*
* Copyright 2001 hereUare Communications, Inc. <raghud@hereuare.com>
* Copyright 2003 Alan DeKok <aland@freeradius.org>
+ * Copyright 2006 The FreeRADIUS server project
+ *
*/
+#include <freeradius-devel/ident.h>
+RCSID("$Id$")
+
#include <freeradius-devel/autoconf.h>
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_RAND_H
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_H
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#endif
+
#include "rlm_eap_tls.h"
+#include "config.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+
+static CONF_PARSER cache_config[] = {
+ { "enable", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
+ offsetof(EAP_TLS_CONF, session_cache_enable), NULL, "no" },
+ { "lifetime", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ offsetof(EAP_TLS_CONF, session_timeout), NULL, "24" },
+ { "max_entries", PW_TYPE_INTEGER,
+ offsetof(EAP_TLS_CONF, session_cache_size), NULL, "255" },
+ { "name", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
+ offsetof(EAP_TLS_CONF, session_id_name), NULL, NULL},
+ { NULL, -1, 0, NULL, NULL } /* end the list */
+};
+
+static CONF_PARSER verify_config[] = {
+ { "tmpdir", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
+ offsetof(EAP_TLS_CONF, verify_tmp_dir), NULL, NULL},
+ { "client", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
+ offsetof(EAP_TLS_CONF, verify_client_cert_cmd), NULL, NULL},
+ { NULL, -1, 0, NULL, NULL } /* end the list */
+};
static CONF_PARSER module_config[] = {
{ "rsa_key_exchange", PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN,
offsetof(EAP_TLS_CONF, cipher_list), NULL, NULL},
{ "check_cert_issuer", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
offsetof(EAP_TLS_CONF, check_cert_issuer), NULL, NULL},
+ { "make_cert_command", PW_TYPE_STRING_PTR,
+ offsetof(EAP_TLS_CONF, make_cert_command), NULL, NULL},
+
+ { "cache", PW_TYPE_SUBSECTION, 0, NULL, (const void *) cache_config },
+
+ { "verify", PW_TYPE_SUBSECTION, 0, NULL, (const void *) verify_config },
{ NULL, -1, 0, NULL, NULL } /* end the list */
};
dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
BIO_free(bio);
+ if (!dh) {
+ DEBUG2("WARNING: rlm_eap_tls: Unable to set DH parameters. DH cipher suites may not work!");
+ DEBUG2("WARNING: Fix this by running the OpenSSL command listed in eap.conf");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh) < 0) {
radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Unable to set DH parameters");
DH_free(dh);
return 0;
}
+
/*
- * Generte ephemeral RSA keys.
+ * Generate ephemeral RSA keys.
*/
static int generate_eph_rsa_key(SSL_CTX *ctx)
{
rsa = RSA_generate_key(512, RSA_F4, NULL, NULL);
if (!SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(ctx, rsa)) {
- radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Couldn't set RSA key");
+ radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Couldn't set ephemeral RSA key");
return -1;
}
/*
+ * These functions don't do anything other than print debugging
+ * messages.
+ *
+ * FIXME: Write sessions to some long-term storage, so that
+ * session resumption can still occur after the server
+ * restarts.
+ */
+#define MAX_SESSION_SIZE (256)
+
+static void cbtls_remove_session(UNUSED SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess)
+{
+ size_t size;
+ char buffer[2 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1];
+
+ size = sess->session_id_length;
+ if (size > MAX_SESSION_SIZE) size = MAX_SESSION_SIZE;
+
+ fr_bin2hex(sess->session_id, buffer, size);
+
+ DEBUG2(" SSL: Removing session %s from the cache", buffer);
+ SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
+
+ return;
+}
+
+static int cbtls_new_session(UNUSED SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *sess)
+{
+ size_t size;
+ char buffer[2 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1];
+
+ size = sess->session_id_length;
+ if (size > MAX_SESSION_SIZE) size = MAX_SESSION_SIZE;
+
+ fr_bin2hex(sess->session_id, buffer, size);
+
+ DEBUG2(" SSL: adding session %s to cache", buffer);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static SSL_SESSION *cbtls_get_session(UNUSED SSL *s,
+ unsigned char *data, int len,
+ UNUSED int *copy)
+{
+ size_t size;
+ char buffer[2 * MAX_SESSION_SIZE + 1];
+
+ size = len;
+ if (size > MAX_SESSION_SIZE) size = MAX_SESSION_SIZE;
+
+ fr_bin2hex(data, buffer, size);
+
+ DEBUG2(" SSL: Client requested nonexistent cached session %s",
+ buffer);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For creating certificate attributes.
+ */
+static const char *cert_attr_names[5][2] = {
+ { "TLS-Client-Cert-Serial", "TLS-Cert-Serial" },
+ { "TLS-Client-Cert-Expiration", "TLS-Cert-Expiration" },
+ { "TLS-Client-Cert-Subject", "TLS-Cert-Subject" },
+ { "TLS-Client-Cert-Issuer", "TLS-Cert-Issuer" },
+ { "TLS-Client-Cert-Common-Name", "TLS-Cert-Common-Name" }
+};
+
+#define EAPTLS_SERIAL (0)
+#define EAPTLS_EXPIRATION (1)
+#define EAPTLS_SUBJECT (2)
+#define EAPTLS_ISSUER (3)
+#define EAPTLS_CN (4)
+
+/*
* Before trusting a certificate, you must make sure that the
* certificate is 'valid'. There are several steps that your
* application can take in determining if a certificate is
char issuer[1024]; /* Used for the issuer name */
char common_name[1024];
char cn_str[1024];
+ char buf[64];
EAP_HANDLER *handler = NULL;
X509 *client_cert;
SSL *ssl;
- int err, depth;
+ int err, depth, lookup;
EAP_TLS_CONF *conf;
int my_ok = ok;
+ REQUEST *request;
+ ASN1_INTEGER *sn = NULL;
+ ASN1_TIME *asn_time = NULL;
client_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
- if (!my_ok) {
- radlog(L_ERR,"--> verify error:num=%d:%s\n",err,
- X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
- return my_ok;
- }
+ lookup = depth;
+
+ /*
+ * Log client/issuing cert. If there's an error, log
+ * issuing cert.
+ */
+ if ((lookup > 1) && !my_ok) lookup = 1;
/*
* Retrieve the pointer to the SSL of the connection currently treated
*/
ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
handler = (EAP_HANDLER *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, 0);
+ request = handler->request;
conf = (EAP_TLS_CONF *)SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, 1);
/*
+ * Get the Serial Number
+ */
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+ sn = X509_get_serialNumber(client_cert);
+
+ /*
+ * For this next bit, we create the attributes *only* if
+ * we're at the client or issuing certificate.
+ */
+ if ((lookup <= 1) && sn && (sn->length < (sizeof(buf) / 2))) {
+ char *p = buf;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sn->length; i++) {
+ sprintf(p, "%02x", (unsigned int)sn->data[i]);
+ p += 2;
+ }
+ pairadd(&handler->certs,
+ pairmake(cert_attr_names[EAPTLS_SERIAL][lookup], buf, T_OP_SET));
+ }
+
+
+ /*
+ * Get the Expiration Date
+ */
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+ asn_time = X509_get_notAfter(client_cert);
+ if ((lookup <= 1) && asn_time && (asn_time->length < MAX_STRING_LEN)) {
+ memcpy(buf, (char*) asn_time->data, asn_time->length);
+ buf[asn_time->length] = '\0';
+ pairadd(&handler->certs,
+ pairmake(cert_attr_names[EAPTLS_EXPIRATION][lookup], buf, T_OP_SET));
+ }
+
+ /*
* Get the Subject & Issuer
*/
subject[0] = issuer[0] = '\0';
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(client_cert), subject,
sizeof(subject));
+ subject[sizeof(subject) - 1] = '\0';
+ if ((lookup <= 1) && subject[0] && (strlen(subject) < MAX_STRING_LEN)) {
+ pairadd(&handler->certs,
+ pairmake(cert_attr_names[EAPTLS_SUBJECT][lookup], subject, T_OP_SET));
+ }
+
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert), issuer,
sizeof(issuer));
-
- subject[sizeof(subject) - 1] = '\0';
issuer[sizeof(issuer) - 1] = '\0';
+ if ((lookup <= 1) && issuer[0] && (strlen(issuer) < MAX_STRING_LEN)) {
+ pairadd(&handler->certs,
+ pairmake(cert_attr_names[EAPTLS_ISSUER][lookup], issuer, T_OP_SET));
+ }
/*
* Get the Common Name
X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(client_cert),
NID_commonName, common_name, sizeof(common_name));
common_name[sizeof(common_name) - 1] = '\0';
+ if ((lookup <= 1) && common_name[0] && (strlen(common_name) < MAX_STRING_LEN)) {
+ pairadd(&handler->certs,
+ pairmake(cert_attr_names[EAPTLS_CN][lookup], common_name, T_OP_SET));
+ }
+
+ if (!my_ok) {
+ const char *p = X509_verify_cert_error_string(err);
+ radlog(L_ERR,"--> verify error:num=%d:%s\n",err, p);
+ radius_pairmake(request, &request->packet->vps,
+ "Module-Failure-Message", p, T_OP_SET);
+ return my_ok;
+ }
switch (ctx->error) {
* against the specified value and fail
* verification if they don't match.
*/
- if (conf->check_cert_issuer &&
+ if (conf->check_cert_issuer &&
(strcmp(issuer, conf->check_cert_issuer) != 0)) {
radlog(L_AUTH, "rlm_eap_tls: Certificate issuer (%s) does not match specified value (%s)!", issuer, conf->check_cert_issuer);
my_ok = 0;
/* if this fails, fail the verification */
my_ok = 0;
} else {
- DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_tls: checking certificate CN (%s) with xlat'ed value (%s)", common_name, cn_str);
+ RDEBUG2("checking certificate CN (%s) with xlat'ed value (%s)", common_name, cn_str);
if (strcmp(cn_str, common_name) != 0) {
radlog(L_AUTH, "rlm_eap_tls: Certificate CN (%s) does not match specified value (%s)!", common_name, cn_str);
my_ok = 0;
}
}
} /* check_cert_cn */
+
+ while (conf->verify_client_cert_cmd) {
+ char filename[256];
+ FILE *fp;
+
+ snprintf(filename, sizeof(filename), "%s/%s.client.XXXXXXXX",
+ conf->verify_tmp_dir, progname);
+ if (mkstemp(filename) < 0) {
+ RDEBUG("Failed creating file in %s: %s",
+ conf->verify_tmp_dir, strerror(errno));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ fp = fopen(filename, "w");
+ if (!fp) {
+ RDEBUG("Failed opening file %s: %s",
+ filename, strerror(errno));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!PEM_write_X509(fp, client_cert)) {
+ fclose(fp);
+ RDEBUG("Failed writing certificate to file");
+ goto do_unlink;
+ }
+ fclose(fp);
+
+ if (!radius_pairmake(request, &request->packet->vps,
+ "TLS-Client-Cert-Filename",
+ filename, T_OP_SET)) {
+ RDEBUG("Failed creating TLS-Client-Cert-Filename");
+
+ goto do_unlink;
+ }
+
+ RDEBUG("Verifying client certificate: %s",
+ conf->verify_client_cert_cmd);
+ if (radius_exec_program(conf->verify_client_cert_cmd,
+ request, 1, NULL, 0,
+ request->packet->vps,
+ NULL, 1) != 0) {
+ radlog(L_AUTH, "rlm_eap_tls: Certificate CN (%s) fails external verification!", common_name);
+ my_ok = 0;
+ } else {
+ RDEBUG("Client certificate CN %s passed external validation", common_name);
+ }
+
+ do_unlink:
+ unlink(filename);
+ break;
+ }
+
+
} /* depth == 0 */
if (debug_flag > 0) {
- radlog(L_INFO, "chain-depth=%d, ", depth);
- radlog(L_INFO, "error=%d", err);
-
- radlog(L_INFO, "--> User-Name = %s", handler->identity);
- radlog(L_INFO, "--> BUF-Name = %s", common_name);
- radlog(L_INFO, "--> subject = %s", subject);
- radlog(L_INFO, "--> issuer = %s", issuer);
- radlog(L_INFO, "--> verify return:%d", my_ok);
+ RDEBUG2("chain-depth=%d, ", depth);
+ RDEBUG2("error=%d", err);
+
+ RDEBUG2("--> User-Name = %s", handler->identity);
+ RDEBUG2("--> BUF-Name = %s", common_name);
+ RDEBUG2("--> subject = %s", subject);
+ RDEBUG2("--> issuer = %s", issuer);
+ RDEBUG2("--> verify return:%d", my_ok);
}
return my_ok;
}
/*
+ * Free cached session data, which is always a list of VALUE_PAIRs
+ */
+static void eaptls_session_free(UNUSED void *parent, void *data_ptr,
+ UNUSED CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, UNUSED int idx,
+ UNUSED long argl, UNUSED void *argp)
+{
+ VALUE_PAIR *vp = data_ptr;
+ if (!data_ptr) return;
+
+ pairfree(&vp);
+}
+
+
+/*
* Create Global context SSL and use it in every new session
*
* - Load the trusted CAs
SSL_library_init();
SSL_load_error_strings();
+ /*
+ * SHA256 is in all versions of OpenSSL, but isn't
+ * initialized by default. It's needed for WiMAX
+ * certificates.
+ */
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_SHA256
+ EVP_add_digest(EVP_sha256());
+#endif
+
meth = TLSv1_method();
ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth);
* Set the password to load private key
*/
if (conf->private_key_password) {
+#ifdef __APPLE__
+ /*
+ * We don't want to put the private key password in eap.conf, so check
+ * for our special string which indicates we should get the password
+ * programmatically.
+ */
+ const char* special_string = "Apple:UseCertAdmin";
+ if (strncmp(conf->private_key_password,
+ special_string,
+ strlen(special_string)) == 0)
+ {
+ char cmd[256];
+ const long max_password_len = 128;
+ snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd) - 1,
+ "/usr/sbin/certadmin --get-private-key-passphrase \"%s\"",
+ conf->private_key_file);
+
+ DEBUG2("rlm_eap: Getting private key passphrase using command \"%s\"", cmd);
+
+ FILE* cmd_pipe = popen(cmd, "r");
+ if (!cmd_pipe) {
+ radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: %s command failed. Unable to get private_key_password", cmd);
+ radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: Error reading private_key_file %s", conf->private_key_file);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ free(conf->private_key_password);
+ conf->private_key_password = malloc(max_password_len * sizeof(char));
+ if (!conf->private_key_password) {
+ radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: Can't malloc space for private_key_password");
+ radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: Error reading private_key_file %s", conf->private_key_file);
+ pclose(cmd_pipe);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ fgets(conf->private_key_password, max_password_len, cmd_pipe);
+ pclose(cmd_pipe);
+
+ /* Get rid of newline at end of password. */
+ conf->private_key_password[strlen(conf->private_key_password) - 1] = '\0';
+ DEBUG2("rlm_eap: Password from command = \"%s\"", conf->private_key_password);
+ }
+#endif
SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ctx, conf->private_key_password);
SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ctx, cbtls_password);
}
* openSSL.org
*/
if (type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
- radlog(L_INFO, "rlm_eap_tls: Loading the certificate file as a chain");
if (!(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, conf->certificate_file))) {
radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: SSL error %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
- radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Error reading certificate file");
+ radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Error reading certificate file %s", conf->certificate_file);
return NULL;
}
} else if (!(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, conf->certificate_file, type))) {
radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: SSL error %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
- radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Error reading certificate file");
+ radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Error reading certificate file %s", conf->certificate_file);
return NULL;
}
/* Load the CAs we trust */
- if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, conf->ca_file, conf->ca_path)) {
- radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: SSL error %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
- radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Error reading Trusted root CA list");
- return NULL;
+ if (conf->ca_file || conf->ca_path) {
+ if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, conf->ca_file, conf->ca_path)) {
+ radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: SSL error %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+ radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Error reading Trusted root CA list %s",conf->ca_file );
+ return NULL;
+ }
}
- SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(conf->ca_file));
+ if (conf->ca_file && *conf->ca_file) SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(conf->ca_file));
if (!(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, conf->private_key_file, type))) {
radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap: SSL error %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
- radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Error reading private key file");
+ radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Error reading private key file %s", conf->private_key_file);
return NULL;
}
*/
ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET ;
+#endif
/*
* SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used in order to prevent
* large.
*/
ctx_options |= SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE;
+
+ /*
+ * SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS to work around issues
+ * in Windows Vista client.
+ * http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt
+ * http://www.nabble.com/(RADIATOR)-Radiator-Version-3.16-released-t2600070.html
+ */
+ ctx_options |= SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS;
+
SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, ctx_options);
/*
SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, cbtls_info);
/*
+ * Callbacks, etc. for session resumption.
+ */
+ if (conf->session_cache_enable) {
+ SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(ctx, cbtls_new_session);
+ SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(ctx, cbtls_get_session);
+ SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(ctx, cbtls_remove_session);
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(ctx, 1);
+ }
+
+ /*
* Check the certificates for revocation.
*/
#ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
}
}
+ /*
+ * Setup session caching
+ */
+ if (conf->session_cache_enable) {
+ /*
+ * Create a unique context Id per EAP-TLS configuration.
+ */
+ if (conf->session_id_name) {
+ snprintf(conf->session_context_id,
+ sizeof(conf->session_context_id),
+ "FreeRADIUS EAP-TLS %s",
+ conf->session_id_name);
+ } else {
+ snprintf(conf->session_context_id,
+ sizeof(conf->session_context_id),
+ "FreeRADIUS EAP-TLS %p", conf);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Cache it, and DON'T auto-clear it.
+ */
+ SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR);
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx,
+ (unsigned char *) conf->session_context_id,
+ (unsigned int) strlen(conf->session_context_id));
+
+ /*
+ * Our timeout is in hours, this is in seconds.
+ */
+ SSL_CTX_set_timeout(ctx, conf->session_timeout * 3600);
+
+ /*
+ * Set the maximum number of entries in the
+ * session cache.
+ */
+ SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx, conf->session_cache_size);
+
+ } else {
+ SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Register the application indices. We can't use
+ * hard-coded "0" and "1" as before, because we need to
+ * set up a "free" handler for the cached session
+ * information.
+ */
+ if (eaptls_handle_idx < 0) {
+ eaptls_handle_idx = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, &eaptls_handle_idx,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+
+ if (eaptls_conf_idx < 0) {
+ eaptls_conf_idx = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, &eaptls_conf_idx,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ }
+
+ if (eaptls_session_idx < 0) {
+ eaptls_session_idx = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, &eaptls_session_idx,
+ NULL, NULL,
+ eaptls_session_free);
+ }
+
return ctx;
}
conf = inst->conf;
if (conf) {
- free(conf->dh_file);
- free(conf->ca_path);
- free(conf->certificate_file);
- free(conf->private_key_file);
- free(conf->private_key_password);
- free(conf->ca_file);
- free(conf->random_file);
-
- free(conf->check_cert_cn);
- free(conf->check_cert_cn);
- free(conf->cipher_list);
- free(conf->check_cert_issuer);
-
memset(conf, 0, sizeof(*conf));
free(inst->conf);
inst->conf = NULL;
*/
conf = (EAP_TLS_CONF *)malloc(sizeof(*conf));
if (conf == NULL) {
+ free(inst);
radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: out of memory");
return -1;
}
return -1;
}
+ /*
+ * The EAP RFC's say 1020, but we're less picky.
+ */
+ if (conf->fragment_size < 100) {
+ radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Fragment size is too small.");
+ eaptls_detach(inst);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The maximum size for a RADIUS packet is 4096,
+ * minus the header (20), Message-Authenticator (18),
+ * and State (18), etc. results in about 4000 bytes of data
+ * that can be devoted *solely* to EAP.
+ */
+ if (conf->fragment_size > 4000) {
+ radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Fragment size is too large.");
+ eaptls_detach(inst);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Account for the EAP header (4), and the EAP-TLS header
+ * (6), as per Section 4.2 of RFC 2716. What's left is
+ * the maximum amount of data we read from a TLS buffer.
+ */
+ conf->fragment_size -= 10;
+
+ /*
+ * This magic makes the administrators life HUGELY easier
+ * on initial deployments.
+ *
+ * If the server starts up in debugging mode, AND the
+ * bootstrap command is configured, AND it exists, AND
+ * there is no server certificate
+ */
+ if (conf->make_cert_command && (debug_flag >= 2)) {
+ struct stat buf;
+
+ if ((stat(conf->make_cert_command, &buf) == 0) &&
+ (stat(conf->certificate_file, &buf) < 0) &&
+ (errno == ENOENT) &&
+ (radius_exec_program(conf->make_cert_command, NULL, 1,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, 0) != 0)) {
+ eaptls_detach(inst);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
/*
* Initialize TLS
eaptls_detach(inst);
return -1;
}
- if (generate_eph_rsa_key(inst->ctx) < 0) {
+
+ if (generate_eph_rsa_key(inst->ctx) < 0) {
+ eaptls_detach(inst);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (conf->verify_tmp_dir) {
+ char filename[256];
+
+ if (chmod(conf->verify_tmp_dir, S_IRWXU) < 0) {
+ radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Failed changing permissions on %s: %s", conf->verify_tmp_dir, strerror(errno));
+ eaptls_detach(inst);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (conf->verify_client_cert_cmd && !conf->verify_tmp_dir) {
+ radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: You MUST set the verify directory in order to use verify_client_cmd");
eaptls_detach(inst);
return -1;
}
VALUE_PAIR *vp;
int client_cert = TRUE;
int verify_mode = 0;
+ REQUEST *request = handler->request;
inst = (eap_tls_t *)type_arg;
+ handler->tls = TRUE;
+ handler->finished = FALSE;
+
+ /*
+ * Manually flush the sessions every so often. If HALF
+ * of the session lifetime has passed since we last
+ * flushed, then flush it again.
+ *
+ * FIXME: Also do it every N sessions?
+ */
+ if (inst->conf->session_cache_enable &&
+ ((inst->conf->session_last_flushed + (inst->conf->session_timeout * 1800)) <= request->timestamp)) {
+ RDEBUG2("Flushing SSL sessions (of #%ld)",
+ SSL_CTX_sess_number(inst->ctx));
+
+ SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(inst->ctx, request->timestamp);
+ inst->conf->session_last_flushed = request->timestamp;
+ }
+
/*
* If we're TTLS or PEAP, then do NOT require a client
* certificate.
*/
if (handler->eap_type != PW_EAP_TLS) {
vp = pairfind(handler->request->config_items,
- PW_EAP_TLS_REQUIRE_CLIENT_CERT);
+ PW_EAP_TLS_REQUIRE_CLIENT_CERT, 0);
if (!vp) {
client_cert = FALSE;
} else {
- client_cert = vp->lvalue;
+ client_cert = vp->vp_integer;
}
}
* Verify the peer certificate, if asked.
*/
if (client_cert) {
- DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_tls: Requiring client certificate");
+ RDEBUG2("Requiring client certificate");
verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT;
verify_mode |= SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE;
ssn->length_flag = inst->conf->include_length;
/*
- * We set a default fragment size, unless the Framed-MTU
- * tells us it's too big.
+ * We use default fragment size, unless the Framed-MTU
+ * tells us it's too big. Note that we do NOT account
+ * for the EAP-TLS headers if conf->fragment_size is
+ * large, because that config item looks to be confusing.
+ *
+ * i.e. it should REALLY be called MTU, and the code here
+ * should figure out what that means for TLS fragment size.
+ * asking the administrator to know the internal details
+ * of EAP-TLS in order to calculate fragment sizes is
+ * just too much.
*/
ssn->offset = inst->conf->fragment_size;
- vp = pairfind(handler->request->packet->vps, PW_FRAMED_MTU);
- if (vp && ((vp->lvalue - 4) < ssn->offset)) {
- ssn->offset = vp->lvalue - 4;
+ vp = pairfind(handler->request->packet->vps, PW_FRAMED_MTU, 0);
+ if (vp && ((vp->vp_integer - 14) < ssn->offset)) {
+ /*
+ * Discount the Framed-MTU by:
+ * 4 : EAPOL header
+ * 4 : EAP header (code + id + length)
+ * 1 : EAP type == EAP-TLS
+ * 1 : EAP-TLS Flags
+ * 4 : EAP-TLS Message length
+ * (even if conf->include_length == 0,
+ * just to be lazy).
+ * ---
+ * 14
+ */
+ ssn->offset = vp->vp_integer - 14;
}
handler->opaque = ((void *)ssn);
handler->free_opaque = session_free;
- DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_tls: Initiate");
+ RDEBUG2("Initiate");
/*
- * PEAP-specific breakage.
+ * Set up type-specific information.
*/
- if (handler->eap_type == PW_EAP_PEAP) {
+ switch (handler->eap_type) {
+ case PW_EAP_TLS:
+ default:
+ ssn->prf_label = "client EAP encryption";
+ break;
+
+ case PW_EAP_TTLS:
+ ssn->prf_label = "ttls keying material";
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * PEAP-specific breakage.
+ */
+ case PW_EAP_PEAP:
/*
* As it is a poorly designed protocol, PEAP uses
* bits in the TLS header to indicate PEAP
* we force it here.
*/
ssn->length_flag = 0;
+
+ ssn->prf_label = "client EAP encryption";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (inst->conf->session_cache_enable) {
+ ssn->allow_session_resumption = 1; /* otherwise it's zero */
}
/*
* related handshaking or application data.
*/
status = eaptls_start(handler->eap_ds, ssn->peap_flag);
- DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_tls: Start returned %d", status);
+ RDEBUG2("Start returned %d", status);
if (status == 0)
return 0;
/*
* Do authentication, by letting EAP-TLS do most of the work.
*/
-static int eaptls_authenticate(void *arg UNUSED, EAP_HANDLER *handler)
+static int eaptls_authenticate(void *arg, EAP_HANDLER *handler)
{
eaptls_status_t status;
tls_session_t *tls_session = (tls_session_t *) handler->opaque;
+ REQUEST *request = handler->request;
+ eap_tls_t *inst = (eap_tls_t *) arg;
- DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_tls: Authenticate");
+ RDEBUG2("Authenticate");
status = eaptls_process(handler);
- DEBUG2(" eaptls_process returned %d\n", status);
+ RDEBUG2("eaptls_process returned %d\n", status);
switch (status) {
/*
* EAP-TLS handshake was successful, return an
* data.
*/
case EAPTLS_OK:
- DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_tls: Received unexpected tunneled data after successful handshake.");
+ RDEBUG2("Received unexpected tunneled data after successful handshake.");
#ifndef NDEBUG
- if (debug_flag > 2) {
+ if ((debug_flag > 2) && fr_log_fp) {
unsigned int i;
unsigned int data_len;
unsigned char buffer[1024];
buffer, sizeof(buffer));
log_debug(" Tunneled data (%u bytes)\n", data_len);
for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) {
- if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x00) printf(" %x: ", i);
- if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x0f) printf("\n");
+ if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x00) fprintf(fr_log_fp, " %x: ", i);
+ if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x0f) fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\n");
- printf("%02x ", buffer[i]);
+ fprintf(fr_log_fp, "%02x ", buffer[i]);
}
- printf("\n");
+ fprintf(fr_log_fp, "\n");
}
#endif
- eaptls_fail(handler->eap_ds, 0);
+ eaptls_fail(handler, 0);
return 0;
break;
/*
* Anything else: fail.
+ *
+ * Also, remove the session from the cache so that
+ * the client can't re-use it.
*/
default:
+ if (inst->conf->session_cache_enable) {
+ SSL_CTX_remove_session(inst->ctx,
+ tls_session->ssl->session);
+ }
+
return 0;
}
/*
- * Success: Return MPPE keys.
+ * New sessions cause some additional information to be
+ * cached.
*/
- eaptls_success(handler->eap_ds, 0);
- eaptls_gen_mppe_keys(&handler->request->reply->vps,
- tls_session->ssl,
- "client EAP encryption");
- return 1;
+ if (!SSL_session_reused(tls_session->ssl)) {
+ /*
+ * FIXME: Store miscellaneous data.
+ */
+ RDEBUG2("Adding user data to cached session");
+
+#if 0
+ SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(tls_session->ssl->session,
+ ssl_session_idx_user_session, session_data);
+#endif
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * FIXME: Retrieve miscellaneous data.
+ */
+#if 0
+ data = SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(tls_session->ssl->session,
+ ssl_session_idx_user_session);
+
+ if (!session_data) {
+ radlog_request(L_ERR, 0, request,
+ "No user session data in cached session - "
+ " REJECTING");
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ RDEBUG2("Retrieved session data from cached session");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Success: Automatically return MPPE keys.
+ */
+ return eaptls_success(handler, 0);
}
/*