X-Git-Url: http://www.project-moonshot.org/gitweb/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=accept_sec_context.c;h=d7a4708ff04fba50b529a5ebc9858262c7736cb4;hb=163856b1a70d7773c46d4ea5495b85c4dce0f089;hp=83f6f00df87d9e0a4df8f5dbd9ec9def33661b92;hpb=ef746e48c6b19da0d2b709de370f573eb74480ac;p=mech_eap.orig diff --git a/accept_sec_context.c b/accept_sec_context.c index 83f6f00..d7a4708 100644 --- a/accept_sec_context.c +++ b/accept_sec_context.c @@ -30,10 +30,25 @@ * SUCH DAMAGE. */ +/* + * Establish a security context on the acceptor (server). These functions + * wrap around libradsec and (thus) talk to a RADIUS server or proxy. + */ + #include "gssapiP_eap.h" +#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH +static OM_uint32 +eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + gss_cred_id_t cred, + gss_buffer_t inputToken, + gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings, + gss_buffer_t outputToken); +#endif + /* - * Mark a context as ready for cryptographic operations + * Mark an acceptor context as ready for cryptographic operations */ static OM_uint32 acceptReadyEap(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred) @@ -50,10 +65,11 @@ acceptReadyEap(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred) gssEapReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &ctx->initiatorName); - vp = rc_avpair_get(ctx->acceptorCtx.avps, PW_USER_NAME, 0); - if (vp != NULL) { - nameBuf.length = vp->lvalue; - nameBuf.value = vp->strvalue; + major = gssEapRadiusGetRawAvp(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.vps, + PW_USER_NAME, 0, &vp); + if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + nameBuf.length = vp->length; + nameBuf.value = vp->vp_strvalue; } else { ctx->gssFlags |= GSS_C_ANON_FLAG; } @@ -63,34 +79,26 @@ acceptReadyEap(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred) if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; - ctx->initiatorName->attrCtx = gssEapCreateAttrContext(cred, ctx); - - vp = rc_avpair_get(ctx->acceptorCtx.avps, - VENDOR_ATTR_MS_MPPE_SEND_KEY, - VENDOR_ID_MICROSOFT); - if (ctx->encryptionType != ENCTYPE_NULL && vp != NULL) { - major = gssEapDeriveRfc3961Key(minor, - (unsigned char *)vp->strvalue, - vp->lvalue, - ctx->encryptionType, - &ctx->rfc3961Key); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - return major; - - major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key, - &ctx->checksumType); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - return major; - } else { - /* - * draft-howlett-eap-gss says that integrity/confidentialty should - * always be advertised as available, but if we have no keying - * material it seems confusing to the caller to advertise this. - */ - ctx->gssFlags &= ~(GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_CONF_FLAG); - ctx->encryptionType = ENCTYPE_NULL; + major = gssEapRadiusGetRawAvp(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.vps, + PW_MS_MPPE_SEND_KEY, VENDORPEC_MS, &vp); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) { + *minor = GSSEAP_KEY_UNAVAILABLE; + return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; } + major = gssEapDeriveRfc3961Key(minor, + vp->vp_octets, + vp->length, + ctx->encryptionType, + &ctx->rfc3961Key); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; + + major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key, + &ctx->checksumType); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; + major = sequenceInit(minor, &ctx->seqState, ctx->recvSeq, ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG) != 0), @@ -99,9 +107,20 @@ acceptReadyEap(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred) if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; + major = gssEapCreateAttrContext(minor, cred, ctx, + &ctx->initiatorName->attrCtx, + &ctx->expiryTime); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; + + *minor = 0; return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } +/* + * Emit a identity EAP request to force the initiator (peer) to identify + * itself. + */ static OM_uint32 eapGssSmAcceptIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, @@ -117,14 +136,10 @@ eapGssSmAcceptIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor, } pkt; gss_buffer_desc pktBuffer; - if (inputToken != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER && inputToken->length != 0) + if (inputToken != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER && inputToken->length != 0) { + *minor = GSSEAP_WRONG_SIZE; return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; - - assert(ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle == NULL); - - major = gssEapRadiusAllocHandle(minor, cred, &ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - return major; + } assert(ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME); @@ -146,60 +161,71 @@ eapGssSmAcceptIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor, if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; - ctx->state = EAP_STATE_AUTHENTICATE; + ctx->state = GSSEAP_STATE_AUTHENTICATE; + *minor = 0; return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; } +/* + * Pass the asserted acceptor identity to the authentication server. + */ static OM_uint32 setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, - VALUE_PAIR **avps) + VALUE_PAIR **vps) { OM_uint32 major; gss_buffer_desc nameBuf; krb5_context krbContext = NULL; krb5_principal krbPrinc; + struct rs_context *rc = ctx->acceptorCtx.radContext; - /* Awaits further specification */ - if (ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME) + assert(rc != NULL); + + if (ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME) { + *minor = 0; return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } + + if ((ctx->acceptorName->flags & NAME_FLAG_SERVICE) == 0) { + *minor = GSSEAP_BAD_SERVICE_NAME; + return GSS_S_BAD_NAME; + } GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext); krbPrinc = ctx->acceptorName->krbPrincipal; assert(krbPrinc != NULL); - - if (krb5_princ_size(krbContext, krbPrinc) < 2) - return GSS_S_BAD_NAME; + assert(KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(krbPrinc) >= 2); /* Acceptor-Service-Name */ - krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_component(krbContext, krbPrinc, 0), &nameBuf); + krbPrincComponentToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, 0, &nameBuf); - major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps, - VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_NAME, - VENDOR_ID_UKERNA, - &nameBuf); + major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps, + PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_NAME, + VENDORPEC_UKERNA, + &nameBuf); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; /* Acceptor-Host-Name */ - krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_component(krbContext, krbPrinc, 1), &nameBuf); + krbPrincComponentToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, 1, &nameBuf); - major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps, - VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_HOST_NAME, - VENDOR_ID_UKERNA, - &nameBuf); + major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps, + PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_HOST_NAME, + VENDORPEC_UKERNA, + &nameBuf); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; - if (krb5_princ_size(krbContext, krbPrinc) > 2) { + if (KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(krbPrinc) > 2) { /* Acceptor-Service-Specific */ krb5_principal_data ssiPrinc = *krbPrinc; char *ssi; - krb5_princ_size(krbContext, &ssiPrinc) -= 2; - krb5_princ_name(krbContext, &ssiPrinc) += 2; + KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(&ssiPrinc) -= 2; + KRB_PRINC_NAME(&ssiPrinc) += 2; *minor = krb5_unparse_name_flags(krbContext, &ssiPrinc, KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &ssi); @@ -209,10 +235,10 @@ setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor, nameBuf.value = ssi; nameBuf.length = strlen(ssi); - major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps, - VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_SPECIFIC, - VENDOR_ID_UKERNA, - &nameBuf); + major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps, + PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_SPECIFIC, + VENDORPEC_UKERNA, + &nameBuf); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) { krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi); @@ -221,20 +247,84 @@ setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor, krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi); } - krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_realm(krbContext, krbPrinc), &nameBuf); + krbPrincRealmToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, &nameBuf); if (nameBuf.length != 0) { /* Acceptor-Realm-Name */ - major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps, - VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_REALM_NAME, - VENDOR_ID_UKERNA, - &nameBuf); + major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps, + PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_REALM_NAME, + VENDORPEC_UKERNA, + &nameBuf); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; } + *minor = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +/* + * Allocate a RadSec handle + */ +static OM_uint32 +createRadiusHandle(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_cred_id_t cred, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx) +{ + struct gss_eap_acceptor_ctx *actx = &ctx->acceptorCtx; + const char *configFile = RS_CONFIG_FILE; + const char *configStanza = "gss-eap"; + struct rs_alloc_scheme ralloc; + struct rs_error *err; + + assert(actx->radContext == NULL); + assert(actx->radConn == NULL); + + if (rs_context_create(&actx->radContext, RS_DICT_FILE) != 0) { + *minor = GSSEAP_RADSEC_CONTEXT_FAILURE; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) { + if (cred->radiusConfigFile != NULL) + configFile = cred->radiusConfigFile; + if (cred->radiusConfigStanza != NULL) + configStanza = cred->radiusConfigStanza; + } + + ralloc.calloc = GSSEAP_CALLOC; + ralloc.malloc = GSSEAP_MALLOC; + ralloc.free = GSSEAP_FREE; + ralloc.realloc = GSSEAP_REALLOC; + + rs_context_set_alloc_scheme(actx->radContext, &ralloc); + + if (rs_context_read_config(actx->radContext, configFile) != 0) { + err = rs_err_ctx_pop(actx->radContext); + goto fail; + } + + if (rs_conn_create(actx->radContext, &actx->radConn, configStanza) != 0) { + err = rs_err_conn_pop(actx->radConn); + goto fail; + } + + if (actx->radServer != NULL) { + if (rs_conn_select_server(actx->radConn, actx->radServer) != 0) { + err = rs_err_conn_pop(actx->radConn); + goto fail; + } + } + + *minor = 0; return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + +fail: + return gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, err); } +/* + * Process a EAP response from the initiator. + */ static OM_uint32 eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, @@ -244,163 +334,152 @@ eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_buffer_t outputToken) { OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor; - int code; - VALUE_PAIR *send = NULL; - VALUE_PAIR *received = NULL; - rc_handle *rh = ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle; - char msgBuffer[4096]; - struct eap_hdr *pdu; - unsigned char *pos; - gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; - - pdu = (struct eap_hdr *)inputToken->value; - pos = (unsigned char *)(pdu + 1); - - if (inputToken->length > sizeof(*pdu) && - pdu->code == EAP_CODE_RESPONSE && - pos[0] == EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY) { - /* - * XXX TODO do we really need to set User-Name? FreeRADIUS does - * not appear to require it. - */ - major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_USER_NAME, 0, &nameBuf); + struct rs_connection *rconn; + struct rs_request *request = NULL; + struct rs_packet *req = NULL, *resp = NULL; + struct radius_packet *frreq, *frresp; + int sendAcceptorIdentity = 0; + + if (ctx->acceptorCtx.radContext == NULL) { + /* May be NULL from an imported partial context */ + major = createRadiusHandle(minor, cred, ctx); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; - major = setAcceptorIdentity(minor, ctx, &send); + sendAcceptorIdentity = 1; + } + + rconn = ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn; + + if (rs_packet_create_acc_request(rconn, &req, NULL, NULL) != 0) { + major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn)); + goto cleanup; + } + frreq = rs_packet_frpkt(req); + + if (sendAcceptorIdentity) { + major = setAcceptorIdentity(minor, ctx, &frreq->vps); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; } - major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, inputToken); + major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, &frreq->vps, + PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, inputToken); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; - if (ctx->acceptorCtx.lastStatus == CHALLENGE_RC) { - major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_STATE, 0, - &ctx->acceptorCtx.state); + if (ctx->acceptorCtx.state.length != 0) { + major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, &frreq->vps, PW_STATE, 0, + &ctx->acceptorCtx.state); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &ctx->acceptorCtx.state); } - code = rc_auth(rh, 0, send, &received, msgBuffer); - switch (code) { - case OK_RC: - case CHALLENGE_RC: + if (rs_request_create(rconn, &request) != 0 || + rs_request_send(request, req, &resp) != 0) { + major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn)); + goto cleanup; + } + + assert(resp != NULL); + + frresp = rs_packet_frpkt(resp); + switch (frresp->code) { + case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK: + case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE: major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; break; - case TIMEOUT_RC: - major = GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; - break; - case REJECT_RC: + case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT: + *minor = GSSEAP_RADIUS_AUTH_FAILURE; major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL; + goto cleanup; break; default: + *minor = GSSEAP_UNKNOWN_RADIUS_CODE; major = GSS_S_FAILURE; goto cleanup; + break; } - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + major = gssEapRadiusGetAvp(minor, frresp->vps, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, + outputToken, TRUE); + if (major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && frresp->code == PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE) { + *minor = GSSEAP_MISSING_EAP_REQUEST; + major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; goto cleanup; - - ctx->acceptorCtx.lastStatus = code; - - major = getBufferFromAvps(minor, received, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, - outputToken, TRUE); - if ((major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && code != OK_RC) || - GSS_ERROR(major)) + } else if (GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; - if (code == CHALLENGE_RC) { - major = getBufferFromAvps(minor, received, PW_STATE, 0, - &ctx->acceptorCtx.state, TRUE); - if (major != GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && GSS_ERROR(major)) + if (frresp->code == PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE) { + major = gssEapRadiusGetAvp(minor, frresp->vps, PW_STATE, 0, + &ctx->acceptorCtx.state, TRUE); + if (GSS_ERROR(major) && *minor != GSSEAP_NO_SUCH_ATTR) goto cleanup; } else { - ctx->acceptorCtx.avps = received; - received = NULL; + ctx->acceptorCtx.vps = frresp->vps; + frresp->vps = NULL; + + rs_conn_destroy(ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn); + ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn = NULL; major = acceptReadyEap(minor, ctx, cred); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; - ctx->state = EAP_STATE_GSS_CHANNEL_BINDINGS; + ctx->state = GSSEAP_STATE_EXTENSIONS_REQ; } + *minor = 0; major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; cleanup: - if (received != NULL) - rc_avpair_free(received); + rs_request_destroy(request); return major; } static OM_uint32 -eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings(OM_uint32 *minor, - gss_ctx_id_t ctx, - gss_cred_id_t cred, - gss_buffer_t inputToken, - gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings, - gss_buffer_t outputToken) +eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsReq(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + gss_cred_id_t cred, + gss_buffer_t inputToken, + gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings, + gss_buffer_t outputToken) { OM_uint32 major; - gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[2]; + + major = gssEapVerifyExtensions(minor, cred, ctx, chanBindings, inputToken); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; outputToken->length = 0; outputToken->value = NULL; - if (chanBindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS) { - if (inputToken->length < 14) { - return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; - } - - iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA; - iov[0].buffer.length = 0; - iov[0].buffer.value = NULL; - - if (chanBindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS) - iov[0].buffer = chanBindings->application_data; - - iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_HEADER; - iov[1].buffer.length = 16; - iov[1].buffer.value = (unsigned char *)inputToken->value - 2; - - assert(load_uint16_be(iov[1].buffer.value) == TOK_TYPE_GSS_CB); - - iov[2].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_TRAILER; - iov[2].buffer.length = inputToken->length - 14; - iov[2].buffer.value = (unsigned char *)inputToken->value + 14; - - major = gssEapUnwrapOrVerifyMIC(minor, ctx, NULL, NULL, - iov, 3, TOK_TYPE_GSS_CB); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - return major; - } - - ctx->state = EAP_STATE_KRB_REAUTH_CRED; + ctx->state = GSSEAP_STATE_EXTENSIONS_RESP; + *minor = 0; return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; } static OM_uint32 -eapGssSmAcceptKrbReauthCred(OM_uint32 *minor, - gss_ctx_id_t ctx, - gss_cred_id_t cred, - gss_buffer_t inputToken, - gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings, - gss_buffer_t outputToken) +eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsResp(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + gss_cred_id_t cred, + gss_buffer_t inputToken, + gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings, + gss_buffer_t outputToken) { OM_uint32 major; - major = gssEapMakeReauthCreds(minor, ctx, cred, outputToken); + major = gssEapMakeExtensions(minor, cred, ctx, chanBindings, outputToken); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; - ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED; + ctx->state = GSSEAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED; + *minor = 0; return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } @@ -413,91 +492,42 @@ eapGssSmAcceptEstablished(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_buffer_t outputToken) { /* Called with already established context */ - *minor = EINVAL; + *minor = GSSEAP_CONTEXT_ESTABLISHED; return GSS_S_BAD_STATUS; } static OM_uint32 -acceptReadyKrb(OM_uint32 *minor, - gss_ctx_id_t ctx, - gss_cred_id_t cred, - const gss_name_t initiator, - const gss_OID mech, - OM_uint32 timeRec) +makeErrorToken(OM_uint32 *minor, + OM_uint32 majorStatus, + OM_uint32 minorStatus, + gss_buffer_t outputToken) { - OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor; - gss_buffer_desc authData = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; - - major = gssEapGlueToMechName(minor, initiator, &ctx->initiatorName); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - goto cleanup; - - major = gssKrbExtractAuthzDataFromSecContext(minor, ctx->kerberosCtx, - KRB5_AUTHDATA_RADIUS_AVP, - &authData); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - goto cleanup; - - major = gssEapImportAttrContext(minor, &authData, ctx->initiatorName); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - goto cleanup; - - if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) { - major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - goto cleanup; + unsigned char errorData[8]; + gss_buffer_desc errorBuffer; + + assert(GSS_ERROR(majorStatus)); + + /* + * Only return error codes that the initiator could have caused, + * to avoid information leakage. + */ + if (IS_RADIUS_ERROR(minorStatus)) { + /* Squash RADIUS error codes */ + minorStatus = GSSEAP_RADIUS_PROT_FAILURE; + } else if (!IS_WIRE_ERROR(minorStatus)) { + /* Don't return non-wire error codes */ + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } - major = gssEapReauthComplete(minor, ctx, cred, mech, timeRec); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - goto cleanup; + minorStatus -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_eapg; - ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED; + store_uint32_be(majorStatus, &errorData[0]); + store_uint32_be(minorStatus, &errorData[4]); -cleanup: - gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &authData); - - return major; -} - -static OM_uint32 -eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor, - gss_ctx_id_t ctx, - gss_cred_id_t cred, - gss_buffer_t inputToken, - gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings, - gss_buffer_t outputToken) -{ - OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor; - gss_cred_id_t krbCred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; - gss_name_t krbInitiator = GSS_C_NO_NAME; - gss_OID mech = GSS_C_NO_OID; - OM_uint32 timeRec = GSS_C_INDEFINITE; - - ctx->flags |= CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH_GSS; - - if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) - krbCred = cred->krbCred; - - major = gssAcceptSecContext(minor, - &ctx->kerberosCtx, - krbCred, - inputToken, - chanBindings, - &krbInitiator, - &mech, - outputToken, - &ctx->gssFlags, - &timeRec, - NULL); - if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { - major = acceptReadyKrb(minor, ctx, cred, - krbInitiator, mech, timeRec); - } - - gssReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &krbInitiator); + errorBuffer.length = sizeof(errorData); + errorBuffer.value = errorData; - return major; + return duplicateBuffer(minor, &errorBuffer, outputToken); } static struct gss_eap_acceptor_sm { @@ -510,12 +540,15 @@ static struct gss_eap_acceptor_sm { gss_channel_bindings_t, gss_buffer_t); } eapGssAcceptorSm[] = { - { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, eapGssSmAcceptIdentity }, - { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate }, - { TOK_TYPE_GSS_CB, TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings }, - { TOK_TYPE_NONE, TOK_TYPE_KRB_CRED, eapGssSmAcceptKrbReauthCred }, - { TOK_TYPE_NONE, TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmAcceptEstablished }, - { TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH, TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH, eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth }, + { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, eapGssSmAcceptIdentity }, + { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate }, + { TOK_TYPE_EXT_REQ, TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsReq }, + { TOK_TYPE_NONE, TOK_TYPE_EXT_RESP, eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsResp }, + { TOK_TYPE_NONE, TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmAcceptEstablished }, + { TOK_TYPE_NONE, TOK_TYPE_CONTEXT_ERR, NULL }, +#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH + { TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH, TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH, eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth }, +#endif }; OM_uint32 @@ -538,17 +571,15 @@ gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_buffer_desc innerInputToken = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc innerOutputToken = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; enum gss_eap_token_type tokType; + int initialContextToken = 0; *minor = 0; output_token->length = 0; output_token->value = NULL; - if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && !(cred->flags & CRED_FLAG_ACCEPT)) { - return GSS_S_NO_CRED; - } - if (input_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER || input_token->length == 0) { + *minor = GSSEAP_TOK_TRUNC; return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; } @@ -557,28 +588,53 @@ gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor, if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; + initialContextToken = 1; *context_handle = ctx; } GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&ctx->mutex); + /* Validate and lock credentials */ + if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) { + GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&cred->mutex); + + if ((cred->flags & CRED_FLAG_ACCEPT) == 0) { + *minor = GSSEAP_CRED_USAGE_MISMATCH; + major = GSS_S_NO_CRED; + goto cleanup; + } + } + sm = &eapGssAcceptorSm[ctx->state]; major = gssEapVerifyToken(minor, ctx, input_token, - sm->inputTokenType, &tokType, - &innerInputToken); - if (major == GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN && tokType == TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH) { - ctx->state = EAP_STATE_KRB_REAUTH_GSS; - } else if (GSS_ERROR(major)) { + &tokType, &innerInputToken); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; - } - /* If credentials were provided, check they're usable with this mech */ if (!gssEapCredAvailable(cred, ctx->mechanismUsed)) { + *minor = GSSEAP_CRED_MECH_MISMATCH; major = GSS_S_BAD_MECH; goto cleanup; } +#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH + /* + * If we're built with fast reauthentication support, it's valid + * for an initiator to send a GSS reauthentication token as its + * initial context token, causing us to short-circuit the state + * machine and process Kerberos GSS messages instead. + */ + if (tokType == TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH && initialContextToken) { + ctx->state = GSSEAP_STATE_KRB_REAUTH; + } else +#endif + if (tokType != sm->inputTokenType) { + *minor = GSSEAP_WRONG_TOK_ID; + major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + goto cleanup; + } + do { sm = &eapGssAcceptorSm[ctx->state]; @@ -588,23 +644,23 @@ gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor, &innerInputToken, input_chan_bindings, &innerOutputToken); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - goto cleanup; + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) { + /* Possibly generate an error token */ + tmpMajor = makeErrorToken(&tmpMinor, major, *minor, &innerOutputToken); + if (GSS_ERROR(tmpMajor)) { + major = tmpMajor; + goto cleanup; + } + + sm = &eapGssAcceptorSm[GSSEAP_STATE_ERROR]; + goto send_token; + } } while (major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED && innerOutputToken.length == 0); if (mech_type != NULL) { if (!gssEapInternalizeOid(ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type)) duplicateOid(&tmpMinor, ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type); } - if (innerOutputToken.value != NULL) { - tmpMajor = gssEapMakeToken(&tmpMinor, ctx, &innerOutputToken, - sm->outputTokenType, output_token); - if (GSS_ERROR(tmpMajor)) { - major = tmpMajor; - *minor = tmpMinor; - goto cleanup; - } - } if (ret_flags != NULL) *ret_flags = ctx->gssFlags; if (delegated_cred_handle != NULL) @@ -616,13 +672,29 @@ gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor, if (GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; } - if (time_rec != NULL) - gssEapContextTime(&tmpMinor, ctx, time_rec); + if (time_rec != NULL) { + major = gssEapContextTime(&tmpMinor, ctx, time_rec); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + goto cleanup; + } } - assert(ctx->state == EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED || major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); + assert(ctx->state == GSSEAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED || major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); + +send_token: + if (innerOutputToken.value != NULL) { + tmpMajor = gssEapMakeToken(&tmpMinor, ctx, &innerOutputToken, + sm->outputTokenType, output_token); + if (GSS_ERROR(tmpMajor)) { + major = tmpMajor; + *minor = tmpMinor; + goto cleanup; + } + } cleanup: + if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) + GSSEAP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&cred->mutex); GSSEAP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ctx->mutex); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) @@ -633,3 +705,76 @@ cleanup: return major; } +#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH +static OM_uint32 +acceptReadyKrb(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + gss_cred_id_t cred, + const gss_name_t initiator, + const gss_OID mech, + OM_uint32 timeRec) +{ + OM_uint32 major; + + major = gssEapGlueToMechName(minor, initiator, &ctx->initiatorName); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; + + if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) { + major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; + } + + major = gssEapReauthComplete(minor, ctx, cred, mech, timeRec); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; + + ctx->state = GSSEAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED; + + *minor = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +static OM_uint32 +eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + gss_cred_id_t cred, + gss_buffer_t inputToken, + gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings, + gss_buffer_t outputToken) +{ + OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor; + gss_cred_id_t krbCred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; + gss_name_t krbInitiator = GSS_C_NO_NAME; + gss_OID mech = GSS_C_NO_OID; + OM_uint32 gssFlags, timeRec = GSS_C_INDEFINITE; + + ctx->flags |= CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH; + + if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) + krbCred = cred->krbCred; + + major = gssAcceptSecContext(minor, + &ctx->kerberosCtx, + krbCred, + inputToken, + chanBindings, + &krbInitiator, + &mech, + outputToken, + &gssFlags, + &timeRec, + NULL); + if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + major = acceptReadyKrb(minor, ctx, cred, + krbInitiator, mech, timeRec); + } + + ctx->gssFlags = gssFlags; + + gssReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &krbInitiator); + + return major; +} +#endif /* GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH */