* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
+/*
+ * Establish a security context on the initiator (client). These functions
+ * wrap around libeap.
+ */
+
#include "gssapiP_eap.h"
+#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmInitGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_name_t target,
+ gss_OID mech,
+ OM_uint32 reqFlags,
+ OM_uint32 timeReq,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+ gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+ gss_buffer_t outputToken);
+#endif
+
static OM_uint32
policyVariableToFlag(enum eapol_bool_var variable)
{
peerNotifyPending,
};
+#ifdef GSSEAP_DEBUG
extern int wpa_debug_level;
+#endif
static OM_uint32
peerConfigInit(OM_uint32 *minor,
krb5_error_code code;
char *identity;
+ eapPeerConfig->identity = NULL;
+ eapPeerConfig->identity_len = 0;
+ eapPeerConfig->password = NULL;
+ eapPeerConfig->password_len = 0;
+
+ assert(cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL);
+
GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
eapPeerConfig->fragment_size = 1024;
+#ifdef GSSEAP_DEBUG
wpa_debug_level = 0;
+#endif
+
+ assert(cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME);
+
+ if ((cred->name->flags & (NAME_FLAG_NAI | NAME_FLAG_SERVICE)) == 0) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_BAD_INITIATOR_NAME;
+ return GSS_S_BAD_NAME;
+ }
code = krb5_unparse_name(krbContext, cred->name->krbPrincipal, &identity);
if (code != 0) {
eapPeerConfig->password = (unsigned char *)cred->password.value;
eapPeerConfig->password_len = cred->password.length;
+ *minor = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, (char *)eapPeerConfig->identity);
+ *minor = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
+/*
+ * Mark an initiator context as ready for cryptographic operations
+ */
static OM_uint32
-initReady(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx)
+initReady(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, OM_uint32 reqFlags)
{
OM_uint32 major;
const unsigned char *key;
size_t keyLength;
- krb5_enctype encryptionType;
- int gotKey = 0;
+
+#if 1
+ /* XXX actually check for mutual auth */
+ if (reqFlags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG)
+ ctx->gssFlags |= GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG;
+#endif
/* Cache encryption type derived from selected mechanism OID */
- major = gssEapOidToEnctype(minor, ctx->mechanismUsed, &encryptionType);
+ major = gssEapOidToEnctype(minor, ctx->mechanismUsed, &ctx->encryptionType);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
return major;
- if (encryptionType != ENCTYPE_NULL &&
- eap_key_available(ctx->initiatorCtx.eap)) {
- key = eap_get_eapKeyData(ctx->initiatorCtx.eap, &keyLength);
-
- if (keyLength >= EAP_EMSK_LEN) {
- major = gssEapDeriveRfc3961Key(minor,
- &key[EAP_EMSK_LEN / 2],
- EAP_EMSK_LEN / 2,
- encryptionType,
- &ctx->rfc3961Key);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- return major;
-
- major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key,
- &ctx->checksumType);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- return major;
- gotKey++;
- }
+ if (!eap_key_available(ctx->initiatorCtx.eap)) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_KEY_UNAVAILABLE;
+ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
}
- if (gotKey) {
- ctx->encryptionType = encryptionType;
- } else {
- /*
- * draft-howlett-eap-gss says that integrity/confidentialty should
- * always be advertised as available, but if we have no keying
- * material it seems confusing to the caller to advertise this.
- */
- ctx->gssFlags &= ~(GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_CONF_FLAG);
+ key = eap_get_eapKeyData(ctx->initiatorCtx.eap, &keyLength);
+
+ if (keyLength < EAP_EMSK_LEN) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_KEY_TOO_SHORT;
+ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
}
+ major = gssEapDeriveRfc3961Key(minor,
+ &key[EAP_EMSK_LEN / 2],
+ EAP_EMSK_LEN / 2,
+ ctx->encryptionType,
+ &ctx->rfc3961Key);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key,
+ &ctx->checksumType);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
major = sequenceInit(minor,
&ctx->seqState,
ctx->recvSeq,
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
return major;
+ *minor = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
{
OM_uint32 major;
- if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && cred->expiryTime)
+ assert(cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL);
+
+ if (cred->expiryTime)
ctx->expiryTime = cred->expiryTime;
else if (timeReq == 0 || timeReq == GSS_C_INDEFINITE)
ctx->expiryTime = 0;
else
ctx->expiryTime = time(NULL) + timeReq;
- if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
- major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->initiatorName);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- return major;
- }
+ /*
+ * The credential mutex protects its name, however we need to
+ * explicitly lock the acceptor name (unlikely as it may be
+ * that it has attributes set on it).
+ */
+ major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->initiatorName);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&target->mutex);
major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, target, &ctx->acceptorName);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+ GSSEAP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&target->mutex);
return major;
+ }
+
+ GSSEAP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&target->mutex);
- if (mech == GSS_C_NULL_OID || oidEqual(mech, GSS_EAP_MECHANISM)) {
+ if (mech == GSS_C_NULL_OID) {
major = gssEapDefaultMech(minor, &ctx->mechanismUsed);
} else if (gssEapIsConcreteMechanismOid(mech)) {
if (!gssEapInternalizeOid(mech, &ctx->mechanismUsed))
major = duplicateOid(minor, mech, &ctx->mechanismUsed);
} else {
major = GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
+ *minor = GSSEAP_WRONG_MECH;
}
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
return major;
/* If credentials were provided, check they're usable with this mech */
- if (!gssEapCredAvailable(cred, ctx->mechanismUsed))
+ if (!gssEapCredAvailable(cred, ctx->mechanismUsed)) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_CRED_MECH_MISMATCH;
return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
+ }
+ *minor = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
int initialContextToken;
initialContextToken = (inputToken->length == 0);
- if (!initialContextToken)
+ if (!initialContextToken) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_WRONG_SIZE;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
major = initBegin(minor, cred, ctx, target, mech,
reqFlags, timeReq, chanBindings,
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
return major;
- ctx->state = EAP_STATE_AUTHENTICATE;
+ ctx->state = GSSEAP_STATE_AUTHENTICATE;
+ *minor = 0;
return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
}
struct wpabuf *resp = NULL;
int initialContextToken;
+ *minor = 0;
+
initialContextToken = (inputToken == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER ||
inputToken->length == 0);
&eapConfig);
if (ctx->initiatorCtx.eap == NULL) {
major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ *minor = GSSEAP_PEER_SM_INIT_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
}
resp = eap_get_eapRespData(ctx->initiatorCtx.eap);
} else if (ctx->flags & CTX_FLAG_EAP_SUCCESS) {
- major = initReady(minor, ctx);
+ major = initReady(minor, ctx, reqFlags);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
ctx->flags &= ~(CTX_FLAG_EAP_SUCCESS);
major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
- ctx->state = EAP_STATE_EXTENSIONS_REQ;
+ ctx->state = GSSEAP_STATE_EXTENSIONS_REQ;
} else if (ctx->flags & CTX_FLAG_EAP_FAIL) {
major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL;
+ *minor = GSSEAP_PEER_AUTH_FAILURE;
} else if (code == 0 && initialContextToken) {
resp = &emptyWpaBuffer;
major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
} else {
major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ *minor = GSSEAP_PEER_BAD_MESSAGE;
}
cleanup:
}
static OM_uint32
-initGssChannelBindings(OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
- gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
- gss_buffer_t outputToken)
-{
- OM_uint32 major;
- gss_buffer_desc buffer = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-
-
- if (chanBindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS)
- buffer = chanBindings->application_data;
-
- major = gssEapWrap(minor, ctx, TRUE, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT,
- &buffer, NULL, outputToken);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- return major;
-
- return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
-}
-
-static OM_uint32
eapGssSmInitExtensionsReq(OM_uint32 *minor,
gss_cred_id_t cred,
gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
gss_buffer_t inputToken,
gss_buffer_t outputToken)
{
- OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
- gss_buffer_desc cbToken = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ OM_uint32 major;
- major = initGssChannelBindings(minor, ctx, chanBindings, &cbToken);
+ major = gssEapMakeExtensions(minor, cred, ctx, chanBindings, outputToken);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
return major;
- ctx->state = EAP_STATE_EXTENSIONS_RESP;
-
- major = duplicateBuffer(minor, &cbToken, outputToken);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
- gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &cbToken);
- return major;
- }
+ assert(outputToken->value != NULL);
- gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &cbToken);
+ ctx->state = GSSEAP_STATE_EXTENSIONS_RESP;
+ *minor = 0;
return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
}
{
OM_uint32 major;
- major = gssEapStoreReauthCreds(minor, ctx, cred, inputToken);
+ major = gssEapVerifyExtensions(minor, cred, ctx, chanBindings, inputToken);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
return major;
- ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
+ ctx->state = GSSEAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
+ *minor = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
gss_buffer_t outputToken)
{
/* Called with already established context */
- *minor = EINVAL;
+ *minor = GSSEAP_CONTEXT_ESTABLISHED;
return GSS_S_BAD_STATUS;
}
-static int
-canReauthP(gss_cred_id_t cred)
-{
- return (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL &&
- cred->krbCred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL &&
- cred->expiryTime > time(NULL));
-}
-
static OM_uint32
-eapGssSmInitGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_cred_id_t cred,
- gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
- gss_name_t target,
- gss_OID mech,
- OM_uint32 reqFlags,
- OM_uint32 timeReq,
- gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
- gss_buffer_t inputToken,
- gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+eapGssSmInitError(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_name_t target,
+ gss_OID mech,
+ OM_uint32 reqFlags,
+ OM_uint32 timeReq,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+ gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+ gss_buffer_t outputToken)
{
- OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
- gss_name_t mechTarget = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
- gss_OID actualMech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
- OM_uint32 gssFlags, timeRec;
-
- assert(cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL);
-
- ctx->flags |= CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH_GSS;
+ OM_uint32 major;
+ unsigned char *p;
- if (inputToken->length == 0) {
- major = initBegin(minor, cred, ctx, target, mech,
- reqFlags, timeReq, chanBindings,
- inputToken, outputToken);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
+ if (inputToken->length < 8) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_TOK_TRUNC;
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
- major = gssEapMechToGlueName(minor, target, &mechTarget);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
-
- major = gssInitSecContext(minor,
- cred->krbCred,
- &ctx->kerberosCtx,
- mechTarget,
- (gss_OID)gss_mech_krb5,
- reqFlags | GSS_C_DCE_STYLE,
- timeReq,
- chanBindings,
- inputToken,
- &actualMech,
- outputToken,
- &gssFlags,
- &timeRec);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
+ p = (unsigned char *)inputToken->value;
- ctx->gssFlags = gssFlags;
+ major = load_uint32_be(&p[0]);
+ *minor = ERROR_TABLE_BASE_eapg + load_uint32_be(&p[4]);
- if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- major = gssEapReauthComplete(minor, ctx, cred, actualMech, timeRec);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
-
- ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(major) || !IS_WIRE_ERROR(*minor)) {
+ major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ *minor = GSSEAP_BAD_ERROR_TOKEN;
}
-cleanup:
- gssReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &mechTarget);
-
return major;
}
gss_buffer_t,
gss_buffer_t);
} eapGssInitiatorSm[] = {
- { TOK_TYPE_NONE, TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, eapGssSmInitIdentity },
- { TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, eapGssSmInitAuthenticate },
- { TOK_TYPE_NONE, TOK_TYPE_EXT_REQ, eapGssSmInitExtensionsReq },
- { TOK_TYPE_EXT_RESP,TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmInitExtensionsResp },
- { TOK_TYPE_NONE, TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmInitEstablished },
- { TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH, TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH, eapGssSmInitGssReauth },
+ { TOK_TYPE_NONE, TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, eapGssSmInitIdentity },
+ { TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, eapGssSmInitAuthenticate },
+ { TOK_TYPE_NONE, TOK_TYPE_EXT_REQ, eapGssSmInitExtensionsReq },
+ { TOK_TYPE_EXT_RESP, TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmInitExtensionsResp },
+ { TOK_TYPE_NONE, TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmInitEstablished },
+ { TOK_TYPE_CONTEXT_ERR, TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmInitError },
+#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
+ { TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH, TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH, eapGssSmInitGssReauth },
+#endif
};
OM_uint32
gss_buffer_desc innerInputToken;
gss_buffer_desc innerOutputToken = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
enum gss_eap_token_type tokType;
+ int initialContextToken = 0;
*minor = 0;
output_token->length = 0;
output_token->value = NULL;
- if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && !(cred->flags & CRED_FLAG_INITIATE)) {
- return GSS_S_NO_CRED;
- }
-
if (ctx == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
if (input_token != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER && input_token->length != 0) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_WRONG_SIZE;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
ctx->flags |= CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR;
- if (canReauthP(cred))
- ctx->state = EAP_STATE_KRB_REAUTH_GSS;
-
+ initialContextToken = 1;
*context_handle = ctx;
}
GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&ctx->mutex);
+ if (cred == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
+ if (ctx->defaultCred == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
+ major = gssEapAcquireCred(minor,
+ GSS_C_NO_NAME,
+ GSS_C_NO_BUFFER,
+ time_req,
+ GSS_C_NO_OID_SET,
+ GSS_C_INITIATE,
+ &ctx->defaultCred,
+ NULL,
+ NULL);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ cred = ctx->defaultCred;
+ }
+
+ GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&cred->mutex);
+
+#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
+ if (initialContextToken && gssEapCanReauthP(cred, target_name, time_req))
+ ctx->state = GSSEAP_STATE_KRB_REAUTH;
+#endif
+
+ if ((cred->flags & CRED_FLAG_INITIATE) == 0) {
+ major = GSS_S_NO_CRED;
+ *minor = GSSEAP_CRED_USAGE_MISMATCH;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
sm = &eapGssInitiatorSm[ctx->state];
- if (input_token != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER) {
+ if (input_token != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER && input_token->length != 0) {
major = gssEapVerifyToken(minor, ctx, input_token,
&tokType, &innerInputToken);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
- if (tokType != sm->inputTokenType) {
+ if (tokType == TOK_TYPE_CONTEXT_ERR) {
+ ctx->state = GSSEAP_STATE_ERROR;
+ } else if (tokType != sm->inputTokenType) {
major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ *minor = GSSEAP_WRONG_TOK_ID;
goto cleanup;
}
} else {
if (time_rec != NULL)
gssEapContextTime(&tmpMinor, ctx, time_rec);
- assert(ctx->state == EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED || major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+ assert(ctx->state == GSSEAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED || major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
cleanup:
+ if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
+ GSSEAP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&cred->mutex);
GSSEAP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ctx->mutex);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
return major;
}
+
+#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmInitGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_name_t target,
+ gss_OID mech,
+ OM_uint32 reqFlags,
+ OM_uint32 timeReq,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+ gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+ gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+ gss_name_t mechTarget = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+ gss_OID actualMech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
+ OM_uint32 gssFlags, timeRec;
+
+ assert(cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL);
+
+ ctx->flags |= CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH;
+
+ if (inputToken->length == 0) {
+ major = initBegin(minor, cred, ctx, target, mech,
+ reqFlags, timeReq, chanBindings,
+ inputToken, outputToken);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ major = gssEapMechToGlueName(minor, target, &mechTarget);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ major = gssInitSecContext(minor,
+ cred->krbCred,
+ &ctx->kerberosCtx,
+ mechTarget,
+ (gss_OID)gss_mech_krb5,
+ reqFlags, /* | GSS_C_DCE_STYLE, */
+ timeReq,
+ chanBindings,
+ inputToken,
+ &actualMech,
+ outputToken,
+ &gssFlags,
+ &timeRec);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ ctx->gssFlags = gssFlags;
+
+ if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ major = gssEapReauthComplete(minor, ctx, cred, actualMech, timeRec);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+ ctx->state = GSSEAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ gssReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &mechTarget);
+
+ return major;
+}
+#endif /* GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH */