6 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
7 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
8 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
9 * (at your option) any later version.
11 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
12 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
13 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
14 * GNU General Public License for more details.
16 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
17 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
18 * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
20 * Copyright 2001 hereUare Communications, Inc. <raghud@hereuare.com>
21 * Copyright 2003 Alan DeKok <aland@freeradius.org>
22 * Copyright 2006 The FreeRADIUS server project
27 * TLS Packet Format in EAP
28 * --- ------ ------ -- ---
30 * 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
31 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
32 * | Code | Identifier | Length |
33 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
34 * | Type | Flags | TLS Message Length
35 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
36 * | TLS Message Length | TLS Data...
37 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
42 USES_APPLE_DEPRECATED_API /* OpenSSL API has been deprecated by Apple */
48 * Send an initial eap-tls request to the peer.
50 * Frame eap reply packet.
51 * len = header + type + tls_typedata
52 * tls_typedata = flags(Start (S) bit set, and no data)
54 * Once having received the peer's Identity, the EAP server MUST
55 * respond with an EAP-TLS/Start packet, which is an
56 * EAP-Request packet with EAP-Type=EAP-TLS, the Start (S) bit
57 * set, and no data. The EAP-TLS conversation will then begin,
58 * with the peer sending an EAP-Response packet with
59 * EAP-Type = EAP-TLS. The data field of that packet will
62 * Fragment length is Framed-MTU - 4.
64 tls_session_t *eaptls_session(eap_handler_t *handler, fr_tls_server_conf_t *tls_conf, bool client_cert)
67 REQUEST *request = handler->request;
72 * Every new session is started only from EAP-TLS-START.
73 * Before Sending EAP-TLS-START, open a new SSL session.
74 * Create all the required data structures & store them
75 * in Opaque. So that we can use these data structures
76 * when we get the response
78 ssn = tls_new_session(handler, tls_conf, request, client_cert);
84 * Create a structure for all the items required to be
85 * verified for each client and set that as opaque data
88 * NOTE: If we want to set each item sepearately then
89 * this index should be global.
91 SSL_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_HANDLER, (void *)handler);
92 SSL_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_CONF, (void *)tls_conf);
93 SSL_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl, fr_tls_ex_index_certs, (void *)&(handler->certs));
94 SSL_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_IDENTITY, (void *)&(handler->identity));
95 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_OCSP_H
96 SSL_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_STORE, (void *)tls_conf->ocsp_store);
98 SSL_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_SSN, (void *)ssn);
99 SSL_set_ex_data(ssn->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_TALLOC, NULL);
101 return talloc_steal(handler, ssn); /* ssn */
105 The S flag is set only within the EAP-TLS start message
106 sent from the EAP server to the peer.
108 int eaptls_start(EAP_DS *eap_ds, int peap_flag)
112 reply.code = FR_TLS_START;
113 reply.length = TLS_HEADER_LEN + 1/*flags*/;
115 reply.flags = peap_flag;
116 reply.flags = SET_START(reply.flags);
121 eaptls_compose(eap_ds, &reply);
126 int eaptls_success(eap_handler_t *handler, int peap_flag)
129 REQUEST *request = handler->request;
130 tls_session_t *tls_session = handler->opaque;
132 handler->finished = true;
133 reply.code = FR_TLS_SUCCESS;
134 reply.length = TLS_HEADER_LEN;
135 reply.flags = peap_flag;
139 tls_success(tls_session, request);
142 * Call compose AFTER checking for cached data.
144 eaptls_compose(handler->eap_ds, &reply);
147 * Automatically generate MPPE keying material.
149 if (tls_session->prf_label) {
150 eaptls_gen_mppe_keys(handler->request,
151 tls_session->ssl, tls_session->prf_label);
153 RWDEBUG("Not adding MPPE keys because there is no PRF label");
156 eaptls_gen_eap_key(handler->request->reply, tls_session->ssl,
161 int eaptls_fail(eap_handler_t *handler, int peap_flag)
164 tls_session_t *tls_session = handler->opaque;
166 handler->finished = true;
167 reply.code = FR_TLS_FAIL;
168 reply.length = TLS_HEADER_LEN;
169 reply.flags = peap_flag;
173 tls_fail(tls_session);
175 eaptls_compose(handler->eap_ds, &reply);
181 A single TLS record may be up to 16384 octets in length, but a TLS
182 message may span multiple TLS records, and a TLS certificate message
183 may in principle be as long as 16MB.
187 * Frame the Dirty data that needs to be send to the client in an
188 * EAP-Request. We always embed the TLS-length in all EAP-TLS
189 * packets that we send, for easy reference purpose. Handle
190 * fragmentation and sending the next fragment etc.
192 int eaptls_request(EAP_DS *eap_ds, tls_session_t *ssn)
197 unsigned int lbit = 0;
199 /* This value determines whether we set (L)ength flag for
200 EVERY packet we send and add corresponding
201 "TLS Message Length" field.
204 This means we include L flag and "TLS Msg Len" in EVERY
208 This means we include L flag and "TLS Msg Len" **ONLY**
209 in First packet of a fragment series. We do not use
212 Having L flag in every packet is prefered.
215 if (ssn->length_flag) {
218 if (ssn->fragment == 0) {
219 ssn->tls_msg_len = ssn->dirty_out.used;
222 reply.code = FR_TLS_REQUEST;
223 reply.flags = ssn->peap_flag;
225 /* Send data, NOT more than the FRAGMENT size */
226 if (ssn->dirty_out.used > ssn->mtu) {
228 reply.flags = SET_MORE_FRAGMENTS(reply.flags);
229 /* Length MUST be included if it is the First Fragment */
230 if (ssn->fragment == 0) {
235 size = ssn->dirty_out.used;
239 reply.dlen = lbit + size;
240 reply.length = TLS_HEADER_LEN + 1/*flags*/ + reply.dlen;
242 reply.data = talloc_array(eap_ds, uint8_t, reply.length);
243 if (!reply.data) return 0;
246 nlen = htonl(ssn->tls_msg_len);
247 memcpy(reply.data, &nlen, lbit);
248 reply.flags = SET_LENGTH_INCLUDED(reply.flags);
250 (ssn->record_minus)(&ssn->dirty_out, reply.data + lbit, size);
252 eaptls_compose(eap_ds, &reply);
253 talloc_free(reply.data);
261 * Similarly, when the EAP server receives an EAP-Response with
262 * the M bit set, it MUST respond with an EAP-Request with
263 * EAP-Type=EAP-TLS and no data. This serves as a fragment ACK.
265 * In order to prevent errors in the processing of fragments, the
266 * EAP server MUST use increment the Identifier value for each
267 * fragment ACK contained within an EAP-Request, and the peer
268 * MUST include this Identifier value in the subsequent fragment
269 * contained within an EAP- Reponse.
271 * EAP server sends an ACK when it determines there are More
272 * fragments to receive to make the complete
273 * TLS-record/TLS-Message
275 static int eaptls_send_ack(eap_handler_t *handler, int peap_flag)
278 REQUEST *request = handler->request;
280 RDEBUG2("ACKing Peer's TLS record fragment");
281 reply.code = FR_TLS_ACK;
282 reply.length = TLS_HEADER_LEN + 1/*flags*/;
283 reply.flags = peap_flag;
287 eaptls_compose(handler->eap_ds, &reply);
293 * The S flag is set only within the EAP-TLS start message sent
294 * from the EAP server to the peer.
296 * Similarly, when the EAP server receives an EAP-Response with
297 * the M bit set, it MUST respond with an EAP-Request with
298 * EAP-Type=EAP-TLS and no data. This serves as a fragment
299 * ACK. The EAP peer MUST wait.
301 static fr_tls_status_t eaptls_verify(eap_handler_t *handler)
303 EAP_DS *eap_ds = handler->eap_ds;
304 EAP_DS *prev_eap_ds = handler->prev_eapds;
305 eaptls_packet_t *eaptls_packet, *eaptls_prev = NULL;
306 REQUEST *request = handler->request;
309 * We don't check ANY of the input parameters. It's all
310 * code which works together, so if something is wrong,
311 * we SHOULD core dump.
313 * e.g. if eap_ds is NULL, of if eap_ds->response is
314 * NULL, of if it's NOT an EAP-Response, or if the packet
315 * is too short. See eap_validation()., in ../../eap.c
317 * Also, eap_method_select() takes care of selecting the
318 * appropriate type, so we don't need to check
319 * eap_ds->response->type.num == PW_EAP_TLS, or anything
322 eaptls_packet = (eaptls_packet_t *)eap_ds->response->type.data;
323 if (prev_eap_ds && prev_eap_ds->response)
324 eaptls_prev = (eaptls_packet_t *)prev_eap_ds->response->type.data;
327 * First output the flags (for debugging)
329 RDEBUG3("Peer sent flags %c%c%c",
330 TLS_START(eaptls_packet->flags) ? 'S' : '-',
331 TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS(eaptls_packet->flags) ? 'M' : '-',
332 TLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED(eaptls_packet->flags) ? 'L' : '-');
338 * If there's no TLS data, or there's 1 byte of TLS data,
339 * with the flags set to zero, then it's an ACK.
341 * Find if this is a reply to the previous request sent
343 if ((!eaptls_packet) ||
344 ((eap_ds->response->length == EAP_HEADER_LEN + 2) &&
345 ((eaptls_packet->flags & 0xc0) == 0x00))) {
347 if (prev_eap_ds && (prev_eap_ds->request->id == eap_ds->response->id)) {
348 return tls_ack_handler(handler->opaque, request);
350 REDEBUG("Received Invalid TLS ACK");
351 return FR_TLS_INVALID;
356 * We send TLS_START, but do not receive it.
358 if (TLS_START(eaptls_packet->flags)) {
359 REDEBUG("Peer sent EAP-TLS Start message (only the server is allowed to do this)");
360 return FR_TLS_INVALID;
364 * The L bit (length included) is set to indicate the
365 * presence of the four octet TLS Message Length field,
366 * and MUST be set for the first fragment of a fragmented
367 * TLS message or set of messages.
369 * The M bit (more fragments) is set on all but the last
372 * The S bit (EAP-TLS start) is set in an EAP-TLS Start
373 * message. This differentiates the EAP-TLS Start message
374 * from a fragment acknowledgement.
376 if (TLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED(eaptls_packet->flags)) {
377 RDEBUG2("Peer indicated complete TLS record size will be %d bytes",
378 eaptls_packet->data[2] * 256 | eaptls_packet->data[3]);
379 if (TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS(eaptls_packet->flags)) {
380 RDEBUG2("Peer indicated TLS record needs fragmenting");
382 * FIRST_FRAGMENT is identified
383 * 1. If there is no previous EAP-response received.
384 * 2. If EAP-response received, then its M bit not set.
385 * (It is because Last fragment will not have M bit set)
387 if (!prev_eap_ds || (!prev_eap_ds->response) || (!eaptls_prev) ||
388 !TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS(eaptls_prev->flags)) {
389 RDEBUG2("Got first TLS record fragment");
390 return FR_TLS_FIRST_FRAGMENT;
392 RDEBUG2("Got additional TLS record fragment (with length?)");
393 return FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS_WITH_LENGTH;
396 RDEBUG2("Got complete TLS record (no fragmentation)");
397 return FR_TLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED;
402 * The previous packet had the M flags set, but this one doesn't,
403 * this must be the final record fragment
405 if (TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS(eaptls_prev->flags) && !TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS(eaptls_packet->flags)) {
406 RDEBUG2("Got final TLS record fragment");
408 RDEBUG2("Got additional TLS record fragment. Peer indicated more fragments to follow");
411 if (TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS(eaptls_packet->flags)) return FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS;
414 * None of the flags are set, but it's still a valid
424 * length = code + id + length + flags + tlsdata
425 * = 1 + 1 + 2 + 1 + X
426 * length = EAP-length - 1(EAP-Type = 1 octet)
427 * flags = EAP-typedata[0] (1 octet)
428 * dlen = EAP-typedata[1-4] (4 octets), if L flag set
429 * = length - 5(code+id+length+flags), otherwise
430 * data = EAP-typedata[5-n], if L flag set
431 * = EAP-typedata[1-n], otherwise
432 * packet = EAP-typedata (complete typedata)
434 * Points to consider during EAP-TLS data extraction
435 * 1. In the received packet, No data will be present incase of ACK-NAK
436 * 2. Incase if more fragments need to be received then ACK after retreiving this fragment.
438 * RFC 2716 Section 4.2. PPP EAP TLS Request Packet
441 * 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
442 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
443 * | Code | Identifier | Length |
444 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
445 * | Type | Flags | TLS Message Length
446 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
447 * | TLS Message Length | TLS Data...
448 * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
450 * The Length field is two octets and indicates the length of the EAP
451 * packet including the Code, Identifir, Length, Type, and TLS data
454 static EAPTLS_PACKET *eaptls_extract(REQUEST *request, EAP_DS *eap_ds, fr_tls_status_t status)
456 EAPTLS_PACKET *tlspacket;
457 uint32_t data_len = 0;
459 uint8_t *data = NULL;
461 if (status == FR_TLS_INVALID) return NULL;
464 * The main EAP code & eaptls_verify() take care of
465 * ensuring that the packet is OK, and that we can
466 * extract the various fields we want.
468 * e.g. a TLS packet with zero data is allowed as an ACK,
469 * but we will never see it here, as we will simply
470 * send another fragment, instead of trying to extract
473 * MUST have TLS type octet, followed by flags, followed
476 assert(eap_ds->response->length > 2);
478 tlspacket = talloc(eap_ds, EAPTLS_PACKET);
479 if (!tlspacket) return NULL;
482 * Code & id for EAPTLS & EAP are same
483 * but eaptls_length = eap_length - 1(EAP-Type = 1 octet)
485 * length = code + id + length + type + tlsdata
486 * = 1 + 1 + 2 + 1 + X
488 tlspacket->code = eap_ds->response->code;
489 tlspacket->id = eap_ds->response->id;
490 tlspacket->length = eap_ds->response->length - 1; /* EAP type */
491 tlspacket->flags = eap_ds->response->type.data[0];
494 * A quick sanity check of the flags. If we've been told
495 * that there's a length, and there isn't one, then stop.
497 if (TLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED(tlspacket->flags) &&
498 (tlspacket->length < 5)) { /* flags + TLS message length */
499 REDEBUG("Invalid EAP-TLS packet received: Length bit is set, "
500 "but packet too short to contain length field");
501 talloc_free(tlspacket);
506 * If the final TLS packet is larger than we can handle, die
509 * Likewise, if the EAP packet says N bytes, and the TLS
510 * packet says there's fewer bytes, it's a problem.
512 * FIXME: Try to ensure that the claimed length is
513 * consistent across multiple TLS fragments.
515 if (TLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED(tlspacket->flags)) {
516 memcpy(&data_len, &eap_ds->response->type.data[1], 4);
517 data_len = ntohl(data_len);
518 if (data_len > MAX_RECORD_SIZE) {
519 REDEBUG("Reassembled TLS record will be %u bytes, "
520 "greater than our maximum record size (" STRINGIFY(MAX_RECORD_SIZE) " bytes)",
522 talloc_free(tlspacket);
527 DEBUG2(" TLS: %d %d\n", data_len, tlspacket->length);
529 if (data_len < tlspacket->length) {
530 REDEBUG("EAP-TLS packet claims to be smaller than the encapsulating EAP packet");
531 talloc_free(tlspacket);
539 * The TLS Message Length field is four octets, and
540 * provides the total length of the TLS message or set of
541 * messages that is being fragmented; this simplifies
544 * Dynamic allocation of buffers as & when we know the
545 * length should solve the problem.
547 case FR_TLS_FIRST_FRAGMENT:
548 case FR_TLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED:
549 case FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS_WITH_LENGTH:
550 if (tlspacket->length < 5) { /* flags + TLS message length */
551 REDEBUG("Invalid EAP-TLS packet received: Expected length, got none");
552 talloc_free(tlspacket);
557 * Extract all the TLS fragments from the
558 * previous eap_ds Start appending this
559 * fragment to the above ds
561 memcpy(&data_len, &eap_ds->response->type.data[1], sizeof(uint32_t));
562 data_len = ntohl(data_len);
563 data = (eap_ds->response->type.data + 5/*flags+TLS-Length*/);
564 len = eap_ds->response->type.length - 5/*flags+TLS-Length*/;
567 * Hmm... this should be an error, too.
569 if (data_len > len) {
575 * Data length is implicit, from the EAP header.
577 case FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS:
579 data_len = eap_ds->response->type.length - 1/*flags*/;
580 data = eap_ds->response->type.data + 1/*flags*/;
584 REDEBUG("Invalid EAP-TLS packet received");
585 talloc_free(tlspacket);
589 tlspacket->dlen = data_len;
591 tlspacket->data = talloc_array(tlspacket, uint8_t,
593 if (!tlspacket->data) {
594 talloc_free(tlspacket);
597 memcpy(tlspacket->data, data, data_len);
606 * To process the TLS,
608 * 1. EAP-TLS should get the compelete TLS data from the peer.
609 * 2. Store that data in a data structure with any other required info
610 * 3. Handle that data structure to the TLS module.
611 * 4. TLS module will perform its operations on the data and
612 * handle back to EAP-TLS
615 * 1. EAP-TLS if necessary will fragment it and send it to the
618 * During EAP-TLS initialization, TLS Context object will be
619 * initialized and stored. For every new authentication
620 * requests, TLS will open a new session object and that session
621 * object should be maintained even after the session is
622 * completed for session resumption. (Probably later as a feature
623 * as we donot know who maintains these session objects ie,
624 * SSL_CTX (internally) or TLS module(explicitly). If TLS module,
625 * then how to let SSL API know about these sessions.)
627 static fr_tls_status_t eaptls_operation(fr_tls_status_t status, eap_handler_t *handler)
629 REQUEST *request = handler->request;
630 tls_session_t *tls_session = handler->opaque;
632 if ((status == FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS) ||
633 (status == FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS_WITH_LENGTH) ||
634 (status == FR_TLS_FIRST_FRAGMENT)) {
638 eaptls_send_ack(handler, tls_session->peap_flag);
639 return FR_TLS_HANDLED;
644 * We have the complete TLS-data or TLS-message.
646 * Clean the dirty message.
648 * Authenticate the user and send
652 * is required then send another request.
654 if (!tls_handshake_recv(handler->request, tls_session)) {
655 REDEBUG("TLS receive handshake failed during operation");
656 tls_fail(tls_session);
661 * FIXME: return success/fail.
663 * TLS proper can decide what to do, then.
665 if (tls_session->dirty_out.used > 0) {
666 eaptls_request(handler->eap_ds, tls_session);
667 return FR_TLS_HANDLED;
671 * If there is no data to send i.e
672 * dirty_out.used <=0 and if the SSL
673 * handshake is finished, then return a
677 if (SSL_is_init_finished(tls_session->ssl)) {
679 * Init is finished. The rest is
682 tls_session->info.content_type = application_data;
683 return FR_TLS_SUCCESS;
687 * Who knows what happened...
689 REDEBUG("TLS failed during operation");
695 * In the actual authentication first verify the packet and then create the data structure
698 * To process the TLS,
700 * 1. EAP-TLS should get the compelete TLS data from the peer.
701 * 2. Store that data in a data structure with any other required info
702 * 3. Hand this data structure to the TLS module.
703 * 4. TLS module will perform its operations on the data and hands back to EAP-TLS
705 * 1. EAP-TLS if necessary will fragment it and send it to the destination.
707 * During EAP-TLS initialization, TLS Context object will be
708 * initialized and stored. For every new authentication
709 * requests, TLS will open a new session object and that
710 * session object SHOULD be maintained even after the session
711 * is completed, for session resumption. (Probably later as a
712 * feature, as we do not know who maintains these session
713 * objects ie, SSL_CTX (internally) or TLS module (explicitly). If
714 * TLS module, then how to let SSL API know about these
719 * Process an EAP request
721 fr_tls_status_t eaptls_process(eap_handler_t *handler)
723 tls_session_t *tls_session = (tls_session_t *) handler->opaque;
724 EAPTLS_PACKET *tlspacket;
725 fr_tls_status_t status;
726 REQUEST *request = handler->request;
728 if (!request) return FR_TLS_FAIL;
730 RDEBUG2("Continuing EAP-TLS");
732 SSL_set_ex_data(tls_session->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST, request);
734 if (handler->certs) pairadd(&request->packet->vps,
735 paircopy(request->packet, handler->certs));
738 * This case is when SSL generates Alert then we
739 * send that alert to the client and then send the EAP-Failure
741 status = eaptls_verify(handler);
742 if ((status == FR_TLS_INVALID) || (status == FR_TLS_FAIL)) {
743 REDEBUG("[eaptls verify] = %s", fr_int2str(fr_tls_status_table, status, "<INVALID>"));
745 RDEBUG2("[eaptls verify] = %s", fr_int2str(fr_tls_status_table, status, "<INVALID>"));
754 * Success means that we're done the initial
755 * handshake. For TTLS, this means send stuff
756 * back to the client, and the client sends us
757 * more tunneled data.
763 * Normal TLS request, continue with the "get rest
764 * of fragments" phase.
767 eaptls_request(handler->eap_ds, tls_session);
768 status = FR_TLS_HANDLED;
772 * The handshake is done, and we're in the "tunnel
776 RDEBUG2("Done initial handshake");
779 * Get the rest of the fragments.
781 case FR_TLS_FIRST_FRAGMENT:
782 case FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS:
783 case FR_TLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED:
784 case FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS_WITH_LENGTH:
789 * Extract the TLS packet from the buffer.
791 if ((tlspacket = eaptls_extract(request, handler->eap_ds, status)) == NULL) {
792 status = FR_TLS_FAIL;
797 * Get the session struct from the handler
799 * update the dirty_in buffer
801 * NOTE: This buffer will contain partial data when M bit is set.
803 * CAUTION while reinitializing this buffer, it should be
804 * reinitialized only when this M bit is NOT set.
806 if (tlspacket->dlen !=
807 (tls_session->record_plus)(&tls_session->dirty_in, tlspacket->data, tlspacket->dlen)) {
808 talloc_free(tlspacket);
809 REDEBUG("Exceeded maximum record size");
810 status = FR_TLS_FAIL;
817 talloc_free(tlspacket);
820 * SSL initalization is done. Return.
822 * The TLS data will be in the tls_session structure.
824 if (SSL_is_init_finished(tls_session->ssl)) {
826 * The initialization may be finished, but if
827 * there more fragments coming, then send ACK,
828 * and get the caller to continue the
831 if ((status == FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS) ||
832 (status == FR_TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS_WITH_LENGTH) ||
833 (status == FR_TLS_FIRST_FRAGMENT)) {
837 eaptls_send_ack(handler, tls_session->peap_flag);
838 RDEBUG2("Init is done, but tunneled data is fragmented");
839 status = FR_TLS_HANDLED;
843 status = tls_application_data(tls_session, request);
848 * Continue the handshake.
850 status = eaptls_operation(status, handler);
853 SSL_set_ex_data(tls_session->ssl, FR_TLS_EX_INDEX_REQUEST, NULL);
860 * compose the TLS reply packet in the EAP reply typedata
862 int eaptls_compose(EAP_DS *eap_ds, EAPTLS_PACKET *reply)
867 * Don't set eap_ds->request->type.num, as the main EAP
868 * handler will do that for us. This allows the TLS
869 * module to be called from TTLS & PEAP.
873 * When the EAP server receives an EAP-Response with the
874 * M bit set, it MUST respond with an EAP-Request with
875 * EAP-Type=EAP-TLS and no data. This serves as a
876 * fragment ACK. The EAP peer MUST wait until it receives
877 * the EAP-Request before sending another fragment.
879 * In order to prevent errors in the processing of
880 * fragments, the EAP server MUST use increment the
881 * Identifier value for each fragment ACK contained
882 * within an EAP-Request, and the peer MUST include this
883 * Identifier value in the subsequent fragment contained
884 * within an EAP- Reponse.
886 eap_ds->request->type.data = talloc_array(eap_ds->request, uint8_t,
887 reply->length - TLS_HEADER_LEN + 1);
888 if (!eap_ds->request->type.data) return 0;
890 /* EAPTLS Header length is excluded while computing EAP typelen */
891 eap_ds->request->type.length = reply->length - TLS_HEADER_LEN;
893 ptr = eap_ds->request->type.data;
894 *ptr++ = (uint8_t)(reply->flags & 0xFF);
896 if (reply->dlen) memcpy(ptr, reply->data, reply->dlen);
898 switch (reply->code) {
902 eap_ds->request->code = PW_EAP_REQUEST;
906 eap_ds->request->code = PW_EAP_SUCCESS;
910 eap_ds->request->code = PW_EAP_FAILURE;
914 /* Should never enter here */
923 * Parse TLS configuration
925 * If the option given by 'attr' is set, we find the config section
926 * of that name and use that for the TLS configuration. If not, we
927 * fall back to compatibility mode and read the TLS options from
930 fr_tls_server_conf_t *eaptls_conf_parse(CONF_SECTION *cs, char const *attr)
932 char const *tls_conf_name;
934 CONF_SECTION *parent;
935 CONF_SECTION *tls_cs;
936 fr_tls_server_conf_t *tls_conf;
941 rad_assert(attr != NULL);
943 parent = cf_item_parent(cf_section_to_item(cs));
945 cp = cf_pair_find(cs, attr);
947 tls_conf_name = cf_pair_value(cp);
949 tls_cs = cf_section_sub_find_name2(parent, TLS_CONFIG_SECTION, tls_conf_name);
952 ERROR("Cannot find tls config \"%s\"", tls_conf_name);
957 * If we can't find the section given by the 'attr', we
958 * fall-back to looking for the "tls" section, as in
961 * We don't fall back if the 'attr' is specified, but we can't
962 * find the section - that is just a config error.
964 INFO("TLS section \"%s\" missing, trying to use legacy configuration", attr);
965 tls_cs = cf_section_sub_find(parent, "tls");
971 tls_conf = tls_server_conf_parse(tls_cs);
977 * The EAP RFC's say 1020, but we're less picky.
979 if (tls_conf->fragment_size < 100) {
980 ERROR("Configured fragment size is too small, must be >= 100");
985 * The maximum size for a RADIUS packet is 4096,
986 * minus the header (20), Message-Authenticator (18),
987 * and State (18), etc. results in about 4000 bytes of data
988 * that can be devoted *solely* to EAP.
990 if (tls_conf->fragment_size > 4000) {
991 ERROR("Configured fragment size is too large, must be <= 4000");
996 * Account for the EAP header (4), and the EAP-TLS header
997 * (6), as per Section 4.2 of RFC 2716. What's left is
998 * the maximum amount of data we read from a TLS buffer.
1000 tls_conf->fragment_size -= 10;