t data2vp_wimax(RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
3086 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
3087 char const *secret, uint32_t vendor,
3088 uint8_t const *data,
3089 size_t attrlen, size_t packetlen,
3094 uint8_t *head, *tail;
3095 const uint8_t *frag, *end;
3096 const DICT_ATTR *child;
3098 if (attrlen < 8) return -1;
3100 if (((size_t) (data[5] + 4)) != attrlen) return -1;
3102 child = dict_attrbyvalue(data[4], vendor);
3103 if (!child) return -1;
3105 if ((data[6] & 0x80) == 0) {
3106 rcode = data2vp(packet, original, secret, child,
3107 data + 7, data[5] - 3, data[5] - 3,
3109 if (rcode < 0) return -1;
3114 * Calculate the length of all of the fragments. For
3115 * now, they MUST be contiguous in the packet, and they
3116 * MUST be all of the same VSA, WiMAX, and WiMAX-attr.
3118 * The first fragment doesn't have a RADIUS attribute
3119 * header, so it needs to be treated a little special.
3121 fraglen = data[5] - 3;
3122 frag = data + attrlen;
3123 end = data + packetlen;
3125 while (frag < end) {
3126 int last_frag = false;
3129 (frag[0] != PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) ||
3130 (frag[1] < 9) || /* too short for wimax */
3131 ((frag + frag[1]) > end) || /* overflow */
3132 (memcmp(frag + 2, data, 4) != 0) || /* not wimax */
3133 (frag[6] != data[4]) || /* not the same wimax attr */
3134 ((frag[7] + 6) != frag[1])) { /* doesn't fill the attr */
3139 last_frag = ((frag[8] & 0x80) == 0);
3141 fraglen += frag[7] - 3;
3145 head = tail = malloc(fraglen);
3146 if (!head) return -1;
3149 * And again, but faster and looser.
3151 * We copy the first fragment, followed by the rest of
3156 memcpy(tail, frag + 4 + 3, frag[4 + 1] - 3);
3157 tail += frag[4 + 1] - 3;
3158 frag += attrlen; /* should be frag[1] - 7 */
3161 * frag now points to RADIUS attributes
3164 memcpy(tail, frag + 2 + 4 + 3, frag[2 + 4 + 1] - 3);
3165 tail += frag[2 + 4 + 1] - 3;
3167 } while (frag < end);
3169 VP_HEXDUMP("wimax fragments", head, fraglen);
3171 rcode = data2vp(packet, original, secret, child,
3172 head, fraglen, fraglen, pvp);
3174 if (rcode < 0) return rcode;
3181 * @brief Convert a top-level VSA to one or more VPs
3183 static ssize_t data2vp_vsas(RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
3184 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
3185 char const *secret, uint8_t const *data,
3186 size_t attrlen, size_t packetlen,
3193 VALUE_PAIR *head, **tail;
3195 if (attrlen > packetlen) return -1;
3196 if (attrlen < 5) return -1; /* vid, value */
3197 if (data[0] != 0) return -1; /* we require 24-bit VIDs */
3199 memcpy(&vendor, data, 4);
3200 vendor = ntohl(vendor);
3201 dv = dict_vendorbyvalue(vendor);
3207 if ((vendor == VENDORPEC_WIMAX) && dv->flags) {
3208 rcode = data2vp_wimax(packet, original, secret, vendor,
3209 data, attrlen, packetlen, pvp);
3214 * VSAs should normally be in TLV format.
3216 if (rad_tlv_ok(data + 4, attrlen - 4,
3217 dv->type, dv->length) < 0) return -1;
3220 * There may be more than one VSA in the
3221 * Vendor-Specific. If so, loop over them all.
3230 while (attrlen > 0) {
3233 vsa_len = data2vp_vsa(packet, original, secret, dv,
3234 data, attrlen, tail);
3237 fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check %d", __LINE__);
3240 tail = &((*tail)->next);
3243 packetlen -= vsa_len;
3253 * @brief Create any kind of VP from the attribute contents.
3255 * "length" is AT LEAST the length of this attribute, as we
3256 * expect the caller to have verified the data with
3257 * rad_packet_ok(). "length" may be up to the length of the
3260 * @return -1 on error, or "length".
3262 static ssize_t data2vp(RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
3263 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
3265 DICT_ATTR const *da, uint8_t const *start,
3266 size_t const attrlen, size_t const packetlen,
3273 const DICT_ATTR *child;
3276 const uint8_t *data = start;
3278 uint8_t buffer[256];
3280 if (!da || (attrlen > 253) || (attrlen > packetlen) ||
3281 (attrlen > 128*1024)) {
3282 fr_strerror_printf("data2vp: invalid arguments");
3286 VP_HEXDUMP("data2vp", start, attrlen);
3288 VP_TRACE("parent %s len %zu ... %zu\n", da->name, attrlen, packetlen);
3293 * Hacks for CUI. The WiMAX spec says that it can be
3294 * zero length, even though this is forbidden by the
3295 * RADIUS specs. So... we make a special case for it.
3298 if (!((da->vendor == 0) &&
3299 (da->attr == PW_CHARGEABLE_USER_IDENTITY))) {
3306 * Hacks for Coverity. Editing the dictionary
3307 * will break assumptions about CUI. We know
3308 * this, but Coverity doesn't.
3310 if (da->type != PW_TYPE_STRING) return -1;
3313 data = (uint8_t const *) "";
3315 goto alloc_cui; /* skip everything */
3319 * Hacks for tags. If the attribute is capable of
3320 * encoding a tag, and there's room for the tag, and
3321 * there is a tag, or it's encryted with Tunnel-Password,
3322 * then decode the tag.
3324 if (da->flags.has_tag && (datalen > 1) &&
3325 ((data[0] < 0x20) ||
3326 (da->flags.encrypt == FLAG_ENCRYPT_TUNNEL_PASSWORD))) {
3328 if (da->type == PW_TYPE_STRING) {
3329 memcpy(buffer, data + 1, datalen - 1);
3333 } else if (da->type == PW_TYPE_INTEGER) {
3334 memcpy(buffer, data, attrlen);
3339 return -1; /* only string and integer can have tags */
3346 * Decrypt the attribute.
3348 if (secret && packet && (da->flags.encrypt != FLAG_ENCRYPT_NONE)) {
3349 if (data == start) memcpy(buffer, data, attrlen);
3352 switch (da->flags.encrypt) { /* can't be tagged */
3356 case FLAG_ENCRYPT_USER_PASSWORD:
3358 rad_pwdecode((char *) buffer,
3362 rad_pwdecode((char *) buffer,
3367 datalen = strlen((char *) buffer);
3371 * Tunnel-Password's may go ONLY in response
3372 * packets. They can have a tag, so datalen is
3373 * not the same as attrlen.
3375 case FLAG_ENCRYPT_TUNNEL_PASSWORD:
3376 if (rad_tunnel_pwdecode(buffer, &datalen, secret,
3377 original ? original->vector : nullvector) < 0) {
3383 * Ascend-Send-Secret
3384 * Ascend-Receive-Secret
3386 case FLAG_ENCRYPT_ASCEND_SECRET:
3390 uint8_t my_digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
3391 make_secret(my_digest,
3394 memcpy(buffer, my_digest,
3396 buffer[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN] = '\0';
3397 datalen = strlen((char *) buffer);
3403 } /* switch over encryption flags */
3407 * Double-check the length after decrypting the
3411 case PW_TYPE_STRING:
3412 case PW_TYPE_OCTETS:
3413 case PW_TYPE_ABINARY:
3416 case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
3417 case PW_TYPE_IPADDR:
3419 case PW_TYPE_SIGNED:
3420 if (datalen != 4) goto raw;
3423 case PW_TYPE_INTEGER64:
3425 if (datalen != 8) goto raw;
3428 case PW_TYPE_IPV6ADDR:
3429 if (datalen != 16) goto raw;
3432 case PW_TYPE_IPV6PREFIX:
3433 if ((datalen < 2) || (datalen > 18)) goto raw;
3434 if (data[1] > 128) goto raw;
3438 if (datalen != 1) goto raw;
3442 if (datalen != 2) goto raw;
3445 case PW_TYPE_ETHERNET:
3446 if (datalen != 6) goto raw;
3449 case PW_TYPE_COMBO_IP:
3451 child = dict_attrbytype(da->attr, da->vendor,
3453 } else if (datalen == 16) {
3454 child = dict_attrbytype(da->attr, da->vendor,
3459 if (!child) goto raw;
3460 da = child; /* re-write it */
3463 case PW_TYPE_IPV4PREFIX:
3464 if (datalen != 6) goto raw;
3465 if ((data[1] & 0x3f) > 32) goto raw;
3469 * The rest of the data types can cause
3470 * recursion! Ask yourself, "is recursion OK?"
3473 case PW_TYPE_EXTENDED:
3474 if (datalen < 2) goto raw; /* etype, value */
3476 child = dict_attrbyparent(da, data[0], 0);
3477 if (!child) goto raw;
3480 * Recurse to decode the contents, which could be
3481 * a TLV, IPaddr, etc. Note that we decode only
3482 * the current attribute, and we ignore any extra
3485 rcode = data2vp(packet, original, secret, child,
3486 data + 1, attrlen - 1, attrlen - 1, pvp);
3487 if (rcode < 0) goto raw;
3490 case PW_TYPE_LONG_EXTENDED:
3491 if (datalen < 3) goto raw; /* etype, flags, value */
3493 child = dict_attrbyparent(da, data[0], 0);
3494 if (!child) goto raw;
3497 * If there no more fragments, then the contents
3498 * have to be a well-known data type.
3501 if ((data[1] & 0x80) == 0) {
3502 rcode = data2vp(packet, original, secret, child,
3503 data + 2, attrlen - 2, attrlen - 2,
3505 if (rcode < 0) goto raw;
3509 fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check %d", __LINE__);
3510 return -1; /* TODO: fixme! */
3513 if (datalen < 6) goto raw; /* vid, vtype, value */
3515 if (data[0] != 0) goto raw; /* we require 24-bit VIDs */
3517 memcpy(&vendor, data, 4);
3518 vendor = ntohl(vendor);
3519 dv = dict_vendorbyvalue(vendor);
3522 child = dict_attrbyparent(da, data[5], vendor);
3523 if (!child) goto raw;
3525 rcode = data2vp(packet, original, secret, child,
3526 data + 5, attrlen - 5, attrlen - 5, pvp);
3527 if (rcode < 0) goto raw;
3532 * We presume that the TLVs all fit into one
3533 * attribute, OR they've already been grouped
3534 * into a contiguous memory buffer.
3536 rcode = data2vp_tlvs(packet, original, secret, da,
3537 data, attrlen, pvp);
3538 if (rcode < 0) goto raw;
3543 * VSAs can be WiMAX, in which case they don't
3544 * fit into one attribute.
3546 rcode = data2vp_vsas(packet, original, secret,
3547 data, attrlen, packetlen, pvp);
3548 if (rcode < 0) goto raw;
3554 * Re-write the attribute to be "raw". It is
3555 * therefore of type "octets", and will be
3558 da = dict_attrunknown(da->attr, da->vendor, true);
3560 fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check %d", __LINE__);
3568 if (da->type != PW_TYPE_OCTETS) {
3569 dict_attr_free(&da);
3577 * And now that we've verified the basic type
3578 * information, decode the actual data.
3581 vp = pairalloc(packet, da);
3584 vp->length = datalen;
3588 case PW_TYPE_STRING:
3589 p = talloc_array(vp, char, vp->length + 1);
3590 memcpy(p, data, vp->length);
3591 p[vp->length] = '\0';
3592 vp->vp_strvalue = p;
3595 case PW_TYPE_OCTETS:
3596 case PW_TYPE_ABINARY:
3597 vp->vp_octets = talloc_memdup(vp, data, vp->length);
3601 vp->vp_integer = data[0];
3606 vp->vp_integer = (data[0] << 8) | data[1];
3609 case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
3610 memcpy(&vp->vp_integer, data, 4);
3611 vp->vp_integer = ntohl(vp->vp_integer);
3614 case PW_TYPE_INTEGER64:
3615 memcpy(&vp->vp_integer64, data, 8);
3616 vp->vp_integer64 = ntohll(vp->vp_integer64);
3620 memcpy(&vp->vp_date, data, 4);
3621 vp->vp_date = ntohl(vp->vp_date);
3625 case PW_TYPE_IPADDR:
3626 memcpy(&vp->vp_ipaddr, data, 4);
3630 memcpy(&vp->vp_ifid, data, 8);
3633 case PW_TYPE_IPV6ADDR:
3634 memcpy(&vp->vp_ipv6addr, data, 16);
3637 case PW_TYPE_IPV6PREFIX:
3639 * FIXME: double-check that
3640 * (vp->vp_octets[1] >> 3) matches vp->length + 2
3642 memcpy(&vp->vp_ipv6prefix, data, vp->length);
3643 if (vp->length < 18) {
3644 memset(((uint8_t *)vp->vp_ipv6prefix) + vp->length, 0,
3649 case PW_TYPE_IPV4PREFIX:
3650 /* FIXME: do the same double-check as for IPv6Prefix */
3651 memcpy(&vp->vp_ipv4prefix, buffer, sizeof(vp->vp_ipv4prefix));
3654 * /32 means "keep all bits". Otherwise, mask
3657 if ((data[1] & 0x3f) > 32) {
3658 uint32_t addr, mask;
3660 memcpy(&addr, vp->vp_octets + 2, sizeof(addr));
3662 mask <<= (32 - (buffer[1] & 0x3f));
3667 memcpy(vp->vp_ipv4prefix + 2, &addr, sizeof(addr));
3671 case PW_TYPE_SIGNED: /* overloaded with vp_integer */
3672 memcpy(&vp->vp_integer, buffer, 4);
3673 vp->vp_integer = ntohl(vp->vp_integer);
3678 fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check %d", __LINE__);
3689 * @brief Create a "normal" VALUE_PAIR from the given data.
3691 ssize_t rad_attr2vp(RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
3692 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
3694 uint8_t const *data, size_t length,
3699 const DICT_ATTR *da;
3701 if ((length < 2) || (data[1] < 2) || (data[1] > length)) {
3702 fr_strerror_printf("rad_attr2vp: Insufficient data");
3706 da = dict_attrbyvalue(data[0], 0);
3707 if (!da) da = dict_attrunknown(data[0], 0, true);
3710 * Pass the entire thing to the decoding function
3712 if (da->flags.concat) {
3713 return data2vp_concat(packet, da, data, length, pvp);
3717 * Note that we pass the entire length, not just the
3718 * length of this attribute. The Extended or WiMAX
3719 * attributes may have the "continuation" bit set, and
3720 * will thus be more than one attribute in length.
3722 rcode = data2vp(packet, original, secret, da,
3723 data + 2, data[1] - 2, length - 2, pvp);
3724 if (rcode < 0) return rcode;
3731 * @brief Converts data in network byte order to a VP
3732 * @return -1 on error, or the length of the data read
3734 ssize_t rad_data2vp(unsigned int attribute, unsigned int vendor,
3735 uint8_t const *data, size_t length,
3738 const DICT_ATTR *da;
3740 if (!data || (length == 0) || !pvp) return -1;
3742 da = dict_attrbyvalue(attribute, vendor);
3743 if (!da) da = dict_attrunknown(attribute, vendor, true);
3746 return data2vp(NULL, NULL, NULL, da,
3747 data, length, length, pvp);
3751 * @brief Converts vp_data to network byte order
3752 * @return -1 on error, or the length of the value
3754 ssize_t rad_vp2data(VALUE_PAIR const *vp, uint8_t *out, size_t outlen)
3762 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: rad_vp2data buffer passed too small");
3767 * Short-circuit it for long attributes.
3769 if ((vp->da->type & PW_FLAG_LONG) != 0) goto do_raw;
3771 switch(vp->da->type) {
3772 case PW_TYPE_STRING:
3773 case PW_TYPE_OCTETS:
3775 case PW_TYPE_IPADDR:
3776 case PW_TYPE_IPV6ADDR:
3777 case PW_TYPE_IPV6PREFIX:
3778 case PW_TYPE_IPV4PREFIX:
3779 case PW_TYPE_ABINARY:
3782 memcpy(out, vp->vp_octets, len);
3785 out[0] = vp->vp_integer & 0xff;
3789 out[0] = (vp->vp_integer >> 8) & 0xff;
3790 out[1] = vp->vp_integer & 0xff;
3793 case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
3794 lvalue = htonl(vp->vp_integer);
3795 memcpy(out, &lvalue, sizeof(lvalue));
3798 case PW_TYPE_INTEGER64:
3799 lvalue64 = htonll(vp->vp_integer64);
3800 memcpy(out, &lvalue64, sizeof(lvalue64));
3804 lvalue = htonl(vp->vp_date);
3805 memcpy(out, &lvalue, sizeof(lvalue));
3808 case PW_TYPE_SIGNED:
3812 slvalue = htonl(vp->vp_signed);
3813 memcpy(out, &slvalue, sizeof(slvalue));
3816 /* unknown type: ignore it */
3818 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Unknown attribute type %d",
3827 * @brief Calculate/check digest, and decode radius attributes.
3828 * @return -1 on decoding error, 0 on success
3830 int rad_decode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET *original,
3836 radius_packet_t *hdr;
3837 VALUE_PAIR *head, **tail, *vp;
3840 * Extract attribute-value pairs
3842 hdr = (radius_packet_t *)packet->data;
3844 packet_length = packet->data_len - AUTH_HDR_LEN;
3851 * Loop over the attributes, decoding them into VPs.
3853 while (packet_length > 0) {
3857 * This may return many VPs
3859 my_len = rad_attr2vp(packet, original, secret,
3860 ptr, packet_length, &vp);
3875 * VSA's may not have been counted properly in
3876 * rad_packet_ok() above, as it is hard to count
3877 * then without using the dictionary. We
3878 * therefore enforce the limits here, too.
3880 if ((fr_max_attributes > 0) &&
3881 (num_attributes > fr_max_attributes)) {
3882 char host_ipaddr[128];
3885 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Possible DoS attack from host %s: Too many attributes in request (received %d, max %d are allowed).",
3886 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
3887 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
3888 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
3889 num_attributes, fr_max_attributes);
3894 packet_length -= my_len;
3898 * Merge information from the outside world into our
3901 fr_rand_seed(packet->data, AUTH_HDR_LEN);
3904 * There may be VP's already in the packet. Don't
3905 * destroy them. Instead, add the decoded attributes to
3906 * the tail of the list.
3908 for (tail = &packet->vps; *tail != NULL; tail = &((*tail)->next)) {
3918 * @brief Encode password.
3920 * We assume that the passwd buffer passed is big enough.
3921 * RFC2138 says the password is max 128 chars, so the size
3922 * of the passwd buffer must be at least 129 characters.
3923 * Preferably it's just MAX_STRING_LEN.
3925 * int *pwlen is updated to the new length of the encrypted
3926 * password - a multiple of 16 bytes.
3928 int rad_pwencode(char *passwd, size_t *pwlen, char const *secret,
3929 uint8_t const *vector)
3931 FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
3932 uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
3933 int i, n, secretlen;
3937 * RFC maximum is 128 bytes.
3939 * If length is zero, pad it out with zeros.
3941 * If the length isn't aligned to 16 bytes,
3942 * zero out the extra data.
3946 if (len > 128) len = 128;
3949 memset(passwd, 0, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
3950 len = AUTH_PASS_LEN;
3951 } else if ((len % AUTH_PASS_LEN) != 0) {
3952 memset(&passwd[len], 0, AUTH_PASS_LEN - (len % AUTH_PASS_LEN));
3953 len += AUTH_PASS_LEN - (len % AUTH_PASS_LEN);
3958 * Use the secret to setup the decryption digest
3960 secretlen = strlen(secret);
3962 fr_MD5Init(&context);
3963 fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, secretlen);
3964 old = context; /* save intermediate work */
3967 * Encrypt it in place. Don't bother checking
3968 * len, as we've ensured above that it's OK.
3970 for (n = 0; n < len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
3972 fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
3973 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
3976 fr_MD5Update(&context,
3977 (uint8_t *) passwd + n - AUTH_PASS_LEN,
3979 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
3982 for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
3983 passwd[i + n] ^= digest[i];
3991 * @brief Decode password.
3993 int rad_pwdecode(char *passwd, size_t pwlen, char const *secret,
3994 uint8_t const *vector)
3996 FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
3997 uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
3999 size_t n, secretlen;
4002 * The RFC's say that the maximum is 128.
4003 * The buffer we're putting it into above is 254, so
4004 * we don't need to do any length checking.
4006 if (pwlen > 128) pwlen = 128;
4011 if (pwlen == 0) goto done;
4014 * Use the secret to setup the decryption digest
4016 secretlen = strlen(secret);
4018 fr_MD5Init(&context);
4019 fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, secretlen);
4020 old = context; /* save intermediate work */
4023 * The inverse of the code above.
4025 for (n = 0; n < pwlen; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
4027 fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
4028 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
4031 if (pwlen > AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
4032 fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t *) passwd,
4036 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
4039 if (pwlen > (n + AUTH_PASS_LEN)) {
4040 fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t *) passwd + n,
4045 for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
4046 passwd[i + n] ^= digest[i];
4051 passwd[pwlen] = '\0';
4052 return strlen(passwd);
4057 * @brief Encode Tunnel-Password attributes when sending them out on the wire.
4059 * int *pwlen is updated to the new length of the encrypted
4060 * password - a multiple of 16 bytes.
4062 * This is per RFC-2868 which adds a two char SALT to the initial intermediate
4065 int rad_tunnel_pwencode(char *passwd, size_t *pwlen, char const *secret,
4066 uint8_t const *vector)
4068 uint8_t buffer[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN + MAX_STRING_LEN + 3];
4069 unsigned char digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
4071 int i, n, secretlen;
4076 if (len > 127) len = 127;
4079 * Shift the password 3 positions right to place a salt and original
4080 * length, tag will be added automatically on packet send
4082 for (n=len ; n>=0 ; n--) passwd[n+3] = passwd[n];
4086 * save original password length as first password character;
4093 * Generate salt. The RFC's say:
4095 * The high bit of salt[0] must be set, each salt in a
4096 * packet should be unique, and they should be random
4098 * So, we set the high bit, add in a counter, and then
4099 * add in some CSPRNG data. should be OK..
4101 salt[0] = (0x80 | ( ((salt_offset++) & 0x0f) << 3) |
4102 (fr_rand() & 0x07));
4103 salt[1] = fr_rand();
4106 * Padd password to multiple of AUTH_PASS_LEN bytes.
4108 n = len % AUTH_PASS_LEN;
4110 n = AUTH_PASS_LEN - n;
4111 for (; n > 0; n--, len++)
4114 /* set new password length */
4118 * Use the secret to setup the decryption digest
4120 secretlen = strlen(secret);
4121 memcpy(buffer, secret, secretlen);
4123 for (n2 = 0; n2 < len; n2+=AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
4125 memcpy(buffer + secretlen, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
4126 memcpy(buffer + secretlen + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN, salt, 2);
4127 fr_md5_calc(digest, buffer, secretlen + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN + 2);
4129 memcpy(buffer + secretlen, passwd + n2 - AUTH_PASS_LEN, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
4130 fr_md5_calc(digest, buffer, secretlen + AUTH_PASS_LEN);
4133 for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
4134 passwd[i + n2] ^= digest[i];
4142 * @brief Decode Tunnel-Password encrypted attributes.
4144 * Defined in RFC-2868, this uses a two char SALT along with the
4145 * initial intermediate value, to differentiate it from the
4148 int rad_tunnel_pwdecode(uint8_t *passwd, size_t *pwlen, char const *secret,
4149 uint8_t const *vector)
4151 FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
4152 uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
4154 unsigned i, n, len, reallen;
4159 * We need at least a salt.
4162 fr_strerror_printf("tunnel password is too short");
4167 * There's a salt, but no password. Or, there's a salt
4168 * and a 'data_len' octet. It's wrong, but at least we
4169 * can figure out what it means: the password is empty.
4171 * Note that this means we ignore the 'data_len' field,
4172 * if the attribute length tells us that there's no
4173 * more data. So the 'data_len' field may be wrong,
4182 len -= 2; /* discount the salt */
4185 * Use the secret to setup the decryption digest
4187 secretlen = strlen(secret);
4189 fr_MD5Init(&context);
4190 fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, secretlen);
4191 old = context; /* save intermediate work */
4194 * Set up the initial key:
4196 * b(1) = MD5(secret + vector + salt)
4198 fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
4199 fr_MD5Update(&context, passwd, 2);
4202 for (n = 0; n < len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
4206 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
4211 * A quick check: decrypt the first octet
4212 * of the password, which is the
4213 * 'data_len' field. Ensure it's sane.
4215 reallen = passwd[2] ^ digest[0];
4216 if (reallen >= len) {
4217 fr_strerror_printf("tunnel password is too long for the attribute");
4221 fr_MD5Update(&context, passwd + 2, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
4225 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
4228 fr_MD5Update(&context, passwd + n + 2, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
4231 for (i = base; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
4232 passwd[n + i - 1] = passwd[n + i + 2] ^ digest[i];
4237 * See make_tunnel_password, above.
4239 if (reallen > 239) reallen = 239;
4242 passwd[reallen] = 0;
4248 * @brief Encode a CHAP password
4250 * @bug FIXME: might not work with Ascend because
4251 * we use vp->length, and Ascend gear likes
4252 * to send an extra '\0' in the string!
4254 int rad_chap_encode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, uint8_t *output, int id,
4255 VALUE_PAIR *password)
4259 uint8_t string[MAX_STRING_LEN * 2 + 1];
4260 VALUE_PAIR *challenge;
4263 * Sanity check the input parameters
4265 if ((packet == NULL) || (password == NULL)) {
4270 * Note that the password VP can be EITHER
4271 * a User-Password attribute (from a check-item list),
4272 * or a CHAP-Password attribute (the client asking
4273 * the library to encode it).
4281 memcpy(ptr, password->vp_strvalue, password->length);
4282 ptr += password->length;
4283 i += password->length;
4286 * Use Chap-Challenge pair if present,
4287 * Request Authenticator otherwise.
4289 challenge = pairfind(packet->vps, PW_CHAP_CHALLENGE, 0, TAG_ANY);
4291 memcpy(ptr, challenge->vp_strvalue, challenge->length);
4292 i += challenge->length;
4294 memcpy(ptr, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
4295 i += AUTH_VECTOR_LEN;
4299 fr_md5_calc((uint8_t *)output + 1, (uint8_t *)string, i);
4306 * @brief Seed the random number generator.
4308 * May be called any number of times.
4310 void fr_rand_seed(void const *data, size_t size)
4315 * Ensure that the pool is initialized.
4317 if (!fr_rand_initialized) {
4320 memset(&fr_rand_pool, 0, sizeof(fr_rand_pool));
4322 fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
4328 while (total < sizeof(fr_rand_pool.randrsl)) {
4329 this = read(fd, fr_rand_pool.randrsl,
4330 sizeof(fr_rand_pool.randrsl) - total);
4331 if ((this < 0) && (errno != EINTR)) break;
4332 if (this > 0) total += this;
4336 fr_rand_pool.randrsl[0] = fd;
4337 fr_rand_pool.randrsl[1] = time(NULL);
4338 fr_rand_pool.randrsl[2] = errno;
4341 fr_randinit(&fr_rand_pool, 1);
4342 fr_rand_pool.randcnt = 0;
4343 fr_rand_initialized = 1;
4349 * Hash the user data
4352 if (!hash) hash = fr_rand();
4353 hash = fr_hash_update(data, size, hash);
4355 fr_rand_pool.randmem[fr_rand_pool.randcnt] ^= hash;
4360 * @brief Return a 32-bit random number.
4362 uint32_t fr_rand(void)
4367 * Ensure that the pool is initialized.
4369 if (!fr_rand_initialized) {
4370 fr_rand_seed(NULL, 0);
4373 num = fr_rand_pool.randrsl[fr_rand_pool.randcnt++];
4374 if (fr_rand_pool.randcnt >= 256) {
4375 fr_rand_pool.randcnt = 0;
4376 fr_isaac(&fr_rand_pool);
4383 /** Allocate a new RADIUS_PACKET
4385 * @param ctx the context in which the packet is allocated. May be NULL if
4386 * the packet is not associated with a REQUEST.
4387 * @param newvector if true a new request authenticator will be generated.
4388 * @return a new RADIUS_PACKET or NULL on error.
4390 RADIUS_PACKET *rad_alloc(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, int newvector)
4394 rp = talloc_zero(ctx, RADIUS_PACKET);
4396 fr_strerror_printf("out of memory");
4404 uint32_t hash, base;
4407 * Don't expose the actual contents of the random
4411 for (i = 0; i < AUTH_VECTOR_LEN; i += sizeof(uint32_t)) {
4412 hash = fr_rand() ^ base;
4413 memcpy(rp->vector + i, &hash, sizeof(hash));
4416 fr_rand(); /* stir the pool again */
4421 /** Allocate a new RADIUS_PACKET response
4423 * @param ctx the context in which the packet is allocated. May be NULL if
4424 * the packet is not associated with a REQUEST.
4425 * @param packet The request packet.
4426 * @return a new RADIUS_PACKET or NULL on error.
4428 RADIUS_PACKET *rad_alloc_reply(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, RADIUS_PACKET *packet)
4430 RADIUS_PACKET *reply;
4432 if (!packet) return NULL;
4434 reply = rad_alloc(ctx, 0);
4435 if (!reply) return NULL;
4438 * Initialize the fields from the request.
4440 reply->sockfd = packet->sockfd;
4441 reply->dst_ipaddr = packet->src_ipaddr;
4442 reply->src_ipaddr = packet->dst_ipaddr;
4443 reply->dst_port = packet->src_port;
4444 reply->src_port = packet->dst_port;
4445 reply->id = packet->id;
4446 reply->code = 0; /* UNKNOWN code */
4447 memcpy(reply->vector, packet->vector,
4448 sizeof(reply->vector));
4451 reply->data_len = 0;
4458 * @brief Free a RADIUS_PACKET
4460 void rad_free(RADIUS_PACKET **radius_packet_ptr)
4462 RADIUS_PACKET *radius_packet;
4464 if (!radius_packet_ptr || !*radius_packet_ptr) return;
4465 radius_packet = *radius_packet_ptr;
4467 talloc_free(radius_packet->data); /* not really necessary... */
4469 pairfree(&radius_packet->vps);
4471 talloc_free(radius_packet);
4472 *radius_packet_ptr = NULL;