/*
- * Copyright 2001-2007 Internet2
- *
+ * Copyright 2001-2009 Internet2
+ *
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
/**
* QueryAttributeResolver.cpp
- *
+ *
* AttributeResolver based on SAML queries.
*/
#include "attribute/resolver/AttributeResolver.h"
#include "attribute/resolver/ResolutionContext.h"
#include "binding/SOAPClient.h"
+#include "metadata/MetadataProviderCriteria.h"
+#include "security/SecurityPolicy.h"
#include "util/SPConstants.h"
#include <saml/exceptions.h>
-#include <saml/binding/SecurityPolicy.h>
#include <saml/saml1/binding/SAML1SOAPClient.h>
#include <saml/saml1/core/Assertions.h>
#include <saml/saml1/core/Protocols.h>
-#include <saml/saml1/profile/AssertionValidator.h>
#include <saml/saml2/binding/SAML2SOAPClient.h>
#include <saml/saml2/core/Protocols.h>
#include <saml/saml2/metadata/Metadata.h>
+#include <saml/saml2/metadata/MetadataCredentialCriteria.h>
#include <saml/saml2/metadata/MetadataProvider.h>
-#include <saml/saml2/profile/AssertionValidator.h>
#include <xmltooling/util/NDC.h>
#include <xmltooling/util/XMLHelper.h>
#include <xercesc/util/XMLUniDefs.hpp>
m_class = XMLString::transcode(session.getAuthnContextClassRef());
m_decl = XMLString::transcode(session.getAuthnContextDeclRef());
}
-
+
QueryContext(
const Application& application,
const EntityDescriptor* issuer,
const XMLCh* protocol,
- const NameID* nameid,
+ const NameID* nameid=NULL,
const XMLCh* authncontext_class=NULL,
const XMLCh* authncontext_decl=NULL,
- const vector<const opensaml::Assertion*>* tokens=NULL,
- const vector<Attribute*>* attributes=NULL
+ const vector<const opensaml::Assertion*>* tokens=NULL
) : m_query(true), m_app(application), m_session(NULL), m_metadata(NULL), m_entity(issuer),
m_protocol(protocol), m_nameid(nameid), m_class(authncontext_class), m_decl(authncontext_decl) {
}
}
}
-
+
~QueryContext() {
if (m_session) {
XMLString::release((XMLCh**)&m_protocol);
for_each(m_attributes.begin(), m_attributes.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<shibsp::Attribute>());
for_each(m_assertions.begin(), m_assertions.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<opensaml::Assertion>());
}
-
+
bool doQuery() const {
return m_query;
}
if (m_entity)
return m_entity;
if (m_session && m_session->getEntityID()) {
- m_metadata = m_app.getMetadataProvider();
+ m_metadata = m_app.getMetadataProvider(false);
if (m_metadata) {
m_metadata->lock();
- return m_entity = m_metadata->getEntityDescriptor(m_session->getEntityID());
+ return m_entity = m_metadata->getEntityDescriptor(MetadataProviderCriteria(m_app, m_session->getEntityID())).first;
}
}
return NULL;
vector<shibsp::Attribute*> m_attributes;
vector<opensaml::Assertion*> m_assertions;
};
-
+
class SHIBSP_DLLLOCAL QueryResolver : public AttributeResolver
{
public:
Lockable* lock() {return this;}
void unlock() {}
-
+
ResolutionContext* createResolutionContext(
const Application& application,
const EntityDescriptor* issuer,
const XMLCh* protocol,
- const NameID* nameid,
+ const NameID* nameid=NULL,
const XMLCh* authncontext_class=NULL,
const XMLCh* authncontext_decl=NULL,
const vector<const opensaml::Assertion*>* tokens=NULL,
const vector<shibsp::Attribute*>* attributes=NULL
) const {
- return new QueryContext(application,issuer,protocol,nameid,authncontext_class,authncontext_decl,tokens,attributes);
+ return new QueryContext(application,issuer,protocol,nameid,authncontext_class,authncontext_decl,tokens);
}
ResolutionContext* createResolutionContext(const Application& application, const Session& session) const {
bool SAML2Query(QueryContext& ctx) const;
Category& m_log;
+ string m_policyId;
+ bool m_subjectMatch;
vector<AttributeDesignator*> m_SAML1Designators;
vector<saml2::Attribute*> m_SAML2Designators;
};
{
return new QueryResolver(e);
}
-
-};
-void SHIBSP_API shibsp::registerAttributeResolvers()
-{
- SPConfig::getConfig().AttributeResolverManager.registerFactory(QUERY_ATTRIBUTE_RESOLVER, QueryResolverFactory);
-}
+ static const XMLCh policyId[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_8(p,o,l,i,c,y,I,d);
+ static const XMLCh subjectMatch[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_12(s,u,b,j,e,c,t,M,a,t,c,h);
+};
-QueryResolver::QueryResolver(const DOMElement* e) : m_log(Category::getInstance(SHIBSP_LOGCAT".AttributeResolver"))
+QueryResolver::QueryResolver(const DOMElement* e) : m_log(Category::getInstance(SHIBSP_LOGCAT".AttributeResolver.Query")), m_subjectMatch(false)
{
#ifdef _DEBUG
xmltooling::NDC ndc("QueryResolver");
#endif
-
+
+ const XMLCh* pid = e ? e->getAttributeNS(NULL, policyId) : NULL;
+ if (pid && *pid) {
+ auto_ptr_char temp(pid);
+ m_policyId = temp.get();
+ }
+ pid = e ? e->getAttributeNS(NULL, subjectMatch) : NULL;
+ if (pid && (*pid == chLatin_t || *pid == chDigit_1))
+ m_subjectMatch = true;
+
DOMElement* child = XMLHelper::getFirstChildElement(e);
while (child) {
try {
- if (XMLHelper::isNodeNamed(e, samlconstants::SAML20_NS, saml2::Attribute::LOCAL_NAME)) {
+ if (XMLHelper::isNodeNamed(child, samlconstants::SAML20_NS, saml2::Attribute::LOCAL_NAME)) {
auto_ptr<XMLObject> obj(saml2::AttributeBuilder::buildOneFromElement(child));
saml2::Attribute* down = dynamic_cast<saml2::Attribute*>(obj.get());
if (down) {
obj.release();
}
}
- else if (XMLHelper::isNodeNamed(e, samlconstants::SAML1P_NS, AttributeDesignator::LOCAL_NAME)) {
+ else if (XMLHelper::isNodeNamed(child, samlconstants::SAML1_NS, AttributeDesignator::LOCAL_NAME)) {
auto_ptr<XMLObject> obj(AttributeDesignatorBuilder::buildOneFromElement(child));
AttributeDesignator* down = dynamic_cast<AttributeDesignator*>(obj.get());
if (down) {
#endif
int version = XMLString::equals(ctx.getProtocol(), samlconstants::SAML11_PROTOCOL_ENUM) ? 1 : 0;
- const AttributeAuthorityDescriptor* AA = ctx.getEntityDescriptor()->getAttributeAuthorityDescriptor(ctx.getProtocol());
+ const AttributeAuthorityDescriptor* AA =
+ find_if(ctx.getEntityDescriptor()->getAttributeAuthorityDescriptors(), isValidForProtocol(ctx.getProtocol()));
if (!AA) {
m_log.warn("no SAML 1.%d AttributeAuthority role found in metadata", version);
return false;
}
const Application& application = ctx.getApplication();
- shibsp::SecurityPolicy policy(application);
+ const PropertySet* relyingParty = application.getRelyingParty(ctx.getEntityDescriptor());
+
+ // Locate policy key.
+ const char* policyId = m_policyId.empty() ? application.getString("policyId").second : m_policyId.c_str();
+
+ // Access policy properties.
+ const PropertySet* settings = application.getServiceProvider().getPolicySettings(policyId);
+ pair<bool,bool> validate = settings->getBool("validate");
+
+ shibsp::SecurityPolicy policy(application, NULL, validate.first && validate.second, policyId);
+ policy.getAudiences().push_back(relyingParty->getXMLString("entityID").second);
MetadataCredentialCriteria mcc(*AA);
shibsp::SOAPClient soaper(policy);
- const PropertySet* policySettings =
- application.getServiceProvider().getPolicySettings(application.getString("policyId").second);
- pair<bool,bool> signedAssertions = policySettings->getBool("signedAssertions");
auto_ptr_XMLCh binding(samlconstants::SAML1_BINDING_SOAP);
saml1p::Response* response=NULL;
const vector<AttributeService*>& endpoints=AA->getAttributeServices();
for (vector<AttributeService*>::const_iterator ep=endpoints.begin(); !response && ep!=endpoints.end(); ++ep) {
+ if (!XMLString::equals((*ep)->getBinding(),binding.get()) || !(*ep)->getLocation())
+ continue;
+ auto_ptr_char loc((*ep)->getLocation());
try {
- if (!XMLString::equals((*ep)->getBinding(),binding.get()))
- continue;
- auto_ptr_char loc((*ep)->getLocation());
- auto_ptr_XMLCh issuer(application.getString("entityID").second);
NameIdentifier* nameid = NameIdentifierBuilder::buildNameIdentifier();
nameid->setName(ctx.getNameID()->getName());
nameid->setFormat(ctx.getNameID()->getFormat());
subject->setNameIdentifier(nameid);
saml1p::AttributeQuery* query = saml1p::AttributeQueryBuilder::buildAttributeQuery();
query->setSubject(subject);
- query->setResource(issuer.get());
+ query->setResource(relyingParty->getXMLString("entityID").second);
for (vector<AttributeDesignator*>::const_iterator ad = m_SAML1Designators.begin(); ad!=m_SAML1Designators.end(); ++ad)
query->getAttributeDesignators().push_back((*ad)->cloneAttributeDesignator());
Request* request = RequestBuilder::buildRequest();
response = client.receiveSAML();
}
catch (exception& ex) {
- m_log.error("exception making SAML query: %s", ex.what());
+ m_log.error("exception during SAML query to %s: %s", loc.get(), ex.what());
soaper.reset();
}
}
auto_ptr<saml1p::Response> wrapper(response);
saml1::Assertion* newtoken = assertions.front();
+ pair<bool,bool> signedAssertions = relyingParty->getBool("requireSignedAssertions");
if (!newtoken->getSignature() && signedAssertions.first && signedAssertions.second) {
m_log.error("assertion unsigned, rejecting it based on signedAssertions policy");
return true;
}
try {
+ // We're going to insist that the assertion issuer is the same as the peer.
+ // Reset the policy's message bits and extract them from the assertion.
+ policy.reset(true);
+ policy.setMessageID(newtoken->getAssertionID());
+ policy.setIssueInstant(newtoken->getIssueInstantEpoch());
+ policy.setIssuer(newtoken->getIssuer());
policy.evaluate(*newtoken);
- if (!policy.isSecure())
+
+ // Now we can check the security status of the policy.
+ if (!policy.isAuthenticated())
throw SecurityPolicyException("Security of SAML 1.x query result not established.");
- saml1::AssertionValidator tokval(application.getAudiences(), time(NULL));
- tokval.validateAssertion(*newtoken);
}
catch (exception& ex) {
- m_log.error("assertion failed policy/validation: %s", ex.what());
+ m_log.error("assertion failed policy validation: %s", ex.what());
return true;
}
newtoken->detach();
- wrapper.release();
+ wrapper.release(); // detach blows away the Response
ctx.getResolvedAssertions().push_back(newtoken);
// Finally, extract and filter the result.
AttributeExtractor* extractor = application.getAttributeExtractor();
if (extractor) {
Locker extlocker(extractor);
- extractor->extractAttributes(application, AA, *newtoken, ctx.getResolvedAttributes());
+ const vector<saml1::AttributeStatement*>& statements = const_cast<const saml1::Assertion*>(newtoken)->getAttributeStatements();
+ for (vector<saml1::AttributeStatement*>::const_iterator s = statements.begin(); s!=statements.end(); ++s) {
+ if (m_subjectMatch) {
+ // Check for subject match.
+ const NameIdentifier* respName = (*s)->getSubject() ? (*s)->getSubject()->getNameIdentifier() : NULL;
+ if (!respName || !XMLString::equals(respName->getName(), ctx.getNameID()->getName()) ||
+ !XMLString::equals(respName->getFormat(), ctx.getNameID()->getFormat()) ||
+ !XMLString::equals(respName->getNameQualifier(), ctx.getNameID()->getNameQualifier())) {
+ if (respName)
+ m_log.warnStream() << "ignoring AttributeStatement without strongly matching NameIdentifier in Subject: " <<
+ *respName << logging::eol;
+ else
+ m_log.warn("ignoring AttributeStatement without NameIdentifier in Subject");
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ extractor->extractAttributes(application, AA, *(*s), ctx.getResolvedAttributes());
+ }
}
AttributeFilter* filter = application.getAttributeFilter();
xmltooling::NDC ndc("query");
#endif
- const AttributeAuthorityDescriptor* AA = ctx.getEntityDescriptor()->getAttributeAuthorityDescriptor(samlconstants::SAML20P_NS);
+ const AttributeAuthorityDescriptor* AA =
+ find_if(ctx.getEntityDescriptor()->getAttributeAuthorityDescriptors(), isValidForProtocol(samlconstants::SAML20P_NS));
if (!AA) {
m_log.warn("no SAML 2 AttributeAuthority role found in metadata");
return false;
}
const Application& application = ctx.getApplication();
- shibsp::SecurityPolicy policy(application);
- MetadataCredentialCriteria mcc(*AA);
- shibsp::SOAPClient soaper(policy);
- const PropertySet* policySettings = application.getServiceProvider().getPolicySettings(application.getString("policyId").second);
- pair<bool,bool> signedAssertions = policySettings->getBool("signedAssertions");
-
const PropertySet* relyingParty = application.getRelyingParty(ctx.getEntityDescriptor());
+
+ // Locate policy key.
+ const char* policyId = m_policyId.empty() ? application.getString("policyId").second : m_policyId.c_str();
+
+ // Access policy properties.
+ const PropertySet* settings = application.getServiceProvider().getPolicySettings(policyId);
+ pair<bool,bool> validate = settings->getBool("validate");
+
+ pair<bool,bool> signedAssertions = relyingParty->getBool("requireSignedAssertions");
pair<bool,const char*> encryption = relyingParty->getString("encryption");
+ shibsp::SecurityPolicy policy(application, NULL, validate.first && validate.second, policyId);
+ policy.getAudiences().push_back(relyingParty->getXMLString("entityID").second);
+ MetadataCredentialCriteria mcc(*AA);
+ shibsp::SOAPClient soaper(policy);
+
auto_ptr_XMLCh binding(samlconstants::SAML20_BINDING_SOAP);
saml2p::StatusResponseType* srt=NULL;
const vector<AttributeService*>& endpoints=AA->getAttributeServices();
for (vector<AttributeService*>::const_iterator ep=endpoints.begin(); !srt && ep!=endpoints.end(); ++ep) {
+ if (!XMLString::equals((*ep)->getBinding(),binding.get()) || !(*ep)->getLocation())
+ continue;
+ auto_ptr_char loc((*ep)->getLocation());
try {
- if (!XMLString::equals((*ep)->getBinding(),binding.get()))
- continue;
- auto_ptr_char loc((*ep)->getLocation());
- auto_ptr_XMLCh issuer(application.getString("entityID").second);
-
auto_ptr<saml2::Subject> subject(saml2::SubjectBuilder::buildSubject());
// Encrypt the NameID?
if (encryption.first && (!strcmp(encryption.second, "true") || !strcmp(encryption.second, "back"))) {
auto_ptr<EncryptedID> encrypted(EncryptedIDBuilder::buildEncryptedID());
- MetadataCredentialCriteria mcc(*AA);
encrypted->encrypt(
*ctx.getNameID(),
*(application.getMetadataProvider()),
saml2p::AttributeQuery* query = saml2p::AttributeQueryBuilder::buildAttributeQuery();
query->setSubject(subject.release());
Issuer* iss = IssuerBuilder::buildIssuer();
- iss->setName(issuer.get());
+ iss->setName(relyingParty->getXMLString("entityID").second);
query->setIssuer(iss);
for (vector<saml2::Attribute*>::const_iterator ad = m_SAML2Designators.begin(); ad!=m_SAML2Designators.end(); ++ad)
query->getAttributes().push_back((*ad)->cloneAttribute());
srt = client.receiveSAML();
}
catch (exception& ex) {
- m_log.error("exception making SAML query: %s", ex.what());
+ m_log.error("exception during SAML query to %s: %s", loc.get(), ex.what());
soaper.reset();
}
}
m_log.error("unable to obtain a SAML response from attribute authority");
return false;
}
+
+ auto_ptr<saml2p::StatusResponseType> wrapper(srt);
+
saml2p::Response* response = dynamic_cast<saml2p::Response*>(srt);
if (!response) {
- delete srt;
m_log.error("message was not a samlp:Response");
return true;
}
else if (!response->getStatus() || !response->getStatus()->getStatusCode() ||
!XMLString::equals(response->getStatus()->getStatusCode()->getValue(), saml2p::StatusCode::SUCCESS)) {
- delete srt;
m_log.error("attribute authority returned a SAML error");
return true;
}
+ saml2::Assertion* newtoken = NULL;
const vector<saml2::Assertion*>& assertions = const_cast<const saml2p::Response*>(response)->getAssertions();
if (assertions.empty()) {
- delete srt;
- m_log.warn("response from attribute authority was empty");
- return true;
- }
- else if (assertions.size()>1)
- m_log.warn("simple resolver only supports one assertion in the query response");
+ // Check for encryption.
+ const vector<saml2::EncryptedAssertion*>& encassertions = const_cast<const saml2p::Response*>(response)->getEncryptedAssertions();
+ if (encassertions.empty()) {
+ m_log.warn("response from attribute authority was empty");
+ return true;
+ }
+ else if (encassertions.size() > 1) {
+ m_log.warn("simple resolver only supports one assertion in the query response");
+ }
- auto_ptr<saml2p::StatusResponseType> wrapper(srt);
- saml2::Assertion* newtoken = assertions.front();
+ CredentialResolver* cr=application.getCredentialResolver();
+ if (!cr) {
+ m_log.warn("found encrypted assertion, but no CredentialResolver was available");
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ // Attempt to decrypt it.
+ try {
+ Locker credlocker(cr);
+ auto_ptr<XMLObject> tokenwrapper(encassertions.front()->decrypt(*cr, relyingParty->getXMLString("entityID").second, &mcc));
+ newtoken = dynamic_cast<saml2::Assertion*>(tokenwrapper.get());
+ if (newtoken) {
+ tokenwrapper.release();
+ if (m_log.isDebugEnabled())
+ m_log.debugStream() << "decrypted Assertion: " << *newtoken << logging::eol;
+ }
+ }
+ catch (exception& ex) {
+ m_log.error(ex.what());
+ }
+ if (newtoken) {
+ // Free the Response now, so we know this is a stand-alone token later.
+ delete wrapper.release();
+ }
+ else {
+ // Nothing decrypted, should already be logged.
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ if (assertions.size() > 1)
+ m_log.warn("simple resolver only supports one assertion in the query response");
+ newtoken = assertions.front();
+ }
if (!newtoken->getSignature() && signedAssertions.first && signedAssertions.second) {
m_log.error("assertion unsigned, rejecting it based on signedAssertions policy");
+ if (!wrapper.get())
+ delete newtoken;
return true;
}
try {
+ // We're going to insist that the assertion issuer is the same as the peer.
+ // Reset the policy's message bits and extract them from the assertion.
+ policy.reset(true);
+ policy.setMessageID(newtoken->getID());
+ policy.setIssueInstant(newtoken->getIssueInstantEpoch());
+ policy.setIssuer(newtoken->getIssuer());
policy.evaluate(*newtoken);
- if (!policy.isSecure())
+
+ // Now we can check the security status of the policy.
+ if (!policy.isAuthenticated())
throw SecurityPolicyException("Security of SAML 2.0 query result not established.");
- saml2::AssertionValidator tokval(application.getAudiences(), time(NULL));
- tokval.validateAssertion(*newtoken);
+
+ if (m_subjectMatch) {
+ // Check for subject match.
+ bool ownedName = false;
+ NameID* respName = newtoken->getSubject() ? newtoken->getSubject()->getNameID() : NULL;
+ if (!respName) {
+ // Check for encryption.
+ EncryptedID* encname = newtoken->getSubject() ? newtoken->getSubject()->getEncryptedID() : NULL;
+ if (encname) {
+ CredentialResolver* cr=application.getCredentialResolver();
+ if (!cr)
+ m_log.warn("found EncryptedID, but no CredentialResolver was available");
+ else {
+ Locker credlocker(cr);
+ auto_ptr<XMLObject> decryptedID(encname->decrypt(*cr, relyingParty->getXMLString("entityID").second, &mcc));
+ respName = dynamic_cast<NameID*>(decryptedID.get());
+ if (respName) {
+ ownedName = true;
+ decryptedID.release();
+ if (m_log.isDebugEnabled())
+ m_log.debugStream() << "decrypted NameID: " << *respName << logging::eol;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ auto_ptr<NameID> nameIDwrapper(ownedName ? respName : NULL);
+
+ if (!respName || !XMLString::equals(respName->getName(), ctx.getNameID()->getName()) ||
+ !XMLString::equals(respName->getFormat(), ctx.getNameID()->getFormat()) ||
+ !XMLString::equals(respName->getNameQualifier(), ctx.getNameID()->getNameQualifier()) ||
+ !XMLString::equals(respName->getSPNameQualifier(), ctx.getNameID()->getSPNameQualifier())) {
+ if (respName)
+ m_log.warnStream() << "ignoring Assertion without strongly matching NameID in Subject: " <<
+ *respName << logging::eol;
+ else
+ m_log.warn("ignoring Assertion without NameID in Subject");
+ if (!wrapper.get())
+ delete newtoken;
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
}
catch (exception& ex) {
- m_log.error("assertion failed policy/validation: %s", ex.what());
+ m_log.error("assertion failed policy validation: %s", ex.what());
+ if (!wrapper.get())
+ delete newtoken;
return true;
}
- newtoken->detach();
- wrapper.release();
+ if (wrapper.get()) {
+ newtoken->detach();
+ wrapper.release(); // detach blows away the Response
+ }
ctx.getResolvedAssertions().push_back(newtoken);
// Finally, extract and filter the result.
m_log.debug("attempting SAML 1.x attribute query");
SAML1Query(qctx);
}
- else
- m_log.warn("SSO protocol does not allow for attribute query");
+ else {
+ m_log.info("SSO protocol does not allow for attribute query");
+ }
}
- else
+ else {
m_log.warn("can't attempt attribute query, either no NameID or no metadata to use");
+ }
}