Cleanup readme
[mech_eap.orig] / accept_sec_context.c
index e75abd0..f686a3c 100644 (file)
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- * Copyright (c) 2010, JANET(UK)
+ * Copyright (c) 2011, JANET(UK)
  * All rights reserved.
  *
  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 
+/*
+ * Establish a security context on the acceptor (server). These functions
+ * wrap around libradsec and (thus) talk to a RADIUS server or proxy.
+ */
+
 #include "gssapiP_eap.h"
 
 #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
@@ -69,7 +74,9 @@ acceptReadyEap(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred)
         ctx->gssFlags |= GSS_C_ANON_FLAG;
     }
 
-    major = gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
+    major = gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf,
+                             (ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_ANON_FLAG) ?
+                                GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS : GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
                              &ctx->initiatorName);
     if (GSS_ERROR(major))
         return major;
@@ -102,8 +109,13 @@ acceptReadyEap(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred)
     if (GSS_ERROR(major))
         return major;
 
-    ctx->initiatorName->attrCtx = gssEapCreateAttrContext(cred, ctx);
+    major = gssEapCreateAttrContext(minor, cred, ctx,
+                                    &ctx->initiatorName->attrCtx,
+                                    &ctx->expiryTime);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
 
+    *minor = 0;
     return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
 }
 
@@ -120,41 +132,86 @@ eapGssSmAcceptIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
                        gss_buffer_t outputToken)
 {
     OM_uint32 major;
-    union {
-        struct eap_hdr pdu;
-        unsigned char data[5];
-    } pkt;
+    struct wpabuf *reqData;
     gss_buffer_desc pktBuffer;
 
-    if (inputToken != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER && inputToken->length != 0)
+    if (inputToken != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER && inputToken->length != 0) {
+        *minor = GSSEAP_WRONG_SIZE;
         return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+    }
 
     assert(ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME);
 
-    if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
+    if (cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
         major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName);
         if (GSS_ERROR(major))
             return major;
     }
 
-    pkt.pdu.code = EAP_CODE_REQUEST;
-    pkt.pdu.identifier = 0;
-    pkt.pdu.length = htons(sizeof(pkt.data));
-    pkt.data[4] = EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY;
+    reqData = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY, 0,
+                            EAP_CODE_REQUEST, 0);
+    if (reqData == NULL) {
+        *minor = ENOMEM;
+        return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+    }
 
-    pktBuffer.length = sizeof(pkt.data);
-    pktBuffer.value = pkt.data;
+    pktBuffer.length = wpabuf_len(reqData);
+    pktBuffer.value = (void *)wpabuf_head(reqData);
 
     major = duplicateBuffer(minor, &pktBuffer, outputToken);
     if (GSS_ERROR(major))
         return major;
 
-    ctx->state = EAP_STATE_AUTHENTICATE;
+    ctx->state = GSSEAP_STATE_AUTHENTICATE;
 
+    wpabuf_free(reqData);
+
+    *minor = 0;
     return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
 }
 
 /*
+ * Returns TRUE if the input token contains an EAP identity response.
+ */
+static int
+isIdentityResponseP(gss_buffer_t inputToken)
+{
+    struct wpabuf respData;
+
+    wpabuf_set(&respData, inputToken->value, inputToken->length);
+
+    return (eap_get_type(&respData) == EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Pass the asserted initiator identity to the authentication server.
+ */
+static OM_uint32
+setInitiatorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
+                     gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+                     VALUE_PAIR **vps)
+{
+    struct wpabuf respData;
+    const unsigned char *pos;
+    size_t len;
+    gss_buffer_desc nameBuf;
+
+    wpabuf_set(&respData, inputToken->value, inputToken->length);
+
+    pos = eap_hdr_validate(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY,
+                           &respData, &len);
+    if (pos == NULL) {
+        *minor = GSSEAP_PEER_BAD_MESSAGE;
+        return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+    }
+
+    nameBuf.value = (void *)pos;
+    nameBuf.length = len;
+
+    return gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps, PW_USER_NAME, 0, &nameBuf);
+}
+
+/*
  * Pass the asserted acceptor identity to the authentication server.
  */
 static OM_uint32
@@ -166,24 +223,28 @@ setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
     gss_buffer_desc nameBuf;
     krb5_context krbContext = NULL;
     krb5_principal krbPrinc;
-    struct rs_handle *rh = ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle;
+    struct rs_context *rc = ctx->acceptorCtx.radContext;
 
-    assert(rh != NULL);
+    assert(rc != NULL);
 
-    /* Awaits further specification */
-    if (ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME)
+    if (ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
+        *minor = 0;
         return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+    }
+
+    if ((ctx->acceptorName->flags & NAME_FLAG_SERVICE) == 0) {
+        *minor = GSSEAP_BAD_SERVICE_NAME;
+        return GSS_S_BAD_NAME;
+    }
 
     GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
 
     krbPrinc = ctx->acceptorName->krbPrincipal;
     assert(krbPrinc != NULL);
-
-    if (krb5_princ_size(krbContext, krbPrinc) < 2)
-        return GSS_S_BAD_NAME;
+    assert(KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(krbPrinc) >= 2);
 
     /* Acceptor-Service-Name */
-    krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_component(krbContext, krbPrinc, 0), &nameBuf);
+    krbPrincComponentToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, 0, &nameBuf);
 
     major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps,
                                PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_NAME,
@@ -193,7 +254,7 @@ setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
         return major;
 
     /* Acceptor-Host-Name */
-    krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_component(krbContext, krbPrinc, 1), &nameBuf);
+    krbPrincComponentToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, 1, &nameBuf);
 
     major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps,
                                PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_HOST_NAME,
@@ -202,13 +263,13 @@ setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
     if (GSS_ERROR(major))
         return major;
 
-    if (krb5_princ_size(krbContext, krbPrinc) > 2) {
+    if (KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(krbPrinc) > 2) {
         /* Acceptor-Service-Specific */
         krb5_principal_data ssiPrinc = *krbPrinc;
         char *ssi;
 
-        krb5_princ_size(krbContext, &ssiPrinc) -= 2;
-        krb5_princ_name(krbContext, &ssiPrinc) += 2;
+        KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(&ssiPrinc) -= 2;
+        KRB_PRINC_NAME(&ssiPrinc) += 2;
 
         *minor = krb5_unparse_name_flags(krbContext, &ssiPrinc,
                                          KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &ssi);
@@ -230,7 +291,7 @@ setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
         krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi);
     }
 
-    krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_realm(krbContext, krbPrinc), &nameBuf);
+    krbPrincRealmToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, &nameBuf);
     if (nameBuf.length != 0) {
         /* Acceptor-Realm-Name */
         major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps,
@@ -241,6 +302,7 @@ setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
             return major;
     }
 
+    *minor = 0;
     return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
 }
 
@@ -258,47 +320,42 @@ createRadiusHandle(OM_uint32 *minor,
     struct rs_alloc_scheme ralloc;
     struct rs_error *err;
 
-    assert(actx->radHandle == NULL);
+    assert(actx->radContext == NULL);
     assert(actx->radConn == NULL);
 
-    if (rs_context_create(&actx->radHandle, RS_DICT_FILE) != 0) {
-        *minor = GSSEAP_RADSEC_INIT_FAILURE;
+    if (rs_context_create(&actx->radContext, RS_DICT_FILE) != 0) {
+        *minor = GSSEAP_RADSEC_CONTEXT_FAILURE;
         return GSS_S_FAILURE;
     }
 
-    if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
-        if (cred->radiusConfigFile != NULL)
-            configFile = cred->radiusConfigFile;
-        if (cred->radiusConfigStanza != NULL)
-            configStanza = cred->radiusConfigStanza;
-    }
+    if (cred->radiusConfigFile != NULL)
+        configFile = cred->radiusConfigFile;
+    if (cred->radiusConfigStanza != NULL)
+        configStanza = cred->radiusConfigStanza;
 
     ralloc.calloc  = GSSEAP_CALLOC;
     ralloc.malloc  = GSSEAP_MALLOC;
     ralloc.free    = GSSEAP_FREE;
     ralloc.realloc = GSSEAP_REALLOC;
 
-    rs_context_set_alloc_scheme(actx->radHandle, &ralloc);
+    rs_context_set_alloc_scheme(actx->radContext, &ralloc);
 
-    if (rs_context_read_config(actx->radHandle, configFile) != 0) {
-        err = rs_err_ctx_pop(actx->radHandle);
+    if (rs_context_read_config(actx->radContext, configFile) != 0) {
+        err = rs_err_ctx_pop(actx->radContext);
         goto fail;
     }
 
-    if (rs_conn_create(actx->radHandle, &actx->radConn, configStanza) != 0) {
+    if (rs_conn_create(actx->radContext, &actx->radConn, configStanza) != 0) {
         err = rs_err_conn_pop(actx->radConn);
         goto fail;
     }
 
-    /* XXX TODO rs_conn_select_server does not exist yet */
-#if 0
     if (actx->radServer != NULL) {
-        if (rs_conn_select_server(actx->radConn, actx->radServer) != 0) {
+        if (rs_conn_select_peer(actx->radConn, actx->radServer) != 0) {
             err = rs_err_conn_pop(actx->radConn);
             goto fail;
         }
     }
-#endif
 
     *minor = 0;
     return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
@@ -319,32 +376,32 @@ eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate(OM_uint32 *minor,
                            gss_buffer_t outputToken)
 {
     OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
-    struct rs_handle *rh;
     struct rs_connection *rconn;
     struct rs_request *request = NULL;
     struct rs_packet *req = NULL, *resp = NULL;
     struct radius_packet *frreq, *frresp;
-    int sendAcceptorIdentity = 0;
+    int isIdentityResponse = isIdentityResponseP(inputToken);
 
-    if (ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle == NULL) {
+    if (ctx->acceptorCtx.radContext == NULL) {
         /* May be NULL from an imported partial context */
         major = createRadiusHandle(minor, cred, ctx);
         if (GSS_ERROR(major))
             goto cleanup;
-
-        sendAcceptorIdentity = 1;
     }
 
-    rh = ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle;
     rconn = ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn;
 
-    if (rs_packet_create_acc_request(rconn, &req, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
+    if (rs_packet_create_authn_request(rconn, &req, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
         major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn));
         goto cleanup;
     }
     frreq = rs_packet_frpkt(req);
 
-    if (sendAcceptorIdentity) {
+    if (isIdentityResponse) {
+        major = setInitiatorIdentity(minor, inputToken, &frreq->vps);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+            goto cleanup;
+
         major = setAcceptorIdentity(minor, ctx, &frreq->vps);
         if (GSS_ERROR(major))
             goto cleanup;
@@ -364,8 +421,15 @@ eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate(OM_uint32 *minor,
         gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
     }
 
-    if (rs_request_create(rconn, &request) != 0 ||
-        rs_request_send(request, req, &resp) != 0) {
+    if (rs_request_create(rconn, &request) != 0) {
+        major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn));
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    rs_request_add_reqpkt(request, req);
+    req = NULL;
+
+    if (rs_request_send(request, &resp) != 0) {
         major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn));
         goto cleanup;
     }
@@ -415,13 +479,17 @@ eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate(OM_uint32 *minor,
         if (GSS_ERROR(major))
             goto cleanup;
 
-        ctx->state = EAP_STATE_EXTENSIONS_REQ;
+        ctx->state = GSSEAP_STATE_EXTENSIONS_REQ;
     }
 
+    *minor = 0;
     major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
 
 cleanup:
-    rs_request_destroy(request);
+    if (request != NULL)
+        rs_request_destroy(request);
+    if (req != NULL)
+        rs_packet_destroy(req);
 
     return major;
 }
@@ -443,8 +511,9 @@ eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsReq(OM_uint32 *minor,
     outputToken->length = 0;
     outputToken->value = NULL;
 
-    ctx->state = EAP_STATE_EXTENSIONS_RESP;
+    ctx->state = GSSEAP_STATE_EXTENSIONS_RESP;
 
+    *minor = 0;
     return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
 }
 
@@ -462,8 +531,9 @@ eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsResp(OM_uint32 *minor,
     if (GSS_ERROR(major))
         return major;
 
-    ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
+    ctx->state = GSSEAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
 
+    *minor = 0;
     return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
 }
 
@@ -495,27 +565,12 @@ makeErrorToken(OM_uint32 *minor,
      * Only return error codes that the initiator could have caused,
      * to avoid information leakage.
      */
-    switch (minorStatus) {
-    case GSSEAP_WRONG_SIZE:
-    case GSSEAP_WRONG_MECH:
-    case GSSEAP_BAD_TOK_HEADER:
-    case GSSEAP_BAD_DIRECTION:
-    case GSSEAP_WRONG_TOK_ID:
-    case GSSEAP_CRIT_EXT_UNAVAILABLE:
-    case GSSEAP_MISSING_REQUIRED_EXT:
-    case GSSEAP_KEY_UNAVAILABLE:
-    case GSSEAP_KEY_TOO_SHORT:
-    case GSSEAP_RADIUS_AUTH_FAILURE:
-    case GSSEAP_UNKNOWN_RADIUS_CODE:
-    case GSSEAP_MISSING_EAP_REQUEST:
-        break;
-    default:
-        if (IS_RADIUS_ERROR(minorStatus))
-            /* Squash RADIUS error codes */
-            minorStatus = GSSEAP_GENERIC_RADIUS_ERROR;
-        else
-            /* Don't return system error codes */
-            return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+    if (IS_RADIUS_ERROR(minorStatus)) {
+        /* Squash RADIUS error codes */
+        minorStatus = GSSEAP_RADIUS_PROT_FAILURE;
+    } else if (!IS_WIRE_ERROR(minorStatus)) {
+        /* Don't return non-wire error codes */
+        return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
     }
 
     minorStatus -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_eapg;
@@ -577,7 +632,11 @@ gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor,
     output_token->length = 0;
     output_token->value = NULL;
 
+    if (src_name != NULL)
+        *src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+
     if (input_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER || input_token->length == 0) {
+        *minor = GSSEAP_TOK_TRUNC;
         return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
     }
 
@@ -592,17 +651,26 @@ gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor,
 
     GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&ctx->mutex);
 
-    /* Validate and lock credentials */
-    if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
-        GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&cred->mutex);
-
-        if ((cred->flags & CRED_FLAG_ACCEPT) == 0) {
-            *minor = GSSEAP_CRED_USAGE_MISMATCH;
-            major = GSS_S_NO_CRED;
-            goto cleanup;
+    if (cred == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
+        if (ctx->defaultCred == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
+            major = gssEapAcquireCred(minor,
+                                      GSS_C_NO_NAME,
+                                      GSS_C_NO_BUFFER,
+                                      GSS_C_INDEFINITE,
+                                      GSS_C_NO_OID_SET,
+                                      GSS_C_ACCEPT,
+                                      &ctx->defaultCred,
+                                      NULL,
+                                      NULL);
+            if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+                goto cleanup;
         }
+
+        cred = ctx->defaultCred;
     }
 
+    GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&cred->mutex);
+
     sm = &eapGssAcceptorSm[ctx->state];
 
     major = gssEapVerifyToken(minor, ctx, input_token,
@@ -611,7 +679,7 @@ gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor,
         goto cleanup;
 
     if (!gssEapCredAvailable(cred, ctx->mechanismUsed)) {
-        *minor = GSSEAP_WRONG_MECH;
+        *minor = GSSEAP_CRED_MECH_MISMATCH;
         major = GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
         goto cleanup;
     }
@@ -624,7 +692,7 @@ gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor,
      * machine and process Kerberos GSS messages instead.
      */
     if (tokType == TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH && initialContextToken) {
-        ctx->state = EAP_STATE_KRB_REAUTH_GSS;
+        ctx->state = GSSEAP_STATE_KRB_REAUTH;
     } else
 #endif
     if (tokType != sm->inputTokenType) {
@@ -650,7 +718,7 @@ gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor,
                 goto cleanup;
             }
 
-            sm = &eapGssAcceptorSm[EAP_STATE_ERROR];
+            sm = &eapGssAcceptorSm[GSSEAP_STATE_ERROR];
             goto send_token;
         }
     } while (major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED && innerOutputToken.length == 0);
@@ -670,11 +738,14 @@ gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor,
             if (GSS_ERROR(major))
                 goto cleanup;
         }
-        if (time_rec != NULL)
-            gssEapContextTime(&tmpMinor, ctx, time_rec);
+        if (time_rec != NULL) {
+            major = gssEapContextTime(&tmpMinor, ctx, time_rec);
+            if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+                goto cleanup;
+        }
     }
 
-    assert(ctx->state == EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED || major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+    assert(ctx->state == GSSEAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED || major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
 
 send_token:
     if (innerOutputToken.value != NULL) {
@@ -711,11 +782,11 @@ acceptReadyKrb(OM_uint32 *minor,
 {
     OM_uint32 major;
 
-    major = gssEapGlueToMechName(minor, initiator, &ctx->initiatorName);
+    major = gssEapGlueToMechName(minor, ctx, initiator, &ctx->initiatorName);
     if (GSS_ERROR(major))
         return major;
 
-    if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
+    if (cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
         major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName);
         if (GSS_ERROR(major))
             return major;
@@ -725,8 +796,9 @@ acceptReadyKrb(OM_uint32 *minor,
     if (GSS_ERROR(major))
         return major;
 
-    ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
+    ctx->state = GSSEAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
 
+    *minor = 0;
     return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
 }
 
@@ -739,19 +811,15 @@ eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor,
                         gss_buffer_t outputToken)
 {
     OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
-    gss_cred_id_t krbCred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
     gss_name_t krbInitiator = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
     gss_OID mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
     OM_uint32 gssFlags, timeRec = GSS_C_INDEFINITE;
 
-    ctx->flags |= CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH_GSS;
-
-    if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
-        krbCred = cred->krbCred;
+    ctx->flags |= CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH;
 
     major = gssAcceptSecContext(minor,
                                 &ctx->kerberosCtx,
-                                krbCred,
+                                cred->krbCred,
                                 inputToken,
                                 chanBindings,
                                 &krbInitiator,