6 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
7 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
8 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
9 * (at your option) any later version.
11 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
12 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
13 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
14 * GNU General Public License for more details.
16 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
17 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
18 * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
20 * Copyright 2001 hereUare Communications, Inc. <raghud@hereuare.com>
21 * Copyright 2003 Alan DeKok <aland@freeradius.org>
22 * Copyright 2006 The FreeRADIUS server project
27 * TLS Packet Format in EAP
28 * --- ------ ------ -- ---
30 * 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
31 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
32 * | Code | Identifier | Length |
33 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
34 * | Type | Flags | TLS Message Length
35 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
36 * | TLS Message Length | TLS Data...
37 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
41 #include <freeradius-devel/ident.h>
48 * Allocate a new TLS_PACKET
50 EAPTLS_PACKET *eaptls_alloc(void)
54 if ((rp = malloc(sizeof(EAPTLS_PACKET))) == NULL) {
55 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: out of memory");
58 memset(rp, 0, sizeof(EAPTLS_PACKET));
65 void eaptls_free(EAPTLS_PACKET **eaptls_packet_ptr)
67 EAPTLS_PACKET *eaptls_packet;
69 if (!eaptls_packet_ptr) return;
70 eaptls_packet = *eaptls_packet_ptr;
71 if (eaptls_packet == NULL) return;
73 if (eaptls_packet->data) {
74 free(eaptls_packet->data);
75 eaptls_packet->data = NULL;
79 *eaptls_packet_ptr = NULL;
83 * Send an initial eap-tls request to the peer.
85 * Frame eap reply packet.
86 * len = header + type + tls_typedata
87 * tls_typedata = flags(Start (S) bit set, and no data)
89 * Once having received the peer's Identity, the EAP server MUST
90 * respond with an EAP-TLS/Start packet, which is an
91 * EAP-Request packet with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS, the Start (S) bit
92 * set, and no data. The EAP-TLS conversation will then begin,
93 * with the peer sending an EAP-Response packet with
94 * EAP-Type = EAP-TLS. The data field of that packet will
97 * Fragment length is Framed-MTU - 4.
99 tls_session_t *eaptls_session(fr_tls_server_conf_t *tls_conf, EAP_HANDLER *handler, int client_cert)
103 REQUEST *request = handler->request;
106 handler->finished = FALSE;
109 * Every new session is started only from EAP-TLS-START.
110 * Before Sending EAP-TLS-START, open a new SSL session.
111 * Create all the required data structures & store them
112 * in Opaque. So that we can use these data structures
113 * when we get the response
115 ssn = tls_new_session(tls_conf, request, client_cert);
121 * Verify the peer certificate, if asked.
124 RDEBUG2("Requiring client certificate");
125 verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
126 verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT;
127 verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE;
129 SSL_set_verify(ssn->ssl, verify_mode, cbtls_verify);
132 * Create a structure for all the items required to be
133 * verified for each client and set that as opaque data
136 * NOTE: If we want to set each item sepearately then
137 * this index should be global.
139 SSL_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_HANDLER, (void *)handler);
140 SSL_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF, (void *)tls_conf);
141 SSL_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CERTS, (void *)&(handler->certs));
142 SSL_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_IDENTITY, (void *)&(handler->identity));
143 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
144 SSL_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_STORE, (void *)tls_conf->ocsp_store);
151 The S flag is set only within the EAP-TLS start message
152 sent from the EAP server to the peer.
154 int eaptls_start(EAP_DS *eap_ds, int peap_flag)
158 reply.code = FR_TLS_START;
159 reply.length = TLS_HEADER_LEN + 1/*flags*/;
161 reply.flags = peap_flag;
162 reply.flags = SET_START(reply.flags);
167 eaptls_compose(eap_ds, &reply);
172 int eaptls_success(EAP_HANDLER *handler, int peap_flag)
175 REQUEST *request = handler->request;
176 tls_session_t *tls_session = handler->opaque;
178 handler->finished = TRUE;
179 reply.code = FR_TLS_SUCCESS;
180 reply.length = TLS_HEADER_LEN;
181 reply.flags = peap_flag;
185 tls_success(tls_session, request);
188 * Call compose AFTER checking for cached data.
190 eaptls_compose(handler->eap_ds, &reply);
193 * Automatically generate MPPE keying material.
195 if (tls_session->prf_label) {
196 eaptls_gen_mppe_keys(&handler->request->reply->vps,
197 tls_session->ssl, tls_session->prf_label);
199 RDEBUGW("Not adding MPPE keys because there is no PRF label");
205 int eaptls_fail(EAP_HANDLER *handler, int peap_flag)
208 tls_session_t *tls_session = handler->opaque;
210 handler->finished = TRUE;
211 reply.code = FR_TLS_FAIL;
212 reply.length = TLS_HEADER_LEN;
213 reply.flags = peap_flag;
217 tls_fail(tls_session);
219 eaptls_compose(handler->eap_ds, &reply);
225 A single TLS record may be up to 16384 octets in length, but a TLS
226 message may span multiple TLS records, and a TLS certificate message
227 may in principle be as long as 16MB.
231 * Frame the Dirty data that needs to be send to the client in an
232 * EAP-Request. We always embed the TLS-length in all EAP-TLS
233 * packets that we send, for easy reference purpose. Handle
234 * fragmentation and sending the next fragment etc.
236 int eaptls_request(EAP_DS *eap_ds, tls_session_t *ssn)
241 unsigned int lbit = 0;
243 /* This value determines whether we set (L)ength flag for
244 EVERY packet we send and add corresponding
245 "TLS Message Length" field.
248 This means we include L flag and "TLS Msg Len" in EVERY
252 This means we include L flag and "TLS Msg Len" **ONLY**
253 in First packet of a fragment series. We do not use
256 Having L flag in every packet is prefered.
259 if (ssn->length_flag) {
262 if (ssn->fragment == 0) {
263 ssn->tls_msg_len = ssn->dirty_out.used;
266 reply.code = FR_TLS_REQUEST;
267 reply.flags = ssn->peap_flag;
269 /* Send data, NOT more than the FRAGMENT size */
270 if (ssn->dirty_out.used > ssn->offset) {
272 reply.flags = SET_MORE_FRAGMENTS(reply.flags);
273 /* Length MUST be included if it is the First Fragment */
274 if (ssn->fragment == 0) {
279 size = ssn->dirty_out.used;
283 reply.dlen = lbit + size;
284 reply.length = TLS_HEADER_LEN + 1/*flags*/ + reply.dlen;
286 reply.data = malloc(reply.dlen);
288 nlen = htonl(ssn->tls_msg_len);
289 memcpy(reply.data, &nlen, lbit);
290 reply.flags = SET_LENGTH_INCLUDED(reply.flags);
292 (ssn->record_minus)(&ssn->dirty_out, reply.data + lbit, size);
294 eaptls_compose(eap_ds, &reply);
303 * Similarly, when the EAP server receives an EAP-Response with
304 * the M bit set, it MUST respond with an EAP-Request with
305 * EAP-Type=EAP-TLS and no data. This serves as a fragment ACK.
307 * In order to prevent errors in the processing of fragments, the
308 * EAP server MUST use increment the Identifier value for each
309 * fragment ACK contained within an EAP-Request, and the peer
310 * MUST include this Identifier value in the subsequent fragment
311 * contained within an EAP- Reponse.
313 * EAP server sends an ACK when it determines there are More
314 * fragments to receive to make the complete
315 * TLS-record/TLS-Message
317 static int eaptls_send_ack(EAP_DS *eap_ds, int peap_flag)
321 reply.code = FR_TLS_ACK;
322 reply.length = TLS_HEADER_LEN + 1/*flags*/;
323 reply.flags = peap_flag;
327 eaptls_compose(eap_ds, &reply);
333 * The S flag is set only within the EAP-TLS start message sent
334 * from the EAP server to the peer.
336 * Similarly, when the EAP server receives an EAP-Response with
337 * the M bit set, it MUST respond with an EAP-Request with
338 * EAP-Type=EAP-TLS and no data. This serves as a fragment
339 * ACK. The EAP peer MUST wait.
341 static fr_tls_status_t eaptls_verify(EAP_HANDLER *handler)
343 EAP_DS *eap_ds = handler->eap_ds;
344 EAP_DS *prev_eap_ds = handler->prev_eapds;
345 eaptls_packet_t *eaptls_packet, *eaptls_prev = NULL;
346 REQUEST *request = handler->request;
349 * We don't check ANY of the input parameters. It's all
350 * code which works together, so if something is wrong,
351 * we SHOULD core dump.
353 * e.g. if eap_ds is NULL, of if eap_ds->response is
354 * NULL, of if it's NOT an EAP-Response, or if the packet
355 * is too short. See eap_validation()., in ../../eap.c
357 * Also, eaptype_select() takes care of selecting the
358 * appropriate type, so we don't need to check
359 * eap_ds->response->type.type == PW_EAP_TLS, or anything
362 eaptls_packet = (eaptls_packet_t *)eap_ds->response->type.data;
363 if (prev_eap_ds && prev_eap_ds->response)
364 eaptls_prev = (eaptls_packet_t *)prev_eap_ds->response->type.data;
369 * If there's no TLS data, or there's 1 byte of TLS data,
370 * with the flags set to zero, then it's an ACK.
372 * Find if this is a reply to the previous request sent
374 if ((eaptls_packet == NULL) ||
375 ((eap_ds->response->length == EAP_HEADER_LEN + 2) &&
376 ((eaptls_packet->flags & 0xc0) == 0x00))) {
379 (prev_eap_ds->request->id == eap_ds->response->id)) {
381 * Run the ACK handler directly from here.
383 RDEBUG2("Received TLS ACK");
384 return tls_ack_handler(handler->opaque, request);
386 radlog_request(L_ERR, 0, request, "Received Invalid TLS ACK");
387 return FR_TLS_INVALID;
392 * We send TLS_START, but do not receive it.
394 if (TLS_START(eaptls_packet->flags)) {
395 RDEBUG("Received unexpected EAP-TLS Start message");
396 return FR_TLS_INVALID;
400 * The L bit (length included) is set to indicate the
401 * presence of the four octet TLS Message Length field,
402 * and MUST be set for the first fragment of a fragmented
403 * TLS message or set of messages.
405 * The M bit (more fragments) is set on all but the last
408 * The S bit (EAP-TLS start) is set in an EAP-TLS Start
409 * message. This differentiates the EAP-TLS Start message
410 * from a fragment acknowledgement.
412 if (TLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED(eaptls_packet->flags)) {
413 DEBUG2(" TLS Length %d",
414 eaptls_packet->data[2] * 256 | eaptls_packet->data[3]);
415 if (TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS(eaptls_packet->flags)) {
417 * FIRST_FRAGMENT is identified
418 * 1. If there is no previous EAP-response received.
419 * 2. If EAP-response received, then its M bit not set.
420 * (It is because Last fragment will not have M bit set)
423 (prev_eap_ds->response == NULL) ||
424 (eaptls_prev == NULL) ||
425 !TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS(eaptls_prev->flags)) {
427 RDEBUG2("Received EAP-TLS First Fragment of the message");
428 return FR_TLS_FIRST_FRAGMENT;
431 RDEBUG2("More Fragments with length included");
432 return FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS_WITH_LENGTH;
435 RDEBUG2("Length Included");
436 return FR_TLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED;
440 if (TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS(eaptls_packet->flags)) {
441 RDEBUG2("More fragments to follow");
442 return FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS;
446 * None of the flags are set, but it's still a valid
456 * length = code + id + length + flags + tlsdata
457 * = 1 + 1 + 2 + 1 + X
458 * length = EAP-length - 1(EAP-Type = 1 octet)
459 * flags = EAP-typedata[0] (1 octet)
460 * dlen = EAP-typedata[1-4] (4 octets), if L flag set
461 * = length - 5(code+id+length+flags), otherwise
462 * data = EAP-typedata[5-n], if L flag set
463 * = EAP-typedata[1-n], otherwise
464 * packet = EAP-typedata (complete typedata)
466 * Points to consider during EAP-TLS data extraction
467 * 1. In the received packet, No data will be present incase of ACK-NAK
468 * 2. Incase if more fragments need to be received then ACK after retreiving this fragment.
470 * RFC 2716 Section 4.2. PPP EAP TLS Request Packet
473 * 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
474 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
475 * | Code | Identifier | Length |
476 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
477 * | Type | Flags | TLS Message Length
478 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
479 * | TLS Message Length | TLS Data...
480 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
482 * The Length field is two octets and indicates the length of the EAP
483 * packet including the Code, Identifir, Length, Type, and TLS data
486 static EAPTLS_PACKET *eaptls_extract(REQUEST *request, EAP_DS *eap_ds, fr_tls_status_t status)
488 EAPTLS_PACKET *tlspacket;
489 uint32_t data_len = 0;
491 uint8_t *data = NULL;
493 if (status == FR_TLS_INVALID)
497 * The main EAP code & eaptls_verify() take care of
498 * ensuring that the packet is OK, and that we can
499 * extract the various fields we want.
501 * e.g. a TLS packet with zero data is allowed as an ACK,
502 * but we will never see it here, as we will simply
503 * send another fragment, instead of trying to extract
506 * MUST have TLS type octet, followed by flags, followed
509 assert(eap_ds->response->length > 2);
511 tlspacket = eaptls_alloc();
512 if (tlspacket == NULL) return NULL;
515 * Code & id for EAPTLS & EAP are same
516 * but eaptls_length = eap_length - 1(EAP-Type = 1 octet)
518 * length = code + id + length + type + tlsdata
519 * = 1 + 1 + 2 + 1 + X
521 tlspacket->code = eap_ds->response->code;
522 tlspacket->id = eap_ds->response->id;
523 tlspacket->length = eap_ds->response->length - 1; /* EAP type */
524 tlspacket->flags = eap_ds->response->type.data[0];
527 * A quick sanity check of the flags. If we've been told
528 * that there's a length, and there isn't one, then stop.
530 if (TLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED(tlspacket->flags) &&
531 (tlspacket->length < 5)) { /* flags + TLS message length */
532 RDEBUG("Invalid EAP-TLS packet received. (Length bit is set, but no length was found.)");
533 eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
538 * If the final TLS packet is larger than we can handle, die
541 * Likewise, if the EAP packet says N bytes, and the TLS
542 * packet says there's fewer bytes, it's a problem.
544 * FIXME: Try to ensure that the claimed length is
545 * consistent across multiple TLS fragments.
547 if (TLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED(tlspacket->flags)) {
548 memcpy(&data_len, &eap_ds->response->type.data[1], 4);
549 data_len = ntohl(data_len);
550 if (data_len > MAX_RECORD_SIZE) {
551 RDEBUG("The EAP-TLS packet will contain more data than we can process.");
552 eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
557 DEBUG2(" TLS: %d %d\n", data_len, tlspacket->length);
559 if (data_len < tlspacket->length) {
560 RDEBUG("EAP-TLS packet claims to be smaller than the encapsulating EAP packet.");
561 eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
569 * The TLS Message Length field is four octets, and
570 * provides the total length of the TLS message or set of
571 * messages that is being fragmented; this simplifies
574 * Dynamic allocation of buffers as & when we know the
575 * length should solve the problem.
577 case FR_TLS_FIRST_FRAGMENT:
578 case FR_TLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED:
579 case FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS_WITH_LENGTH:
580 if (tlspacket->length < 5) { /* flags + TLS message length */
581 RDEBUG("Invalid EAP-TLS packet received. (Expected length, got none.)");
582 eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
587 * Extract all the TLS fragments from the
588 * previous eap_ds Start appending this
589 * fragment to the above ds
591 memcpy(&data_len, &eap_ds->response->type.data[1], sizeof(uint32_t));
592 data_len = ntohl(data_len);
593 data = (eap_ds->response->type.data + 5/*flags+TLS-Length*/);
594 len = eap_ds->response->type.length - 5/*flags+TLS-Length*/;
597 * Hmm... this should be an error, too.
599 if (data_len > len) {
605 * Data length is implicit, from the EAP header.
607 case FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS:
609 data_len = eap_ds->response->type.length - 1/*flags*/;
610 data = eap_ds->response->type.data + 1/*flags*/;
614 RDEBUG("Invalid EAP-TLS packet received");
615 eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
619 tlspacket->dlen = data_len;
621 tlspacket->data = (unsigned char *)malloc(data_len);
622 if (tlspacket->data == NULL) {
623 RDEBUG("out of memory");
624 eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
627 memcpy(tlspacket->data, data, data_len);
636 * To process the TLS,
638 * 1. EAP-TLS should get the compelete TLS data from the peer.
639 * 2. Store that data in a data structure with any other required info
640 * 3. Handle that data structure to the TLS module.
641 * 4. TLS module will perform its operations on the data and
642 * handle back to EAP-TLS
645 * 1. EAP-TLS if necessary will fragment it and send it to the
648 * During EAP-TLS initialization, TLS Context object will be
649 * initialized and stored. For every new authentication
650 * requests, TLS will open a new session object and that session
651 * object should be maintained even after the session is
652 * completed for session resumption. (Probably later as a feature
653 * as we donot know who maintains these session objects ie,
654 * SSL_CTX (internally) or TLS module(explicitly). If TLS module,
655 * then how to let SSL API know about these sessions.)
657 static fr_tls_status_t eaptls_operation(fr_tls_status_t status,
658 EAP_HANDLER *handler)
660 tls_session_t *tls_session;
662 tls_session = (tls_session_t *)handler->opaque;
664 if ((status == FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS) ||
665 (status == FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS_WITH_LENGTH) ||
666 (status == FR_TLS_FIRST_FRAGMENT)) {
670 eaptls_send_ack(handler->eap_ds, tls_session->peap_flag);
671 return FR_TLS_HANDLED;
676 * We have the complete TLS-data or TLS-message.
678 * Clean the dirty message.
680 * Authenticate the user and send
684 * is required then send another request.
686 if (!tls_handshake_recv(handler->request, tls_session)) {
687 DEBUG2("TLS receive handshake failed during operation");
688 eaptls_fail(handler, tls_session->peap_flag);
693 * FIXME: return success/fail.
695 * TLS proper can decide what to do, then.
697 if (tls_session->dirty_out.used > 0) {
698 eaptls_request(handler->eap_ds, tls_session);
699 return FR_TLS_HANDLED;
703 * If there is no data to send i.e
704 * dirty_out.used <=0 and if the SSL
705 * handshake is finished, then return a
709 if (SSL_is_init_finished(tls_session->ssl)) {
711 * Init is finished. The rest is
714 tls_session->info.content_type = application_data;
715 return FR_TLS_SUCCESS;
719 * Who knows what happened...
721 DEBUG2("TLS failed during operation");
727 * In the actual authentication first verify the packet and then create the data structure
730 * To process the TLS,
732 * 1. EAP-TLS should get the compelete TLS data from the peer.
733 * 2. Store that data in a data structure with any other required info
734 * 3. Hand this data structure to the TLS module.
735 * 4. TLS module will perform its operations on the data and hands back to EAP-TLS
737 * 1. EAP-TLS if necessary will fragment it and send it to the destination.
739 * During EAP-TLS initialization, TLS Context object will be
740 * initialized and stored. For every new authentication
741 * requests, TLS will open a new session object and that
742 * session object SHOULD be maintained even after the session
743 * is completed, for session resumption. (Probably later as a
744 * feature, as we do not know who maintains these session
745 * objects ie, SSL_CTX (internally) or TLS module (explicitly). If
746 * TLS module, then how to let SSL API know about these
751 * Process an EAP request
753 fr_tls_status_t eaptls_process(EAP_HANDLER *handler)
755 tls_session_t *tls_session = (tls_session_t *) handler->opaque;
756 EAPTLS_PACKET *tlspacket;
757 fr_tls_status_t status;
758 REQUEST *request = handler->request;
760 if (!request) return FR_TLS_FAIL;
762 RDEBUG2("processing EAP-TLS");
763 SSL_set_ex_data(tls_session->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST, request);
765 if (handler->certs) pairadd(&request->packet->vps,
766 paircopy(handler->certs));
768 /* This case is when SSL generates Alert then we
769 * send that alert to the client and then send the EAP-Failure
771 status = eaptls_verify(handler);
772 RDEBUG2("eaptls_verify returned %d\n", status);
780 * Success means that we're done the initial
781 * handshake. For TTLS, this means send stuff
782 * back to the client, and the client sends us
783 * more tunneled data.
789 * Normal TLS request, continue with the "get rest
790 * of fragments" phase.
793 eaptls_request(handler->eap_ds, tls_session);
794 status = FR_TLS_HANDLED;
798 * The handshake is done, and we're in the "tunnel
802 RDEBUG2("Done initial handshake");
805 * Get the rest of the fragments.
807 case FR_TLS_FIRST_FRAGMENT:
808 case FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS:
809 case FR_TLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED:
810 case FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS_WITH_LENGTH:
815 * Extract the TLS packet from the buffer.
817 if ((tlspacket = eaptls_extract(request, handler->eap_ds, status)) == NULL) {
818 status = FR_TLS_FAIL;
823 * Get the session struct from the handler
825 * update the dirty_in buffer
827 * NOTE: This buffer will contain partial data when M bit is set.
829 * CAUTION while reinitializing this buffer, it should be
830 * reinitialized only when this M bit is NOT set.
832 if (tlspacket->dlen !=
833 (tls_session->record_plus)(&tls_session->dirty_in, tlspacket->data, tlspacket->dlen)) {
834 eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
835 RDEBUG("Exceeded maximum record size");
843 eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
846 * SSL initalization is done. Return.
848 * The TLS data will be in the tls_session structure.
850 if (SSL_is_init_finished(tls_session->ssl)) {
852 * The initialization may be finished, but if
853 * there more fragments coming, then send ACK,
854 * and get the caller to continue the
857 if ((status == FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS) ||
858 (status == FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS_WITH_LENGTH) ||
859 (status == FR_TLS_FIRST_FRAGMENT)) {
863 eaptls_send_ack(handler->eap_ds,
864 tls_session->peap_flag);
865 RDEBUG2("Init is done, but tunneled data is fragmented");
866 status = FR_TLS_HANDLED;
870 status = tls_application_data(tls_session, request);
875 * Continue the handshake.
877 status = eaptls_operation(status, handler);
880 SSL_set_ex_data(tls_session->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST, NULL);
887 * compose the TLS reply packet in the EAP reply typedata
889 int eaptls_compose(EAP_DS *eap_ds, EAPTLS_PACKET *reply)
894 * Don't set eap_ds->request->type.type, as the main EAP
895 * handler will do that for us. This allows the TLS
896 * module to be called from TTLS & PEAP.
900 * When the EAP server receives an EAP-Response with the
901 * M bit set, it MUST respond with an EAP-Request with
902 * EAP-Type=EAP-TLS and no data. This serves as a
903 * fragment ACK. The EAP peer MUST wait until it receives
904 * the EAP-Request before sending another fragment.
906 * In order to prevent errors in the processing of
907 * fragments, the EAP server MUST use increment the
908 * Identifier value for each fragment ACK contained
909 * within an EAP-Request, and the peer MUST include this
910 * Identifier value in the subsequent fragment contained
911 * within an EAP- Reponse.
913 eap_ds->request->type.data = malloc(reply->length - TLS_HEADER_LEN + 1);
914 if (eap_ds->request->type.data == NULL) {
915 radlog(L_ERR, "out of memory");
919 /* EAPTLS Header length is excluded while computing EAP typelen */
920 eap_ds->request->type.length = reply->length - TLS_HEADER_LEN;
922 ptr = eap_ds->request->type.data;
923 *ptr++ = (uint8_t)(reply->flags & 0xFF);
925 if (reply->dlen) memcpy(ptr, reply->data, reply->dlen);
927 switch (reply->code) {
931 eap_ds->request->code = PW_EAP_REQUEST;
934 eap_ds->request->code = PW_EAP_SUCCESS;
937 eap_ds->request->code = PW_EAP_FAILURE;
940 /* Should never enter here */
941 eap_ds->request->code = PW_EAP_FAILURE;
949 * Parse TLS configuration
951 * If the option given by 'attr' is set, we find the config section
952 * of that name and use that for the TLS configuration. If not, we
953 * fall back to compatibility mode and read the TLS options from
956 fr_tls_server_conf_t *eaptls_conf_parse(CONF_SECTION *cs, const char *attr)
958 const char *tls_conf_name;
960 CONF_SECTION *parent;
961 CONF_SECTION *tls_cs;
962 fr_tls_server_conf_t *tls_conf;
967 rad_assert(attr != NULL);
969 parent = cf_item_parent(cf_sectiontoitem(cs));
971 cp = cf_pair_find(cs, attr);
973 tls_conf_name = cf_pair_value(cp);
975 tls_cs = cf_section_sub_find_name2(parent, TLS_CONFIG_SECTION, tls_conf_name);
978 radlog(L_ERR, "error: cannot find tls config '%s'", tls_conf_name);
983 * If we can't find the section given by the 'attr', we
984 * fall-back to looking for the "tls" section, as in
987 * We don't fall back if the 'attr' is specified, but we can't
988 * find the section - that is just a config error.
990 radlog(L_INFO, "debug: '%s' option missing, trying to use legacy configuration", attr);
991 tls_cs = cf_section_sub_find(parent, "tls");
997 tls_conf = tls_server_conf_parse(tls_cs);
1003 * The EAP RFC's say 1020, but we're less picky.
1005 if (tls_conf->fragment_size < 100) {
1006 radlog(L_ERR, "error: Fragment size is too small.");
1011 * The maximum size for a RADIUS packet is 4096,
1012 * minus the header (20), Message-Authenticator (18),
1013 * and State (18), etc. results in about 4000 bytes of data
1014 * that can be devoted *solely* to EAP.
1016 if (tls_conf->fragment_size > 4000) {
1017 radlog(L_ERR, "error: Fragment size is too large.");
1022 * Account for the EAP header (4), and the EAP-TLS header
1023 * (6), as per Section 4.2 of RFC 2716. What's left is
1024 * the maximum amount of data we read from a TLS buffer.
1026 tls_conf->fragment_size -= 10;