-/*
- * Copyright 2001-2010 Internet2
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+/**
+ * Licensed to the University Corporation for Advanced Internet
+ * Development, Inc. (UCAID) under one or more contributor license
+ * agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with this work for
+ * additional information regarding copyright ownership.
+ *
+ * UCAID licenses this file to you under the Apache License,
+ * Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may not use this file except
+ * in compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of the
+ * License at
*
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing,
+ * software distributed under the License is distributed on an
+ * "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND,
+ * either express or implied. See the License for the specific
+ * language governing permissions and limitations under the License.
*/
/**
return s;
}
- static void XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL getRemoteCRLs(vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>& crls, const char* cdpuri, Category& log) {
+ static time_t XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL getCRLTime(const ASN1_TIME *a)
+ {
+ struct tm t;
+ memset(&t, 0, sizeof(t));
+ // RFC 5280, sections 5.1.2.4 and 5.1.2.5 require thisUpdate and nextUpdate
+ // to be encoded as UTCTime until 2049, and RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.5.1
+ // further restricts the format to "YYMMDDHHMMSSZ" ("even where the number
+ // of seconds is zero").
+ // As long as OpenSSL doesn't provide any API to convert ASN1_TIME values
+ // time_t, we therefore have to parse it ourselves, unfortunately.
+ if (sscanf((const char*)a->data, "%2d%2d%2d%2d%2d%2dZ",
+ &t.tm_year, &t.tm_mon, &t.tm_mday,
+ &t.tm_hour, &t.tm_min, &t.tm_sec) == 6) {
+ if (t.tm_year <= 50) {
+ // RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.5.1
+ t.tm_year += 100;
+ }
+ t.tm_mon--;
+#if defined(HAVE_TIMEGM)
+ return timegm(&t);
+#else
+ // Windows, and hopefully most others...?
+ return mktime(&t) - timezone;
+#endif
+ }
+ return (time_t)-1;
+ }
+
+ static bool XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL isFreshCRL(XSECCryptoX509CRL *c, Category* log=nullptr)
+ {
+ // eventually, these should be made configurable
+ #define MIN_SECS_REMAINING 86400
+ #define MIN_PERCENT_REMAINING 10
+ if (c) {
+ const X509_CRL* crl = static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(c)->getOpenSSLX509CRL();
+ time_t thisUpdate = getCRLTime(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl));
+ time_t nextUpdate = getCRLTime(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl));
+ time_t now = time(nullptr);
+
+ if (thisUpdate < 0 || nextUpdate < 0) {
+ // we failed to parse at least one of the fields (they were not encoded
+ // as required by RFC 5280, actually)
+ time_t exp = now + MIN_SECS_REMAINING;
+ if (log) {
+ log->warn("isFreshCRL (issuer '%s'): improperly encoded thisUpdate or nextUpdate field - falling back to simple time comparison",
+ (X509_NAME_to_string(X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))).c_str());
+ }
+ return (X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), &exp) > 0) ? true : false;
+ }
+ else {
+ if (log && log->isDebugEnabled()) {
+ log->debug("isFreshCRL (issuer '%s'): %.0f seconds until nextUpdate (%3.2f%% elapsed since thisUpdate)",
+ (X509_NAME_to_string(X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))).c_str(),
+ difftime(nextUpdate, now), (difftime(now, thisUpdate) * 100) / difftime(nextUpdate, thisUpdate));
+ }
+
+ // consider it recent enough if there are at least MIN_SECS_REMAINING
+ // to the nextUpdate, and at least MIN_PERCENT_REMAINING of its
+ // overall "validity" are remaining to the nextUpdate
+ return (now + MIN_SECS_REMAINING < nextUpdate) &&
+ ((difftime(nextUpdate, now) * 100) / difftime(nextUpdate, thisUpdate) > MIN_PERCENT_REMAINING);
+ }
+ }
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ static XSECCryptoX509CRL* XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL getRemoteCRLs(const char* cdpuri, Category& log) {
// This is a temporary CRL cache implementation to avoid breaking binary compatibility
// for the library. Caching can't rely on any member objects within the TrustEngine,
// including locks, so we're using the global library lock for the time being.
// All other state is kept in the file system.
+ // minimum number of seconds between re-attempting a download from one particular CRLDP
+ #define MIN_RETRY_WAIT 60
+
// The filenames for the CRL cache are based on a hash of the CRL location.
string cdpfile = SecurityHelper::doHash("SHA1", cdpuri, strlen(cdpuri)) + ".crl";
XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().getPathResolver()->resolve(cdpfile, PathResolver::XMLTOOLING_RUN_FILE);
- string cdpstaging = cdpfile + ".bak";
- string counterfile = cdpfile + ".cnt";
-
- // Need to move this to a configurable parameter once we can break binary compatibility.
- // Ideally this would be based on a percentage of the original CRL window, but OpenSSL
- // doesn't provide much in the way of ASN1_TIME parsing functions. It does support adding
- // a fixed time value and comparing against known times.
- #define MIN_SECS_REMAINING 86400;
- long counter = 0;
+ string cdpstaging = cdpfile + ".tmp";
+ string tsfile = cdpfile + ".ts";
+
+ time_t now = time(nullptr);
+ vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*> crls;
+
try {
- // While holding the lock, check for a cached copy of the CRL, and check its validity.
+ // While holding the lock, check for a cached copy of the CRL, and remove "expired" ones.
Locker glock(&XMLToolingConfig::getConfig());
#ifdef WIN32
struct _stat stat_buf;
#endif
SecurityHelper::loadCRLsFromFile(crls, cdpfile.c_str());
if (crls.empty() || crls.front()->getProviderName() != DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL ||
- X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(crls.front())->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), nullptr) < 0) {
+ X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(crls.front())->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), &now) < 0) {
for_each(crls.begin(), crls.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<XSECCryptoX509CRL>());
crls.clear();
remove(cdpfile.c_str()); // may as well delete the local copy
- remove(counterfile.c_str());
- log.info("cached CRL(s) from (%s) have expired", cdpuri);
- }
- else {
- // Look for a file containing the allowable time remaining on the CRL.
- // We store this counter in the file system because of the binary compatibility issue.
- try {
- ifstream countersrc(counterfile.c_str());
- if (countersrc)
- countersrc >> counter;
- }
- catch (exception&) {
- counter = 0;
- }
- if (counter == 0)
- counter = MIN_SECS_REMAINING;
-
- // See if the time left is under the counter threshold.
- time_t exp = time(nullptr) + counter;
- if (X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(crls.front())->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), &exp) < 0) {
- for_each(crls.begin(), crls.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<XSECCryptoX509CRL>());
- crls.clear();
- log.info("cached CRL(s) from (%s) will expire within %ld seconds, attempting to update them", cdpuri, counter);
- }
+ remove(tsfile.c_str());
+ log.info("deleting cached CRL from %s with nextUpdate field in the past", cdpuri);
}
}
}
catch (exception& ex) {
- log.error("exception loading cached copy of CRL at (%s): %s", cdpuri, ex.what());
+ log.error("exception loading cached copy of CRL from %s: %s", cdpuri, ex.what());
}
- if (crls.empty()) {
+ if (crls.empty() || !isFreshCRL(crls.front(), &log)) {
+ bool updateTimestamp = true;
try {
// If we get here, the cached copy didn't exist yet, or it's time to refresh.
- SOAPTransport::Address addr("AbstractPKIXTrustEngine", cdpuri, cdpuri);
- string scheme(addr.m_endpoint, strchr(addr.m_endpoint,':') - addr.m_endpoint);
- auto_ptr<SOAPTransport> soap(XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().SOAPTransportManager.newPlugin(scheme.c_str(), addr));
- soap->send();
- istream& msg = soap->receive();
- Locker glock(&XMLToolingConfig::getConfig());
- ofstream out(cdpstaging.c_str(), fstream::trunc|fstream::binary);
- out << msg.rdbuf();
- out.close();
- SecurityHelper::loadCRLsFromFile(crls, cdpstaging.c_str());
- if (crls.empty() || crls.front()->getProviderName() != DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL ||
- X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(crls.front())->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), nullptr) < 0) {
- // The "new" CRLs weren't usable, so get rid of them.
- for_each(crls.begin(), crls.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<XSECCryptoX509CRL>());
- crls.clear();
- remove(cdpstaging.c_str());
- log.error("updated CRL(s) from (%s) have already expired", cdpuri);
-
- // If counter isn't 0, then we were attempting an update of still-valid CRLs, so reload the old ones
- // and cut the counter in half for next time.
- if (counter > 0) {
- SecurityHelper::loadCRLsFromFile(crls, cdpfile.c_str());
- ofstream countersink(counterfile.c_str(), fstream::trunc);
- counter /= 2;
- countersink << counter;
- log.info("failed CRL update attempt, reducing threshold to %ld seconds", counter);
- }
+ // To limit the rate of unsuccessful attempts when a CRLDP is unreachable,
+ // we remember the timestamp of the last attempt (both successful/unsuccessful).
+ // We store this in the file system because of the binary compatibility issue.
+ time_t ts = 0;
+ try {
+ Locker glock(&XMLToolingConfig::getConfig());
+ ifstream tssrc(tsfile.c_str());
+ if (tssrc)
+ tssrc >> ts;
+ }
+ catch (exception&) {
+ ts = 0;
}
- else {
- // If counter isn't zero, we reloaded; see if the new CRLs are "more" valid than before.
- if (counter > 0) {
- time_t exp = time(nullptr) + counter;
- if (X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(crls.front())->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), &exp) < 0) {
- // Still invalid past the acceptable interval, so they're the same as what we had.
- // Remove the extra copy, and cut the counter in half for next time.
- remove(cdpstaging.c_str());
- ofstream countersink(counterfile.c_str(), fstream::trunc);
- counter /= 2;
- countersink << counter;
- log.info("remote CRL(s) unchanged, reducing threshold to %ld seconds", counter);
- }
- else {
- counter = 0;
- log.info("remote CRL(s) updated");
- }
- }
- if (counter == 0) {
- // "Commit" the new CRLs.
+ if (difftime(now, ts) > MIN_RETRY_WAIT) {
+ SOAPTransport::Address addr("AbstractPKIXTrustEngine", cdpuri, cdpuri);
+ string scheme(addr.m_endpoint, strchr(addr.m_endpoint,':') - addr.m_endpoint);
+ auto_ptr<SOAPTransport> soap(XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().SOAPTransportManager.newPlugin(scheme.c_str(), addr));
+ soap->send();
+ istream& msg = soap->receive();
+ Locker glock(&XMLToolingConfig::getConfig());
+ ofstream out(cdpstaging.c_str(), fstream::trunc|fstream::binary);
+ out << msg.rdbuf();
+ out.close();
+ SecurityHelper::loadCRLsFromFile(crls, cdpstaging.c_str());
+ if (crls.empty() || crls.front()->getProviderName() != DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL ||
+ X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(crls.front())->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), &now) < 0) {
+ // The "new" CRL wasn't usable, so get rid of it.
+ for_each(crls.begin(), crls.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<XSECCryptoX509CRL>());
+ crls.clear();
+ remove(cdpstaging.c_str());
+ log.error("ignoring CRL retrieved from %s with nextUpdate field in the past", cdpuri);
+ }
+ else {
+ // "Commit" the new CRL. Note that we might add a CRL which doesn't pass
+ // isFreshCRL, but that's preferrable over adding none at all.
+ log.info("CRL refreshed from %s", cdpuri);
remove(cdpfile.c_str());
- remove(counterfile.c_str());
if (rename(cdpstaging.c_str(), cdpfile.c_str()) != 0)
log.error("unable to rename CRL staging file");
}
}
+ else {
+ updateTimestamp = false; // don't update if we're within the backoff window
+ }
}
catch (exception& ex) {
- log.error("exception downloading/caching CRL at (%s): %s", cdpuri, ex.what());
+ log.error("exception downloading/caching CRL from %s: %s", cdpuri, ex.what());
+ }
+
+ if (updateTimestamp) {
+ // update the timestamp file
+ Locker glock(&XMLToolingConfig::getConfig());
+ ofstream tssink(tsfile.c_str(), fstream::trunc);
+ tssink << now;
+ tssink.close();
}
}
+
+ if (crls.empty())
+ return nullptr;
+ for_each(crls.begin() + 1, crls.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<XSECCryptoX509CRL>());
+ return crls.front();
}
static bool XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL validate(
X509* EE,
STACK_OF(X509)* untrusted,
AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::PKIXValidationInfoIterator* pkixInfo,
- bool useCRL,
+ bool useCRL,
bool fullCRLChain,
- const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>* inlineCRLs=nullptr
+ const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>* inlineCRLs=nullptr,
+ bool policyMappingInhibit=false,
+ bool anyPolicyInhibit=false,
+ const set<string>* policyOIDs=nullptr
)
{
Category& log=Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".TrustEngine");
log_openssl();
return false;
}
+
+ // PKIX policy checking (cf. RFCs 3280/5280 section 6)
+ if (policyMappingInhibit || anyPolicyInhibit || (policyOIDs && !policyOIDs->empty())) {
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00908000L)
+ log.error("PKIX policy checking option is configured, but OpenSSL version is less than 0.9.8");
+ X509_STORE_free(store);
+ return false;
+#else
+ unsigned long pflags = 0;
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
+ if (!vpm) {
+ log_openssl();
+ X509_STORE_free(store);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // populate the "user-initial-policy-set" input variable
+ if (policyOIDs && !policyOIDs->empty()) {
+ for (set<string>::const_iterator o=policyOIDs->begin(); o!=policyOIDs->end(); o++) {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *oid = OBJ_txt2obj(o->c_str(), 1);
+ if (oid && X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy(vpm, oid)) {
+ log.debug("OID (%s) added to set of acceptable policies", o->c_str());
+ }
+ else {
+ log_openssl();
+ log.error("unable to parse/configure policy OID value (%s)", o->c_str());
+ if (oid)
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(oid);
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
+ X509_STORE_free(store);
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ // when the user has supplied at least one policy OID, he obviously wants to check
+ // for an explicit policy ("initial-explicit-policy")
+ pflags |= X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY;
+ }
+
+ // "initial-policy-mapping-inhibit" input variable
+ if (policyMappingInhibit)
+ pflags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP;
+ // "initial-any-policy-inhibit" input variable
+ if (anyPolicyInhibit)
+ pflags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
+
+ if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(vpm, pflags) || !X509_STORE_set1_param(store, vpm)) {
+ log_openssl();
+ log.error("unable to set PKIX policy checking parameters");
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
+ X509_STORE_free(store);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
+#endif
+ }
// This contains the state of the validate operation.
int count=0;
// the CRL in that case. If we end up not adding a CRL for a particular link in the chain, the
// validation will fail (if the fullChain option was set).
set<string> crlissuers;
+ time_t now = time(nullptr);
if (inlineCRLs) {
for (vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>::const_iterator j=inlineCRLs->begin(); j!=inlineCRLs->end(); ++j) {
if ((*j)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL &&
- (X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), nullptr)==1)) {
+ (X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), &now) > 0)) {
// owned by store
X509_STORE_add_crl(store, X509_CRL_dup(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()));
string crlissuer(X509_NAME_to_string(X509_CRL_get_issuer(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL())));
if (!crlissuer.empty()) {
- log.debug("added CRL issued by (%s)", crlissuer.c_str());
+ log.debug("added inline CRL issued by (%s)", crlissuer.c_str());
crlissuers.insert(crlissuer);
}
}
const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>& crls = pkixInfo->getCRLs();
for (vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>::const_iterator j=crls.begin(); j!=crls.end(); ++j) {
if ((*j)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL &&
- (X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), nullptr)==1)) {
+ (X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), &now) > 0)) {
// owned by store
X509_STORE_add_crl(store, X509_CRL_dup(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()));
string crlissuer(X509_NAME_to_string(X509_CRL_get_issuer(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL())));
X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(untrusted, i);
string crlissuer(X509_NAME_to_string(X509_get_issuer_name(cert)));
if (crlissuers.count(crlissuer)) {
- // We already have a CRL for this cert, so skip it.
+ // We already have a CRL for this cert, so skip CRLDP processing for this one.
continue;
}
GENERAL_NAME* gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->distpoint->name.fullname, iii);
// Only consider HTTP URIs, and stop after the first one we find.
#ifdef HAVE_STRCASECMP
- if (gen->type == GEN_URI && (!strncasecmp((const char*)gen->d.ia5->data, "http:", 5) ||
- !strncasecmp((const char*)gen->d.ia5->data, "https:", 6))) {
+ if (gen->type == GEN_URI && (!strncasecmp((const char*)gen->d.ia5->data, "http:", 5))) {
#else
- if (gen->type == GEN_URI && (!strnicmp((const char*)gen->d.ia5->data, "http:", 5) ||
- !strnicmp((const char*)gen->d.ia5->data, "https:", 6))) {
+ if (gen->type == GEN_URI && (!strnicmp((const char*)gen->d.ia5->data, "http:", 5))) {
#endif
const char* cdpuri = (const char*)gen->d.ia5->data;
- vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*> crls;
- getRemoteCRLs(crls, cdpuri, log);
- for (vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>::const_iterator j = crls.begin(); j != crls.end(); ++j) {
- if ((*j)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL &&
- X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), nullptr) > 0) {
- // owned by store
- X509_STORE_add_crl(store, X509_CRL_dup(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()));
- log.debug("added CRL issued by (%s)", crlissuer.c_str());
- crlissuers.insert(crlissuer);
- foundUsableCDP = true;
- }
+ auto_ptr<XSECCryptoX509CRL> crl(getRemoteCRLs(cdpuri, log));
+ if (crl.get() && crl->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL &&
+ (isFreshCRL(crl.get()) || (ii == sk_DIST_POINT_num(dps)-1 && iii == sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->distpoint->name.fullname)-1))) {
+ // owned by store
+ X509_STORE_add_crl(store, X509_CRL_dup(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(crl.get())->getOpenSSLX509CRL()));
+ log.debug("added CRL issued by (%s)", crlissuer.c_str());
+ crlissuers.insert(crlissuer);
+ foundUsableCDP = true;
}
- for_each(crls.begin(), crls.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<XSECCryptoX509CRL>());
}
}
}
sk_DIST_POINT_free(dps);
}
- if (count > 0) {
- X509_STORE_set_flags(store, fullCRLChain ? (X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) : (X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK));
- }
- else {
- log.warn("CRL checking is enabled, but none were supplied");
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- X509_STORE_free(store);
- sk_X509_free(CAstack);
- return false;
- }
-#else
- log.warn("CRL checking is enabled, but OpenSSL version is too old");
- X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
- X509_STORE_free(store);
- sk_X509_free(CAstack);
- return false;
-#endif
// Do a second pass verify with CRLs in place.
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, fullCRLChain ? (X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) : (X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK));
ret=X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
+#else
+ log.warn("CRL checking is enabled, but OpenSSL version is too old");
+ ret = 0;
+#endif
}
// Clean up...
return false;
}
- static XMLCh fullCRLChain[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_12(f,u,l,l,C,R,L,C,h,a,i,n);
- static XMLCh checkRevocation[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_15(c,h,e,c,k,R,e,v,o,c,a,t,i,o,n);
+ static XMLCh fullCRLChain[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_12(f,u,l,l,C,R,L,C,h,a,i,n);
+ static XMLCh checkRevocation[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_15(c,h,e,c,k,R,e,v,o,c,a,t,i,o,n);
+ static XMLCh policyMappingInhibit[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_20(p,o,l,i,c,y,M,a,p,p,i,n,g,I,n,h,i,b,i,t);
+ static XMLCh anyPolicyInhibit[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_16(a,n,y,P,o,l,i,c,y,I,n,h,i,b,i,t);
+ static XMLCh PolicyOID[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_9(P,o,l,i,c,y,O,I,D);
+ static XMLCh TrustedName[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_11(T,r,u,s,t,e,d,N,a,m,e);
};
AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::PKIXValidationInfoIterator::PKIXValidationInfoIterator()
AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::AbstractPKIXTrustEngine(const xercesc::DOMElement* e)
: TrustEngine(e),
+ m_checkRevocation(XMLHelper::getAttrString(e, nullptr, checkRevocation)),
m_fullCRLChain(XMLHelper::getAttrBool(e, false, fullCRLChain)),
- m_checkRevocation(XMLHelper::getAttrString(e, nullptr, checkRevocation))
+ m_policyMappingInhibit(XMLHelper::getAttrBool(e, false, policyMappingInhibit)),
+ m_anyPolicyInhibit(XMLHelper::getAttrBool(e, false, anyPolicyInhibit))
{
if (m_fullCRLChain) {
Category::getInstance(XMLTOOLING_LOGCAT".TrustEngine.PKIX").warn(
else if (m_checkRevocation == "fullChain") {
m_fullCRLChain = true; // in case anything's using this
}
+
+ xercesc::DOMElement* c = XMLHelper::getFirstChildElement(e);
+ while (c) {
+ if (c->hasChildNodes()) {
+ auto_ptr_char v(c->getTextContent());
+ if (v.get() && *v.get()) {
+ if (XMLString::equals(c->getLocalName(), PolicyOID))
+ m_policyOIDs.insert(v.get());
+ else if (XMLString::equals(c->getLocalName(), TrustedName))
+ m_trustedNames.insert(v.get());
+ }
+ }
+ c = XMLHelper::getNextSiblingElement(c);
+ }
}
AbstractPKIXTrustEngine::~AbstractPKIXTrustEngine()
credResolver.resolve(creds,&criteria);
// Build a list of acceptable names.
- set<string> trustednames;
- trustednames.insert(criteria.getPeerName());
- for (vector<const Credential*>::const_iterator cred = creds.begin(); cred!=creds.end(); ++cred)
+ set<string> trustednames = m_trustedNames;
+ if (log.isDebugEnabled()) {
+ for (set<string>::const_iterator n=m_trustedNames.begin(); n!=m_trustedNames.end(); n++) {
+ log.debug("adding to list of trusted names (%s)", n->c_str());
+ }
+ }
+ if (criteria.getPeerName()) {
+ trustednames.insert(criteria.getPeerName());
+ log.debug("adding to list of trusted names (%s)", criteria.getPeerName());
+ }
+ for (vector<const Credential*>::const_iterator cred = creds.begin(); cred!=creds.end(); ++cred) {
trustednames.insert((*cred)->getKeyNames().begin(), (*cred)->getKeyNames().end());
+ if (log.isDebugEnabled()) {
+ for (set<string>::const_iterator n=(*cred)->getKeyNames().begin(); n!=(*cred)->getKeyNames().end(); n++) {
+ log.debug("adding to list of trusted names (%s)", n->c_str());
+ }
+ }
+ }
X509_NAME* subject=X509_get_subject_name(certEE);
if (subject) {
return false;
}
- if (criteria && criteria->getPeerName() && *(criteria->getPeerName())) {
+ if ((criteria && criteria->getPeerName() && *(criteria->getPeerName())) || !m_trustedNames.empty()) {
log.debug("checking that the certificate name is acceptable");
- if (criteria->getUsage()==Credential::UNSPECIFIED_CREDENTIAL)
+ if (criteria && criteria->getUsage()==Credential::UNSPECIFIED_CREDENTIAL)
criteria->setUsage(Credential::SIGNING_CREDENTIAL);
if (!checkEntityNames(certEE,credResolver,*criteria)) {
log.error("certificate name was not acceptable");
pkix.get(),
(m_checkRevocation=="entityOnly" || m_checkRevocation=="fullChain"),
(m_checkRevocation=="fullChain"),
- (m_checkRevocation=="entityOnly" || m_checkRevocation=="fullChain") ? inlineCRLs : nullptr
+ (m_checkRevocation=="entityOnly" || m_checkRevocation=="fullChain") ? inlineCRLs : nullptr,
+ m_policyMappingInhibit,
+ m_anyPolicyInhibit,
+ &m_policyOIDs
)) {
return true;
}