6 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
7 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
8 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
9 * (at your option) any later version.
11 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
12 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
13 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
14 * GNU General Public License for more details.
16 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
17 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
18 * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
20 * Copyright 2001 hereUare Communications, Inc. <raghud@hereuare.com>
21 * Copyright 2003 Alan DeKok <aland@freeradius.org>
22 * Copyright 2006 The FreeRADIUS server project
27 * TLS Packet Format in EAP
28 * --- ------ ------ -- ---
30 * 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
31 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
32 * | Code | Identifier | Length |
33 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
34 * | Type | Flags | TLS Message Length
35 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
36 * | TLS Message Length | TLS Data...
37 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
41 #include <freeradius-devel/ident.h>
44 #include <freeradius-devel/autoconf.h>
49 * Allocate a new TLS_PACKET
51 EAPTLS_PACKET *eaptls_alloc(void)
55 if ((rp = malloc(sizeof(EAPTLS_PACKET))) == NULL) {
56 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: out of memory");
59 memset(rp, 0, sizeof(EAPTLS_PACKET));
66 void eaptls_free(EAPTLS_PACKET **eaptls_packet_ptr)
68 EAPTLS_PACKET *eaptls_packet;
70 if (!eaptls_packet_ptr) return;
71 eaptls_packet = *eaptls_packet_ptr;
72 if (eaptls_packet == NULL) return;
74 if (eaptls_packet->data) {
75 free(eaptls_packet->data);
76 eaptls_packet->data = NULL;
80 *eaptls_packet_ptr = NULL;
84 The S flag is set only within the EAP-TLS start message
85 sent from the EAP server to the peer.
87 int eaptls_start(EAP_DS *eap_ds, int peap_flag)
91 reply.code = EAPTLS_START;
92 reply.length = TLS_HEADER_LEN + 1/*flags*/;
94 reply.flags = peap_flag;
95 reply.flags = SET_START(reply.flags);
100 eaptls_compose(eap_ds, &reply);
105 int eaptls_success(EAP_DS *eap_ds, int peap_flag)
109 reply.code = EAPTLS_SUCCESS;
110 reply.length = TLS_HEADER_LEN;
111 reply.flags = peap_flag;
115 eaptls_compose(eap_ds, &reply);
120 int eaptls_fail(EAP_DS *eap_ds, int peap_flag)
124 reply.code = EAPTLS_FAIL;
125 reply.length = TLS_HEADER_LEN;
126 reply.flags = peap_flag;
130 eaptls_compose(eap_ds, &reply);
136 A single TLS record may be up to 16384 octets in length, but a TLS
137 message may span multiple TLS records, and a TLS certificate message
138 may in principle be as long as 16MB.
142 * Frame the Dirty data that needs to be send to the client in an
143 * EAP-Request. We always embed the TLS-length in all EAP-TLS
144 * packets that we send, for easy reference purpose. Handle
145 * fragmentation and sending the next fragment etc.
147 int eaptls_request(EAP_DS *eap_ds, tls_session_t *ssn)
152 unsigned int lbit = 0;
154 /* This value determines whether we set (L)ength flag for
155 EVERY packet we send and add corresponding
156 "TLS Message Length" field.
159 This means we include L flag and "TLS Msg Len" in EVERY
163 This means we include L flag and "TLS Msg Len" **ONLY**
164 in First packet of a fragment series. We do not use
167 Having L flag in every packet is prefered.
170 if (ssn->length_flag) {
173 if (ssn->fragment == 0) {
174 ssn->tls_msg_len = ssn->dirty_out.used;
177 reply.code = EAPTLS_REQUEST;
178 reply.flags = ssn->peap_flag;
180 /* Send data, NOT more than the FRAGMENT size */
181 if (ssn->dirty_out.used > ssn->offset) {
183 reply.flags = SET_MORE_FRAGMENTS(reply.flags);
184 /* Length MUST be included if it is the First Fragment */
185 if (ssn->fragment == 0) {
190 size = ssn->dirty_out.used;
194 reply.dlen = lbit + size;
195 reply.length = TLS_HEADER_LEN + 1/*flags*/ + reply.dlen;
197 reply.data = malloc(reply.dlen);
199 nlen = htonl(ssn->tls_msg_len);
200 memcpy(reply.data, &nlen, lbit);
201 reply.flags = SET_LENGTH_INCLUDED(reply.flags);
203 (ssn->record_minus)(&ssn->dirty_out, reply.data + lbit, size);
205 eaptls_compose(eap_ds, &reply);
213 * Acknowledge received is for one of the following messages sent earlier
214 * 1. Handshake completed Message, so now send, EAP-Success
215 * 2. Alert Message, now send, EAP-Failure
216 * 3. Fragment Message, now send, next Fragment
218 static eaptls_status_t eaptls_ack_handler(EAP_HANDLER *handler)
220 tls_session_t *tls_session;
222 tls_session = (tls_session_t *)handler->opaque;
223 if (tls_session == NULL){
224 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Unexpected ACK received");
227 if (tls_session->info.initialized == 0) {
228 DEBUG(" rlm_eap_tls: No SSL info available. Waiting for more SSL data.");
229 return EAPTLS_REQUEST;
231 if (tls_session->info.origin == 0) {
232 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Unexpected ACK received");
236 switch (tls_session->info.content_type) {
238 DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_tls: ack alert");
239 eaptls_fail(handler->eap_ds, tls_session->peap_flag);
243 if ((tls_session->info.handshake_type == finished) &&
244 (tls_session->dirty_out.used == 0)) {
245 DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_tls: ack handshake is finished");
246 return EAPTLS_SUCCESS;
247 } /* else more data to send */
249 DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_tls: ack handshake fragment handler");
250 /* Fragmentation handler, send next fragment */
251 return EAPTLS_REQUEST;
254 * For the rest of the conditions, switch over
255 * to the default section below.
258 DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_tls: ack default");
259 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Invalid ACK received: %d",
260 tls_session->info.content_type);
266 * Similarly, when the EAP server receives an EAP-Response with
267 * the M bit set, it MUST respond with an EAP-Request with
268 * EAP-Type=EAP-TLS and no data. This serves as a fragment ACK.
270 * In order to prevent errors in the processing of fragments, the
271 * EAP server MUST use increment the Identifier value for each
272 * fragment ACK contained within an EAP-Request, and the peer
273 * MUST include this Identifier value in the subsequent fragment
274 * contained within an EAP- Reponse.
276 * EAP server sends an ACK when it determines there are More
277 * fragments to receive to make the complete
278 * TLS-record/TLS-Message
280 static int eaptls_send_ack(EAP_DS *eap_ds, int peap_flag)
284 reply.code = EAPTLS_ACK;
285 reply.length = TLS_HEADER_LEN + 1/*flags*/;
286 reply.flags = peap_flag;
290 eaptls_compose(eap_ds, &reply);
296 * The S flag is set only within the EAP-TLS start message sent
297 * from the EAP server to the peer.
299 * Similarly, when the EAP server receives an EAP-Response with
300 * the M bit set, it MUST respond with an EAP-Request with
301 * EAP-Type=EAP-TLS and no data. This serves as a fragment
302 * ACK. The EAP peer MUST wait.
304 static eaptls_status_t eaptls_verify(EAP_HANDLER *handler)
306 EAP_DS *eap_ds = handler->eap_ds;
307 EAP_DS *prev_eap_ds = handler->prev_eapds;
308 eaptls_packet_t *eaptls_packet, *eaptls_prev = NULL;
311 * We don't check ANY of the input parameters. It's all
312 * code which works together, so if something is wrong,
313 * we SHOULD core dump.
315 * e.g. if eap_ds is NULL, of if eap_ds->response is
316 * NULL, of if it's NOT an EAP-Response, or if the packet
317 * is too short. See eap_validation()., in ../../eap.c
319 * Also, eaptype_select() takes care of selecting the
320 * appropriate type, so we don't need to check
321 * eap_ds->response->type.type == PW_EAP_TLS, or anything
324 eaptls_packet = (eaptls_packet_t *)eap_ds->response->type.data;
325 if (prev_eap_ds && prev_eap_ds->response)
326 eaptls_prev = (eaptls_packet_t *)prev_eap_ds->response->type.data;
331 * If there's no TLS data, or there's 1 byte of TLS data,
332 * with the flags set to zero, then it's an ACK.
334 * Find if this is a reply to the previous request sent
336 if ((eaptls_packet == NULL) ||
337 ((eap_ds->response->length == EAP_HEADER_LEN + 2) &&
338 ((eaptls_packet->flags & 0xc0) == 0x00))) {
342 * Un-comment this for TLS inside of TTLS/PEAP
344 DEBUG2("rlm_eap_tls: Received EAP-TLS ACK message");
345 return eaptls_ack_handler(handler);
347 if (prev_eap_ds->request->id == eap_ds->response->id) {
349 * Run the ACK handler directly from here.
351 DEBUG2("rlm_eap_tls: Received EAP-TLS ACK message");
352 return eaptls_ack_handler(handler);
354 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Received Invalid EAP-TLS ACK message");
355 return EAPTLS_INVALID;
361 * We send TLS_START, but do not receive it.
363 if (TLS_START(eaptls_packet->flags)) {
364 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Received unexpected EAP-TLS Start message");
365 return EAPTLS_INVALID;
369 * The L bit (length included) is set to indicate the
370 * presence of the four octet TLS Message Length field,
371 * and MUST be set for the first fragment of a fragmented
372 * TLS message or set of messages.
374 * The M bit (more fragments) is set on all but the last
377 * The S bit (EAP-TLS start) is set in an EAP-TLS Start
378 * message. This differentiates the EAP-TLS Start message
379 * from a fragment acknowledgement.
381 if (TLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED(eaptls_packet->flags)) {
382 DEBUG2(" TLS Length %d",
383 eaptls_packet->data[2] * 256 | eaptls_packet->data[3]);
384 if (TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS(eaptls_packet->flags)) {
386 * FIRST_FRAGMENT is identified
387 * 1. If there is no previous EAP-response received.
388 * 2. If EAP-response received, then its M bit not set.
389 * (It is because Last fragment will not have M bit set)
392 (prev_eap_ds->response == NULL) ||
393 (eaptls_prev == NULL) ||
394 !TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS(eaptls_prev->flags)) {
396 DEBUG2("rlm_eap_tls: Received EAP-TLS First Fragment of the message");
397 return EAPTLS_FIRST_FRAGMENT;
400 DEBUG2("rlm_eap_tls: More Fragments with length included");
401 return EAPTLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS_WITH_LENGTH;
404 DEBUG2("rlm_eap_tls: Length Included");
405 return EAPTLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED;
409 if (TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS(eaptls_packet->flags)) {
410 DEBUG2("rlm_eap_tls: More fragments to follow");
411 return EAPTLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS;
415 * None of the flags are set, but it's still a valid
425 * length = code + id + length + flags + tlsdata
426 * = 1 + 1 + 2 + 1 + X
427 * length = EAP-length - 1(EAP-Type = 1 octet)
428 * flags = EAP-typedata[0] (1 octet)
429 * dlen = EAP-typedata[1-4] (4 octets), if L flag set
430 * = length - 5(code+id+length+flags), otherwise
431 * data = EAP-typedata[5-n], if L flag set
432 * = EAP-typedata[1-n], otherwise
433 * packet = EAP-typedata (complete typedata)
435 * Points to consider during EAP-TLS data extraction
436 * 1. In the received packet, No data will be present incase of ACK-NAK
437 * 2. Incase if more fragments need to be received then ACK after retreiving this fragment.
439 * RFC 2716 Section 4.2. PPP EAP TLS Request Packet
442 * 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
443 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
444 * | Code | Identifier | Length |
445 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
446 * | Type | Flags | TLS Message Length
447 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
448 * | TLS Message Length | TLS Data...
449 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
451 * The Length field is two octets and indicates the length of the EAP
452 * packet including the Code, Identifir, Length, Type, and TLS data
455 static EAPTLS_PACKET *eaptls_extract(EAP_DS *eap_ds, eaptls_status_t status)
457 EAPTLS_PACKET *tlspacket;
458 uint32_t data_len = 0;
460 uint8_t *data = NULL;
462 if (status == EAPTLS_INVALID)
466 * The main EAP code & eaptls_verify() take care of
467 * ensuring that the packet is OK, and that we can
468 * extract the various fields we want.
470 * e.g. a TLS packet with zero data is allowed as an ACK,
471 * but we will never see it here, as we will simply
472 * send another fragment, instead of trying to extract
475 * MUST have TLS type octet, followed by flags, followed
478 assert(eap_ds->response->length > 2);
480 tlspacket = eaptls_alloc();
481 if (tlspacket == NULL) return NULL;
484 * Code & id for EAPTLS & EAP are same
485 * but eaptls_length = eap_length - 1(EAP-Type = 1 octet)
487 * length = code + id + length + type + tlsdata
488 * = 1 + 1 + 2 + 1 + X
490 tlspacket->code = eap_ds->response->code;
491 tlspacket->id = eap_ds->response->id;
492 tlspacket->length = eap_ds->response->length - 1; /* EAP type */
493 tlspacket->flags = eap_ds->response->type.data[0];
496 * A quick sanity check of the flags. If we've been told
497 * that there's a length, and there isn't one, then stop.
499 if (TLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED(tlspacket->flags) &&
500 (tlspacket->length < 5)) { /* flags + TLS message length */
501 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Invalid EAP-TLS packet received. (Length bit is set, but no length was found.)");
502 eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
507 * If the final TLS packet is larger than we can handle, die
510 * Likewise, if the EAP packet says N bytes, and the TLS
511 * packet says there's fewer bytes, it's a problem.
513 * FIXME: Try to ensure that the claimed length is
514 * consistent across multiple TLS fragments.
516 if (TLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED(tlspacket->flags)) {
517 memcpy(&data_len, &eap_ds->response->type.data[1], 4);
518 data_len = ntohl(data_len);
519 if (data_len > MAX_RECORD_SIZE) {
520 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: The EAP-TLS packet will contain more data than we can process.");
521 eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
526 DEBUG2(" TLS: %d %d\n", data_len, tlspacket->length);
528 if (data_len < tlspacket->length) {
529 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: EAP-TLS packet claims to be smaller than the encapsulating EAP packet.");
530 eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
538 * The TLS Message Length field is four octets, and
539 * provides the total length of the TLS message or set of
540 * messages that is being fragmented; this simplifies
543 * Dynamic allocation of buffers as & when we know the
544 * length should solve the problem.
546 case EAPTLS_FIRST_FRAGMENT:
547 case EAPTLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED:
548 case EAPTLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS_WITH_LENGTH:
549 if (tlspacket->length < 5) { /* flags + TLS message length */
550 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Invalid EAP-TLS packet received. (Expected length, got none.)");
551 eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
556 * Extract all the TLS fragments from the
557 * previous eap_ds Start appending this
558 * fragment to the above ds
560 memcpy(&data_len, &eap_ds->response->type.data[1], sizeof(uint32_t));
561 data_len = ntohl(data_len);
562 data = (eap_ds->response->type.data + 5/*flags+TLS-Length*/);
563 len = eap_ds->response->type.length - 5/*flags+TLS-Length*/;
566 * Hmm... this should be an error, too.
568 if (data_len > len) {
574 * Data length is implicit, from the EAP header.
576 case EAPTLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS:
578 data_len = eap_ds->response->type.length - 1/*flags*/;
579 data = eap_ds->response->type.data + 1/*flags*/;
583 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Invalid EAP-TLS packet received");
584 eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
588 tlspacket->dlen = data_len;
590 tlspacket->data = (unsigned char *)malloc(data_len);
591 if (tlspacket->data == NULL) {
592 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: out of memory");
593 eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
596 memcpy(tlspacket->data, data, data_len);
605 * To process the TLS,
607 * 1. EAP-TLS should get the compelete TLS data from the peer.
608 * 2. Store that data in a data structure with any other required info
609 * 3. Handle that data structure to the TLS module.
610 * 4. TLS module will perform its operations on the data and
611 * handle back to EAP-TLS
614 * 1. EAP-TLS if necessary will fragment it and send it to the
617 * During EAP-TLS initialization, TLS Context object will be
618 * initialized and stored. For every new authentication
619 * requests, TLS will open a new session object and that session
620 * object should be maintained even after the session is
621 * completed for session resumption. (Probably later as a feature
622 * as we donot know who maintains these session objects ie,
623 * SSL_CTX (internally) or TLS module(explicitly). If TLS module,
624 * then how to let SSL API know about these sessions.)
626 static void eaptls_operation(EAPTLS_PACKET *eaptls_packet UNUSED,
627 eaptls_status_t status, EAP_HANDLER *handler)
629 tls_session_t *tls_session;
631 tls_session = (tls_session_t *)handler->opaque;
633 if ((status == EAPTLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS) ||
634 (status == EAPTLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS_WITH_LENGTH) ||
635 (status == EAPTLS_FIRST_FRAGMENT)) {
639 eaptls_send_ack(handler->eap_ds, tls_session->peap_flag);
644 * We have the complete TLS-data or TLS-message.
646 * Clean the dirty message.
648 * Authenticate the user and send
652 * is required then send another request.
654 rcode = tls_handshake_recv(tls_session);
657 * FIXME: return success/fail.
659 * TLS proper can decide what to do, then.
661 eaptls_request(handler->eap_ds, tls_session);
664 * TLS returns 0 or 1.
665 * anything else is application-specific.
667 * In our code, this means "session
668 * resumption was OK".
670 } else if (rcode == 0xea) {
672 * FIXME: hard-code key based on EAP type.
673 * Also, this code is duplicated all over
676 eaptls_success(handler->eap_ds, 0);
677 eaptls_gen_mppe_keys(&handler->request->reply->vps,
679 "client EAP encryption");
682 eaptls_fail(handler->eap_ds, tls_session->peap_flag);
691 * In the actual authentication first verify the packet and then create the data structure
694 * To process the TLS,
696 * 1. EAP-TLS should get the compelete TLS data from the peer.
697 * 2. Store that data in a data structure with any other required info
698 * 3. Hand this data structure to the TLS module.
699 * 4. TLS module will perform its operations on the data and hands back to EAP-TLS
701 * 1. EAP-TLS if necessary will fragment it and send it to the destination.
703 * During EAP-TLS initialization, TLS Context object will be
704 * initialized and stored. For every new authentication
705 * requests, TLS will open a new session object and that
706 * session object SHOULD be maintained even after the session
707 * is completed, for session resumption. (Probably later as a
708 * feature, as we do not know who maintains these session
709 * objects ie, SSL_CTX (internally) or TLS module (explicitly). If
710 * TLS module, then how to let SSL API know about these
715 * Process an EAP request
717 eaptls_status_t eaptls_process(EAP_HANDLER *handler)
719 tls_session_t *tls_session = (tls_session_t *) handler->opaque;
720 EAPTLS_PACKET *tlspacket;
721 eaptls_status_t status;
723 DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_tls: processing TLS");
725 /* This case is when SSL generates Alert then we
726 * send that alert to the client and then send the EAP-Failure
728 status = eaptls_verify(handler);
729 DEBUG2(" eaptls_verify returned %d\n", status);
737 * Success means that we're done the initial
738 * handshake. For TTLS, this means send stuff
739 * back to the client, and the client sends us
740 * more tunneled data.
747 * Normal TLS request, continue with the "get rest
748 * of fragments" phase.
751 eaptls_request(handler->eap_ds, tls_session);
752 return EAPTLS_HANDLED;
756 * The handshake is done, and we're in the "tunnel
760 DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_tls: Done initial handshake");
763 * Get the rest of the fragments.
765 case EAPTLS_FIRST_FRAGMENT:
766 case EAPTLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS:
767 case EAPTLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED:
768 case EAPTLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS_WITH_LENGTH:
773 * Extract the TLS packet from the buffer.
775 if ((tlspacket = eaptls_extract(handler->eap_ds, status)) == NULL)
779 * Get the session struct from the handler
781 * update the dirty_in buffer
783 * NOTE: This buffer will contain partial data when M bit is set.
785 * CAUTION while reinitializing this buffer, it should be
786 * reinitialized only when this M bit is NOT set.
788 if (tlspacket->dlen !=
789 (tls_session->record_plus)(&tls_session->dirty_in, tlspacket->data, tlspacket->dlen)) {
790 eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
791 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Exceeded maximum record size");
796 * SSL initalization is done. Return.
798 * The TLS data will be in the tls_session structure.
800 if (SSL_is_init_finished(tls_session->ssl) && (status == EAPTLS_OK)) {
801 eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
806 * Continue the handshake.
808 eaptls_operation(tlspacket, status, handler);
810 eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
811 return EAPTLS_HANDLED;
816 * compose the TLS reply packet in the EAP reply typedata
818 int eaptls_compose(EAP_DS *eap_ds, EAPTLS_PACKET *reply)
823 * Don't set eap_ds->request->type.type, as the main EAP
824 * handler will do that for us. This allows the TLS
825 * module to be called from TTLS & PEAP.
829 * When the EAP server receives an EAP-Response with the
830 * M bit set, it MUST respond with an EAP-Request with
831 * EAP-Type=EAP-TLS and no data. This serves as a
832 * fragment ACK. The EAP peer MUST wait until it receives
833 * the EAP-Request before sending another fragment.
835 * In order to prevent errors in the processing of
836 * fragments, the EAP server MUST use increment the
837 * Identifier value for each fragment ACK contained
838 * within an EAP-Request, and the peer MUST include this
839 * Identifier value in the subsequent fragment contained
840 * within an EAP- Reponse.
842 eap_ds->request->type.data = malloc(reply->length - TLS_HEADER_LEN + 1);
843 if (eap_ds->request->type.data == NULL) {
844 radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: out of memory");
848 /* EAPTLS Header length is excluded while computing EAP typelen */
849 eap_ds->request->type.length = reply->length - TLS_HEADER_LEN;
851 ptr = eap_ds->request->type.data;
852 *ptr++ = (uint8_t)(reply->flags & 0xFF);
854 if (reply->dlen) memcpy(ptr, reply->data, reply->dlen);
856 switch (reply->code) {
860 eap_ds->request->code = PW_EAP_REQUEST;
863 eap_ds->request->code = PW_EAP_SUCCESS;
866 eap_ds->request->code = PW_EAP_FAILURE;
869 /* Should never enter here */
870 eap_ds->request->code = PW_EAP_FAILURE;