2 * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
3 * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
4 * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
5 * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
7 * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
8 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
9 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
10 * Lesser General Public License for more details.
12 * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
13 * License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
14 * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
21 * @brief Functions to send/receive radius packets.
23 * @copyright 2000-2003,2006 The FreeRADIUS server project
28 #include <freeradius-devel/libradius.h>
30 #include <freeradius-devel/md5.h>
36 #include <freeradius-devel/udpfromto.h>
40 #define VP_TRACE if (fr_debug_flag) printf
42 static void VP_HEXDUMP(char const *msg, uint8_t const *data, size_t len)
46 printf("--- %s ---\n", msg);
47 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
48 if ((i & 0x0f) == 0) printf("%04x: ", (unsigned int) i);
49 printf("%02x ", data[i]);
50 if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x0f) printf("\n");
52 if ((len == 0x0f) || ((len & 0x0f) != 0x0f)) printf("\n");
56 #define VP_TRACE(_x, ...)
57 #define VP_HEXDUMP(_x, _y, _z)
62 * The RFC says 4096 octets max, and most packets are less than 256.
64 #define MAX_PACKET_LEN 4096
67 * The maximum number of attributes which we allow in an incoming
68 * request. If there are more attributes than this, the request
71 * This helps to minimize the potential for a DoS, when an
72 * attacker spoofs Access-Request packets, which don't have a
73 * Message-Authenticator attribute. This means that the packet
74 * is unsigned, and the attacker can use resources on the server,
75 * even if the end request is rejected.
77 uint32_t fr_max_attributes = 0;
78 FILE *fr_log_fp = NULL;
80 typedef struct radius_packet_t {
84 uint8_t vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
88 static fr_randctx fr_rand_pool; /* across multiple calls */
89 static int fr_rand_initialized = 0;
90 static unsigned int salt_offset = 0;
91 static uint8_t nullvector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; /* for CoA decode */
93 char const *fr_packet_codes[FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE] = {
99 "Accounting-Response",
104 "Accounting-Message", //!< 10
115 "Resource-Free-Request",
116 "Resource-Free-Response",
117 "Resource-Query-Request",
118 "Resource-Query-Response",
119 "Alternate-Resource-Reclaim-Request",
120 "NAS-Reboot-Request",
121 "NAS-Reboot-Response",
134 "Disconnect-Request", //!< 40
144 "IP-Address-Allocate",
145 "IP-Address-Release", //!< 50
149 void fr_printf_log(char const *fmt, ...)
154 if ((fr_debug_flag == 0) || !fr_log_fp) {
159 vfprintf(fr_log_fp, fmt, ap);
165 static char const *tabs = "\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t";
167 static void print_hex_data(uint8_t const *ptr, int attrlen, int depth)
171 for (i = 0; i < attrlen; i++) {
172 if ((i > 0) && ((i & 0x0f) == 0x00))
173 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%.*s", depth, tabs);
174 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x ", ptr[i]);
175 if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x0f) fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\n");
177 if ((i & 0x0f) != 0) fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\n");
181 void rad_print_hex(RADIUS_PACKET *packet)
185 if (!packet->data || !fr_log_fp) return;
187 fprintf(fr_log_fp, " Code:\t\t%u\n", packet->data[0]);
188 fprintf(fr_log_fp, " Id:\t\t%u\n", packet->data[1]);
189 fprintf(fr_log_fp, " Length:\t%u\n", ((packet->data[2] << 8) |
191 fprintf(fr_log_fp, " Vector:\t");
192 for (i = 4; i < 20; i++) {
193 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x", packet->data[i]);
195 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\n");
197 if (packet->data_len > 20) {
200 fprintf(fr_log_fp, " Data:");
202 total = packet->data_len - 20;
203 ptr = packet->data + 20;
207 unsigned int vendor = 0;
209 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t");
210 if (total < 2) { /* too short */
211 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x\n", *ptr);
215 if (ptr[1] > total) { /* too long */
216 for (i = 0; i < total; i++) {
217 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x ", ptr[i]);
222 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x %02x ", ptr[0], ptr[1]);
223 attrlen = ptr[1] - 2;
225 if ((ptr[0] == PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) &&
227 vendor = (ptr[3] << 16) | (ptr[4] << 8) | ptr[5];
228 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x%02x%02x%02x (%u) ",
229 ptr[2], ptr[3], ptr[4], ptr[5], vendor);
239 print_hex_data(ptr, attrlen, 3);
249 * @brief Wrapper for sendto which handles sendfromto, IPv6, and all
250 * possible combinations.
252 static int rad_sendto(int sockfd, void *data, size_t data_len, int flags,
253 #ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
254 fr_ipaddr_t *src_ipaddr, uint16_t src_port,
256 UNUSED fr_ipaddr_t *src_ipaddr, UNUSED uint16_t src_port,
258 fr_ipaddr_t *dst_ipaddr, uint16_t dst_port)
261 struct sockaddr_storage dst;
262 socklen_t sizeof_dst;
264 #ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
265 struct sockaddr_storage src;
266 socklen_t sizeof_src;
268 fr_ipaddr2sockaddr(src_ipaddr, src_port, &src, &sizeof_src);
271 if (!fr_ipaddr2sockaddr(dst_ipaddr, dst_port, &dst, &sizeof_dst)) {
275 #ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
277 * And if they don't specify a source IP address, don't
280 if (((dst_ipaddr->af == AF_INET) || (dst_ipaddr->af == AF_INET6)) &&
281 (src_ipaddr->af != AF_UNSPEC) &&
282 !fr_inaddr_any(src_ipaddr)) {
283 rcode = sendfromto(sockfd, data, data_len, flags,
284 (struct sockaddr *)&src, sizeof_src,
285 (struct sockaddr *)&dst, sizeof_dst);
291 * No udpfromto, fail gracefully.
293 rcode = sendto(sockfd, data, data_len, flags,
294 (struct sockaddr *) &dst, sizeof_dst);
295 #ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
299 fr_strerror_printf("sendto failed: %s", fr_syserror(errno));
306 void rad_recv_discard(int sockfd)
309 struct sockaddr_storage src;
310 socklen_t sizeof_src = sizeof(src);
312 (void) recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), 0,
313 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
317 ssize_t rad_recv_header(int sockfd, fr_ipaddr_t *src_ipaddr, uint16_t *src_port, int *code)
319 ssize_t data_len, packet_len;
321 struct sockaddr_storage src;
322 socklen_t sizeof_src = sizeof(src);
324 data_len = recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), MSG_PEEK,
325 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
327 if ((errno == EAGAIN) || (errno == EINTR)) return 0;
332 * Too little data is available, discard the packet.
335 rad_recv_discard(sockfd);
339 } else { /* we got 4 bytes of data. */
341 * See how long the packet says it is.
343 packet_len = (header[2] * 256) + header[3];
346 * The length in the packet says it's less than
347 * a RADIUS header length: discard it.
349 if (packet_len < AUTH_HDR_LEN) {
350 rad_recv_discard(sockfd);
355 * Enforce RFC requirements, for sanity.
356 * Anything after 4k will be discarded.
358 } else if (packet_len > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
359 rad_recv_discard(sockfd);
366 * Convert AF. If unknown, discard packet.
368 if (!fr_sockaddr2ipaddr(&src, sizeof_src, src_ipaddr, src_port)) {
369 rad_recv_discard(sockfd);
377 * The packet says it's this long, but the actual UDP
378 * size could still be smaller.
385 * @brief wrapper for recvfrom, which handles recvfromto, IPv6, and all
386 * possible combinations.
388 static ssize_t rad_recvfrom(int sockfd, RADIUS_PACKET *packet, int flags,
389 fr_ipaddr_t *src_ipaddr, uint16_t *src_port,
390 fr_ipaddr_t *dst_ipaddr, uint16_t *dst_port)
392 struct sockaddr_storage src;
393 struct sockaddr_storage dst;
394 socklen_t sizeof_src = sizeof(src);
395 socklen_t sizeof_dst = sizeof(dst);
401 memset(&src, 0, sizeof_src);
402 memset(&dst, 0, sizeof_dst);
405 * Read the length of the packet, from the packet.
406 * This lets us allocate the buffer to use for
407 * reading the rest of the packet.
409 data_len = recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), MSG_PEEK,
410 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
412 if ((errno == EAGAIN) || (errno == EINTR)) return 0;
417 * Too little data is available, discard the packet.
420 rad_recv_discard(sockfd);
424 } else { /* we got 4 bytes of data. */
426 * See how long the packet says it is.
428 len = (header[2] * 256) + header[3];
431 * The length in the packet says it's less than
432 * a RADIUS header length: discard it.
434 if (len < AUTH_HDR_LEN) {
435 recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), flags,
436 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
440 * Enforce RFC requirements, for sanity.
441 * Anything after 4k will be discarded.
443 } else if (len > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
444 recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), flags,
445 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
450 packet->data = talloc_array(packet, uint8_t, len);
451 if (!packet->data) return -1;
454 * Receive the packet. The OS will discard any data in the
455 * packet after "len" bytes.
457 #ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
458 data_len = recvfromto(sockfd, packet->data, len, flags,
459 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src,
460 (struct sockaddr *)&dst, &sizeof_dst);
462 data_len = recvfrom(sockfd, packet->data, len, flags,
463 (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
466 * Get the destination address, too.
468 if (getsockname(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&dst,
469 &sizeof_dst) < 0) return -1;
475 if (!fr_sockaddr2ipaddr(&src, sizeof_src, src_ipaddr, &port)) {
476 return -1; /* Unknown address family, Die Die Die! */
480 fr_sockaddr2ipaddr(&dst, sizeof_dst, dst_ipaddr, &port);
484 * Different address families should never happen.
486 if (src.ss_family != dst.ss_family) {
494 #define AUTH_PASS_LEN (AUTH_VECTOR_LEN)
496 * @brief Build an encrypted secret value to return in a reply packet
498 * The secret is hidden by xoring with a MD5 digest
499 * created from the shared secret and the authentication
500 * vector. We put them into MD5 in the reverse order from
501 * that used when encrypting passwords to RADIUS.
504 static void make_secret(uint8_t *digest, uint8_t const *vector,
505 char const *secret, uint8_t const *value)
510 fr_MD5Init(&context);
511 fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
512 fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret));
513 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
515 for ( i = 0; i < AUTH_VECTOR_LEN; i++ ) {
516 digest[i] ^= value[i];
520 #define MAX_PASS_LEN (128)
521 static void make_passwd(uint8_t *output, ssize_t *outlen,
522 uint8_t const *input, size_t inlen,
523 char const *secret, uint8_t const *vector)
525 FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
526 uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
527 uint8_t passwd[MAX_PASS_LEN];
532 * If the length is zero, round it up.
536 if (len > MAX_PASS_LEN) len = MAX_PASS_LEN;
538 memcpy(passwd, input, len);
539 if (len < sizeof(passwd)) memset(passwd + len, 0, sizeof(passwd) - len);
545 else if ((len & 0x0f) != 0) {
551 fr_MD5Init(&context);
552 fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret));
558 fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
560 for (n = 0; n < len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
563 fr_MD5Update(&context,
564 passwd + n - AUTH_PASS_LEN,
568 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
569 for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
570 passwd[i + n] ^= digest[i];
574 memcpy(output, passwd, len);
577 static void make_tunnel_passwd(uint8_t *output, ssize_t *outlen,
578 uint8_t const *input, size_t inlen, size_t room,
579 char const *secret, uint8_t const *vector)
581 FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
582 uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
583 uint8_t passwd[MAX_STRING_LEN + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
590 if (room > 253) room = 253;
593 * Account for 2 bytes of the salt, and round the room
594 * available down to the nearest multiple of 16. Then,
595 * subtract one from that to account for the length byte,
596 * and the resulting number is the upper bound on the data
599 * We could short-cut this calculation just be forcing
600 * inlen to be no more than 239. It would work for all
601 * VSA's, as we don't pack multiple VSA's into one
604 * However, this calculation is more general, if a little
605 * complex. And it will work in the future for all possible
606 * kinds of weird attribute packing.
609 room -= (room & 0x0f);
612 if (inlen > room) inlen = room;
615 * Length of the encrypted data is password length plus
616 * one byte for the length of the password.
619 if ((len & 0x0f) != 0) {
623 *outlen = len + 2; /* account for the salt */
626 * Copy the password over.
628 memcpy(passwd + 3, input, inlen);
629 memset(passwd + 3 + inlen, 0, sizeof(passwd) - 3 - inlen);
632 * Generate salt. The RFC's say:
634 * The high bit of salt[0] must be set, each salt in a
635 * packet should be unique, and they should be random
637 * So, we set the high bit, add in a counter, and then
638 * add in some CSPRNG data. should be OK..
640 passwd[0] = (0x80 | ( ((salt_offset++) & 0x0f) << 3) |
642 passwd[1] = fr_rand();
643 passwd[2] = inlen; /* length of the password string */
645 fr_MD5Init(&context);
646 fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret));
649 fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
650 fr_MD5Update(&context, &passwd[0], 2);
652 for (n = 0; n < len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
655 fr_MD5Update(&context,
656 passwd + 2 + n - AUTH_PASS_LEN,
660 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
662 for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
663 passwd[i + 2 + n] ^= digest[i];
666 memcpy(output, passwd, len + 2);
669 extern int fr_attr_max_tlv;
670 extern int fr_attr_shift[];
671 extern int fr_attr_mask[];
673 static int do_next_tlv(VALUE_PAIR const *vp, VALUE_PAIR const *next, int nest)
675 unsigned int tlv1, tlv2;
677 if (nest > fr_attr_max_tlv) return 0;
682 * Keep encoding TLVs which have the same scope.
683 * e.g. two attributes of:
684 * ATTR.TLV1.TLV2.TLV3 = data1
685 * ATTR.TLV1.TLV2.TLV4 = data2
686 * both get put into a container of "ATTR.TLV1.TLV2"
690 * Nothing to follow, we're done.
695 * Not from the same vendor, skip it.
697 if (vp->da->vendor != next->da->vendor) return 0;
700 * In a different TLV space, skip it.
703 tlv2 = next->da->attr;
705 tlv1 &= ((1 << fr_attr_shift[nest]) - 1);
706 tlv2 &= ((1 << fr_attr_shift[nest]) - 1);
708 if (tlv1 != tlv2) return 0;
714 static ssize_t vp2data_any(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
715 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
716 char const *secret, int nest,
717 VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
718 uint8_t *start, size_t room);
720 static ssize_t vp2attr_rfc(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
721 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
722 char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
723 unsigned int attribute, uint8_t *ptr, size_t room);
726 * @brief This is really a sub-function of vp2data_any(). It encodes
727 * the *data* portion of the TLV, and assumes that the encapsulating
728 * attribute has already been encoded.
730 static ssize_t vp2data_tlvs(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
731 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
732 char const *secret, int nest,
733 VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
734 uint8_t *start, size_t room)
738 uint8_t *ptr = start;
739 VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;
740 VALUE_PAIR const *svp = vp;
745 if (nest > fr_attr_max_tlv) {
746 fr_strerror_printf("vp2data_tlvs: attribute nesting overflow");
754 if (room <= 2) return ptr - start;
756 ptr[0] = (vp->da->attr >> fr_attr_shift[nest]) & fr_attr_mask[nest];
760 if (room > 255) my_room = 255;
762 len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, nest,
763 &vp, ptr + 2, my_room - 2);
764 if (len < 0) return len;
765 if (len == 0) return ptr - start;
766 /* len can NEVER be more than 253 */
771 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
772 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x %02x ", ptr[0], ptr[1]);
773 print_hex_data(ptr + 2, len, 3);
781 if (!do_next_tlv(svp, vp, nest)) break;
785 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
788 da = dict_attrbyvalue(svp->da->attr & ((1 << fr_attr_shift[nest ]) - 1), svp->da->vendor);
789 if (da) fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t%s = ...\n", da->name);
797 * @brief Encodes the data portion of an attribute.
798 * @return -1 on error, or the length of the data portion.
800 static ssize_t vp2data_any(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
801 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
802 char const *secret, int nest,
803 VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
804 uint8_t *start, size_t room)
809 uint8_t *ptr = start;
812 VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;
817 * See if we need to encode a TLV. The low portion of
818 * the attribute has already been placed into the packer.
819 * If there are still attribute bytes left, then go
820 * encode them as TLVs.
822 * If we cared about the stack, we could unroll the loop.
824 if (vp->da->flags.is_tlv && (nest < fr_attr_max_tlv) &&
825 ((vp->da->attr >> fr_attr_shift[nest + 1]) != 0)) {
826 return vp2data_tlvs(packet, original, secret, nest + 1, pvp,
833 * Set up the default sources for the data.
837 switch(vp->da->type) {
843 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot encode NULL data");
850 case PW_TYPE_IPV6ADDR:
851 case PW_TYPE_IPV6PREFIX:
852 case PW_TYPE_IPV4PREFIX:
853 case PW_TYPE_ABINARY:
854 case PW_TYPE_ETHERNET: /* just in case */
855 data = (uint8_t const *) &vp->data;
859 len = 1; /* just in case */
860 array[0] = vp->vp_byte;
865 len = 2; /* just in case */
866 array[0] = (vp->vp_short >> 8) & 0xff;
867 array[1] = vp->vp_short & 0xff;
871 case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
872 len = 4; /* just in case */
873 lvalue = htonl(vp->vp_integer);
874 memcpy(array, &lvalue, sizeof(lvalue));
878 case PW_TYPE_INTEGER64:
879 len = 8; /* just in case */
880 lvalue64 = htonll(vp->vp_integer64);
881 data = (uint8_t *) &lvalue64;
885 * There are no tagged date attributes.
888 lvalue = htonl(vp->vp_date);
889 data = (uint8_t const *) &lvalue;
890 len = 4; /* just in case */
897 len = 4; /* just in case */
898 slvalue = htonl(vp->vp_signed);
899 memcpy(array, &slvalue, sizeof(slvalue));
904 default: /* unknown type: ignore it */
905 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Unknown attribute type %d", vp->da->type);
918 * Bound the data to the calling size
920 if (len > (ssize_t) room) len = room;
923 * Encrypt the various password styles
925 * Attributes with encrypted values MUST be less than
928 switch (vp->da->flags.encrypt) {
929 case FLAG_ENCRYPT_USER_PASSWORD:
930 make_passwd(ptr, &len, data, len,
931 secret, packet->vector);
934 case FLAG_ENCRYPT_TUNNEL_PASSWORD:
936 if (vp->da->flags.has_tag) lvalue = 1;
939 * Check if there's enough room. If there isn't,
940 * we discard the attribute.
942 * This is ONLY a problem if we have multiple VSA's
943 * in one Vendor-Specific, though.
945 if (room < (18 + lvalue)) return 0;
947 switch (packet->code) {
948 case PW_CODE_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
949 case PW_CODE_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
950 case PW_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
953 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: No request packet, cannot encrypt %s attribute in the vp.", vp->da->name);
957 if (lvalue) ptr[0] = TAG_VALID(vp->tag) ? vp->tag : TAG_NONE;
958 make_tunnel_passwd(ptr + lvalue, &len, data, len,
960 secret, original->vector);
962 case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
963 case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
964 case PW_CODE_COA_REQUEST:
965 ptr[0] = TAG_VALID(vp->tag) ? vp->tag : TAG_NONE;
966 make_tunnel_passwd(ptr + 1, &len, data, len - 1, room,
967 secret, packet->vector);
973 * The code above ensures that this attribute
976 case FLAG_ENCRYPT_ASCEND_SECRET:
977 if (len != 16) return 0;
978 make_secret(ptr, packet->vector, secret, data);
979 len = AUTH_VECTOR_LEN;
984 if (vp->da->flags.has_tag && TAG_VALID(vp->tag)) {
985 if (vp->da->type == PW_TYPE_STRING) {
986 if (len > ((ssize_t) (room - 1))) len = room - 1;
989 } else if (vp->da->type == PW_TYPE_INTEGER) {
991 } /* else it can't be any other type */
993 memcpy(ptr, data, len);
995 } /* switch over encryption flags */
998 return len + (ptr - start);
1001 static ssize_t attr_shift(uint8_t const *start, uint8_t const *end,
1002 uint8_t *ptr, int hdr_len, ssize_t len,
1003 int flag_offset, int vsa_offset)
1005 int check_len = len - ptr[1];
1006 int total = len + hdr_len;
1009 * Pass 1: Check if the addition of the headers
1010 * overflows the available room. If so, return
1011 * what we were capable of encoding.
1014 while (check_len > (255 - hdr_len)) {
1016 check_len -= (255 - hdr_len);
1020 * Note that this results in a number of attributes maybe
1021 * being marked as "encoded", but which aren't in the
1022 * packet. Oh well. The solution is to fix the
1023 * "vp2data_any" function to take into account the header
1026 if ((ptr + ptr[1] + total) > end) {
1027 return (ptr + ptr[1]) - start;
1031 * Pass 2: Now that we know there's enough room,
1032 * re-arrange the data to form a set of valid
1033 * RADIUS attributes.
1036 int sublen = 255 - ptr[1];
1038 if (len <= sublen) {
1043 memmove(ptr + 255 + hdr_len, ptr + 255, sublen);
1044 memcpy(ptr + 255, ptr, hdr_len);
1046 if (vsa_offset) ptr[vsa_offset] += sublen;
1047 ptr[flag_offset] |= 0x80;
1051 if (vsa_offset) ptr[vsa_offset] = 3;
1055 if (vsa_offset) ptr[vsa_offset] += len;
1057 return (ptr + ptr[1]) - start;
1062 * @brief Encode an "extended" attribute.
1064 int rad_vp2extended(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
1065 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
1066 char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
1067 uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
1071 uint8_t *start = ptr;
1072 VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;
1076 if (!vp->da->flags.extended) {
1077 fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2extended called for non-extended attribute");
1082 * The attribute number is encoded into the upper 8 bits
1085 ptr[0] = (vp->da->vendor / FR_MAX_VENDOR) & 0xff;
1087 if (!vp->da->flags.long_extended) {
1088 if (room < 3) return 0;
1091 ptr[2] = vp->da->attr & fr_attr_mask[0];
1094 if (room < 4) return 0;
1097 ptr[2] = vp->da->attr & fr_attr_mask[0];
1102 * Only "flagged" attributes can be longer than one
1105 if (!vp->da->flags.long_extended && (room > 255)) {
1112 if (vp->da->flags.evs) {
1113 uint8_t *evs = ptr + ptr[1];
1115 if (room < (size_t) (ptr[1] + 5)) return 0;
1119 evs[0] = 0; /* always zero */
1120 evs[1] = (vp->da->vendor >> 16) & 0xff;
1121 evs[2] = (vp->da->vendor >> 8) & 0xff;
1122 evs[3] = vp->da->vendor & 0xff;
1123 evs[4] = vp->da->attr & fr_attr_mask[0];
1129 len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, 0,
1130 pvp, ptr + ptr[1], room - hdr_len);
1131 if (len <= 0) return len;
1134 * There may be more than 252 octets of data encoded in
1135 * the attribute. If so, move the data up in the packet,
1136 * and copy the existing header over. Set the "M" flag ONLY
1137 * after copying the rest of the data.
1139 if (vp->da->flags.long_extended && (len > (255 - ptr[1]))) {
1140 return attr_shift(start, start + room, ptr, 4, len, 3, 0);
1146 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
1149 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x %02x ", ptr[0], ptr[1]);
1150 if (!vp->da->flags.long_extended) {
1151 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x ", ptr[2]);
1154 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x %02x ", ptr[2], ptr[3]);
1158 if (vp->da->flags.evs) {
1159 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x%02x%02x%02x (%u) %02x ",
1160 ptr[jump], ptr[jump + 1],
1161 ptr[jump + 2], ptr[jump + 3],
1162 ((ptr[jump + 1] << 16) |
1163 (ptr[jump + 2] << 8) |
1169 print_hex_data(ptr + jump, len, 3);
1173 return (ptr + ptr[1]) - start;
1178 * @brief Encode a WiMAX attribute.
1180 int rad_vp2wimax(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
1181 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
1182 char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
1183 uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
1188 uint8_t *start = ptr;
1189 VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;
1194 * Double-check for WiMAX format.
1196 if (!vp->da->flags.wimax) {
1197 fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2wimax called for non-WIMAX VSA");
1202 * Not enough room for:
1203 * attr, len, vendor-id, vsa, vsalen, continuation
1205 if (room < 9) return 0;
1208 * Build the Vendor-Specific header
1211 ptr[0] = PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
1213 lvalue = htonl(vp->da->vendor);
1214 memcpy(ptr + 2, &lvalue, 4);
1215 ptr[6] = (vp->da->attr & fr_attr_mask[1]);
1217 ptr[8] = 0; /* continuation byte */
1221 len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, 0, pvp, ptr + ptr[1],
1223 if (len <= 0) return len;
1226 * There may be more than 252 octets of data encoded in
1227 * the attribute. If so, move the data up in the packet,
1228 * and copy the existing header over. Set the "C" flag
1229 * ONLY after copying the rest of the data.
1231 if (len > (255 - ptr[1])) {
1232 return attr_shift(start, start + room, ptr, hdr_len, len, 8, 7);
1239 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
1240 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x %02x %02x%02x%02x%02x (%u) %02x %02x %02x ",
1242 ptr[2], ptr[3], ptr[4], ptr[5],
1243 (ptr[3] << 16) | (ptr[4] << 8) | ptr[5],
1244 ptr[6], ptr[7], ptr[8]);
1245 print_hex_data(ptr + 9, len, 3);
1249 return (ptr + ptr[1]) - start;
1253 * @brief Encode an RFC format attribute, with the "concat" flag set.
1255 * If there isn't enough room in the packet, the data is
1258 static ssize_t vp2attr_concat(UNUSED RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
1259 UNUSED RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
1260 UNUSED char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
1261 unsigned int attribute, uint8_t *start, size_t room)
1263 uint8_t *ptr = start;
1266 VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;
1276 if (room <= 2) break;
1283 /* no more than 253 octets */
1284 if (left > 253) left = 253;
1286 /* no more than "room" octets */
1287 if (room < (left + 2)) left = room - 2;
1289 memcpy(ptr + 2, p, left);
1292 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
1293 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x %02x ", ptr[0], ptr[1]);
1294 print_hex_data(ptr + 2, len, 3);
1309 * @brief Encode an RFC format TLV.
1311 * This could be a standard attribute,
1312 * or a TLV data type. If it's a standard attribute, then
1313 * vp->da->attr == attribute. Otherwise, attribute may be
1316 static ssize_t vp2attr_rfc(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
1317 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
1318 char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
1319 unsigned int attribute, uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
1323 if (room <= 2) return 0;
1325 ptr[0] = attribute & 0xff;
1328 if (room > ((unsigned) 255 - ptr[1])) room = 255 - ptr[1];
1330 len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, 0, pvp, ptr + ptr[1], room);
1331 if (len <= 0) return len;
1336 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
1337 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x %02x ", ptr[0], ptr[1]);
1338 print_hex_data(ptr + 2, len, 3);
1347 * @brief Encode a VSA which is a TLV. If it's in the RFC format, call
1348 * vp2attr_rfc. Otherwise, encode it here.
1350 static ssize_t vp2attr_vsa(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
1351 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
1352 char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
1353 unsigned int attribute, unsigned int vendor,
1354 uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
1358 VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;
1362 * Unknown vendor: RFC format.
1363 * Known vendor and RFC format: go do that.
1365 dv = dict_vendorbyvalue(vendor);
1367 (!vp->da->flags.is_tlv && (dv->type == 1) && (dv->length == 1))) {
1368 return vp2attr_rfc(packet, original, secret, pvp,
1369 attribute, ptr, room);
1374 fr_strerror_printf("vp2attr_vsa: Internal sanity check failed,"
1375 " type %u", (unsigned) dv->type);
1379 ptr[0] = 0; /* attr must be 24-bit */
1380 ptr[1] = (attribute >> 16) & 0xff;
1381 ptr[2] = (attribute >> 8) & 0xff;
1382 ptr[3] = attribute & 0xff;
1386 ptr[0] = (attribute >> 8) & 0xff;
1387 ptr[1] = attribute & 0xff;
1391 ptr[0] = attribute & 0xff;
1395 switch (dv->length) {
1397 fr_strerror_printf("vp2attr_vsa: Internal sanity check failed,"
1398 " length %u", (unsigned) dv->length);
1406 ptr[dv->type + 1] = dv->type + 2;
1410 ptr[dv->type] = dv->type + 1;
1415 if (room > ((unsigned) 255 - (dv->type + dv->length))) {
1416 room = 255 - (dv->type + dv->length);
1419 len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, 0, pvp,
1420 ptr + dv->type + dv->length, room);
1421 if (len <= 0) return len;
1423 if (dv->length) ptr[dv->type + dv->length - 1] += len;
1426 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
1432 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp)
1433 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x%02x%02x%02x ",
1434 ptr[0], ptr[1], ptr[2], ptr[3]);
1438 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp)
1439 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x%02x ",
1444 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp)
1445 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x ", ptr[0]);
1449 switch (dv->length) {
1454 fprintf(fr_log_fp, " ");
1458 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x ",
1463 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x%02x ",
1464 ptr[dv->type], ptr[dv->type] + 1);
1468 print_hex_data(ptr + dv->type + dv->length, len, 3);
1472 return dv->type + dv->length + len;
1477 * @brief Encode a Vendor-Specific attribute.
1479 int rad_vp2vsa(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
1480 char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp, uint8_t *ptr,
1485 VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;
1489 * Double-check for WiMAX format.
1491 if (vp->da->flags.wimax) {
1492 return rad_vp2wimax(packet, original, secret, pvp,
1496 if (vp->da->vendor > FR_MAX_VENDOR) {
1497 fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2vsa: Invalid arguments");
1502 * Not enough room for:
1503 * attr, len, vendor-id
1505 if (room < 6) return 0;
1508 * Build the Vendor-Specific header
1510 ptr[0] = PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
1512 lvalue = htonl(vp->da->vendor);
1513 memcpy(ptr + 2, &lvalue, 4);
1515 if (room > ((unsigned) 255 - ptr[1])) room = 255 - ptr[1];
1517 len = vp2attr_vsa(packet, original, secret, pvp,
1518 vp->da->attr, vp->da->vendor,
1519 ptr + ptr[1], room);
1520 if (len < 0) return len;
1523 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
1524 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t%02x %02x %02x%02x%02x%02x (%u) ",
1526 ptr[2], ptr[3], ptr[4], ptr[5],
1527 (ptr[3] << 16) | (ptr[4] << 8) | ptr[5]);
1528 print_hex_data(ptr + 6, len, 3);
1539 * @brief Encode an RFC standard attribute 1..255
1541 int rad_vp2rfc(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
1542 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
1543 char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
1544 uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
1546 VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;
1550 if (vp->da->vendor != 0) {
1551 fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2rfc called with VSA");
1555 if ((vp->da->attr == 0) || (vp->da->attr > 255)) {
1556 fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2rfc called with non-standard attribute %u", vp->da->attr);
1561 * Only CUI is allowed to have zero length.
1564 if ((vp->length == 0) &&
1565 (vp->da->attr == PW_CHARGEABLE_USER_IDENTITY)) {
1566 ptr[0] = PW_CHARGEABLE_USER_IDENTITY;
1574 * Message-Authenticator is hard-coded.
1576 if (vp->da->attr == PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR) {
1577 if (room < 18) return -1;
1580 ptr[0] = PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR;
1582 memset(ptr + 2, 0, 16);
1584 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp) {
1585 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\t\t50 12 ...\n");
1589 *pvp = (*pvp)->next;
1594 * EAP-Message is special.
1596 if (vp->da->flags.concat && (vp->length > 253)) {
1597 return vp2attr_concat(packet, original, secret, pvp, vp->da->attr,
1601 return vp2attr_rfc(packet, original, secret, pvp, vp->da->attr,
1605 static ssize_t rad_vp2rfctlv(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet,
1606 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
1607 char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp,
1608 uint8_t *start, size_t room)
1611 VALUE_PAIR const *vp = *pvp;
1615 if (!vp->da->flags.is_tlv) {
1616 fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2rfctlv: attr is not a TLV");
1620 if ((vp->da->vendor & (FR_MAX_VENDOR - 1)) != 0) {
1621 fr_strerror_printf("rad_vp2rfctlv: attr is not an RFC TLV");
1625 if (room < 5) return 0;
1628 * Encode the first level of TLVs
1630 start[0] = (vp->da->vendor / FR_MAX_VENDOR) & 0xff;
1632 start[2] = vp->da->attr & fr_attr_mask[0];
1635 len = vp2data_any(packet, original, secret, 0, pvp,
1636 start + 4, room - 4);
1637 if (len <= 0) return len;
1650 * @brief Parse a data structure into a RADIUS attribute.
1652 int rad_vp2attr(RADIUS_PACKET const *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
1653 char const *secret, VALUE_PAIR const **pvp, uint8_t *start,
1656 VALUE_PAIR const *vp;
1658 if (!pvp || !*pvp || !start || (room <= 2)) return -1;
1665 * RFC format attributes take the fast path.
1667 if (!vp->da->vendor) {
1668 if (vp->da->attr > 255) return 0;
1670 return rad_vp2rfc(packet, original, secret, pvp,
1674 if (vp->da->flags.extended) {
1675 return rad_vp2extended(packet, original, secret, pvp,
1680 * The upper 8 bits of the vendor number are the standard
1681 * space attribute which is a TLV.
1683 if ((vp->da->vendor & (FR_MAX_VENDOR - 1)) == 0) {
1684 return rad_vp2rfctlv(packet, original, secret, pvp,
1688 if (vp->da->flags.wimax) {
1689 return rad_vp2wimax(packet, original, secret, pvp,
1693 return rad_vp2vsa(packet, original, secret, pvp,
1699 * @brief Encode a packet.
1701 int rad_encode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
1704 radius_packet_t *hdr;
1706 uint16_t total_length;
1708 VALUE_PAIR const *reply;
1710 char ip_src_buffer[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
1711 char ip_dst_buffer[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
1714 * A 4K packet, aligned on 64-bits.
1716 uint64_t data[MAX_PACKET_LEN / sizeof(uint64_t)];
1718 if (is_radius_code(packet->code)) {
1719 what = fr_packet_codes[packet->code];
1724 DEBUG("Sending %s Id %d from %s:%u to %s:%u\n",
1726 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
1727 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
1728 ip_src_buffer, sizeof(ip_src_buffer)),
1730 inet_ntop(packet->dst_ipaddr.af,
1731 &packet->dst_ipaddr.ipaddr,
1732 ip_dst_buffer, sizeof(ip_dst_buffer)),
1736 * Double-check some things based on packet code.
1738 switch (packet->code) {
1739 case PW_CODE_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
1740 case PW_CODE_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
1741 case PW_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
1743 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot sign response packet without a request packet");
1749 * These packet vectors start off as all zero.
1751 case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
1752 case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
1753 case PW_CODE_COA_REQUEST:
1754 memset(packet->vector, 0, sizeof(packet->vector));
1762 * Use memory on the stack, until we know how
1763 * large the packet will be.
1765 hdr = (radius_packet_t *) data;
1768 * Build standard header
1770 hdr->code = packet->code;
1771 hdr->id = packet->id;
1773 memcpy(hdr->vector, packet->vector, sizeof(hdr->vector));
1775 total_length = AUTH_HDR_LEN;
1778 * Load up the configuration values for the user
1784 * FIXME: Loop twice over the reply list. The first time,
1785 * calculate the total length of data. The second time,
1786 * allocate the memory, and fill in the VP's.
1788 * Hmm... this may be slower than just doing a small
1793 * Loop over the reply attributes for the packet.
1795 reply = packet->vps;
1798 char const *last_name = NULL;
1803 * Ignore non-wire attributes, but allow extended
1806 if ((reply->da->vendor == 0) &&
1807 ((reply->da->attr & 0xFFFF) >= 256) &&
1808 !reply->da->flags.extended && !reply->da->flags.long_extended) {
1811 * Permit the admin to send BADLY formatted
1812 * attributes with a debug build.
1814 if (reply->da->attr == PW_RAW_ATTRIBUTE) {
1815 memcpy(ptr, reply->vp_octets, reply->length);
1816 len = reply->length;
1817 reply = reply->next;
1821 reply = reply->next;
1826 * Set the Message-Authenticator to the correct
1827 * length and initial value.
1829 if (reply->da->attr == PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR) {
1831 * Cache the offset to the
1832 * Message-Authenticator
1834 packet->offset = total_length;
1837 last_len = reply->length;
1839 last_name = reply->da->name;
1841 len = rad_vp2attr(packet, original, secret, &reply, ptr,
1842 ((uint8_t *) data) + sizeof(data) - ptr);
1843 if (len < 0) return -1;
1846 * Failed to encode the attribute, likely because
1847 * the packet is full.
1850 if (last_len != 0) {
1851 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Failed encoding attribute %s\n", last_name);
1854 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Skipping zero-length attribute %s\n", last_name);
1859 next: /* Used only for Raw-Attribute */
1862 total_length += len;
1863 } /* done looping over all attributes */
1866 * Fill in the rest of the fields, and copy the data over
1867 * from the local stack to the newly allocated memory.
1869 * Yes, all this 'memcpy' is slow, but it means
1870 * that we only allocate the minimum amount of
1871 * memory for a request.
1873 packet->data_len = total_length;
1874 packet->data = talloc_array(packet, uint8_t, packet->data_len);
1875 if (!packet->data) {
1876 fr_strerror_printf("Out of memory");
1880 memcpy(packet->data, hdr, packet->data_len);
1881 hdr = (radius_packet_t *) packet->data;
1883 total_length = htons(total_length);
1884 memcpy(hdr->length, &total_length, sizeof(total_length));
1891 * @brief Sign a previously encoded packet.
1893 int rad_sign(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
1896 radius_packet_t *hdr = (radius_packet_t *)packet->data;
1899 * It wasn't assigned an Id, this is bad!
1901 if (packet->id < 0) {
1902 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: RADIUS packets must be assigned an Id");
1906 if (!packet->data || (packet->data_len < AUTH_HDR_LEN) ||
1907 (packet->offset < 0)) {
1908 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: You must call rad_encode() before rad_sign()");
1913 * If there's a Message-Authenticator, update it
1914 * now, BEFORE updating the authentication vector.
1916 if (packet->offset > 0) {
1917 uint8_t calc_auth_vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
1919 switch (packet->code) {
1920 case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE:
1921 if (original && original->code == PW_CODE_STATUS_SERVER) {
1925 case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
1926 case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
1927 case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_ACK:
1928 case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_NAK:
1929 case PW_CODE_COA_REQUEST:
1930 case PW_CODE_COA_ACK:
1931 memset(hdr->vector, 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
1935 case PW_CODE_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
1936 case PW_CODE_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
1937 case PW_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
1939 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot sign response packet without a request packet");
1942 memcpy(hdr->vector, original->vector,
1946 default: /* others have vector already set to zero */
1952 * Set the authentication vector to zero,
1953 * calculate the HMAC, and put it
1954 * into the Message-Authenticator
1957 fr_hmac_md5(packet->data, packet->data_len,
1958 (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret),
1960 memcpy(packet->data + packet->offset + 2,
1961 calc_auth_vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
1964 * Copy the original request vector back
1965 * to the raw packet.
1967 memcpy(hdr->vector, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
1971 * Switch over the packet code, deciding how to
1974 switch (packet->code) {
1976 * Request packets are not signed, bur
1977 * have a random authentication vector.
1979 case PW_CODE_AUTHENTICATION_REQUEST:
1980 case PW_CODE_STATUS_SERVER:
1984 * Reply packets are signed with the
1985 * authentication vector of the request.
1992 fr_MD5Init(&context);
1993 fr_MD5Update(&context, packet->data, packet->data_len);
1994 fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret,
1996 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
1998 memcpy(hdr->vector, digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
1999 memcpy(packet->vector, digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2002 }/* switch over packet codes */
2008 * @brief Reply to the request. Also attach
2009 * reply attribute value pairs and any user message provided.
2011 int rad_send(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
2016 char ip_src_buffer[128];
2017 char ip_dst_buffer[128];
2020 * Maybe it's a fake packet. Don't send it.
2022 if (!packet || (packet->sockfd < 0)) {
2026 if (is_radius_code(packet->code)) {
2027 what = fr_packet_codes[packet->code];
2033 * First time through, allocate room for the packet
2035 if (!packet->data) {
2037 * Encode the packet.
2039 if (rad_encode(packet, original, secret) < 0) {
2044 * Re-sign it, including updating the
2045 * Message-Authenticator.
2047 if (rad_sign(packet, original, secret) < 0) {
2052 * If packet->data points to data, then we print out
2053 * the VP list again only for debugging.
2055 } else if (fr_debug_flag) {
2056 DEBUG("Sending %s Id %d from %s:%u to %s:%u\n", what,
2058 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af, &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2059 ip_src_buffer, sizeof(ip_src_buffer)),
2061 inet_ntop(packet->dst_ipaddr.af, &packet->dst_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2062 ip_dst_buffer, sizeof(ip_dst_buffer)),
2065 for (reply = packet->vps; reply; reply = reply->next) {
2066 if ((reply->da->vendor == 0) &&
2067 ((reply->da->attr & 0xFFFF) > 0xff)) continue;
2073 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp) rad_print_hex(packet);
2078 * If the socket is TCP, call write(). Calling sendto()
2079 * is allowed on some platforms, but it's not nice. Even
2080 * worse, if UDPFROMTO is defined, we *can't* use it on
2081 * TCP sockets. So... just call write().
2083 if (packet->proto == IPPROTO_TCP) {
2086 rcode = write(packet->sockfd, packet->data, packet->data_len);
2087 if (rcode >= 0) return rcode;
2089 fr_strerror_printf("sendto failed: %s", fr_syserror(errno));
2095 * And send it on it's way.
2097 return rad_sendto(packet->sockfd, packet->data, packet->data_len, 0,
2098 &packet->src_ipaddr, packet->src_port,
2099 &packet->dst_ipaddr, packet->dst_port);
2103 * @brief Do a comparison of two authentication digests by comparing
2106 * Otherwise, the server can be subject to
2107 * timing attacks that allow attackers find a valid message
2110 * http://www.cs.rice.edu/~dwallach/pub/crosby-timing2009.pdf
2112 int rad_digest_cmp(uint8_t const *a, uint8_t const *b, size_t length)
2117 for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
2118 result |= a[i] ^ b[i];
2121 return result; /* 0 is OK, !0 is !OK, just like memcmp */
2126 * @brief Validates the requesting client NAS. Calculates the
2127 * Request Authenticator based on the clients private key.
2129 static int calc_acctdigest(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, char const *secret)
2131 uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
2135 * Zero out the auth_vector in the received packet.
2136 * Then append the shared secret to the received packet,
2137 * and calculate the MD5 sum. This must be the same
2138 * as the original MD5 sum (packet->vector).
2140 memset(packet->data + 4, 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2143 * MD5(packet + secret);
2145 fr_MD5Init(&context);
2146 fr_MD5Update(&context, packet->data, packet->data_len);
2147 fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret));
2148 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
2151 * Return 0 if OK, 2 if not OK.
2153 if (rad_digest_cmp(digest, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) != 0) return 2;
2159 * @brief Validates the requesting client NAS. Calculates the
2160 * Response Authenticator based on the clients private key.
2162 static int calc_replydigest(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET *original,
2165 uint8_t calc_digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
2171 if (original == NULL) {
2176 * Copy the original vector in place.
2178 memcpy(packet->data + 4, original->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2181 * MD5(packet + secret);
2183 fr_MD5Init(&context);
2184 fr_MD5Update(&context, packet->data, packet->data_len);
2185 fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret));
2186 fr_MD5Final(calc_digest, &context);
2189 * Copy the packet's vector back to the packet.
2191 memcpy(packet->data + 4, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2194 * Return 0 if OK, 2 if not OK.
2196 if (rad_digest_cmp(packet->vector, calc_digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) != 0) return 2;
2202 * @brief Check if a set of RADIUS formatted TLVs are OK.
2204 int rad_tlv_ok(uint8_t const *data, size_t length,
2205 size_t dv_type, size_t dv_length)
2207 uint8_t const *end = data + length;
2209 if ((dv_length > 2) || (dv_type == 0) || (dv_type > 4)) {
2210 fr_strerror_printf("rad_tlv_ok: Invalid arguments");
2214 while (data < end) {
2217 if ((data + dv_type + dv_length) > end) {
2218 fr_strerror_printf("Attribute header overflow");
2224 if ((data[0] == 0) && (data[1] == 0) &&
2225 (data[2] == 0) && (data[3] == 0)) {
2227 fr_strerror_printf("Invalid attribute 0");
2232 fr_strerror_printf("Invalid attribute > 2^24");
2238 if ((data[0] == 0) && (data[1] == 0)) goto zero;
2242 if (data[0] == 0) goto zero;
2246 fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check failed");
2250 switch (dv_length) {
2255 if (data[dv_type + 1] != 0) {
2256 fr_strerror_printf("Attribute is longer than 256 octets");
2261 attrlen = data[dv_type + dv_length - 1];
2266 fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check failed");
2270 if (attrlen < (dv_type + dv_length)) {
2271 fr_strerror_printf("Attribute header has invalid length");
2275 if (attrlen > length) {
2276 fr_strerror_printf("Attribute overflows container");
2288 /** See if the data pointed to by PTR is a valid RADIUS packet.
2290 * Packet is not 'const * const' because we may update data_len, if there's more data
2291 * in the UDP packet than in the RADIUS packet.
2293 * @param packet to check
2294 * @param flags to control decoding
2295 * @param reason if not NULL, will have the failure reason written to where it points.
2296 * @return bool, true on success, false on failure.
2298 bool rad_packet_ok(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, int flags, decode_fail_t *reason)
2303 radius_packet_t *hdr;
2304 char host_ipaddr[128];
2305 bool require_ma = false;
2306 bool seen_ma = false;
2307 uint32_t num_attributes;
2308 decode_fail_t failure = DECODE_FAIL_NONE;
2311 * Check for packets smaller than the packet header.
2313 * RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
2315 * "The minimum length is 20 ..."
2317 if (packet->data_len < AUTH_HDR_LEN) {
2318 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too short (received %zu < minimum %d)",
2319 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2320 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2321 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2322 packet->data_len, AUTH_HDR_LEN);
2323 failure = DECODE_FAIL_MIN_LENGTH_PACKET;
2329 * Check for packets with mismatched size.
2330 * i.e. We've received 128 bytes, and the packet header
2331 * says it's 256 bytes long.
2333 totallen = (packet->data[2] << 8) | packet->data[3];
2334 hdr = (radius_packet_t *)packet->data;
2337 * Code of 0 is not understood.
2338 * Code of 16 or greate is not understood.
2340 if ((hdr->code == 0) ||
2341 (hdr->code >= FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
2342 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Bad RADIUS packet from host %s: unknown packet code %d",
2343 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2344 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2345 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2347 failure = DECODE_FAIL_UNKNOWN_PACKET_CODE;
2352 * Message-Authenticator is required in Status-Server
2353 * packets, otherwise they can be trivially forged.
2355 if (hdr->code == PW_CODE_STATUS_SERVER) require_ma = true;
2358 * It's also required if the caller asks for it.
2360 if (flags) require_ma = true;
2363 * Repeat the length checks. This time, instead of
2364 * looking at the data we received, look at the value
2365 * of the 'length' field inside of the packet.
2367 * Check for packets smaller than the packet header.
2369 * RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
2371 * "The minimum length is 20 ..."
2373 if (totallen < AUTH_HDR_LEN) {
2374 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too short (length %zu < minimum %d)",
2375 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2376 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2377 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2378 totallen, AUTH_HDR_LEN);
2379 failure = DECODE_FAIL_MIN_LENGTH_FIELD;
2384 * And again, for the value of the 'length' field.
2386 * RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
2388 * " ... and maximum length is 4096."
2390 * HOWEVER. This requirement is for the network layer.
2391 * If the code gets here, we assume that a well-formed
2392 * packet is an OK packet.
2394 * We allow both the UDP data length, and the RADIUS
2395 * "length" field to contain up to 64K of data.
2399 * RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
2401 * "If the packet is shorter than the Length field
2402 * indicates, it MUST be silently discarded."
2404 * i.e. No response to the NAS.
2406 if (packet->data_len < totallen) {
2407 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: received %zu octets, packet length says %zu",
2408 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2409 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2410 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2411 packet->data_len, totallen);
2412 failure = DECODE_FAIL_MIN_LENGTH_MISMATCH;
2417 * RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
2419 * "Octets outside the range of the Length field MUST be
2420 * treated as padding and ignored on reception."
2422 if (packet->data_len > totallen) {
2424 * We're shortening the packet below, but just
2425 * to be paranoid, zero out the extra data.
2427 memset(packet->data + totallen, 0, packet->data_len - totallen);
2428 packet->data_len = totallen;
2432 * Walk through the packet's attributes, ensuring that
2433 * they add up EXACTLY to the size of the packet.
2435 * If they don't, then the attributes either under-fill
2436 * or over-fill the packet. Any parsing of the packet
2437 * is impossible, and will result in unknown side effects.
2439 * This would ONLY happen with buggy RADIUS implementations,
2440 * or with an intentional attack. Either way, we do NOT want
2441 * to be vulnerable to this problem.
2444 count = totallen - AUTH_HDR_LEN;
2449 * We need at least 2 bytes to check the
2453 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: attribute header overflows the packet",
2454 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2455 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2456 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
2457 failure = DECODE_FAIL_HEADER_OVERFLOW;
2462 * Attribute number zero is NOT defined.
2465 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: Invalid attribute 0",
2466 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2467 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2468 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
2469 failure = DECODE_FAIL_INVALID_ATTRIBUTE;
2474 * Attributes are at LEAST as long as the ID & length
2475 * fields. Anything shorter is an invalid attribute.
2478 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: attribute %u too short",
2479 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2480 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2481 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2483 failure = DECODE_FAIL_ATTRIBUTE_TOO_SHORT;
2488 * If there are fewer bytes in the packet than in the
2489 * attribute, it's a bad packet.
2491 if (count < attr[1]) {
2492 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: attribute %u data overflows the packet",
2493 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2494 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2495 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2497 failure = DECODE_FAIL_ATTRIBUTE_OVERFLOW;
2502 * Sanity check the attributes for length.
2505 default: /* don't do anything by default */
2509 * If there's an EAP-Message, we require
2510 * a Message-Authenticator.
2512 case PW_EAP_MESSAGE:
2516 case PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR:
2517 if (attr[1] != 2 + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) {
2518 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: Message-Authenticator has invalid length %d",
2519 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2520 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2521 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2523 failure = DECODE_FAIL_MA_INVALID_LENGTH;
2531 * FIXME: Look up the base 255 attributes in the
2532 * dictionary, and switch over their type. For
2533 * integer/date/ip, the attribute length SHOULD
2536 count -= attr[1]; /* grab the attribute length */
2538 num_attributes++; /* seen one more attribute */
2542 * If the attributes add up to a packet, it's allowed.
2544 * If not, we complain, and throw the packet away.
2547 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: packet attributes do NOT exactly fill the packet",
2548 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2549 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2550 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
2551 failure = DECODE_FAIL_ATTRIBUTE_UNDERFLOW;
2556 * If we're configured to look for a maximum number of
2557 * attributes, and we've seen more than that maximum,
2558 * then throw the packet away, as a possible DoS.
2560 if ((fr_max_attributes > 0) &&
2561 (num_attributes > fr_max_attributes)) {
2562 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Possible DoS attack from host %s: Too many attributes in request (received %d, max %d are allowed).",
2563 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2564 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2565 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2566 num_attributes, fr_max_attributes);
2567 failure = DECODE_FAIL_TOO_MANY_ATTRIBUTES;
2572 * http://www.freeradius.org/rfc/rfc2869.html#EAP-Message
2574 * A packet with an EAP-Message attribute MUST also have
2575 * a Message-Authenticator attribute.
2577 * A Message-Authenticator all by itself is OK, though.
2579 * Similarly, Status-Server packets MUST contain
2580 * Message-Authenticator attributes.
2582 if (require_ma && !seen_ma) {
2583 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Insecure packet from host %s: Packet does not contain required Message-Authenticator attribute",
2584 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2585 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2586 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
2587 failure = DECODE_FAIL_MA_MISSING;
2592 * Fill RADIUS header fields
2594 packet->code = hdr->code;
2595 packet->id = hdr->id;
2596 memcpy(packet->vector, hdr->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2604 return (failure == DECODE_FAIL_NONE);
2609 * @brief Receive UDP client requests, and fill in
2610 * the basics of a RADIUS_PACKET structure.
2612 RADIUS_PACKET *rad_recv(int fd, int flags)
2616 RADIUS_PACKET *packet;
2619 * Allocate the new request data structure
2621 packet = rad_alloc(NULL, 0);
2623 fr_strerror_printf("out of memory");
2628 sock_flags = MSG_PEEK;
2632 data_len = rad_recvfrom(fd, packet, sock_flags,
2633 &packet->src_ipaddr, &packet->src_port,
2634 &packet->dst_ipaddr, &packet->dst_port);
2637 * Check for socket errors.
2640 fr_strerror_printf("Error receiving packet: %s", fr_syserror(errno));
2641 /* packet->data is NULL */
2645 packet->data_len = data_len; /* unsigned vs signed */
2648 * If the packet is too big, then rad_recvfrom did NOT
2649 * allocate memory. Instead, it just discarded the
2652 if (packet->data_len > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
2653 fr_strerror_printf("Discarding packet: Larger than RFC limitation of 4096 bytes");
2654 /* packet->data is NULL */
2660 * Read no data. Continue.
2661 * This check is AFTER the MAX_PACKET_LEN check above, because
2662 * if the packet is larger than MAX_PACKET_LEN, we also have
2663 * packet->data == NULL
2665 if ((packet->data_len == 0) || !packet->data) {
2666 fr_strerror_printf("Empty packet: Socket is not ready");
2672 * See if it's a well-formed RADIUS packet.
2674 if (!rad_packet_ok(packet, flags, NULL)) {
2680 * Remember which socket we read the packet from.
2682 packet->sockfd = fd;
2685 * FIXME: Do even more filtering by only permitting
2686 * certain IP's. The problem is that we don't know
2687 * how to do this properly for all possible clients...
2691 * Explicitely set the VP list to empty.
2695 if (fr_debug_flag) {
2696 char src_ipaddr[128];
2697 char dst_ipaddr[128];
2699 if (is_radius_code(packet->code)) {
2700 DEBUG("Received %s Id %d from %s:%d to %s:%d length %d\n",
2701 fr_packet_codes[packet->code],
2703 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2704 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2705 src_ipaddr, sizeof(src_ipaddr)),
2707 inet_ntop(packet->dst_ipaddr.af,
2708 &packet->dst_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2709 dst_ipaddr, sizeof(dst_ipaddr)),
2711 (int) packet->data_len);
2713 DEBUG("Received code %d Id %d from %s:%d to %s:%d length %d\n",
2716 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2717 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2718 src_ipaddr, sizeof(src_ipaddr)),
2720 inet_ntop(packet->dst_ipaddr.af,
2721 &packet->dst_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2722 dst_ipaddr, sizeof(dst_ipaddr)),
2724 (int) packet->data_len);
2729 if ((fr_debug_flag > 3) && fr_log_fp) rad_print_hex(packet);
2737 * @brief Verify the Request/Response Authenticator
2738 * (and Message-Authenticator if present) of a packet.
2740 int rad_verify(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET *original,
2747 if (!packet || !packet->data) return -1;
2750 * Before we allocate memory for the attributes, do more
2753 ptr = packet->data + AUTH_HDR_LEN;
2754 length = packet->data_len - AUTH_HDR_LEN;
2755 while (length > 0) {
2756 uint8_t msg_auth_vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
2757 uint8_t calc_auth_vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
2762 default: /* don't do anything. */
2766 * Note that more than one Message-Authenticator
2767 * attribute is invalid.
2769 case PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR:
2770 memcpy(msg_auth_vector, &ptr[2], sizeof(msg_auth_vector));
2771 memset(&ptr[2], 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2773 switch (packet->code) {
2777 case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE:
2779 (original->code == PW_CODE_STATUS_SERVER)) {
2783 case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
2784 case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
2785 case PW_CODE_COA_REQUEST:
2786 memset(packet->data + 4, 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2790 case PW_CODE_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
2791 case PW_CODE_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
2792 case PW_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
2793 case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_ACK:
2794 case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_NAK:
2795 case PW_CODE_COA_ACK:
2796 case PW_CODE_COA_NAK:
2798 fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot validate Message-Authenticator in response packet without a request packet");
2801 memcpy(packet->data + 4, original->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2805 fr_hmac_md5(packet->data, packet->data_len,
2806 (uint8_t const *) secret, strlen(secret),
2808 if (rad_digest_cmp(calc_auth_vector, msg_auth_vector,
2809 sizeof(calc_auth_vector)) != 0) {
2811 fr_strerror_printf("Received packet from %s with invalid Message-Authenticator! (Shared secret is incorrect.)",
2812 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2813 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2814 buffer, sizeof(buffer)));
2815 /* Silently drop packet, according to RFC 3579 */
2817 } /* else the message authenticator was good */
2820 * Reinitialize Authenticators.
2822 memcpy(&ptr[2], msg_auth_vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2823 memcpy(packet->data + 4, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
2825 } /* switch over the attributes */
2829 } /* loop over the packet, sanity checking the attributes */
2832 * It looks like a RADIUS packet, but we don't know what it is
2833 * so can't validate the authenticators.
2835 if ((packet->code == 0) || (packet->code >= FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
2837 fr_strerror_printf("Received Unknown packet code %d "
2838 "from client %s port %d: Cannot validate Request/Response Authenticator.",
2840 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2841 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2842 buffer, sizeof(buffer)),
2848 * Calculate and/or verify Request or Response Authenticator.
2850 switch (packet->code) {
2854 case PW_CODE_AUTHENTICATION_REQUEST:
2855 case PW_CODE_STATUS_SERVER:
2857 * The authentication vector is random
2858 * nonsense, invented by the client.
2862 case PW_CODE_COA_REQUEST:
2863 case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
2864 case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
2865 if (calc_acctdigest(packet, secret) > 1) {
2866 fr_strerror_printf("Received %s packet "
2867 "from client %s with invalid Request Authenticator! (Shared secret is incorrect.)",
2868 fr_packet_codes[packet->code],
2869 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2870 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2871 buffer, sizeof(buffer)));
2876 /* Verify the reply digest */
2877 case PW_CODE_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
2878 case PW_CODE_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
2879 case PW_CODE_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
2880 case PW_CODE_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE:
2881 case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_ACK:
2882 case PW_CODE_DISCONNECT_NAK:
2883 case PW_CODE_COA_ACK:
2884 case PW_CODE_COA_NAK:
2885 rcode = calc_replydigest(packet, original, secret);
2887 fr_strerror_printf("Received %s packet "
2888 "from home server %s port %d with invalid Response Authenticator! (Shared secret is incorrect.)",
2889 fr_packet_codes[packet->code],
2890 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2891 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2892 buffer, sizeof(buffer)),
2899 fr_strerror_printf("Received Unknown packet code %d "
2900 "from client %s port %d: Cannot validate Request/Response Authenticator",
2902 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2903 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2904 buffer, sizeof(buffer)),
2914 * @brief convert a "concatenated" attribute to one long VP.
2916 static ssize_t data2vp_concat(RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
2917 DICT_ATTR const *da, uint8_t const *start,
2918 size_t const packetlen, VALUE_PAIR **pvp)
2922 uint8_t const *ptr = start;
2923 uint8_t const *end = start + packetlen;
2931 * The packet has already been sanity checked, so we
2932 * don't care about walking off of the end of it.
2935 total += ptr[1] - 2;
2940 * Attributes MUST be consecutive.
2942 if (ptr[0] != attr) break;
2945 vp = pairalloc(packet, da);
2949 vp->vp_octets = p = talloc_array(vp, uint8_t, vp->length);
2957 while (total < vp->length) {
2958 memcpy(p, ptr + 2, ptr[1] - 2);
2960 total += ptr[1] - 2;
2970 * @brief convert TLVs to one or more VPs
2972 static ssize_t data2vp_tlvs(RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
2973 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
2974 char const *secret, DICT_ATTR const *da,
2975 uint8_t const *start, size_t length,
2978 uint8_t const *data = start;
2979 DICT_ATTR const *child;
2980 VALUE_PAIR *head, **tail;
2982 if (length < 3) return -1; /* type, length, value */
2984 VP_HEXDUMP("tlvs", data, length);
2986 if (rad_tlv_ok(data, length, 1, 1) < 0) return -1;
2991 while (data < (start + length)) {
2994 child = dict_attrbyparent(da, data[0], da->vendor);
2996 unsigned int my_attr, my_vendor;
2998 VP_TRACE("Failed to find child %u of TLV %s\n",
3002 * Get child attr/vendor so that
3003 * we can call unknown attr.
3006 my_vendor = da->vendor;
3008 if (!dict_attr_child(da, &my_attr, &my_vendor)) {
3013 child = dict_attrunknown(my_attr, my_vendor, true);
3020 tlv_len = data2vp(packet, original, secret, child,
3021 data + 2, data[1] - 2, data[1] - 2, tail);
3026 tail = &((*tail)->next);
3035 * @brief Convert a top-level VSA to a VP.
3037 * "length" can be LONGER than just this sub-vsa
3039 static ssize_t data2vp_vsa(RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
3040 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
3041 char const *secret, DICT_VENDOR *dv,
3042 uint8_t const *data, size_t length,
3045 unsigned int attribute;
3046 ssize_t attrlen, my_len;
3047 DICT_ATTR const *da;
3050 if (length <= (dv->type + dv->length)) {
3051 fr_strerror_printf("data2vp_vsa: Failure to call rad_tlv_ok");
3058 /* data[0] must be zero */
3059 attribute = data[1] << 16;
3060 attribute |= data[2] << 8;
3061 attribute |= data[3];
3065 attribute = data[0] << 8;
3066 attribute |= data[1];
3070 attribute = data[0];
3074 fr_strerror_printf("data2vp_vsa: Internal sanity check failed");
3078 switch (dv->length) {
3080 /* data[dv->type] must be zero, from rad_tlv_ok() */
3081 attrlen = data[dv->type + 1];
3085 attrlen = data[dv->type];
3093 fr_strerror_printf("data2vp_vsa: Internal sanity check failed");
3098 if (attrlen <= (ssize_t) (dv->type + dv->length)) {
3099 fr_strerror_printf("data2vp_vsa: Failure to call rad_tlv_ok");
3105 * See if the VSA is known.
3107 da = dict_attrbyvalue(attribute, dv->vendorpec);
3108 if (!da) da = dict_attrunknown(attribute, dv->vendorpec, true);
3111 my_len = data2vp(packet, original, secret, da,
3112 data + dv->type + dv->length,
3113 attrlen - (dv->type + dv->length),
3114 attrlen - (dv->type + dv->length),
3116 if (my_len < 0) return my_len;
3123 * @brief Convert a fragmented extended attr to a VP
3133 * But for the first fragment, we get passed a pointer to the
3136 static ssize_t data2vp_extended(RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
3137 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
3138 char const *secret, DICT_ATTR const *da,
3139 uint8_t const *data,
3140 size_t attrlen, size_t packetlen,
3145 uint8_t *head, *tail;
3146 uint8_t const *frag, *end;
3147 uint8_t const *attr;
3151 if (attrlen < 3) return -1;
3154 * Calculate the length of all of the fragments. For
3155 * now, they MUST be contiguous in the packet, and they
3156 * MUST be all of the same TYPE and EXTENDED-TYPE
3159 fraglen = attrlen - 2;
3160 frag = data + attrlen;
3161 end = data + packetlen;
3165 while (frag < end) {
3167 (frag[0] != attr[0]) ||
3168 (frag[1] < 4) || /* too short for long-extended */
3169 (frag[2] != attr[2]) ||
3170 ((frag + frag[1]) > end)) { /* overflow */
3175 last_frag = ((frag[3] & 0x80) == 0);
3177 fraglen += frag[1] - 4;
3182 head = tail = malloc(fraglen);
3183 if (!head) return -1;
3185 VP_TRACE("Fragments %d, total length %d\n", fragments, (int) fraglen);
3188 * And again, but faster and looser.
3190 * We copy the first fragment, followed by the rest of
3195 while (fragments > 0) {
3196 memcpy(tail, frag + 4, frag[1] - 4);
3197 tail += frag[1] - 4;
3202 VP_HEXDUMP("long-extended fragments", head, fraglen);
3204 rcode = data2vp(packet, original, secret, da,
3205 head, fraglen, fraglen, pvp);
3207 if (rcode < 0) return rcode;
3213 * @brief Convert a Vendor-Specific WIMAX to vps
3215 * Called ONLY for Vendor-Specific
3217 static ssize_t data2vp_wimax(RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
3218 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
3219 char const *secret, uint32_t vendor,
3220 uint8_t const *data,
3221 size_t attrlen, size_t packetlen,
3227 uint8_t *head, *tail;
3228 uint8_t const *frag, *end;
3229 DICT_ATTR const *child;
3231 if (attrlen < 8) return -1;
3233 if (((size_t) (data[5] + 4)) != attrlen) return -1;
3235 child = dict_attrbyvalue(data[4], vendor);
3236 if (!child) return -1;
3238 if ((data[6] & 0x80) == 0) {
3239 rcode = data2vp(packet, original, secret, child,
3240 data + 7, data[5] - 3, data[5] - 3,
3242 if (rcode < 0) return -1;
3247 * Calculate the length of all of the fragments. For
3248 * now, they MUST be contiguous in the packet, and they
3249 * MUST be all of the same VSA, WiMAX, and WiMAX-attr.
3251 * The first fragment doesn't have a RADIUS attribute
3252 * header, so it needs to be treated a little special.
3254 fraglen = data[5] - 3;
3255 frag = data + attrlen;
3256 end = data + packetlen;
3259 while (frag < end) {
3261 (frag[0] != PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) ||
3262 (frag[1] < 9) || /* too short for wimax */
3263 ((frag + frag[1]) > end) || /* overflow */
3264 (memcmp(frag + 2, data, 4) != 0) || /* not wimax */
3265 (frag[6] != data[4]) || /* not the same wimax attr */
3266 ((frag[7] + 6) != frag[1])) { /* doesn't fill the attr */
3271 last_frag = ((frag[8] & 0x80) == 0);
3273 fraglen += frag[7] - 3;
3277 head = tail = malloc(fraglen);
3278 if (!head) return -1;
3281 * And again, but faster and looser.
3283 * We copy the first fragment, followed by the rest of
3288 memcpy(tail, frag + 4 + 3, frag[4 + 1] - 3);
3289 tail += frag[4 + 1] - 3;
3290 frag += attrlen; /* should be frag[1] - 7 */
3293 * frag now points to RADIUS attributes
3296 memcpy(tail, frag + 2 + 4 + 3, frag[2 + 4 + 1] - 3);
3297 tail += frag[2 + 4 + 1] - 3;
3299 } while (frag < end);
3301 VP_HEXDUMP("wimax fragments", head, fraglen);
3303 rcode = data2vp(packet, original, secret, child,
3304 head, fraglen, fraglen, pvp);
3306 if (rcode < 0) return rcode;
3313 * @brief Convert a top-level VSA to one or more VPs
3315 static ssize_t data2vp_vsas(RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
3316 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
3317 char const *secret, uint8_t const *data,
3318 size_t attrlen, size_t packetlen,
3325 VALUE_PAIR *head, **tail;
3327 if (attrlen > packetlen) return -1;
3328 if (attrlen < 5) return -1; /* vid, value */
3329 if (data[0] != 0) return -1; /* we require 24-bit VIDs */
3331 memcpy(&vendor, data, 4);
3332 vendor = ntohl(vendor);
3333 dv = dict_vendorbyvalue(vendor);
3339 if ((vendor == VENDORPEC_WIMAX) && dv->flags) {
3340 rcode = data2vp_wimax(packet, original, secret, vendor,
3341 data, attrlen, packetlen, pvp);
3346 * VSAs should normally be in TLV format.
3348 if (rad_tlv_ok(data + 4, attrlen - 4,
3349 dv->type, dv->length) < 0) return -1;
3352 * There may be more than one VSA in the
3353 * Vendor-Specific. If so, loop over them all.
3362 while (attrlen > 0) {
3365 vsa_len = data2vp_vsa(packet, original, secret, dv,
3366 data, attrlen, tail);
3369 fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check %d", __LINE__);
3372 tail = &((*tail)->next);
3375 packetlen -= vsa_len;
3385 * @brief Create any kind of VP from the attribute contents.
3387 * "length" is AT LEAST the length of this attribute, as we
3388 * expect the caller to have verified the data with
3389 * rad_packet_ok(). "length" may be up to the length of the
3392 * @return -1 on error, or "length".
3394 ssize_t data2vp(RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
3395 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
3397 DICT_ATTR const *da, uint8_t const *start,
3398 size_t const attrlen, size_t const packetlen,
3401 int8_t tag = TAG_NONE;
3405 DICT_ATTR const *child;
3408 uint8_t const *data = start;
3410 uint8_t buffer[256];
3413 * FIXME: Attrlen can be larger than 253 for extended attrs!
3415 if (!da || (attrlen > packetlen) ||
3416 ((attrlen > 253) && (attrlen != packetlen)) ||
3417 (attrlen > 128*1024)) {
3418 fr_strerror_printf("data2vp: invalid arguments");
3422 VP_HEXDUMP("data2vp", start, attrlen);
3424 VP_TRACE("parent %s len %zu ... %zu\n", da->name, attrlen, packetlen);
3429 * Hacks for CUI. The WiMAX spec says that it can be
3430 * zero length, even though this is forbidden by the
3431 * RADIUS specs. So... we make a special case for it.
3434 if (!((da->vendor == 0) &&
3435 (da->attr == PW_CHARGEABLE_USER_IDENTITY))) {
3442 * Hacks for Coverity. Editing the dictionary
3443 * will break assumptions about CUI. We know
3444 * this, but Coverity doesn't.
3446 if (da->type != PW_TYPE_OCTETS) return -1;
3451 goto alloc_cui; /* skip everything */
3455 * Hacks for tags. If the attribute is capable of
3456 * encoding a tag, and there's room for the tag, and
3457 * there is a tag, or it's encrypted with Tunnel-Password,
3458 * then decode the tag.
3460 if (da->flags.has_tag && (datalen > 1) &&
3461 ((data[0] < 0x20) ||
3462 (da->flags.encrypt == FLAG_ENCRYPT_TUNNEL_PASSWORD))) {
3464 * Only "short" attributes can be encrypted.
3466 if (datalen >= sizeof(buffer)) return -1;
3468 if (da->type == PW_TYPE_STRING) {
3469 memcpy(buffer, data + 1, datalen - 1);
3473 } else if (da->type == PW_TYPE_INTEGER) {
3474 memcpy(buffer, data, attrlen);
3479 return -1; /* only string and integer can have tags */
3486 * Decrypt the attribute.
3488 if (secret && packet && (da->flags.encrypt != FLAG_ENCRYPT_NONE)) {
3490 * Encrypted attributes can only exist for the
3491 * old-style format. Extended attributes CANNOT
3494 if (attrlen > 253) {
3498 if (data == start) {
3499 memcpy(buffer, data, attrlen);
3503 switch (da->flags.encrypt) { /* can't be tagged */
3507 case FLAG_ENCRYPT_USER_PASSWORD:
3509 rad_pwdecode((char *) buffer,
3513 rad_pwdecode((char *) buffer,
3518 datalen = strlen((char *) buffer);
3522 * Tunnel-Password's may go ONLY in response
3523 * packets. They can have a tag, so datalen is
3524 * not the same as attrlen.
3526 case FLAG_ENCRYPT_TUNNEL_PASSWORD:
3527 if (rad_tunnel_pwdecode(buffer, &datalen, secret,
3528 original ? original->vector : nullvector) < 0) {
3534 * Ascend-Send-Secret
3535 * Ascend-Receive-Secret
3537 case FLAG_ENCRYPT_ASCEND_SECRET:
3541 uint8_t my_digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
3542 make_secret(my_digest,
3545 memcpy(buffer, my_digest,
3547 buffer[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN] = '\0';
3548 datalen = strlen((char *) buffer);
3554 } /* switch over encryption flags */
3558 * Double-check the length after decrypting the
3562 case PW_TYPE_STRING:
3563 case PW_TYPE_OCTETS:
3566 case PW_TYPE_ABINARY:
3567 if (datalen > sizeof(vp->vp_filter)) goto raw;
3570 case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
3571 case PW_TYPE_IPADDR:
3573 case PW_TYPE_SIGNED:
3574 if (datalen != 4) goto raw;
3577 case PW_TYPE_INTEGER64:
3579 if (datalen != 8) goto raw;
3582 case PW_TYPE_IPV6ADDR:
3583 if (datalen != 16) goto raw;
3586 case PW_TYPE_IPV6PREFIX:
3587 if ((datalen < 2) || (datalen > 18)) goto raw;
3588 if (data[1] > 128) goto raw;
3592 if (datalen != 1) goto raw;
3596 if (datalen != 2) goto raw;
3599 case PW_TYPE_ETHERNET:
3600 if (datalen != 6) goto raw;
3603 case PW_TYPE_COMBO_IP:
3605 child = dict_attrbytype(da->attr, da->vendor,
3607 } else if (datalen == 16) {
3608 child = dict_attrbytype(da->attr, da->vendor,
3613 if (!child) goto raw;
3614 da = child; /* re-write it */
3617 case PW_TYPE_IPV4PREFIX:
3618 if (datalen != 6) goto raw;
3619 if ((data[1] & 0x3f) > 32) goto raw;
3623 * The rest of the data types can cause
3624 * recursion! Ask yourself, "is recursion OK?"
3627 case PW_TYPE_EXTENDED:
3628 if (datalen < 2) goto raw; /* etype, value */
3630 child = dict_attrbyparent(da, data[0], 0);
3631 if (!child) goto raw;
3634 * Recurse to decode the contents, which could be
3635 * a TLV, IPaddr, etc. Note that we decode only
3636 * the current attribute, and we ignore any extra
3639 rcode = data2vp(packet, original, secret, child,
3640 data + 1, attrlen - 1, attrlen - 1, pvp);
3641 if (rcode < 0) goto raw;
3644 case PW_TYPE_LONG_EXTENDED:
3645 if (datalen < 3) goto raw; /* etype, flags, value */
3647 child = dict_attrbyparent(da, data[0], 0);
3649 if ((data[0] != PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) ||
3650 (datalen < (3 + 4 + 1))) {
3651 /* da->attr < 255, da->vendor == 0 */
3652 child = dict_attrunknown(data[0], da->attr * FR_MAX_VENDOR, true);
3655 * Try to find the VSA.
3657 memcpy(&vendor, data + 3, 4);
3658 vendor = ntohl(vendor);
3660 if (vendor == 0) goto raw;
3662 child = dict_attrunknown(data[7], vendor | (da->attr * FR_MAX_VENDOR), true);
3666 fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check %d", __LINE__);
3672 * If there no more fragments, then the contents
3673 * have to be a well-known data type.
3676 if ((data[1] & 0x80) == 0) {
3677 rcode = data2vp(packet, original, secret, child,
3678 data + 2, attrlen - 2, attrlen - 2,
3680 if (rcode < 0) goto raw;
3685 * This requires a whole lot more work.
3687 return data2vp_extended(packet, original, secret, child,
3688 start, attrlen, packetlen, pvp);
3691 if (datalen < 6) goto raw; /* vid, vtype, value */
3693 if (data[0] != 0) goto raw; /* we require 24-bit VIDs */
3695 memcpy(&vendor, data, 4);
3696 vendor = ntohl(vendor);
3697 dv = dict_vendorbyvalue(vendor);
3699 child = dict_attrunknown(data[4], da->vendor | vendor, true);
3701 child = dict_attrbyparent(da, data[4], vendor);
3703 child = dict_attrunknown(data[4], da->vendor | vendor, true);
3706 if (!child) goto raw;
3708 rcode = data2vp(packet, original, secret, child,
3709 data + 5, attrlen - 5, attrlen - 5, pvp);
3710 if (rcode < 0) goto raw;
3715 * We presume that the TLVs all fit into one
3716 * attribute, OR they've already been grouped
3717 * into a contiguous memory buffer.
3719 rcode = data2vp_tlvs(packet, original, secret, da,
3720 data, attrlen, pvp);
3721 if (rcode < 0) goto raw;
3726 * VSAs can be WiMAX, in which case they don't
3727 * fit into one attribute.
3729 rcode = data2vp_vsas(packet, original, secret,
3730 data, attrlen, packetlen, pvp);
3731 if (rcode < 0) goto raw;
3737 * Re-write the attribute to be "raw". It is
3738 * therefore of type "octets", and will be
3741 da = dict_attrunknown(da->attr, da->vendor, true);
3743 fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check %d", __LINE__);
3751 if (da->type != PW_TYPE_OCTETS) {
3752 dict_attr_free(&da);
3760 * And now that we've verified the basic type
3761 * information, decode the actual data.
3764 vp = pairalloc(packet, da);
3767 vp->length = datalen;
3771 case PW_TYPE_STRING:
3772 p = talloc_array(vp, char, vp->length + 1);
3773 memcpy(p, data, vp->length);
3774 p[vp->length] = '\0';
3775 vp->vp_strvalue = p;
3778 case PW_TYPE_OCTETS:
3779 pairmemcpy(vp, data, vp->length);
3782 case PW_TYPE_ABINARY:
3783 if (vp->length > sizeof(vp->vp_filter)) {
3784 vp->length = sizeof(vp->vp_filter);
3786 memcpy(vp->vp_filter, data, vp->length);
3790 vp->vp_byte = data[0];
3794 vp->vp_short = (data[0] << 8) | data[1];
3797 case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
3798 memcpy(&vp->vp_integer, data, 4);
3799 vp->vp_integer = ntohl(vp->vp_integer);
3802 case PW_TYPE_INTEGER64:
3803 memcpy(&vp->vp_integer64, data, 8);
3804 vp->vp_integer64 = ntohll(vp->vp_integer64);
3808 memcpy(&vp->vp_date, data, 4);
3809 vp->vp_date = ntohl(vp->vp_date);
3812 case PW_TYPE_ETHERNET:
3813 memcpy(&vp->vp_ether, data, 6);
3816 case PW_TYPE_IPADDR:
3817 memcpy(&vp->vp_ipaddr, data, 4);
3821 memcpy(&vp->vp_ifid, data, 8);
3824 case PW_TYPE_IPV6ADDR:
3825 memcpy(&vp->vp_ipv6addr, data, 16);
3828 case PW_TYPE_IPV6PREFIX:
3830 * FIXME: double-check that
3831 * (vp->vp_octets[1] >> 3) matches vp->length + 2
3833 memcpy(&vp->vp_ipv6prefix, data, vp->length);
3834 if (vp->length < 18) {
3835 memset(((uint8_t *)vp->vp_ipv6prefix) + vp->length, 0,
3840 case PW_TYPE_IPV4PREFIX:
3841 /* FIXME: do the same double-check as for IPv6Prefix */
3842 memcpy(&vp->vp_ipv4prefix, data, vp->length);
3845 * /32 means "keep all bits". Otherwise, mask
3848 if ((data[1] & 0x3f) > 32) {
3849 uint32_t addr, mask;
3851 memcpy(&addr, vp->vp_octets + 2, sizeof(addr));
3853 mask <<= (32 - (data[1] & 0x3f));
3858 memcpy(vp->vp_ipv4prefix + 2, &addr, sizeof(addr));
3862 case PW_TYPE_SIGNED: /* overloaded with vp_integer */
3863 memcpy(&vp->vp_integer, buffer, 4);
3864 vp->vp_integer = ntohl(vp->vp_integer);
3869 fr_strerror_printf("Internal sanity check %d", __LINE__);
3880 * @brief Create a "normal" VALUE_PAIR from the given data.
3882 ssize_t rad_attr2vp(RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
3883 RADIUS_PACKET const *original,
3885 uint8_t const *data, size_t length,
3890 DICT_ATTR const *da;
3892 if ((length < 2) || (data[1] < 2) || (data[1] > length)) {
3893 fr_strerror_printf("rad_attr2vp: Insufficient data");
3897 da = dict_attrbyvalue(data[0], 0);
3898 if (!da) da = dict_attrunknown(data[0], 0, true);
3902 * Pass the entire thing to the decoding function
3904 if (da->flags.concat) {
3905 return data2vp_concat(packet, da, data, length, pvp);
3909 * Note that we pass the entire length, not just the
3910 * length of this attribute. The Extended or WiMAX
3911 * attributes may have the "continuation" bit set, and
3912 * will thus be more than one attribute in length.
3914 rcode = data2vp(packet, original, secret, da,
3915 data + 2, data[1] - 2, length - 2, pvp);
3916 if (rcode < 0) return rcode;
3923 * @brief Converts data in network byte order to a VP
3924 * @return -1 on error, or the length of the data read
3926 ssize_t rad_data2vp(unsigned int attribute, unsigned int vendor,
3927 uint8_t const *data, size_t length,
3930 DICT_ATTR const *da;
3932 if (!data || (length == 0) || !pvp) return -1;
3934 da = dict_attrbyvalue(attribute, vendor);
3935 if (!da) da = dict_attrunknown(attribute, vendor, true);
3938 return data2vp(NULL, NULL, NULL, da,
3939 data, length, length, pvp);
3942 fr_thread_local_setup(uint8_t *, rad_vp2data_buff);
3944 /** Converts vp_data to network byte order
3946 * Provide a pointer to a buffer which contains the value of the VALUE_PAIR
3947 * in an architecture independent format.
3949 * The pointer is only guaranteed to be valid between calls to rad_vp2data, and so long
3950 * as the source VALUE_PAIR is not freed.
3952 * @param out where to write the pointer to the value.
3953 * @param vp to get the value from.
3954 * @return -1 on error, or the length of the value
3956 ssize_t rad_vp2data(uint8_t const **out, VALUE_PAIR const *vp)
3964 buffer = fr_thread_local_init(rad_vp2data_buff, free);
3968 buffer = malloc(sizeof(uint8_t) * sizeof(value_data_t));
3970 fr_strerror_printf("Failed allocating memory for rad_vp2data buffer");
3974 ret = fr_thread_local_set(rad_vp2data_buff, buffer);
3976 fr_strerror_printf("Failed setting up TLS for rad_vp2data buffer: %s", strerror(errno));
3984 switch(vp->da->type) {
3985 case PW_TYPE_STRING:
3986 case PW_TYPE_OCTETS:
3988 memcpy(out, &vp->data.ptr, sizeof(*out));
3992 * All of these values are at the same location.
3995 case PW_TYPE_IPADDR:
3996 case PW_TYPE_IPV6ADDR:
3997 case PW_TYPE_IPV6PREFIX:
3998 case PW_TYPE_IPV4PREFIX:
3999 case PW_TYPE_ABINARY:
4000 case PW_TYPE_ETHERNET:
4001 case PW_TYPE_COMBO_IP:
4002 case PW_TYPE_COMBO_IPPREFIX:
4004 void const *p = &vp->data;
4005 memcpy(out, &p, sizeof(*out));
4009 case PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN:
4010 buffer[0] = vp->vp_integer & 0x01;
4015 buffer[0] = vp->vp_integer & 0xff;
4020 buffer[0] = (vp->vp_integer >> 8) & 0xff;
4021 buffer[1] = vp->vp_integer & 0xff;
4025 case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
4026 lvalue = htonl(vp->vp_integer);
4027 memcpy(buffer, &lvalue, sizeof(lvalue));
4031 case PW_TYPE_INTEGER64:
4032 lvalue64 = htonll(vp->vp_integer64);
4033 memcpy(buffer, &lvalue64, sizeof(lvalue64));
4038 lvalue = htonl(vp->vp_date);
4039 memcpy(buffer, &lvalue, sizeof(lvalue));
4043 case PW_TYPE_SIGNED:
4045 int32_t slvalue = htonl(vp->vp_signed);
4046 memcpy(buffer, &slvalue, sizeof(slvalue));
4051 case PW_TYPE_INVALID:
4052 case PW_TYPE_EXTENDED:
4053 case PW_TYPE_LONG_EXTENDED:
4056 case PW_TYPE_TIMEVAL:
4058 fr_strerror_printf("Cannot get data for VALUE_PAIR type %i", vp->da->type);
4061 /* Don't add default */
4068 * @brief Calculate/check digest, and decode radius attributes.
4069 * @return -1 on decoding error, 0 on success
4071 int rad_decode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET *original,
4075 uint32_t num_attributes;
4077 radius_packet_t *hdr;
4078 VALUE_PAIR *head, **tail, *vp;
4081 * Extract attribute-value pairs
4083 hdr = (radius_packet_t *)packet->data;
4085 packet_length = packet->data_len - AUTH_HDR_LEN;
4092 * Loop over the attributes, decoding them into VPs.
4094 while (packet_length > 0) {
4098 * This may return many VPs
4100 my_len = rad_attr2vp(packet, original, secret,
4101 ptr, packet_length, &vp);
4116 * VSA's may not have been counted properly in
4117 * rad_packet_ok() above, as it is hard to count
4118 * then without using the dictionary. We
4119 * therefore enforce the limits here, too.
4121 if ((fr_max_attributes > 0) &&
4122 (num_attributes > fr_max_attributes)) {
4123 char host_ipaddr[128];
4126 fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Possible DoS attack from host %s: Too many attributes in request (received %d, max %d are allowed).",
4127 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
4128 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
4129 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
4130 num_attributes, fr_max_attributes);
4135 packet_length -= my_len;
4139 * Merge information from the outside world into our
4142 fr_rand_seed(packet->data, AUTH_HDR_LEN);
4145 * There may be VP's already in the packet. Don't
4146 * destroy them. Instead, add the decoded attributes to
4147 * the tail of the list.
4149 for (tail = &packet->vps; *tail != NULL; tail = &((*tail)->next)) {
4159 * @brief Encode password.
4161 * We assume that the passwd buffer passed is big enough.
4162 * RFC2138 says the password is max 128 chars, so the size
4163 * of the passwd buffer must be at least 129 characters.
4164 * Preferably it's just MAX_STRING_LEN.
4166 * int *pwlen is updated to the new length of the encrypted
4167 * password - a multiple of 16 bytes.
4169 int rad_pwencode(char *passwd, size_t *pwlen, char const *secret,
4170 uint8_t const *vector)
4172 FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
4173 uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
4174 int i, n, secretlen;
4178 * RFC maximum is 128 bytes.
4180 * If length is zero, pad it out with zeros.
4182 * If the length isn't aligned to 16 bytes,
4183 * zero out the extra data.
4187 if (len > 128) len = 128;
4190 memset(passwd, 0, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
4191 len = AUTH_PASS_LEN;
4192 } else if ((len % AUTH_PASS_LEN) != 0) {
4193 memset(&passwd[len], 0, AUTH_PASS_LEN - (len % AUTH_PASS_LEN));
4194 len += AUTH_PASS_LEN - (len % AUTH_PASS_LEN);
4199 * Use the secret to setup the decryption digest
4201 secretlen = strlen(secret);
4203 fr_MD5Init(&context);
4204 fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, secretlen);
4205 old = context; /* save intermediate work */
4208 * Encrypt it in place. Don't bother checking
4209 * len, as we've ensured above that it's OK.
4211 for (n = 0; n < len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
4213 fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
4214 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
4217 fr_MD5Update(&context,
4218 (uint8_t *) passwd + n - AUTH_PASS_LEN,
4220 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
4223 for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
4224 passwd[i + n] ^= digest[i];
4232 * @brief Decode password.
4234 int rad_pwdecode(char *passwd, size_t pwlen, char const *secret,
4235 uint8_t const *vector)
4237 FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
4238 uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
4240 size_t n, secretlen;
4243 * The RFC's say that the maximum is 128.
4244 * The buffer we're putting it into above is 254, so
4245 * we don't need to do any length checking.
4247 if (pwlen > 128) pwlen = 128;
4252 if (pwlen == 0) goto done;
4255 * Use the secret to setup the decryption digest
4257 secretlen = strlen(secret);
4259 fr_MD5Init(&context);
4260 fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, secretlen);
4261 old = context; /* save intermediate work */
4264 * The inverse of the code above.
4266 for (n = 0; n < pwlen; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
4268 fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
4269 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
4272 if (pwlen > AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
4273 fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t *) passwd,
4277 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
4280 if (pwlen > (n + AUTH_PASS_LEN)) {
4281 fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t *) passwd + n,
4286 for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
4287 passwd[i + n] ^= digest[i];
4292 passwd[pwlen] = '\0';
4293 return strlen(passwd);
4298 * @brief Encode Tunnel-Password attributes when sending them out on the wire.
4300 * int *pwlen is updated to the new length of the encrypted
4301 * password - a multiple of 16 bytes.
4303 * This is per RFC-2868 which adds a two char SALT to the initial intermediate
4306 int rad_tunnel_pwencode(char *passwd, size_t *pwlen, char const *secret,
4307 uint8_t const *vector)
4309 uint8_t buffer[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN + MAX_STRING_LEN + 3];
4310 unsigned char digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
4312 int i, n, secretlen;
4317 if (len > 127) len = 127;
4320 * Shift the password 3 positions right to place a salt and original
4321 * length, tag will be added automatically on packet send
4323 for (n=len ; n>=0 ; n--) passwd[n+3] = passwd[n];
4327 * save original password length as first password character;
4334 * Generate salt. The RFC's say:
4336 * The high bit of salt[0] must be set, each salt in a
4337 * packet should be unique, and they should be random
4339 * So, we set the high bit, add in a counter, and then
4340 * add in some CSPRNG data. should be OK..
4342 salt[0] = (0x80 | ( ((salt_offset++) & 0x0f) << 3) |
4343 (fr_rand() & 0x07));
4344 salt[1] = fr_rand();
4347 * Padd password to multiple of AUTH_PASS_LEN bytes.
4349 n = len % AUTH_PASS_LEN;
4351 n = AUTH_PASS_LEN - n;
4352 for (; n > 0; n--, len++)
4355 /* set new password length */
4359 * Use the secret to setup the decryption digest
4361 secretlen = strlen(secret);
4362 memcpy(buffer, secret, secretlen);
4364 for (n2 = 0; n2 < len; n2+=AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
4366 memcpy(buffer + secretlen, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
4367 memcpy(buffer + secretlen + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN, salt, 2);
4368 fr_md5_calc(digest, buffer, secretlen + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN + 2);
4370 memcpy(buffer + secretlen, passwd + n2 - AUTH_PASS_LEN, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
4371 fr_md5_calc(digest, buffer, secretlen + AUTH_PASS_LEN);
4374 for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
4375 passwd[i + n2] ^= digest[i];
4383 * @brief Decode Tunnel-Password encrypted attributes.
4385 * Defined in RFC-2868, this uses a two char SALT along with the
4386 * initial intermediate value, to differentiate it from the
4389 int rad_tunnel_pwdecode(uint8_t *passwd, size_t *pwlen, char const *secret,
4390 uint8_t const *vector)
4392 FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
4393 uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
4395 unsigned i, n, len, reallen;
4400 * We need at least a salt.
4403 fr_strerror_printf("tunnel password is too short");
4408 * There's a salt, but no password. Or, there's a salt
4409 * and a 'data_len' octet. It's wrong, but at least we
4410 * can figure out what it means: the password is empty.
4412 * Note that this means we ignore the 'data_len' field,
4413 * if the attribute length tells us that there's no
4414 * more data. So the 'data_len' field may be wrong,
4423 len -= 2; /* discount the salt */
4426 * Use the secret to setup the decryption digest
4428 secretlen = strlen(secret);
4430 fr_MD5Init(&context);
4431 fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t const *) secret, secretlen);
4432 old = context; /* save intermediate work */
4435 * Set up the initial key:
4437 * b(1) = MD5(secret + vector + salt)
4439 fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
4440 fr_MD5Update(&context, passwd, 2);
4443 for (n = 0; n < len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
4447 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
4452 * A quick check: decrypt the first octet
4453 * of the password, which is the
4454 * 'data_len' field. Ensure it's sane.
4456 reallen = passwd[2] ^ digest[0];
4457 if (reallen >= len) {
4458 fr_strerror_printf("tunnel password is too long for the attribute");
4462 fr_MD5Update(&context, passwd + 2, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
4466 fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
4469 fr_MD5Update(&context, passwd + n + 2, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
4472 for (i = base; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
4473 passwd[n + i - 1] = passwd[n + i + 2] ^ digest[i];
4478 * See make_tunnel_password, above.
4480 if (reallen > 239) reallen = 239;
4483 passwd[reallen] = 0;
4489 * @brief Encode a CHAP password
4491 * @bug FIXME: might not work with Ascend because
4492 * we use vp->length, and Ascend gear likes
4493 * to send an extra '\0' in the string!
4495 int rad_chap_encode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, uint8_t *output, int id,
4496 VALUE_PAIR *password)
4500 uint8_t string[MAX_STRING_LEN * 2 + 1];
4501 VALUE_PAIR *challenge;
4504 * Sanity check the input parameters
4506 if ((packet == NULL) || (password == NULL)) {
4511 * Note that the password VP can be EITHER
4512 * a User-Password attribute (from a check-item list),
4513 * or a CHAP-Password attribute (the client asking
4514 * the library to encode it).
4522 memcpy(ptr, password->vp_strvalue, password->length);
4523 ptr += password->length;
4524 i += password->length;
4527 * Use Chap-Challenge pair if present,
4528 * Request Authenticator otherwise.
4530 challenge = pairfind(packet->vps, PW_CHAP_CHALLENGE, 0, TAG_ANY);
4532 memcpy(ptr, challenge->vp_strvalue, challenge->length);
4533 i += challenge->length;
4535 memcpy(ptr, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
4536 i += AUTH_VECTOR_LEN;
4540 fr_md5_calc((uint8_t *)output + 1, (uint8_t *)string, i);
4547 * @brief Seed the random number generator.
4549 * May be called any number of times.
4551 void fr_rand_seed(void const *data, size_t size)
4556 * Ensure that the pool is initialized.
4558 if (!fr_rand_initialized) {
4561 memset(&fr_rand_pool, 0, sizeof(fr_rand_pool));
4563 fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
4569 while (total < sizeof(fr_rand_pool.randrsl)) {
4570 this = read(fd, fr_rand_pool.randrsl,
4571 sizeof(fr_rand_pool.randrsl) - total);
4572 if ((this < 0) && (errno != EINTR)) break;
4573 if (this > 0) total += this;
4577 fr_rand_pool.randrsl[0] = fd;
4578 fr_rand_pool.randrsl[1] = time(NULL);
4579 fr_rand_pool.randrsl[2] = errno;
4582 fr_randinit(&fr_rand_pool, 1);
4583 fr_rand_pool.randcnt = 0;
4584 fr_rand_initialized = 1;
4590 * Hash the user data
4593 if (!hash) hash = fr_rand();
4594 hash = fr_hash_update(data, size, hash);
4596 fr_rand_pool.randmem[fr_rand_pool.randcnt] ^= hash;
4601 * @brief Return a 32-bit random number.
4603 uint32_t fr_rand(void)
4608 * Ensure that the pool is initialized.
4610 if (!fr_rand_initialized) {
4611 fr_rand_seed(NULL, 0);
4614 num = fr_rand_pool.randrsl[fr_rand_pool.randcnt++];
4615 if (fr_rand_pool.randcnt >= 256) {
4616 fr_rand_pool.randcnt = 0;
4617 fr_isaac(&fr_rand_pool);
4624 /** Allocate a new RADIUS_PACKET
4626 * @param ctx the context in which the packet is allocated. May be NULL if
4627 * the packet is not associated with a REQUEST.
4628 * @param newvector if true a new request authenticator will be generated.
4629 * @return a new RADIUS_PACKET or NULL on error.
4631 RADIUS_PACKET *rad_alloc(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, int newvector)
4635 rp = talloc_zero(ctx, RADIUS_PACKET);
4637 fr_strerror_printf("out of memory");
4645 uint32_t hash, base;
4648 * Don't expose the actual contents of the random
4652 for (i = 0; i < AUTH_VECTOR_LEN; i += sizeof(uint32_t)) {
4653 hash = fr_rand() ^ base;
4654 memcpy(rp->vector + i, &hash, sizeof(hash));
4657 fr_rand(); /* stir the pool again */
4662 /** Allocate a new RADIUS_PACKET response
4664 * @param ctx the context in which the packet is allocated. May be NULL if
4665 * the packet is not associated with a REQUEST.
4666 * @param packet The request packet.
4667 * @return a new RADIUS_PACKET or NULL on error.
4669 RADIUS_PACKET *rad_alloc_reply(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, RADIUS_PACKET *packet)
4671 RADIUS_PACKET *reply;
4673 if (!packet) return NULL;
4675 reply = rad_alloc(ctx, 0);
4676 if (!reply) return NULL;
4679 * Initialize the fields from the request.
4681 reply->sockfd = packet->sockfd;
4682 reply->dst_ipaddr = packet->src_ipaddr;
4683 reply->src_ipaddr = packet->dst_ipaddr;
4684 reply->dst_port = packet->src_port;
4685 reply->src_port = packet->dst_port;
4686 reply->id = packet->id;
4687 reply->code = 0; /* UNKNOWN code */
4688 memcpy(reply->vector, packet->vector,
4689 sizeof(reply->vector));
4692 reply->data_len = 0;
4695 reply->proto = packet->proto;
4702 * @brief Free a RADIUS_PACKET
4704 void rad_free(RADIUS_PACKET **radius_packet_ptr)
4706 RADIUS_PACKET *radius_packet;
4708 if (!radius_packet_ptr || !*radius_packet_ptr) return;
4709 radius_packet = *radius_packet_ptr;
4711 VERIFY_PACKET(radius_packet);
4713 pairfree(&radius_packet->vps);
4715 talloc_free(radius_packet);
4716 *radius_packet_ptr = NULL;
4719 /** Duplicate a RADIUS_PACKET
4721 * @param ctx the context in which the packet is allocated. May be NULL if
4722 * the packet is not associated with a REQUEST.
4723 * @param in The packet to copy
4724 * @return a new RADIUS_PACKET or NULL on error.
4726 RADIUS_PACKET *rad_copy_packet(TALLOC_CTX *ctx, RADIUS_PACKET const *in)
4730 out = rad_alloc(ctx, 0);
4731 if (!out) return NULL;
4734 * Bootstrap by copying everything.
4736 memcpy(out, in, sizeof(*out));
4739 * Then reset necessary fields
4746 out->vps = paircopy(out, in->vps);