X-Git-Url: http://www.project-moonshot.org/gitweb/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=accept_sec_context.c;h=c68548f81e04ff0a426d85f46351c25e18230a79;hb=15c93f06ee6ddefa7e7b095351f6e66698c7cc9e;hp=8b984847cad9da7232075fa665d3b4efbf9d4544;hpb=5d599389b81a3f0694db891ce6574394a619ec13;p=mech_eap.orig diff --git a/accept_sec_context.c b/accept_sec_context.c index 8b98484..c68548f 100644 --- a/accept_sec_context.c +++ b/accept_sec_context.c @@ -60,10 +60,11 @@ acceptReadyEap(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred) gssEapReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &ctx->initiatorName); - vp = rc_avpair_get(ctx->acceptorCtx.avps, PW_USER_NAME, 0); - if (vp != NULL) { - nameBuf.length = vp->lvalue; - nameBuf.value = vp->strvalue; + major = gssEapRadiusGetRawAvp(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.vps, + PW_USER_NAME, 0, &vp); + if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + nameBuf.length = vp->length; + nameBuf.value = vp->vp_strvalue; } else { ctx->gssFlags |= GSS_C_ANON_FLAG; } @@ -73,33 +74,25 @@ acceptReadyEap(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred) if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; - ctx->initiatorName->attrCtx = gssEapCreateAttrContext(cred, ctx); + major = gssEapRadiusGetRawAvp(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.vps, + PW_MS_MPPE_SEND_KEY, VENDORPEC_MS, &vp); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) { + *minor = GSSEAP_KEY_UNAVAILABLE; + return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; + } - vp = rc_avpair_get(ctx->acceptorCtx.avps, - VENDOR_ATTR_MS_MPPE_SEND_KEY, - VENDOR_ID_MICROSOFT); - if (ctx->encryptionType != ENCTYPE_NULL && vp != NULL) { - major = gssEapDeriveRfc3961Key(minor, - (unsigned char *)vp->strvalue, - vp->lvalue, - ctx->encryptionType, - &ctx->rfc3961Key); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - return major; + major = gssEapDeriveRfc3961Key(minor, + vp->vp_octets, + vp->length, + ctx->encryptionType, + &ctx->rfc3961Key); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; - major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key, - &ctx->checksumType); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - return major; - } else { - /* - * draft-howlett-eap-gss says that integrity/confidentialty should - * always be advertised as available, but if we have no keying - * material it seems confusing to the caller to advertise this. - */ - ctx->gssFlags &= ~(GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_CONF_FLAG); - ctx->encryptionType = ENCTYPE_NULL; - } + major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key, + &ctx->checksumType); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; major = sequenceInit(minor, &ctx->seqState, ctx->recvSeq, @@ -109,6 +102,8 @@ acceptReadyEap(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred) if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; + ctx->initiatorName->attrCtx = gssEapCreateAttrContext(cred, ctx); + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } @@ -130,12 +125,6 @@ eapGssSmAcceptIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor, if (inputToken != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER && inputToken->length != 0) return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; - assert(ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle == NULL); - - major = gssEapRadiusAllocHandle(minor, cred, &ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - return major; - assert(ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME); if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) { @@ -164,12 +153,15 @@ eapGssSmAcceptIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor, static OM_uint32 setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, - VALUE_PAIR **avps) + VALUE_PAIR **vps) { OM_uint32 major; gss_buffer_desc nameBuf; krb5_context krbContext = NULL; krb5_principal krbPrinc; + struct rs_handle *rh = ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle; + + assert(rh != NULL); /* Awaits further specification */ if (ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME) @@ -186,20 +178,20 @@ setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor, /* Acceptor-Service-Name */ krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_component(krbContext, krbPrinc, 0), &nameBuf); - major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps, - VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_NAME, - VENDOR_ID_UKERNA, - &nameBuf); + major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps, + PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_NAME, + VENDORPEC_UKERNA, + &nameBuf); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; /* Acceptor-Host-Name */ krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_component(krbContext, krbPrinc, 1), &nameBuf); - major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps, - VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_HOST_NAME, - VENDOR_ID_UKERNA, - &nameBuf); + major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps, + PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_HOST_NAME, + VENDORPEC_UKERNA, + &nameBuf); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; @@ -219,10 +211,10 @@ setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor, nameBuf.value = ssi; nameBuf.length = strlen(ssi); - major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps, - VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_SPECIFIC, - VENDOR_ID_UKERNA, - &nameBuf); + major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps, + PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_SPECIFIC, + VENDORPEC_UKERNA, + &nameBuf); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) { krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi); @@ -234,10 +226,10 @@ setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor, krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_realm(krbContext, krbPrinc), &nameBuf); if (nameBuf.length != 0) { /* Acceptor-Realm-Name */ - major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps, - VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_REALM_NAME, - VENDOR_ID_UKERNA, - &nameBuf); + major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps, + PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_REALM_NAME, + VENDORPEC_UKERNA, + &nameBuf); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; } @@ -246,6 +238,66 @@ setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor, } static OM_uint32 +createRadiusHandle(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_cred_id_t cred, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx) +{ + struct gss_eap_acceptor_ctx *actx = &ctx->acceptorCtx; + const char *configFile = RS_CONFIG_FILE; + const char *configStanza = "gss-eap"; + struct rs_alloc_scheme ralloc; + struct rs_error *err; + + assert(actx->radHandle == NULL); + assert(actx->radConn == NULL); + + if (rs_context_create(&actx->radHandle, RS_DICT_FILE) != 0) { + *minor = GSSEAP_RADSEC_INIT_FAILURE; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) { + if (cred->radiusConfigFile != NULL) + configFile = cred->radiusConfigFile; + if (cred->radiusConfigStanza != NULL) + configStanza = cred->radiusConfigStanza; + } + + ralloc.calloc = GSSEAP_CALLOC; + ralloc.malloc = GSSEAP_MALLOC; + ralloc.free = GSSEAP_FREE; + ralloc.realloc = GSSEAP_REALLOC; + + rs_context_set_alloc_scheme(actx->radHandle, &ralloc); + + if (rs_context_read_config(actx->radHandle, configFile) != 0) { + err = rs_err_ctx_pop(actx->radHandle); + goto fail; + } + + if (rs_conn_create(actx->radHandle, &actx->radConn, configStanza) != 0) { + err = rs_err_conn_pop(actx->radConn); + goto fail; + } + + /* XXX TODO rs_conn_select_server does not exist yet */ +#if 0 + if (actx->radServer != NULL) { + if (rs_conn_select_server(actx->radConn, actx->radServer) != 0) { + err = rs_err_conn_pop(actx->radConn); + goto fail; + } + } +#endif + + *minor = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + +fail: + return gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, err); +} + +static OM_uint32 eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred, @@ -254,83 +306,92 @@ eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_buffer_t outputToken) { OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor; - int code; - VALUE_PAIR *send = NULL; - VALUE_PAIR *received = NULL; - rc_handle *rh = ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle; - char msgBuffer[4096]; - struct eap_hdr *pdu; - unsigned char *pos; - gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; - - pdu = (struct eap_hdr *)inputToken->value; - pos = (unsigned char *)(pdu + 1); - - if (inputToken->length > sizeof(*pdu) && - pdu->code == EAP_CODE_RESPONSE && - pos[0] == EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY) { - /* - * XXX TODO do we really need to set User-Name? FreeRADIUS does - * not require it but some other RADIUS servers might. - */ - major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_USER_NAME, 0, &nameBuf); + struct rs_handle *rh; + struct rs_connection *rconn; + struct rs_request *request = NULL; + struct rs_packet *req = NULL, *resp = NULL; + struct radius_packet *frreq, *frresp; + int sendAcceptorIdentity = 0; + + if (ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle == NULL) { + /* May be NULL from an imported partial context */ + major = createRadiusHandle(minor, cred, ctx); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; - major = setAcceptorIdentity(minor, ctx, &send); + sendAcceptorIdentity = 1; + } + + rh = ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle; + rconn = ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn; + + if (rs_packet_create_acc_request(rconn, &req, NULL, NULL) != 0) { + major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn)); + goto cleanup; + } + frreq = rs_packet_frpkt(req); + + if (sendAcceptorIdentity) { + major = setAcceptorIdentity(minor, ctx, &frreq->vps); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; } - major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, inputToken); + major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, &frreq->vps, + PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, inputToken); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; - if (ctx->acceptorCtx.lastStatus == CHALLENGE_RC) { - major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_STATE, 0, - &ctx->acceptorCtx.state); + if (ctx->acceptorCtx.state.length != 0) { + major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, &frreq->vps, PW_STATE, 0, + &ctx->acceptorCtx.state); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &ctx->acceptorCtx.state); } - code = rc_auth(rh, 0, send, &received, msgBuffer); - switch (code) { - case OK_RC: - case CHALLENGE_RC: + if (rs_request_create(rconn, &request) != 0 || + rs_request_send(request, req, &resp) != 0) { + major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn)); + goto cleanup; + } + + assert(resp != NULL); + + frresp = rs_packet_frpkt(resp); + switch (frresp->code) { + case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK: + case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE: major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; break; - case TIMEOUT_RC: - major = GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; - break; - case REJECT_RC: + case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT: major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL; + goto cleanup; break; default: major = GSS_S_FAILURE; goto cleanup; + break; } - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - goto cleanup; - - ctx->acceptorCtx.lastStatus = code; - - major = getBufferFromAvps(minor, received, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, - outputToken, TRUE); - if ((major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && code != OK_RC) || + major = gssEapRadiusGetAvp(minor, frresp->vps, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, + outputToken, TRUE); + if ((major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && frresp->code != PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK) || GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; - if (code == CHALLENGE_RC) { - major = getBufferFromAvps(minor, received, PW_STATE, 0, - &ctx->acceptorCtx.state, TRUE); + if (frresp->code == PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE) { + major = gssEapRadiusGetAvp(minor, frresp->vps, PW_STATE, 0, + &ctx->acceptorCtx.state, TRUE); if (major != GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; } else { - ctx->acceptorCtx.avps = received; - received = NULL; + ctx->acceptorCtx.vps = frresp->vps; + frresp->vps = NULL; + + rs_conn_destroy(ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn); + ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn = NULL; major = acceptReadyEap(minor, ctx, cred); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) @@ -342,42 +403,7 @@ eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate(OM_uint32 *minor, major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; cleanup: - if (received != NULL) - rc_avpair_free(received); - - return major; -} - -static OM_uint32 -acceptGssChannelBindings(OM_uint32 *minor, - gss_ctx_id_t ctx, - gss_cred_id_t cred, - gss_buffer_t inputToken, - gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings) -{ - OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor; - gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[2]; - - iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA | GSS_IOV_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATE; - iov[0].buffer.length = 0; - iov[0].buffer.value = NULL; - - iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_STREAM; - iov[1].buffer = *inputToken; - - major = gssEapUnwrapOrVerifyMIC(minor, ctx, NULL, NULL, - iov, 2, TOK_TYPE_WRAP); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - return major; - - if (chanBindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS && - !bufferEqual(&iov[0].buffer, &chanBindings->application_data)) { - major = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS; - } else { - major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; - } - - gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &iov[0].buffer); + rs_request_destroy(request); return major; } @@ -392,14 +418,13 @@ eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsReq(OM_uint32 *minor, { OM_uint32 major; - outputToken->length = 0; - outputToken->value = NULL; - - major = acceptGssChannelBindings(minor, ctx, cred, inputToken, - chanBindings); + major = gssEapVerifyExtensions(minor, cred, ctx, chanBindings, inputToken); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; + outputToken->length = 0; + outputToken->value = NULL; + ctx->state = EAP_STATE_EXTENSIONS_RESP; return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; @@ -413,31 +438,11 @@ eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsResp(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings, gss_buffer_t outputToken) { - OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor; - gss_buffer_desc credsToken = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + OM_uint32 major; -#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH - /* - * If we're built with fast reauthentication enabled, then - * fabricate a ticket from the initiator to ourselves. - * Otherwise return an empty token. - */ - major = gssEapMakeReauthCreds(minor, ctx, cred, &credsToken); + major = gssEapMakeExtensions(minor, cred, ctx, chanBindings, outputToken); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; -#else - credsToken.value = ""; -#endif /* GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH */ - - major = duplicateBuffer(minor, &credsToken, outputToken); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) { - gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &credsToken); - return major; - } - -#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH - gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &credsToken); -#endif ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED; @@ -453,7 +458,7 @@ eapGssSmAcceptEstablished(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_buffer_t outputToken) { /* Called with already established context */ - *minor = EINVAL; + *minor = GSSEAP_CONTEXT_ESTABLISHED; return GSS_S_BAD_STATUS; } @@ -524,6 +529,7 @@ gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor, GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&cred->mutex); if ((cred->flags & CRED_FLAG_ACCEPT) == 0) { + *minor = GSSEAP_CRED_USAGE_MISMATCH; major = GSS_S_NO_CRED; goto cleanup; } @@ -537,6 +543,7 @@ gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor, goto cleanup; if (!gssEapCredAvailable(cred, ctx->mechanismUsed)) { + *minor = GSSEAP_WRONG_MECH; major = GSS_S_BAD_MECH; goto cleanup; } @@ -553,6 +560,7 @@ gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor, } else #endif if (tokType != sm->inputTokenType) { + *minor = GSSEAP_WRONG_TOK_ID; major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; goto cleanup; }