X-Git-Url: http://www.project-moonshot.org/gitweb/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=accept_sec_context.c;h=981a7d8b3d29a36a69e6a110d83768a5e37b4f7d;hb=6fd9f5a521f9efa7cb9dd43f90ae8f33c83c66e1;hp=3e0654bfc89622e45b276dd4605e2a0311459de1;hpb=31cef49681566dc99790812f31de834dfce02c74;p=mech_eap.git

diff --git a/accept_sec_context.c b/accept_sec_context.c
index 3e0654b..981a7d8 100644
--- a/accept_sec_context.c
+++ b/accept_sec_context.c
@@ -32,3 +32,515 @@
 
 #include "gssapiP_eap.h"
 
+/*
+ * Mark a context as ready for cryptographic operations
+ */
+static OM_uint32
+acceptReady(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred)
+{
+    OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+    VALUE_PAIR *vp;
+    gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+
+    /* Cache encryption type derived from selected mechanism OID */
+    major = gssEapOidToEnctype(minor, ctx->mechanismUsed,
+                               &ctx->encryptionType);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
+
+    gssEapReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &ctx->initiatorName);
+
+    vp = rc_avpair_get(ctx->acceptorCtx.avps, PW_USER_NAME, 0);
+    if (vp != NULL) {
+        nameBuf.length = vp->lvalue;
+        nameBuf.value = vp->strvalue;
+    } else {
+        ctx->gssFlags |= GSS_C_ANON_FLAG;
+    }
+
+    major = gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
+                             &ctx->initiatorName);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
+
+    ctx->initiatorName->attrCtx = gssEapCreateAttrContext(cred, ctx);
+
+    vp = rc_avpair_get(ctx->acceptorCtx.avps,
+                       VENDOR_ATTR_MS_MPPE_SEND_KEY,
+                       VENDOR_ID_MICROSOFT);
+    if (ctx->encryptionType != ENCTYPE_NULL && vp != NULL) {
+        major = gssEapDeriveRfc3961Key(minor,
+                                       (unsigned char *)vp->strvalue,
+                                       vp->lvalue,
+                                       ctx->encryptionType,
+                                       &ctx->rfc3961Key);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+            return major;
+
+        major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key,
+                                           &ctx->checksumType);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+            return major;
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * draft-howlett-eap-gss says that integrity/confidentialty should
+         * always be advertised as available, but if we have no keying
+         * material it seems confusing to the caller to advertise this.
+         */
+        ctx->gssFlags &= ~(GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_CONF_FLAG);
+        ctx->encryptionType = ENCTYPE_NULL;
+    }
+
+    major = sequenceInit(minor,
+                         &ctx->seqState, ctx->recvSeq,
+                         ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG) != 0),
+                         ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG) != 0),
+                         TRUE);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
+
+    return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
+                       gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+                       gss_cred_id_t cred,
+                       gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+                       gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+                       gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+{
+    OM_uint32 major;
+    union {
+        struct eap_hdr pdu;
+        unsigned char data[5];
+    } pkt;
+    gss_buffer_desc pktBuffer;
+
+    if (inputToken != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER && inputToken->length != 0)
+        return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+    assert(ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle == NULL);
+
+    major = gssEapRadiusAllocHandle(minor, cred, &ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
+
+    assert(ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME);
+
+    if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
+        major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+            return major;
+    }
+
+    pkt.pdu.code = EAP_CODE_REQUEST;
+    pkt.pdu.identifier = 0;
+    pkt.pdu.length = htons(sizeof(pkt.data));
+    pkt.data[4] = EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY;
+
+    pktBuffer.length = sizeof(pkt.data);
+    pktBuffer.value = pkt.data;
+
+    major = duplicateBuffer(minor, &pktBuffer, outputToken);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
+
+    ctx->state = EAP_STATE_AUTHENTICATE;
+
+    return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
+                    gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+                    VALUE_PAIR **avps)
+{
+    OM_uint32 major;
+    gss_buffer_desc nameBuf;
+    krb5_context krbContext = NULL;
+    krb5_principal krbPrinc;
+
+    /* Awaits further specification */
+    if (ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME)
+        return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+
+    GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
+
+    krbPrinc = ctx->acceptorName->krbPrincipal;
+    assert(krbPrinc != NULL);
+
+    if (krb5_princ_size(krbContext, krbPrinc) < 2)
+        return GSS_S_BAD_NAME;
+
+    /* Acceptor-Service-Name */
+    krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_component(krbContext, krbPrinc, 0), &nameBuf);
+
+    major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps,
+                             VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_NAME,
+                             VENDOR_ID_UKERNA,
+                             &nameBuf);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
+
+    /* Acceptor-Host-Name */
+    krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_component(krbContext, krbPrinc, 1), &nameBuf);
+
+    major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps,
+                             VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_HOST_NAME,
+                             VENDOR_ID_UKERNA,
+                             &nameBuf);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
+
+    if (krb5_princ_size(krbContext, krbPrinc) > 2) {
+        /* Acceptor-Service-Specific */
+        krb5_principal_data ssiPrinc = *krbPrinc;
+        char *ssi;
+
+        krb5_princ_size(krbContext, &ssiPrinc) -= 2;
+        krb5_princ_name(krbContext, &ssiPrinc) += 2;
+
+        *minor = krb5_unparse_name_flags(krbContext, &ssiPrinc,
+                                         KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &ssi);
+        if (*minor != 0)
+            return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+        nameBuf.value = ssi;
+        nameBuf.length = strlen(ssi);
+
+        major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps,
+                                 VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_SPECIFIC,
+                                 VENDOR_ID_UKERNA,
+                                 &nameBuf);
+
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+            krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi);
+            return major;
+        }
+        krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi);
+    }
+
+    krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_realm(krbContext, krbPrinc), &nameBuf);
+    if (nameBuf.length != 0) {
+        /* Acceptor-Realm-Name */
+        major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps,
+                                 VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_REALM_NAME,
+                                 VENDOR_ID_UKERNA,
+                                 &nameBuf);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+            return major;
+    }
+
+    return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate(OM_uint32 *minor,
+                           gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+                           gss_cred_id_t cred,
+                           gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+                           gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+                           gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+{
+    OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+    int code;
+    VALUE_PAIR *send = NULL;
+    VALUE_PAIR *received = NULL;
+    rc_handle *rh = ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle;
+    char msgBuffer[4096];
+    struct eap_hdr *pdu;
+    unsigned char *pos;
+    gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+
+    pdu = (struct eap_hdr *)inputToken->value;
+    pos = (unsigned char *)(pdu + 1);
+
+    if (inputToken->length > sizeof(*pdu) &&
+        pdu->code == EAP_CODE_RESPONSE &&
+        pos[0] == EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY) {
+        /*
+         * XXX TODO do we really need to set User-Name? FreeRADIUS does
+         * not appear to require it.
+         */
+        major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_USER_NAME, 0, &nameBuf);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+            goto cleanup;
+
+        major = setAcceptorIdentity(minor, ctx, &send);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+            goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, inputToken);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        goto cleanup;
+
+    if (ctx->acceptorCtx.lastStatus == CHALLENGE_RC) {
+        major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_STATE, 0,
+                                 &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+            goto cleanup;
+
+        gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
+    }
+
+    code = rc_auth(rh, 0, send, &received, msgBuffer);
+    switch (code) {
+    case OK_RC:
+    case CHALLENGE_RC:
+        major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
+        break;
+    case TIMEOUT_RC:
+        major = GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+        break;
+    case REJECT_RC:
+        major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL;
+        break;
+    default:
+        major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        goto cleanup;
+
+    ctx->acceptorCtx.lastStatus = code;
+
+    major = getBufferFromAvps(minor, received, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0,
+                              outputToken, TRUE);
+    if ((major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && code != OK_RC) ||
+        GSS_ERROR(major))
+        goto cleanup;
+
+    if (code == CHALLENGE_RC) {
+        major = getBufferFromAvps(minor, received, PW_STATE, 0,
+                                  &ctx->acceptorCtx.state, TRUE);
+        if (major != GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && GSS_ERROR(major))
+            goto cleanup;
+    } else {
+        ctx->acceptorCtx.avps = received;
+        received = NULL;
+
+        major = acceptReady(minor, ctx, cred);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+            goto cleanup;
+
+        ctx->state = EAP_STATE_GSS_CHANNEL_BINDINGS;
+    }
+
+    major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
+
+cleanup:
+    if (received != NULL)
+        rc_avpair_free(received);
+
+    return major;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings(OM_uint32 *minor,
+                                 gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+                                 gss_cred_id_t cred,
+                                 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+                                 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+                                 gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+{
+    OM_uint32 major;
+    gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[2];
+
+    outputToken->length = 0;
+    outputToken->value = NULL;
+
+    if (chanBindings == GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS) {
+        ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
+        return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+    }
+
+    if (inputToken->length < 14) {
+        return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+    }
+
+    iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA;
+    iov[0].buffer.length = 0;
+    iov[0].buffer.value = NULL;
+
+    if (chanBindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS)
+        iov[0].buffer = chanBindings->application_data;
+
+    iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_HEADER;
+    iov[1].buffer.length = 16;
+    iov[1].buffer.value = (unsigned char *)inputToken->value - 2;
+
+    assert(load_uint16_be(iov[1].buffer.value) == TOK_TYPE_GSS_CB);
+
+    iov[2].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_TRAILER;
+    iov[2].buffer.length = inputToken->length - 14;
+    iov[2].buffer.value = (unsigned char *)inputToken->value + 14;
+
+    major = gssEapUnwrapOrVerifyMIC(minor, ctx, NULL, NULL,
+                                    iov, 3, TOK_TYPE_GSS_CB);
+    if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+        ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
+    }
+
+#if 0
+    gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &iov[0].buffer);
+#endif
+
+    return major;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptKrbCred(OM_uint32 *minor,
+                      gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+                      gss_cred_id_t cred,
+                      gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+                      gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+                      gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+{
+    /* Called with already established context */
+    *minor = EINVAL;
+    return GSS_S_BAD_STATUS;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptEstablished(OM_uint32 *minor,
+                          gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+                          gss_cred_id_t cred,
+                          gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+                          gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+                          gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+{
+    /* Called with already established context */
+    *minor = EINVAL;
+    return GSS_S_BAD_STATUS;
+}
+
+static struct gss_eap_acceptor_sm {
+    enum gss_eap_token_type inputTokenType;
+    enum gss_eap_token_type outputTokenType;
+    OM_uint32 (*processToken)(OM_uint32 *,
+                              gss_ctx_id_t,
+                              gss_cred_id_t,
+                              gss_buffer_t,
+                              gss_channel_bindings_t,
+                              gss_buffer_t);
+} eapGssAcceptorSm[] = {
+    { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP,    TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ,  eapGssSmAcceptIdentity           },
+    { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP,    TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ,  eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate       },
+    { TOK_TYPE_GSS_CB,      TOK_TYPE_NONE,     eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings },
+    { TOK_TYPE_NONE,        TOK_TYPE_KRB_CRED, eapGssSmAcceptKrbCred            },
+    { TOK_TYPE_NONE,        TOK_TYPE_NONE,     eapGssSmAcceptEstablished        },
+};
+
+OM_uint32
+gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor,
+                       gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
+                       gss_cred_id_t cred,
+                       gss_buffer_t input_token,
+                       gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
+                       gss_name_t *src_name,
+                       gss_OID *mech_type,
+                       gss_buffer_t output_token,
+                       OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
+                       OM_uint32 *time_rec,
+                       gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle)
+{
+    OM_uint32 major;
+    OM_uint32 tmpMajor, tmpMinor;
+    gss_ctx_id_t ctx = *context_handle;
+    struct gss_eap_acceptor_sm *sm = NULL;
+    gss_buffer_desc innerInputToken = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+    gss_buffer_desc innerOutputToken = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+
+    *minor = 0;
+
+    output_token->length = 0;
+    output_token->value = NULL;
+
+    if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && !(cred->flags & CRED_FLAG_ACCEPT)) {
+        return GSS_S_NO_CRED;
+    }
+
+    if (input_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER || input_token->length == 0) {
+        return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
+        major = gssEapAllocContext(minor, &ctx);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+            return major;
+
+        *context_handle = ctx;
+    }
+
+    GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&ctx->mutex);
+
+    sm = &eapGssAcceptorSm[ctx->state];
+
+    major = gssEapVerifyToken(minor, ctx, input_token,
+                              sm->inputTokenType, &innerInputToken);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        goto cleanup;
+
+    /* If credentials were provided, check they're usable with this mech */
+    if (!gssEapCredAvailable(cred, ctx->mechanismUsed)) {
+        major = GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    do {
+        sm = &eapGssAcceptorSm[ctx->state];
+
+        major = (sm->processToken)(minor,
+                                   ctx,
+                                   cred,
+                                   &innerInputToken,
+                                   input_chan_bindings,
+                                   &innerOutputToken);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+            goto cleanup;
+    } while (major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED && innerOutputToken.length == 0);
+
+    if (mech_type != NULL) {
+        if (!gssEapInternalizeOid(ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type))
+            duplicateOid(&tmpMinor, ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type);
+    }
+    if (innerOutputToken.length != 0) {
+        tmpMajor = gssEapMakeToken(&tmpMinor, ctx, &innerOutputToken,
+                                   sm->outputTokenType, output_token);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(tmpMajor)) {
+            major = tmpMajor;
+            *minor = tmpMinor;
+            goto cleanup;
+        }
+    }
+    if (ret_flags != NULL)
+        *ret_flags = ctx->gssFlags;
+    if (delegated_cred_handle != NULL)
+        *delegated_cred_handle = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+
+    if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+        if (src_name != NULL && ctx->initiatorName != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
+            major = gssEapDuplicateName(&tmpMinor, ctx->initiatorName, src_name);
+            if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+                goto cleanup;
+        }
+        if (time_rec != NULL)
+            gssEapContextTime(&tmpMinor, ctx, time_rec);
+    }
+
+    assert(ctx->state == EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED || major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+
+cleanup:
+    GSSEAP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ctx->mutex);
+
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        gssEapReleaseContext(&tmpMinor, context_handle);
+
+    gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &innerOutputToken);
+
+    return major;
+}
+