X-Git-Url: http://www.project-moonshot.org/gitweb/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=accept_sec_context.c;h=afbfb3f901ce25040d5bda81fbe7e642825dcce8;hb=refs%2Fheads%2Fjson-name;hp=b977242b81855ff75455c79985a8674925494997;hpb=42b89b66a1d432ead5b424a7d39afec2d76bd7af;p=mech_eap.orig diff --git a/accept_sec_context.c b/accept_sec_context.c index b977242..afbfb3f 100644 --- a/accept_sec_context.c +++ b/accept_sec_context.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright (c) 2010, JANET(UK) + * Copyright (c) 2011, JANET(UK) * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without @@ -30,20 +30,30 @@ * SUCH DAMAGE. */ +/* + * Establish a security context on the acceptor (server). These functions + * wrap around libradsec and (thus) talk to a RADIUS server or proxy. + */ + #include "gssapiP_eap.h" #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH static OM_uint32 eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor, - gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred, - gss_buffer_t inputToken, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + gss_name_t target, + gss_OID mech, + OM_uint32 reqFlags, + OM_uint32 timeReq, gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings, - gss_buffer_t outputToken); + gss_buffer_t inputToken, + gss_buffer_t outputToken, + OM_uint32 *smFlags); #endif /* - * Mark a context as ready for cryptographic operations + * Mark an acceptor context as ready for cryptographic operations */ static OM_uint32 acceptReadyEap(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred) @@ -60,47 +70,43 @@ acceptReadyEap(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred) gssEapReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &ctx->initiatorName); - vp = rc_avpair_get(ctx->acceptorCtx.avps, PW_USER_NAME, 0); - if (vp != NULL) { - nameBuf.length = vp->lvalue; - nameBuf.value = vp->strvalue; + major = gssEapRadiusGetRawAvp(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.vps, + PW_USER_NAME, 0, &vp); + if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + nameBuf.length = vp->length; + nameBuf.value = vp->vp_strvalue; } else { ctx->gssFlags |= GSS_C_ANON_FLAG; } - major = gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, + major = gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf, + (ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_ANON_FLAG) ? + GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS : GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, + ctx->mechanismUsed, &ctx->initiatorName); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; - ctx->initiatorName->attrCtx = gssEapCreateAttrContext(cred, ctx); - - vp = rc_avpair_get(ctx->acceptorCtx.avps, - VENDOR_ATTR_MS_MPPE_SEND_KEY, - VENDOR_ID_MICROSOFT); - if (ctx->encryptionType != ENCTYPE_NULL && vp != NULL) { - major = gssEapDeriveRfc3961Key(minor, - (unsigned char *)vp->strvalue, - vp->lvalue, - ctx->encryptionType, - &ctx->rfc3961Key); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - return major; - - major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key, - &ctx->checksumType); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - return major; - } else { - /* - * draft-howlett-eap-gss says that integrity/confidentialty should - * always be advertised as available, but if we have no keying - * material it seems confusing to the caller to advertise this. - */ - ctx->gssFlags &= ~(GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_CONF_FLAG); - ctx->encryptionType = ENCTYPE_NULL; + major = gssEapRadiusGetRawAvp(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.vps, + PW_MS_MPPE_SEND_KEY, VENDORPEC_MS, &vp); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) { + *minor = GSSEAP_KEY_UNAVAILABLE; + return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; } + major = gssEapDeriveRfc3961Key(minor, + vp->vp_octets, + vp->length, + ctx->encryptionType, + &ctx->rfc3961Key); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; + + major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key, + &ctx->checksumType); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; + major = sequenceInit(minor, &ctx->seqState, ctx->recvSeq, ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG) != 0), @@ -109,104 +115,259 @@ acceptReadyEap(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred) if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; + major = gssEapCreateAttrContext(minor, cred, ctx, + &ctx->initiatorName->attrCtx, + &ctx->expiryTime); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; + + *minor = 0; return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } static OM_uint32 +eapGssSmAcceptAcceptorName(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_cred_id_t cred GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_buffer_t inputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_buffer_t outputToken, + OM_uint32 *smFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED) +{ + OM_uint32 major; + + /* XXX TODO import and validate name from inputToken */ + + if (ctx->acceptorName != GSS_C_NO_NAME) { + /* Send desired target name to acceptor */ + major = gssEapDisplayName(minor, ctx->acceptorName, + outputToken, NULL); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; + } + + return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; +} + +#ifdef GSSEAP_DEBUG +static OM_uint32 +eapGssSmAcceptVendorInfo(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_cred_id_t cred GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_buffer_t inputToken, + gss_buffer_t outputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 *smFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "GSS-EAP: vendor: %.*s\n", + (int)inputToken->length, (char *)inputToken->value); + + *minor = 0; + return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; +} +#endif + + +/* + * Emit a identity EAP request to force the initiator (peer) to identify + * itself. + */ +static OM_uint32 eapGssSmAcceptIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor, - gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED, gss_buffer_t inputToken, - gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings, - gss_buffer_t outputToken) + gss_buffer_t outputToken, + OM_uint32 *smFlags) { OM_uint32 major; - union { - struct eap_hdr pdu; - unsigned char data[5]; - } pkt; + struct wpabuf *reqData; gss_buffer_desc pktBuffer; - if (inputToken != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER && inputToken->length != 0) - return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; - - assert(ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME); + if (!gssEapCredAvailable(cred, ctx->mechanismUsed)) { + *minor = GSSEAP_CRED_MECH_MISMATCH; + return GSS_S_BAD_MECH; + } - if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) { - major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - return major; + if (inputToken != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER && inputToken->length != 0) { + *minor = GSSEAP_WRONG_SIZE; + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; } - pkt.pdu.code = EAP_CODE_REQUEST; - pkt.pdu.identifier = 0; - pkt.pdu.length = htons(sizeof(pkt.data)); - pkt.data[4] = EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY; + reqData = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY, 0, + EAP_CODE_REQUEST, 0); + if (reqData == NULL) { + *minor = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } - pktBuffer.length = sizeof(pkt.data); - pktBuffer.value = pkt.data; + pktBuffer.length = wpabuf_len(reqData); + pktBuffer.value = (void *)wpabuf_head(reqData); major = duplicateBuffer(minor, &pktBuffer, outputToken); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; - ctx->state = EAP_STATE_AUTHENTICATE; + wpabuf_free(reqData); + + GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION_NEXT(ctx); + + *minor = 0; + *smFlags |= SM_FLAG_OUTPUT_TOKEN_CRITICAL; return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; } +/* + * Returns TRUE if the input token contains an EAP identity response. + */ +static int +isIdentityResponseP(gss_buffer_t inputToken) +{ + struct wpabuf respData; + + wpabuf_set(&respData, inputToken->value, inputToken->length); + + return (eap_get_type(&respData) == EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY); +} + +/* + * Save the asserted initiator identity from the EAP identity response. + */ +static OM_uint32 +importInitiatorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + gss_buffer_t inputToken) +{ + OM_uint32 tmpMinor; + struct wpabuf respData; + const unsigned char *pos; + size_t len; + gss_buffer_desc nameBuf; + + wpabuf_set(&respData, inputToken->value, inputToken->length); + + pos = eap_hdr_validate(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY, + &respData, &len); + if (pos == NULL) { + *minor = GSSEAP_PEER_BAD_MESSAGE; + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + } + + nameBuf.value = (void *)pos; + nameBuf.length = len; + + gssEapReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &ctx->initiatorName); + + return gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, + ctx->mechanismUsed, &ctx->initiatorName); +} + +/* + * Pass the asserted initiator identity to the authentication server. + */ +static OM_uint32 +setInitiatorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + VALUE_PAIR **vps) +{ + OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor; + gss_buffer_desc nameBuf; + + /* + * We should have got an EAP identity response, but if we didn't, then + * we will just avoid sending User-Name. Note that radsecproxy requires + * User-Name to be sent on every request (presumably so it can remain + * stateless). + */ + if (ctx->initiatorName != GSS_C_NO_NAME) { + major = gssEapDisplayName(minor, ctx->initiatorName, &nameBuf, NULL); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; + + major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps, PW_USER_NAME, 0, &nameBuf); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; + + gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &nameBuf); + } + + *minor = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +/* + * Pass the asserted acceptor identity to the authentication server. + */ static OM_uint32 setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, - VALUE_PAIR **avps) + VALUE_PAIR **vps) { OM_uint32 major; gss_buffer_desc nameBuf; krb5_context krbContext = NULL; krb5_principal krbPrinc; - rc_handle *rh = ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle; + struct rs_context *rc = ctx->acceptorCtx.radContext; - assert(rh != NULL); + assert(rc != NULL); - /* Awaits further specification */ - if (ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME) + if (ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME) { + *minor = 0; return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } + + if ((ctx->acceptorName->flags & NAME_FLAG_SERVICE) == 0) { + *minor = GSSEAP_BAD_SERVICE_NAME; + return GSS_S_BAD_NAME; + } GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext); krbPrinc = ctx->acceptorName->krbPrincipal; assert(krbPrinc != NULL); - - if (krb5_princ_size(krbContext, krbPrinc) < 2) - return GSS_S_BAD_NAME; + assert(KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(krbPrinc) >= 2); /* Acceptor-Service-Name */ - krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_component(krbContext, krbPrinc, 0), &nameBuf); + krbPrincComponentToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, 0, &nameBuf); - major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, avps, - VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_NAME, - VENDOR_ID_UKERNA, - &nameBuf); + major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps, + PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_NAME, + VENDORPEC_UKERNA, + &nameBuf); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; /* Acceptor-Host-Name */ - krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_component(krbContext, krbPrinc, 1), &nameBuf); + krbPrincComponentToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, 1, &nameBuf); - major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, avps, - VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_HOST_NAME, - VENDOR_ID_UKERNA, - &nameBuf); + major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps, + PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_HOST_NAME, + VENDORPEC_UKERNA, + &nameBuf); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; - if (krb5_princ_size(krbContext, krbPrinc) > 2) { + if (KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(krbPrinc) > 2) { /* Acceptor-Service-Specific */ krb5_principal_data ssiPrinc = *krbPrinc; char *ssi; - krb5_princ_size(krbContext, &ssiPrinc) -= 2; - krb5_princ_name(krbContext, &ssiPrinc) += 2; + KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(&ssiPrinc) -= 2; + KRB_PRINC_NAME(&ssiPrinc) += 2; *minor = krb5_unparse_name_flags(krbContext, &ssiPrinc, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &ssi); @@ -216,10 +377,10 @@ setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor, nameBuf.value = ssi; nameBuf.length = strlen(ssi); - major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, avps, - VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_SPECIFIC, - VENDOR_ID_UKERNA, - &nameBuf); + major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps, + PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_SPECIFIC, + VENDORPEC_UKERNA, + &nameBuf); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) { krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi); @@ -228,136 +389,239 @@ setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor, krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi); } - krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_realm(krbContext, krbPrinc), &nameBuf); + krbPrincRealmToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, &nameBuf); if (nameBuf.length != 0) { /* Acceptor-Realm-Name */ - major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, avps, - VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_REALM_NAME, - VENDOR_ID_UKERNA, - &nameBuf); + major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps, + PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_REALM_NAME, + VENDORPEC_UKERNA, + &nameBuf); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; } + *minor = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +/* + * Allocate a RadSec handle + */ +static OM_uint32 +createRadiusHandle(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_cred_id_t cred, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx) +{ + struct gss_eap_acceptor_ctx *actx = &ctx->acceptorCtx; + const char *configFile = RS_CONFIG_FILE; + const char *configStanza = "gss-eap"; + struct rs_alloc_scheme ralloc; + struct rs_error *err; + + assert(actx->radContext == NULL); + assert(actx->radConn == NULL); + + if (rs_context_create(&actx->radContext) != 0) { + *minor = GSSEAP_RADSEC_CONTEXT_FAILURE; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + if (cred->radiusConfigFile != NULL) + configFile = cred->radiusConfigFile; + if (cred->radiusConfigStanza != NULL) + configStanza = cred->radiusConfigStanza; + + ralloc.calloc = GSSEAP_CALLOC; + ralloc.malloc = GSSEAP_MALLOC; + ralloc.free = GSSEAP_FREE; + ralloc.realloc = GSSEAP_REALLOC; + + rs_context_set_alloc_scheme(actx->radContext, &ralloc); + + if (rs_context_read_config(actx->radContext, configFile) != 0) { + err = rs_err_ctx_pop(actx->radContext); + goto fail; + } + + if (rs_context_init_freeradius_dict(actx->radContext, NULL) != 0) { + err = rs_err_ctx_pop(actx->radContext); + goto fail; + } + + if (rs_conn_create(actx->radContext, &actx->radConn, configStanza) != 0) { + err = rs_err_conn_pop(actx->radConn); + goto fail; + } + + if (actx->radServer != NULL) { + if (rs_conn_select_peer(actx->radConn, actx->radServer) != 0) { + err = rs_err_conn_pop(actx->radConn); + goto fail; + } + } + + *minor = 0; return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + +fail: + return gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, err); } +/* + * Process a EAP response from the initiator. + */ static OM_uint32 eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate(OM_uint32 *minor, - gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED, gss_buffer_t inputToken, - gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings, - gss_buffer_t outputToken) + gss_buffer_t outputToken, + OM_uint32 *smFlags) { OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor; - rc_handle *rh; - int code; - VALUE_PAIR *send = NULL; - VALUE_PAIR *received = NULL; - char msgBuffer[4096]; - struct eap_hdr *pdu; - unsigned char *pos; - gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + struct rs_connection *rconn; + struct rs_request *request = NULL; + struct rs_packet *req = NULL, *resp = NULL; + struct radius_packet *frreq, *frresp; - if (ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle == NULL) { + if (ctx->acceptorCtx.radContext == NULL) { /* May be NULL from an imported partial context */ - major = gssEapRadiusAllocHandle(minor, cred, ctx); + major = createRadiusHandle(minor, cred, ctx); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; } - rh = ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle; - - pdu = (struct eap_hdr *)inputToken->value; - pos = (unsigned char *)(pdu + 1); - - if (inputToken->length > sizeof(*pdu) && - pdu->code == EAP_CODE_RESPONSE && - pos[0] == EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY) { - /* - * XXX TODO do we really need to set User-Name? FreeRADIUS does - * not require it but some other RADIUS servers might. - */ - major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_USER_NAME, 0, &nameBuf); + if (isIdentityResponseP(inputToken)) { + major = importInitiatorIdentity(minor, ctx, inputToken); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - goto cleanup; + return major; + } - major = setAcceptorIdentity(minor, ctx, &send); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - goto cleanup; + rconn = ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn; + + if (rs_packet_create_authn_request(rconn, &req, NULL, NULL) != 0) { + major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn)); + goto cleanup; } + frreq = rs_packet_frpkt(req); + + major = setInitiatorIdentity(minor, ctx, &frreq->vps); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + goto cleanup; - major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, inputToken); + major = setAcceptorIdentity(minor, ctx, &frreq->vps); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + goto cleanup; + + major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, &frreq->vps, + PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, inputToken); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; if (ctx->acceptorCtx.state.length != 0) { - major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_STATE, 0, - &ctx->acceptorCtx.state); + major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, &frreq->vps, PW_STATE, 0, + &ctx->acceptorCtx.state); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &ctx->acceptorCtx.state); } - code = rc_auth(rh, 0, send, &received, msgBuffer); - switch (code) { - case OK_RC: - case CHALLENGE_RC: - major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; - break; - case TIMEOUT_RC: - major = GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; + if (rs_request_create(rconn, &request) != 0) { + major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn)); + goto cleanup; + } + + rs_request_add_reqpkt(request, req); + req = NULL; + + if (rs_request_send(request, &resp) != 0) { + major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn)); + goto cleanup; + } + + assert(resp != NULL); + + frresp = rs_packet_frpkt(resp); + switch (frresp->code) { + case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE: + case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK: break; - case REJECT_RC: + case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT: + *minor = GSSEAP_RADIUS_AUTH_FAILURE; major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL; + goto cleanup; break; default: + *minor = GSSEAP_UNKNOWN_RADIUS_CODE; major = GSS_S_FAILURE; goto cleanup; + break; } - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + major = gssEapRadiusGetAvp(minor, frresp->vps, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, + outputToken, TRUE); + if (major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && frresp->code == PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE) { + *minor = GSSEAP_MISSING_EAP_REQUEST; + major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; goto cleanup; - - major = getBufferFromAvps(minor, received, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, - outputToken, TRUE); - if ((major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && code != OK_RC) || - GSS_ERROR(major)) + } else if (GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; - if (code == CHALLENGE_RC) { - major = getBufferFromAvps(minor, received, PW_STATE, 0, - &ctx->acceptorCtx.state, TRUE); - if (major != GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && GSS_ERROR(major)) + if (frresp->code == PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE) { + major = gssEapRadiusGetAvp(minor, frresp->vps, PW_STATE, 0, + &ctx->acceptorCtx.state, TRUE); + if (GSS_ERROR(major) && *minor != GSSEAP_NO_SUCH_ATTR) goto cleanup; } else { - ctx->acceptorCtx.avps = received; - received = NULL; + ctx->acceptorCtx.vps = frresp->vps; + frresp->vps = NULL; major = acceptReadyEap(minor, ctx, cred); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; - ctx->state = EAP_STATE_EXTENSIONS_REQ; + GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION_NEXT(ctx); } major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; + *minor = 0; + *smFlags |= SM_FLAG_OUTPUT_TOKEN_CRITICAL; cleanup: - if (received != NULL) - rc_avpair_free(received); + if (request != NULL) + rs_request_destroy(request); + if (req != NULL) + rs_packet_destroy(req); + if (resp != NULL) + rs_packet_destroy(resp); + if (GSSEAP_SM_STATE(ctx) == GSSEAP_STATE_INITIATOR_EXTS) { + assert(major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); + + rs_conn_destroy(ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn); + ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn = NULL; + } return major; } static OM_uint32 -acceptGssChannelBindings(OM_uint32 *minor, - gss_ctx_id_t ctx, - gss_cred_id_t cred, - gss_buffer_t inputToken, - gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings) +eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_cred_id_t cred GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings, + gss_buffer_t inputToken, + gss_buffer_t outputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 *smFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED) { OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor; gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[2]; @@ -377,8 +641,10 @@ acceptGssChannelBindings(OM_uint32 *minor, if (chanBindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS && !bufferEqual(&iov[0].buffer, &chanBindings->application_data)) { major = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS; + *minor = GSSEAP_BINDINGS_MISMATCH; } else { major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; + *minor = 0; } gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &iov[0].buffer); @@ -386,99 +652,147 @@ acceptGssChannelBindings(OM_uint32 *minor, return major; } +#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH static OM_uint32 -eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsReq(OM_uint32 *minor, - gss_ctx_id_t ctx, - gss_cred_id_t cred, - gss_buffer_t inputToken, - gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings, - gss_buffer_t outputToken) +eapGssSmAcceptReauthCreds(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_cred_id_t cred, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_buffer_t inputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_buffer_t outputToken, + OM_uint32 *smFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED) { OM_uint32 major; - outputToken->length = 0; - outputToken->value = NULL; - - major = acceptGssChannelBindings(minor, ctx, cred, inputToken, - chanBindings); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - return major; - - ctx->state = EAP_STATE_EXTENSIONS_RESP; - - return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; -} - -static OM_uint32 -eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsResp(OM_uint32 *minor, - gss_ctx_id_t ctx, - gss_cred_id_t cred, - gss_buffer_t inputToken, - gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings, - gss_buffer_t outputToken) -{ - OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor; - gss_buffer_desc credsToken = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; - -#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH /* * If we're built with fast reauthentication enabled, then * fabricate a ticket from the initiator to ourselves. - * Otherwise return an empty token. */ - major = gssEapMakeReauthCreds(minor, ctx, cred, &credsToken); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - return major; -#else - credsToken.value = ""; -#endif /* GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH */ - - major = duplicateBuffer(minor, &credsToken, outputToken); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) { - gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &credsToken); - return major; - } + major = gssEapMakeReauthCreds(minor, ctx, cred, outputToken); + if (major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE) + major = GSS_S_COMPLETE; + if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) + major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; -#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH - gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &credsToken); + return major; +} #endif - ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED; +static OM_uint32 +eapGssSmAcceptCompleteInitiatorExts(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_cred_id_t cred GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_buffer_t inputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_buffer_t outputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 *smFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED) +{ + GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION_NEXT(ctx); - return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + *minor = 0; + + return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; } static OM_uint32 -eapGssSmAcceptEstablished(OM_uint32 *minor, - gss_ctx_id_t ctx, - gss_cred_id_t cred, - gss_buffer_t inputToken, - gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings, - gss_buffer_t outputToken) +eapGssSmAcceptCompleteAcceptorExts(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_cred_id_t cred GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_buffer_t inputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_buffer_t outputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 *smFlags) { - /* Called with already established context */ - *minor = EINVAL; - return GSS_S_BAD_STATUS; + GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION(ctx, GSSEAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED); + + *minor = 0; + *smFlags |= SM_FLAG_FORCE_SEND_TOKEN; + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } -static struct gss_eap_acceptor_sm { - enum gss_eap_token_type inputTokenType; - enum gss_eap_token_type outputTokenType; - OM_uint32 (*processToken)(OM_uint32 *, - gss_ctx_id_t, - gss_cred_id_t, - gss_buffer_t, - gss_channel_bindings_t, - gss_buffer_t); -} eapGssAcceptorSm[] = { - { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, eapGssSmAcceptIdentity }, - { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate }, - { TOK_TYPE_EXT_REQ, TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsReq }, - { TOK_TYPE_NONE, TOK_TYPE_EXT_RESP, eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsResp }, - { TOK_TYPE_NONE, TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmAcceptEstablished }, +static struct gss_eap_sm eapGssAcceptorSm[] = { + { + ITOK_TYPE_ACCEPTOR_NAME_REQ, + ITOK_TYPE_ACCEPTOR_NAME_RESP, + GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL, + 0, + eapGssSmAcceptAcceptorName + }, +#ifdef GSSEAP_DEBUG + { + ITOK_TYPE_VENDOR_INFO, + ITOK_TYPE_NONE, + GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL, + 0, + eapGssSmAcceptVendorInfo, + }, +#endif #ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH - { TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH, TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH, eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth }, + { + ITOK_TYPE_REAUTH_REQ, + ITOK_TYPE_REAUTH_RESP, + GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL, + 0, + eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth, + }, #endif + { + ITOK_TYPE_NONE, + ITOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, + GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL, + SM_ITOK_FLAG_REQUIRED, + eapGssSmAcceptIdentity, + }, + { + ITOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, + ITOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, + GSSEAP_STATE_AUTHENTICATE, + SM_ITOK_FLAG_REQUIRED, + eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate + }, + { + ITOK_TYPE_GSS_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, + ITOK_TYPE_NONE, + GSSEAP_STATE_INITIATOR_EXTS, + SM_ITOK_FLAG_REQUIRED, + eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings, + }, + { + ITOK_TYPE_NONE, + ITOK_TYPE_NONE, + GSSEAP_STATE_INITIATOR_EXTS, + 0, + eapGssSmAcceptCompleteInitiatorExts, + }, +#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH + { + ITOK_TYPE_NONE, + ITOK_TYPE_REAUTH_CREDS, + GSSEAP_STATE_ACCEPTOR_EXTS, + 0, + eapGssSmAcceptReauthCreds, + }, +#endif + { + ITOK_TYPE_NONE, + ITOK_TYPE_NONE, + GSSEAP_STATE_ACCEPTOR_EXTS, + 0, + eapGssSmAcceptCompleteAcceptorExts + }, }; OM_uint32 @@ -494,21 +808,19 @@ gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor, OM_uint32 *time_rec, gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle) { - OM_uint32 major; - OM_uint32 tmpMajor, tmpMinor; + OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor; gss_ctx_id_t ctx = *context_handle; - struct gss_eap_acceptor_sm *sm = NULL; - gss_buffer_desc innerInputToken = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; - gss_buffer_desc innerOutputToken = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; - enum gss_eap_token_type tokType; - int initialContextToken = 0; *minor = 0; output_token->length = 0; output_token->value = NULL; + if (src_name != NULL) + *src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; + if (input_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER || input_token->length == 0) { + *minor = GSSEAP_TOK_TRUNC; return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; } @@ -517,70 +829,56 @@ gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor, if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; - initialContextToken = 1; *context_handle = ctx; } GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&ctx->mutex); - /* Validate and lock credentials */ - if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) { - GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&cred->mutex); - - if ((cred->flags & CRED_FLAG_ACCEPT) == 0) { - major = GSS_S_NO_CRED; - goto cleanup; + if (cred == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) { + if (ctx->defaultCred == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) { + major = gssEapAcquireCred(minor, + GSS_C_NO_NAME, + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, + GSS_C_INDEFINITE, + GSS_C_NO_OID_SET, + GSS_C_ACCEPT, + &ctx->defaultCred, + NULL, + NULL); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + goto cleanup; } - } - - sm = &eapGssAcceptorSm[ctx->state]; - - major = gssEapVerifyToken(minor, ctx, input_token, - &tokType, &innerInputToken); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - goto cleanup; - if (!gssEapCredAvailable(cred, ctx->mechanismUsed)) { - major = GSS_S_BAD_MECH; - goto cleanup; + cred = ctx->defaultCred; } -#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH - /* - * If we're built with fast reauthentication support, it's valid - * for an initiator to send a GSS reauthentication token as its - * initial context token, causing us to short-circuit the state - * machine and process Kerberos GSS messages instead. - */ - if (tokType == TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH && initialContextToken) { - ctx->state = EAP_STATE_KRB_REAUTH_GSS; - } else -#endif - if (tokType != sm->inputTokenType) { - major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; - goto cleanup; - } - - do { - sm = &eapGssAcceptorSm[ctx->state]; + GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&cred->mutex); - major = (sm->processToken)(minor, - ctx, - cred, - &innerInputToken, - input_chan_bindings, - &innerOutputToken); + if (cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) { + major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; - } while (major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED && innerOutputToken.length == 0); + } + + major = gssEapSmStep(minor, + cred, + ctx, + GSS_C_NO_NAME, + GSS_C_NO_OID, + 0, + GSS_C_INDEFINITE, + input_chan_bindings, + input_token, + output_token, + eapGssAcceptorSm, + sizeof(eapGssAcceptorSm) / sizeof(eapGssAcceptorSm[0])); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + goto cleanup; if (mech_type != NULL) { - if (!gssEapInternalizeOid(ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type)) - duplicateOid(&tmpMinor, ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type); - } - if (innerOutputToken.value != NULL) { - tmpMajor = gssEapMakeToken(&tmpMinor, ctx, &innerOutputToken, - sm->outputTokenType, output_token); + OM_uint32 tmpMajor; + + tmpMajor = gssEapCanonicalizeOid(&tmpMinor, ctx->mechanismUsed, 0, mech_type); if (GSS_ERROR(tmpMajor)) { major = tmpMajor; *minor = tmpMinor; @@ -598,11 +896,14 @@ gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor, if (GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; } - if (time_rec != NULL) - gssEapContextTime(&tmpMinor, ctx, time_rec); + if (time_rec != NULL) { + major = gssEapContextTime(&tmpMinor, ctx, time_rec); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + goto cleanup; + } } - assert(ctx->state == EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED || major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); + assert(CTX_IS_ESTABLISHED(ctx) || major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); cleanup: if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) @@ -612,8 +913,6 @@ cleanup: if (GSS_ERROR(major)) gssEapReleaseContext(&tmpMinor, context_handle); - gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &innerOutputToken); - return major; } @@ -628,47 +927,47 @@ acceptReadyKrb(OM_uint32 *minor, { OM_uint32 major; - major = gssEapGlueToMechName(minor, initiator, &ctx->initiatorName); + major = gssEapGlueToMechName(minor, ctx, initiator, &ctx->initiatorName); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; - if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) { - major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - return major; - } - major = gssEapReauthComplete(minor, ctx, cred, mech, timeRec); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; - ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED; - + *minor = 0; return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } static OM_uint32 eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor, - gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred, - gss_buffer_t inputToken, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_OID mech, + OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED, gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings, - gss_buffer_t outputToken) + gss_buffer_t inputToken, + gss_buffer_t outputToken, + OM_uint32 *smFlags) { OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor; - gss_cred_id_t krbCred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; gss_name_t krbInitiator = GSS_C_NO_NAME; - gss_OID mech = GSS_C_NO_OID; OM_uint32 gssFlags, timeRec = GSS_C_INDEFINITE; - ctx->flags |= CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH_GSS; + /* + * If we're built with fast reauthentication support, it's valid + * for an initiator to send a GSS reauthentication token as its + * initial context token, causing us to short-circuit the state + * machine and process Kerberos GSS messages instead. + */ - if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) - krbCred = cred->krbCred; + ctx->flags |= CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH; major = gssAcceptSecContext(minor, &ctx->kerberosCtx, - krbCred, + cred->krbCred, inputToken, chanBindings, &krbInitiator, @@ -680,10 +979,19 @@ eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor, if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { major = acceptReadyKrb(minor, ctx, cred, krbInitiator, mech, timeRec); + if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION(ctx, GSSEAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED); + } + ctx->gssFlags = gssFlags; + } else if (GSS_ERROR(major) && + (*smFlags & SM_FLAG_INPUT_TOKEN_CRITICAL) == 0) { + /* pretend reauthentication attempt never happened */ + gssDeleteSecContext(&tmpMinor, &ctx->kerberosCtx, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + ctx->flags &= ~(CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH); + GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION(ctx, GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL); + major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; } - ctx->gssFlags = gssFlags; - gssReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &krbInitiator); return major;