#include "security/CredentialResolver.h"
#include "security/KeyInfoResolver.h"
#include "security/OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL.h"
+#include "security/SecurityHelper.h"
#include "security/X509Credential.h"
#include "signature/SignatureValidator.h"
#include "util/NDC.h"
+#include "util/PathResolver.h"
+#include <fstream>
#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <xercesc/util/XMLUniDefs.hpp>
return ok;
}
+ static string XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL X509_NAME_to_string(X509_NAME* n)
+ {
+ string s;
+ BIO* b = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
+ X509_NAME_print_ex(b,n,0,XN_FLAG_RFC2253);
+ BIO_flush(b);
+ BUF_MEM* bptr=nullptr;
+ BIO_get_mem_ptr(b, &bptr);
+ if (bptr && bptr->length > 0) {
+ s.append(bptr->data, bptr->length);
+ }
+ BIO_free(b);
+ return s;
+ }
+
+ static time_t XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL getCRLTime(const ASN1_TIME *a)
+ {
+ struct tm t;
+ memset(&t, 0, sizeof(t));
+ // RFC 5280, sections 5.1.2.4 and 5.1.2.5 require thisUpdate and nextUpdate
+ // to be encoded as UTCTime until 2049, and RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.5.1
+ // further restricts the format to "YYMMDDHHMMSSZ" ("even where the number
+ // of seconds is zero").
+ // As long as OpenSSL doesn't provide any API to convert ASN1_TIME values
+ // time_t, we therefore have to parse it ourselves, unfortunately.
+ if (sscanf((const char*)a->data, "%2d%2d%2d%2d%2d%2dZ",
+ &t.tm_year, &t.tm_mon, &t.tm_mday,
+ &t.tm_hour, &t.tm_min, &t.tm_sec) == 6) {
+ if (t.tm_year <= 50) {
+ // RFC 5280, section 4.1.2.5.1
+ t.tm_year += 100;
+ }
+ t.tm_mon--;
+#if defined(HAVE_TIMEGM)
+ return timegm(&t);
+#else
+ // Windows, and hopefully most others...?
+ return mktime(&t) - timezone;
+#endif
+ }
+ return (time_t)-1;
+ }
+
+ static bool XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL isFreshCRL(XSECCryptoX509CRL *c, Category* log=nullptr)
+ {
+ // eventually, these should be made configurable
+ #define MIN_SECS_REMAINING 86400
+ #define MIN_PERCENT_REMAINING 10
+ if (c) {
+ const X509_CRL* crl = static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(c)->getOpenSSLX509CRL();
+ time_t thisUpdate = getCRLTime(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl));
+ time_t nextUpdate = getCRLTime(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl));
+ time_t now = time(nullptr);
+
+ if (thisUpdate < 0 || nextUpdate < 0) {
+ // we failed to parse at least one of the fields (they were not encoded
+ // as required by RFC 5280, actually)
+ time_t exp = now + MIN_SECS_REMAINING;
+ if (log) {
+ log->warn("isFreshCRL (issuer '%s'): improperly encoded thisUpdate or nextUpdate field - falling back to simple time comparison",
+ (X509_NAME_to_string(X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))).c_str());
+ }
+ return (X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), &exp) > 0) ? true : false;
+ }
+ else {
+ if (log && log->isDebugEnabled()) {
+ log->debug("isFreshCRL (issuer '%s'): %.0f seconds until nextUpdate (%3.2f%% elapsed since thisUpdate)",
+ (X509_NAME_to_string(X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))).c_str(),
+ difftime(nextUpdate, now), (difftime(now, thisUpdate) * 100) / difftime(nextUpdate, thisUpdate));
+ }
+
+ // consider it recent enough if there are at least MIN_SECS_REMAINING
+ // to the nextUpdate, and at least MIN_PERCENT_REMAINING of its
+ // overall "validity" are remaining to the nextUpdate
+ return (now + MIN_SECS_REMAINING < nextUpdate) &&
+ ((difftime(nextUpdate, now) * 100) / difftime(nextUpdate, thisUpdate) > MIN_PERCENT_REMAINING);
+ }
+ }
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ static XSECCryptoX509CRL* XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL getRemoteCRLs(const char* cdpuri, Category& log) {
+ // This is a temporary CRL cache implementation to avoid breaking binary compatibility
+ // for the library. Caching can't rely on any member objects within the TrustEngine,
+ // including locks, so we're using the global library lock for the time being.
+ // All other state is kept in the file system.
+
+ // minimum number of seconds between re-attempting a download from one particular CRLDP
+ #define MIN_RETRY_WAIT 60
+
+ // The filenames for the CRL cache are based on a hash of the CRL location.
+ string cdpfile = SecurityHelper::doHash("SHA1", cdpuri, strlen(cdpuri)) + ".crl";
+ XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().getPathResolver()->resolve(cdpfile, PathResolver::XMLTOOLING_RUN_FILE);
+ string cdpstaging = cdpfile + ".tmp";
+ string tsfile = cdpfile + ".ts";
+
+ time_t now = time(nullptr);
+ vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*> crls;
+
+ try {
+ // While holding the lock, check for a cached copy of the CRL, and remove "expired" ones.
+ Locker glock(&XMLToolingConfig::getConfig());
+#ifdef WIN32
+ struct _stat stat_buf;
+ if (_stat(cdpfile.c_str(), &stat_buf) == 0) {
+#else
+ struct stat stat_buf;
+ if (stat(cdpfile.c_str(), &stat_buf) == 0) {
+#endif
+ SecurityHelper::loadCRLsFromFile(crls, cdpfile.c_str());
+ if (crls.empty() || crls.front()->getProviderName() != DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL ||
+ X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(crls.front())->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), &now) < 0) {
+ for_each(crls.begin(), crls.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<XSECCryptoX509CRL>());
+ crls.clear();
+ remove(cdpfile.c_str()); // may as well delete the local copy
+ remove(tsfile.c_str());
+ log.info("deleting cached CRL from %s with nextUpdate field in the past", cdpuri);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ catch (exception& ex) {
+ log.error("exception loading cached copy of CRL from %s: %s", cdpuri, ex.what());
+ }
+
+ if (crls.empty() || !isFreshCRL(crls.front(), &log)) {
+ bool updateTimestamp = true;
+ try {
+ // If we get here, the cached copy didn't exist yet, or it's time to refresh.
+ // To limit the rate of unsuccessful attempts when a CRLDP is unreachable,
+ // we remember the timestamp of the last attempt (both successful/unsuccessful).
+ // We store this in the file system because of the binary compatibility issue.
+ time_t ts = 0;
+ try {
+ Locker glock(&XMLToolingConfig::getConfig());
+ ifstream tssrc(tsfile.c_str());
+ if (tssrc)
+ tssrc >> ts;
+ }
+ catch (exception&) {
+ ts = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (difftime(now, ts) > MIN_RETRY_WAIT) {
+ SOAPTransport::Address addr("AbstractPKIXTrustEngine", cdpuri, cdpuri);
+ string scheme(addr.m_endpoint, strchr(addr.m_endpoint,':') - addr.m_endpoint);
+ auto_ptr<SOAPTransport> soap(XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().SOAPTransportManager.newPlugin(scheme.c_str(), addr));
+ soap->send();
+ istream& msg = soap->receive();
+ Locker glock(&XMLToolingConfig::getConfig());
+ ofstream out(cdpstaging.c_str(), fstream::trunc|fstream::binary);
+ out << msg.rdbuf();
+ out.close();
+ SecurityHelper::loadCRLsFromFile(crls, cdpstaging.c_str());
+ if (crls.empty() || crls.front()->getProviderName() != DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL ||
+ X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(crls.front())->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), &now) < 0) {
+ // The "new" CRL wasn't usable, so get rid of it.
+ for_each(crls.begin(), crls.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<XSECCryptoX509CRL>());
+ crls.clear();
+ remove(cdpstaging.c_str());
+ log.error("ignoring CRL retrieved from %s with nextUpdate field in the past", cdpuri);
+ }
+ else {
+ // "Commit" the new CRL. Note that we might add a CRL which doesn't pass
+ // isFreshCRL, but that's preferrable over adding none at all.
+ log.info("CRL refreshed from %s", cdpuri);
+ remove(cdpfile.c_str());
+ if (rename(cdpstaging.c_str(), cdpfile.c_str()) != 0)
+ log.error("unable to rename CRL staging file");
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ updateTimestamp = false; // don't update if we're within the backoff window
+ }
+ }
+ catch (exception& ex) {
+ log.error("exception downloading/caching CRL from %s: %s", cdpuri, ex.what());
+ }
+
+ if (updateTimestamp) {
+ // update the timestamp file
+ Locker glock(&XMLToolingConfig::getConfig());
+ ofstream tssink(tsfile.c_str(), fstream::trunc);
+ tssink << now;
+ tssink.close();
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (crls.empty())
+ return nullptr;
+ for_each(crls.begin() + 1, crls.end(), xmltooling::cleanup<XSECCryptoX509CRL>());
+ return crls.front();
+ }
+
static bool XMLTOOL_DLLLOCAL validate(
X509* EE,
STACK_OF(X509)* untrusted,
return false;
}
- STACK_OF(X509)* CAstack = sk_X509_new_null();
-
// This contains the state of the validate operation.
int count=0;
X509_STORE_CTX ctx;
-
+
+ // AFAICT, EE and untrusted are passed in but not owned by the ctx.
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
+ if (X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,store,EE,untrusted)!=1) {
+ log_openssl();
+ log.error("unable to initialize X509_STORE_CTX");
+ X509_STORE_free(store);
+ return false;
+ }
+#else
+ X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,store,EE,untrusted);
+#endif
+
+ STACK_OF(X509)* CAstack = sk_X509_new_null();
const vector<XSECCryptoX509*>& CAcerts = pkixInfo->getTrustAnchors();
for (vector<XSECCryptoX509*>::const_iterator i=CAcerts.begin(); i!=CAcerts.end(); ++i) {
if ((*i)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL) {
++count;
}
}
-
log.debug("supplied (%d) CA certificate(s)", count);
+ // Seems to be most efficient to just pass in the CA stack.
+ X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(&ctx,CAstack);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx,100); // we check the depth down below
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx,error_callback);
+
+ // Do a first pass verify. If CRLs aren't used, this is the only pass.
+ int ret=X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
+ if (ret==1) {
+ // Now see if the depth was acceptable by counting the number of intermediates.
+ int depth=sk_X509_num(ctx.chain)-2;
+ if (pkixInfo->getVerificationDepth() < depth) {
+ log.error(
+ "certificate chain was too long (%d intermediates, only %d allowed)",
+ (depth==-1) ? 0 : depth,
+ pkixInfo->getVerificationDepth()
+ );
+ ret=0;
+ }
+ }
+
if (useCRL) {
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
- count=0;
+ // When we add CRLs, we have to be sure the nextUpdate hasn't passed, because OpenSSL won't accept
+ // the CRL in that case. If we end up not adding a CRL for a particular link in the chain, the
+ // validation will fail (if the fullChain option was set).
+ set<string> crlissuers;
+ time_t now = time(nullptr);
if (inlineCRLs) {
for (vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>::const_iterator j=inlineCRLs->begin(); j!=inlineCRLs->end(); ++j) {
- if ((*j)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL) {
+ if ((*j)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL &&
+ (X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), &now) > 0)) {
// owned by store
X509_STORE_add_crl(store, X509_CRL_dup(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()));
- ++count;
+ string crlissuer(X509_NAME_to_string(X509_CRL_get_issuer(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL())));
+ if (!crlissuer.empty()) {
+ log.debug("added inline CRL issued by (%s)", crlissuer.c_str());
+ crlissuers.insert(crlissuer);
+ }
}
}
}
const vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>& crls = pkixInfo->getCRLs();
for (vector<XSECCryptoX509CRL*>::const_iterator j=crls.begin(); j!=crls.end(); ++j) {
- if ((*j)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL) {
+ if ((*j)->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL &&
+ (X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()), &now) > 0)) {
// owned by store
X509_STORE_add_crl(store, X509_CRL_dup(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL()));
- ++count;
+ string crlissuer(X509_NAME_to_string(X509_CRL_get_issuer(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(*j)->getOpenSSLX509CRL())));
+ if (!crlissuer.empty()) {
+ log.debug("added CRL issued by (%s)", crlissuer.c_str());
+ crlissuers.insert(crlissuer);
+ }
}
}
- log.debug("supplied (%d) CRL(s)", count);
- if (count > 0) {
- X509_STORE_set_flags(store, fullCRLChain ? (X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) : (X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK));
- }
- else {
- log.warn("CRL checking is enabled, but none were supplied");
- sk_X509_free(CAstack);
- X509_STORE_free(store);
- return false;
- }
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(untrusted); ++i) {
+ X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(untrusted, i);
+ string crlissuer(X509_NAME_to_string(X509_get_issuer_name(cert)));
+ if (crlissuers.count(crlissuer)) {
+ // We already have a CRL for this cert, so skip CRLDP processing for this one.
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ bool foundUsableCDP = false;
+ STACK_OF(DIST_POINT)* dps = (STACK_OF(DIST_POINT)*)X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_crl_distribution_points, nullptr, nullptr);
+ for (int ii = 0; !foundUsableCDP && ii < sk_DIST_POINT_num(dps); ++ii) {
+ DIST_POINT* dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(dps, ii);
+ if (!dp->distpoint || dp->distpoint->type != 0)
+ continue;
+ for (int iii = 0; !foundUsableCDP && iii < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->distpoint->name.fullname); ++iii) {
+ GENERAL_NAME* gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->distpoint->name.fullname, iii);
+ // Only consider HTTP URIs, and stop after the first one we find.
+#ifdef HAVE_STRCASECMP
+ if (gen->type == GEN_URI && (!strncasecmp((const char*)gen->d.ia5->data, "http:", 5))) {
#else
- log.warn("CRL checking is enabled, but OpenSSL version is too old");
- sk_X509_free(CAstack);
- X509_STORE_free(store);
- return false;
+ if (gen->type == GEN_URI && (!strnicmp((const char*)gen->d.ia5->data, "http:", 5))) {
#endif
- }
+ const char* cdpuri = (const char*)gen->d.ia5->data;
+ auto_ptr<XSECCryptoX509CRL> crl(getRemoteCRLs(cdpuri, log));
+ if (crl.get() && crl->getProviderName()==DSIGConstants::s_unicodeStrPROVOpenSSL &&
+ (isFreshCRL(crl.get()) || (ii == sk_DIST_POINT_num(dps)-1 && iii == sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->distpoint->name.fullname)-1))) {
+ // owned by store
+ X509_STORE_add_crl(store, X509_CRL_dup(static_cast<OpenSSLCryptoX509CRL*>(crl.get())->getOpenSSLX509CRL()));
+ log.debug("added CRL issued by (%s)", crlissuer.c_str());
+ crlissuers.insert(crlissuer);
+ foundUsableCDP = true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ sk_DIST_POINT_free(dps);
+ }
- // AFAICT, EE and untrusted are passed in but not owned by the ctx.
-#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L)
- if (X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,store,EE,untrusted)!=1) {
- log_openssl();
- log.error("unable to initialize X509_STORE_CTX");
- sk_X509_free(CAstack);
- X509_STORE_free(store);
- return false;
- }
+ // Do a second pass verify with CRLs in place.
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, fullCRLChain ? (X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) : (X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK));
+ ret=X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
#else
- X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx,store,EE,untrusted);
+ log.warn("CRL checking is enabled, but OpenSSL version is too old");
+ ret = 0;
#endif
-
- // Seems to be most efficient to just pass in the CA stack.
- X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(&ctx,CAstack);
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&ctx,100); // we check the depth down below
- X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(&ctx,error_callback);
-
- int ret=X509_verify_cert(&ctx);
- if (ret==1) {
- // Now see if the depth was acceptable by counting the number of intermediates.
- int depth=sk_X509_num(ctx.chain)-2;
- if (pkixInfo->getVerificationDepth() < depth) {
- log.error(
- "certificate chain was too long (%d intermediates, only %d allowed)",
- (depth==-1) ? 0 : depth,
- pkixInfo->getVerificationDepth()
- );
- ret=0;
- }
}
-
+
// Clean up...
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
X509_STORE_free(store);
projects / shibboleth / cpp-xmltooling.git / blobdiff