6 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
7 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
8 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
9 * (at your option) any later version.
11 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
12 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
13 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
14 * GNU General Public License for more details.
16 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
17 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
18 * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
20 * Copyright 2001 hereUare Communications, Inc. <raghud@hereuare.com>
21 * Copyright 2003 Alan DeKok <aland@freeradius.org>
22 * Copyright 2006 The FreeRADIUS server project
25 #include <freeradius-devel/ident.h>
28 #include <freeradius-devel/autoconf.h>
29 #include <freeradius-devel/radiusd.h>
30 #include <freeradius-devel/process.h>
31 #include <freeradius-devel/rad_assert.h>
33 #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
38 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_RAND_H
39 #include <openssl/rand.h>
42 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
43 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
47 #define PTHREAD_MUTEX_LOCK pthread_mutex_lock
48 #define PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK pthread_mutex_unlock
50 #define PTHREAD_MUTEX_LOCK(_x)
51 #define PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(_x)
56 static void record_init(record_t *buf);
57 static void record_close(record_t *buf);
58 static unsigned int record_plus(record_t *buf, const void *ptr,
60 static unsigned int record_minus(record_t *buf, void *ptr,
63 tls_session_t *tls_new_client_session(fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf, int fd)
66 tls_session_t *ssn = NULL;
68 ssn = (tls_session_t *) malloc(sizeof(*ssn));
69 memset(ssn, 0, sizeof(*ssn));
72 ssn->ssl = SSL_new(ssn->ctx);
73 rad_assert(ssn->ssl != NULL);
76 * Add the message callback to identify what type of
77 * message/handshake is passed
79 SSL_set_msg_callback(ssn->ssl, cbtls_msg);
80 SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssn->ssl, ssn);
81 SSL_set_info_callback(ssn->ssl, cbtls_info);
84 * Always verify the peer certificate.
86 DEBUG2("Requiring Server certificate");
87 verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
88 verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT;
89 SSL_set_verify(ssn->ssl, verify_mode, cbtls_verify);
91 SSL_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF, (void *)conf);
92 SSL_set_fd(ssn->ssl, fd);
93 if (SSL_connect(ssn->ssl) <= 0) {
95 while ((err = ERR_get_error())) {
96 DEBUG("OpenSSL Err says %s",
97 ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
106 tls_session_t *tls_new_session(fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf, REQUEST *request,
109 tls_session_t *state = NULL;
115 * Manually flush the sessions every so often. If HALF
116 * of the session lifetime has passed since we last
117 * flushed, then flush it again.
119 * FIXME: Also do it every N sessions?
121 if (conf->session_cache_enable &&
122 ((conf->session_last_flushed + (conf->session_timeout * 1800)) <= request->timestamp)){
123 RDEBUG2("Flushing SSL sessions (of #%ld)",
124 SSL_CTX_sess_number(conf->ctx));
126 SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(conf->ctx, request->timestamp);
127 conf->session_last_flushed = request->timestamp;
130 if ((new_tls = SSL_new(conf->ctx)) == NULL) {
131 radlog(L_ERR, "SSL: Error creating new SSL: %s",
132 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
136 /* We use the SSL's "app_data" to indicate a call-back */
137 SSL_set_app_data(new_tls, NULL);
139 state = (tls_session_t *)malloc(sizeof(*state));
140 memset(state, 0, sizeof(*state));
143 state->ctx = conf->ctx;
144 state->ssl = new_tls;
147 * Initialize callbacks
149 state->record_init = record_init;
150 state->record_close = record_close;
151 state->record_plus = record_plus;
152 state->record_minus = record_minus;
155 * Create & hook the BIOs to handle the dirty side of the
156 * SSL. This is *very important* as we want to handle
157 * the transmission part. Now the only IO interface
158 * that SSL is aware of, is our defined BIO buffers.
160 * This means that all SSL IO is done to/from memory,
161 * and we can update those BIOs from the packets we've
164 state->into_ssl = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
165 state->from_ssl = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
166 SSL_set_bio(state->ssl, state->into_ssl, state->from_ssl);
169 * Add the message callback to identify what type of
170 * message/handshake is passed
172 SSL_set_msg_callback(new_tls, cbtls_msg);
173 SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(new_tls, state);
174 SSL_set_info_callback(new_tls, cbtls_info);
177 * In Server mode we only accept.
179 SSL_set_accept_state(state->ssl);
182 * Verify the peer certificate, if asked.
185 RDEBUG2("Requiring client certificate");
186 verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
187 verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT;
188 verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE;
190 SSL_set_verify(state->ssl, verify_mode, cbtls_verify);
192 SSL_set_ex_data(state->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF, (void *)conf);
193 state->length_flag = conf->include_length;
196 * We use default fragment size, unless the Framed-MTU
197 * tells us it's too big. Note that we do NOT account
198 * for the EAP-TLS headers if conf->fragment_size is
199 * large, because that config item looks to be confusing.
201 * i.e. it should REALLY be called MTU, and the code here
202 * should figure out what that means for TLS fragment size.
203 * asking the administrator to know the internal details
204 * of EAP-TLS in order to calculate fragment sizes is
207 state->offset = conf->fragment_size;
208 vp = pairfind(request->packet->vps, PW_FRAMED_MTU, 0);
209 if (vp && (vp->vp_integer > 100) && (vp->vp_integer < state->offset)) {
210 state->offset = vp->vp_integer;
213 if (conf->session_cache_enable) {
214 state->allow_session_resumption = 1; /* otherwise it's zero */
223 * Print out some text describing the error.
225 static int int_ssl_check(REQUEST *request, SSL *s, int ret, const char *text)
230 if ((l = ERR_get_error()) != 0) {
231 const char *p = ERR_error_string(l, NULL);
234 radlog(L_ERR, "SSL error %s", p);
237 vp = pairmake("Module-Failure-Message", p, T_OP_ADD);
238 if (vp) pairadd(&request->packet->vps, vp);
241 e = SSL_get_error(s, ret);
245 * These seem to be harmless and already "dealt
246 * with" by our non-blocking environment. NB:
247 * "ZERO_RETURN" is the clean "error"
248 * indicating a successfully closed SSL
249 * tunnel. We let this happen because our IO
250 * loop should not appear to have broken on
251 * this condition - and outside the IO loop, the
252 * "shutdown" state is checked.
254 * Don't print anything if we ignore the error.
257 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
258 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
259 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
260 case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
264 * These seem to be indications of a genuine
265 * error that should result in the SSL tunnel
266 * being regarded as "dead".
268 case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
269 radlog(L_ERR, "SSL: %s failed in a system call (%d), TLS session fails.",
274 radlog(L_ERR, "SSL: %s failed inside of TLS (%d), TLS session fails.",
280 * For any other errors that (a) exist, and (b)
281 * crop up - we need to interpret what to do with
282 * them - so "politely inform" the caller that
283 * the code needs updating here.
285 radlog(L_ERR, "SSL: FATAL SSL error ..... %d\n", e);
293 * We are the server, we always get the dirty data
294 * (Handshake data is also considered as dirty data)
295 * During handshake, since SSL API handles itself,
296 * After clean-up, dirty_out will be filled with
297 * the data required for handshaking. So we check
298 * if dirty_out is empty then we simply send it back.
299 * As of now, if handshake is successful, then we keep going,
302 * Fill the Bio with the dirty data to clean it
303 * Get the cleaned data from SSL, if it is not Handshake data
305 int tls_handshake_recv(REQUEST *request, tls_session_t *ssn)
309 err = BIO_write(ssn->into_ssl, ssn->dirty_in.data, ssn->dirty_in.used);
310 if (err != (int) ssn->dirty_in.used) {
311 RDEBUG("Failed writing %d to SSL BIO: %d", ssn->dirty_in.used,
313 record_init(&ssn->dirty_in);
316 record_init(&ssn->dirty_in);
318 err = SSL_read(ssn->ssl, ssn->clean_out.data + ssn->clean_out.used,
319 sizeof(ssn->clean_out.data) - ssn->clean_out.used);
321 ssn->clean_out.used += err;
325 if (!int_ssl_check(request, ssn->ssl, err, "SSL_read")) {
329 /* Some Extra STATE information for easy debugging */
330 if (SSL_is_init_finished(ssn->ssl)) {
331 DEBUG2("SSL Connection Established\n");
333 if (SSL_in_init(ssn->ssl)) {
334 DEBUG2("In SSL Handshake Phase\n");
336 if (SSL_in_before(ssn->ssl)) {
337 DEBUG2("Before SSL Handshake Phase\n");
339 if (SSL_in_accept_init(ssn->ssl)) {
340 DEBUG2("In SSL Accept mode \n");
342 if (SSL_in_connect_init(ssn->ssl)) {
343 DEBUG2("In SSL Connect mode \n");
346 err = BIO_ctrl_pending(ssn->from_ssl);
348 err = BIO_read(ssn->from_ssl, ssn->dirty_out.data,
349 sizeof(ssn->dirty_out.data));
351 ssn->dirty_out.used = err;
353 } else if (BIO_should_retry(ssn->from_ssl)) {
354 record_init(&ssn->dirty_in);
355 DEBUG2(" tls: Asking for more data in tunnel");
359 int_ssl_check(request, ssn->ssl, err, "BIO_read");
360 record_init(&ssn->dirty_in);
364 DEBUG2("SSL Application Data");
365 /* Its clean application data, do whatever we want */
366 record_init(&ssn->clean_out);
369 /* We are done with dirty_in, reinitialize it */
370 record_init(&ssn->dirty_in);
375 * Take clear-text user data, and encrypt it into the output buffer,
376 * to send to the client at the other end of the SSL connection.
378 int tls_handshake_send(REQUEST *request, tls_session_t *ssn)
383 * If there's un-encrypted data in 'clean_in', then write
384 * that data to the SSL session, and then call the BIO function
385 * to get that encrypted data from the SSL session, into
386 * a buffer which we can then package into an EAP packet.
388 * Based on Server's logic this clean_in is expected to
389 * contain the data to send to the client.
391 if (ssn->clean_in.used > 0) {
394 written = SSL_write(ssn->ssl, ssn->clean_in.data, ssn->clean_in.used);
395 record_minus(&ssn->clean_in, NULL, written);
397 /* Get the dirty data from Bio to send it */
398 err = BIO_read(ssn->from_ssl, ssn->dirty_out.data,
399 sizeof(ssn->dirty_out.data));
401 ssn->dirty_out.used = err;
403 int_ssl_check(request, ssn->ssl, err, "handshake_send");
410 void session_init(tls_session_t *ssn)
413 ssn->into_ssl = ssn->from_ssl = NULL;
414 record_init(&ssn->clean_in);
415 record_init(&ssn->clean_out);
416 record_init(&ssn->dirty_in);
417 record_init(&ssn->dirty_out);
419 memset(&ssn->info, 0, sizeof(ssn->info));
423 ssn->tls_msg_len = 0;
424 ssn->length_flag = 0;
426 ssn->free_opaque = NULL;
429 void session_close(tls_session_t *ssn)
431 if (ssn->ssl->session) {
434 vp = SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(ssn->ssl->session,
435 FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_VPS);
436 if (vp) pairfree(&vp);
439 SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(ssn->ssl, 1);
440 SSL_shutdown(ssn->ssl);
446 * WARNING: SSL_free seems to decrement the reference counts already,
447 * so doing this might crash the application.
450 BIO_free(ssn->into_ssl);
452 BIO_free(ssn->from_ssl);
454 record_close(&ssn->clean_in);
455 record_close(&ssn->clean_out);
456 record_close(&ssn->dirty_in);
457 record_close(&ssn->dirty_out);
461 void session_free(void *ssn)
463 tls_session_t *sess = (tls_session_t *)ssn;
468 * Free any opaque TTLS or PEAP data.
470 if ((sess->opaque) && (sess->free_opaque)) {
471 sess->free_opaque(sess->opaque);
480 static void record_init(record_t *rec)
485 static void record_close(record_t *rec)
492 * Copy data to the intermediate buffer, before we send
495 static unsigned int record_plus(record_t *rec, const void *ptr,
498 unsigned int added = MAX_RECORD_SIZE - rec->used;
504 memcpy(rec->data + rec->used, ptr, added);
510 * Take data from the buffer, and give it to the caller.
512 static unsigned int record_minus(record_t *rec, void *ptr,
515 unsigned int taken = rec->used;
522 memcpy(ptr, rec->data, taken);
526 * This is pretty bad...
529 memmove(rec->data, rec->data + taken, rec->used);
533 void tls_session_information(tls_session_t *tls_session)
535 const char *str_write_p, *str_version, *str_content_type = "";
536 const char *str_details1 = "", *str_details2= "";
540 * Don't print this out in the normal course of
543 if (debug_flag == 0) {
547 str_write_p = tls_session->info.origin ? ">>>" : "<<<";
549 switch (tls_session->info.version)
552 str_version = "SSL 2.0";
555 str_version = "SSL 3.0 ";
558 str_version = "TLS 1.0 ";
561 str_version = "Unknown TLS version";
565 if (tls_session->info.version == SSL3_VERSION ||
566 tls_session->info.version == TLS1_VERSION) {
567 switch (tls_session->info.content_type) {
568 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
569 str_content_type = "ChangeCipherSpec";
572 str_content_type = "Alert";
574 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
575 str_content_type = "Handshake";
577 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
578 str_content_type = "ApplicationData";
581 str_content_type = "UnknownContentType";
585 if (tls_session->info.content_type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
586 str_details1 = ", ???";
588 if (tls_session->info.record_len == 2) {
590 switch (tls_session->info.alert_level) {
591 case SSL3_AL_WARNING:
592 str_details1 = ", warning";
595 str_details1 = ", fatal";
599 str_details2 = " ???";
600 switch (tls_session->info.alert_description) {
601 case SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
602 str_details2 = " close_notify";
604 case SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
605 str_details2 = " unexpected_message";
607 case SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
608 str_details2 = " bad_record_mac";
610 case TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
611 str_details2 = " decryption_failed";
613 case TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
614 str_details2 = " record_overflow";
616 case SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
617 str_details2 = " decompression_failure";
619 case SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
620 str_details2 = " handshake_failure";
622 case SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
623 str_details2 = " bad_certificate";
625 case SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
626 str_details2 = " unsupported_certificate";
628 case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
629 str_details2 = " certificate_revoked";
631 case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
632 str_details2 = " certificate_expired";
634 case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
635 str_details2 = " certificate_unknown";
637 case SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
638 str_details2 = " illegal_parameter";
640 case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
641 str_details2 = " unknown_ca";
643 case TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
644 str_details2 = " access_denied";
646 case TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
647 str_details2 = " decode_error";
649 case TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
650 str_details2 = " decrypt_error";
652 case TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
653 str_details2 = " export_restriction";
655 case TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
656 str_details2 = " protocol_version";
658 case TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
659 str_details2 = " insufficient_security";
661 case TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
662 str_details2 = " internal_error";
664 case TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
665 str_details2 = " user_canceled";
667 case TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
668 str_details2 = " no_renegotiation";
674 if (tls_session->info.content_type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
675 str_details1 = "???";
677 if (tls_session->info.record_len > 0)
678 switch (tls_session->info.handshake_type)
680 case SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST:
681 str_details1 = ", HelloRequest";
683 case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO:
684 str_details1 = ", ClientHello";
686 case SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO:
687 str_details1 = ", ServerHello";
689 case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE:
690 str_details1 = ", Certificate";
692 case SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:
693 str_details1 = ", ServerKeyExchange";
695 case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
696 str_details1 = ", CertificateRequest";
698 case SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE:
699 str_details1 = ", ServerHelloDone";
701 case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
702 str_details1 = ", CertificateVerify";
704 case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:
705 str_details1 = ", ClientKeyExchange";
707 case SSL3_MT_FINISHED:
708 str_details1 = ", Finished";
714 snprintf(tls_session->info.info_description,
715 sizeof(tls_session->info.info_description),
716 "%s %s%s [length %04lx]%s%s\n",
717 str_write_p, str_version, str_content_type,
718 (unsigned long)tls_session->info.record_len,
719 str_details1, str_details2);
721 request = SSL_get_ex_data(tls_session->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST);
723 RDEBUG2("%s\n", tls_session->info.info_description);
726 static CONF_PARSER cache_config[] = {
727 { "enable", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
728 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, session_cache_enable), NULL, "no" },
729 { "lifetime", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
730 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, session_timeout), NULL, "24" },
731 { "max_entries", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
732 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, session_cache_size), NULL, "255" },
733 { "name", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
734 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, session_id_name), NULL, NULL},
735 { NULL, -1, 0, NULL, NULL } /* end the list */
738 static CONF_PARSER verify_config[] = {
739 { "tmpdir", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
740 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, verify_tmp_dir), NULL, NULL},
741 { "client", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
742 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, verify_client_cert_cmd), NULL, NULL},
743 { NULL, -1, 0, NULL, NULL } /* end the list */
746 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
747 static CONF_PARSER ocsp_config[] = {
748 { "enable", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
749 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, ocsp_enable), NULL, "no"},
750 { "override_cert_url", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
751 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, ocsp_override_url), NULL, "no"},
752 { "url", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
753 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, ocsp_url), NULL, NULL },
754 { NULL, -1, 0, NULL, NULL } /* end the list */
758 static CONF_PARSER tls_server_config[] = {
759 { "rsa_key_exchange", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
760 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, rsa_key), NULL, "no" },
761 { "dh_key_exchange", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
762 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, dh_key), NULL, "yes" },
763 { "rsa_key_length", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
764 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, rsa_key_length), NULL, "512" },
765 { "dh_key_length", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
766 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, dh_key_length), NULL, "512" },
767 { "verify_depth", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
768 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, verify_depth), NULL, "0" },
769 { "CA_path", PW_TYPE_FILENAME,
770 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, ca_path), NULL, NULL },
771 { "pem_file_type", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
772 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, file_type), NULL, "yes" },
773 { "private_key_file", PW_TYPE_FILENAME,
774 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, private_key_file), NULL, NULL },
775 { "certificate_file", PW_TYPE_FILENAME,
776 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, certificate_file), NULL, NULL },
777 { "CA_file", PW_TYPE_FILENAME,
778 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, ca_file), NULL, NULL },
779 { "private_key_password", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
780 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, private_key_password), NULL, NULL },
781 { "dh_file", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
782 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, dh_file), NULL, NULL },
783 { "random_file", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
784 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, random_file), NULL, NULL },
785 { "fragment_size", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
786 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, fragment_size), NULL, "1024" },
787 { "include_length", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
788 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, include_length), NULL, "yes" },
789 { "check_crl", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
790 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_crl), NULL, "no"},
791 { "allow_expired_crl", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
792 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, allow_expired_crl), NULL, NULL},
793 { "check_cert_cn", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
794 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_cert_cn), NULL, NULL},
795 { "cipher_list", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
796 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, cipher_list), NULL, NULL},
797 { "check_cert_issuer", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
798 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_cert_issuer), NULL, NULL},
799 { "make_cert_command", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
800 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, make_cert_command), NULL, NULL},
801 { "require_client_cert", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
802 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, require_client_cert), NULL, NULL },
804 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL
805 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
806 { "ecdh_curve", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
807 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, ecdh_curve), NULL, "prime256v1"},
811 { "cache", PW_TYPE_SUBSECTION, 0, NULL, (const void *) cache_config },
813 { "verify", PW_TYPE_SUBSECTION, 0, NULL, (const void *) verify_config },
815 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
816 { "ocsp", PW_TYPE_SUBSECTION, 0, NULL, (const void *) ocsp_config },
819 { NULL, -1, 0, NULL, NULL } /* end the list */
823 static CONF_PARSER tls_client_config[] = {
824 { "rsa_key_exchange", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
825 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, rsa_key), NULL, "no" },
826 { "dh_key_exchange", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
827 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, dh_key), NULL, "yes" },
828 { "rsa_key_length", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
829 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, rsa_key_length), NULL, "512" },
830 { "dh_key_length", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
831 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, dh_key_length), NULL, "512" },
832 { "verify_depth", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
833 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, verify_depth), NULL, "0" },
834 { "CA_path", PW_TYPE_FILENAME,
835 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, ca_path), NULL, NULL },
836 { "pem_file_type", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
837 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, file_type), NULL, "yes" },
838 { "private_key_file", PW_TYPE_FILENAME,
839 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, private_key_file), NULL, NULL },
840 { "certificate_file", PW_TYPE_FILENAME,
841 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, certificate_file), NULL, NULL },
842 { "CA_file", PW_TYPE_FILENAME,
843 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, ca_file), NULL, NULL },
844 { "private_key_password", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
845 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, private_key_password), NULL, NULL },
846 { "dh_file", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
847 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, dh_file), NULL, NULL },
848 { "random_file", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
849 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, random_file), NULL, NULL },
850 { "fragment_size", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
851 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, fragment_size), NULL, "1024" },
852 { "include_length", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
853 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, include_length), NULL, "yes" },
854 { "check_crl", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
855 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_crl), NULL, "no"},
856 { "check_cert_cn", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
857 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_cert_cn), NULL, NULL},
858 { "cipher_list", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
859 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, cipher_list), NULL, NULL},
860 { "check_cert_issuer", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
861 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_cert_issuer), NULL, NULL},
863 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL
864 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
865 { "ecdh_curve", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
866 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, ecdh_curve), NULL, "prime256v1"},
870 { NULL, -1, 0, NULL, NULL } /* end the list */
875 * TODO: Check for the type of key exchange * like conf->dh_key
877 static int load_dh_params(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *file)
882 if ((bio = BIO_new_file(file, "r")) == NULL) {
883 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Unable to open DH file - %s", file);
887 dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
890 DEBUG2("WARNING: rlm_eap_tls: Unable to set DH parameters. DH cipher suites may not work!");
891 DEBUG2("WARNING: Fix this by running the OpenSSL command listed in eap.conf");
895 if (SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh) < 0) {
896 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Unable to set DH parameters");
907 * Generate ephemeral RSA keys.
909 static int generate_eph_rsa_key(SSL_CTX *ctx)
913 rsa = RSA_generate_key(512, RSA_F4, NULL, NULL);
915 if (!SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(ctx, rsa)) {
916 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Couldn't set ephemeral RSA key");
926 * These functions don't do anything other than print debugging
929 * FIXME: Write sessions to some long-term storage, so that
930 * session resumption can still occur after the server
933 #define MAX_SESSION_SIZE (256)
935 static void cbtls_remove_session(UNUSED SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess)
938 char buffer[2 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1];
940 size = sess->session_id_length;
941 if (size > MAX_SESSION_SIZE) size = MAX_SESSION_SIZE;
943 fr_bin2hex(sess->session_id, buffer, size);
945 DEBUG2(" SSL: Removing session %s from the cache", buffer);
946 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
951 static int cbtls_new_session(UNUSED SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *sess)
954 char buffer[2 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1];
956 size = sess->session_id_length;
957 if (size > MAX_SESSION_SIZE) size = MAX_SESSION_SIZE;
959 fr_bin2hex(sess->session_id, buffer, size);
961 DEBUG2(" SSL: adding session %s to cache", buffer);
966 static SSL_SESSION *cbtls_get_session(UNUSED SSL *s,
967 unsigned char *data, int len,
971 char buffer[2 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1];
974 if (size > MAX_SESSION_SIZE) size = MAX_SESSION_SIZE;
976 fr_bin2hex(data, buffer, size);
978 DEBUG2(" SSL: Client requested nonexistent cached session %s",
984 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
986 * This function extracts the OCSP Responder URL
987 * from an existing x509 certificate.
989 static int ocsp_parse_cert_url(X509 *cert, char **phost, char **pport,
990 char **ppath, int *pssl)
994 AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS *aia;
995 ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *ad;
997 aia = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_info_access, NULL, NULL);
999 for (i = 0; i < sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(aia); i++) {
1000 ad = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_value(aia, 0);
1001 if (OBJ_obj2nid(ad->method) == NID_ad_OCSP) {
1002 if (ad->location->type == GEN_URI) {
1003 if(OCSP_parse_url(ad->location->d.ia5->data,
1004 phost, pport, ppath, pssl))
1013 * This function sends a OCSP request to a defined OCSP responder
1014 * and checks the OCSP response for correctness.
1017 /* Maximum leeway in validity period: default 5 minutes */
1018 #define MAX_VALIDITY_PERIOD (5 * 60)
1020 static int ocsp_check(X509_STORE *store, X509 *issuer_cert, X509 *client_cert,
1021 fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf)
1023 OCSP_CERTID *certid;
1025 OCSP_RESPONSE *resp;
1026 OCSP_BASICRESP *bresp = NULL;
1031 long nsec = MAX_VALIDITY_PERIOD, maxage = -1;
1032 BIO *cbio, *bio_out;
1035 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
1039 * Create OCSP Request
1041 certid = OCSP_cert_to_id(NULL, client_cert, issuer_cert);
1042 req = OCSP_REQUEST_new();
1043 OCSP_request_add0_id(req, certid);
1044 OCSP_request_add1_nonce(req, NULL, 8);
1047 * Send OCSP Request and get OCSP Response
1050 /* Get OCSP responder URL */
1051 if(conf->ocsp_override_url) {
1052 OCSP_parse_url(conf->ocsp_url, &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl);
1055 ocsp_parse_cert_url(client_cert, &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl);
1058 DEBUG2("[ocsp] --> Responder URL = http://%s:%s%s", host, port, path);
1060 /* Setup BIO socket to OCSP responder */
1061 cbio = BIO_new_connect(host);
1063 bio_out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
1065 BIO_set_conn_port(cbio, port);
1066 BIO_do_connect(cbio);
1068 /* Send OCSP request and wait for response */
1069 resp = OCSP_sendreq_bio(cbio, path, req);
1071 radlog(L_ERR, "Error: Couldn't get OCSP response");
1075 /* Verify OCSP response status */
1076 status = OCSP_response_status(resp);
1077 DEBUG2("[ocsp] --> Response status: %s",OCSP_response_status_str(status));
1078 if(status != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL) {
1079 radlog(L_ERR, "Error: OCSP response status: %s", OCSP_response_status_str(status));
1082 bresp = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp);
1083 if(OCSP_check_nonce(req, bresp)!=1) {
1084 radlog(L_ERR, "Error: OCSP response has wrong nonce value");
1087 if(OCSP_basic_verify(bresp, NULL, store, 0)!=1){
1088 radlog(L_ERR, "Error: Couldn't verify OCSP basic response");
1092 /* Verify OCSP cert status */
1093 if(!OCSP_resp_find_status(bresp, certid, &status, &reason,
1094 &rev, &thisupd, &nextupd)) {
1095 radlog(L_ERR, "ERROR: No Status found.\n");
1099 if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, nsec, maxage)) {
1100 BIO_puts(bio_out, "WARNING: Status times invalid.\n");
1101 ERR_print_errors(bio_out);
1104 BIO_puts(bio_out, "\tThis Update: ");
1105 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bio_out, thisupd);
1106 BIO_puts(bio_out, "\n");
1107 BIO_puts(bio_out, "\tNext Update: ");
1108 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bio_out, nextupd);
1109 BIO_puts(bio_out, "\n");
1112 case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD:
1113 DEBUG2("[oscp] --> Cert status: good");
1118 /* REVOKED / UNKNOWN */
1119 DEBUG2("[ocsp] --> Cert status: %s",OCSP_cert_status_str(status));
1121 DEBUG2("[ocsp] --> Reason: %s", OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason));
1122 BIO_puts(bio_out, "\tRevocation Time: ");
1123 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bio_out, rev);
1124 BIO_puts(bio_out, "\n");
1129 /* Free OCSP Stuff */
1130 OCSP_REQUEST_free(req);
1131 OCSP_RESPONSE_free(resp);
1136 OCSP_BASICRESP_free(bresp);
1139 DEBUG2("[ocsp] --> Certificate is valid!");
1141 DEBUG2("[ocsp] --> Certificate has been expired/revoked!");
1146 #endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H */
1149 * For creating certificate attributes.
1151 static const char *cert_attr_names[5][2] = {
1152 { "TLS-Client-Cert-Serial", "TLS-Cert-Serial" },
1153 { "TLS-Client-Cert-Expiration", "TLS-Cert-Expiration" },
1154 { "TLS-Client-Cert-Subject", "TLS-Cert-Subject" },
1155 { "TLS-Client-Cert-Issuer", "TLS-Cert-Issuer" },
1156 { "TLS-Client-Cert-Common-Name", "TLS-Cert-Common-Name" }
1159 #define FR_TLS_SERIAL (0)
1160 #define FR_TLS_EXPIRATION (1)
1161 #define FR_TLS_SUBJECT (2)
1162 #define FR_TLS_ISSUER (3)
1163 #define FR_TLS_CN (4)
1166 * Before trusting a certificate, you must make sure that the
1167 * certificate is 'valid'. There are several steps that your
1168 * application can take in determining if a certificate is
1169 * valid. Commonly used steps are:
1171 * 1.Verifying the certificate's signature, and verifying that
1172 * the certificate has been issued by a trusted Certificate
1175 * 2.Verifying that the certificate is valid for the present date
1176 * (i.e. it is being presented within its validity dates).
1178 * 3.Verifying that the certificate has not been revoked by its
1179 * issuing Certificate Authority, by checking with respect to a
1180 * Certificate Revocation List (CRL).
1182 * 4.Verifying that the credentials presented by the certificate
1183 * fulfill additional requirements specific to the application,
1184 * such as with respect to access control lists or with respect
1185 * to OCSP (Online Certificate Status Processing).
1187 * NOTE: This callback will be called multiple times based on the
1188 * depth of the root certificate chain
1190 int cbtls_verify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1192 char subject[1024]; /* Used for the subject name */
1193 char issuer[1024]; /* Used for the issuer name */
1194 char common_name[1024];
1199 int err, depth, lookup;
1200 fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf;
1203 ASN1_INTEGER *sn = NULL;
1204 ASN1_TIME *asn_time = NULL;
1207 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
1208 X509_STORE *ocsp_store = NULL;
1212 client_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
1213 err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
1214 depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
1219 * Log client/issuing cert. If there's an error, log
1222 if ((lookup > 1) && !my_ok) lookup = 1;
1225 * Retrieve the pointer to the SSL of the connection currently treated
1226 * and the application specific data stored into the SSL object.
1228 ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
1229 conf = (fr_tls_server_conf_t *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF);
1230 if (!conf) return 1;
1232 request = (REQUEST *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST);
1234 if (!request) return 1; /* FIXME: outbound TLS */
1236 rad_assert(request != NULL);
1237 certs = (VALUE_PAIR **)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CERTS);
1238 rad_assert(certs != NULL);
1239 identity = (char **)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_IDENTITY);
1240 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
1241 ocsp_store = (X509_STORE *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_STORE);
1246 * Get the Serial Number
1249 sn = X509_get_serialNumber(client_cert);
1252 * For this next bit, we create the attributes *only* if
1253 * we're at the client or issuing certificate, AND we
1254 * have a user identity. i.e. we don't create the
1255 * attributes for RadSec connections.
1258 (lookup <= 1) && sn && ((size_t) sn->length < (sizeof(buf) / 2))) {
1262 for (i = 0; i < sn->length; i++) {
1263 sprintf(p, "%02x", (unsigned int)sn->data[i]);
1267 pairmake(cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_SERIAL][lookup], buf, T_OP_SET));
1272 * Get the Expiration Date
1275 asn_time = X509_get_notAfter(client_cert);
1276 if (identity && (lookup <= 1) && asn_time &&
1277 (asn_time->length < MAX_STRING_LEN)) {
1278 memcpy(buf, (char*) asn_time->data, asn_time->length);
1279 buf[asn_time->length] = '\0';
1281 pairmake(cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_EXPIRATION][lookup], buf, T_OP_SET));
1285 * Get the Subject & Issuer
1287 subject[0] = issuer[0] = '\0';
1288 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(client_cert), subject,
1290 subject[sizeof(subject) - 1] = '\0';
1291 if (identity && (lookup <= 1) && subject[0] &&
1292 (strlen(subject) < MAX_STRING_LEN)) {
1294 pairmake(cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_SUBJECT][lookup], subject, T_OP_SET));
1297 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert), issuer,
1299 issuer[sizeof(issuer) - 1] = '\0';
1300 if (identity && (lookup <= 1) && issuer[0] &&
1301 (strlen(issuer) < MAX_STRING_LEN)) {
1303 pairmake(cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_ISSUER][lookup], issuer, T_OP_SET));
1307 * Get the Common Name
1309 X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(client_cert),
1310 NID_commonName, common_name, sizeof(common_name));
1311 common_name[sizeof(common_name) - 1] = '\0';
1312 if (identity && (lookup <= 1) && common_name[0] &&
1313 (strlen(common_name) < MAX_STRING_LEN)) {
1315 pairmake(cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_CN][lookup], common_name, T_OP_SET));
1319 * If the CRL has expired, that might still be OK.
1322 (conf->allow_expired_crl) &&
1323 (err == X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED)) {
1325 X509_STORE_CTX_set_error( ctx, 0 );
1329 const char *p = X509_verify_cert_error_string(err);
1330 radlog(L_ERR,"--> verify error:num=%d:%s\n",err, p);
1331 radius_pairmake(request, &request->packet->vps,
1332 "Module-Failure-Message", p, T_OP_SET);
1336 switch (ctx->error) {
1338 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
1339 radlog(L_ERR, "issuer= %s\n", issuer);
1341 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
1342 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
1343 radlog(L_ERR, "notBefore=");
1345 ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get_notBefore(ctx->current_cert));
1348 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
1349 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
1350 radlog(L_ERR, "notAfter=");
1352 ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get_notAfter(ctx->current_cert));
1358 * If we're at the actual client cert, apply additional
1363 * If the conf tells us to, check cert issuer
1364 * against the specified value and fail
1365 * verification if they don't match.
1367 if (conf->check_cert_issuer &&
1368 (strcmp(issuer, conf->check_cert_issuer) != 0)) {
1369 radlog(L_AUTH, "rlm_eap_tls: Certificate issuer (%s) does not match specified value (%s)!", issuer, conf->check_cert_issuer);
1374 * If the conf tells us to, check the CN in the
1375 * cert against xlat'ed value, but only if the
1376 * previous checks passed.
1378 if (my_ok && conf->check_cert_cn) {
1379 if (!radius_xlat(cn_str, sizeof(cn_str), conf->check_cert_cn, request, NULL)) {
1380 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls (%s): xlat failed.",
1381 conf->check_cert_cn);
1382 /* if this fails, fail the verification */
1385 RDEBUG2("checking certificate CN (%s) with xlat'ed value (%s)", common_name, cn_str);
1386 if (strcmp(cn_str, common_name) != 0) {
1387 radlog(L_AUTH, "rlm_eap_tls: Certificate CN (%s) does not match specified value (%s)!", common_name, cn_str);
1391 } /* check_cert_cn */
1393 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
1394 if (my_ok && conf->ocsp_enable){
1395 RDEBUG2("--> Starting OCSP Request");
1396 if(X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer(&issuer_cert, ctx, client_cert)!=1) {
1397 radlog(L_ERR, "Error: Couldn't get issuer_cert for %s", common_name);
1399 my_ok = ocsp_check(ocsp_store, issuer_cert, client_cert, conf);
1403 while (conf->verify_client_cert_cmd) {
1408 snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/%s.client.XXXXXXXX",
1409 conf->verify_tmp_dir, progname);
1410 fd = mkstemp(filename);
1412 RDEBUG("Failed creating file in %s: %s",
1413 conf->verify_tmp_dir, strerror(errno));
1417 fp = fdopen(fd, "w");
1419 RDEBUG("Failed opening file %s: %s",
1420 filename, strerror(errno));
1424 if (!PEM_write_X509(fp, client_cert)) {
1426 RDEBUG("Failed writing certificate to file");
1431 if (!radius_pairmake(request, &request->packet->vps,
1432 "TLS-Client-Cert-Filename",
1433 filename, T_OP_SET)) {
1434 RDEBUG("Failed creating TLS-Client-Cert-Filename");
1439 RDEBUG("Verifying client certificate: %s",
1440 conf->verify_client_cert_cmd);
1441 if (radius_exec_program(conf->verify_client_cert_cmd,
1442 request, 1, NULL, 0,
1443 request->packet->vps,
1445 radlog(L_AUTH, "rlm_eap_tls: Certificate CN (%s) fails external verification!", common_name);
1448 RDEBUG("Client certificate CN %s passed external validation", common_name);
1459 if (debug_flag > 0) {
1460 RDEBUG2("chain-depth=%d, ", depth);
1461 RDEBUG2("error=%d", err);
1463 if (identity) RDEBUG2("--> User-Name = %s", *identity);
1464 RDEBUG2("--> BUF-Name = %s", common_name);
1465 RDEBUG2("--> subject = %s", subject);
1466 RDEBUG2("--> issuer = %s", issuer);
1467 RDEBUG2("--> verify return:%d", my_ok);
1473 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
1475 * Create Global X509 revocation store and use it to verify
1478 * - Load the trusted CAs
1479 * - Load the trusted issuer certificates
1481 static X509_STORE *init_revocation_store(fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf)
1483 X509_STORE *store = NULL;
1485 store = X509_STORE_new();
1487 /* Load the CAs we trust */
1488 if (conf->ca_file || conf->ca_path)
1489 if(!X509_STORE_load_locations(store, conf->ca_file, conf->ca_path)) {
1490 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: X509_STORE error %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
1491 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Error reading Trusted root CA list %s",conf->ca_file );
1495 #ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
1496 if (conf->check_crl)
1497 X509_STORE_set_flags(store, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
1501 #endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H */
1503 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL
1504 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1505 static int set_ecdh_curve(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *ecdh_curve)
1510 if (!ecdh_curve || !*ecdh_curve) return 0;
1512 nid = OBJ_sn2nid(ecdh_curve);
1514 radlog(L_ERR, "Unknown ecdh_curve \"%s\"", ecdh_curve);
1518 ecdh = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
1520 radlog(L_ERR, "Unable to create new curve \"%s\"", ecdh_curve);
1524 SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(ctx, ecdh);
1526 SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE);
1536 * Create Global context SSL and use it in every new session
1538 * - Load the trusted CAs
1539 * - Load the Private key & the certificate
1540 * - Set the Context options & Verify options
1542 static SSL_CTX *init_tls_ctx(fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf)
1544 const SSL_METHOD *meth;
1546 X509_STORE *certstore;
1547 int verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
1548 int ctx_options = 0;
1552 * Add all the default ciphers and message digests
1553 * Create our context.
1556 SSL_load_error_strings();
1559 * SHA256 is in all versions of OpenSSL, but isn't
1560 * initialized by default. It's needed for WiMAX
1563 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_SHA256
1564 EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
1567 meth = TLSv1_method();
1568 ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth);
1571 * Identify the type of certificates that needs to be loaded
1573 if (conf->file_type) {
1574 type = SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
1576 type = SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1;
1580 * Set the password to load private key
1582 if (conf->private_key_password) {
1585 * We don't want to put the private key password in eap.conf, so check
1586 * for our special string which indicates we should get the password
1589 const char* special_string = "Apple:UseCertAdmin";
1590 if (strncmp(conf->private_key_password,
1592 strlen(special_string)) == 0)
1595 const long max_password_len = 128;
1596 snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd) - 1,
1597 "/usr/sbin/certadmin --get-private-key-passphrase \"%s\"",
1598 conf->private_key_file);
1600 DEBUG2("rlm_eap: Getting private key passphrase using command \"%s\"", cmd);
1602 FILE* cmd_pipe = popen(cmd, "r");
1604 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: %s command failed. Unable to get private_key_password", cmd);
1605 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: Error reading private_key_file %s", conf->private_key_file);
1609 free(conf->private_key_password);
1610 conf->private_key_password = malloc(max_password_len * sizeof(char));
1611 if (!conf->private_key_password) {
1612 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: Can't malloc space for private_key_password");
1613 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: Error reading private_key_file %s", conf->private_key_file);
1618 fgets(conf->private_key_password, max_password_len, cmd_pipe);
1621 /* Get rid of newline at end of password. */
1622 conf->private_key_password[strlen(conf->private_key_password) - 1] = '\0';
1623 DEBUG2("rlm_eap: Password from command = \"%s\"", conf->private_key_password);
1626 SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ctx, conf->private_key_password);
1627 SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ctx, cbtls_password);
1631 * Load our keys and certificates
1633 * If certificates are of type PEM then we can make use
1634 * of cert chain authentication using openssl api call
1635 * SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file. Please see how
1636 * the cert chain needs to be given in PEM from
1639 if (!conf->certificate_file) goto load_ca;
1641 if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
1642 if (!(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, conf->certificate_file))) {
1643 radlog(L_ERR, "Error reading certificate file %s:%s",
1644 conf->certificate_file,
1645 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
1649 } else if (!(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, conf->certificate_file, type))) {
1650 radlog(L_ERR, "Error reading certificate file %s:%s",
1651 conf->certificate_file,
1652 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
1656 /* Load the CAs we trust */
1658 if (conf->ca_file || conf->ca_path) {
1659 if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, conf->ca_file, conf->ca_path)) {
1660 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: SSL error %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
1661 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Error reading Trusted root CA list %s",conf->ca_file );
1665 if (conf->ca_file && *conf->ca_file) SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(conf->ca_file));
1667 if (conf->private_key_file) {
1668 if (!(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, conf->private_key_file, type))) {
1669 radlog(L_ERR, "Failed reading private key file %s:%s",
1670 conf->private_key_file,
1671 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
1676 * Check if the loaded private key is the right one
1678 if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) {
1679 radlog(L_ERR, "Private key does not match the certificate public key");
1687 ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
1688 ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
1689 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
1690 ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET ;
1694 * SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used in order to prevent
1695 * small subgroup attacks and forward secrecy. Always
1698 * SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE has an impact on the computer
1699 * time needed during negotiation, but it is not very
1702 ctx_options |= SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE;
1705 * SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS to work around issues
1706 * in Windows Vista client.
1707 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt
1708 * http://www.nabble.com/(RADIATOR)-Radiator-Version-3.16-released-t2600070.html
1710 ctx_options |= SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS;
1712 SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, ctx_options);
1715 * TODO: Set the RSA & DH
1716 * SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx, cbtls_rsa);
1717 * SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(ctx, cbtls_dh);
1721 * set the message callback to identify the type of
1722 * message. For every new session, there can be a
1723 * different callback argument.
1725 * SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(ctx, cbtls_msg);
1729 * Set eliptical curve crypto configuration.
1731 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL
1732 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH
1733 if (set_ecdh_curve(ctx, conf->ecdh_curve) < 0) {
1739 /* Set Info callback */
1740 SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, cbtls_info);
1743 * Callbacks, etc. for session resumption.
1745 if (conf->session_cache_enable) {
1746 SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(ctx, cbtls_new_session);
1747 SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(ctx, cbtls_get_session);
1748 SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(ctx, cbtls_remove_session);
1750 SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(ctx, 1);
1754 * Check the certificates for revocation.
1756 #ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
1757 if (conf->check_crl) {
1758 certstore = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx);
1759 if (certstore == NULL) {
1760 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: SSL error %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
1761 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Error reading Certificate Store");
1764 X509_STORE_set_flags(certstore, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
1770 * Always verify the peer certificate
1772 verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
1773 verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT;
1774 verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE;
1775 SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify_mode, cbtls_verify);
1777 if (conf->verify_depth) {
1778 SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(ctx, conf->verify_depth);
1781 /* Load randomness */
1782 if (!(RAND_load_file(conf->random_file, 1024*1024))) {
1783 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: SSL error %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
1784 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Error loading randomness");
1789 * Set the cipher list if we were told to
1791 if (conf->cipher_list) {
1792 if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, conf->cipher_list)) {
1793 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Error setting cipher list");
1799 * Setup session caching
1801 if (conf->session_cache_enable) {
1803 * Create a unique context Id per EAP-TLS configuration.
1805 if (conf->session_id_name) {
1806 snprintf(conf->session_context_id,
1807 sizeof(conf->session_context_id),
1808 "FreeRADIUS EAP-TLS %s",
1809 conf->session_id_name);
1811 snprintf(conf->session_context_id,
1812 sizeof(conf->session_context_id),
1813 "FreeRADIUS EAP-TLS %p", conf);
1817 * Cache it, and DON'T auto-clear it.
1819 SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR);
1821 SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx,
1822 (unsigned char *) conf->session_context_id,
1823 (unsigned int) strlen(conf->session_context_id));
1826 * Our timeout is in hours, this is in seconds.
1828 SSL_CTX_set_timeout(ctx, conf->session_timeout * 3600);
1831 * Set the maximum number of entries in the
1834 SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx, conf->session_cache_size);
1837 SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
1844 void tls_server_conf_free(fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf)
1848 if (conf->cs) cf_section_parse_free(conf->cs, conf);
1850 if (conf->ctx) SSL_CTX_free(conf->ctx);
1852 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
1853 if (conf->ocsp_store) X509_STORE_free(conf->ocsp_store);
1854 conf->ocsp_store = NULL;
1857 memset(conf, 0, sizeof(*conf));
1862 fr_tls_server_conf_t *tls_server_conf_parse(CONF_SECTION *cs)
1864 fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf;
1866 conf = malloc(sizeof(*conf));
1868 radlog(L_ERR, "Out of memory");
1871 memset(conf, 0, sizeof(*conf));
1873 if (cf_section_parse(cs, conf, tls_server_config) < 0) {
1875 tls_server_conf_free(conf);
1880 * Save people from their own stupidity.
1882 if (conf->fragment_size < 100) conf->fragment_size = 100;
1885 * This magic makes the administrators life HUGELY easier
1886 * on initial deployments.
1888 * If the server starts up in debugging mode, AND the
1889 * bootstrap command is configured, AND it exists, AND
1890 * there is no server certificate
1892 if (conf->make_cert_command && (debug_flag >= 2)) {
1895 if ((stat(conf->make_cert_command, &buf) == 0) &&
1896 (stat(conf->certificate_file, &buf) < 0) &&
1897 (errno == ENOENT) &&
1898 (radius_exec_program(conf->make_cert_command, NULL, 1,
1899 NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, 0) != 0)) {
1904 if (!conf->private_key_file) {
1905 radlog(L_ERR, "TLS Server requires a private key file");
1909 if (!conf->certificate_file) {
1910 radlog(L_ERR, "TLS Server requires a certificate file");
1917 conf->ctx = init_tls_ctx(conf);
1918 if (conf->ctx == NULL) {
1922 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
1924 * Initialize OCSP Revocation Store
1926 if (conf->ocsp_enable) {
1927 conf->ocsp_store = init_revocation_store(conf);
1928 if (conf->ocsp_store == NULL) goto error;
1930 #endif /*HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H*/
1932 if (load_dh_params(conf->ctx, conf->dh_file) < 0) {
1936 if (generate_eph_rsa_key(conf->ctx) < 0) {
1940 if (conf->verify_tmp_dir) {
1941 if (chmod(conf->verify_tmp_dir, S_IRWXU) < 0) {
1942 radlog(L_ERR, "Failed changing permissions on %s: %s", conf->verify_tmp_dir, strerror(errno));
1947 if (conf->verify_client_cert_cmd && !conf->verify_tmp_dir) {
1948 radlog(L_ERR, "You MUST set the verify directory in order to use verify_client_cmd");
1955 fr_tls_server_conf_t *tls_client_conf_parse(CONF_SECTION *cs)
1957 fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf;
1959 conf = malloc(sizeof(*conf));
1961 radlog(L_ERR, "Out of memory");
1964 memset(conf, 0, sizeof(*conf));
1966 if (cf_section_parse(cs, conf, tls_client_config) < 0) {
1968 tls_server_conf_free(conf);
1973 * Save people from their own stupidity.
1975 if (conf->fragment_size < 100) conf->fragment_size = 100;
1980 conf->ctx = init_tls_ctx(conf);
1981 if (conf->ctx == NULL) {
1985 if (load_dh_params(conf->ctx, conf->dh_file) < 0) {
1989 if (generate_eph_rsa_key(conf->ctx) < 0) {
1996 int tls_success(tls_session_t *ssn, REQUEST *request)
1998 VALUE_PAIR *vp, *vps = NULL;
1999 fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf;
2001 conf = (fr_tls_server_conf_t *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF);
2002 rad_assert(conf != NULL);
2005 * If there's no session resumption, delete the entry
2006 * from the cache. This means either it's disabled
2007 * globally for this SSL context, OR we were told to
2008 * disable it for this user.
2010 * This also means you can't turn it on just for one
2013 if ((!ssn->allow_session_resumption) ||
2014 (((vp = pairfind(request->config_items, 1127, 0)) != NULL) &&
2015 (vp->vp_integer == 0))) {
2016 SSL_CTX_remove_session(ssn->ctx,
2018 ssn->allow_session_resumption = 0;
2021 * If we're in a resumed session and it's
2024 if (SSL_session_reused(ssn->ssl)) {
2025 RDEBUG("FAIL: Forcibly stopping session resumption as it is not allowed.");
2030 * Else resumption IS allowed, so we store the
2031 * user data in the cache.
2033 } else if (!SSL_session_reused(ssn->ssl)) {
2034 RDEBUG2("Saving response in the cache");
2036 vp = paircopy2(request->reply->vps, PW_USER_NAME, 0);
2037 if (vp) pairadd(&vps, vp);
2039 vp = paircopy2(request->packet->vps, PW_STRIPPED_USER_NAME, 0);
2040 if (vp) pairadd(&vps, vp);
2042 vp = paircopy2(request->reply->vps, PW_CACHED_SESSION_POLICY, 0);
2043 if (vp) pairadd(&vps, vp);
2046 SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl->session,
2047 FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_VPS, vps);
2049 RDEBUG2("WARNING: No information to cache: session caching will be disabled for this session.");
2050 SSL_CTX_remove_session(ssn->ctx,
2055 * Else the session WAS allowed. Copy the cached
2060 vp = SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(ssn->ssl->session,
2061 FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_VPS);
2063 RDEBUG("WARNING: No information in cached session!");
2067 RDEBUG("Adding cached attributes to the reply:");
2068 debug_pair_list(vp);
2069 pairadd(&request->reply->vps, paircopy(vp));
2072 * Mark the request as resumed.
2074 vp = pairmake("EAP-Session-Resumed", "1", T_OP_SET);
2075 if (vp) pairadd(&request->packet->vps, vp);
2083 void tls_fail(tls_session_t *ssn)
2086 * Force the session to NOT be cached.
2088 SSL_CTX_remove_session(ssn->ctx, ssn->ssl->session);
2091 fr_tls_status_t tls_application_data(tls_session_t *ssn,
2098 * Decrypt the complete record.
2100 err = BIO_write(ssn->into_ssl, ssn->dirty_in.data,
2101 ssn->dirty_in.used);
2102 if (err != (int) ssn->dirty_in.used) {
2103 record_init(&ssn->dirty_in);
2104 RDEBUG("Failed writing %d to SSL BIO: %d",
2105 ssn->dirty_in.used, err);
2110 * Clear the dirty buffer now that we are done with it
2111 * and init the clean_out buffer to store decrypted data
2113 record_init(&ssn->dirty_in);
2114 record_init(&ssn->clean_out);
2117 * Read (and decrypt) the tunneled data from the
2118 * SSL session, and put it into the decrypted
2121 err = SSL_read(ssn->ssl, ssn->clean_out.data,
2122 sizeof(ssn->clean_out.data));
2127 RDEBUG("SSL_read Error");
2129 code = SSL_get_error(ssn->ssl, err);
2131 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
2132 return FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS;
2133 DEBUG("Error in fragmentation logic: SSL_WANT_READ");
2136 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
2137 DEBUG("Error in fragmentation logic: SSL_WANT_WRITE");
2141 DEBUG("Error in fragmentation logic: ?");
2144 * FIXME: Call int_ssl_check?
2152 RDEBUG("WARNING: No data inside of the tunnel.");
2156 * Passed all checks, successfully decrypted data
2158 ssn->clean_out.used = err;
2165 * Acknowledge received is for one of the following messages sent earlier
2166 * 1. Handshake completed Message, so now send, EAP-Success
2167 * 2. Alert Message, now send, EAP-Failure
2168 * 3. Fragment Message, now send, next Fragment
2170 fr_tls_status_t tls_ack_handler(tls_session_t *ssn, REQUEST *request)
2172 RDEBUG2("Received TLS ACK");
2175 radlog_request(L_ERR, 0, request, "FAIL: Unexpected ACK received. Could not obtain session information.");
2176 return FR_TLS_INVALID;
2178 if (ssn->info.initialized == 0) {
2179 RDEBUG("No SSL info available. Waiting for more SSL data.");
2180 return FR_TLS_REQUEST;
2182 if ((ssn->info.content_type == handshake) &&
2183 (ssn->info.origin == 0)) {
2184 radlog_request(L_ERR, 0, request, "FAIL: ACK without earlier message.");
2185 return FR_TLS_INVALID;
2188 switch (ssn->info.content_type) {
2190 RDEBUG2("ACK alert");
2194 if ((ssn->info.handshake_type == finished) &&
2195 (ssn->dirty_out.used == 0)) {
2196 RDEBUG2("ACK handshake is finished");
2199 * From now on all the content is
2200 * application data set it here as nobody else
2203 ssn->info.content_type = application_data;
2204 return FR_TLS_SUCCESS;
2205 } /* else more data to send */
2207 RDEBUG2("ACK handshake fragment handler");
2208 /* Fragmentation handler, send next fragment */
2209 return FR_TLS_REQUEST;
2211 case application_data:
2212 RDEBUG2("ACK handshake fragment handler in application data");
2213 return FR_TLS_REQUEST;
2216 * For the rest of the conditions, switch over
2217 * to the default section below.
2220 RDEBUG2("ACK default");
2221 radlog_request(L_ERR, 0, request, "Invalid ACK received: %d",
2222 ssn->info.content_type);
2223 return FR_TLS_INVALID;
2227 static void dump_hex(const char *msg, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len)
2231 if (debug_flag < 3) return;
2233 printf("%s %d\n", msg, (int) data_len);
2234 if (data_len > 256) data_len = 256;
2236 for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) {
2237 if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x00) printf ("%02x: ", (unsigned int) i);
2238 printf("%02x ", data[i]);
2239 if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x0f) printf ("\n");
2245 static void tls_socket_close(rad_listen_t *listener)
2247 listen_socket_t *sock = listener->data;
2249 listener->status = RAD_LISTEN_STATUS_REMOVE_FD;
2250 listener->tls = NULL; /* parent owns this! */
2254 * Decrement the number of connections.
2256 if (sock->parent->num_connections > 0) {
2257 sock->parent->num_connections--;
2259 if (sock->client->num_connections > 0) {
2260 sock->client->num_connections--;
2265 * Tell the event handler that an FD has disappeared.
2267 DEBUG("Client has closed connection");
2268 event_new_fd(listener);
2271 * Do NOT free the listener here. It's in use by
2272 * a request, and will need to hang around until
2273 * all of the requests are done.
2275 * It is instead free'd in remove_from_request_hash()
2279 static int tls_socket_write(rad_listen_t *listener, REQUEST *request)
2283 listen_socket_t *sock = listener->data;
2285 p = sock->ssn->dirty_out.data;
2287 while (p < (sock->ssn->dirty_out.data + sock->ssn->dirty_out.used)) {
2288 RDEBUG3("Writing to socket %d", request->packet->sockfd);
2289 rcode = write(request->packet->sockfd, p,
2290 (sock->ssn->dirty_out.data + sock->ssn->dirty_out.used) - p);
2292 RDEBUG("Error writing to TLS socket: %s", strerror(errno));
2294 tls_socket_close(listener);
2300 sock->ssn->dirty_out.used = 0;
2306 static int tls_socket_recv(rad_listen_t *listener)
2308 int doing_init = FALSE;
2310 RADIUS_PACKET *packet;
2312 listen_socket_t *sock = listener->data;
2313 fr_tls_status_t status;
2314 RADCLIENT *client = sock->client;
2316 if (!sock->packet) {
2317 sock->packet = rad_alloc(0);
2318 if (!sock->packet) return 0;
2320 sock->packet->sockfd = listener->fd;
2321 sock->packet->src_ipaddr = sock->other_ipaddr;
2322 sock->packet->src_port = sock->other_port;
2323 sock->packet->dst_ipaddr = sock->my_ipaddr;
2324 sock->packet->dst_port = sock->my_port;
2326 if (sock->request) sock->request->packet = sock->packet;
2330 * Allocate a REQUEST for debugging.
2332 if (!sock->request) {
2333 sock->request = request = request_alloc();
2334 if (!sock->request) {
2335 radlog(L_ERR, "Out of memory");
2339 rad_assert(request->packet == NULL);
2340 rad_assert(sock->packet != NULL);
2341 request->packet = sock->packet;
2343 request->component = "<core>";
2344 request->component = "<tls-connect>";
2347 * Not sure if we should do this on every packet...
2349 request->reply = rad_alloc(0);
2350 if (!request->reply) return 0;
2352 request->options = RAD_REQUEST_OPTION_DEBUG2;
2354 rad_assert(sock->ssn == NULL);
2356 sock->ssn = tls_new_session(listener->tls, sock->request,
2357 listener->tls->require_client_cert);
2359 request_free(&sock->request);
2360 sock->packet = NULL;
2364 SSL_set_ex_data(sock->ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST, (void *)request);
2365 SSL_set_ex_data(sock->ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CERTS, (void *)&request->packet->vps);
2370 rad_assert(sock->request != NULL);
2371 rad_assert(sock->request->packet != NULL);
2372 rad_assert(sock->packet != NULL);
2373 rad_assert(sock->ssn != NULL);
2375 request = sock->request;
2377 RDEBUG3("Reading from socket %d", request->packet->sockfd);
2378 PTHREAD_MUTEX_LOCK(&sock->mutex);
2379 rcode = read(request->packet->sockfd,
2380 sock->ssn->dirty_in.data,
2381 sizeof(sock->ssn->dirty_in.data));
2382 if ((rcode < 0) && (errno == ECONNRESET)) {
2384 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2385 tls_socket_close(listener);
2390 RDEBUG("Error reading TLS socket: %s", strerror(errno));
2395 * Normal socket close.
2397 if (rcode == 0) goto do_close;
2399 sock->ssn->dirty_in.used = rcode;
2400 memset(sock->ssn->dirty_in.data + sock->ssn->dirty_in.used,
2403 dump_hex("READ FROM SSL", sock->ssn->dirty_in.data, sock->ssn->dirty_in.used);
2406 * Catch attempts to use non-SSL.
2408 if (doing_init && (sock->ssn->dirty_in.data[0] != handshake)) {
2409 RDEBUG("Non-TLS data sent to TLS socket: closing");
2414 * Skip ahead to reading application data.
2416 if (SSL_is_init_finished(sock->ssn->ssl)) goto app;
2418 if (!tls_handshake_recv(request, sock->ssn)) {
2419 RDEBUG("FAILED in TLS handshake receive");
2423 if (sock->ssn->dirty_out.used > 0) {
2424 tls_socket_write(listener, request);
2425 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2431 * FIXME: Run the packet through a virtual server in
2432 * order to see if we like the certificate presented by
2436 status = tls_application_data(sock->ssn, request);
2437 RDEBUG("Application data status %d", status);
2439 if (status == FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS) {
2440 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2444 if (sock->ssn->clean_out.used == 0) {
2445 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2449 dump_hex("TUNNELED DATA", sock->ssn->clean_out.data, sock->ssn->clean_out.used);
2452 * If the packet is a complete RADIUS packet, return it to
2453 * the caller. Otherwise...
2455 if ((sock->ssn->clean_out.used < 20) ||
2456 (((sock->ssn->clean_out.data[2] << 8) | sock->ssn->clean_out.data[3]) != (int) sock->ssn->clean_out.used)) {
2457 RDEBUG("Received bad packet: Length %d contents %d",
2458 sock->ssn->clean_out.used,
2459 (sock->ssn->clean_out.data[2] << 8) | sock->ssn->clean_out.data[3]);
2463 packet = sock->packet;
2464 packet->data = rad_malloc(sock->ssn->clean_out.used);
2465 packet->data_len = sock->ssn->clean_out.used;
2466 record_minus(&sock->ssn->clean_out, packet->data, packet->data_len);
2468 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2470 if (!rad_packet_ok(packet, 0)) {
2471 RDEBUG("Received bad packet: %s", fr_strerror());
2472 tls_socket_close(listener);
2473 return 0; /* do_close unlocks the mutex */
2477 * Copied from src/lib/radius.c, rad_recv();
2479 if (fr_debug_flag) {
2480 char host_ipaddr[128];
2482 if ((packet->code > 0) && (packet->code < FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
2483 RDEBUG("tls_recv: %s packet from host %s port %d, id=%d, length=%d",
2484 fr_packet_codes[packet->code],
2485 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2486 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2487 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2489 packet->id, (int) packet->data_len);
2491 RDEBUG("tls_recv: Packet from host %s port %d code=%d, id=%d, length=%d",
2492 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2493 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2494 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2497 packet->id, (int) packet->data_len);
2501 FR_STATS_INC(auth, total_requests);
2507 int dual_tls_recv(rad_listen_t *listener)
2509 RADIUS_PACKET *packet;
2511 RAD_REQUEST_FUNP fun = NULL;
2512 listen_socket_t *sock = listener->data;
2513 RADCLIENT *client = sock->client;
2515 if (!tls_socket_recv(listener)) {
2519 rad_assert(sock->request != NULL);
2520 rad_assert(sock->request->packet != NULL);
2521 rad_assert(sock->packet != NULL);
2522 rad_assert(sock->ssn != NULL);
2524 request = sock->request;
2525 packet = sock->packet;
2528 * Some sanity checks, based on the packet code.
2530 switch(packet->code) {
2531 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REQUEST:
2532 if (listener->type != RAD_LISTEN_AUTH) goto bad_packet;
2533 FR_STATS_INC(auth, total_requests);
2534 fun = rad_authenticate;
2537 case PW_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
2538 if (listener->type != RAD_LISTEN_ACCT) goto bad_packet;
2539 FR_STATS_INC(acct, total_requests);
2540 fun = rad_accounting;
2543 case PW_STATUS_SERVER:
2544 if (!mainconfig.status_server) {
2545 FR_STATS_INC(auth, total_unknown_types);
2546 DEBUG("WARNING: Ignoring Status-Server request due to security configuration");
2547 rad_free(&sock->packet);
2548 request->packet = NULL;
2551 fun = rad_status_server;
2556 FR_STATS_INC(auth, total_unknown_types);
2558 DEBUG("Invalid packet code %d sent from client %s port %d : IGNORED",
2559 packet->code, client->shortname, packet->src_port);
2560 rad_free(&sock->packet);
2561 request->packet = NULL;
2563 } /* switch over packet types */
2565 if (!request_receive(listener, packet, client, fun)) {
2566 FR_STATS_INC(auth, total_packets_dropped);
2567 rad_free(&sock->packet);
2568 request->packet = NULL;
2572 sock->packet = NULL; /* we have no need for more partial reads */
2573 request->packet = NULL;
2580 * Send a response packet
2582 int dual_tls_send(rad_listen_t *listener, REQUEST *request)
2584 listen_socket_t *sock = listener->data;
2586 rad_assert(request->listener == listener);
2587 rad_assert(listener->send == dual_tls_send);
2590 * Accounting reject's are silently dropped.
2592 * We do it here to avoid polluting the rest of the
2593 * code with this knowledge
2595 if (request->reply->code == 0) return 0;
2600 if (rad_encode(request->reply, request->packet,
2601 request->client->secret) < 0) {
2602 RDEBUG("Failed encoding packet: %s", fr_strerror());
2609 if (rad_sign(request->reply, request->packet,
2610 request->client->secret) < 0) {
2611 RDEBUG("Failed signing packet: %s", fr_strerror());
2615 PTHREAD_MUTEX_LOCK(&sock->mutex);
2617 * Write the packet to the SSL buffers.
2619 record_plus(&sock->ssn->clean_in,
2620 request->reply->data, request->reply->data_len);
2623 * Do SSL magic to get encrypted data.
2625 tls_handshake_send(request, sock->ssn);
2628 * And finally write the data to the socket.
2630 if (sock->ssn->dirty_out.used > 0) {
2631 dump_hex("WRITE TO SSL", sock->ssn->dirty_out.data, sock->ssn->dirty_out.used);
2633 tls_socket_write(listener, request);
2635 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2641 int proxy_tls_recv(rad_listen_t *listener)
2645 listen_socket_t *sock = listener->data;
2648 RADIUS_PACKET *packet;
2649 RAD_REQUEST_FUNP fun = NULL;
2651 DEBUG3("Proxy SSL socket has data to read");
2652 PTHREAD_MUTEX_LOCK(&sock->mutex);
2654 rcode = SSL_read(sock->ssn->ssl, data, 4);
2656 int err = SSL_get_error(sock->ssn->ssl, rcode);
2658 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
2659 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
2662 case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
2663 /* remote end sent close_notify, send one back */
2664 SSL_shutdown(sock->ssn->ssl);
2666 case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
2668 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2669 tls_socket_close(listener);
2673 while ((err = ERR_get_error())) {
2674 DEBUG("proxy recv says %s",
2675 ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
2682 length = (data[2] << 8) | data[3];
2683 DEBUG3("Proxy received header saying we have a packet of %u bytes",
2684 (unsigned int) length);
2686 if (length > sizeof(data)) {
2687 DEBUG("Received packet will be too large! (%u)",
2688 (data[2] << 8) | data[3]);
2692 rcode = SSL_read(sock->ssn->ssl, data + 4, length);
2694 switch (SSL_get_error(sock->ssn->ssl, rcode)) {
2695 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
2696 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
2700 case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
2701 /* remote end sent close_notify, send one back */
2702 SSL_shutdown(sock->ssn->ssl);
2708 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2710 packet = rad_alloc(0);
2711 packet->sockfd = listener->fd;
2712 packet->src_ipaddr = sock->other_ipaddr;
2713 packet->src_port = sock->other_port;
2714 packet->dst_ipaddr = sock->my_ipaddr;
2715 packet->dst_port = sock->my_port;
2716 packet->code = data[0];
2717 packet->id = data[1];
2718 packet->data_len = length;
2719 packet->data = rad_malloc(packet->data_len);
2720 memcpy(packet->data, data, packet->data_len);
2721 memcpy(packet->vector, packet->data + 4, 16);
2724 * FIXME: Client MIB updates?
2726 switch(packet->code) {
2727 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
2728 case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
2729 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
2730 fun = rad_authenticate;
2733 #ifdef WITH_ACCOUNTING
2734 case PW_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE:
2735 fun = rad_accounting;
2741 * FIXME: Update MIB for packet types?
2743 radlog(L_ERR, "Invalid packet code %d sent to a proxy port "
2744 "from home server %s port %d - ID %d : IGNORED",
2746 ip_ntoh(&packet->src_ipaddr, buffer, sizeof(buffer)),
2747 packet->src_port, packet->id);
2752 if (!request_proxy_reply(packet)) {
2760 int proxy_tls_send(rad_listen_t *listener, REQUEST *request)
2763 listen_socket_t *sock = listener->data;
2766 * Normal proxying calls us with the data already
2767 * encoded. The "ping home server" code does not. So,
2768 * if there's no packet, encode it here.
2770 if (!request->proxy->data) {
2771 request->proxy_listener->encode(request->proxy_listener,
2775 DEBUG3("Proxy is writing %u bytes to SSL",
2776 (unsigned int) request->proxy->data_len);
2777 PTHREAD_MUTEX_LOCK(&sock->mutex);
2778 while ((rcode = SSL_write(sock->ssn->ssl, request->proxy->data,
2779 request->proxy->data_len)) < 0) {
2781 while ((err = ERR_get_error())) {
2782 DEBUG("proxy SSL_write says %s",
2783 ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
2785 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2786 tls_socket_close(listener);
2789 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2794 #endif /* WITH_TLS */