X-Git-Url: http://www.project-moonshot.org/gitweb/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=accept_sec_context.c;h=eb1a07cc73379062a00141f0cc440c412f84af9a;hb=31355119edb3a282ab302c05e33e23430af67603;hp=ecd5e1c7a10cbe8226f77aaba6ce6f64249e617b;hpb=62664c0337b533710e6d9a049847ca46fc572c0b;p=mech_eap.orig

diff --git a/accept_sec_context.c b/accept_sec_context.c
index ecd5e1c..eb1a07c 100644
--- a/accept_sec_context.c
+++ b/accept_sec_context.c
@@ -32,199 +32,207 @@
 
 #include "gssapiP_eap.h"
 
-#ifdef BUILTIN_EAP
-#define EAP_KEY_AVAILABLE(ctx)  ((ctx)->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapKeyAvailable)
-#define EAP_KEY_DATA(ctx)       ((ctx)->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapKeyData)
-#define EAP_KEY_LENGTH(ctx)     ((ctx)->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapKeyDataLen)
-#else
-#define EAP_KEY_AVAILABLE(ctx)  0
-#define EAP_KEY_DATA(ctx)       NULL
-#define EAP_KEY_LENGTH(ctx)     0
-#endif /* BUILTIN_EAP */
-
+/*
+ * Mark a context as ready for cryptographic operations
+ */
 static OM_uint32
-acceptReady(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx);
-
-#ifdef BUILTIN_EAP
-#define EAP_MAX_METHODS 8
-
-#define EAP_TTLS_AUTH_PAP 1
-#define EAP_TTLS_AUTH_CHAP 2
-#define EAP_TTLS_AUTH_MSCHAP 4
-#define EAP_TTLS_AUTH_MSCHAPV2 8
-
-struct eap_user {
-        struct {
-                int vendor;
-                u32 method;
-        } methods[EAP_MAX_METHODS];
-        u8 *password;
-        size_t password_len;
-        int password_hash; /* whether password is hashed with
-                            * nt_password_hash() */
-        int phase2;
-        int force_version;
-        int ttls_auth; /* bitfield of
-                        * EAP_TTLS_AUTH_{PAP,CHAP,MSCHAP,MSCHAPV2} */
-};
+acceptReadyEap(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred)
+{
+    OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+    VALUE_PAIR *vp;
+    gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
 
-struct eap_eapol_interface {
-        /* Lower layer to full authenticator variables */
-        Boolean eapResp; /* shared with EAPOL Backend Authentication */
-        struct wpabuf *eapRespData;
-        Boolean portEnabled;
-        int retransWhile;
-        Boolean eapRestart; /* shared with EAPOL Authenticator PAE */
-        int eapSRTT;
-        int eapRTTVAR;
-
-        /* Full authenticator to lower layer variables */
-        Boolean eapReq; /* shared with EAPOL Backend Authentication */
-        Boolean eapNoReq; /* shared with EAPOL Backend Authentication */
-        Boolean eapSuccess;
-        Boolean eapFail;
-        Boolean eapTimeout;
-        struct wpabuf *eapReqData;
-        u8 *eapKeyData;
-        size_t eapKeyDataLen;
-        Boolean eapKeyAvailable; /* called keyAvailable in IEEE 802.1X-2004 */
-
-        /* AAA interface to full authenticator variables */
-        Boolean aaaEapReq;
-        Boolean aaaEapNoReq;
-        Boolean aaaSuccess;
-        Boolean aaaFail;
-        struct wpabuf *aaaEapReqData;
-        u8 *aaaEapKeyData;
-        size_t aaaEapKeyDataLen;
-        Boolean aaaEapKeyAvailable;
-        int aaaMethodTimeout;
-
-        /* Full authenticator to AAA interface variables */
-        Boolean aaaEapResp;
-        struct wpabuf *aaaEapRespData;
-        /* aaaIdentity -> eap_get_identity() */
-        Boolean aaaTimeout;
-};
+    /* Cache encryption type derived from selected mechanism OID */
+    major = gssEapOidToEnctype(minor, ctx->mechanismUsed,
+                               &ctx->encryptionType);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
 
-#define eapol_callbacks     SERVER_eapol_callbacks
+    gssEapReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &ctx->initiatorName);
 
-struct eapol_callbacks {
-        int (*get_eap_user)(void *ctx, const u8 *identity, size_t identity_len,
-                            int phase2, struct eap_user *user);
-        const char * (*get_eap_req_id_text)(void *ctx, size_t *len);
-};
+    vp = rc_avpair_get(ctx->acceptorCtx.avps, PW_USER_NAME, 0);
+    if (vp != NULL) {
+        nameBuf.length = vp->lvalue;
+        nameBuf.value = vp->strvalue;
+    } else {
+        ctx->gssFlags |= GSS_C_ANON_FLAG;
+    }
 
-#define eap_config          SERVER_eap_config
-
-struct eap_config {
-        void *ssl_ctx;
-        void *msg_ctx;
-        void *eap_sim_db_priv;
-        Boolean backend_auth;
-        int eap_server;
-        u8 *pac_opaque_encr_key;
-        u8 *eap_fast_a_id;
-        size_t eap_fast_a_id_len;
-        char *eap_fast_a_id_info;
-        int eap_fast_prov;
-        int pac_key_lifetime;
-        int pac_key_refresh_time;
-        int eap_sim_aka_result_ind;
-        int tnc;
-        struct wps_context *wps;
-        const struct wpabuf *assoc_wps_ie;
-        const u8 *peer_addr;
-        int fragment_size;
-};
+    major = gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
+                             &ctx->initiatorName);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
 
-struct eap_sm * eap_server_sm_init(void *eapol_ctx,
-                                   struct eapol_callbacks *eapol_cb,
-                                   struct eap_config *eap_conf);
-void eap_server_sm_deinit(struct eap_sm *sm);
-int eap_server_sm_step(struct eap_sm *sm);
-void eap_sm_notify_cached(struct eap_sm *sm);
-void eap_sm_pending_cb(struct eap_sm *sm);
-int eap_sm_method_pending(struct eap_sm *sm);
-const u8 * eap_get_identity(struct eap_sm *sm, size_t *len);
-struct eap_eapol_interface * eap_get_interface(struct eap_sm *sm);
+    ctx->initiatorName->attrCtx = gssEapCreateAttrContext(cred, ctx);
 
-#include <eap_server/eap_i.h>
+    vp = rc_avpair_get(ctx->acceptorCtx.avps,
+                       VENDOR_ATTR_MS_MPPE_SEND_KEY,
+                       VENDOR_ID_MICROSOFT);
+    if (ctx->encryptionType != ENCTYPE_NULL && vp != NULL) {
+        major = gssEapDeriveRfc3961Key(minor,
+                                       (unsigned char *)vp->strvalue,
+                                       vp->lvalue,
+                                       ctx->encryptionType,
+                                       &ctx->rfc3961Key);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+            return major;
+
+        major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key,
+                                           &ctx->checksumType);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+            return major;
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * draft-howlett-eap-gss says that integrity/confidentialty should
+         * always be advertised as available, but if we have no keying
+         * material it seems confusing to the caller to advertise this.
+         */
+        ctx->gssFlags &= ~(GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_CONF_FLAG);
+        ctx->encryptionType = ENCTYPE_NULL;
+    }
+
+    major = sequenceInit(minor,
+                         &ctx->seqState, ctx->recvSeq,
+                         ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG) != 0),
+                         ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG) != 0),
+                         TRUE);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
+
+    return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
 
 static OM_uint32
-initTls(OM_uint32 *minor,
-        gss_ctx_id_t ctx)
+eapGssSmAcceptIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
+                       gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+                       gss_cred_id_t cred,
+                       gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+                       gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+                       gss_buffer_t outputToken)
 {
-    struct tls_config tconf;
-    struct tls_connection_params tparams;
+    OM_uint32 major;
+    union {
+        struct eap_hdr pdu;
+        unsigned char data[5];
+    } pkt;
+    gss_buffer_desc pktBuffer;
 
-    memset(&tconf, 0, sizeof(tconf));
-    ctx->acceptorCtx.tlsContext = tls_init(&tconf);
-    if (ctx->acceptorCtx.tlsContext == NULL)
-        return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+    if (inputToken != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER && inputToken->length != 0)
+        return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
 
-    memset(&tparams, 0, sizeof(tparams));
-    tparams.ca_cert = "ca.pem";
-    tparams.client_cert = "server.pem";
-    tparams.private_key = "server-key.pem";
+    assert(ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle == NULL);
 
-    if (tls_global_set_params(ctx->acceptorCtx.tlsContext, &tparams)) {
-        return GSS_S_FAILURE;
-    }
+    major = gssEapRadiusAllocHandle(minor, cred, &ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
 
-    if (tls_global_set_verify(ctx->acceptorCtx.tlsContext, 0)) {
-        return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+    assert(ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME);
+
+    if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
+        major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+            return major;
     }
 
-    return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+    pkt.pdu.code = EAP_CODE_REQUEST;
+    pkt.pdu.identifier = 0;
+    pkt.pdu.length = htons(sizeof(pkt.data));
+    pkt.data[4] = EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY;
+
+    pktBuffer.length = sizeof(pkt.data);
+    pktBuffer.value = pkt.data;
+
+    major = duplicateBuffer(minor, &pktBuffer, outputToken);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
+
+    ctx->state = EAP_STATE_AUTHENTICATE;
+
+    return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
 }
 
-static int
-serverGetEapUser(void *ctx,
-                 const unsigned char *identity,
-                 size_t identityLength,
-                 int phase2,
-                 struct eap_user *user)
+static OM_uint32
+setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
+                    gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+                    VALUE_PAIR **avps)
 {
-    gss_ctx_id_t gssCtx = (gss_ctx_id_t)ctx;
-    OM_uint32 major, minor;
-    gss_buffer_desc buf;
+    OM_uint32 major;
+    gss_buffer_desc nameBuf;
+    krb5_context krbContext = NULL;
+    krb5_principal krbPrinc;
+
+    /* Awaits further specification */
+    if (ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME)
+        return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
 
-    memset(user, 0, sizeof(*user));
+    GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
 
-    buf.length = identityLength;
-    buf.value = (void *)identity;
+    krbPrinc = ctx->acceptorName->krbPrincipal;
+    assert(krbPrinc != NULL);
 
-    if (phase2 == 0) {
-        user->methods[0].vendor = EAP_VENDOR_IETF;
-        user->methods[0].method = EAP_TYPE_PEAP;
-        return 0;
-    }
+    if (krb5_princ_size(krbContext, krbPrinc) < 2)
+        return GSS_S_BAD_NAME;
 
-    major = gssEapImportName(&minor, &buf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
-                             &gssCtx->initiatorName);
+    /* Acceptor-Service-Name */
+    krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_component(krbContext, krbPrinc, 0), &nameBuf);
+
+    major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps,
+                             VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_NAME,
+                             VENDOR_ID_UKERNA,
+                             &nameBuf);
     if (GSS_ERROR(major))
-        return -1;
-
-    /*
-     * OK, obviously there is no real security here, this is simply
-     * for testing the token exchange; this code will be completely
-     * replaced with libradsec once that library is available.
-     */
-    user->methods[0].vendor = EAP_VENDOR_IETF;
-    user->methods[0].method = EAP_TYPE_MSCHAPV2;
-    user->password = (unsigned char *)strdup(" ");
-    user->password_len = 1;
-
-    return 0;
-}
+        return major;
 
-static const char *
-serverGetEapReqIdText(void *ctx,
-                      size_t *len)
-{
-    *len = 0;
-    return NULL;
+    /* Acceptor-Host-Name */
+    krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_component(krbContext, krbPrinc, 1), &nameBuf);
+
+    major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps,
+                             VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_HOST_NAME,
+                             VENDOR_ID_UKERNA,
+                             &nameBuf);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
+
+    if (krb5_princ_size(krbContext, krbPrinc) > 2) {
+        /* Acceptor-Service-Specific */
+        krb5_principal_data ssiPrinc = *krbPrinc;
+        char *ssi;
+
+        krb5_princ_size(krbContext, &ssiPrinc) -= 2;
+        krb5_princ_name(krbContext, &ssiPrinc) += 2;
+
+        *minor = krb5_unparse_name_flags(krbContext, &ssiPrinc,
+                                         KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &ssi);
+        if (*minor != 0)
+            return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+        nameBuf.value = ssi;
+        nameBuf.length = strlen(ssi);
+
+        major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps,
+                                 VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_SPECIFIC,
+                                 VENDOR_ID_UKERNA,
+                                 &nameBuf);
+
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+            krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi);
+            return major;
+        }
+        krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi);
+    }
+
+    krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_realm(krbContext, krbPrinc), &nameBuf);
+    if (nameBuf.length != 0) {
+        /* Acceptor-Realm-Name */
+        major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps,
+                                 VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_REALM_NAME,
+                                 VENDOR_ID_UKERNA,
+                                 &nameBuf);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+            return major;
+    }
+
+    return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
 }
 
 static OM_uint32
@@ -235,153 +243,184 @@ eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate(OM_uint32 *minor,
                            gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
                            gss_buffer_t outputToken)
 {
-    OM_uint32 major;
-    OM_uint32 tmpMinor, tmpMajor;
+    OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
     int code;
-    struct wpabuf respData;
-    static struct eapol_callbacks cb = { serverGetEapUser, serverGetEapReqIdText };
-    if (ctx->acceptorCtx.eap == NULL) {
-        struct eap_config eapConfig;
-
-        major = initTls(minor, ctx);
+    VALUE_PAIR *send = NULL;
+    VALUE_PAIR *received = NULL;
+    rc_handle *rh = ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle;
+    char msgBuffer[4096];
+    struct eap_hdr *pdu;
+    unsigned char *pos;
+    gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+
+    pdu = (struct eap_hdr *)inputToken->value;
+    pos = (unsigned char *)(pdu + 1);
+
+    if (inputToken->length > sizeof(*pdu) &&
+        pdu->code == EAP_CODE_RESPONSE &&
+        pos[0] == EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY) {
+        /*
+         * XXX TODO do we really need to set User-Name? FreeRADIUS does
+         * not appear to require it.
+         */
+        major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_USER_NAME, 0, &nameBuf);
         if (GSS_ERROR(major))
             goto cleanup;
 
-        memset(&eapConfig, 0, sizeof(eapConfig));
-        eapConfig.eap_server = 1;
-        eapConfig.ssl_ctx = ctx->acceptorCtx.tlsContext;
-
-        ctx->acceptorCtx.eap = eap_server_sm_init(ctx, &cb, &eapConfig);
-        if (ctx->acceptorCtx.eap == NULL) {
-            major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
-            goto cleanup;
-        }
-
-        ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface = eap_get_interface(ctx->acceptorCtx.eap);
-        ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->portEnabled = TRUE;
-        ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapRestart = TRUE;
-    }
-
-    if (ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME &&
-        cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL &&
-        cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
-        major = gss_duplicate_name(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName);
+        major = setAcceptorIdentity(minor, ctx, &send);
         if (GSS_ERROR(major))
             goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    wpabuf_set(&respData, inputToken->value, inputToken->length);
-    ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapRespData = &respData;
-    ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapResp = TRUE;
-
-    code = eap_server_sm_step(ctx->acceptorCtx.eap);
-
-    if (ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapReq) {
-        ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapReq = 0;
-        major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
-    }
+    major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, inputToken);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        goto cleanup;
 
-    if (ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapSuccess) {
-        ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapSuccess = 0;
-        major = acceptReady(minor, ctx);
+    if (ctx->acceptorCtx.lastStatus == CHALLENGE_RC) {
+        major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_STATE, 0,
+                                 &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
         if (GSS_ERROR(major))
             goto cleanup;
 
-        ctx->state = EAP_STATE_GSS_CHANNEL_BINDINGS;
+        gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
+    }
+
+    code = rc_auth(rh, 0, send, &received, msgBuffer);
+    switch (code) {
+    case OK_RC:
+    case CHALLENGE_RC:
         major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
-    } else if (ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapFail) {
-        ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapFail = 0;
-        major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
-    } else if (code == 0) {
+        break;
+    case TIMEOUT_RC:
+        major = GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+        break;
+    case REJECT_RC:
+        major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL;
+        break;
+    default:
         major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+        goto cleanup;
     }
 
-    if (ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapReqData != NULL) {
-        gss_buffer_desc buf;
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        goto cleanup;
 
-        buf.length = wpabuf_len(ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapReqData);
-        buf.value = (void *)wpabuf_head(ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapReqData);
+    ctx->acceptorCtx.lastStatus = code;
 
-        tmpMajor = duplicateBuffer(&tmpMinor, &buf, outputToken);
-        if (GSS_ERROR(tmpMajor)) {
-            major = tmpMajor;
-            *minor = tmpMinor;
+    major = getBufferFromAvps(minor, received, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0,
+                              outputToken, TRUE);
+    if ((major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && code != OK_RC) ||
+        GSS_ERROR(major))
+        goto cleanup;
+
+    if (code == CHALLENGE_RC) {
+        major = getBufferFromAvps(minor, received, PW_STATE, 0,
+                                  &ctx->acceptorCtx.state, TRUE);
+        if (major != GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && GSS_ERROR(major))
             goto cleanup;
-        }
+    } else {
+        ctx->acceptorCtx.avps = received;
+        received = NULL;
+
+        major = acceptReadyEap(minor, ctx, cred);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+            goto cleanup;
+
+        ctx->state = EAP_STATE_EXTENSIONS_REQ;
     }
 
+    major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
+
 cleanup:
-    ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapRespData = NULL;
+    if (received != NULL)
+        rc_avpair_free(received);
 
     return major;
 }
-#else
+
 static OM_uint32
-eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate(OM_uint32 *minor,
-                           gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
-                           gss_cred_id_t cred,
-                           gss_buffer_t inputToken,
-                           gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
-                           gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+acceptGssChannelBindings(OM_uint32 *minor,
+                         gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+                         gss_cred_id_t cred,
+                         gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+                         gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings)
 {
     OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+    gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[2];
+
+    iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA | GSS_IOV_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATE;
+    iov[0].buffer.length = 0;
+    iov[0].buffer.value = NULL;
+
+    iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_STREAM;
+    iov[1].buffer = *inputToken;
+
+    major = gssEapUnwrapOrVerifyMIC(minor, ctx, NULL, NULL,
+                                    iov, 2, TOK_TYPE_WRAP);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
+
+    if (chanBindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS &&
+        !bufferEqual(&iov[0].buffer, &chanBindings->application_data)) {
+        major = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS;
+    } else {
+        major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
+    }
+
+    gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &iov[0].buffer);
 
-cleanup:
     return major;
 }
-#endif /* BUILTIN_EAP */
 
 static OM_uint32
-eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings(OM_uint32 *minor,
-                                 gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
-                                 gss_cred_id_t cred,
-                                 gss_buffer_t inputToken,
-                                 gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
-                                 gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsReq(OM_uint32 *minor,
+                            gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+                            gss_cred_id_t cred,
+                            gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+                            gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+                            gss_buffer_t outputToken)
 {
-    OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
-    gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[2];
+    OM_uint32 major;
 
     outputToken->length = 0;
     outputToken->value = NULL;
 
-    if (chanBindings == GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS) {
-        ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
-        return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-    }
-
-    if (inputToken->length < 14) {
-        return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
-    }
+    major = acceptGssChannelBindings(minor, ctx, cred, inputToken,
+                                     chanBindings);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
 
-    iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA;
-    iov[0].buffer.length = 0;
-    iov[0].buffer.value = NULL;
+    ctx->state = EAP_STATE_EXTENSIONS_RESP;
 
-    if (chanBindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS)
-        iov[0].buffer = chanBindings->application_data;
+    return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
+}
 
-    iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_HEADER;
-    iov[1].buffer.length = 16;
-    iov[1].buffer.value = (unsigned char *)inputToken->value - 2;
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsResp(OM_uint32 *minor,
+                             gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+                             gss_cred_id_t cred,
+                             gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+                             gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+                             gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+{
+    OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+    gss_buffer_desc credsToken = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
 
-    assert(load_uint16_be(iov[1].buffer.value) == TOK_TYPE_GSS_CB);
+    major = gssEapMakeReauthCreds(minor, ctx, cred, &credsToken);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
 
-    iov[2].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_TRAILER;
-    iov[2].buffer.length = inputToken->length - 14;
-    iov[2].buffer.value = (unsigned char *)inputToken->value + 14;
+    ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
 
-    major = gssEapUnwrapOrVerifyMIC(minor, ctx, NULL, NULL,
-                                    iov, 3, TOK_TYPE_GSS_CB);
-    if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
-        ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
+    major = duplicateBuffer(minor, &credsToken, outputToken);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+        gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &credsToken);
+        return major;
     }
 
-#if 0
-    gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &iov[0].buffer);
-#endif
+    gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &credsToken);
 
-    return major;
+    return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
 }
 
 static OM_uint32
@@ -397,6 +436,77 @@ eapGssSmAcceptEstablished(OM_uint32 *minor,
     return GSS_S_BAD_STATUS;
 }
 
+static OM_uint32
+acceptReadyKrb(OM_uint32 *minor,
+               gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+               gss_cred_id_t cred,
+               const gss_name_t initiator,
+               const gss_OID mech,
+               OM_uint32 timeRec)
+{
+    OM_uint32 major;
+
+    major = gssEapGlueToMechName(minor, initiator, &ctx->initiatorName);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
+
+    if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
+        major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+            return major;
+    }
+
+    major = gssEapReauthComplete(minor, ctx, cred, mech, timeRec);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
+
+    ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
+
+    return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor,
+                         gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+                         gss_cred_id_t cred,
+                         gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+                         gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+                         gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+{
+    OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+    gss_cred_id_t krbCred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+    gss_name_t krbInitiator = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+    gss_OID mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
+    OM_uint32 gssFlags, timeRec = GSS_C_INDEFINITE;
+
+    ctx->flags |= CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH_GSS;
+
+    if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
+        krbCred = cred->krbCred;
+
+    major = gssAcceptSecContext(minor,
+                                &ctx->kerberosCtx,
+                                krbCred,
+                                inputToken,
+                                chanBindings,
+                                &krbInitiator,
+                                &mech,
+                                outputToken,
+                                &gssFlags,
+                                &timeRec,
+                                NULL);
+    if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+        major = acceptReadyKrb(minor, ctx, cred,
+                               krbInitiator, mech, timeRec);
+    }
+
+    ctx->gssFlags = gssFlags & ~(GSS_C_DCE_STYLE);
+
+    gssReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &krbInitiator);
+
+    return major;
+}
+
 static struct gss_eap_acceptor_sm {
     enum gss_eap_token_type inputTokenType;
     enum gss_eap_token_type outputTokenType;
@@ -407,13 +517,12 @@ static struct gss_eap_acceptor_sm {
                               gss_channel_bindings_t,
                               gss_buffer_t);
 } eapGssAcceptorSm[] = {
-    { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP,    TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ,  eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate       },
-#if 0
-    { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP,    TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ,  NULL                             },
-    { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP,    TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ,  NULL                             },
-#endif
-    { TOK_TYPE_GSS_CB,      TOK_TYPE_NONE,     eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings },
-    { TOK_TYPE_NONE,        TOK_TYPE_NONE,     eapGssSmAcceptEstablished        },
+    { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP,    TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ,    eapGssSmAcceptIdentity           },
+    { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP,    TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ,    eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate       },
+    { TOK_TYPE_EXT_REQ,     TOK_TYPE_NONE,       eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsReq      },
+    { TOK_TYPE_NONE,        TOK_TYPE_EXT_RESP,   eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsResp     },
+    { TOK_TYPE_NONE,        TOK_TYPE_NONE,       eapGssSmAcceptEstablished        },
+    { TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH,  TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH, eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth          },
 };
 
 OM_uint32
@@ -435,6 +544,8 @@ gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor,
     struct gss_eap_acceptor_sm *sm = NULL;
     gss_buffer_desc innerInputToken = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
     gss_buffer_desc innerOutputToken = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+    enum gss_eap_token_type tokType;
+    int initialContextToken = 0;
 
     *minor = 0;
 
@@ -454,6 +565,7 @@ gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor,
         if (GSS_ERROR(major))
             return major;
 
+        initialContextToken = 1;
         *context_handle = ctx;
     }
 
@@ -462,12 +574,20 @@ gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor,
     sm = &eapGssAcceptorSm[ctx->state];
 
     major = gssEapVerifyToken(minor, ctx, input_token,
-                              sm->inputTokenType, &innerInputToken);
+                              &tokType, &innerInputToken);
     if (GSS_ERROR(major))
         goto cleanup;
 
+    if (tokType == TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH && initialContextToken) {
+        ctx->state = EAP_STATE_KRB_REAUTH_GSS;
+    } else if (tokType != sm->inputTokenType) {
+        major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
     /* If credentials were provided, check they're usable with this mech */
-    if (!gssEapCredAvailable(cred, ctx->mechanismUsed)) {
+    if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL &&
+        !gssEapCredAvailable(cred, ctx->mechanismUsed)) {
         major = GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
         goto cleanup;
     }
@@ -489,7 +609,7 @@ gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor,
         if (!gssEapInternalizeOid(ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type))
             duplicateOid(&tmpMinor, ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type);
     }
-    if (innerOutputToken.length != 0) {
+    if (innerOutputToken.value != NULL) {
         tmpMajor = gssEapMakeToken(&tmpMinor, ctx, &innerOutputToken,
                                    sm->outputTokenType, output_token);
         if (GSS_ERROR(tmpMajor)) {
@@ -505,12 +625,12 @@ gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor,
 
     if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
         if (src_name != NULL && ctx->initiatorName != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
-            major = gss_duplicate_name(&tmpMinor, ctx->initiatorName, src_name);
+            major = gssEapDuplicateName(&tmpMinor, ctx->initiatorName, src_name);
             if (GSS_ERROR(major))
                 goto cleanup;
         }
         if (time_rec != NULL)
-            gss_context_time(&tmpMinor, ctx, time_rec);
+            gssEapContextTime(&tmpMinor, ctx, time_rec);
     }
 
     assert(ctx->state == EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED || major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
@@ -525,50 +645,3 @@ cleanup:
 
     return major;
 }
-
-/*
- * Mark a context as ready for cryptographic operations
- */
-static OM_uint32
-acceptReady(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx)
-{
-    OM_uint32 major;
-
-    /* Cache encryption type derived from selected mechanism OID */
-    major = gssEapOidToEnctype(minor, ctx->mechanismUsed, &ctx->encryptionType);
-    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
-        return major;
-
-    if (ctx->encryptionType != ENCTYPE_NULL &&
-        EAP_KEY_AVAILABLE(ctx)) {
-        major = gssEapDeriveRfc3961Key(minor,
-                                       EAP_KEY_DATA(ctx),
-                                       EAP_KEY_LENGTH(ctx),
-                                       ctx->encryptionType,
-                                       &ctx->rfc3961Key);
-        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
-            return major;
-
-        major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key,
-                                           &ctx->checksumType);
-        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
-            return major;
-    } else {
-        /*
-         * draft-howlett-eap-gss says that integrity/confidentialty should
-         * always be advertised as available, but if we have no keying
-         * material it seems confusing to the caller to advertise this.
-         */
-        ctx->gssFlags &= ~(GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_CONF_FLAG);
-    }
-
-    major = sequenceInit(minor,
-                         &ctx->seqState, ctx->recvSeq,
-                         ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG) != 0),
-                         ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG) != 0),
-                         TRUE);
-    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
-        return major;
-
-    return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-}