src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_ttls/ttls.c

   1 /*
   2  * rlm_eap_ttls.c  contains the interfaces that are called from eap
   3  *
   4  * Version:     $Id$
   5  *
   6  *   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
   7  *   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
   8  *   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
   9  *   (at your option) any later version.
  10  *
  11  *   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
  12  *   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
  13  *   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
  14  *   GNU General Public License for more details.
  15  *
  16  *   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
  17  *   along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
  18  *   Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
  19  *
  20  *   Copyright 2003 Alan DeKok <aland@freeradius.org>
  21  *   Copyright 2006 The FreeRADIUS server project
  22  */
  23
  24 #include <freeradius-devel/ident.h>
  25 RCSID("$Id$")
  26
  27 #include "eap_ttls.h"
  28
  29 /*
  30  *    0                   1                   2                   3
  31  *    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
  32  *   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  33  *   |                           AVP Code                            |
  34  *   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  35  *   |V M r r r r r r|                  AVP Length                   |
  36  *   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  37  *   |                        Vendor-ID (opt)                        |
  38  *   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  39  *   |    Data ...
  40  *   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  41  */
  42
  43 /*
  44  *      Verify that the diameter packet is valid.
  45  */
  46 static int diameter_verify(REQUEST *request,
  47                            const uint8_t *data, unsigned int data_len)
  48 {
  49         uint32_t attr;
  50         uint32_t length;
  51         unsigned int offset;
  52         unsigned int data_left = data_len;
  53
  54         while (data_left > 0) {
  55                 if (data_len < 12) {
  56                         RDEBUG2(" Diameter attribute is too small to contain a Diameter header");
  57                         return 0;
  58                 }
  59
  60                 rad_assert(data_left <= data_len);
  61                 memcpy(&attr, data, sizeof(attr));
  62                 data += 4;
  63                 attr = ntohl(attr);
  64                 if (attr > 255) {
  65                         RDEBUG2(" Non-RADIUS attribute in tunneled authentication is not supported");
  66                         return 0;
  67                 }
  68
  69                 memcpy(&length, data , sizeof(length));
  70                 data += 4;
  71                 length = ntohl(length);
  72
  73                 /*
  74                  *      A "vendor" flag, with a vendor ID of zero,
  75                  *      is equivalent to no vendor.  This is stupid.
  76                  */
  77                 offset = 8;
  78                 if ((length & (1 << 31)) != 0) {
  79                         uint32_t vendor;
  80                         DICT_ATTR *da;
  81
  82                         memcpy(&vendor, data, sizeof(vendor));
  83                         vendor = ntohl(vendor);
  84
  85                         if (vendor > FR_MAX_VENDOR) {
  86                                 RDEBUG2("Vendor codes larger than 2^24 are not supported");
  87                                 return 0;
  88                         }
  89
  90                         da = dict_attrbyvalue(attr, vendor);
  91
  92                         /*
  93                          *      SHOULD check ((length & (1 << 30)) != 0)
  94                          *      for the mandatory bit.
  95                          */
  96                         if (!da) {
  97                                 RDEBUG2("Fatal! Vendor %u, Attribute %u was not found in our dictionary. ",
  98                                        vendor, attr);
  99                                 return 0;
 100                         }
 101
 102                         data += 4; /* skip the vendor field */
 103                         offset += 4; /* offset to value field */
 104                 }
 105
 106                 /*
 107                  *      Ignore the M bit.  We support all RADIUS attributes...
 108                  */
 109
 110                 /*
 111                  *      Get the length.  If it's too big, die.
 112                  */
 113                 length &= 0x00ffffff;
 114
 115                 /*
 116                  *      Too short or too long is bad.
 117                  */
 118                 if (length < offset) {
 119                         RDEBUG2("Tunneled attribute %d is too short (%d)to contain anything useful.", attr, length);
 120                         return 0;
 121                 }
 122
 123                 /*
 124                  *      EAP Messages cane be longer than MAX_STRING_LEN.
 125                  *      Other attributes cannot be.
 126                  */
 127                 if ((attr != PW_EAP_MESSAGE) &&
 128                     (length > (MAX_STRING_LEN + 8))) {
 129                         RDEBUG2("Tunneled attribute %d is too long (%d) to pack into a RADIUS attribute.", attr, length);
 130                         return 0;
 131                 }
 132
 133                 if (length > data_left) {
 134                         RDEBUG2("Tunneled attribute %d is longer than room left in the packet (%d > %d).", attr, length, data_left);
 135                         return 0;
 136                 }
 137
 138                 /*
 139                  *      Check for broken implementations, which don't
 140                  *      pad the AVP to a 4-octet boundary.
 141                  */
 142                 if (data_left == length) break;
 143
 144                 /*
 145                  *      The length does NOT include the padding, so
 146                  *      we've got to account for it here by rounding up
 147                  *      to the nearest 4-byte boundary.
 148                  */
 149                 length += 0x03;
 150                 length &= ~0x03;
 151
 152                 /*
 153                  *      If the rest of the diameter packet is larger than
 154                  *      this attribute, continue.
 155                  *
 156                  *      Otherwise, if the attribute over-flows the end
 157                  *      of the packet, die.
 158                  */
 159                 if (data_left < length) {
 160                         RDEBUG2("ERROR! Diameter attribute overflows packet!");
 161                         return 0;
 162                 }
 163
 164                 /*
 165                  *      Check again for equality, now that we're padded
 166                  *      length to a multiple of 4 octets.
 167                  */
 168                 if (data_left == length) break;
 169
 170                 /*
 171                  *      data_left > length, continue.
 172                  */
 173                 data_left -= length;
 174                 data += length - offset;
 175         }
 176
 177         /*
 178          *      We got this far.  It looks OK.
 179          */
 180         return 1;
 181 }
 182
 183
 184 /*
 185  *      Convert diameter attributes to our VALUE_PAIR's
 186  */
 187 static VALUE_PAIR *diameter2vp(REQUEST *request, SSL *ssl,
 188                                const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len)
 189 {
 190         uint32_t        attr;
 191         uint32_t        vendor;
 192         uint32_t        length;
 193         size_t          offset;
 194         size_t          size;
 195         size_t          data_left = data_len;
 196         VALUE_PAIR      *first = NULL;
 197         VALUE_PAIR      **last = &first;
 198         VALUE_PAIR      *vp;
 199
 200         while (data_left > 0) {
 201                 rad_assert(data_left <= data_len);
 202                 memcpy(&attr, data, sizeof(attr));
 203                 data += 4;
 204                 attr = ntohl(attr);
 205                 vendor = 0;
 206
 207                 memcpy(&length, data, sizeof(length));
 208                 data += 4;
 209                 length = ntohl(length);
 210
 211                 /*
 212                  *      A "vendor" flag, with a vendor ID of zero,
 213                  *      is equivalent to no vendor.  This is stupid.
 214                  */
 215                 offset = 8;
 216                 if ((length & (1 << 31)) != 0) {
 217                         memcpy(&vendor, data, sizeof(vendor));
 218                         vendor = ntohl(vendor);
 219
 220                         if (vendor > FR_MAX_VENDOR) {
 221                                 RDEBUG2("Cannot handle vendor Id greater than 2^&24");
 222                                 pairfree(&first);
 223                                 return NULL;
 224                         }
 225
 226                         data += 4; /* skip the vendor field, it's zero */
 227                         offset += 4; /* offset to value field */
 228                 }
 229
 230                 /*
 231                  *      Vendor attributes can be larger than 255.
 232                  *      Normal attributes cannot be.
 233                  */
 234                 if ((attr > 255) && (vendor == 0)) {
 235                         RDEBUG2("Cannot handle Diameter attributes");
 236                         pairfree(&first);
 237                         return NULL;
 238                 }
 239
 240                 /*
 241                  *      FIXME: Handle the M bit.  For now, we assume that
 242                  *      some other module takes care of any attribute
 243                  *      with the M bit set.
 244                  */
 245
 246                 /*
 247                  *      Get the length.
 248                  */
 249                 length &= 0x00ffffff;
 250
 251                 /*
 252                  *      Get the size of the value portion of the
 253                  *      attribute.
 254                  */
 255                 size = length - offset;
 256
 257                 /*
 258                  *      Create it.
 259                  */
 260                 vp = paircreate(attr, vendor, PW_TYPE_OCTETS);
 261                 if (!vp) {
 262                         RDEBUG2("Failure in creating VP");
 263                         pairfree(&first);
 264                         return NULL;
 265                 }
 266
 267                 /*
 268                  *      If it's a type from our dictionary, then
 269                  *      we need to put the data in a relevant place.
 270                  */
 271                 switch (vp->type) {
 272                 case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
 273                 case PW_TYPE_DATE:
 274                         if (size != vp->length) {
 275                                 RDEBUG2("Invalid length attribute %d",
 276                                        attr);
 277                                 pairfree(&first);
 278                                 pairfree(&vp);
 279                                 return NULL;
 280                         }
 281                         memcpy(&vp->vp_integer, data, vp->length);
 282
 283                         /*
 284                          *      Stored in host byte order: change it.
 285                          */
 286                         vp->vp_integer = ntohl(vp->vp_integer);
 287                         break;
 288
 289                 case PW_TYPE_INTEGER64:
 290                         if (size != vp->length) {
 291                                 RDEBUG2("Invalid length attribute %d",
 292                                        attr);
 293                                 pairfree(&first);
 294                                 pairfree(&vp);
 295                                 return NULL;
 296                         }
 297                         memcpy(&vp->vp_integer64, data, vp->length);
 298
 299                         /*
 300                          *      Stored in host byte order: change it.
 301                          */
 302                         vp->vp_integer64 = ntohll(vp->vp_integer64);
 303                         break;
 304
 305                 case PW_TYPE_IPADDR:
 306                         if (size != vp->length) {
 307                                 RDEBUG2("Invalid length attribute %d",
 308                                        attr);
 309                                 pairfree(&first);
 310                                 pairfree(&vp);
 311                                 return NULL;
 312                         }
 313                   memcpy(&vp->vp_ipaddr, data, vp->length);
 314
 315                   /*
 316                    *    Stored in network byte order: don't change it.
 317                    */
 318                   break;
 319
 320                   /*
 321                    *    String, octet, etc.  Copy the data from the
 322                    *    value field over verbatim.
 323                    *
 324                    *    FIXME: Ipv6 attributes ?
 325                    *
 326                    */
 327                 case PW_TYPE_OCTETS:
 328                         if (attr == PW_EAP_MESSAGE) {
 329                                 const uint8_t *eap_message = data;
 330
 331                                 /*
 332                                  *      vp exists the first time around.
 333                                  */
 334                                 while (1) {
 335                                         vp->length = size;
 336                                         if (vp->length > 253) vp->length = 253;
 337                                         memcpy(vp->vp_octets, eap_message,
 338                                                vp->length);
 339
 340                                         size -= vp->length;
 341                                         eap_message += vp->length;
 342
 343                                         *last = vp;
 344                                         last = &(vp->next);
 345
 346                                         if (size == 0) break;
 347
 348                                         vp = paircreate(attr, vendor, PW_TYPE_OCTETS);
 349                                         if (!vp) {
 350                                                 RDEBUG2("Failure in creating VP");
 351                                                 pairfree(&first);
 352                                                 return NULL;
 353                                         }
 354                                 }
 355
 356                                 goto next_attr;
 357                         } /* else it's another kind of attribute */
 358                         /* FALL-THROUGH */
 359
 360                 default:
 361                         vp->length = size;
 362                         memcpy(vp->vp_strvalue, data, vp->length);
 363                         break;
 364                 }
 365
 366                 /*
 367                  *      User-Password is NUL padded to a multiple
 368                  *      of 16 bytes.  Let's chop it to something
 369                  *      more reasonable.
 370                  *
 371                  *      NOTE: This means that the User-Password
 372                  *      attribute CANNOT EVER have embedded zeros in it!
 373                  */
 374                 switch (vp->attribute) {
 375                 case PW_USER_PASSWORD:
 376                         /*
 377                          *      If the password is exactly 16 octets,
 378                          *      it won't be zero-terminated.
 379                          */
 380                         vp->vp_strvalue[vp->length] = '\0';
 381                         vp->length = strlen(vp->vp_strvalue);
 382                         break;
 383
 384                         /*
 385                          *      Ensure that the client is using the
 386                          *      correct challenge.  This weirdness is
 387                          *      to protect against against replay
 388                          *      attacks, where anyone observing the
 389                          *      CHAP exchange could pose as that user,
 390                          *      by simply choosing to use the same
 391                          *      challenge.
 392                          *
 393                          *      By using a challenge based on
 394                          *      information from the current session,
 395                          *      we can guarantee that the client is
 396                          *      not *choosing* a challenge.
 397                          *
 398                          *      We're a little forgiving in that we
 399                          *      have loose checks on the length, and
 400                          *      we do NOT check the Id (first octet of
 401                          *      the response to the challenge)
 402                          *
 403                          *      But if the client gets the challenge correct,
 404                          *      we're not too worried about the Id.
 405                          */
 406                 case PW_CHAP_CHALLENGE:
 407                 case PW_MSCHAP_CHALLENGE:
 408                         if ((vp->length < 8) ||
 409                             (vp->length > 16)) {
 410                                 RDEBUG("Tunneled challenge has invalid length");
 411                                 pairfree(&first);
 412                                 pairfree(&vp);
 413                                 return NULL;
 414
 415                         } else {
 416                                 uint8_t challenge[16];
 417
 418                                 eapttls_gen_challenge(ssl, challenge,
 419                                                       sizeof(challenge));
 420
 421                                 if (memcmp(challenge, vp->vp_octets,
 422                                            vp->length) != 0) {
 423                                         RDEBUG("Tunneled challenge is incorrect");
 424                                         pairfree(&first);
 425                                         pairfree(&vp);
 426                                         return NULL;
 427                                 }
 428                         }
 429                         break;
 430
 431                 default:
 432                         break;
 433                 } /* switch over checking/re-writing of attributes. */
 434
 435                 /*
 436                  *      Update the list.
 437                  */
 438                 *last = vp;
 439                 last = &(vp->next);
 440
 441         next_attr:
 442                 /*
 443                  *      Catch non-aligned attributes.
 444                  */
 445                 if (data_left == length) break;
 446
 447                 /*
 448                  *      The length does NOT include the padding, so
 449                  *      we've got to account for it here by rounding up
 450                  *      to the nearest 4-byte boundary.
 451                  */
 452                 length += 0x03;
 453                 length &= ~0x03;
 454
 455                 rad_assert(data_left >= length);
 456                 data_left -= length;
 457                 data += length - offset; /* already updated */
 458         }
 459
 460         /*
 461          *      We got this far.  It looks OK.
 462          */
 463         return first;
 464 }
 465
 466 /*
 467  *      Convert VALUE_PAIR's to diameter attributes, and write them
 468  *      to an SSL session.
 469  *
 470  *      The ONLY VALUE_PAIR's which may be passed to this function
 471  *      are ones which can go inside of a RADIUS (i.e. diameter)
 472  *      packet.  So no server-configuration attributes, or the like.
 473  */
 474 static int vp2diameter(REQUEST *request, tls_session_t *tls_session, VALUE_PAIR *first)
 475 {
 476         /*
 477          *      RADIUS packets are no more than 4k in size, so if
 478          *      we've got more than 4k of data to write, it's very
 479          *      bad.
 480          */
 481         uint8_t         buffer[4096];
 482         uint8_t         *p;
 483         uint32_t        attr;
 484         uint32_t        length;
 485         uint32_t        vendor;
 486         size_t          total;
 487         uint64_t        attr64;
 488         VALUE_PAIR      *vp;
 489
 490         p = buffer;
 491         total = 0;
 492
 493         for (vp = first; vp != NULL; vp = vp->next) {
 494                 /*
 495                  *      Too much data: die.
 496                  */
 497                 if ((total + vp->length + 12) >= sizeof(buffer)) {
 498                         RDEBUG2("output buffer is full!");
 499                         return 0;
 500                 }
 501
 502                 /*
 503                  *      Hmm... we don't group multiple EAP-Messages
 504                  *      together.  Maybe we should...
 505                  */
 506
 507                 /*
 508                  *      Length is no more than 253, due to RADIUS
 509                  *      issues.
 510                  */
 511                 length = vp->length;
 512                 vendor = vp->vendor;
 513                 if (vendor != 0) {
 514                         attr = vp->attribute & 0xffff;
 515                         length |= (1 << 31);
 516                 } else {
 517                         attr = vp->attribute;
 518                 }
 519
 520                 /*
 521                  *      Hmm... set the M bit for all attributes?
 522                  */
 523                 length |= (1 << 30);
 524
 525                 attr = ntohl(attr);
 526
 527                 memcpy(p, &attr, sizeof(attr));
 528                 p += 4;
 529                 total += 4;
 530
 531                 length += 8;    /* includes 8 bytes of attr & length */
 532
 533                 if (vendor != 0) {
 534                         length += 4; /* include 4 bytes of vendor */
 535
 536                         length = ntohl(length);
 537                         memcpy(p, &length, sizeof(length));
 538                         p += 4;
 539                         total += 4;
 540
 541                         vendor = ntohl(vendor);
 542                         memcpy(p, &vendor, sizeof(vendor));
 543                         p += 4;
 544                         total += 4;
 545                 } else {
 546                         length = ntohl(length);
 547                         memcpy(p, &length, sizeof(length));
 548                         p += 4;
 549                         total += 4;
 550                 }
 551
 552                 switch (vp->type) {
 553                 case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
 554                 case PW_TYPE_DATE:
 555                         attr = htonl(vp->vp_integer); /* stored in host order */
 556                         memcpy(p, &attr, sizeof(attr));
 557                         length = 4;
 558                         break;
 559
 560                 case PW_TYPE_INTEGER64:
 561                         attr64 = htonll(vp->vp_integer64); /* stored in host order */
 562                         memcpy(p, &attr64, sizeof(attr64));
 563                         length = 8;
 564                         break;
 565
 566                 case PW_TYPE_IPADDR:
 567                         memcpy(p, &vp->vp_ipaddr, 4); /* network order */
 568                         length = 4;
 569                         break;
 570
 571                 case PW_TYPE_STRING:
 572                 case PW_TYPE_OCTETS:
 573                 default:
 574                         memcpy(p, vp->vp_strvalue, vp->length);
 575                         length = vp->length;
 576                         break;
 577                 }
 578
 579                 /*
 580                  *      Skip to the end of the data.
 581                  */
 582                 p += length;
 583                 total += length;
 584
 585                 /*
 586                  *      Align the data to a multiple of 4 bytes.
 587                  */
 588                 if ((total & 0x03) != 0) {
 589                         size_t i;
 590
 591                         length = 4 - (total & 0x03);
 592                         for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
 593                                 *p = '\0';
 594                                 p++;
 595                                 total++;
 596                         }
 597                 }
 598         } /* loop over the VP's to write. */
 599
 600         /*
 601          *      Write the data in the buffer to the SSL session.
 602          */
 603         if (total > 0) {
 604 #ifndef NDEBUG
 605                 size_t i;
 606
 607                 if ((debug_flag > 2) && fr_log_fp) {
 608                         for (i = 0; i < total; i++) {
 609                                 if ((i & 0x0f) == 0) fprintf(fr_log_fp, "  TTLS tunnel data out %04x: ", (int) i);
 610
 611                                 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x ", buffer[i]);
 612
 613                                 if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x0f) fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\n");
 614                         }
 615                         if ((total & 0x0f) != 0) fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\n");
 616                 }
 617 #endif
 618
 619                 (tls_session->record_plus)(&tls_session->clean_in, buffer, total);
 620
 621                 /*
 622                  *      FIXME: Check the return code.
 623                  */
 624                 tls_handshake_send(request, tls_session);
 625         }
 626
 627         /*
 628          *      Everything's OK.
 629          */
 630         return 1;
 631 }
 632
 633 /*
 634  *      Use a reply packet to determine what to do.
 635  */
 636 static int process_reply(EAP_HANDLER *handler, tls_session_t *tls_session,
 637                          REQUEST *request, RADIUS_PACKET *reply)
 638 {
 639         int rcode = RLM_MODULE_REJECT;
 640         VALUE_PAIR *vp;
 641         ttls_tunnel_t *t = tls_session->opaque;
 642
 643         handler = handler;      /* -Wunused */
 644         rad_assert(request != NULL);
 645         rad_assert(handler->request == request);
 646
 647         /*
 648          *      If the response packet was Access-Accept, then
 649          *      we're OK.  If not, die horribly.
 650          *
 651          *      FIXME: Take MS-CHAP2-Success attribute, and
 652          *      tunnel it back to the client, to authenticate
 653          *      ourselves to the client.
 654          *
 655          *      FIXME: If we have an Access-Challenge, then
 656          *      the Reply-Message is tunneled back to the client.
 657          *
 658          *      FIXME: If we have an EAP-Message, then that message
 659          *      must be tunneled back to the client.
 660          *
 661          *      FIXME: If we have an Access-Challenge with a State
 662          *      attribute, then do we tunnel that to the client, or
 663          *      keep track of it ourselves?
 664          *
 665          *      FIXME: EAP-Messages can only start with 'identity',
 666          *      NOT 'eap start', so we should check for that....
 667          */
 668         switch (reply->code) {
 669         case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
 670                 RDEBUG("Got tunneled Access-Accept");
 671
 672                 rcode = RLM_MODULE_OK;
 673
 674                 /*
 675                  *      MS-CHAP2-Success means that we do NOT return
 676                  *      an Access-Accept, but instead tunnel that
 677                  *      attribute to the client, and keep going with
 678                  *      the TTLS session.  Once the client accepts
 679                  *      our identity, it will respond with an empty
 680                  *      packet, and we will send EAP-Success.
 681                  */
 682                 vp = NULL;
 683                 pairmove2(&vp, &reply->vps, PW_MSCHAP2_SUCCESS, VENDORPEC_MICROSOFT);
 684                 if (vp) {
 685                         RDEBUG("Got MS-CHAP2-Success, tunneling it to the client in a challenge.");
 686                         rcode = RLM_MODULE_HANDLED;
 687                         t->authenticated = TRUE;
 688
 689                         /*
 690                          *      Delete MPPE keys & encryption policy.  We don't
 691                          *      want these here.
 692                          */
 693                         pairdelete(&reply->vps, 7, VENDORPEC_MICROSOFT);
 694                         pairdelete(&reply->vps, 8, VENDORPEC_MICROSOFT);
 695                         pairdelete(&reply->vps, 16, VENDORPEC_MICROSOFT);
 696                         pairdelete(&reply->vps, 17, VENDORPEC_MICROSOFT);
 697
 698                         /*
 699                          *      Use the tunneled reply, but not now.
 700                          */
 701                         if (t->use_tunneled_reply) {
 702                                 t->accept_vps = reply->vps;
 703                                 reply->vps = NULL;
 704                         }
 705
 706                 } else { /* no MS-CHAP2-Success */
 707                         /*
 708                          *      Can only have EAP-Message if there's
 709                          *      no MS-CHAP2-Success.  (FIXME: EAP-MSCHAP?)
 710                          *
 711                          *      We also do NOT tunnel the EAP-Success
 712                          *      attribute back to the client, as the client
 713                          *      can figure it out, from the non-tunneled
 714                          *      EAP-Success packet.
 715                          */
 716                         pairmove2(&vp, &reply->vps, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0);
 717                         pairfree(&vp);
 718                 }
 719
 720                 /*
 721                  *      Handle the ACK, by tunneling any necessary reply
 722                  *      VP's back to the client.
 723                  */
 724                 if (vp) {
 725                         vp2diameter(request, tls_session, vp);
 726                         pairfree(&vp);
 727                 }
 728
 729                 /*
 730                  *      If we've been told to use the attributes from
 731                  *      the reply, then do so.
 732                  *
 733                  *      WARNING: This may leak information about the
 734                  *      tunneled user!
 735                  */
 736                 if (t->use_tunneled_reply) {
 737                         pairdelete(&reply->vps, PW_PROXY_STATE, 0);
 738                         pairadd(&request->reply->vps, reply->vps);
 739                         reply->vps = NULL;
 740                 }
 741                 break;
 742
 743
 744         case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
 745                 RDEBUG("Got tunneled Access-Reject");
 746                 rcode = RLM_MODULE_REJECT;
 747                 break;
 748
 749                 /*
 750                  *      Handle Access-Challenge, but only if we
 751                  *      send tunneled reply data.  This is because
 752                  *      an Access-Challenge means that we MUST tunnel
 753                  *      a Reply-Message to the client.
 754                  */
 755         case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
 756                 RDEBUG("Got tunneled Access-Challenge");
 757
 758                 /*
 759                  *      Keep the State attribute, if necessary.
 760                  *
 761                  *      Get rid of the old State, too.
 762                  */
 763                 pairfree(&t->state);
 764                 pairmove2(&t->state, &reply->vps, PW_STATE, 0);
 765
 766                 /*
 767                  *      We should really be a bit smarter about this,
 768                  *      and move over only those attributes which
 769                  *      are relevant to the authentication request,
 770                  *      but that's a lot more work, and this "dumb"
 771                  *      method works in 99.9% of the situations.
 772                  */
 773                 vp = NULL;
 774                 pairmove2(&vp, &reply->vps, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0);
 775
 776                 /*
 777                  *      There MUST be a Reply-Message in the challenge,
 778                  *      which we tunnel back to the client.
 779                  *
 780                  *      If there isn't one in the reply VP's, then
 781                  *      we MUST create one, with an empty string as
 782                  *      it's value.
 783                  */
 784                 pairmove2(&vp, &reply->vps, PW_REPLY_MESSAGE, 0);
 785
 786                 /*
 787                  *      Handle the ACK, by tunneling any necessary reply
 788                  *      VP's back to the client.
 789                  */
 790                 if (vp) {
 791                         vp2diameter(request, tls_session, vp);
 792                         pairfree(&vp);
 793                 }
 794                 rcode = RLM_MODULE_HANDLED;
 795                 break;
 796
 797         default:
 798                 RDEBUG("Unknown RADIUS packet type %d: rejecting tunneled user", reply->code);
 799                 rcode = RLM_MODULE_INVALID;
 800                 break;
 801         }
 802
 803         return rcode;
 804 }
 805
 806
 807 #ifdef WITH_PROXY
 808 /*
 809  *      Do post-proxy processing,
 810  */
 811 static int eapttls_postproxy(EAP_HANDLER *handler, void *data)
 812 {
 813         int rcode;
 814         tls_session_t *tls_session = (tls_session_t *) data;
 815         REQUEST *fake, *request = handler->request;
 816
 817         rad_assert(request != NULL);
 818         RDEBUG("Passing reply from proxy back into the tunnel.");
 819
 820         /*
 821          *      If there was a fake request associated with the proxied
 822          *      request, do more processing of it.
 823          */
 824         fake = (REQUEST *) request_data_get(handler->request,
 825                                             handler->request->proxy,
 826                                             REQUEST_DATA_EAP_MSCHAP_TUNNEL_CALLBACK);
 827
 828         /*
 829          *      Do the callback, if it exists, and if it was a success.
 830          */
 831         if (fake && (handler->request->proxy_reply->code == PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK)) {
 832                 /*
 833                  *      Terrible hacks.
 834                  */
 835                 rad_assert(fake->packet == NULL);
 836                 fake->packet = request->proxy;
 837                 fake->packet->src_ipaddr = request->packet->src_ipaddr;
 838                 request->proxy = NULL;
 839
 840                 rad_assert(fake->reply == NULL);
 841                 fake->reply = request->proxy_reply;
 842                 request->proxy_reply = NULL;
 843
 844                 if ((debug_flag > 0) && fr_log_fp) {
 845                         fprintf(fr_log_fp, "server %s {\n",
 846                                 (fake->server == NULL) ? "" : fake->server);
 847                 }
 848
 849                 /*
 850                  *      Perform a post-auth stage for the tunneled
 851                  *      session.
 852                  */
 853                 fake->options &= ~RAD_REQUEST_OPTION_PROXY_EAP;
 854                 rcode = rad_postauth(fake);
 855                 RDEBUG2("post-auth returns %d", rcode);
 856
 857                 if ((debug_flag > 0) && fr_log_fp) {
 858                         fprintf(fr_log_fp, "} # server %s\n",
 859                                 (fake->server == NULL) ? "" : fake->server);
 860
 861                         RDEBUG("Final reply from tunneled session code %d",
 862                                fake->reply->code);
 863                         debug_pair_list(fake->reply->vps);
 864                 }
 865
 866                 /*
 867                  *      Terrible hacks.
 868                  */
 869                 request->proxy = fake->packet;
 870                 fake->packet = NULL;
 871                 request->proxy_reply = fake->reply;
 872                 fake->reply = NULL;
 873
 874                 /*
 875                  *      And we're done with this request.
 876                  */
 877
 878                 switch (rcode) {
 879                 case RLM_MODULE_FAIL:
 880                         request_free(&fake);
 881                         eaptls_fail(handler, 0);
 882                         return 0;
 883                         break;
 884
 885                 default:  /* Don't Do Anything */
 886                         RDEBUG2("Got reply %d",
 887                                request->proxy_reply->code);
 888                         break;
 889                 }
 890         }
 891         request_free(&fake);    /* robust if fake == NULL */
 892
 893         /*
 894          *      Process the reply from the home server.
 895          */
 896         rcode = process_reply(handler, tls_session, handler->request,
 897                               handler->request->proxy_reply);
 898
 899         /*
 900          *      The proxy code uses the reply from the home server as
 901          *      the basis for the reply to the NAS.  We don't want that,
 902          *      so we toss it, after we've had our way with it.
 903          */
 904         pairfree(&handler->request->proxy_reply->vps);
 905
 906         switch (rcode) {
 907         case RLM_MODULE_REJECT:
 908                 RDEBUG("Reply was rejected");
 909                 break;
 910
 911         case RLM_MODULE_HANDLED:
 912                 RDEBUG("Reply was handled");
 913                 eaptls_request(handler->eap_ds, tls_session);
 914                 return 1;
 915
 916         case RLM_MODULE_OK:
 917                 RDEBUG("Reply was OK");
 918
 919                 /*
 920                  *      Success: Automatically return MPPE keys.
 921                  */
 922                 return eaptls_success(handler, 0);
 923
 924         default:
 925                 RDEBUG("Reply was unknown.");
 926                 break;
 927         }
 928
 929         eaptls_fail(handler, 0);
 930         return 0;
 931 }
 932
 933
 934 /*
 935  *      Free a request.
 936  */
 937 static void my_request_free(void *data)
 938 {
 939         REQUEST *request = (REQUEST *)data;
 940
 941         request_free(&request);
 942 }
 943 #endif  /* WITH_PROXY */
 944
 945 /*
 946  *      Process the "diameter" contents of the tunneled data.
 947  */
 948 int eapttls_process(EAP_HANDLER *handler, tls_session_t *tls_session)
 949 {
 950         int rcode = PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT;
 951         REQUEST *fake;
 952         VALUE_PAIR *vp;
 953         ttls_tunnel_t *t;
 954         const uint8_t *data;
 955         size_t data_len;
 956         REQUEST *request = handler->request;
 957         eap_chbind_packet_t *chbind_packet;
 958         size_t chbind_len;
 959
 960         rad_assert(request != NULL);
 961
 962         /*
 963          *      Just look at the buffer directly, without doing
 964          *      record_minus.
 965          */
 966         data_len = tls_session->clean_out.used;
 967         tls_session->clean_out.used = 0;
 968         data = tls_session->clean_out.data;
 969
 970         t = (ttls_tunnel_t *) tls_session->opaque;
 971
 972         /*
 973          *      If there's no data, maybe this is an ACK to an
 974          *      MS-CHAP2-Success.
 975          */
 976         if (data_len == 0) {
 977                 if (t->authenticated) {
 978                         RDEBUG("Got ACK, and the user was already authenticated.");
 979                         return PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK;
 980                 } /* else no session, no data, die. */
 981
 982                 /*
 983                  *      FIXME: Call SSL_get_error() to see what went
 984                  *      wrong.
 985                  */
 986                 RDEBUG2("SSL_read Error");
 987                 return PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT;
 988         }
 989
 990 #ifndef NDEBUG
 991         if ((debug_flag > 2) && fr_log_fp) {
 992                 size_t i;
 993
 994                 for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) {
 995                         if ((i & 0x0f) == 0) fprintf(fr_log_fp, "  TTLS tunnel data in %04x: ", (int) i);
 996
 997                         fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x ", data[i]);
 998
 999                         if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x0f) fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\n");
1000                 }
1001                 if ((data_len & 0x0f) != 0) fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\n");
1002         }
1003 #endif
1004
1005         if (!diameter_verify(request, data, data_len)) {
1006                 return PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT;
1007         }
1008
1009         /*
1010          *      Allocate a fake REQUEST structe.
1011          */
1012         fake = request_alloc_fake(request);
1013
1014         rad_assert(fake->packet->vps == NULL);
1015
1016         /*
1017          *      Add the tunneled attributes to the fake request.
1018          */
1019         fake->packet->vps = diameter2vp(request, tls_session->ssl, data, data_len);
1020         if (!fake->packet->vps) {
1021                 request_free(&fake);
1022                 return PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT;
1023         }
1024
1025         /*
1026          *      Tell the request that it's a fake one.
1027          */
1028         vp = pairmake("Freeradius-Proxied-To", "127.0.0.1", T_OP_EQ);
1029         if (vp) {
1030                 pairadd(&fake->packet->vps, vp);
1031         }
1032
1033         if ((debug_flag > 0) && fr_log_fp) {
1034                 RDEBUG("Got tunneled request");
1035
1036                 debug_pair_list(fake->packet->vps);
1037         }
1038
1039         /*
1040          *      Update other items in the REQUEST data structure.
1041          */
1042         fake->username = pairfind(fake->packet->vps, PW_USER_NAME, 0);
1043         fake->password = pairfind(fake->packet->vps, PW_USER_PASSWORD, 0);
1044
1045         /*
1046          *      No User-Name, try to create one from stored data.
1047          */
1048         if (!fake->username) {
1049                 /*
1050                  *      No User-Name in the stored data, look for
1051                  *      an EAP-Identity, and pull it out of there.
1052                  */
1053                 if (!t->username) {
1054                         vp = pairfind(fake->packet->vps, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0);
1055                         if (vp &&
1056                             (vp->length >= EAP_HEADER_LEN + 2) &&
1057                             (vp->vp_strvalue[0] == PW_EAP_RESPONSE) &&
1058                             (vp->vp_strvalue[EAP_HEADER_LEN] == PW_EAP_IDENTITY) &&
1059                             (vp->vp_strvalue[EAP_HEADER_LEN + 1] != 0)) {
1060                                 /*
1061                                  *      Create & remember a User-Name
1062                                  */
1063                                 t->username = pairmake("User-Name", "", T_OP_EQ);
1064                                 rad_assert(t->username != NULL);
1065
1066                                 memcpy(t->username->vp_strvalue, vp->vp_strvalue + 5,
1067                                        vp->length - 5);
1068                                 t->username->length = vp->length - 5;
1069                                 t->username->vp_strvalue[t->username->length] = 0;
1070
1071                                 RDEBUG("Got tunneled identity of %s",
1072                                        t->username->vp_strvalue);
1073
1074                                 /*
1075                                  *      If there's a default EAP type,
1076                                  *      set it here.
1077                                  */
1078                                 if (t->default_eap_type != 0) {
1079                                         RDEBUG("Setting default EAP type for tunneled EAP session.");
1080                                         vp = paircreate(PW_EAP_TYPE, 0,
1081                                                         PW_TYPE_INTEGER);
1082                                         rad_assert(vp != NULL);
1083                                         vp->vp_integer = t->default_eap_type;
1084                                         pairadd(&fake->config_items, vp);
1085                                 }
1086
1087                         } else {
1088                                 /*
1089                                  *      Don't reject the request outright,
1090                                  *      as it's permitted to do EAP without
1091                                  *      user-name.
1092                                  */
1093                                 RDEBUG2("WARNING! No EAP-Identity found to start EAP conversation.");
1094                         }
1095                 } /* else there WAS a t->username */
1096
1097                 if (t->username) {
1098                         vp = paircopy(t->username);
1099                         pairadd(&fake->packet->vps, vp);
1100                         fake->username = pairfind(fake->packet->vps, PW_USER_NAME, 0);
1101                 }
1102         } /* else the request ALREADY had a User-Name */
1103
1104         /*
1105          *      Add the State attribute, too, if it exists.
1106          */
1107         if (t->state) {
1108                 vp = paircopy(t->state);
1109                 if (vp) pairadd(&fake->packet->vps, vp);
1110         }
1111
1112         /*
1113          *      If this is set, we copy SOME of the request attributes
1114          *      from outside of the tunnel to inside of the tunnel.
1115          *
1116          *      We copy ONLY those attributes which do NOT already
1117          *      exist in the tunneled request.
1118          */
1119         if (t->copy_request_to_tunnel) {
1120                 VALUE_PAIR *copy;
1121
1122                 for (vp = request->packet->vps; vp != NULL; vp = vp->next) {
1123                         /*
1124                          *      The attribute is a server-side thingy,
1125                          *      don't copy it.
1126                          */
1127                         if ((vp->attribute > 255) &&
1128                             (vp->vendor == 0)) {
1129                                 continue;
1130                         }
1131
1132                         /*
1133                          *      The outside attribute is already in the
1134                          *      tunnel, don't copy it.
1135                          *
1136                          *      This works for BOTH attributes which
1137                          *      are originally in the tunneled request,
1138                          *      AND attributes which are copied there
1139                          *      from below.
1140                          */
1141                         if (pairfind(fake->packet->vps, vp->attribute, vp->vendor)) {
1142                                 continue;
1143                         }
1144
1145                         /*
1146                          *      Some attributes are handled specially.
1147                          */
1148                         switch (vp->attribute) {
1149                                 /*
1150                                  *      NEVER copy Message-Authenticator,
1151                                  *      EAP-Message, or State.  They're
1152                                  *      only for outside of the tunnel.
1153                                  */
1154                         case PW_USER_NAME:
1155                         case PW_USER_PASSWORD:
1156                         case PW_CHAP_PASSWORD:
1157                         case PW_CHAP_CHALLENGE:
1158                         case PW_PROXY_STATE:
1159                         case PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR:
1160                         case PW_EAP_MESSAGE:
1161                         case PW_STATE:
1162                                 continue;
1163                                 break;
1164
1165                                 /*
1166                                  *      By default, copy it over.
1167                                  */
1168                         default:
1169                                 break;
1170                         }
1171
1172                         /*
1173                          *      Don't copy from the head, we've already
1174                          *      checked it.
1175                          */
1176                         copy = paircopy2(vp, vp->attribute, vp->vendor);
1177                         pairadd(&fake->packet->vps, copy);
1178                 }
1179         }
1180
1181         if ((vp = pairfind(request->config_items, PW_VIRTUAL_SERVER, 0)) != NULL) {
1182                 fake->server = vp->vp_strvalue;
1183
1184         } else if (t->virtual_server) {
1185                 fake->server = t->virtual_server;
1186
1187         } /* else fake->server == request->server */
1188
1189
1190         if ((debug_flag > 0) && fr_log_fp) {
1191                 RDEBUG("Sending tunneled request");
1192
1193                 debug_pair_list(fake->packet->vps);
1194
1195                 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "server %s {\n",
1196                         (fake->server == NULL) ? "" : fake->server);
1197         }
1198
1199         /*
1200          *      Process channel binding here.
1201          */
1202         chbind_len = eap_chbind_vp2packet(fake->packet->vps, &chbind_packet);
1203         if (chbind_len > 0) {
1204                 /*CHBIND_REQ *req = chbind_allocate();
1205                 req->chbind_req = chbind_packet;
1206                 req->chbind_req_len = chbind_len;
1207                 if (fake->username) {
1208                         req->username = fake->username->vp_octets;
1209                         req->username_len = fake->username->length;
1210                 } else {
1211                         req->username = NULL;
1212                         req->username_len = 0;
1213                 }
1214                 chbind_process(request, req);
1215                 */
1216
1217                 /* free the chbind packet; we're done with it */
1218                 free(chbind_packet);
1219
1220                 /* encapsulate response here */
1221                 /*pairadd(replyvps, eap_chbind_packet2vp(req->chbind_resp,
1222                                                        req->chbind_resp_len));
1223                 */
1224
1225                 /* clean up chbind req */
1226                 /*chbind_free(req);*/
1227         }
1228
1229         /*
1230          *      Call authentication recursively, which will
1231          *      do PAP, CHAP, MS-CHAP, etc.
1232          */
1233         rad_authenticate(fake);
1234
1235         /*
1236          *      Note that we don't do *anything* with the reply
1237          *      attributes.
1238          */
1239         if ((debug_flag > 0) && fr_log_fp) {
1240                 fprintf(fr_log_fp, "} # server %s\n",
1241                         (fake->server == NULL) ? "" : fake->server);
1242
1243                 RDEBUG("Got tunneled reply code %d", fake->reply->code);
1244
1245                 debug_pair_list(fake->reply->vps);
1246         }
1247
1248         /*
1249          *      Decide what to do with the reply.
1250          */
1251         switch (fake->reply->code) {
1252         case 0:                 /* No reply code, must be proxied... */
1253 #ifdef WITH_PROXY
1254           vp = pairfind(fake->config_items, PW_PROXY_TO_REALM, 0);
1255                 if (vp) {
1256                         eap_tunnel_data_t *tunnel;
1257                         RDEBUG("Tunneled authentication will be proxied to %s", vp->vp_strvalue);
1258
1259                         /*
1260                          *      Tell the original request that it's going
1261                          *      to be proxied.
1262                          */
1263                         pairmove2(&(request->config_items),
1264                                   &(fake->config_items),
1265                                   PW_PROXY_TO_REALM, 0);
1266
1267                         /*
1268                          *      Seed the proxy packet with the
1269                          *      tunneled request.
1270                          */
1271                         rad_assert(request->proxy == NULL);
1272                         request->proxy = fake->packet;
1273                         memset(&request->proxy->src_ipaddr, 0,
1274                                sizeof(request->proxy->src_ipaddr));
1275                         memset(&request->proxy->src_ipaddr, 0,
1276                                sizeof(request->proxy->src_ipaddr));
1277                         request->proxy->src_port = 0;
1278                         request->proxy->dst_port = 0;
1279                         fake->packet = NULL;
1280                         rad_free(&fake->reply);
1281                         fake->reply = NULL;
1282
1283                         /*
1284                          *      Set up the callbacks for the tunnel
1285                          */
1286                         tunnel = rad_malloc(sizeof(*tunnel));
1287                         memset(tunnel, 0, sizeof(*tunnel));
1288
1289                         tunnel->tls_session = tls_session;
1290                         tunnel->callback = eapttls_postproxy;
1291
1292                         /*
1293                          *      Associate the callback with the request.
1294                          */
1295                         rcode = request_data_add(request,
1296                                                  request->proxy,
1297                                                  REQUEST_DATA_EAP_TUNNEL_CALLBACK,
1298                                                  tunnel, free);
1299                         rad_assert(rcode == 0);
1300
1301                         /*
1302                          *      rlm_eap.c has taken care of associating
1303                          *      the handler with the fake request.
1304                          *
1305                          *      So we associate the fake request with
1306                          *      this request.
1307                          */
1308                         rcode = request_data_add(request,
1309                                                  request->proxy,
1310                                                  REQUEST_DATA_EAP_MSCHAP_TUNNEL_CALLBACK,
1311                                                  fake, my_request_free);
1312                         rad_assert(rcode == 0);
1313                         fake = NULL;
1314
1315                         /*
1316                          *      Didn't authenticate the packet, but
1317                          *      we're proxying it.
1318                          */
1319                         rcode = PW_STATUS_CLIENT;
1320
1321                 } else
1322 #endif  /* WITH_PROXY */
1323                   {
1324                         RDEBUG("No tunneled reply was found for request %d , and the request was not proxied: rejecting the user.",
1325                                request->number);
1326                         rcode = PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT;
1327                 }
1328                 break;
1329
1330         default:
1331                 /*
1332                  *      Returns RLM_MODULE_FOO, and we want to return
1333                  *      PW_FOO
1334                  */
1335                 rcode = process_reply(handler, tls_session, request,
1336                                       fake->reply);
1337                 switch (rcode) {
1338                 case RLM_MODULE_REJECT:
1339                         rcode = PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT;
1340                         break;
1341
1342                 case RLM_MODULE_HANDLED:
1343                         rcode = PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE;
1344                         break;
1345
1346                 case RLM_MODULE_OK:
1347                         rcode = PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK;
1348                         break;
1349
1350                 default:
1351                         rcode = PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT;
1352                         break;
1353                 }
1354                 break;
1355         }
1356
1357         request_free(&fake);
1358
1359         return rcode;
1360 }