6 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
7 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
8 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
9 * (at your option) any later version.
11 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
12 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
13 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
14 * GNU General Public License for more details.
16 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
17 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
18 * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
20 * Copyright 2001 hereUare Communications, Inc. <raghud@hereuare.com>
21 * Copyright 2003 Alan DeKok <aland@freeradius.org>
22 * Copyright 2006 The FreeRADIUS server project
25 #include <freeradius-devel/ident.h>
28 #include <freeradius-devel/autoconf.h>
29 #include <freeradius-devel/radiusd.h>
30 #include <freeradius-devel/process.h>
31 #include <freeradius-devel/rad_assert.h>
33 #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
38 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_RAND_H
39 #include <openssl/rand.h>
42 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
43 #include <openssl/ocsp.h>
47 #define PTHREAD_MUTEX_LOCK pthread_mutex_lock
48 #define PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK pthread_mutex_unlock
50 #define PTHREAD_MUTEX_LOCK(_x)
51 #define PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(_x)
56 static void record_init(record_t *buf);
57 static void record_close(record_t *buf);
58 static unsigned int record_plus(record_t *buf, const void *ptr,
60 static unsigned int record_minus(record_t *buf, void *ptr,
63 tls_session_t *tls_new_client_session(fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf, int fd)
66 tls_session_t *ssn = NULL;
68 ssn = (tls_session_t *) malloc(sizeof(*ssn));
69 memset(ssn, 0, sizeof(*ssn));
72 ssn->ssl = SSL_new(ssn->ctx);
73 rad_assert(ssn->ssl != NULL);
76 * Add the message callback to identify what type of
77 * message/handshake is passed
79 SSL_set_msg_callback(ssn->ssl, cbtls_msg);
80 SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssn->ssl, ssn);
81 SSL_set_info_callback(ssn->ssl, cbtls_info);
84 * Always verify the peer certificate.
86 DEBUG2("Requiring Server certificate");
87 verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
88 verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT;
89 SSL_set_verify(ssn->ssl, verify_mode, cbtls_verify);
91 SSL_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF, (void *)conf);
92 SSL_set_fd(ssn->ssl, fd);
93 if (SSL_connect(ssn->ssl) <= 0) {
95 while ((err = ERR_get_error())) {
96 DEBUG("OpenSSL Err says %s",
97 ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
106 tls_session_t *tls_new_session(fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf, REQUEST *request,
109 tls_session_t *state = NULL;
115 * Manually flush the sessions every so often. If HALF
116 * of the session lifetime has passed since we last
117 * flushed, then flush it again.
119 * FIXME: Also do it every N sessions?
121 if (conf->session_cache_enable &&
122 ((conf->session_last_flushed + (conf->session_timeout * 1800)) <= request->timestamp)){
123 RDEBUG2("Flushing SSL sessions (of #%ld)",
124 SSL_CTX_sess_number(conf->ctx));
126 SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(conf->ctx, request->timestamp);
127 conf->session_last_flushed = request->timestamp;
130 if ((new_tls = SSL_new(conf->ctx)) == NULL) {
131 radlog(L_ERR, "SSL: Error creating new SSL: %s",
132 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
136 /* We use the SSL's "app_data" to indicate a call-back */
137 SSL_set_app_data(new_tls, NULL);
139 state = (tls_session_t *)malloc(sizeof(*state));
140 memset(state, 0, sizeof(*state));
143 state->ctx = conf->ctx;
144 state->ssl = new_tls;
147 * Initialize callbacks
149 state->record_init = record_init;
150 state->record_close = record_close;
151 state->record_plus = record_plus;
152 state->record_minus = record_minus;
155 * Create & hook the BIOs to handle the dirty side of the
156 * SSL. This is *very important* as we want to handle
157 * the transmission part. Now the only IO interface
158 * that SSL is aware of, is our defined BIO buffers.
160 * This means that all SSL IO is done to/from memory,
161 * and we can update those BIOs from the packets we've
164 state->into_ssl = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
165 state->from_ssl = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
166 SSL_set_bio(state->ssl, state->into_ssl, state->from_ssl);
169 * Add the message callback to identify what type of
170 * message/handshake is passed
172 SSL_set_msg_callback(new_tls, cbtls_msg);
173 SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(new_tls, state);
174 SSL_set_info_callback(new_tls, cbtls_info);
177 * In Server mode we only accept.
179 SSL_set_accept_state(state->ssl);
182 * Verify the peer certificate, if asked.
185 RDEBUG2("Requiring client certificate");
186 verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
187 verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT;
188 verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE;
190 SSL_set_verify(state->ssl, verify_mode, cbtls_verify);
192 SSL_set_ex_data(state->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF, (void *)conf);
193 state->length_flag = conf->include_length;
196 * We use default fragment size, unless the Framed-MTU
197 * tells us it's too big. Note that we do NOT account
198 * for the EAP-TLS headers if conf->fragment_size is
199 * large, because that config item looks to be confusing.
201 * i.e. it should REALLY be called MTU, and the code here
202 * should figure out what that means for TLS fragment size.
203 * asking the administrator to know the internal details
204 * of EAP-TLS in order to calculate fragment sizes is
207 state->offset = conf->fragment_size;
208 vp = pairfind(request->packet->vps, PW_FRAMED_MTU, 0);
209 if (vp && (vp->vp_integer > 100) && (vp->vp_integer < state->offset)) {
210 state->offset = vp->vp_integer;
213 if (conf->session_cache_enable) {
214 state->allow_session_resumption = 1; /* otherwise it's zero */
223 * Print out some text describing the error.
225 static int int_ssl_check(REQUEST *request, SSL *s, int ret, const char *text)
230 if ((l = ERR_get_error()) != 0) {
231 const char *p = ERR_error_string(l, NULL);
234 radlog(L_ERR, "SSL error %s", p);
237 vp = pairmake("Module-Failure-Message", p, T_OP_ADD);
238 if (vp) pairadd(&request->packet->vps, vp);
241 e = SSL_get_error(s, ret);
245 * These seem to be harmless and already "dealt
246 * with" by our non-blocking environment. NB:
247 * "ZERO_RETURN" is the clean "error"
248 * indicating a successfully closed SSL
249 * tunnel. We let this happen because our IO
250 * loop should not appear to have broken on
251 * this condition - and outside the IO loop, the
252 * "shutdown" state is checked.
254 * Don't print anything if we ignore the error.
257 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
258 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
259 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
260 case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
264 * These seem to be indications of a genuine
265 * error that should result in the SSL tunnel
266 * being regarded as "dead".
268 case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
269 radlog(L_ERR, "SSL: %s failed in a system call (%d), TLS session fails.",
274 radlog(L_ERR, "SSL: %s failed inside of TLS (%d), TLS session fails.",
280 * For any other errors that (a) exist, and (b)
281 * crop up - we need to interpret what to do with
282 * them - so "politely inform" the caller that
283 * the code needs updating here.
285 radlog(L_ERR, "SSL: FATAL SSL error ..... %d\n", e);
293 * We are the server, we always get the dirty data
294 * (Handshake data is also considered as dirty data)
295 * During handshake, since SSL API handles itself,
296 * After clean-up, dirty_out will be filled with
297 * the data required for handshaking. So we check
298 * if dirty_out is empty then we simply send it back.
299 * As of now, if handshake is successful, then we keep going,
302 * Fill the Bio with the dirty data to clean it
303 * Get the cleaned data from SSL, if it is not Handshake data
305 int tls_handshake_recv(REQUEST *request, tls_session_t *ssn)
309 err = BIO_write(ssn->into_ssl, ssn->dirty_in.data, ssn->dirty_in.used);
310 if (err != (int) ssn->dirty_in.used) {
311 RDEBUG("Failed writing %d to SSL BIO: %d", ssn->dirty_in.used,
313 record_init(&ssn->dirty_in);
316 record_init(&ssn->dirty_in);
318 err = SSL_read(ssn->ssl, ssn->clean_out.data + ssn->clean_out.used,
319 sizeof(ssn->clean_out.data) - ssn->clean_out.used);
321 ssn->clean_out.used += err;
325 if (!int_ssl_check(request, ssn->ssl, err, "SSL_read")) {
329 /* Some Extra STATE information for easy debugging */
330 if (SSL_is_init_finished(ssn->ssl)) {
331 DEBUG2("SSL Connection Established\n");
333 if (SSL_in_init(ssn->ssl)) {
334 DEBUG2("In SSL Handshake Phase\n");
336 if (SSL_in_before(ssn->ssl)) {
337 DEBUG2("Before SSL Handshake Phase\n");
339 if (SSL_in_accept_init(ssn->ssl)) {
340 DEBUG2("In SSL Accept mode \n");
342 if (SSL_in_connect_init(ssn->ssl)) {
343 DEBUG2("In SSL Connect mode \n");
346 err = BIO_ctrl_pending(ssn->from_ssl);
348 err = BIO_read(ssn->from_ssl, ssn->dirty_out.data,
349 sizeof(ssn->dirty_out.data));
351 ssn->dirty_out.used = err;
353 } else if (BIO_should_retry(ssn->from_ssl)) {
354 record_init(&ssn->dirty_in);
355 DEBUG2(" tls: Asking for more data in tunnel");
359 int_ssl_check(request, ssn->ssl, err, "BIO_read");
360 record_init(&ssn->dirty_in);
364 DEBUG2("SSL Application Data");
365 /* Its clean application data, do whatever we want */
366 record_init(&ssn->clean_out);
369 /* We are done with dirty_in, reinitialize it */
370 record_init(&ssn->dirty_in);
375 * Take clear-text user data, and encrypt it into the output buffer,
376 * to send to the client at the other end of the SSL connection.
378 int tls_handshake_send(REQUEST *request, tls_session_t *ssn)
383 * If there's un-encrypted data in 'clean_in', then write
384 * that data to the SSL session, and then call the BIO function
385 * to get that encrypted data from the SSL session, into
386 * a buffer which we can then package into an EAP packet.
388 * Based on Server's logic this clean_in is expected to
389 * contain the data to send to the client.
391 if (ssn->clean_in.used > 0) {
394 written = SSL_write(ssn->ssl, ssn->clean_in.data, ssn->clean_in.used);
395 record_minus(&ssn->clean_in, NULL, written);
397 /* Get the dirty data from Bio to send it */
398 err = BIO_read(ssn->from_ssl, ssn->dirty_out.data,
399 sizeof(ssn->dirty_out.data));
401 ssn->dirty_out.used = err;
403 int_ssl_check(request, ssn->ssl, err, "handshake_send");
410 void session_init(tls_session_t *ssn)
413 ssn->into_ssl = ssn->from_ssl = NULL;
414 record_init(&ssn->clean_in);
415 record_init(&ssn->clean_out);
416 record_init(&ssn->dirty_in);
417 record_init(&ssn->dirty_out);
419 memset(&ssn->info, 0, sizeof(ssn->info));
423 ssn->tls_msg_len = 0;
424 ssn->length_flag = 0;
426 ssn->free_opaque = NULL;
429 void session_close(tls_session_t *ssn)
431 if (ssn->ssl->session) {
434 vp = SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(ssn->ssl->session,
435 FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_VPS);
436 if (vp) pairfree(&vp);
439 SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(ssn->ssl, 1);
440 SSL_shutdown(ssn->ssl);
446 * WARNING: SSL_free seems to decrement the reference counts already,
447 * so doing this might crash the application.
450 BIO_free(ssn->into_ssl);
452 BIO_free(ssn->from_ssl);
454 record_close(&ssn->clean_in);
455 record_close(&ssn->clean_out);
456 record_close(&ssn->dirty_in);
457 record_close(&ssn->dirty_out);
461 void session_free(void *ssn)
463 tls_session_t *sess = (tls_session_t *)ssn;
468 * Free any opaque TTLS or PEAP data.
470 if ((sess->opaque) && (sess->free_opaque)) {
471 sess->free_opaque(sess->opaque);
480 static void record_init(record_t *rec)
485 static void record_close(record_t *rec)
492 * Copy data to the intermediate buffer, before we send
495 static unsigned int record_plus(record_t *rec, const void *ptr,
498 unsigned int added = MAX_RECORD_SIZE - rec->used;
504 memcpy(rec->data + rec->used, ptr, added);
510 * Take data from the buffer, and give it to the caller.
512 static unsigned int record_minus(record_t *rec, void *ptr,
515 unsigned int taken = rec->used;
522 memcpy(ptr, rec->data, taken);
526 * This is pretty bad...
529 memmove(rec->data, rec->data + taken, rec->used);
533 void tls_session_information(tls_session_t *tls_session)
535 const char *str_write_p, *str_version, *str_content_type = "";
536 const char *str_details1 = "", *str_details2= "";
540 * Don't print this out in the normal course of
543 if (debug_flag == 0) {
547 str_write_p = tls_session->info.origin ? ">>>" : "<<<";
549 switch (tls_session->info.version)
552 str_version = "SSL 2.0";
555 str_version = "SSL 3.0 ";
558 str_version = "TLS 1.0 ";
561 str_version = "Unknown TLS version";
565 if (tls_session->info.version == SSL3_VERSION ||
566 tls_session->info.version == TLS1_VERSION) {
567 switch (tls_session->info.content_type) {
568 case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
569 str_content_type = "ChangeCipherSpec";
572 str_content_type = "Alert";
574 case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
575 str_content_type = "Handshake";
577 case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
578 str_content_type = "ApplicationData";
581 str_content_type = "UnknownContentType";
585 if (tls_session->info.content_type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
586 str_details1 = ", ???";
588 if (tls_session->info.record_len == 2) {
590 switch (tls_session->info.alert_level) {
591 case SSL3_AL_WARNING:
592 str_details1 = ", warning";
595 str_details1 = ", fatal";
599 str_details2 = " ???";
600 switch (tls_session->info.alert_description) {
601 case SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY:
602 str_details2 = " close_notify";
604 case SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:
605 str_details2 = " unexpected_message";
607 case SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC:
608 str_details2 = " bad_record_mac";
610 case TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED:
611 str_details2 = " decryption_failed";
613 case TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW:
614 str_details2 = " record_overflow";
616 case SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE:
617 str_details2 = " decompression_failure";
619 case SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE:
620 str_details2 = " handshake_failure";
622 case SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE:
623 str_details2 = " bad_certificate";
625 case SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE:
626 str_details2 = " unsupported_certificate";
628 case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED:
629 str_details2 = " certificate_revoked";
631 case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED:
632 str_details2 = " certificate_expired";
634 case SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN:
635 str_details2 = " certificate_unknown";
637 case SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER:
638 str_details2 = " illegal_parameter";
640 case TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA:
641 str_details2 = " unknown_ca";
643 case TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED:
644 str_details2 = " access_denied";
646 case TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR:
647 str_details2 = " decode_error";
649 case TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR:
650 str_details2 = " decrypt_error";
652 case TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION:
653 str_details2 = " export_restriction";
655 case TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
656 str_details2 = " protocol_version";
658 case TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY:
659 str_details2 = " insufficient_security";
661 case TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR:
662 str_details2 = " internal_error";
664 case TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED:
665 str_details2 = " user_canceled";
667 case TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION:
668 str_details2 = " no_renegotiation";
674 if (tls_session->info.content_type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
675 str_details1 = "???";
677 if (tls_session->info.record_len > 0)
678 switch (tls_session->info.handshake_type)
680 case SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST:
681 str_details1 = ", HelloRequest";
683 case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO:
684 str_details1 = ", ClientHello";
686 case SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO:
687 str_details1 = ", ServerHello";
689 case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE:
690 str_details1 = ", Certificate";
692 case SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:
693 str_details1 = ", ServerKeyExchange";
695 case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
696 str_details1 = ", CertificateRequest";
698 case SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE:
699 str_details1 = ", ServerHelloDone";
701 case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
702 str_details1 = ", CertificateVerify";
704 case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:
705 str_details1 = ", ClientKeyExchange";
707 case SSL3_MT_FINISHED:
708 str_details1 = ", Finished";
714 snprintf(tls_session->info.info_description,
715 sizeof(tls_session->info.info_description),
716 "%s %s%s [length %04lx]%s%s\n",
717 str_write_p, str_version, str_content_type,
718 (unsigned long)tls_session->info.record_len,
719 str_details1, str_details2);
721 request = SSL_get_ex_data(tls_session->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST);
723 RDEBUG2("%s\n", tls_session->info.info_description);
726 static CONF_PARSER cache_config[] = {
727 { "enable", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
728 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, session_cache_enable), NULL, "no" },
729 { "lifetime", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
730 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, session_timeout), NULL, "24" },
731 { "max_entries", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
732 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, session_cache_size), NULL, "255" },
733 { "name", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
734 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, session_id_name), NULL, NULL},
735 { NULL, -1, 0, NULL, NULL } /* end the list */
738 static CONF_PARSER verify_config[] = {
739 { "tmpdir", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
740 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, verify_tmp_dir), NULL, NULL},
741 { "client", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
742 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, verify_client_cert_cmd), NULL, NULL},
743 { NULL, -1, 0, NULL, NULL } /* end the list */
746 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
747 static CONF_PARSER ocsp_config[] = {
748 { "enable", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
749 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, ocsp_enable), NULL, "no"},
750 { "override_cert_url", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
751 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, ocsp_override_url), NULL, "no"},
752 { "url", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
753 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, ocsp_url), NULL, NULL },
754 { NULL, -1, 0, NULL, NULL } /* end the list */
758 static CONF_PARSER tls_server_config[] = {
759 { "rsa_key_exchange", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
760 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, rsa_key), NULL, "no" },
761 { "dh_key_exchange", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
762 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, dh_key), NULL, "yes" },
763 { "rsa_key_length", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
764 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, rsa_key_length), NULL, "512" },
765 { "dh_key_length", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
766 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, dh_key_length), NULL, "512" },
767 { "verify_depth", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
768 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, verify_depth), NULL, "0" },
769 { "CA_path", PW_TYPE_FILENAME,
770 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, ca_path), NULL, NULL },
771 { "pem_file_type", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
772 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, file_type), NULL, "yes" },
773 { "private_key_file", PW_TYPE_FILENAME,
774 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, private_key_file), NULL, NULL },
775 { "certificate_file", PW_TYPE_FILENAME,
776 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, certificate_file), NULL, NULL },
777 { "CA_file", PW_TYPE_FILENAME,
778 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, ca_file), NULL, NULL },
779 { "private_key_password", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
780 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, private_key_password), NULL, NULL },
781 { "dh_file", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
782 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, dh_file), NULL, NULL },
783 { "random_file", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
784 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, random_file), NULL, NULL },
785 { "fragment_size", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
786 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, fragment_size), NULL, "1024" },
787 { "include_length", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
788 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, include_length), NULL, "yes" },
789 { "check_crl", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
790 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_crl), NULL, "no"},
791 { "allow_expired_crl", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
792 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, allow_expired_crl), NULL, NULL},
793 { "check_cert_cn", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
794 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_cert_cn), NULL, NULL},
795 { "cipher_list", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
796 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, cipher_list), NULL, NULL},
797 { "check_cert_issuer", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
798 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_cert_issuer), NULL, NULL},
799 { "make_cert_command", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
800 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, make_cert_command), NULL, NULL},
801 { "require_client_cert", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
802 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, require_client_cert), NULL, NULL },
804 { "cache", PW_TYPE_SUBSECTION, 0, NULL, (const void *) cache_config },
806 { "verify", PW_TYPE_SUBSECTION, 0, NULL, (const void *) verify_config },
808 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
809 { "ocsp", PW_TYPE_SUBSECTION, 0, NULL, (const void *) ocsp_config },
812 { NULL, -1, 0, NULL, NULL } /* end the list */
816 static CONF_PARSER tls_client_config[] = {
817 { "rsa_key_exchange", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
818 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, rsa_key), NULL, "no" },
819 { "dh_key_exchange", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
820 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, dh_key), NULL, "yes" },
821 { "rsa_key_length", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
822 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, rsa_key_length), NULL, "512" },
823 { "dh_key_length", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
824 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, dh_key_length), NULL, "512" },
825 { "verify_depth", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
826 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, verify_depth), NULL, "0" },
827 { "CA_path", PW_TYPE_FILENAME,
828 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, ca_path), NULL, NULL },
829 { "pem_file_type", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
830 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, file_type), NULL, "yes" },
831 { "private_key_file", PW_TYPE_FILENAME,
832 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, private_key_file), NULL, NULL },
833 { "certificate_file", PW_TYPE_FILENAME,
834 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, certificate_file), NULL, NULL },
835 { "CA_file", PW_TYPE_FILENAME,
836 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, ca_file), NULL, NULL },
837 { "private_key_password", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
838 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, private_key_password), NULL, NULL },
839 { "dh_file", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
840 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, dh_file), NULL, NULL },
841 { "random_file", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
842 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, random_file), NULL, NULL },
843 { "fragment_size", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
844 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, fragment_size), NULL, "1024" },
845 { "include_length", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
846 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, include_length), NULL, "yes" },
847 { "check_crl", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
848 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_crl), NULL, "no"},
849 { "check_cert_cn", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
850 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_cert_cn), NULL, NULL},
851 { "cipher_list", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
852 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, cipher_list), NULL, NULL},
853 { "check_cert_issuer", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
854 offsetof(fr_tls_server_conf_t, check_cert_issuer), NULL, NULL},
856 { NULL, -1, 0, NULL, NULL } /* end the list */
861 * TODO: Check for the type of key exchange * like conf->dh_key
863 static int load_dh_params(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *file)
868 if ((bio = BIO_new_file(file, "r")) == NULL) {
869 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Unable to open DH file - %s", file);
873 dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
876 DEBUG2("WARNING: rlm_eap_tls: Unable to set DH parameters. DH cipher suites may not work!");
877 DEBUG2("WARNING: Fix this by running the OpenSSL command listed in eap.conf");
881 if (SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh) < 0) {
882 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Unable to set DH parameters");
893 * Generate ephemeral RSA keys.
895 static int generate_eph_rsa_key(SSL_CTX *ctx)
899 rsa = RSA_generate_key(512, RSA_F4, NULL, NULL);
901 if (!SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(ctx, rsa)) {
902 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Couldn't set ephemeral RSA key");
912 * These functions don't do anything other than print debugging
915 * FIXME: Write sessions to some long-term storage, so that
916 * session resumption can still occur after the server
919 #define MAX_SESSION_SIZE (256)
921 static void cbtls_remove_session(UNUSED SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess)
924 char buffer[2 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1];
926 size = sess->session_id_length;
927 if (size > MAX_SESSION_SIZE) size = MAX_SESSION_SIZE;
929 fr_bin2hex(sess->session_id, buffer, size);
931 DEBUG2(" SSL: Removing session %s from the cache", buffer);
932 SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
937 static int cbtls_new_session(UNUSED SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *sess)
940 char buffer[2 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1];
942 size = sess->session_id_length;
943 if (size > MAX_SESSION_SIZE) size = MAX_SESSION_SIZE;
945 fr_bin2hex(sess->session_id, buffer, size);
947 DEBUG2(" SSL: adding session %s to cache", buffer);
952 static SSL_SESSION *cbtls_get_session(UNUSED SSL *s,
953 unsigned char *data, int len,
957 char buffer[2 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1];
960 if (size > MAX_SESSION_SIZE) size = MAX_SESSION_SIZE;
962 fr_bin2hex(data, buffer, size);
964 DEBUG2(" SSL: Client requested nonexistent cached session %s",
970 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
972 * This function extracts the OCSP Responder URL
973 * from an existing x509 certificate.
975 static int ocsp_parse_cert_url(X509 *cert, char **phost, char **pport,
976 char **ppath, int *pssl)
980 AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS *aia;
981 ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *ad;
983 aia = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_info_access, NULL, NULL);
985 for (i = 0; i < sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(aia); i++) {
986 ad = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_value(aia, 0);
987 if (OBJ_obj2nid(ad->method) == NID_ad_OCSP) {
988 if (ad->location->type == GEN_URI) {
989 if(OCSP_parse_url(ad->location->d.ia5->data,
990 phost, pport, ppath, pssl))
999 * This function sends a OCSP request to a defined OCSP responder
1000 * and checks the OCSP response for correctness.
1003 /* Maximum leeway in validity period: default 5 minutes */
1004 #define MAX_VALIDITY_PERIOD (5 * 60)
1006 static int ocsp_check(X509_STORE *store, X509 *issuer_cert, X509 *client_cert,
1007 fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf)
1009 OCSP_CERTID *certid;
1011 OCSP_RESPONSE *resp;
1012 OCSP_BASICRESP *bresp = NULL;
1017 long nsec = MAX_VALIDITY_PERIOD, maxage = -1;
1018 BIO *cbio, *bio_out;
1021 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
1025 * Create OCSP Request
1027 certid = OCSP_cert_to_id(NULL, client_cert, issuer_cert);
1028 req = OCSP_REQUEST_new();
1029 OCSP_request_add0_id(req, certid);
1030 OCSP_request_add1_nonce(req, NULL, 8);
1033 * Send OCSP Request and get OCSP Response
1036 /* Get OCSP responder URL */
1037 if(conf->ocsp_override_url) {
1038 OCSP_parse_url(conf->ocsp_url, &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl);
1041 ocsp_parse_cert_url(client_cert, &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl);
1044 DEBUG2("[ocsp] --> Responder URL = http://%s:%s%s", host, port, path);
1046 /* Setup BIO socket to OCSP responder */
1047 cbio = BIO_new_connect(host);
1049 bio_out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE);
1051 BIO_set_conn_port(cbio, port);
1052 BIO_do_connect(cbio);
1054 /* Send OCSP request and wait for response */
1055 resp = OCSP_sendreq_bio(cbio, path, req);
1057 radlog(L_ERR, "Error: Couldn't get OCSP response");
1061 /* Verify OCSP response status */
1062 status = OCSP_response_status(resp);
1063 DEBUG2("[ocsp] --> Response status: %s",OCSP_response_status_str(status));
1064 if(status != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL) {
1065 radlog(L_ERR, "Error: OCSP response status: %s", OCSP_response_status_str(status));
1068 bresp = OCSP_response_get1_basic(resp);
1069 if(OCSP_check_nonce(req, bresp)!=1) {
1070 radlog(L_ERR, "Error: OCSP response has wrong nonce value");
1073 if(OCSP_basic_verify(bresp, NULL, store, 0)!=1){
1074 radlog(L_ERR, "Error: Couldn't verify OCSP basic response");
1078 /* Verify OCSP cert status */
1079 if(!OCSP_resp_find_status(bresp, certid, &status, &reason,
1080 &rev, &thisupd, &nextupd)) {
1081 radlog(L_ERR, "ERROR: No Status found.\n");
1085 if (!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, nsec, maxage)) {
1086 BIO_puts(bio_out, "WARNING: Status times invalid.\n");
1087 ERR_print_errors(bio_out);
1090 BIO_puts(bio_out, "\tThis Update: ");
1091 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bio_out, thisupd);
1092 BIO_puts(bio_out, "\n");
1093 BIO_puts(bio_out, "\tNext Update: ");
1094 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bio_out, nextupd);
1095 BIO_puts(bio_out, "\n");
1098 case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD:
1099 DEBUG2("[oscp] --> Cert status: good");
1104 /* REVOKED / UNKNOWN */
1105 DEBUG2("[ocsp] --> Cert status: %s",OCSP_cert_status_str(status));
1107 DEBUG2("[ocsp] --> Reason: %s", OCSP_crl_reason_str(reason));
1108 BIO_puts(bio_out, "\tRevocation Time: ");
1109 ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(bio_out, rev);
1110 BIO_puts(bio_out, "\n");
1115 /* Free OCSP Stuff */
1116 OCSP_REQUEST_free(req);
1117 OCSP_RESPONSE_free(resp);
1122 OCSP_BASICRESP_free(bresp);
1125 DEBUG2("[ocsp] --> Certificate is valid!");
1127 DEBUG2("[ocsp] --> Certificate has been expired/revoked!");
1132 #endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H */
1135 * For creating certificate attributes.
1137 static const char *cert_attr_names[5][2] = {
1138 { "TLS-Client-Cert-Serial", "TLS-Cert-Serial" },
1139 { "TLS-Client-Cert-Expiration", "TLS-Cert-Expiration" },
1140 { "TLS-Client-Cert-Subject", "TLS-Cert-Subject" },
1141 { "TLS-Client-Cert-Issuer", "TLS-Cert-Issuer" },
1142 { "TLS-Client-Cert-Common-Name", "TLS-Cert-Common-Name" }
1145 #define FR_TLS_SERIAL (0)
1146 #define FR_TLS_EXPIRATION (1)
1147 #define FR_TLS_SUBJECT (2)
1148 #define FR_TLS_ISSUER (3)
1149 #define FR_TLS_CN (4)
1152 * Before trusting a certificate, you must make sure that the
1153 * certificate is 'valid'. There are several steps that your
1154 * application can take in determining if a certificate is
1155 * valid. Commonly used steps are:
1157 * 1.Verifying the certificate's signature, and verifying that
1158 * the certificate has been issued by a trusted Certificate
1161 * 2.Verifying that the certificate is valid for the present date
1162 * (i.e. it is being presented within its validity dates).
1164 * 3.Verifying that the certificate has not been revoked by its
1165 * issuing Certificate Authority, by checking with respect to a
1166 * Certificate Revocation List (CRL).
1168 * 4.Verifying that the credentials presented by the certificate
1169 * fulfill additional requirements specific to the application,
1170 * such as with respect to access control lists or with respect
1171 * to OCSP (Online Certificate Status Processing).
1173 * NOTE: This callback will be called multiple times based on the
1174 * depth of the root certificate chain
1176 int cbtls_verify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
1178 char subject[1024]; /* Used for the subject name */
1179 char issuer[1024]; /* Used for the issuer name */
1180 char common_name[1024];
1185 int err, depth, lookup;
1186 fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf;
1189 ASN1_INTEGER *sn = NULL;
1190 ASN1_TIME *asn_time = NULL;
1193 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
1194 X509_STORE *ocsp_store = NULL;
1198 client_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
1199 err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
1200 depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
1205 * Log client/issuing cert. If there's an error, log
1208 if ((lookup > 1) && !my_ok) lookup = 1;
1211 * Retrieve the pointer to the SSL of the connection currently treated
1212 * and the application specific data stored into the SSL object.
1214 ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
1215 conf = (fr_tls_server_conf_t *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF);
1216 if (!conf) return 1;
1218 request = (REQUEST *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST);
1220 if (!request) return 1; /* FIXME: outbound TLS */
1222 rad_assert(request != NULL);
1223 certs = (VALUE_PAIR **)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CERTS);
1224 rad_assert(certs != NULL);
1225 identity = (char **)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_IDENTITY);
1226 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
1227 ocsp_store = (X509_STORE *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_STORE);
1232 * Get the Serial Number
1235 sn = X509_get_serialNumber(client_cert);
1238 * For this next bit, we create the attributes *only* if
1239 * we're at the client or issuing certificate, AND we
1240 * have a user identity. i.e. we don't create the
1241 * attributes for RadSec connections.
1244 (lookup <= 1) && sn && ((size_t) sn->length < (sizeof(buf) / 2))) {
1248 for (i = 0; i < sn->length; i++) {
1249 sprintf(p, "%02x", (unsigned int)sn->data[i]);
1253 pairmake(cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_SERIAL][lookup], buf, T_OP_SET));
1258 * Get the Expiration Date
1261 asn_time = X509_get_notAfter(client_cert);
1262 if (identity && (lookup <= 1) && asn_time &&
1263 (asn_time->length < MAX_STRING_LEN)) {
1264 memcpy(buf, (char*) asn_time->data, asn_time->length);
1265 buf[asn_time->length] = '\0';
1267 pairmake(cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_EXPIRATION][lookup], buf, T_OP_SET));
1271 * Get the Subject & Issuer
1273 subject[0] = issuer[0] = '\0';
1274 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(client_cert), subject,
1276 subject[sizeof(subject) - 1] = '\0';
1277 if (identity && (lookup <= 1) && subject[0] &&
1278 (strlen(subject) < MAX_STRING_LEN)) {
1280 pairmake(cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_SUBJECT][lookup], subject, T_OP_SET));
1283 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert), issuer,
1285 issuer[sizeof(issuer) - 1] = '\0';
1286 if (identity && (lookup <= 1) && issuer[0] &&
1287 (strlen(issuer) < MAX_STRING_LEN)) {
1289 pairmake(cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_ISSUER][lookup], issuer, T_OP_SET));
1293 * Get the Common Name
1295 X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(client_cert),
1296 NID_commonName, common_name, sizeof(common_name));
1297 common_name[sizeof(common_name) - 1] = '\0';
1298 if (identity && (lookup <= 1) && common_name[0] &&
1299 (strlen(common_name) < MAX_STRING_LEN)) {
1301 pairmake(cert_attr_names[FR_TLS_CN][lookup], common_name, T_OP_SET));
1305 * If the CRL has expired, that might still be OK.
1308 (conf->allow_expired_crl) &&
1309 (err == X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED)) {
1311 X509_STORE_CTX_set_error( ctx, 0 );
1315 const char *p = X509_verify_cert_error_string(err);
1316 radlog(L_ERR,"--> verify error:num=%d:%s\n",err, p);
1317 radius_pairmake(request, &request->packet->vps,
1318 "Module-Failure-Message", p, T_OP_SET);
1322 switch (ctx->error) {
1324 case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
1325 radlog(L_ERR, "issuer= %s\n", issuer);
1327 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
1328 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
1329 radlog(L_ERR, "notBefore=");
1331 ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get_notBefore(ctx->current_cert));
1334 case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
1335 case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
1336 radlog(L_ERR, "notAfter=");
1338 ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get_notAfter(ctx->current_cert));
1344 * If we're at the actual client cert, apply additional
1349 * If the conf tells us to, check cert issuer
1350 * against the specified value and fail
1351 * verification if they don't match.
1353 if (conf->check_cert_issuer &&
1354 (strcmp(issuer, conf->check_cert_issuer) != 0)) {
1355 radlog(L_AUTH, "rlm_eap_tls: Certificate issuer (%s) does not match specified value (%s)!", issuer, conf->check_cert_issuer);
1360 * If the conf tells us to, check the CN in the
1361 * cert against xlat'ed value, but only if the
1362 * previous checks passed.
1364 if (my_ok && conf->check_cert_cn) {
1365 if (!radius_xlat(cn_str, sizeof(cn_str), conf->check_cert_cn, request, NULL)) {
1366 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls (%s): xlat failed.",
1367 conf->check_cert_cn);
1368 /* if this fails, fail the verification */
1371 RDEBUG2("checking certificate CN (%s) with xlat'ed value (%s)", common_name, cn_str);
1372 if (strcmp(cn_str, common_name) != 0) {
1373 radlog(L_AUTH, "rlm_eap_tls: Certificate CN (%s) does not match specified value (%s)!", common_name, cn_str);
1377 } /* check_cert_cn */
1379 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
1380 if (my_ok && conf->ocsp_enable){
1381 RDEBUG2("--> Starting OCSP Request");
1382 if(X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer(&issuer_cert, ctx, client_cert)!=1) {
1383 radlog(L_ERR, "Error: Couldn't get issuer_cert for %s", common_name);
1385 my_ok = ocsp_check(ocsp_store, issuer_cert, client_cert, conf);
1389 while (conf->verify_client_cert_cmd) {
1394 snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/%s.client.XXXXXXXX",
1395 conf->verify_tmp_dir, progname);
1396 fd = mkstemp(filename);
1398 RDEBUG("Failed creating file in %s: %s",
1399 conf->verify_tmp_dir, strerror(errno));
1403 fp = fdopen(fd, "w");
1405 RDEBUG("Failed opening file %s: %s",
1406 filename, strerror(errno));
1410 if (!PEM_write_X509(fp, client_cert)) {
1412 RDEBUG("Failed writing certificate to file");
1417 if (!radius_pairmake(request, &request->packet->vps,
1418 "TLS-Client-Cert-Filename",
1419 filename, T_OP_SET)) {
1420 RDEBUG("Failed creating TLS-Client-Cert-Filename");
1425 RDEBUG("Verifying client certificate: %s",
1426 conf->verify_client_cert_cmd);
1427 if (radius_exec_program(conf->verify_client_cert_cmd,
1428 request, 1, NULL, 0,
1429 request->packet->vps,
1431 radlog(L_AUTH, "rlm_eap_tls: Certificate CN (%s) fails external verification!", common_name);
1434 RDEBUG("Client certificate CN %s passed external validation", common_name);
1445 if (debug_flag > 0) {
1446 RDEBUG2("chain-depth=%d, ", depth);
1447 RDEBUG2("error=%d", err);
1449 if (identity) RDEBUG2("--> User-Name = %s", *identity);
1450 RDEBUG2("--> BUF-Name = %s", common_name);
1451 RDEBUG2("--> subject = %s", subject);
1452 RDEBUG2("--> issuer = %s", issuer);
1453 RDEBUG2("--> verify return:%d", my_ok);
1459 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
1461 * Create Global X509 revocation store and use it to verify
1464 * - Load the trusted CAs
1465 * - Load the trusted issuer certificates
1467 static X509_STORE *init_revocation_store(fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf)
1469 X509_STORE *store = NULL;
1471 store = X509_STORE_new();
1473 /* Load the CAs we trust */
1474 if (conf->ca_file || conf->ca_path)
1475 if(!X509_STORE_load_locations(store, conf->ca_file, conf->ca_path)) {
1476 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: X509_STORE error %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
1477 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Error reading Trusted root CA list %s",conf->ca_file );
1481 #ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
1482 if (conf->check_crl)
1483 X509_STORE_set_flags(store, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
1487 #endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H */
1490 * Create Global context SSL and use it in every new session
1492 * - Load the trusted CAs
1493 * - Load the Private key & the certificate
1494 * - Set the Context options & Verify options
1496 static SSL_CTX *init_tls_ctx(fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf)
1498 const SSL_METHOD *meth;
1500 X509_STORE *certstore;
1501 int verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
1502 int ctx_options = 0;
1506 * Add all the default ciphers and message digests
1507 * Create our context.
1510 SSL_load_error_strings();
1513 * SHA256 is in all versions of OpenSSL, but isn't
1514 * initialized by default. It's needed for WiMAX
1517 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_SHA256
1518 EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
1521 meth = TLSv1_method();
1522 ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth);
1525 * Identify the type of certificates that needs to be loaded
1527 if (conf->file_type) {
1528 type = SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
1530 type = SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1;
1534 * Set the password to load private key
1536 if (conf->private_key_password) {
1539 * We don't want to put the private key password in eap.conf, so check
1540 * for our special string which indicates we should get the password
1543 const char* special_string = "Apple:UseCertAdmin";
1544 if (strncmp(conf->private_key_password,
1546 strlen(special_string)) == 0)
1549 const long max_password_len = 128;
1550 snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd) - 1,
1551 "/usr/sbin/certadmin --get-private-key-passphrase \"%s\"",
1552 conf->private_key_file);
1554 DEBUG2("rlm_eap: Getting private key passphrase using command \"%s\"", cmd);
1556 FILE* cmd_pipe = popen(cmd, "r");
1558 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: %s command failed. Unable to get private_key_password", cmd);
1559 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: Error reading private_key_file %s", conf->private_key_file);
1563 free(conf->private_key_password);
1564 conf->private_key_password = malloc(max_password_len * sizeof(char));
1565 if (!conf->private_key_password) {
1566 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: Can't malloc space for private_key_password");
1567 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: Error reading private_key_file %s", conf->private_key_file);
1572 fgets(conf->private_key_password, max_password_len, cmd_pipe);
1575 /* Get rid of newline at end of password. */
1576 conf->private_key_password[strlen(conf->private_key_password) - 1] = '\0';
1577 DEBUG2("rlm_eap: Password from command = \"%s\"", conf->private_key_password);
1580 SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ctx, conf->private_key_password);
1581 SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ctx, cbtls_password);
1585 * Load our keys and certificates
1587 * If certificates are of type PEM then we can make use
1588 * of cert chain authentication using openssl api call
1589 * SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file. Please see how
1590 * the cert chain needs to be given in PEM from
1593 if (!conf->certificate_file) goto load_ca;
1595 if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
1596 if (!(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, conf->certificate_file))) {
1597 radlog(L_ERR, "Error reading certificate file %s:%s",
1598 conf->certificate_file,
1599 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
1603 } else if (!(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, conf->certificate_file, type))) {
1604 radlog(L_ERR, "Error reading certificate file %s:%s",
1605 conf->certificate_file,
1606 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
1610 /* Load the CAs we trust */
1612 if (conf->ca_file || conf->ca_path) {
1613 if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, conf->ca_file, conf->ca_path)) {
1614 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: SSL error %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
1615 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Error reading Trusted root CA list %s",conf->ca_file );
1619 if (conf->ca_file && *conf->ca_file) SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(conf->ca_file));
1621 if (conf->private_key_file) {
1622 if (!(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, conf->private_key_file, type))) {
1623 radlog(L_ERR, "Failed reading private key file %s:%s",
1624 conf->private_key_file,
1625 ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
1630 * Check if the loaded private key is the right one
1632 if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) {
1633 radlog(L_ERR, "Private key does not match the certificate public key");
1641 ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
1642 ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
1643 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
1644 ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET ;
1648 * SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used in order to prevent
1649 * small subgroup attacks and forward secrecy. Always
1652 * SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE has an impact on the computer
1653 * time needed during negotiation, but it is not very
1656 ctx_options |= SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE;
1659 * SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS to work around issues
1660 * in Windows Vista client.
1661 * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt
1662 * http://www.nabble.com/(RADIATOR)-Radiator-Version-3.16-released-t2600070.html
1664 ctx_options |= SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS;
1666 SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, ctx_options);
1669 * TODO: Set the RSA & DH
1670 * SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx, cbtls_rsa);
1671 * SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(ctx, cbtls_dh);
1675 * set the message callback to identify the type of
1676 * message. For every new session, there can be a
1677 * different callback argument.
1679 * SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(ctx, cbtls_msg);
1682 /* Set Info callback */
1683 SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, cbtls_info);
1686 * Callbacks, etc. for session resumption.
1688 if (conf->session_cache_enable) {
1689 SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(ctx, cbtls_new_session);
1690 SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(ctx, cbtls_get_session);
1691 SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(ctx, cbtls_remove_session);
1693 SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(ctx, 1);
1697 * Check the certificates for revocation.
1699 #ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
1700 if (conf->check_crl) {
1701 certstore = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx);
1702 if (certstore == NULL) {
1703 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: SSL error %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
1704 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Error reading Certificate Store");
1707 X509_STORE_set_flags(certstore, X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK);
1713 * Always verify the peer certificate
1715 verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
1716 verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT;
1717 verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE;
1718 SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify_mode, cbtls_verify);
1720 if (conf->verify_depth) {
1721 SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(ctx, conf->verify_depth);
1724 /* Load randomness */
1725 if (!(RAND_load_file(conf->random_file, 1024*1024))) {
1726 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: SSL error %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
1727 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Error loading randomness");
1732 * Set the cipher list if we were told to
1734 if (conf->cipher_list) {
1735 if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, conf->cipher_list)) {
1736 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Error setting cipher list");
1742 * Setup session caching
1744 if (conf->session_cache_enable) {
1746 * Create a unique context Id per EAP-TLS configuration.
1748 if (conf->session_id_name) {
1749 snprintf(conf->session_context_id,
1750 sizeof(conf->session_context_id),
1751 "FreeRADIUS EAP-TLS %s",
1752 conf->session_id_name);
1754 snprintf(conf->session_context_id,
1755 sizeof(conf->session_context_id),
1756 "FreeRADIUS EAP-TLS %p", conf);
1760 * Cache it, and DON'T auto-clear it.
1762 SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR);
1764 SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx,
1765 (unsigned char *) conf->session_context_id,
1766 (unsigned int) strlen(conf->session_context_id));
1769 * Our timeout is in hours, this is in seconds.
1771 SSL_CTX_set_timeout(ctx, conf->session_timeout * 3600);
1774 * Set the maximum number of entries in the
1777 SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx, conf->session_cache_size);
1780 SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
1787 void tls_server_conf_free(fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf)
1791 if (conf->cs) cf_section_parse_free(conf->cs, conf);
1793 if (conf->ctx) SSL_CTX_free(conf->ctx);
1795 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
1796 if (conf->ocsp_store) X509_STORE_free(conf->ocsp_store);
1797 conf->ocsp_store = NULL;
1800 memset(conf, 0, sizeof(*conf));
1805 fr_tls_server_conf_t *tls_server_conf_parse(CONF_SECTION *cs)
1807 fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf;
1809 conf = malloc(sizeof(*conf));
1811 radlog(L_ERR, "Out of memory");
1814 memset(conf, 0, sizeof(*conf));
1816 if (cf_section_parse(cs, conf, tls_server_config) < 0) {
1818 tls_server_conf_free(conf);
1823 * Save people from their own stupidity.
1825 if (conf->fragment_size < 100) conf->fragment_size = 100;
1828 * This magic makes the administrators life HUGELY easier
1829 * on initial deployments.
1831 * If the server starts up in debugging mode, AND the
1832 * bootstrap command is configured, AND it exists, AND
1833 * there is no server certificate
1835 if (conf->make_cert_command && (debug_flag >= 2)) {
1838 if ((stat(conf->make_cert_command, &buf) == 0) &&
1839 (stat(conf->certificate_file, &buf) < 0) &&
1840 (errno == ENOENT) &&
1841 (radius_exec_program(conf->make_cert_command, NULL, 1,
1842 NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, 0) != 0)) {
1847 if (!conf->private_key_file) {
1848 radlog(L_ERR, "TLS Server requires a private key file");
1852 if (!conf->private_key_password) {
1853 radlog(L_ERR, "TLS Server requires a private key password");
1857 if (!conf->certificate_file) {
1858 radlog(L_ERR, "TLS Server requires a certificate file");
1865 conf->ctx = init_tls_ctx(conf);
1866 if (conf->ctx == NULL) {
1870 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
1872 * Initialize OCSP Revocation Store
1874 if (conf->ocsp_enable) {
1875 conf->ocsp_store = init_revocation_store(conf);
1876 if (conf->ocsp_store == NULL) goto error;
1878 #endif /*HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H*/
1880 if (load_dh_params(conf->ctx, conf->dh_file) < 0) {
1884 if (generate_eph_rsa_key(conf->ctx) < 0) {
1888 if (conf->verify_tmp_dir) {
1889 if (chmod(conf->verify_tmp_dir, S_IRWXU) < 0) {
1890 radlog(L_ERR, "Failed changing permissions on %s: %s", conf->verify_tmp_dir, strerror(errno));
1895 if (conf->verify_client_cert_cmd && !conf->verify_tmp_dir) {
1896 radlog(L_ERR, "You MUST set the verify directory in order to use verify_client_cmd");
1903 fr_tls_server_conf_t *tls_client_conf_parse(CONF_SECTION *cs)
1905 fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf;
1907 conf = malloc(sizeof(*conf));
1909 radlog(L_ERR, "Out of memory");
1912 memset(conf, 0, sizeof(*conf));
1914 if (cf_section_parse(cs, conf, tls_client_config) < 0) {
1916 tls_server_conf_free(conf);
1921 * Save people from their own stupidity.
1923 if (conf->fragment_size < 100) conf->fragment_size = 100;
1928 conf->ctx = init_tls_ctx(conf);
1929 if (conf->ctx == NULL) {
1933 if (load_dh_params(conf->ctx, conf->dh_file) < 0) {
1937 if (generate_eph_rsa_key(conf->ctx) < 0) {
1944 int tls_success(tls_session_t *ssn, REQUEST *request)
1946 VALUE_PAIR *vp, *vps = NULL;
1947 fr_tls_server_conf_t *conf;
1949 conf = (fr_tls_server_conf_t *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF);
1950 rad_assert(conf != NULL);
1953 * If there's no session resumption, delete the entry
1954 * from the cache. This means either it's disabled
1955 * globally for this SSL context, OR we were told to
1956 * disable it for this user.
1958 * This also means you can't turn it on just for one
1961 if ((!ssn->allow_session_resumption) ||
1962 (((vp = pairfind(request->config_items, 1127, 0)) != NULL) &&
1963 (vp->vp_integer == 0))) {
1964 SSL_CTX_remove_session(ssn->ctx,
1966 ssn->allow_session_resumption = 0;
1969 * If we're in a resumed session and it's
1972 if (SSL_session_reused(ssn->ssl)) {
1973 RDEBUG("FAIL: Forcibly stopping session resumption as it is not allowed.");
1978 * Else resumption IS allowed, so we store the
1979 * user data in the cache.
1981 } else if (!SSL_session_reused(ssn->ssl)) {
1982 RDEBUG2("Saving response in the cache");
1984 vp = paircopy2(request->reply->vps, PW_USER_NAME, 0);
1985 if (vp) pairadd(&vps, vp);
1987 vp = paircopy2(request->packet->vps, PW_STRIPPED_USER_NAME, 0);
1988 if (vp) pairadd(&vps, vp);
1990 vp = paircopy2(request->reply->vps, PW_CACHED_SESSION_POLICY, 0);
1991 if (vp) pairadd(&vps, vp);
1994 SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl->session,
1995 FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_VPS, vps);
1997 RDEBUG2("WARNING: No information to cache: session caching will be disabled for this session.");
1998 SSL_CTX_remove_session(ssn->ctx,
2003 * Else the session WAS allowed. Copy the cached
2008 vp = SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(ssn->ssl->session,
2009 FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_VPS);
2011 RDEBUG("WARNING: No information in cached session!");
2015 RDEBUG("Adding cached attributes to the reply:");
2016 debug_pair_list(vp);
2017 pairadd(&request->reply->vps, paircopy(vp));
2020 * Mark the request as resumed.
2022 vp = pairmake("EAP-Session-Resumed", "1", T_OP_SET);
2023 if (vp) pairadd(&request->packet->vps, vp);
2031 void tls_fail(tls_session_t *ssn)
2034 * Force the session to NOT be cached.
2036 SSL_CTX_remove_session(ssn->ctx, ssn->ssl->session);
2039 fr_tls_status_t tls_application_data(tls_session_t *ssn,
2046 * Decrypt the complete record.
2048 err = BIO_write(ssn->into_ssl, ssn->dirty_in.data,
2049 ssn->dirty_in.used);
2050 if (err != (int) ssn->dirty_in.used) {
2051 record_init(&ssn->dirty_in);
2052 RDEBUG("Failed writing %d to SSL BIO: %d",
2053 ssn->dirty_in.used, err);
2058 * Clear the dirty buffer now that we are done with it
2059 * and init the clean_out buffer to store decrypted data
2061 record_init(&ssn->dirty_in);
2062 record_init(&ssn->clean_out);
2065 * Read (and decrypt) the tunneled data from the
2066 * SSL session, and put it into the decrypted
2069 err = SSL_read(ssn->ssl, ssn->clean_out.data,
2070 sizeof(ssn->clean_out.data));
2075 RDEBUG("SSL_read Error");
2077 code = SSL_get_error(ssn->ssl, err);
2079 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
2080 return FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS;
2081 DEBUG("Error in fragmentation logic: SSL_WANT_READ");
2084 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
2085 DEBUG("Error in fragmentation logic: SSL_WANT_WRITE");
2089 DEBUG("Error in fragmentation logic: ?");
2092 * FIXME: Call int_ssl_check?
2100 RDEBUG("WARNING: No data inside of the tunnel.");
2104 * Passed all checks, successfully decrypted data
2106 ssn->clean_out.used = err;
2113 * Acknowledge received is for one of the following messages sent earlier
2114 * 1. Handshake completed Message, so now send, EAP-Success
2115 * 2. Alert Message, now send, EAP-Failure
2116 * 3. Fragment Message, now send, next Fragment
2118 fr_tls_status_t tls_ack_handler(tls_session_t *ssn, REQUEST *request)
2120 RDEBUG2("Received TLS ACK");
2123 radlog_request(L_ERR, 0, request, "FAIL: Unexpected ACK received. Could not obtain session information.");
2124 return FR_TLS_INVALID;
2126 if (ssn->info.initialized == 0) {
2127 RDEBUG("No SSL info available. Waiting for more SSL data.");
2128 return FR_TLS_REQUEST;
2130 if ((ssn->info.content_type == handshake) &&
2131 (ssn->info.origin == 0)) {
2132 radlog_request(L_ERR, 0, request, "FAIL: ACK without earlier message.");
2133 return FR_TLS_INVALID;
2136 switch (ssn->info.content_type) {
2138 RDEBUG2("ACK alert");
2142 if ((ssn->info.handshake_type == finished) &&
2143 (ssn->dirty_out.used == 0)) {
2144 RDEBUG2("ACK handshake is finished");
2147 * From now on all the content is
2148 * application data set it here as nobody else
2151 ssn->info.content_type = application_data;
2152 return FR_TLS_SUCCESS;
2153 } /* else more data to send */
2155 RDEBUG2("ACK handshake fragment handler");
2156 /* Fragmentation handler, send next fragment */
2157 return FR_TLS_REQUEST;
2159 case application_data:
2160 RDEBUG2("ACK handshake fragment handler in application data");
2161 return FR_TLS_REQUEST;
2164 * For the rest of the conditions, switch over
2165 * to the default section below.
2168 RDEBUG2("ACK default");
2169 radlog_request(L_ERR, 0, request, "Invalid ACK received: %d",
2170 ssn->info.content_type);
2171 return FR_TLS_INVALID;
2175 static void dump_hex(const char *msg, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len)
2179 if (debug_flag < 3) return;
2181 printf("%s %d\n", msg, (int) data_len);
2182 if (data_len > 256) data_len = 256;
2184 for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) {
2185 if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x00) printf ("%02x: ", (unsigned int) i);
2186 printf("%02x ", data[i]);
2187 if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x0f) printf ("\n");
2193 static void tls_socket_close(rad_listen_t *listener)
2195 listen_socket_t *sock = listener->data;
2197 listener->status = RAD_LISTEN_STATUS_REMOVE_FD;
2198 listener->tls = NULL; /* parent owns this! */
2202 * Decrement the number of connections.
2204 if (sock->parent->num_connections > 0) {
2205 sock->parent->num_connections--;
2207 if (sock->client->num_connections > 0) {
2208 sock->client->num_connections--;
2213 * Tell the event handler that an FD has disappeared.
2215 DEBUG("Client has closed connection");
2216 event_new_fd(listener);
2219 * Do NOT free the listener here. It's in use by
2220 * a request, and will need to hang around until
2221 * all of the requests are done.
2223 * It is instead free'd in remove_from_request_hash()
2227 static int tls_socket_write(rad_listen_t *listener, REQUEST *request)
2231 listen_socket_t *sock = listener->data;
2233 p = sock->ssn->dirty_out.data;
2235 while (p < (sock->ssn->dirty_out.data + sock->ssn->dirty_out.used)) {
2236 RDEBUG3("Writing to socket %d", request->packet->sockfd);
2237 rcode = write(request->packet->sockfd, p,
2238 (sock->ssn->dirty_out.data + sock->ssn->dirty_out.used) - p);
2240 RDEBUG("Error writing to TLS socket: %s", strerror(errno));
2242 tls_socket_close(listener);
2248 sock->ssn->dirty_out.used = 0;
2254 static int tls_socket_recv(rad_listen_t *listener)
2256 int doing_init = FALSE;
2258 RADIUS_PACKET *packet;
2260 listen_socket_t *sock = listener->data;
2261 fr_tls_status_t status;
2262 RADCLIENT *client = sock->client;
2264 if (!sock->packet) {
2265 sock->packet = rad_alloc(0);
2266 if (!sock->packet) return 0;
2268 sock->packet->sockfd = listener->fd;
2269 sock->packet->src_ipaddr = sock->other_ipaddr;
2270 sock->packet->src_port = sock->other_port;
2271 sock->packet->dst_ipaddr = sock->my_ipaddr;
2272 sock->packet->dst_port = sock->my_port;
2274 if (sock->request) sock->request->packet = sock->packet;
2278 * Allocate a REQUEST for debugging.
2280 if (!sock->request) {
2281 sock->request = request = request_alloc();
2282 if (!sock->request) {
2283 radlog(L_ERR, "Out of memory");
2287 rad_assert(request->packet == NULL);
2288 rad_assert(sock->packet != NULL);
2289 request->packet = sock->packet;
2291 request->component = "<core>";
2292 request->component = "<tls-connect>";
2295 * Not sure if we should do this on every packet...
2297 request->reply = rad_alloc(0);
2298 if (!request->reply) return 0;
2300 request->options = RAD_REQUEST_OPTION_DEBUG2;
2302 rad_assert(sock->ssn == NULL);
2304 sock->ssn = tls_new_session(listener->tls, sock->request,
2305 listener->tls->require_client_cert);
2307 request_free(&sock->request);
2308 sock->packet = NULL;
2312 SSL_set_ex_data(sock->ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST, (void *)request);
2313 SSL_set_ex_data(sock->ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CERTS, (void *)&request->packet->vps);
2318 rad_assert(sock->request != NULL);
2319 rad_assert(sock->request->packet != NULL);
2320 rad_assert(sock->packet != NULL);
2321 rad_assert(sock->ssn != NULL);
2323 request = sock->request;
2325 RDEBUG3("Reading from socket %d", request->packet->sockfd);
2326 PTHREAD_MUTEX_LOCK(&sock->mutex);
2327 rcode = read(request->packet->sockfd,
2328 sock->ssn->dirty_in.data,
2329 sizeof(sock->ssn->dirty_in.data));
2330 if ((rcode < 0) && (errno == ECONNRESET)) {
2332 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2333 tls_socket_close(listener);
2338 RDEBUG("Error reading TLS socket: %s", strerror(errno));
2343 * Normal socket close.
2345 if (rcode == 0) goto do_close;
2347 sock->ssn->dirty_in.used = rcode;
2348 memset(sock->ssn->dirty_in.data + sock->ssn->dirty_in.used,
2351 dump_hex("READ FROM SSL", sock->ssn->dirty_in.data, sock->ssn->dirty_in.used);
2354 * Catch attempts to use non-SSL.
2356 if (doing_init && (sock->ssn->dirty_in.data[0] != handshake)) {
2357 RDEBUG("Non-TLS data sent to TLS socket: closing");
2362 * Skip ahead to reading application data.
2364 if (SSL_is_init_finished(sock->ssn->ssl)) goto app;
2366 if (!tls_handshake_recv(request, sock->ssn)) {
2367 RDEBUG("FAILED in TLS handshake receive");
2371 if (sock->ssn->dirty_out.used > 0) {
2372 tls_socket_write(listener, request);
2373 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2379 * FIXME: Run the packet through a virtual server in
2380 * order to see if we like the certificate presented by
2384 status = tls_application_data(sock->ssn, request);
2385 RDEBUG("Application data status %d", status);
2387 if (status == FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS) {
2388 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2392 if (sock->ssn->clean_out.used == 0) {
2393 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2397 dump_hex("TUNNELED DATA", sock->ssn->clean_out.data, sock->ssn->clean_out.used);
2400 * If the packet is a complete RADIUS packet, return it to
2401 * the caller. Otherwise...
2403 if ((sock->ssn->clean_out.used < 20) ||
2404 (((sock->ssn->clean_out.data[2] << 8) | sock->ssn->clean_out.data[3]) != (int) sock->ssn->clean_out.used)) {
2405 RDEBUG("Received bad packet: Length %d contents %d",
2406 sock->ssn->clean_out.used,
2407 (sock->ssn->clean_out.data[2] << 8) | sock->ssn->clean_out.data[3]);
2411 packet = sock->packet;
2412 packet->data = rad_malloc(sock->ssn->clean_out.used);
2413 packet->data_len = sock->ssn->clean_out.used;
2414 memcpy(packet->data, sock->ssn->clean_out.data, packet->data_len);
2416 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2418 if (!rad_packet_ok(packet, 0)) {
2419 RDEBUG("Received bad packet: %s", fr_strerror());
2420 tls_socket_close(listener);
2421 return 0; /* do_close unlocks the mutex */
2425 * Copied from src/lib/radius.c, rad_recv();
2427 if (fr_debug_flag) {
2428 char host_ipaddr[128];
2430 if ((packet->code > 0) && (packet->code < FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
2431 RDEBUG("tls_recv: %s packet from host %s port %d, id=%d, length=%d",
2432 fr_packet_codes[packet->code],
2433 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2434 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2435 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2437 packet->id, (int) packet->data_len);
2439 RDEBUG("tls_recv: Packet from host %s port %d code=%d, id=%d, length=%d",
2440 inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
2441 &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
2442 host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
2445 packet->id, (int) packet->data_len);
2449 FR_STATS_INC(auth, total_requests);
2455 int dual_tls_recv(rad_listen_t *listener)
2457 RADIUS_PACKET *packet;
2459 RAD_REQUEST_FUNP fun = NULL;
2460 listen_socket_t *sock = listener->data;
2461 RADCLIENT *client = sock->client;
2463 if (!tls_socket_recv(listener)) {
2467 rad_assert(sock->request != NULL);
2468 rad_assert(sock->request->packet != NULL);
2469 rad_assert(sock->packet != NULL);
2470 rad_assert(sock->ssn != NULL);
2472 request = sock->request;
2473 packet = sock->packet;
2476 * Some sanity checks, based on the packet code.
2478 switch(packet->code) {
2479 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REQUEST:
2480 if (listener->type != RAD_LISTEN_AUTH) goto bad_packet;
2481 FR_STATS_INC(auth, total_requests);
2482 fun = rad_authenticate;
2485 case PW_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
2486 if (listener->type != RAD_LISTEN_ACCT) goto bad_packet;
2487 FR_STATS_INC(acct, total_requests);
2488 fun = rad_accounting;
2491 case PW_STATUS_SERVER:
2492 if (!mainconfig.status_server) {
2493 FR_STATS_INC(auth, total_unknown_types);
2494 DEBUG("WARNING: Ignoring Status-Server request due to security configuration");
2495 rad_free(&sock->packet);
2496 request->packet = NULL;
2499 fun = rad_status_server;
2504 FR_STATS_INC(auth, total_unknown_types);
2506 DEBUG("Invalid packet code %d sent from client %s port %d : IGNORED",
2507 packet->code, client->shortname, packet->src_port);
2508 rad_free(&sock->packet);
2509 request->packet = NULL;
2511 } /* switch over packet types */
2513 if (!request_receive(listener, packet, client, fun)) {
2514 FR_STATS_INC(auth, total_packets_dropped);
2515 rad_free(&sock->packet);
2516 request->packet = NULL;
2520 sock->packet = NULL; /* we have no need for more partial reads */
2521 request->packet = NULL;
2528 * Send a response packet
2530 int dual_tls_send(rad_listen_t *listener, REQUEST *request)
2532 listen_socket_t *sock = listener->data;
2534 rad_assert(request->listener == listener);
2535 rad_assert(listener->send == dual_tls_send);
2538 * Accounting reject's are silently dropped.
2540 * We do it here to avoid polluting the rest of the
2541 * code with this knowledge
2543 if (request->reply->code == 0) return 0;
2548 if (rad_encode(request->reply, request->packet,
2549 request->client->secret) < 0) {
2550 RDEBUG("Failed encoding packet: %s", fr_strerror());
2557 if (rad_sign(request->reply, request->packet,
2558 request->client->secret) < 0) {
2559 RDEBUG("Failed signing packet: %s", fr_strerror());
2563 PTHREAD_MUTEX_LOCK(&sock->mutex);
2565 * Write the packet to the SSL buffers.
2567 record_plus(&sock->ssn->clean_in,
2568 request->reply->data, request->reply->data_len);
2571 * Do SSL magic to get encrypted data.
2573 tls_handshake_send(request, sock->ssn);
2576 * And finally write the data to the socket.
2578 if (sock->ssn->dirty_out.used > 0) {
2579 dump_hex("WRITE TO SSL", sock->ssn->dirty_out.data, sock->ssn->dirty_out.used);
2581 tls_socket_write(listener, request);
2583 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2589 int proxy_tls_recv(rad_listen_t *listener)
2593 listen_socket_t *sock = listener->data;
2596 RADIUS_PACKET *packet;
2597 RAD_REQUEST_FUNP fun = NULL;
2599 DEBUG3("Proxy SSL socket has data to read");
2600 PTHREAD_MUTEX_LOCK(&sock->mutex);
2602 rcode = SSL_read(sock->ssn->ssl, data, 4);
2604 int err = SSL_get_error(sock->ssn->ssl, rcode);
2606 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
2607 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
2610 case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
2611 /* remote end sent close_notify, send one back */
2612 SSL_shutdown(sock->ssn->ssl);
2614 case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
2616 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2617 tls_socket_close(listener);
2621 while ((err = ERR_get_error())) {
2622 DEBUG("proxy recv says %s",
2623 ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
2630 length = (data[2] << 8) | data[3];
2631 DEBUG3("Proxy received header saying we have a packet of %u bytes",
2632 (unsigned int) length);
2634 if (length > sizeof(data)) {
2635 DEBUG("Received packet will be too large! (%u)",
2636 (data[2] << 8) | data[3]);
2640 rcode = SSL_read(sock->ssn->ssl, data + 4, length);
2642 switch (SSL_get_error(sock->ssn->ssl, rcode)) {
2643 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
2644 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
2648 case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
2649 /* remote end sent close_notify, send one back */
2650 SSL_shutdown(sock->ssn->ssl);
2656 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2658 packet = rad_alloc(0);
2659 packet->sockfd = listener->fd;
2660 packet->src_ipaddr = sock->other_ipaddr;
2661 packet->src_port = sock->other_port;
2662 packet->dst_ipaddr = sock->my_ipaddr;
2663 packet->dst_port = sock->my_port;
2664 packet->code = data[0];
2665 packet->id = data[1];
2666 packet->data_len = length;
2667 packet->data = rad_malloc(packet->data_len);
2668 memcpy(packet->data, data, packet->data_len);
2669 memcpy(packet->vector, packet->data + 4, 16);
2672 * FIXME: Client MIB updates?
2674 switch(packet->code) {
2675 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
2676 case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
2677 case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
2678 fun = rad_authenticate;
2681 #ifdef WITH_ACCOUNTING
2682 case PW_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE:
2683 fun = rad_accounting;
2689 * FIXME: Update MIB for packet types?
2691 radlog(L_ERR, "Invalid packet code %d sent to a proxy port "
2692 "from home server %s port %d - ID %d : IGNORED",
2694 ip_ntoh(&packet->src_ipaddr, buffer, sizeof(buffer)),
2695 packet->src_port, packet->id);
2700 if (!request_proxy_reply(packet)) {
2708 int proxy_tls_send(rad_listen_t *listener, REQUEST *request)
2711 listen_socket_t *sock = listener->data;
2714 * Normal proxying calls us with the data already
2715 * encoded. The "ping home server" code does not. So,
2716 * if there's no packet, encode it here.
2718 if (!request->proxy->data) {
2719 request->proxy_listener->encode(request->proxy_listener,
2723 DEBUG3("Proxy is writing %u bytes to SSL",
2724 (unsigned int) request->proxy->data_len);
2725 PTHREAD_MUTEX_LOCK(&sock->mutex);
2726 while ((rcode = SSL_write(sock->ssn->ssl, request->proxy->data,
2727 request->proxy->data_len)) < 0) {
2729 while ((err = ERR_get_error())) {
2730 DEBUG("proxy SSL_write says %s",
2731 ERR_error_string(err, NULL));
2733 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2734 tls_socket_close(listener);
2737 PTHREAD_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&sock->mutex);
2742 #endif /* WITH_TLS */