src/lib/radius.c

   1 /*
   2  * radius.c     Functions to send/receive radius packets.
   3  *
   4  * Version:     $Id$
   5  *
   6  *   This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
   7  *   modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
   8  *   License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
   9  *   version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
  10  *
  11  *   This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
  12  *   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
  13  *   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
  14  *   Lesser General Public License for more details.
  15  *
  16  *   You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
  17  *   License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
  18  *   Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
  19  *
  20  * Copyright 2000-2003,2006  The FreeRADIUS server project
  21  */
  22
  23 #include        <freeradius-devel/ident.h>
  24 RCSID("$Id$")
  25
  26 #include        <freeradius-devel/libradius.h>
  27 #include        <freeradius-devel/md5.h>
  28
  29 #include        <fcntl.h>
  30 #include        <ctype.h>
  31
  32 #ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
  33 #include        <freeradius-devel/udpfromto.h>
  34 #endif
  35
  36 #ifdef HAVE_MALLOC_H
  37 #include        <malloc.h>
  38 #endif
  39
  40 /*
  41  *  The RFC says 4096 octets max, and most packets are less than 256.
  42  */
  43 #define MAX_PACKET_LEN 4096
  44
  45 /*
  46  *      The maximum number of attributes which we allow in an incoming
  47  *      request.  If there are more attributes than this, the request
  48  *      is rejected.
  49  *
  50  *      This helps to minimize the potential for a DoS, when an
  51  *      attacker spoofs Access-Request packets, which don't have a
  52  *      Message-Authenticator attribute.  This means that the packet
  53  *      is unsigned, and the attacker can use resources on the server,
  54  *      even if the end request is rejected.
  55  */
  56 int fr_max_attributes = 0;
  57 FILE *fr_log_fp = NULL;
  58
  59 typedef struct radius_packet_t {
  60   uint8_t       code;
  61   uint8_t       id;
  62   uint8_t       length[2];
  63   uint8_t       vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
  64   uint8_t       data[1];
  65 } radius_packet_t;
  66
  67 static fr_randctx fr_rand_pool; /* across multiple calls */
  68 static int fr_rand_initialized = 0;
  69 static unsigned int salt_offset = 0;
  70
  71 const char *fr_packet_codes[FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE] = {
  72   "",
  73   "Access-Request",
  74   "Access-Accept",
  75   "Access-Reject",
  76   "Accounting-Request",
  77   "Accounting-Response",
  78   "Accounting-Status",
  79   "Password-Request",
  80   "Password-Accept",
  81   "Password-Reject",
  82   "Accounting-Message",
  83   "Access-Challenge",
  84   "Status-Server",
  85   "Status-Client",
  86   "14",
  87   "15",
  88   "16",
  89   "17",
  90   "18",
  91   "19",
  92   "20",
  93   "Resource-Free-Request",
  94   "Resource-Free-Response",
  95   "Resource-Query-Request",
  96   "Resource-Query-Response",
  97   "Alternate-Resource-Reclaim-Request",
  98   "NAS-Reboot-Request",
  99   "NAS-Reboot-Response",
 100   "28",
 101   "Next-Passcode",
 102   "New-Pin",
 103   "Terminate-Session",
 104   "Password-Expired",
 105   "Event-Request",
 106   "Event-Response",
 107   "35",
 108   "36",
 109   "37",
 110   "38",
 111   "39",
 112   "Disconnect-Request",
 113   "Disconnect-ACK",
 114   "Disconnect-NAK",
 115   "CoA-Request",
 116   "CoA-ACK",
 117   "CoA-NAK",
 118   "46",
 119   "47",
 120   "48",
 121   "49",
 122   "IP-Address-Allocate",
 123   "IP-Address-Release"
 124 };
 125
 126
 127 void fr_printf_log(const char *fmt, ...)
 128 {
 129         va_list ap;
 130
 131         va_start(ap, fmt);
 132         if ((fr_debug_flag == 0) || !fr_log_fp) {
 133                 va_end(ap);
 134                 return;
 135         }
 136
 137         vfprintf(fr_log_fp, fmt, ap);
 138         va_end(ap);
 139
 140         return;
 141 }
 142
 143 static void print_hex(RADIUS_PACKET *packet)
 144 {
 145         int i;
 146
 147         if (!packet->data) return;
 148
 149         printf("  Code:\t\t%u\n", packet->data[0]);
 150         printf("  Id:\t\t%u\n", packet->data[1]);
 151         printf("  Length:\t%u\n", ((packet->data[2] << 8) |
 152                                    (packet->data[3])));
 153         printf("  Vector:\t");
 154         for (i = 4; i < 20; i++) {
 155                 printf("%02x", packet->data[i]);
 156         }
 157         printf("\n");
 158
 159         if (packet->data_len > 20) {
 160                 int total;
 161                 const uint8_t *ptr;
 162                 printf("  Data:");
 163
 164                 total = packet->data_len - 20;
 165                 ptr = packet->data + 20;
 166
 167                 while (total > 0) {
 168                         int attrlen;
 169
 170                         printf("\t\t");
 171                         if (total < 2) { /* too short */
 172                                 printf("%02x\n", *ptr);
 173                                 break;
 174                         }
 175
 176                         if (ptr[1] > total) { /* too long */
 177                                 for (i = 0; i < total; i++) {
 178                                         printf("%02x ", ptr[i]);
 179                                 }
 180                                 break;
 181                         }
 182
 183                         printf("%02x  %02x  ", ptr[0], ptr[1]);
 184                         attrlen = ptr[1] - 2;
 185                         ptr += 2;
 186                         total -= 2;
 187
 188                         for (i = 0; i < attrlen; i++) {
 189                                 if ((i > 0) && ((i & 0x0f) == 0x00))
 190                                         printf("\t\t\t");
 191                                 printf("%02x ", ptr[i]);
 192                                 if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x0f) printf("\n");
 193                         }
 194
 195                         if ((attrlen & 0x0f) != 0x00) printf("\n");
 196
 197                         ptr += attrlen;
 198                         total -= attrlen;
 199                 }
 200         }
 201         fflush(stdout);
 202 }
 203
 204
 205 /*
 206  *      Wrapper for sendto which handles sendfromto, IPv6, and all
 207  *      possible combinations.
 208  */
 209 static int rad_sendto(int sockfd, void *data, size_t data_len, int flags,
 210                       fr_ipaddr_t *src_ipaddr, int src_port,
 211                       fr_ipaddr_t *dst_ipaddr, int dst_port)
 212 {
 213         struct sockaddr_storage dst;
 214         socklen_t               sizeof_dst;
 215
 216 #ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
 217         struct sockaddr_storage src;
 218         socklen_t               sizeof_src;
 219
 220         fr_ipaddr2sockaddr(src_ipaddr, src_port, &src, &sizeof_src);
 221 #else
 222         src_port = src_port;    /* -Wunused */
 223 #endif
 224
 225         if (!fr_ipaddr2sockaddr(dst_ipaddr, dst_port, &dst, &sizeof_dst)) {
 226                 return -1;
 227         }
 228
 229 #ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
 230         /*
 231          *      Only IPv4 is supported for udpfromto.
 232          *
 233          *      And if they don't specify a source IP address, don't
 234          *      use udpfromto.
 235          */
 236         if ((dst_ipaddr->af == AF_INET) ||
 237             (src_ipaddr->af != AF_UNSPEC)) {
 238                 return sendfromto(sockfd, data, data_len, flags,
 239                                   (struct sockaddr *)&src, sizeof_src,
 240                                   (struct sockaddr *)&dst, sizeof_dst);
 241         }
 242 #else
 243         src_ipaddr = src_ipaddr; /* -Wunused */
 244 #endif
 245
 246         /*
 247          *      No udpfromto, OR an IPv6 socket, fail gracefully.
 248          */
 249         return sendto(sockfd, data, data_len, flags,
 250                       (struct sockaddr *) &dst, sizeof_dst);
 251 }
 252
 253
 254 void rad_recv_discard(int sockfd)
 255 {
 256         uint8_t                 header[4];
 257         struct sockaddr_storage src;
 258         socklen_t               sizeof_src = sizeof(src);
 259
 260         recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), 0,
 261                  (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
 262 }
 263
 264
 265 ssize_t rad_recv_header(int sockfd, fr_ipaddr_t *src_ipaddr, int *src_port,
 266                         int *code)
 267 {
 268         ssize_t                 data_len, packet_len;
 269         uint8_t                 header[4];
 270         struct sockaddr_storage src;
 271         socklen_t               sizeof_src = sizeof(src);
 272
 273         data_len = recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), MSG_PEEK,
 274                             (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
 275         if (data_len < 0) {
 276                 if ((errno == EAGAIN) || (errno == EINTR)) return 0;
 277                 return -1;
 278         }
 279
 280         /*
 281          *      Too little data is available, discard the packet.
 282          */
 283         if (data_len < 4) {
 284                 recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), 0,
 285                          (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
 286                 return 1;
 287
 288         } else {                /* we got 4 bytes of data. */
 289                 /*
 290                  *      See how long the packet says it is.
 291                  */
 292                 packet_len = (header[2] * 256) + header[3];
 293
 294                 /*
 295                  *      The length in the packet says it's less than
 296                  *      a RADIUS header length: discard it.
 297                  */
 298                 if (packet_len < AUTH_HDR_LEN) {
 299                         recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), 0,
 300                                  (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
 301                         return 1;
 302
 303                         /*
 304                          *      Enforce RFC requirements, for sanity.
 305                          *      Anything after 4k will be discarded.
 306                          */
 307                 } else if (packet_len > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
 308                         recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), 0,
 309                                  (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
 310                         return 1;
 311                 }
 312         }
 313
 314         /*
 315          *      Convert AF.  If unknown, discard packet.
 316          */
 317         if (!fr_sockaddr2ipaddr(&src, sizeof_src, src_ipaddr, src_port)) {
 318                 recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), 0,
 319                          (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
 320                 return 1;
 321         }
 322
 323         *code = header[0];
 324
 325         /*
 326          *      The packet says it's this long, but the actual UDP
 327          *      size could still be smaller.
 328          */
 329         return packet_len;
 330 }
 331
 332
 333 /*
 334  *      wrapper for recvfrom, which handles recvfromto, IPv6, and all
 335  *      possible combinations.
 336  */
 337 static ssize_t rad_recvfrom(int sockfd, uint8_t **pbuf, int flags,
 338                             fr_ipaddr_t *src_ipaddr, uint16_t *src_port,
 339                             fr_ipaddr_t *dst_ipaddr, uint16_t *dst_port)
 340 {
 341         struct sockaddr_storage src;
 342         struct sockaddr_storage dst;
 343         socklen_t               sizeof_src = sizeof(src);
 344         socklen_t               sizeof_dst = sizeof(dst);
 345         ssize_t                 data_len;
 346         uint8_t                 header[4];
 347         void                    *buf;
 348         size_t                  len;
 349         int                     port;
 350
 351         memset(&src, 0, sizeof_src);
 352         memset(&dst, 0, sizeof_dst);
 353
 354         /*
 355          *      Get address family, etc. first, so we know if we
 356          *      need to do udpfromto.
 357          *
 358          *      FIXME: udpfromto also does this, but it's not
 359          *      a critical problem.
 360          */
 361         if (getsockname(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&dst,
 362                         &sizeof_dst) < 0) return -1;
 363
 364         /*
 365          *      Read the length of the packet, from the packet.
 366          *      This lets us allocate the buffer to use for
 367          *      reading the rest of the packet.
 368          */
 369         data_len = recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), MSG_PEEK,
 370                             (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
 371         if (data_len < 0) {
 372                 if ((errno == EAGAIN) || (errno == EINTR)) return 0;
 373                 return -1;
 374         }
 375
 376         /*
 377          *      Too little data is available, discard the packet.
 378          */
 379         if (data_len < 4) {
 380                 recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), flags,
 381                          (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
 382                 return 0;
 383
 384         } else {                /* we got 4 bytes of data. */
 385                 /*
 386                  *      See how long the packet says it is.
 387                  */
 388                 len = (header[2] * 256) + header[3];
 389
 390                 /*
 391                  *      The length in the packet says it's less than
 392                  *      a RADIUS header length: discard it.
 393                  */
 394                 if (len < AUTH_HDR_LEN) {
 395                         recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), flags,
 396                                  (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
 397                         return 0;
 398
 399                         /*
 400                          *      Enforce RFC requirements, for sanity.
 401                          *      Anything after 4k will be discarded.
 402                          */
 403                 } else if (len > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
 404                         recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), flags,
 405                                  (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
 406                         return len;
 407                 }
 408         }
 409
 410         buf = malloc(len);
 411         if (!buf) return -1;
 412
 413         /*
 414          *      Receive the packet.  The OS will discard any data in the
 415          *      packet after "len" bytes.
 416          */
 417 #ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
 418         if (dst.ss_family == AF_INET) {
 419                 data_len = recvfromto(sockfd, buf, len, flags,
 420                                       (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src,
 421                                       (struct sockaddr *)&dst, &sizeof_dst);
 422         } else
 423 #endif
 424                 /*
 425                  *      No udpfromto, OR an IPv6 socket.  Fail gracefully.
 426                  */
 427                 data_len = recvfrom(sockfd, buf, len, flags,
 428                                     (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
 429         if (data_len < 0) {
 430                 free(buf);
 431                 return data_len;
 432         }
 433
 434         if (!fr_sockaddr2ipaddr(&src, sizeof_src, src_ipaddr, &port)) {
 435                 free(buf);
 436                 return -1;      /* Unknown address family, Die Die Die! */
 437         }
 438         *src_port = port;
 439
 440         fr_sockaddr2ipaddr(&dst, sizeof_dst, dst_ipaddr, &port);
 441         *dst_port = port;
 442
 443         /*
 444          *      Different address families should never happen.
 445          */
 446         if (src.ss_family != dst.ss_family) {
 447                 free(buf);
 448                 return -1;
 449         }
 450
 451         /*
 452          *      Tell the caller about the data
 453          */
 454         *pbuf = buf;
 455
 456         return data_len;
 457 }
 458
 459
 460 #define AUTH_PASS_LEN (AUTH_VECTOR_LEN)
 461 /*************************************************************************
 462  *
 463  *      Function: make_secret
 464  *
 465  *      Purpose: Build an encrypted secret value to return in a reply
 466  *               packet.  The secret is hidden by xoring with a MD5 digest
 467  *               created from the shared secret and the authentication
 468  *               vector.  We put them into MD5 in the reverse order from
 469  *               that used when encrypting passwords to RADIUS.
 470  *
 471  *************************************************************************/
 472 static void make_secret(uint8_t *digest, const uint8_t *vector,
 473                         const char *secret, const uint8_t *value)
 474 {
 475         FR_MD5_CTX context;
 476         int             i;
 477
 478         fr_MD5Init(&context);
 479         fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
 480         fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret, strlen(secret));
 481         fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
 482
 483         for ( i = 0; i < AUTH_VECTOR_LEN; i++ ) {
 484                 digest[i] ^= value[i];
 485         }
 486 }
 487
 488 #define MAX_PASS_LEN (128)
 489 static void make_passwd(uint8_t *output, size_t *outlen,
 490                         const uint8_t *input, size_t inlen,
 491                         const char *secret, const uint8_t *vector)
 492 {
 493         FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
 494         uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
 495         uint8_t passwd[MAX_PASS_LEN];
 496         int     i, n;
 497         int     len;
 498
 499         /*
 500          *      If the length is zero, round it up.
 501          */
 502         len = inlen;
 503
 504         if (len > MAX_PASS_LEN) len = MAX_PASS_LEN;
 505
 506         memcpy(passwd, input, len);
 507         memset(passwd + len, 0, sizeof(passwd) - len);
 508
 509         if (len == 0) {
 510                 len = AUTH_PASS_LEN;
 511         }
 512
 513         else if ((len & 0x0f) != 0) {
 514                 len += 0x0f;
 515                 len &= ~0x0f;
 516         }
 517         *outlen = len;
 518
 519         fr_MD5Init(&context);
 520         fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret, strlen(secret));
 521         old = context;
 522
 523         /*
 524          *      Do first pass.
 525          */
 526         fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
 527
 528         for (n = 0; n < len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
 529                 if (n > 0) {
 530                         context = old;
 531                         fr_MD5Update(&context,
 532                                        passwd + n - AUTH_PASS_LEN,
 533                                        AUTH_PASS_LEN);
 534                 }
 535
 536                 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
 537                 for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
 538                         passwd[i + n] ^= digest[i];
 539                 }
 540         }
 541
 542         memcpy(output, passwd, len);
 543 }
 544
 545 static void make_tunnel_passwd(uint8_t *output, size_t *outlen,
 546                                const uint8_t *input, size_t inlen, size_t room,
 547                                const char *secret, const uint8_t *vector)
 548 {
 549         FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
 550         uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
 551         uint8_t passwd[MAX_STRING_LEN + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
 552         int     i, n;
 553         int     len;
 554
 555         /*
 556          *      Be paranoid.
 557          */
 558         if (room > 253) room = 253;
 559
 560         /*
 561          *      Account for 2 bytes of the salt, and round the room
 562          *      available down to the nearest multiple of 16.  Then,
 563          *      subtract one from that to account for the length byte,
 564          *      and the resulting number is the upper bound on the data
 565          *      to copy.
 566          *
 567          *      We could short-cut this calculation just be forcing
 568          *      inlen to be no more than 239.  It would work for all
 569          *      VSA's, as we don't pack multiple VSA's into one
 570          *      attribute.
 571          *
 572          *      However, this calculation is more general, if a little
 573          *      complex.  And it will work in the future for all possible
 574          *      kinds of weird attribute packing.
 575          */
 576         room -= 2;
 577         room -= (room & 0x0f);
 578         room--;
 579
 580         if (inlen > room) inlen = room;
 581
 582         /*
 583          *      Length of the encrypted data is password length plus
 584          *      one byte for the length of the password.
 585          */
 586         len = inlen + 1;
 587         if ((len & 0x0f) != 0) {
 588                 len += 0x0f;
 589                 len &= ~0x0f;
 590         }
 591         *outlen = len + 2;      /* account for the salt */
 592
 593         /*
 594          *      Copy the password over.
 595          */
 596         memcpy(passwd + 3, input, inlen);
 597         memset(passwd + 3 + inlen, 0, sizeof(passwd) - 3 - inlen);
 598
 599         /*
 600          *      Generate salt.  The RFC's say:
 601          *
 602          *      The high bit of salt[0] must be set, each salt in a
 603          *      packet should be unique, and they should be random
 604          *
 605          *      So, we set the high bit, add in a counter, and then
 606          *      add in some CSPRNG data.  should be OK..
 607          */
 608         passwd[0] = (0x80 | ( ((salt_offset++) & 0x0f) << 3) |
 609                      (fr_rand() & 0x07));
 610         passwd[1] = fr_rand();
 611         passwd[2] = inlen;      /* length of the password string */
 612
 613         fr_MD5Init(&context);
 614         fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret, strlen(secret));
 615         old = context;
 616
 617         fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
 618         fr_MD5Update(&context, &passwd[0], 2);
 619
 620         for (n = 0; n < len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
 621                 if (n > 0) {
 622                         context = old;
 623                         fr_MD5Update(&context,
 624                                        passwd + 2 + n - AUTH_PASS_LEN,
 625                                        AUTH_PASS_LEN);
 626                 }
 627
 628                 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
 629                 for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
 630                         passwd[i + 2 + n] ^= digest[i];
 631                 }
 632         }
 633         memcpy(output, passwd, len + 2);
 634 }
 635
 636 /*
 637  *      Returns the end of the data.
 638  */
 639 static uint8_t *vp2data(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
 640                         const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
 641                         const char *secret, const VALUE_PAIR *vp, uint8_t *ptr,
 642                         size_t room)
 643 {
 644         uint32_t lvalue;
 645         size_t len;
 646         const uint8_t *data;
 647         uint8_t array[4];
 648
 649         /*
 650          *      Set up the default sources for the data.
 651          */
 652         data = vp->vp_octets;
 653         len = vp->length;
 654
 655         switch(vp->type) {
 656         case PW_TYPE_STRING:
 657         case PW_TYPE_OCTETS:
 658         case PW_TYPE_IFID:
 659         case PW_TYPE_IPV6ADDR:
 660         case PW_TYPE_IPV6PREFIX:
 661         case PW_TYPE_ABINARY:
 662                 /* nothing more to do */
 663                 break;
 664
 665         case PW_TYPE_BYTE:
 666                 len = 1;        /* just in case */
 667                 array[0] = vp->vp_integer & 0xff;
 668                 data = array;
 669                 break;
 670
 671         case PW_TYPE_SHORT:
 672                 len = 2;        /* just in case */
 673                 array[0] = (vp->vp_integer >> 8) & 0xff;
 674                 array[1] = vp->vp_integer & 0xff;
 675                 data = array;
 676                 break;
 677
 678         case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
 679                 len = 4;        /* just in case */
 680                 lvalue = htonl(vp->vp_integer);
 681                 memcpy(array, &lvalue, sizeof(lvalue));
 682                 data = array;
 683                 break;
 684
 685         case PW_TYPE_IPADDR:
 686                 data = (const uint8_t *) &vp->vp_ipaddr;
 687                 len = 4;        /* just in case */
 688                 break;
 689
 690                 /*
 691                  *  There are no tagged date attributes.
 692                  */
 693         case PW_TYPE_DATE:
 694                 lvalue = htonl(vp->vp_date);
 695                 data = (const uint8_t *) &lvalue;
 696                 len = 4;        /* just in case */
 697                 break;
 698
 699         case PW_TYPE_SIGNED:
 700         {
 701                 int32_t slvalue;
 702
 703                 len = 4;        /* just in case */
 704                 slvalue = htonl(vp->vp_signed);
 705                 memcpy(array, &slvalue, sizeof(slvalue));
 706                 break;
 707         }
 708
 709         case PW_TYPE_TLV:
 710                 data = vp->vp_tlv;
 711                 if (!data) {
 712                         fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot encode NULL TLV");
 713                         return NULL;
 714                 }
 715                 break;
 716
 717         default:                /* unknown type: ignore it */
 718                 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Unknown attribute type %d", vp->type);
 719                 return NULL;
 720         }
 721
 722         /*
 723          *      Bound the data to the calling size
 724          */
 725         if (len > room) len = room;
 726
 727         /*
 728          *      Encrypt the various password styles
 729          *
 730          *      Attributes with encrypted values MUST be less than
 731          *      128 bytes long.
 732          */
 733         switch (vp->flags.encrypt) {
 734         case FLAG_ENCRYPT_USER_PASSWORD:
 735                 make_passwd(ptr, &len, data, len,
 736                             secret, packet->vector);
 737                 break;
 738
 739         case FLAG_ENCRYPT_TUNNEL_PASSWORD:
 740                 /*
 741                  *      Check if there's enough room.  If there isn't,
 742                  *      we discard the attribute.
 743                  *
 744                  *      This is ONLY a problem if we have multiple VSA's
 745                  *      in one Vendor-Specific, though.
 746                  */
 747                 if (room < 18) return ptr;
 748
 749                 switch (packet->code) {
 750                 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
 751                 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
 752                 case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
 753                 default:
 754                         if (!original) {
 755                                 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: No request packet, cannot encrypt %s attribute in the vp.", vp->name);
 756                                 return NULL;
 757                         }
 758                         make_tunnel_passwd(ptr, &len, data, len, room,
 759                                            secret, original->vector);
 760                         break;
 761                 case PW_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
 762                 case PW_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
 763                 case PW_COA_REQUEST:
 764                         make_tunnel_passwd(ptr, &len, data, len, room,
 765                                            secret, packet->vector);
 766                         break;
 767                 }
 768                 break;
 769
 770                 /*
 771                  *      The code above ensures that this attribute
 772                  *      always fits.
 773                  */
 774         case FLAG_ENCRYPT_ASCEND_SECRET:
 775                 make_secret(ptr, packet->vector, secret, data);
 776                 len = AUTH_VECTOR_LEN;
 777                 break;
 778
 779
 780         default:
 781                 /*
 782                  *      Just copy the data over
 783                  */
 784                 memcpy(ptr, data, len);
 785                 break;
 786         } /* switch over encryption flags */
 787
 788         return ptr + len;
 789 }
 790
 791
 792 static VALUE_PAIR *rad_vp2tlv(VALUE_PAIR *vps)
 793 {
 794         int maxattr = 0;
 795         int length;
 796         unsigned int attribute;
 797         uint8_t *ptr, *end;
 798         VALUE_PAIR *vp, *tlv;
 799
 800         attribute = vps->attribute & 0xffff00ff;
 801         maxattr = vps->attribute & 0x0ff;
 802
 803         tlv = paircreate(attribute, PW_TYPE_TLV);
 804         if (!tlv) return NULL;
 805
 806         tlv->length = 0;
 807         for (vp = vps; vp != NULL; vp = vp->next) {
 808                 /*
 809                  *      Group the attributes ONLY until we see a
 810                  *      non-TLV attribute.
 811                  */
 812                 if (!vp->flags.is_tlv ||
 813                     vp->flags.encoded ||
 814                     (vp->flags.encrypt != FLAG_ENCRYPT_NONE) ||
 815                     ((vp->attribute & 0xffff00ff) != attribute) ||
 816                     ((vp->attribute & 0x0000ff00) <= maxattr)) {
 817                         break;
 818                 }
 819
 820                 maxattr = vp->attribute & 0xff00;
 821                 tlv->length += vp->length + 2;
 822         }
 823
 824         if (!tlv->length) {
 825                 pairfree(&tlv);
 826                 return NULL;
 827         }
 828
 829         tlv->vp_tlv = malloc(tlv->length);
 830         if (!tlv->vp_tlv) {
 831                 pairfree(&tlv);
 832                 return NULL;
 833         }
 834
 835         ptr = tlv->vp_tlv;
 836         maxattr = vps->attribute & 0x0ff;
 837         for (vp = vps; vp != NULL; vp = vp->next) {
 838                 if (!vp->flags.is_tlv ||
 839                     vp->flags.encoded ||
 840                     (vp->flags.encrypt != FLAG_ENCRYPT_NONE) ||
 841                     ((vp->attribute & 0xffff00ff) != attribute) ||
 842                     ((vp->attribute & 0x0000ff00) <= maxattr)) {
 843                         break;
 844                 }
 845
 846                 maxattr = vp->attribute & 0xff00;
 847                 end = vp2data(NULL, NULL, NULL, vp, ptr + 2,
 848                               tlv->vp_tlv + tlv->length - ptr);
 849                 if (!end) {
 850                         vp->length = ptr - vp->vp_tlv;
 851                         return tlv; /* should be a more serious error... */
 852                 }
 853
 854                 length = (end - ptr);
 855                 if (length > 255) return NULL;
 856
 857                 /*
 858                  *      Pack the attribute.
 859                  */
 860                 ptr[0] = (vp->attribute & 0xff00) >> 8;
 861                 ptr[1] = length;
 862
 863                 ptr += ptr[1];
 864                 vp->flags.encoded = 1;
 865         }
 866
 867         return tlv;
 868 }
 869
 870 /*
 871  *      Pack data without any encryption.
 872  *      start == start of RADIUS attribute
 873  *      ptr   == continuation byte (i.e. one after length)
 874  */
 875 static int rad_vp2continuation(const VALUE_PAIR *vp, uint8_t *start,
 876                                uint8_t *ptr)
 877 {
 878         size_t left, piece;
 879         size_t hsize = (ptr - start);
 880         uint8_t *this = start;
 881         const uint8_t *data;
 882         uint8_t header[16];
 883
 884         /*
 885          *      If it's too long and marked as encrypted, ignore it.
 886          */
 887         if (vp->flags.encrypt != FLAG_ENCRYPT_NONE) {
 888                 return 0;
 889         }
 890
 891         memcpy(header, start, hsize);
 892
 893         left = vp->length;
 894
 895         switch (vp->type) {
 896         case PW_TYPE_TLV:
 897                 data = vp->vp_tlv;
 898                 break;
 899
 900         case PW_TYPE_OCTETS:
 901         case PW_TYPE_STRING:
 902                 data = vp->vp_octets;
 903                 break;
 904
 905                 /*
 906                  *      This is invalid.
 907                  */
 908         default:
 909                 return 0;
 910         }
 911
 912         while (left > 0) {
 913                 memcpy(this, header, hsize);
 914                 ptr = this + hsize;
 915
 916                 /*
 917                  *      254 to account for
 918                  *      continuation flag.
 919                  */
 920                 if (left > (254 - hsize)) {
 921                         piece = 254 - hsize;
 922                         *(ptr++) = 0x80;
 923                 } else {
 924                         piece = left;
 925                         *(ptr++) = 0x00;
 926                 }
 927
 928                 memcpy(ptr, data, piece);
 929                 this[1] = hsize + piece + 1;
 930
 931                 /*
 932                  *
 933                  */
 934                 this[hsize - 1] = hsize - 6 + 1 + piece;
 935                 data += piece;
 936                 ptr += piece;
 937                 left -= piece;
 938                 this = ptr;
 939         }
 940
 941         return (ptr - start);
 942 }
 943
 944
 945 /*
 946  *      Parse a data structure into a RADIUS attribute.
 947  */
 948 int rad_vp2attr(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
 949                 const char *secret, const VALUE_PAIR *vp, uint8_t *start)
 950 {
 951         int             vendorcode;
 952         int             len, total_length;
 953         uint32_t        lvalue;
 954         uint8_t         *ptr, *length_ptr, *vsa_length_ptr, *tlv_length_ptr;
 955         uint8_t         *end;
 956
 957         ptr = start;
 958         end = ptr + 255;
 959         vendorcode = total_length = 0;
 960         length_ptr = vsa_length_ptr = tlv_length_ptr = NULL;
 961
 962         /*
 963          *      For interoperability, always put vendor attributes
 964          *      into their own VSA.
 965          */
 966         if ((vendorcode = VENDOR(vp->attribute)) == 0) {
 967                 *(ptr++) = vp->attribute & 0xFF;
 968                 length_ptr = ptr;
 969                 *(ptr++) = 2;
 970                 total_length += 2;
 971
 972         } else {
 973                 int vsa_tlen = 1;
 974                 int vsa_llen = 1;
 975                 int vsa_offset = 0;
 976                 DICT_VENDOR *dv = dict_vendorbyvalue(vendorcode);
 977
 978                 /*
 979                  *      This must be an RFC-format attribute.  If it
 980                  *      wasn't, then the "decode" function would have
 981                  *      made a Vendor-Specific attribute (i.e. type
 982                  *      26), and we would have "vendorcode == 0" here.
 983                  */
 984                 if (dv) {
 985                         vsa_tlen = dv->type;
 986                         vsa_llen = dv->length;
 987                         if (dv->flags) vsa_offset = 1;
 988                 }
 989
 990                 /*
 991                  *      Build a VSA header.
 992                  */
 993                 *ptr++ = PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
 994                 vsa_length_ptr = ptr;
 995                 *ptr++ = 6;
 996                 lvalue = htonl(vendorcode);
 997                 memcpy(ptr, &lvalue, 4);
 998                 ptr += 4;
 999                 total_length += 6;
1000
1001                 switch (vsa_tlen) {
1002                 case 1:
1003                         ptr[0] = (vp->attribute & 0xFF);
1004                         break;
1005
1006                 case 2:
1007                         ptr[0] = ((vp->attribute >> 8) & 0xFF);
1008                         ptr[1] = (vp->attribute & 0xFF);
1009                         break;
1010
1011                 case 4:
1012                         ptr[0] = 0;
1013                         ptr[1] = 0;
1014                         ptr[2] = ((vp->attribute >> 8) & 0xFF);
1015                         ptr[3] = (vp->attribute & 0xFF);
1016                         break;
1017
1018                 default:
1019                         return 0; /* silently discard it */
1020                 }
1021                 ptr += vsa_tlen;
1022
1023                 switch (vsa_llen) {
1024                 case 0:
1025                         length_ptr = vsa_length_ptr;
1026                         vsa_length_ptr = NULL;
1027                         break;
1028                 case 1:
1029                         ptr[0] = 0;
1030                         length_ptr = ptr;
1031                         break;
1032                 case 2:
1033                         ptr[0] = 0;
1034                         ptr[1] = 0;
1035                         length_ptr = ptr + 1;
1036                         break;
1037
1038                 default:
1039                         return 0; /* silently discard it */
1040                 }
1041                 ptr += vsa_llen;
1042
1043                 /*
1044                  *      Allow for some continuation.
1045                  */
1046                 if (vsa_offset) {
1047                         /*
1048                          *      Allow TLV's to be encoded, if someone
1049                          *      manages to somehow encode the sub-tlv's.
1050                          *
1051                          *      FIXME: Keep track of room in the packet!
1052                          */
1053                         if (vp->length > (((size_t) 254) - (ptr - start))) {
1054                                 return rad_vp2continuation(vp, start, ptr);
1055                         }
1056
1057                         ptr[0] = 0x00;
1058                         ptr++;
1059
1060                         /*
1061                          *      sub-TLV's can only be in one format.
1062                          */
1063                         if (vp->flags.is_tlv) {
1064                                 *(ptr++) = (vp->attribute & 0xff00) >> 8;
1065                                 tlv_length_ptr = ptr;
1066                                 *(ptr++) = 2;
1067                                 vsa_offset += 2;
1068                         }
1069                 }
1070
1071                 total_length += vsa_tlen + vsa_llen + vsa_offset;
1072                 if (vsa_length_ptr) *vsa_length_ptr += vsa_tlen + vsa_llen + vsa_offset;
1073                 *length_ptr += vsa_tlen + vsa_llen + vsa_offset;
1074         }
1075
1076         /*
1077          *      Insert tags for string attributes.  They go BEFORE
1078          *      the string.
1079          */
1080         if (vp->flags.has_tag && (vp->type == PW_TYPE_STRING) &&
1081             (TAG_VALID(vp->flags.tag) ||
1082              (vp->flags.encrypt == FLAG_ENCRYPT_TUNNEL_PASSWORD))) {
1083                 ptr[0] = vp->flags.tag;
1084                 end = vp2data(packet, original, secret, vp, ptr + 1,
1085                               (end - ptr) - 1);
1086         } else {
1087                 end = vp2data(packet, original, secret, vp, ptr,
1088                               (end - ptr));
1089         }
1090         if (!end) return -1;
1091
1092         /*
1093          *      Insert tags for integer attributes.  They go at the START
1094          *      of the integer, and over-write the first byte.
1095          */
1096         if (vp->flags.has_tag && (vp->type == PW_TYPE_INTEGER)) {
1097                 ptr[0] = vp->flags.tag;
1098         }
1099
1100         /*
1101          *      RFC 2865 section 5 says that zero-length attributes
1102          *      MUST NOT be sent.
1103          *
1104          *      ... and the WiMAX forum ignores this... because of
1105          *      one vendor.  Don't they have anything better to do
1106          *      with their time?
1107          */
1108         if ((end == ptr) &&
1109             (vp->attribute != PW_CHARGEABLE_USER_IDENTITY)) return 0;
1110
1111         len = (end - ptr);
1112
1113         /*
1114          *      Update the various lengths.
1115          */
1116         *length_ptr += len;
1117         if (vsa_length_ptr) *vsa_length_ptr += len;
1118         if (tlv_length_ptr) *tlv_length_ptr += len;
1119         ptr += len;
1120         total_length += len;
1121
1122         return total_length;    /* of attribute */
1123 }
1124
1125
1126 /*
1127  *      Encode a packet.
1128  */
1129 int rad_encode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
1130                const char *secret)
1131 {
1132         radius_packet_t *hdr;
1133         uint8_t         *ptr;
1134         uint16_t        total_length;
1135         int             len;
1136         VALUE_PAIR      *reply;
1137         const char      *what;
1138         char            ip_buffer[128];
1139
1140         /*
1141          *      For simplicity in the following logic, we allow
1142          *      the attributes to "overflow" the 4k maximum
1143          *      RADIUS packet size, by one attribute.
1144          *
1145          *      It's uint32_t, for alignment purposes.
1146          */
1147         uint32_t        data[(MAX_PACKET_LEN + 256) / 4];
1148
1149         if ((packet->code > 0) && (packet->code < FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
1150                 what = fr_packet_codes[packet->code];
1151         } else {
1152                 what = "Reply";
1153         }
1154
1155         DEBUG("Sending %s of id %d to %s port %d\n",
1156               what, packet->id,
1157               inet_ntop(packet->dst_ipaddr.af,
1158                         &packet->dst_ipaddr.ipaddr,
1159                         ip_buffer, sizeof(ip_buffer)),
1160               packet->dst_port);
1161
1162         /*
1163          *      Double-check some things based on packet code.
1164          */
1165         switch (packet->code) {
1166         case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
1167         case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
1168         case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
1169                 if (!original) {
1170                         fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot sign response packet without a request packet.");
1171                         return -1;
1172                 }
1173                 break;
1174
1175                 /*
1176                  *      These packet vectors start off as all zero.
1177                  */
1178         case PW_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
1179         case PW_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
1180         case PW_COA_REQUEST:
1181                 memset(packet->vector, 0, sizeof(packet->vector));
1182                 break;
1183
1184         default:
1185                 break;
1186         }
1187
1188         /*
1189          *      Use memory on the stack, until we know how
1190          *      large the packet will be.
1191          */
1192         hdr = (radius_packet_t *) data;
1193
1194         /*
1195          *      Build standard header
1196          */
1197         hdr->code = packet->code;
1198         hdr->id = packet->id;
1199
1200         memcpy(hdr->vector, packet->vector, sizeof(hdr->vector));
1201
1202         total_length = AUTH_HDR_LEN;
1203
1204         /*
1205          *      Load up the configuration values for the user
1206          */
1207         ptr = hdr->data;
1208         packet->offset = 0;
1209
1210         /*
1211          *      FIXME: Loop twice over the reply list.  The first time,
1212          *      calculate the total length of data.  The second time,
1213          *      allocate the memory, and fill in the VP's.
1214          *
1215          *      Hmm... this may be slower than just doing a small
1216          *      memcpy.
1217          */
1218
1219         /*
1220          *      Loop over the reply attributes for the packet.
1221          */
1222         for (reply = packet->vps; reply; reply = reply->next) {
1223                 /*
1224                  *      Ignore non-wire attributes
1225                  */
1226                 if ((VENDOR(reply->attribute) == 0) &&
1227                     ((reply->attribute & 0xFFFF) > 0xff)) {
1228 #ifndef NDEBUG
1229                         /*
1230                          *      Permit the admin to send BADLY formatted
1231                          *      attributes with a debug build.
1232                          */
1233                         if (reply->attribute == PW_RAW_ATTRIBUTE) {
1234                                 memcpy(ptr, reply->vp_octets, reply->length);
1235                                 len = reply->length;
1236                                 goto next;
1237                         }
1238 #endif
1239                         continue;
1240                 }
1241
1242                 /*
1243                  *      Set the Message-Authenticator to the correct
1244                  *      length and initial value.
1245                  */
1246                 if (reply->attribute == PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR) {
1247                         reply->length = AUTH_VECTOR_LEN;
1248                         memset(reply->vp_strvalue, 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
1249
1250                         /*
1251                          *      Cache the offset to the
1252                          *      Message-Authenticator
1253                          */
1254                         packet->offset = total_length;
1255                 }
1256
1257                 /*
1258                  *      Print out ONLY the attributes which
1259                  *      we're sending over the wire, and print
1260                  *      them out BEFORE they're encrypted.
1261                  */
1262                 debug_pair(reply);
1263
1264                 /*
1265                  *      Print them in order, even if they were encoded
1266                  *      already.
1267                  */
1268                 len = 0;
1269                 if (reply->flags.encoded) goto next;
1270
1271                 if (reply->flags.is_tlv) {
1272                         VALUE_PAIR *tlv = rad_vp2tlv(reply);
1273                         if (tlv) {
1274                                 tlv->next = reply->next;
1275                                 reply->next = tlv;
1276                         }
1277
1278                         /*
1279                          *      The encoded flag MUST be set in reply!
1280                          */
1281                         reply = reply->next;
1282                 }
1283
1284                 len = rad_vp2attr(packet, original, secret, reply, ptr);
1285
1286                 if (len < 0) return -1;
1287
1288                 /*
1289                  *      Check that the packet is no more than 4k in
1290                  *      size, AFTER writing the attribute past the 4k
1291                  *      boundary, but BEFORE deciding to increase the
1292                  *      size of the packet. Note that the 'data'
1293                  *      buffer, above, is one attribute longer than
1294                  *      necessary, in order to permit this overflow.
1295                  */
1296                 if ((total_length + len) > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
1297                         break;
1298                 }
1299
1300         next:
1301                 ptr += len;
1302                 total_length += len;
1303         } /* done looping over all attributes */
1304
1305         /*
1306          *      Fill in the rest of the fields, and copy the data over
1307          *      from the local stack to the newly allocated memory.
1308          *
1309          *      Yes, all this 'memcpy' is slow, but it means
1310          *      that we only allocate the minimum amount of
1311          *      memory for a request.
1312          */
1313         packet->data_len = total_length;
1314         packet->data = (uint8_t *) malloc(packet->data_len);
1315         if (!packet->data) {
1316                 fr_strerror_printf("Out of memory");
1317                 return -1;
1318         }
1319
1320         memcpy(packet->data, hdr, packet->data_len);
1321         hdr = (radius_packet_t *) packet->data;
1322
1323         total_length = htons(total_length);
1324         memcpy(hdr->length, &total_length, sizeof(total_length));
1325
1326         return 0;
1327 }
1328
1329
1330 /*
1331  *      Sign a previously encoded packet.
1332  */
1333 int rad_sign(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
1334              const char *secret)
1335 {
1336         radius_packet_t *hdr = (radius_packet_t *)packet->data;
1337
1338         /*
1339          *      It wasn't assigned an Id, this is bad!
1340          */
1341         if (packet->id < 0) {
1342                 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: RADIUS packets must be assigned an Id.");
1343                 return -1;
1344         }
1345
1346         if (!packet->data || (packet->data_len < AUTH_HDR_LEN) ||
1347             (packet->offset < 0)) {
1348                 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: You must call rad_encode() before rad_sign()");
1349                 return -1;
1350         }
1351
1352         /*
1353          *      If there's a Message-Authenticator, update it
1354          *      now, BEFORE updating the authentication vector.
1355          */
1356         if (packet->offset > 0) {
1357                 uint8_t calc_auth_vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
1358
1359                 switch (packet->code) {
1360                 case PW_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
1361                 case PW_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE:
1362                 case PW_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
1363                 case PW_DISCONNECT_ACK:
1364                 case PW_DISCONNECT_NAK:
1365                 case PW_COA_REQUEST:
1366                 case PW_COA_ACK:
1367                 case PW_COA_NAK:
1368                         memset(hdr->vector, 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
1369                         break;
1370
1371                 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
1372                 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
1373                 case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
1374                         if (!original) {
1375                                 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot sign response packet without a request packet.");
1376                                 return -1;
1377                         }
1378                         memcpy(hdr->vector, original->vector,
1379                                AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
1380                         break;
1381
1382                 default:        /* others have vector already set to zero */
1383                         break;
1384
1385                 }
1386
1387                 /*
1388                  *      Set the authentication vector to zero,
1389                  *      calculate the signature, and put it
1390                  *      into the Message-Authenticator
1391                  *      attribute.
1392                  */
1393                 fr_hmac_md5(packet->data, packet->data_len,
1394                             (const uint8_t *) secret, strlen(secret),
1395                             calc_auth_vector);
1396                 memcpy(packet->data + packet->offset + 2,
1397                        calc_auth_vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
1398
1399                 /*
1400                  *      Copy the original request vector back
1401                  *      to the raw packet.
1402                  */
1403                 memcpy(hdr->vector, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
1404         }
1405
1406         /*
1407          *      Switch over the packet code, deciding how to
1408          *      sign the packet.
1409          */
1410         switch (packet->code) {
1411                 /*
1412                  *      Request packets are not signed, bur
1413                  *      have a random authentication vector.
1414                  */
1415         case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REQUEST:
1416         case PW_STATUS_SERVER:
1417                 break;
1418
1419                 /*
1420                  *      Reply packets are signed with the
1421                  *      authentication vector of the request.
1422                  */
1423         default:
1424                 {
1425                         uint8_t digest[16];
1426
1427                         FR_MD5_CTX      context;
1428                         fr_MD5Init(&context);
1429                         fr_MD5Update(&context, packet->data, packet->data_len);
1430                         fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret,
1431                                      strlen(secret));
1432                         fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
1433
1434                         memcpy(hdr->vector, digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
1435                         memcpy(packet->vector, digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
1436                         break;
1437                 }
1438         }/* switch over packet codes */
1439
1440         return 0;
1441 }
1442
1443 /*
1444  *      Reply to the request.  Also attach
1445  *      reply attribute value pairs and any user message provided.
1446  */
1447 int rad_send(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
1448              const char *secret)
1449 {
1450         VALUE_PAIR              *reply;
1451         const char              *what;
1452         char                    ip_buffer[128];
1453
1454         /*
1455          *      Maybe it's a fake packet.  Don't send it.
1456          */
1457         if (!packet || (packet->sockfd < 0)) {
1458                 return 0;
1459         }
1460
1461         if ((packet->code > 0) && (packet->code < FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
1462                 what = fr_packet_codes[packet->code];
1463         } else {
1464                 what = "Reply";
1465         }
1466
1467         /*
1468          *  First time through, allocate room for the packet
1469          */
1470         if (!packet->data) {
1471                 /*
1472                  *      Encode the packet.
1473                  */
1474                 if (rad_encode(packet, original, secret) < 0) {
1475                         return -1;
1476                 }
1477
1478                 /*
1479                  *      Re-sign it, including updating the
1480                  *      Message-Authenticator.
1481                  */
1482                 if (rad_sign(packet, original, secret) < 0) {
1483                         return -1;
1484                 }
1485
1486                 /*
1487                  *      If packet->data points to data, then we print out
1488                  *      the VP list again only for debugging.
1489                  */
1490         } else if (fr_debug_flag) {
1491                 DEBUG("Sending %s of id %d to %s port %d\n", what, packet->id,
1492                       inet_ntop(packet->dst_ipaddr.af,
1493                                 &packet->dst_ipaddr.ipaddr,
1494                                 ip_buffer, sizeof(ip_buffer)),
1495                       packet->dst_port);
1496
1497                 for (reply = packet->vps; reply; reply = reply->next) {
1498                         if ((VENDOR(reply->attribute) == 0) &&
1499                             ((reply->attribute & 0xFFFF) > 0xff)) continue;
1500                         debug_pair(reply);
1501                 }
1502         }
1503
1504         /*
1505          *      And send it on it's way.
1506          */
1507         return rad_sendto(packet->sockfd, packet->data, packet->data_len, 0,
1508                           &packet->src_ipaddr, packet->src_port,
1509                           &packet->dst_ipaddr, packet->dst_port);
1510 }
1511
1512 /*
1513  *      Do a comparison of two authentication digests by comparing
1514  *      the FULL digest.  Otehrwise, the server can be subject to
1515  *      timing attacks that allow attackers find a valid message
1516  *      authenticator.
1517  *
1518  *      http://www.cs.rice.edu/~dwallach/pub/crosby-timing2009.pdf
1519  */
1520 static int digest_cmp(const uint8_t *a, const uint8_t *b, size_t length)
1521 {
1522         int result = 0;
1523         size_t i;
1524
1525         for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
1526                 result |= a[i] ^ b[i];
1527         }
1528
1529         return result;          /* 0 is OK, !0 is !OK, just like memcmp */
1530 }
1531
1532
1533 /*
1534  *      Validates the requesting client NAS.  Calculates the
1535  *      signature based on the clients private key.
1536  */
1537 static int calc_acctdigest(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const char *secret)
1538 {
1539         uint8_t         digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
1540         FR_MD5_CTX              context;
1541
1542         /*
1543          *      Zero out the auth_vector in the received packet.
1544          *      Then append the shared secret to the received packet,
1545          *      and calculate the MD5 sum. This must be the same
1546          *      as the original MD5 sum (packet->vector).
1547          */
1548         memset(packet->data + 4, 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
1549
1550         /*
1551          *  MD5(packet + secret);
1552          */
1553         fr_MD5Init(&context);
1554         fr_MD5Update(&context, packet->data, packet->data_len);
1555         fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret, strlen(secret));
1556         fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
1557
1558         /*
1559          *      Return 0 if OK, 2 if not OK.
1560          */
1561         if (digest_cmp(digest, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) != 0) return 2;
1562         return 0;
1563 }
1564
1565
1566 /*
1567  *      Validates the requesting client NAS.  Calculates the
1568  *      signature based on the clients private key.
1569  */
1570 static int calc_replydigest(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET *original,
1571                             const char *secret)
1572 {
1573         uint8_t         calc_digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
1574         FR_MD5_CTX              context;
1575
1576         /*
1577          *      Very bad!
1578          */
1579         if (original == NULL) {
1580                 return 3;
1581         }
1582
1583         /*
1584          *  Copy the original vector in place.
1585          */
1586         memcpy(packet->data + 4, original->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
1587
1588         /*
1589          *  MD5(packet + secret);
1590          */
1591         fr_MD5Init(&context);
1592         fr_MD5Update(&context, packet->data, packet->data_len);
1593         fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret, strlen(secret));
1594         fr_MD5Final(calc_digest, &context);
1595
1596         /*
1597          *  Copy the packet's vector back to the packet.
1598          */
1599         memcpy(packet->data + 4, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
1600
1601         /*
1602          *      Return 0 if OK, 2 if not OK.
1603          */
1604         if (digest_cmp(packet->vector, calc_digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) != 0) return 2;
1605         return 0;
1606 }
1607
1608
1609 /*
1610  *      See if the data pointed to by PTR is a valid RADIUS packet.
1611  *
1612  *      packet is not 'const * const' because we may update data_len,
1613  *      if there's more data in the UDP packet than in the RADIUS packet.
1614  */
1615 int rad_packet_ok(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, int flags)
1616 {
1617         uint8_t                 *attr;
1618         int                     totallen;
1619         int                     count;
1620         radius_packet_t         *hdr;
1621         char                    host_ipaddr[128];
1622         int                     require_ma = 0;
1623         int                     seen_ma = 0;
1624         int                     num_attributes;
1625
1626         /*
1627          *      Check for packets smaller than the packet header.
1628          *
1629          *      RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
1630          *
1631          *      "The minimum length is 20 ..."
1632          */
1633         if (packet->data_len < AUTH_HDR_LEN) {
1634                 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too short (received %d < minimum %d)",
1635                            inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
1636                                      &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
1637                                      host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
1638                            packet->data_len, AUTH_HDR_LEN);
1639                 return 0;
1640         }
1641
1642         /*
1643          *      RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
1644          *
1645          *      " ... and maximum length is 4096."
1646          */
1647         if (packet->data_len > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
1648                 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too long (received %d > maximum %d)",
1649                            inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
1650                                      &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
1651                                      host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
1652                            packet->data_len, MAX_PACKET_LEN);
1653                 return 0;
1654         }
1655
1656         /*
1657          *      Check for packets with mismatched size.
1658          *      i.e. We've received 128 bytes, and the packet header
1659          *      says it's 256 bytes long.
1660          */
1661         totallen = (packet->data[2] << 8) | packet->data[3];
1662         hdr = (radius_packet_t *)packet->data;
1663
1664         /*
1665          *      Code of 0 is not understood.
1666          *      Code of 16 or greate is not understood.
1667          */
1668         if ((hdr->code == 0) ||
1669             (hdr->code >= FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
1670                 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Bad RADIUS packet from host %s: unknown packet code%d ",
1671                            inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
1672                                      &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
1673                                      host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
1674                            hdr->code);
1675                 return 0;
1676         }
1677
1678         /*
1679          *      Message-Authenticator is required in Status-Server
1680          *      packets, otherwise they can be trivially forged.
1681          */
1682         if (hdr->code == PW_STATUS_SERVER) require_ma = 1;
1683
1684         /*
1685          *      It's also required if the caller asks for it.
1686          */
1687         if (flags) require_ma = 1;
1688
1689         /*
1690          *      Repeat the length checks.  This time, instead of
1691          *      looking at the data we received, look at the value
1692          *      of the 'length' field inside of the packet.
1693          *
1694          *      Check for packets smaller than the packet header.
1695          *
1696          *      RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
1697          *
1698          *      "The minimum length is 20 ..."
1699          */
1700         if (totallen < AUTH_HDR_LEN) {
1701                 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too short (length %d < minimum %d)",
1702                            inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
1703                                      &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
1704                                      host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
1705                            totallen, AUTH_HDR_LEN);
1706                 return 0;
1707         }
1708
1709         /*
1710          *      And again, for the value of the 'length' field.
1711          *
1712          *      RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
1713          *
1714          *      " ... and maximum length is 4096."
1715          */
1716         if (totallen > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
1717                 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too long (length %d > maximum %d)",
1718                            inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
1719                                      &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
1720                                      host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
1721                            totallen, MAX_PACKET_LEN);
1722                 return 0;
1723         }
1724
1725         /*
1726          *      RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
1727          *
1728          *      "If the packet is shorter than the Length field
1729          *      indicates, it MUST be silently discarded."
1730          *
1731          *      i.e. No response to the NAS.
1732          */
1733         if (packet->data_len < totallen) {
1734                 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: received %d octets, packet length says %d",
1735                            inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
1736                                      &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
1737                                      host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
1738                            packet->data_len, totallen);
1739                 return 0;
1740         }
1741
1742         /*
1743          *      RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
1744          *
1745          *      "Octets outside the range of the Length field MUST be
1746          *      treated as padding and ignored on reception."
1747          */
1748         if (packet->data_len > totallen) {
1749                 /*
1750                  *      We're shortening the packet below, but just
1751                  *      to be paranoid, zero out the extra data.
1752                  */
1753                 memset(packet->data + totallen, 0, packet->data_len - totallen);
1754                 packet->data_len = totallen;
1755         }
1756
1757         /*
1758          *      Walk through the packet's attributes, ensuring that
1759          *      they add up EXACTLY to the size of the packet.
1760          *
1761          *      If they don't, then the attributes either under-fill
1762          *      or over-fill the packet.  Any parsing of the packet
1763          *      is impossible, and will result in unknown side effects.
1764          *
1765          *      This would ONLY happen with buggy RADIUS implementations,
1766          *      or with an intentional attack.  Either way, we do NOT want
1767          *      to be vulnerable to this problem.
1768          */
1769         attr = hdr->data;
1770         count = totallen - AUTH_HDR_LEN;
1771         num_attributes = 0;
1772
1773         while (count > 0) {
1774                 /*
1775                  *      Attribute number zero is NOT defined.
1776                  */
1777                 if (attr[0] == 0) {
1778                         fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: Invalid attribute 0",
1779                                    inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
1780                                              &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
1781                                              host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
1782                         return 0;
1783                 }
1784
1785                 /*
1786                  *      Attributes are at LEAST as long as the ID & length
1787                  *      fields.  Anything shorter is an invalid attribute.
1788                  */
1789                 if (attr[1] < 2) {
1790                         fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: attribute %d too short",
1791                                    inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
1792                                              &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
1793                                              host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
1794                                    attr[0]);
1795                         return 0;
1796                 }
1797
1798                 /*
1799                  *      Sanity check the attributes for length.
1800                  */
1801                 switch (attr[0]) {
1802                 default:        /* don't do anything by default */
1803                         break;
1804
1805                         /*
1806                          *      If there's an EAP-Message, we require
1807                          *      a Message-Authenticator.
1808                          */
1809                 case PW_EAP_MESSAGE:
1810                         require_ma = 1;
1811                         break;
1812
1813                 case PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR:
1814                         if (attr[1] != 2 + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) {
1815                                 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: Message-Authenticator has invalid length %d",
1816                                            inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
1817                                                      &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
1818                                                      host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
1819                                            attr[1] - 2);
1820                                 return 0;
1821                         }
1822                         seen_ma = 1;
1823                         break;
1824                 }
1825
1826                 /*
1827                  *      FIXME: Look up the base 255 attributes in the
1828                  *      dictionary, and switch over their type.  For
1829                  *      integer/date/ip, the attribute length SHOULD
1830                  *      be 6.
1831                  */
1832                 count -= attr[1];       /* grab the attribute length */
1833                 attr += attr[1];
1834                 num_attributes++;       /* seen one more attribute */
1835         }
1836
1837         /*
1838          *      If the attributes add up to a packet, it's allowed.
1839          *
1840          *      If not, we complain, and throw the packet away.
1841          */
1842         if (count != 0) {
1843                 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: packet attributes do NOT exactly fill the packet",
1844                            inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
1845                                      &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
1846                                      host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
1847                 return 0;
1848         }
1849
1850         /*
1851          *      If we're configured to look for a maximum number of
1852          *      attributes, and we've seen more than that maximum,
1853          *      then throw the packet away, as a possible DoS.
1854          */
1855         if ((fr_max_attributes > 0) &&
1856             (num_attributes > fr_max_attributes)) {
1857                 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Possible DoS attack from host %s: Too many attributes in request (received %d, max %d are allowed).",
1858                            inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
1859                                      &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
1860                                      host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
1861                            num_attributes, fr_max_attributes);
1862                 return 0;
1863         }
1864
1865         /*
1866          *      http://www.freeradius.org/rfc/rfc2869.html#EAP-Message
1867          *
1868          *      A packet with an EAP-Message attribute MUST also have
1869          *      a Message-Authenticator attribute.
1870          *
1871          *      A Message-Authenticator all by itself is OK, though.
1872          *
1873          *      Similarly, Status-Server packets MUST contain
1874          *      Message-Authenticator attributes.
1875          */
1876         if (require_ma && ! seen_ma) {
1877                 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Insecure packet from host %s:  Packet does not contain required Message-Authenticator attribute",
1878                            inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
1879                                      &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
1880                                      host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
1881                 return 0;
1882         }
1883
1884         /*
1885          *      Fill RADIUS header fields
1886          */
1887         packet->code = hdr->code;
1888         packet->id = hdr->id;
1889         memcpy(packet->vector, hdr->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
1890
1891         return 1;
1892 }
1893
1894
1895 /*
1896  *      Receive UDP client requests, and fill in
1897  *      the basics of a RADIUS_PACKET structure.
1898  */
1899 RADIUS_PACKET *rad_recv(int fd, int flags)
1900 {
1901         int sock_flags = 0;
1902         RADIUS_PACKET           *packet;
1903
1904         /*
1905          *      Allocate the new request data structure
1906          */
1907         if ((packet = malloc(sizeof(*packet))) == NULL) {
1908                 fr_strerror_printf("out of memory");
1909                 return NULL;
1910         }
1911         memset(packet, 0, sizeof(*packet));
1912
1913         if (flags & 0x02) {
1914                 sock_flags = MSG_PEEK;
1915                 flags &= ~0x02;
1916         }
1917
1918         packet->data_len = rad_recvfrom(fd, &packet->data, sock_flags,
1919                                         &packet->src_ipaddr, &packet->src_port,
1920                                         &packet->dst_ipaddr, &packet->dst_port);
1921
1922         /*
1923          *      Check for socket errors.
1924          */
1925         if (packet->data_len < 0) {
1926                 fr_strerror_printf("Error receiving packet: %s", strerror(errno));
1927                 /* packet->data is NULL */
1928                 free(packet);
1929                 return NULL;
1930         }
1931
1932         /*
1933          *      If the packet is too big, then rad_recvfrom did NOT
1934          *      allocate memory.  Instead, it just discarded the
1935          *      packet.
1936          */
1937         if (packet->data_len > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
1938                 fr_strerror_printf("Discarding packet: Larger than RFC limitation of 4096 bytes.");
1939                 /* packet->data is NULL */
1940                 free(packet);
1941                 return NULL;
1942         }
1943
1944         /*
1945          *      Read no data.  Continue.
1946          *      This check is AFTER the MAX_PACKET_LEN check above, because
1947          *      if the packet is larger than MAX_PACKET_LEN, we also have
1948          *      packet->data == NULL
1949          */
1950         if ((packet->data_len == 0) || !packet->data) {
1951                 fr_strerror_printf("Empty packet: Socket is not ready.");
1952                 free(packet);
1953                 return NULL;
1954         }
1955
1956         /*
1957          *      See if it's a well-formed RADIUS packet.
1958          */
1959         if (!rad_packet_ok(packet, flags)) {
1960                 rad_free(&packet);
1961                 return NULL;
1962         }
1963
1964         /*
1965          *      Remember which socket we read the packet from.
1966          */
1967         packet->sockfd = fd;
1968
1969         /*
1970          *      FIXME: Do even more filtering by only permitting
1971          *      certain IP's.  The problem is that we don't know
1972          *      how to do this properly for all possible clients...
1973          */
1974
1975         /*
1976          *      Explicitely set the VP list to empty.
1977          */
1978         packet->vps = NULL;
1979
1980         if (fr_debug_flag) {
1981                 char host_ipaddr[128];
1982
1983                 if ((packet->code > 0) && (packet->code < FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
1984                         DEBUG("rad_recv: %s packet from host %s port %d",
1985                               fr_packet_codes[packet->code],
1986                               inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
1987                                         &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
1988                                         host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
1989                               packet->src_port);
1990                 } else {
1991                         DEBUG("rad_recv: Packet from host %s port %d code=%d",
1992                               inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
1993                                         &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
1994                                         host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
1995                               packet->src_port,
1996                               packet->code);
1997                 }
1998                 DEBUG(", id=%d, length=%d\n", packet->id, packet->data_len);
1999         }
2000
2001         return packet;
2002 }
2003
2004
2005 /*
2006  *      Verify the signature of a packet.
2007  */
2008 int rad_verify(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET *original,
2009                const char *secret)
2010 {
2011         uint8_t                 *ptr;
2012         int                     length;
2013         int                     attrlen;
2014
2015         if (!packet || !packet->data) return -1;
2016
2017         /*
2018          *      Before we allocate memory for the attributes, do more
2019          *      sanity checking.
2020          */
2021         ptr = packet->data + AUTH_HDR_LEN;
2022         length = packet->data_len - AUTH_HDR_LEN;
2023         while (length > 0) {
2024                 uint8_t msg_auth_vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
2025                 uint8_t calc_auth_vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
2026
2027                 attrlen = ptr[1];
2028
2029                 switch (ptr[0]) {
2030                 default:        /* don't do anything. */
2031                         break;
2032
2033                         /*
2034                          *      Note that more than one Message-Authenticator
2035                          *      attribute is invalid.
2036                          */
2037                 case PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR:
2038                         memcpy(msg_auth_vector, &ptr[2], sizeof(msg_auth_vector));
2039                         memset(&ptr[2], 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2040
2041                         switch (packet->code) {
2042                         default:
2043                                 break;
2044
2045                         case PW_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
2046                         case PW_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE:
2047                         case PW_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
2048                         case PW_DISCONNECT_ACK:
2049                         case PW_DISCONNECT_NAK:
2050                         case PW_COA_REQUEST:
2051                         case PW_COA_ACK:
2052                         case PW_COA_NAK:
2053                                 memset(packet->data + 4, 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2054                                 break;
2055
2056                         case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
2057                         case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
2058                         case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
2059                                 if (!original) {
2060                                         fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot validate Message-Authenticator in response packet without a request packet.");
2061                                         return -1;
2062                                 }
2063                                 memcpy(packet->data + 4, original->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2064                                 break;
2065                         }
2066
2067                         fr_hmac_md5(packet->data, packet->data_len,
2068                                     (const uint8_t *) secret, strlen(secret),
2069                                     calc_auth_vector);
2070                         if (digest_cmp(calc_auth_vector, msg_auth_vector,
2071                                    sizeof(calc_auth_vector)) != 0) {
2072                                 char buffer[32];
2073                                 fr_strerror_printf("Received packet from %s with invalid Message-Authenticator!  (Shared secret is incorrect.)",
2074                                            inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2075                                                      &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2076                                                      buffer, sizeof(buffer)));
2077                                 /* Silently drop packet, according to RFC 3579 */
2078                                 return -1;
2079                         } /* else the message authenticator was good */
2080
2081                         /*
2082                          *      Reinitialize Authenticators.
2083                          */
2084                         memcpy(&ptr[2], msg_auth_vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2085                         memcpy(packet->data + 4, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2086                         break;
2087                 } /* switch over the attributes */
2088
2089                 ptr += attrlen;
2090                 length -= attrlen;
2091         } /* loop over the packet, sanity checking the attributes */
2092
2093         /*
2094          *      It looks like a RADIUS packet, but we can't validate
2095          *      the signature.
2096          */
2097         if ((packet->code == 0) || (packet->code >= FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
2098                 char buffer[32];
2099                 fr_strerror_printf("Received Unknown packet code %d "
2100                            "from client %s port %d: Cannot validate signature.",
2101                            packet->code,
2102                            inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2103                                      &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2104                                      buffer, sizeof(buffer)),
2105                            packet->src_port);
2106                 return -1;
2107         }
2108
2109         /*
2110          *      Calculate and/or verify digest.
2111          */
2112         switch(packet->code) {
2113                 int rcode;
2114                 char buffer[32];
2115
2116                 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REQUEST:
2117                 case PW_STATUS_SERVER:
2118                         /*
2119                          *      The authentication vector is random
2120                          *      nonsense, invented by the client.
2121                          */
2122                         break;
2123
2124                 case PW_COA_REQUEST:
2125                 case PW_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
2126                 case PW_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
2127                         if (calc_acctdigest(packet, secret) > 1) {
2128                                 fr_strerror_printf("Received %s packet "
2129                                            "from %s with invalid signature!  (Shared secret is incorrect.)",
2130                                            fr_packet_codes[packet->code],
2131                                            inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2132                                                      &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2133                                                      buffer, sizeof(buffer)));
2134                                 return -1;
2135                         }
2136                         break;
2137
2138                         /* Verify the reply digest */
2139                 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
2140                 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
2141                 case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
2142                 case PW_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE:
2143                 case PW_DISCONNECT_ACK:
2144                 case PW_DISCONNECT_NAK:
2145                 case PW_COA_ACK:
2146                 case PW_COA_NAK:
2147                         rcode = calc_replydigest(packet, original, secret);
2148                         if (rcode > 1) {
2149                                 fr_strerror_printf("Received %s packet "
2150                                            "from client %s port %d with invalid signature (err=%d)!  (Shared secret is incorrect.)",
2151                                            fr_packet_codes[packet->code],
2152                                            inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2153                                                      &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2154                                                      buffer, sizeof(buffer)),
2155                                            packet->src_port,
2156                                            rcode);
2157                                 return -1;
2158                         }
2159                         break;
2160
2161                 default:
2162                         fr_strerror_printf("Received Unknown packet code %d "
2163                                    "from client %s port %d: Cannot validate signature",
2164                                    packet->code,
2165                                    inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2166                                              &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2167                                                      buffer, sizeof(buffer)),
2168                                    packet->src_port);
2169                         return -1;
2170         }
2171
2172         return 0;
2173 }
2174
2175
2176 static VALUE_PAIR *data2vp(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
2177                            const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
2178                            const char *secret,
2179                            UNUSED unsigned int attribute, size_t length,
2180                            const uint8_t *data, VALUE_PAIR *vp)
2181 {
2182         int offset = 0;
2183
2184         /*
2185          *      If length is greater than 253, something is SERIOUSLY
2186          *      wrong.
2187          */
2188         if (length > 253) length = 253; /* paranoia (pair-anoia?) */
2189
2190         vp->length = length;
2191         vp->operator = T_OP_EQ;
2192         vp->next = NULL;
2193
2194         /*
2195          *      Handle tags.
2196          */
2197         if (vp->flags.has_tag) {
2198                 if (TAG_VALID(data[0]) ||
2199                     (vp->flags.encrypt == FLAG_ENCRYPT_TUNNEL_PASSWORD)) {
2200                         /*
2201                          *      Tunnel passwords REQUIRE a tag, even
2202                          *      if don't have a valid tag.
2203                          */
2204                         vp->flags.tag = data[0];
2205
2206                         if ((vp->type == PW_TYPE_STRING) ||
2207                             (vp->type == PW_TYPE_OCTETS)) offset = 1;
2208                 }
2209         }
2210
2211         /*
2212          *      Copy the data to be decrypted
2213          */
2214         memcpy(&vp->vp_octets[0], data + offset, length - offset);
2215         vp->length -= offset;
2216
2217         /*
2218          *      Decrypt the attribute.
2219          */
2220         switch (vp->flags.encrypt) {
2221                 /*
2222                  *  User-Password
2223                  */
2224         case FLAG_ENCRYPT_USER_PASSWORD:
2225                 if (original) {
2226                         rad_pwdecode((char *)vp->vp_strvalue,
2227                                      vp->length, secret,
2228                                      original->vector);
2229                 } else {
2230                         rad_pwdecode((char *)vp->vp_strvalue,
2231                                      vp->length, secret,
2232                                      packet->vector);
2233                 }
2234                 if (vp->attribute == PW_USER_PASSWORD) {
2235                         vp->length = strlen(vp->vp_strvalue);
2236                 }
2237                 break;
2238
2239                 /*
2240                  *      Tunnel-Password's may go ONLY
2241                  *      in response packets.
2242                  */
2243         case FLAG_ENCRYPT_TUNNEL_PASSWORD:
2244                 if (!original) goto raw;
2245
2246                 if (rad_tunnel_pwdecode(vp->vp_octets, &vp->length,
2247                                         secret, original->vector) < 0) {
2248                         goto raw;
2249                 }
2250                 break;
2251
2252                 /*
2253                  *  Ascend-Send-Secret
2254                  *  Ascend-Receive-Secret
2255                  */
2256         case FLAG_ENCRYPT_ASCEND_SECRET:
2257                 if (!original) {
2258                         goto raw;
2259                 } else {
2260                         uint8_t my_digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
2261                         make_secret(my_digest,
2262                                     original->vector,
2263                                     secret, data);
2264                         memcpy(vp->vp_strvalue, my_digest,
2265                                AUTH_VECTOR_LEN );
2266                         vp->vp_strvalue[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN] = '\0';
2267                         vp->length = strlen(vp->vp_strvalue);
2268                 }
2269                 break;
2270
2271         default:
2272                 break;
2273         } /* switch over encryption flags */
2274
2275
2276         switch (vp->type) {
2277         case PW_TYPE_STRING:
2278         case PW_TYPE_OCTETS:
2279         case PW_TYPE_ABINARY:
2280                 /* nothing more to do */
2281                 break;
2282
2283         case PW_TYPE_BYTE:
2284                 if (vp->length != 1) goto raw;
2285
2286                 vp->vp_integer = vp->vp_octets[0];
2287                 break;
2288
2289
2290         case PW_TYPE_SHORT:
2291                 if (vp->length != 2) goto raw;
2292
2293                 vp->vp_integer = (vp->vp_octets[0] << 8) | vp->vp_octets[1];
2294                 break;
2295
2296         case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
2297                 if (vp->length != 4) goto raw;
2298
2299                 memcpy(&vp->vp_integer, vp->vp_octets, 4);
2300                 vp->vp_integer = ntohl(vp->vp_integer);
2301
2302                 if (vp->flags.has_tag) vp->vp_integer &= 0x00ffffff;
2303
2304                 /*
2305                  *      Try to get named VALUEs
2306                  */
2307                 {
2308                         DICT_VALUE *dval;
2309                         dval = dict_valbyattr(vp->attribute,
2310                                               vp->vp_integer);
2311                         if (dval) {
2312                                 strlcpy(vp->vp_strvalue,
2313                                         dval->name,
2314                                         sizeof(vp->vp_strvalue));
2315                         }
2316                 }
2317                 break;
2318
2319         case PW_TYPE_DATE:
2320                 if (vp->length != 4) goto raw;
2321
2322                 memcpy(&vp->vp_date, vp->vp_octets, 4);
2323                 vp->vp_date = ntohl(vp->vp_date);
2324                 break;
2325
2326
2327         case PW_TYPE_IPADDR:
2328                 if (vp->length != 4) goto raw;
2329
2330                 memcpy(&vp->vp_ipaddr, vp->vp_octets, 4);
2331                 break;
2332
2333                 /*
2334                  *      IPv6 interface ID is 8 octets long.
2335                  */
2336         case PW_TYPE_IFID:
2337                 if (vp->length != 8) goto raw;
2338                 /* vp->vp_ifid == vp->vp_octets */
2339                 break;
2340
2341                 /*
2342                  *      IPv6 addresses are 16 octets long
2343                  */
2344         case PW_TYPE_IPV6ADDR:
2345                 if (vp->length != 16) goto raw;
2346                 /* vp->vp_ipv6addr == vp->vp_octets */
2347                 break;
2348
2349                 /*
2350                  *      IPv6 prefixes are 2 to 18 octets long.
2351                  *
2352                  *      RFC 3162: The first octet is unused.
2353                  *      The second is the length of the prefix
2354                  *      the rest are the prefix data.
2355                  *
2356                  *      The prefix length can have value 0 to 128.
2357                  */
2358         case PW_TYPE_IPV6PREFIX:
2359                 if (vp->length < 2 || vp->length > 18) goto raw;
2360                 if (vp->vp_octets[1] > 128) goto raw;
2361
2362                 /*
2363                  *      FIXME: double-check that
2364                  *      (vp->vp_octets[1] >> 3) matches vp->length + 2
2365                  */
2366                 if (vp->length < 18) {
2367                         memset(vp->vp_octets + vp->length, 0,
2368                                18 - vp->length);
2369                 }
2370                 break;
2371
2372         case PW_TYPE_SIGNED:
2373                 if (vp->length != 4) goto raw;
2374
2375                 /*
2376                  *      Overload vp_integer for ntohl, which takes
2377                  *      uint32_t, not int32_t
2378                  */
2379                 memcpy(&vp->vp_integer, vp->vp_octets, 4);
2380                 vp->vp_integer = ntohl(vp->vp_integer);
2381                 memcpy(&vp->vp_signed, &vp->vp_integer, 4);
2382                 break;
2383
2384         case PW_TYPE_TLV:
2385                 vp->length = length;
2386                 vp->vp_tlv = malloc(length);
2387                 if (!vp->vp_tlv) {
2388                         pairfree(&vp);
2389                         fr_strerror_printf("No memory");
2390                         return NULL;
2391                 }
2392                 memcpy(vp->vp_tlv, data, length);
2393                 break;
2394
2395         case PW_TYPE_COMBO_IP:
2396                 if (vp->length == 4) {
2397                         vp->type = PW_TYPE_IPADDR;
2398                         memcpy(&vp->vp_ipaddr, vp->vp_octets, 4);
2399                         break;
2400
2401                 } else if (vp->length == 16) {
2402                         vp->type = PW_TYPE_IPV6ADDR;
2403                         /* vp->vp_ipv6addr == vp->vp_octets */
2404                         break;
2405
2406                 }
2407                 /* FALL-THROUGH */
2408
2409         default:
2410         raw:
2411                 vp->type = PW_TYPE_OCTETS;
2412                 vp->length = length;
2413                 memcpy(vp->vp_octets, data, length);
2414
2415
2416                 /*
2417                  *      Ensure there's no encryption or tag stuff,
2418                  *      we just pass the attribute as-is.
2419                  */
2420                 memset(&vp->flags, 0, sizeof(vp->flags));
2421         }
2422
2423         return vp;
2424 }
2425
2426 static void rad_sortvp(VALUE_PAIR **head)
2427 {
2428         int swapped;
2429         VALUE_PAIR *vp, **tail;
2430
2431         /*
2432          *      Walk over the VP's, sorting them in order.  Did I
2433          *      mention that I hate WiMAX continuations?
2434          *
2435          *      And bubble sort!  WTF is up with that?
2436          */
2437         do {
2438                 swapped = 0;
2439                 tail = head;
2440                 while (*tail) {
2441                         vp = *tail;
2442                         if (!vp->next) break;
2443
2444                         if (vp->attribute > vp->next->attribute) {
2445                                 *tail = vp->next;
2446                                 vp->next = (*tail)->next;
2447                                 (*tail)->next = vp;
2448                                 swapped = 1;
2449                         }
2450                         tail = &(vp->next);
2451                 }
2452         } while (swapped);
2453 }
2454
2455
2456 /*
2457  *      Walk the packet, looking for continuations of this attribute.
2458  *
2459  *      This is (worst-case) O(N^2) in the number of RADIUS
2460  *      attributes.  That happens only when perverse clients create
2461  *      continued attributes, AND separate the fragmented portions
2462  *      with a lot of other attributes.
2463  *
2464  *      Sane clients should put the fragments next to each other, in
2465  *      which case this is O(N), in the number of fragments.
2466  */
2467 static uint8_t *rad_coalesce(unsigned int attribute, size_t length,
2468                              uint8_t *data,
2469                              size_t packet_length, size_t *ptlv_length)
2470
2471 {
2472         uint32_t lvalue;
2473         size_t tlv_length = length;
2474         uint8_t *ptr, *tlv, *tlv_data;
2475
2476         for (ptr = data + length;
2477              ptr != (data + packet_length);
2478              ptr += ptr[1]) {
2479                 if ((ptr[0] != PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) ||
2480                     (ptr[1] < (2 + 4 + 3)) || /* WiMAX VSA with continuation */
2481                     (ptr[2] != 0) || (ptr[3] != 0)) { /* our requirement */
2482                         continue;
2483                 }
2484
2485                 memcpy(&lvalue, ptr + 2, 4); /* Vendor Id */
2486                 lvalue = ntohl(lvalue);
2487                 lvalue <<= 16;
2488                 lvalue |= ptr[2 + 4]; /* add in VSA number */
2489                 if (lvalue != attribute) continue;
2490
2491                 /*
2492                  *      If the vendor-length is too small, it's badly
2493                  *      formed, so we stop.
2494                  */
2495                 if ((ptr[2 + 4 + 1]) < 3) break;
2496
2497                 tlv_length += ptr[2 + 4 + 1] - 3;
2498                 if ((ptr[2 + 4 + 1 + 1] & 0x80) == 0) break;
2499         }
2500
2501         tlv = tlv_data = malloc(tlv_length);
2502         if (!tlv_data) return NULL;
2503
2504         memcpy(tlv, data, length);
2505         tlv += length;
2506
2507         /*
2508          *      Now we walk the list again, copying the data over to
2509          *      our newly created memory.
2510          */
2511         for (ptr = data + length;
2512              ptr != (data + packet_length);
2513              ptr += ptr[1]) {
2514                 int this_length;
2515
2516                 if ((ptr[0] != PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) ||
2517                     (ptr[1] < (2 + 4 + 3)) || /* WiMAX VSA with continuation */
2518                     (ptr[2] != 0) || (ptr[3] != 0)) { /* our requirement */
2519                         continue;
2520                 }
2521
2522                 memcpy(&lvalue, ptr + 2, 4);
2523                 lvalue = ntohl(lvalue);
2524                 lvalue <<= 16;
2525                 lvalue |= ptr[2 + 4];
2526                 if (lvalue != attribute) continue;
2527
2528                 /*
2529                  *      If the vendor-length is too small, it's badly
2530                  *      formed, so we stop.
2531                  */
2532                 if ((ptr[2 + 4 + 1]) < 3) break;
2533
2534                 this_length = ptr[2 + 4 + 1] - 3;
2535                 memcpy(tlv, ptr + 2 + 4 + 3, this_length);
2536                 tlv += this_length;
2537
2538                 ptr[2 + 4] = 0; /* What a hack! */
2539                 if ((ptr[2 + 4 + 1 + 1] & 0x80) == 0) break;
2540         }
2541
2542         *ptlv_length = tlv_length;
2543         return tlv_data;
2544 }
2545
2546 /*
2547  *      Start at the *data* portion of a continued attribute.  search
2548  *      through the rest of the attributes to find a matching one, and
2549  *      add it's contents to our contents.
2550  */
2551 static VALUE_PAIR *rad_continuation2vp(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
2552                                        const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
2553                                        const char *secret, int attribute,
2554                                        int length, /* CANNOT be zero */
2555                                        uint8_t *data, size_t packet_length,
2556                                        int flag, DICT_ATTR *da)
2557 {
2558         size_t tlv_length, left;
2559         uint8_t *ptr;
2560         uint8_t *tlv_data;
2561         VALUE_PAIR *vp, *head, **tail;
2562
2563         /*
2564          *      Ensure we have data that hasn't been split across
2565          *      multiple attributes.
2566          */
2567         if (flag) {
2568                 tlv_data = rad_coalesce(attribute, length,
2569                                         data, packet_length, &tlv_length);
2570                 if (!tlv_data) return NULL;
2571         } else {
2572                 tlv_data = data;
2573                 tlv_length = length;
2574         }
2575
2576         /*
2577          *      Non-TLV types cannot be continued across multiple
2578          *      attributes.  This is true even of keys that are
2579          *      encrypted with the tunnel-password method.  The spec
2580          *      says that they can be continued... but also that the
2581          *      keys are 160 bits, which means that they CANNOT be
2582          *      continued.  <sigh>
2583          *
2584          *      Note that we don't check "flag" here.  The calling
2585          *      code ensures that
2586          */
2587         if (!da || (da->type != PW_TYPE_TLV)) {
2588         not_well_formed:
2589                 if (tlv_data == data) { /* true if we had 'goto' */
2590                         tlv_data = malloc(tlv_length);
2591                         if (!tlv_data) return NULL;
2592                         memcpy(tlv_data, data, tlv_length);
2593                 }
2594
2595                 vp = paircreate(attribute, PW_TYPE_OCTETS);
2596                 if (!vp) return NULL;
2597
2598                 vp->type = PW_TYPE_TLV;
2599                 vp->flags.encrypt = FLAG_ENCRYPT_NONE;
2600                 vp->flags.has_tag = 0;
2601                 vp->flags.is_tlv = 0;
2602                 vp->vp_tlv = tlv_data;
2603                 vp->length = tlv_length;
2604                 return vp;
2605         } /* else it WAS a TLV, go decode the sub-tlv's */
2606
2607         /*
2608          *      Now (sigh) we walk over the TLV, seeing if it is
2609          *      well-formed.
2610          */
2611         left = tlv_length;
2612         for (ptr = tlv_data;
2613              ptr != (tlv_data + tlv_length);
2614              ptr += ptr[1]) {
2615                 if ((left < 2) ||
2616                     (ptr[1] < 2) ||
2617                     (ptr[1] > left)) {
2618                         goto not_well_formed;
2619                 }
2620                 left -= ptr[1];
2621         }
2622
2623         /*
2624          *      Now we walk over the TLV *again*, creating sub-tlv's.
2625          */
2626         head = NULL;
2627         tail = &head;
2628
2629         for (ptr = tlv_data;
2630              ptr != (tlv_data + tlv_length);
2631              ptr += ptr[1]) {
2632                 vp = paircreate(attribute | (ptr[0] << 8), PW_TYPE_OCTETS);
2633                 if (!vp) {
2634                         pairfree(&head);
2635                         goto not_well_formed;
2636                 }
2637
2638                 if (!data2vp(packet, original, secret,
2639                              ptr[0], ptr[1] - 2, ptr + 2, vp)) {
2640                         pairfree(&head);
2641                         goto not_well_formed;
2642                 }
2643
2644                 *tail = vp;
2645                 tail = &(vp->next);
2646         }
2647
2648         /*
2649          *      TLV's MAY be continued, but sometimes they're not.
2650          */
2651         if (tlv_data != data) free(tlv_data);
2652
2653         if (head->next) rad_sortvp(&head);
2654
2655         return head;
2656 }
2657
2658
2659 /*
2660  *      Parse a RADIUS attribute into a data structure.
2661  */
2662 VALUE_PAIR *rad_attr2vp(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
2663                         const char *secret, int attribute, int length,
2664                         const uint8_t *data)
2665 {
2666         VALUE_PAIR *vp;
2667
2668         vp = paircreate(attribute, PW_TYPE_OCTETS);
2669         if (!vp) return NULL;
2670
2671         return data2vp(packet, original, secret, attribute, length, data, vp);
2672 }
2673
2674
2675 /*
2676  *      Calculate/check digest, and decode radius attributes.
2677  *      Returns:
2678  *      -1 on decoding error
2679  *      0 on success
2680  */
2681 int rad_decode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET *original,
2682                const char *secret)
2683 {
2684         uint32_t                lvalue;
2685         uint32_t                vendorcode;
2686         VALUE_PAIR              **tail;
2687         VALUE_PAIR              *pair;
2688         uint8_t                 *ptr, *vsa_ptr;
2689         int                     packet_length;
2690         int                     attribute;
2691         int                     attrlen;
2692         int                     vendorlen;
2693         radius_packet_t         *hdr;
2694         int                     vsa_tlen, vsa_llen, vsa_offset;
2695         DICT_VENDOR             *dv = NULL;
2696         int                     num_attributes = 0;
2697
2698         /*
2699          *      Extract attribute-value pairs
2700          */
2701         hdr = (radius_packet_t *)packet->data;
2702         ptr = hdr->data;
2703         packet_length = packet->data_len - AUTH_HDR_LEN;
2704
2705         /*
2706          *      There may be VP's already in the packet.  Don't
2707          *      destroy them.
2708          */
2709         for (tail = &packet->vps; *tail != NULL; tail = &((*tail)->next)) {
2710                 /* nothing */
2711         }
2712
2713         vendorcode = 0;
2714         vendorlen  = 0;
2715         vsa_tlen = vsa_llen = 1;
2716         vsa_offset = 0;
2717
2718         /*
2719          *      We have to read at least two bytes.
2720          *
2721          *      rad_recv() above ensures that this is OK.
2722          */
2723         while (packet_length > 0) {
2724                 attribute = -1;
2725                 attrlen = -1;
2726
2727                 /*
2728                  *      Normal attribute, handle it like normal.
2729                  */
2730                 if (vendorcode == 0) {
2731                         /*
2732                          *      No room to read attr/length,
2733                          *      or bad attribute, or attribute is
2734                          *      too short, or attribute is too long,
2735                          *      stop processing the packet.
2736                          */
2737                         if ((packet_length < 2) ||
2738                             (ptr[0] == 0) ||  (ptr[1] < 2) ||
2739                             (ptr[1] > packet_length)) break;
2740
2741                         attribute = *ptr++;
2742                         attrlen   = *ptr++;
2743
2744                         attrlen -= 2;
2745                         packet_length  -= 2;
2746
2747                         if (attribute != PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) goto create_pair;
2748
2749                         /*
2750                          *      No vendor code, or ONLY vendor code.
2751                          */
2752                         if (attrlen <= 4) goto create_pair;
2753
2754                         vendorlen = 0;
2755                 }
2756
2757                 /*
2758                  *      Handle Vendor-Specific
2759                  */
2760                 if (vendorlen == 0) {
2761                         uint8_t *subptr;
2762                         int sublen;
2763                         int myvendor;
2764
2765                         /*
2766                          *      attrlen was checked above.
2767                          */
2768                         memcpy(&lvalue, ptr, 4);
2769                         myvendor = ntohl(lvalue);
2770
2771                         /*
2772                          *      Zero isn't allowed.
2773                          */
2774                         if (myvendor == 0) goto create_pair;
2775
2776                         /*
2777                          *      This is an implementation issue.
2778                          *      We currently pack vendor into the upper
2779                          *      16 bits of a 32-bit attribute number,
2780                          *      so we can't handle vendor numbers larger
2781                          *      than 16 bits.
2782                          */
2783                         if (myvendor > 65535) goto create_pair;
2784
2785                         vsa_tlen = vsa_llen = 1;
2786                         vsa_offset = 0;
2787                         dv = dict_vendorbyvalue(myvendor);
2788                         if (dv) {
2789                                 vsa_tlen = dv->type;
2790                                 vsa_llen = dv->length;
2791                                 if (dv->flags) vsa_offset = 1;
2792                         }
2793
2794                         /*
2795                          *      Sweep through the list of VSA's,
2796                          *      seeing if they exactly fill the
2797                          *      outer Vendor-Specific attribute.
2798                          *
2799                          *      If not, create a raw Vendor-Specific.
2800                          */
2801                         subptr = ptr + 4;
2802                         sublen = attrlen - 4;
2803
2804                         /*
2805                          *      See if we can parse it.
2806                          */
2807                         do {
2808                                 int myattr = 0;
2809
2810                                 /*
2811                                  *      Not enough room for one more
2812                                  *      attribute.  Die!
2813                                  */
2814                                 if (sublen < (vsa_tlen + vsa_llen + vsa_offset)) goto create_pair;
2815
2816                                 /*
2817                                  *      Ensure that the attribute number
2818                                  *      is OK.
2819                                  */
2820                                 switch (vsa_tlen) {
2821                                 case 1:
2822                                         myattr = subptr[0];
2823                                         break;
2824
2825                                 case 2:
2826                                         myattr = (subptr[0] << 8) | subptr[1];
2827                                         break;
2828
2829                                 case 4:
2830                                         if ((subptr[0] != 0) ||
2831                                             (subptr[1] != 0)) goto create_pair;
2832
2833                                         myattr = (subptr[2] << 8) | subptr[3];
2834                                         break;
2835
2836                                         /*
2837                                          *      Our dictionary is broken.
2838                                          */
2839                                 default:
2840                                         goto create_pair;
2841                                 }
2842
2843                                 switch (vsa_llen) {
2844                                 case 0:
2845                                         attribute = (myvendor << 16) | myattr;
2846                                         ptr += 4 + vsa_tlen;
2847                                         attrlen -= (4 + vsa_tlen);
2848                                         packet_length -= 4 + vsa_tlen;
2849                                         goto create_pair;
2850
2851                                 case 1:
2852                                         if (subptr[vsa_tlen] < (vsa_tlen + vsa_llen + vsa_offset))
2853                                                 goto create_pair;
2854
2855                                         if (subptr[vsa_tlen] > sublen)
2856                                                 goto create_pair;
2857
2858                                         /*
2859                                          *      WiMAX: 0bCrrrrrrr
2860                                          *      Reserved bits MUST be
2861                                          *      zero.
2862                                          */
2863                                         if (vsa_offset &&
2864                                             ((subptr[vsa_tlen + vsa_llen] & 0x7f) != 0))
2865                                                 goto create_pair;
2866
2867                                         sublen -= subptr[vsa_tlen];
2868                                         subptr += subptr[vsa_tlen];
2869                                         break;
2870
2871                                 case 2:
2872                                         if (subptr[vsa_tlen] != 0) goto create_pair;
2873                                         if (subptr[vsa_tlen + 1] < (vsa_tlen + vsa_llen))
2874                                                 goto create_pair;
2875                                         if (subptr[vsa_tlen + 1] > sublen)
2876                                                 goto create_pair;
2877                                         sublen -= subptr[vsa_tlen + 1];
2878                                         subptr += subptr[vsa_tlen + 1];
2879                                         break;
2880
2881                                         /*
2882                                          *      Our dictionaries are
2883                                          *      broken.
2884                                          */
2885                                 default:
2886                                         goto create_pair;
2887                                 }
2888                         } while (sublen > 0);
2889
2890                         vendorcode = myvendor;
2891                         vendorlen = attrlen - 4;
2892                         packet_length -= 4;
2893
2894                         ptr += 4;
2895                 }
2896
2897                 /*
2898                  *      attrlen is the length of this attribute.
2899                  *      total_len is the length of the encompassing
2900                  *      attribute.
2901                  */
2902                 switch (vsa_tlen) {
2903                 case 1:
2904                         attribute = ptr[0];
2905                         break;
2906
2907                 case 2:
2908                         attribute = (ptr[0] << 8) | ptr[1];
2909                         break;
2910
2911                 default:        /* can't hit this. */
2912                         return -1;
2913                 }
2914                 attribute |= (vendorcode << 16);
2915                 vsa_ptr = ptr;
2916                 ptr += vsa_tlen;
2917
2918                 switch (vsa_llen) {
2919                 case 1:
2920                         attrlen = ptr[0] - (vsa_tlen + vsa_llen + vsa_offset);
2921                         break;
2922
2923                 case 2:
2924                         attrlen = ptr[1] - (vsa_tlen + vsa_llen);
2925                         break;
2926
2927                 default:        /* can't hit this. */
2928                         return -1;
2929                 }
2930
2931                 ptr += vsa_llen + vsa_offset;
2932                 vendorlen -= vsa_tlen + vsa_llen + vsa_offset + attrlen;
2933                 if (vendorlen == 0) vendorcode = 0;
2934                 packet_length -= (vsa_tlen + vsa_llen + vsa_offset);
2935
2936                 /*
2937                  *      Ignore VSAs that have no data.
2938                  */
2939                 if (attrlen == 0) goto next;
2940
2941                 /*
2942                  *      WiMAX attributes of type 0 are ignored.  They
2943                  *      are a secret flag to us that the attribute has
2944                  *      already been dealt with.
2945                  */
2946                 if (attribute == 0x60b50000) goto next;
2947
2948                 if (vsa_offset) {
2949                         DICT_ATTR *da;
2950
2951                         da = dict_attrbyvalue(attribute);
2952
2953                         /*
2954                          *      If it's NOT continued, AND we know
2955                          *      about it, AND it's not a TLV, we can
2956                          *      create a normal pair.
2957                          */
2958                         if (((vsa_ptr[2] & 0x80) == 0) &&
2959                             da && (da->type != PW_TYPE_TLV)) goto create_pair;
2960
2961                         /*
2962                          *      Else it IS continued, or it's a TLV.
2963                          *      Go do a lot of work to find the stuff.
2964                          */
2965                         pair = rad_continuation2vp(packet, original, secret,
2966                                                    attribute, attrlen, ptr,
2967                                                    packet_length,
2968                                                    ((vsa_ptr[2] & 0x80) != 0),
2969                                                    da);
2970                         goto created_pair;
2971                 }
2972
2973                 /*
2974                  *      Create the attribute, setting the default type
2975                  *      to 'octets'.  If the type in the dictionary
2976                  *      is different, then the dictionary type will
2977                  *      over-ride this one.
2978                  *
2979                  *      If the attribute has no data, then discard it.
2980                  *
2981                  *      Unless it's CUI.  Damn you, CUI!
2982                  */
2983         create_pair:
2984                 if (!attrlen &&
2985                     (attribute != PW_CHARGEABLE_USER_IDENTITY)) goto next;
2986
2987                 pair = rad_attr2vp(packet, original, secret,
2988                                    attribute, attrlen, ptr);
2989                 if (!pair) {
2990                         pairfree(&packet->vps);
2991                         fr_strerror_printf("out of memory");
2992                         return -1;
2993                 }
2994
2995         created_pair:
2996                 *tail = pair;
2997                 while (pair) {
2998                         num_attributes++;
2999                         debug_pair(pair);
3000                         tail = &pair->next;
3001                         pair = pair->next;
3002                 }
3003
3004                 /*
3005                  *      VSA's may not have been counted properly in
3006                  *      rad_packet_ok() above, as it is hard to count
3007                  *      then without using the dictionary.  We
3008                  *      therefore enforce the limits here, too.
3009                  */
3010                 if ((fr_max_attributes > 0) &&
3011                     (num_attributes > fr_max_attributes)) {
3012                         char host_ipaddr[128];
3013
3014                         pairfree(&packet->vps);
3015                         fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Possible DoS attack from host %s: Too many attributes in request (received %d, max %d are allowed).",
3016                                    inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
3017                                              &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
3018                                              host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
3019                                    num_attributes, fr_max_attributes);
3020                         return -1;
3021                 }
3022
3023         next:
3024                 ptr += attrlen;
3025                 packet_length -= attrlen;
3026         }
3027
3028         /*
3029          *      Merge information from the outside world into our
3030          *      random pool.
3031          */
3032         fr_rand_seed(packet->data, AUTH_HDR_LEN);
3033
3034         return 0;
3035 }
3036
3037
3038 /*
3039  *      Encode password.
3040  *
3041  *      We assume that the passwd buffer passed is big enough.
3042  *      RFC2138 says the password is max 128 chars, so the size
3043  *      of the passwd buffer must be at least 129 characters.
3044  *      Preferably it's just MAX_STRING_LEN.
3045  *
3046  *      int *pwlen is updated to the new length of the encrypted
3047  *      password - a multiple of 16 bytes.
3048  */
3049 int rad_pwencode(char *passwd, size_t *pwlen, const char *secret,
3050                  const uint8_t *vector)
3051 {
3052         FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
3053         uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
3054         int     i, n, secretlen;
3055         int     len;
3056
3057         /*
3058          *      RFC maximum is 128 bytes.
3059          *
3060          *      If length is zero, pad it out with zeros.
3061          *
3062          *      If the length isn't aligned to 16 bytes,
3063          *      zero out the extra data.
3064          */
3065         len = *pwlen;
3066
3067         if (len > 128) len = 128;
3068
3069         if (len == 0) {
3070                 memset(passwd, 0, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
3071                 len = AUTH_PASS_LEN;
3072         } else if ((len % AUTH_PASS_LEN) != 0) {
3073                 memset(&passwd[len], 0, AUTH_PASS_LEN - (len % AUTH_PASS_LEN));
3074                 len += AUTH_PASS_LEN - (len % AUTH_PASS_LEN);
3075         }
3076         *pwlen = len;
3077
3078         /*
3079          *      Use the secret to setup the decryption digest
3080          */
3081         secretlen = strlen(secret);
3082
3083         fr_MD5Init(&context);
3084         fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret, secretlen);
3085         old = context;          /* save intermediate work */
3086
3087         /*
3088          *      Encrypt it in place.  Don't bother checking
3089          *      len, as we've ensured above that it's OK.
3090          */
3091         for (n = 0; n < len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
3092                 if (n == 0) {
3093                         fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
3094                         fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
3095                 } else {
3096                         context = old;
3097                         fr_MD5Update(&context,
3098                                      (uint8_t *) passwd + n - AUTH_PASS_LEN,
3099                                      AUTH_PASS_LEN);
3100                         fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
3101                 }
3102
3103                 for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
3104                         passwd[i + n] ^= digest[i];
3105                 }
3106         }
3107
3108         return 0;
3109 }
3110
3111 /*
3112  *      Decode password.
3113  */
3114 int rad_pwdecode(char *passwd, size_t pwlen, const char *secret,
3115                  const uint8_t *vector)
3116 {
3117         FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
3118         uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
3119         int     i;
3120         size_t  n, secretlen;
3121
3122         /*
3123          *      The RFC's say that the maximum is 128.
3124          *      The buffer we're putting it into above is 254, so
3125          *      we don't need to do any length checking.
3126          */
3127         if (pwlen > 128) pwlen = 128;
3128
3129         /*
3130          *      Catch idiots.
3131          */
3132         if (pwlen == 0) goto done;
3133
3134         /*
3135          *      Use the secret to setup the decryption digest
3136          */
3137         secretlen = strlen(secret);
3138
3139         fr_MD5Init(&context);
3140         fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret, secretlen);
3141         old = context;          /* save intermediate work */
3142
3143         /*
3144          *      The inverse of the code above.
3145          */
3146         for (n = 0; n < pwlen; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
3147                 if (n == 0) {
3148                         fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
3149                         fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
3150
3151                         context = old;
3152                         if (pwlen > AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
3153                                 fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t *) passwd,
3154                                              AUTH_PASS_LEN);
3155                         }
3156                 } else {
3157                         fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
3158
3159                         context = old;
3160                         if (pwlen > (n + AUTH_PASS_LEN)) {
3161                                 fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t *) passwd + n,
3162                                              AUTH_PASS_LEN);
3163                         }
3164                 }
3165
3166                 for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
3167                         passwd[i + n] ^= digest[i];
3168                 }
3169         }
3170
3171  done:
3172         passwd[pwlen] = '\0';
3173         return strlen(passwd);
3174 }
3175
3176
3177 /*
3178  *      Encode Tunnel-Password attributes when sending them out on the wire.
3179  *
3180  *      int *pwlen is updated to the new length of the encrypted
3181  *      password - a multiple of 16 bytes.
3182  *
3183  *      This is per RFC-2868 which adds a two char SALT to the initial intermediate
3184  *      value MD5 hash.
3185  */
3186 int rad_tunnel_pwencode(char *passwd, size_t *pwlen, const char *secret,
3187                         const uint8_t *vector)
3188 {
3189         uint8_t buffer[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN + MAX_STRING_LEN + 3];
3190         unsigned char   digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
3191         char*   salt;
3192         int     i, n, secretlen;
3193         unsigned len, n2;
3194
3195         len = *pwlen;
3196
3197         if (len > 127) len = 127;
3198
3199         /*
3200          * Shift the password 3 positions right to place a salt and original
3201          * length, tag will be added automatically on packet send
3202          */
3203         for (n=len ; n>=0 ; n--) passwd[n+3] = passwd[n];
3204         salt = passwd;
3205         passwd += 2;
3206         /*
3207          * save original password length as first password character;
3208          */
3209         *passwd = len;
3210         len += 1;
3211
3212
3213         /*
3214          *      Generate salt.  The RFC's say:
3215          *
3216          *      The high bit of salt[0] must be set, each salt in a
3217          *      packet should be unique, and they should be random
3218          *
3219          *      So, we set the high bit, add in a counter, and then
3220          *      add in some CSPRNG data.  should be OK..
3221          */
3222         salt[0] = (0x80 | ( ((salt_offset++) & 0x0f) << 3) |
3223                    (fr_rand() & 0x07));
3224         salt[1] = fr_rand();
3225
3226         /*
3227          *      Padd password to multiple of AUTH_PASS_LEN bytes.
3228          */
3229         n = len % AUTH_PASS_LEN;
3230         if (n) {
3231                 n = AUTH_PASS_LEN - n;
3232                 for (; n > 0; n--, len++)
3233                         passwd[len] = 0;
3234         }
3235         /* set new password length */
3236         *pwlen = len + 2;
3237
3238         /*
3239          *      Use the secret to setup the decryption digest
3240          */
3241         secretlen = strlen(secret);
3242         memcpy(buffer, secret, secretlen);
3243
3244         for (n2 = 0; n2 < len; n2+=AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
3245                 if (!n2) {
3246                         memcpy(buffer + secretlen, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
3247                         memcpy(buffer + secretlen + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN, salt, 2);
3248                         fr_md5_calc(digest, buffer, secretlen + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN + 2);
3249                 } else {
3250                         memcpy(buffer + secretlen, passwd + n2 - AUTH_PASS_LEN, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
3251                         fr_md5_calc(digest, buffer, secretlen + AUTH_PASS_LEN);
3252                 }
3253
3254                 for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
3255                         passwd[i + n2] ^= digest[i];
3256                 }
3257         }
3258         passwd[n2] = 0;
3259         return 0;
3260 }
3261
3262 /*
3263  *      Decode Tunnel-Password encrypted attributes.
3264  *
3265  *      Defined in RFC-2868, this uses a two char SALT along with the
3266  *      initial intermediate value, to differentiate it from the
3267  *      above.
3268  */
3269 int rad_tunnel_pwdecode(uint8_t *passwd, size_t *pwlen, const char *secret,
3270                         const uint8_t *vector)
3271 {
3272         FR_MD5_CTX  context, old;
3273         uint8_t         digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
3274         int             secretlen;
3275         unsigned        i, n, len, reallen;
3276
3277         len = *pwlen;
3278
3279         /*
3280          *      We need at least a salt.
3281          */
3282         if (len < 2) {
3283                 fr_strerror_printf("tunnel password is too short");
3284                 return -1;
3285         }
3286
3287         /*
3288          *      There's a salt, but no password.  Or, there's a salt
3289          *      and a 'data_len' octet.  It's wrong, but at least we
3290          *      can figure out what it means: the password is empty.
3291          *
3292          *      Note that this means we ignore the 'data_len' field,
3293          *      if the attribute length tells us that there's no
3294          *      more data.  So the 'data_len' field may be wrong,
3295          *      but that's ok...
3296          */
3297         if (len <= 3) {
3298                 passwd[0] = 0;
3299                 *pwlen = 0;
3300                 return 0;
3301         }
3302
3303         len -= 2;               /* discount the salt */
3304
3305         /*
3306          *      Use the secret to setup the decryption digest
3307          */
3308         secretlen = strlen(secret);
3309
3310         fr_MD5Init(&context);
3311         fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret, secretlen);
3312         old = context;          /* save intermediate work */
3313
3314         /*
3315          *      Set up the initial key:
3316          *
3317          *       b(1) = MD5(secret + vector + salt)
3318          */
3319         fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
3320         fr_MD5Update(&context, passwd, 2);
3321
3322         reallen = 0;
3323         for (n = 0; n < len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
3324                 int base = 0;
3325
3326                 if (n == 0) {
3327                         fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
3328
3329                         context = old;
3330
3331                         /*
3332                          *      A quick check: decrypt the first octet
3333                          *      of the password, which is the
3334                          *      'data_len' field.  Ensure it's sane.
3335                          */
3336                         reallen = passwd[2] ^ digest[0];
3337                         if (reallen >= len) {
3338                                 fr_strerror_printf("tunnel password is too long for the attribute");
3339                                 return -1;
3340                         }
3341
3342                         fr_MD5Update(&context, passwd + 2, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
3343
3344                         base = 1;
3345                 } else {
3346                         fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
3347
3348                         context = old;
3349                         fr_MD5Update(&context, passwd + n + 2, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
3350                 }
3351
3352                 for (i = base; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
3353                         passwd[n + i - 1] = passwd[n + i + 2] ^ digest[i];
3354                 }
3355         }
3356
3357         /*
3358          *      See make_tunnel_password, above.
3359          */
3360         if (reallen > 239) reallen = 239;
3361
3362         *pwlen = reallen;
3363         passwd[reallen] = 0;
3364
3365         return reallen;
3366 }
3367
3368 /*
3369  *      Encode a CHAP password
3370  *
3371  *      FIXME: might not work with Ascend because
3372  *      we use vp->length, and Ascend gear likes
3373  *      to send an extra '\0' in the string!
3374  */
3375 int rad_chap_encode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, uint8_t *output, int id,
3376                     VALUE_PAIR *password)
3377 {
3378         int             i;
3379         uint8_t         *ptr;
3380         uint8_t         string[MAX_STRING_LEN * 2 + 1];
3381         VALUE_PAIR      *challenge;
3382
3383         /*
3384          *      Sanity check the input parameters
3385          */
3386         if ((packet == NULL) || (password == NULL)) {
3387                 return -1;
3388         }
3389
3390         /*
3391          *      Note that the password VP can be EITHER
3392          *      a User-Password attribute (from a check-item list),
3393          *      or a CHAP-Password attribute (the client asking
3394          *      the library to encode it).
3395          */
3396
3397         i = 0;
3398         ptr = string;
3399         *ptr++ = id;
3400
3401         i++;
3402         memcpy(ptr, password->vp_strvalue, password->length);
3403         ptr += password->length;
3404         i += password->length;
3405
3406         /*
3407          *      Use Chap-Challenge pair if present,
3408          *      Request-Authenticator otherwise.
3409          */
3410         challenge = pairfind(packet->vps, PW_CHAP_CHALLENGE);
3411         if (challenge) {
3412                 memcpy(ptr, challenge->vp_strvalue, challenge->length);
3413                 i += challenge->length;
3414         } else {
3415                 memcpy(ptr, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
3416                 i += AUTH_VECTOR_LEN;
3417         }
3418
3419         *output = id;
3420         fr_md5_calc((uint8_t *)output + 1, (uint8_t *)string, i);
3421
3422         return 0;
3423 }
3424
3425
3426 /*
3427  *      Seed the random number generator.
3428  *
3429  *      May be called any number of times.
3430  */
3431 void fr_rand_seed(const void *data, size_t size)
3432 {
3433         uint32_t hash;
3434
3435         /*
3436          *      Ensure that the pool is initialized.
3437          */
3438         if (!fr_rand_initialized) {
3439                 int fd;
3440
3441                 memset(&fr_rand_pool, 0, sizeof(fr_rand_pool));
3442
3443                 fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
3444                 if (fd >= 0) {
3445                         size_t total;
3446                         ssize_t this;
3447
3448                         total = this = 0;
3449                         while (total < sizeof(fr_rand_pool.randrsl)) {
3450                                 this = read(fd, fr_rand_pool.randrsl,
3451                                             sizeof(fr_rand_pool.randrsl) - total);
3452                                 if ((this < 0) && (errno != EINTR)) break;
3453                                 if (this > 0) total += this;
3454                         }
3455                         close(fd);
3456                 } else {
3457                         fr_rand_pool.randrsl[0] = fd;
3458                         fr_rand_pool.randrsl[1] = time(NULL);
3459                         fr_rand_pool.randrsl[2] = errno;
3460                 }
3461
3462                 fr_randinit(&fr_rand_pool, 1);
3463                 fr_rand_pool.randcnt = 0;
3464                 fr_rand_initialized = 1;
3465         }
3466
3467         if (!data) return;
3468
3469         /*
3470          *      Hash the user data
3471          */
3472         hash = fr_rand();
3473         if (!hash) hash = fr_rand();
3474         hash = fr_hash_update(data, size, hash);
3475
3476         fr_rand_pool.randmem[fr_rand_pool.randcnt] ^= hash;
3477 }
3478
3479
3480 /*
3481  *      Return a 32-bit random number.
3482  */
3483 uint32_t fr_rand(void)
3484 {
3485         uint32_t num;
3486
3487         /*
3488          *      Ensure that the pool is initialized.
3489          */
3490         if (!fr_rand_initialized) {
3491                 fr_rand_seed(NULL, 0);
3492         }
3493
3494         num = fr_rand_pool.randrsl[fr_rand_pool.randcnt++];
3495         if (fr_rand_pool.randcnt >= 256) {
3496                 fr_rand_pool.randcnt = 0;
3497                 fr_isaac(&fr_rand_pool);
3498         }
3499
3500         return num;
3501 }
3502
3503
3504 /*
3505  *      Allocate a new RADIUS_PACKET
3506  */
3507 RADIUS_PACKET *rad_alloc(int newvector)
3508 {
3509         RADIUS_PACKET   *rp;
3510
3511         if ((rp = malloc(sizeof(RADIUS_PACKET))) == NULL) {
3512                 fr_strerror_printf("out of memory");
3513                 return NULL;
3514         }
3515         memset(rp, 0, sizeof(*rp));
3516         rp->id = -1;
3517         rp->offset = -1;
3518
3519         if (newvector) {
3520                 int i;
3521                 uint32_t hash, base;
3522
3523                 /*
3524                  *      Don't expose the actual contents of the random
3525                  *      pool.
3526                  */
3527                 base = fr_rand();
3528                 for (i = 0; i < AUTH_VECTOR_LEN; i += sizeof(uint32_t)) {
3529                         hash = fr_rand() ^ base;
3530                         memcpy(rp->vector + i, &hash, sizeof(hash));
3531                 }
3532         }
3533         fr_rand();              /* stir the pool again */
3534
3535         return rp;
3536 }
3537
3538 RADIUS_PACKET *rad_alloc_reply(RADIUS_PACKET *packet)
3539 {
3540         RADIUS_PACKET *reply;
3541
3542         if (!packet) return NULL;
3543
3544         reply = rad_alloc(0);
3545         if (!reply) return NULL;
3546
3547         /*
3548          *      Initialize the fields from the request.
3549          */
3550         reply->sockfd = packet->sockfd;
3551         reply->dst_ipaddr = packet->src_ipaddr;
3552         reply->src_ipaddr = packet->dst_ipaddr;
3553         reply->dst_port = packet->src_port;
3554         reply->src_port = packet->dst_port;
3555         reply->id = packet->id;
3556         reply->code = 0; /* UNKNOWN code */
3557         memcpy(reply->vector, packet->vector,
3558                sizeof(reply->vector));
3559         reply->vps = NULL;
3560         reply->data = NULL;
3561         reply->data_len = 0;
3562
3563         return reply;
3564 }
3565
3566
3567 /*
3568  *      Free a RADIUS_PACKET
3569  */
3570 void rad_free(RADIUS_PACKET **radius_packet_ptr)
3571 {
3572         RADIUS_PACKET *radius_packet;
3573
3574         if (!radius_packet_ptr || !*radius_packet_ptr) return;
3575         radius_packet = *radius_packet_ptr;
3576
3577         free(radius_packet->data);
3578
3579         pairfree(&radius_packet->vps);
3580
3581         free(radius_packet);
3582
3583         *radius_packet_ptr = NULL;
3584 }