X-Git-Url: http://www.project-moonshot.org/gitweb/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=mech_eap%2Futil_reauth.c;h=6c665705bbdcf5e4a12fb3f374471902c16fda0e;hb=e82fcf22c3b6961beae883fc66bf4567896b7c4b;hp=cd73da66f0238e050b57ab24ffec7793ebff0f8d;hpb=9adf7f38b4842f257560c901c51aacbb8d341b78;p=moonshot.git diff --git a/mech_eap/util_reauth.c b/mech_eap/util_reauth.c index cd73da6..6c66570 100644 --- a/mech_eap/util_reauth.c +++ b/mech_eap/util_reauth.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright (c) 2010, JANET(UK) + * Copyright (c) 2011, JANET(UK) * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without @@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ * SUCH DAMAGE. */ +/* + * Fast reauthentication support. + */ + #include "gssapiP_eap.h" #include @@ -44,6 +48,18 @@ krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(krb5_context, const krb5_keyblock *, krb5_ticket *); krb5_error_code encode_krb5_ticket(const krb5_ticket *rep, krb5_data **code); +static OM_uint32 +gssDisplayName(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_name_t name, + gss_buffer_t buffer, + gss_OID *name_type); + +static OM_uint32 +gssImportName(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_buffer_t buffer, + gss_OID name_type, + gss_name_t *name); + static krb5_error_code getAcceptorKey(krb5_context krbContext, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, @@ -53,12 +69,12 @@ getAcceptorKey(krb5_context krbContext, { krb5_error_code code; krb5_keytab keytab = NULL; - krb5_keytab_entry ktent; - krb5_kt_cursor cursor = NULL; + krb5_keytab_entry ktent = { 0 }; + krb5_kt_cursor cursor; *princ = NULL; memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key)); - memset(&ktent, 0, sizeof(ktent)); + memset(&cursor, 0, sizeof(cursor)); code = krb5_kt_default(krbContext, &keytab); if (code != 0) @@ -66,47 +82,104 @@ getAcceptorKey(krb5_context krbContext, if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) { code = krb5_kt_get_entry(krbContext, keytab, - cred->name->krbPrincipal, 0, + cred->name->krbPrincipal, 0, ctx->encryptionType, &ktent); if (code != 0) goto cleanup; } else { + /* + * It's not clear that looking encrypting the ticket in the + * requested EAP enctype provides any value. + */ code = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(krbContext, keytab, &cursor); if (code != 0) goto cleanup; while ((code = krb5_kt_next_entry(krbContext, keytab, &ktent, &cursor)) == 0) { - if (ktent.key.enctype == ctx->encryptionType) { + if (KRB_KEY_TYPE(KRB_KT_ENT_KEYBLOCK(&ktent)) == ctx->encryptionType) break; - } else { - krb5_free_keytab_entry_contents(krbContext, &ktent); - } + else + KRB_KT_ENT_FREE(krbContext, &ktent); } } if (code == 0) { *princ = ktent.principal; - *key = ktent.key; + *key = *KRB_KT_ENT_KEYBLOCK(&ktent); } cleanup: if (cred == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL || cred->name == GSS_C_NO_NAME) krb5_kt_end_seq_get(krbContext, keytab, &cursor); krb5_kt_close(krbContext, keytab); + if (code != 0) + KRB_KT_ENT_FREE(krbContext, &ktent); + + return code; +} + +static OM_uint32 +freezeAttrContext(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_name_t initiatorName, + krb5_const_principal acceptorPrinc, + krb5_keyblock *session, +#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION + krb5_authdata *kdcIssuedAuthData +#else + krb5_authdata ***kdcIssuedAuthData +#endif + ) +{ + OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor; + krb5_error_code code; + krb5_context krbContext; + gss_buffer_desc attrBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; +#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION + krb5_authdata authDataBuf, *authData = &authDataBuf; + AuthorizationDataElement authDatum = { 0 }; +#else + krb5_authdata *authData[2], authDatum = { 0 }; +#endif + + memset(kdcIssuedAuthData, 0, sizeof(*kdcIssuedAuthData)); + + GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext); + + major = gssEapExportAttrContext(minor, initiatorName, &attrBuf); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; + authDatum.ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_RADIUS_AVP; +#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION + authDatum.ad_data.length = attrBuf.length; + authDatum.ad_data.data = attrBuf.value; + authData->len = 1; + authData->val = &authDatum; +#else + authDatum.length = attrBuf.length; + authDatum.contents = attrBuf.value; + authData[0] = &authDatum; + authData[1] = NULL; +#endif + + code = krbMakeAuthDataKdcIssued(krbContext, session, acceptorPrinc, + authData, kdcIssuedAuthData); if (code != 0) { - if (*princ != NULL) { - krb5_free_principal(krbContext, *princ); - *princ = NULL; - } - krb5_free_keyblock_contents(krbContext, key), - memset(key, 0, sizeof(key)); + major = GSS_S_FAILURE; + *minor = code; + } else { + major = GSS_S_COMPLETE; } - return code; + gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &attrBuf); + + return major; } +/* + * Fabricate a ticket to ourselves given a GSS EAP context. + */ OM_uint32 gssEapMakeReauthCreds(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, @@ -116,62 +189,114 @@ gssEapMakeReauthCreds(OM_uint32 *minor, OM_uint32 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE; krb5_error_code code; krb5_context krbContext = NULL; - krb5_ticket ticket = { 0 }; krb5_keyblock session = { 0 }, acceptorKey = { 0 }; - krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_part = { 0 }; - gss_buffer_desc attrBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; - krb5_authdata *authData[2], authDatum = { 0 }; - krb5_data *ticketData = NULL, *credsData = NULL; + krb5_principal server = NULL; +#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION + Ticket ticket; + EncTicketPart enc_part; + AuthorizationData authData = { 0 }; + krb5_crypto krbCrypto = NULL; + krb5_data ticketData = { 0 }; + krb5_data encPartData = { 0 }; + size_t len; +#else + krb5_ticket ticket; + krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_part; + krb5_data *ticketData = NULL; +#endif + krb5_data credsData = { 0 }; krb5_creds creds = { 0 }; krb5_auth_context authContext = NULL; - + + memset(&ticket, 0, sizeof(ticket)); + memset(&enc_part, 0, sizeof(enc_part)); + credBuf->length = 0; credBuf->value = NULL; - + GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext); - code = getAcceptorKey(krbContext, ctx, cred, - &ticket.server, &acceptorKey); - if (code == KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND) { - gss_buffer_desc emptyToken = { 0, "" }; + code = getAcceptorKey(krbContext, ctx, cred, &server, &acceptorKey); + if (code != 0) { + *minor = code; + return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; + } - /* - * If we can't produce the KRB-CRED message, we need to - * return an empty (not NULL) token to the caller so we - * don't change the number of authentication legs. - */ - return duplicateBuffer(minor, &emptyToken, credBuf); - } else if (code != 0) + /* + * Generate a random session key to place in the ticket and + * sign the "KDC-Issued" authorization data element. + */ +#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION + ticket.realm = server->realm; + ticket.sname = server->name; + + code = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(krbContext, ctx->encryptionType, + &session); + if (code != 0) goto cleanup; - enc_part.flags = TKT_FLG_INITIAL; + enc_part.flags.initial = 1; + enc_part.key = session; + enc_part.crealm = ctx->initiatorName->krbPrincipal->realm; + enc_part.cname = ctx->initiatorName->krbPrincipal->name; + enc_part.authtime = time(NULL); + enc_part.starttime = &enc_part.authtime; + enc_part.endtime = (ctx->expiryTime != 0) + ? ctx->expiryTime : KRB_TIME_FOREVER; + enc_part.renew_till = NULL; + enc_part.authorization_data = &authData; + + major = freezeAttrContext(minor, ctx->initiatorName, server, + &session, &authData); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + goto cleanup; + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTicketPart, encPartData.data, encPartData.length, + &enc_part, &len, code); + if (code != 0) + goto cleanup; + + code = krb5_crypto_init(krbContext, &acceptorKey, 0, &krbCrypto); + if (code != 0) + goto cleanup; + + code = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(krbContext, + krbCrypto, + KRB5_KU_TICKET, + encPartData.data, + encPartData.length, + 0, + &ticket.enc_part); + if (code != 0) + goto cleanup; + + ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Ticket, ticketData.data, ticketData.length, + &ticket, &len, code); + if (code != 0) + goto cleanup; +#else + ticket.server = server; code = krb5_c_make_random_key(krbContext, ctx->encryptionType, &session); if (code != 0) goto cleanup; + enc_part.flags = TKT_FLG_INITIAL; enc_part.session = &session; enc_part.client = ctx->initiatorName->krbPrincipal; enc_part.times.authtime = time(NULL); enc_part.times.starttime = enc_part.times.authtime; - enc_part.times.endtime = ctx->expiryTime + enc_part.times.endtime = (ctx->expiryTime != 0) ? ctx->expiryTime - : KRB5_INT32_MAX; + : KRB_TIME_FOREVER; enc_part.times.renew_till = 0; - major = gssEapExportAttrContext(minor, ctx->initiatorName, - &attrBuf); + major = freezeAttrContext(minor, ctx->initiatorName, server, + &session, &enc_part.authorization_data); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; - authDatum.ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_RADIUS_AVP; - authDatum.length = attrBuf.length; - authDatum.contents = attrBuf.value; - authData[0] = &authDatum; - authData[1] = NULL; - enc_part.authorization_data = authData; - ticket.enc_part2 = &enc_part; code = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(krbContext, &acceptorKey, &ticket); @@ -181,14 +306,26 @@ gssEapMakeReauthCreds(OM_uint32 *minor, code = encode_krb5_ticket(&ticket, &ticketData); if (code != 0) goto cleanup; - - creds.client = enc_part.client; - creds.server = ticket.server; +#endif /* HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION */ + + creds.client = ctx->initiatorName->krbPrincipal; + creds.server = server; +#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION + creds.session = session; + creds.times.authtime = enc_part.authtime; + creds.times.starttime = *enc_part.starttime; + creds.times.endtime = enc_part.endtime; + creds.times.renew_till = 0; + creds.flags.b = enc_part.flags; + creds.ticket = ticketData; + creds.authdata = authData; +#else creds.keyblock = session; creds.times = enc_part.times; creds.ticket_flags = enc_part.flags; creds.ticket = *ticketData; - creds.authdata = authData; + creds.authdata = enc_part.authorization_data; +#endif code = krb5_auth_con_init(krbContext, &authContext); if (code != 0) @@ -203,55 +340,181 @@ gssEapMakeReauthCreds(OM_uint32 *minor, if (code != 0) goto cleanup; - code = krb5_mk_1cred(krbContext, authContext, &creds, &credsData, NULL); + code = krbMakeCred(krbContext, authContext, &creds, &credsData); if (code != 0) goto cleanup; - krbDataToGssBuffer(credsData, credBuf); + krbDataToGssBuffer(&credsData, credBuf); cleanup: +#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION + if (krbCrypto != NULL) + krb5_crypto_destroy(krbContext, krbCrypto); + free_AuthorizationData(&authData); + free_EncryptedData(&ticket.enc_part); + krb5_data_free(&ticketData); + krb5_data_free(&encPartData); +#else + krb5_free_authdata(krbContext, enc_part.authorization_data); if (ticket.enc_part.ciphertext.data != NULL) GSSEAP_FREE(ticket.enc_part.ciphertext.data); + krb5_free_data(krbContext, ticketData); +#endif krb5_free_keyblock_contents(krbContext, &session); + krb5_free_principal(krbContext, server); krb5_free_keyblock_contents(krbContext, &acceptorKey); - gss_release_buffer(minor, &attrBuf); - krb5_free_data(krbContext, ticketData); krb5_auth_con_free(krbContext, authContext); - if (credsData != NULL) - GSSEAP_FREE(credsData); if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { *minor = code; - major = code != 0 ? GSS_S_FAILURE : GSS_S_COMPLETE; + major = (code != 0) ? GSS_S_FAILURE : GSS_S_COMPLETE; } return major; } static int -isTicketGrantingServiceP(krb5_context krbContext, +isTicketGrantingServiceP(krb5_context krbContext GSSEAP_UNUSED, krb5_const_principal principal) { - if (krb5_princ_size(krbContext, principal) == 2 && + if (KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(principal) == 2 && +#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION + strcmp(KRB_PRINC_NAME(principal)[0], "krbtgt") == 0 +#else krb5_princ_component(krbContext, principal, 0)->length == 6 && - memcmp(krb5_princ_component(krbContext, principal, 0)->data, "krbtgt", 6) == 0) + memcmp(krb5_princ_component(krbContext, + principal, 0)->data, "krbtgt", 6) == 0 +#endif + ) return TRUE; return FALSE; } +/* + * Returns TRUE if the configuration variable reauth_use_ccache is + * set in krb5.conf for the eap_gss application and the client realm. + */ +static int +reauthUseCredsCache(krb5_context krbContext, + krb5_principal principal) +{ + int reauthUseCCache; + + /* if reauth_use_ccache, use default credentials cache if ticket is for us */ + krb5_appdefault_boolean(krbContext, "eap_gss", + KRB_PRINC_REALM(principal), + "reauth_use_ccache", 0, &reauthUseCCache); + + return reauthUseCCache; +} + +/* + * Look in default credentials cache for reauthentication credentials, + * if policy allows. + */ +static OM_uint32 +getDefaultReauthCredentials(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_cred_id_t cred, + gss_name_t target, + time_t now, + OM_uint32 timeReq) +{ + OM_uint32 major = GSS_S_CRED_UNAVAIL; + krb5_context krbContext = NULL; + krb5_error_code code = 0; + krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; + krb5_creds match = { 0 }; + krb5_creds creds = { 0 }; + + GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext); + + assert(cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL); + assert(target != GSS_C_NO_NAME); + + if (cred->name == GSS_C_NO_NAME || + !reauthUseCredsCache(krbContext, cred->name->krbPrincipal)) + goto cleanup; + + match.client = cred->name->krbPrincipal; + match.server = target->krbPrincipal; + if (timeReq != 0 && timeReq != GSS_C_INDEFINITE) + match.times.endtime = now + timeReq; + + code = krb5_cc_default(krbContext, &ccache); + if (code != 0) + goto cleanup; + + code = krb5_cc_retrieve_cred(krbContext, ccache, 0, &match, &creds); + if (code != 0) + goto cleanup; + + cred->flags |= CRED_FLAG_DEFAULT_CCACHE; + cred->krbCredCache = ccache; + ccache = NULL; + + major = gss_krb5_import_cred(minor, cred->krbCredCache, NULL, NULL, + &cred->krbCred); + +cleanup: + if (major == GSS_S_CRED_UNAVAIL) + *minor = code; + + if (ccache != NULL) + krb5_cc_close(krbContext, ccache); + krb5_free_cred_contents(krbContext, &creds); + + return major; +} + +/* + * Returns TRUE if the credential handle's reauth credentials are + * valid or if we can use the default credentials cache. Credentials + * handle must be locked. + */ +int +gssEapCanReauthP(gss_cred_id_t cred, + gss_name_t target, + OM_uint32 timeReq) +{ + time_t now, expiryReq; + OM_uint32 minor; + + assert(cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL); + + now = time(NULL); + expiryReq = now; + if (timeReq != GSS_C_INDEFINITE) + expiryReq += timeReq; + + if (cred->krbCredCache != NULL && cred->expiryTime > expiryReq) + return TRUE; + + if (getDefaultReauthCredentials(&minor, cred, target, + now, timeReq) == GSS_S_COMPLETE) + return TRUE; + + return FALSE; +} + +/* + * Store re-authentication (Kerberos) credentials in a credential handle. + * Credentials handle must be locked. + */ OM_uint32 gssEapStoreReauthCreds(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred, gss_buffer_t credBuf) { - OM_uint32 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE, code; + OM_uint32 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE; + krb5_error_code code; krb5_context krbContext = NULL; krb5_auth_context authContext = NULL; krb5_data credData = { 0 }; krb5_creds **creds = NULL; krb5_principal canonPrinc; + krb5_principal ccPrinc = NULL; int i; if (credBuf->length == 0 || cred == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) @@ -288,23 +551,52 @@ gssEapStoreReauthCreds(OM_uint32 *minor, krb5_free_principal(krbContext, cred->name->krbPrincipal); cred->name->krbPrincipal = canonPrinc; - cred->expiryTime = creds[0]->times.endtime; + if (creds[0]->times.endtime == KRB_TIME_FOREVER) + cred->expiryTime = 0; + else + cred->expiryTime = creds[0]->times.endtime; - code = krb5_cc_new_unique(krbContext, "MEMORY", NULL, &cred->krbCredCache); - if (code != 0) - goto cleanup; + if (cred->krbCredCache == NULL) { + if (reauthUseCredsCache(krbContext, creds[0]->client) && + krb5_cc_default(krbContext, &cred->krbCredCache) == 0) + cred->flags |= CRED_FLAG_DEFAULT_CCACHE; + } else { + /* + * If we already have an associated credentials cache, possibly from + * the last time we stored a reauthentication credential, then we + * need to clear it out and release the associated GSS credential. + */ + if (cred->flags & CRED_FLAG_DEFAULT_CCACHE) { + krb5_cc_remove_cred(krbContext, cred->krbCredCache, 0, creds[0]); + } else { + krb5_cc_destroy(krbContext, cred->krbCredCache); + cred->krbCredCache = NULL; + } + gssReleaseCred(minor, &cred->krbCred); + } - code = krb5_cc_initialize(krbContext, cred->krbCredCache, - creds[0]->client); - if (code != 0) - goto cleanup; + if (cred->krbCredCache == NULL) { + code = krb5_cc_new_unique(krbContext, "MEMORY", NULL, &cred->krbCredCache); + if (code != 0) + goto cleanup; + } + + if ((cred->flags & CRED_FLAG_DEFAULT_CCACHE) == 0 || + krb5_cc_get_principal(krbContext, cred->krbCredCache, &ccPrinc) != 0) { + code = krb5_cc_initialize(krbContext, cred->krbCredCache, + creds[0]->client); + if (code != 0) + goto cleanup; + } for (i = 0; creds[i] != NULL; i++) { krb5_creds kcred = *(creds[i]); /* * Swap in the acceptor name the client asked for so - * get_credentials() works + * get_credentials() works. We're making the assumption that + * any service tickets returned are for us. We'll need to + * reflect some more on whether that is a safe assumption. */ if (!isTicketGrantingServiceP(krbContext, kcred.server)) kcred.server = ctx->acceptorName->krbPrincipal; @@ -322,10 +614,12 @@ gssEapStoreReauthCreds(OM_uint32 *minor, cleanup: *minor = code; + krb5_free_principal(krbContext, ccPrinc); krb5_auth_con_free(krbContext, authContext); if (creds != NULL) { for (i = 0; creds[i] != NULL; i++) krb5_free_creds(krbContext, creds[i]); + GSSEAP_FREE(creds); } if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) major = *minor ? GSS_S_FAILURE : GSS_S_COMPLETE; @@ -333,98 +627,396 @@ cleanup: return major; } -static OM_uint32 (*gssInitSecContextNext)( - OM_uint32 *minor, - gss_cred_id_t cred, - gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle, - gss_name_t target_name, - gss_OID mech_type, - OM_uint32 req_flags, - OM_uint32 time_req, - gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings, - gss_buffer_t input_token, - gss_OID *actual_mech_type, - gss_buffer_t output_token, - OM_uint32 *ret_flags, - OM_uint32 *time_rec); - -static OM_uint32 (*gssAcceptSecContextNext)( - OM_uint32 *minor, - gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle, - gss_cred_id_t cred, - gss_buffer_t input_token, - gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings, - gss_name_t *src_name, - gss_OID *mech_type, - gss_buffer_t output_token, - OM_uint32 *ret_flags, - OM_uint32 *time_rec, - gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle); - -static OM_uint32 (*gssReleaseCredNext)( - OM_uint32 *minor, - gss_cred_id_t *cred_handle); - -static OM_uint32 (*gssReleaseNameNext)( - OM_uint32 *minor, - gss_name_t *name); - -static OM_uint32 (*gssInquireSecContextByOidNext)( - OM_uint32 *minor, - const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, - const gss_OID desired_object, - gss_buffer_set_t *data_set); - -static OM_uint32 (*gssDeleteSecContextNext)( - OM_uint32 *minor, - gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle, - gss_buffer_t output_token); - -static OM_uint32 (*gssDisplayNameNext)( - OM_uint32 *minor, - gss_name_t name, - gss_buffer_t output_name_buffer, - gss_OID *output_name_type); - -static OM_uint32 (*gssImportNameNext)( - OM_uint32 *minor, - gss_buffer_t buffer, - gss_OID nameType, - gss_name_t *outputName); - -static OM_uint32 (*gssKrbExtractAuthzDataFromSecContextNext)( - OM_uint32 *minor, - const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle, - int ad_type, - gss_buffer_t ad_data); - -static OM_uint32 (*gssStoreCredNext)( - OM_uint32 *minor, - const gss_cred_id_t input_cred_handle, - gss_cred_usage_t input_usage, - const gss_OID desired_mech, - OM_uint32 overwrite_cred, - OM_uint32 default_cred, - gss_OID_set *elements_stored, - gss_cred_usage_t *cred_usage_stored); - -#define NEXT_SYMBOL(local, global) ((local) = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, (global))) +#ifndef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION +static gss_buffer_desc radiusAvpKrbAttr = { + sizeof("urn:authdata-radius-avp") - 1, "urn:authdata-radius-avp" +}; +#endif + +/* + * Unfortunately extracting an AD-KDCIssued authorization data element + * is pretty implementation-dependent. It's not possible to verify the + * signature ourselves because the ticket session key is not exposed + * outside GSS. In an ideal world, all AD-KDCIssued elements would be + * verified by the Kerberos library and authentication would fail if + * verification failed. We're not quite there yet and as a result have + * to go through some hoops to get this to work. The alternative would + * be to sign the authorization data with our long-term key, but it + * seems a pity to compromise the design because of current implementation + * limitations. + * + * (Specifically, the hoops involve a libkrb5 authorisation data plugin + * that exposes the verified and serialised attribute context through + * the Kerberos GSS mechanism's naming extensions API.) + */ +static OM_uint32 +defrostAttrContext(OM_uint32 *minor, +#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION + gss_ctx_id_t glueContext, +#else + gss_name_t glueName, +#endif + gss_name_t mechName) +{ + OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor; +#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION + gss_OID_desc oid = { 0 }; + gss_buffer_set_t authData = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET; +#else + gss_buffer_desc authData = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + gss_buffer_desc authDataDisplay = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + int more = -1; + int authenticated, complete; +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION + major = composeOid(minor, + GSS_KRB5_EXTRACT_AUTHZ_DATA_FROM_SEC_CONTEXT_X->elements, + GSS_KRB5_EXTRACT_AUTHZ_DATA_FROM_SEC_CONTEXT_X->length, + KRB5_AUTHDATA_RADIUS_AVP, &oid); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; + + /* XXX we are assuming that this verifies AD-KDCIssued signature */ + major = gssInquireSecContextByOid(minor, glueContext, + &oid, &authData); + if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + if (authData == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET || authData->count != 1) + major = GSS_S_FAILURE; + else + major = gssEapImportAttrContext(minor, authData->elements, mechName); + } else if (major == GSS_S_FAILURE && *minor == ENOENT) { + /* This is the equivalent of GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE for MIT attr APIs */ + *minor = 0; + major = GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } + + gss_release_buffer_set(&tmpMinor, &authData); + GSSEAP_FREE(oid.elements); +#else + major = gssGetNameAttribute(minor, glueName, &radiusAvpKrbAttr, + &authenticated, &complete, + &authData, &authDataDisplay, &more); + if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + if (authenticated == 0) + major = GSS_S_BAD_NAME; + else + major = gssEapImportAttrContext(minor, &authData, mechName); + } else if (major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE) { + major = GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } + + gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &authData); + gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &authDataDisplay); +#endif /* HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION */ + + return major; +} + +/* + * Convert a mechanism glue to an EAP mechanism name by displaying and + * importing it. This also handles the RADIUS attributes. + */ +OM_uint32 +gssEapGlueToMechName(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + gss_name_t glueName, + gss_name_t *pMechName) +{ + OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor; + gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + + *pMechName = GSS_C_NO_NAME; + + major = gssDisplayName(minor, glueName, &nameBuf, NULL); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + goto cleanup; + + major = gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, + ctx->mechanismUsed, pMechName); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + goto cleanup; + + major = defrostAttrContext(minor, +#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION + ctx->reauthCtx, +#else + glueName, +#endif + *pMechName); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + goto cleanup; + +cleanup: + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) { + gssReleaseName(&tmpMinor, pMechName); + *pMechName = GSS_C_NO_NAME; + } + + gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &nameBuf); + + return major; +} + +/* + * Convert an EAP mechanism name to a mechanism glue name by displaying + * and importing it. + */ +OM_uint32 +gssEapMechToGlueName(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_name_t mechName, + gss_name_t *pGlueName) +{ + OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor; + gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; + + *pGlueName = GSS_C_NO_NAME; + + major = gssEapDisplayName(minor, mechName, &nameBuf, NULL); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + goto cleanup; + + major = gssImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, + pGlueName); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + goto cleanup; + +cleanup: + gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &nameBuf); + + return major; +} + +/* + * Suck out the analgous elements of a Kerberos GSS context into an EAP + * one so that the application doesn't know the difference. + */ +OM_uint32 +gssEapReauthComplete(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + gss_cred_id_t cred GSSEAP_UNUSED, + const gss_OID mech, + OM_uint32 timeRec) +{ + OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor; + gss_buffer_set_t keyData = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET; + krb5_context krbContext = NULL; +#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION + krb5_storage *sp = NULL; +#endif + + GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext); + + if (!oidEqual(mech, gss_mech_krb5)) { + major = GSS_S_BAD_MECH; + goto cleanup; + } + + /* Get the raw subsession key and encryption type */ +#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION +#define KRB_GSS_SUBKEY_COUNT 1 /* encoded session key */ + major = gssInquireSecContextByOid(minor, ctx->reauthCtx, + GSS_KRB5_GET_SUBKEY_X, &keyData); +#else +#define KRB_GSS_SUBKEY_COUNT 2 /* raw session key, enctype OID */ + major = gssInquireSecContextByOid(minor, ctx->reauthCtx, + GSS_C_INQ_SSPI_SESSION_KEY, &keyData); +#endif + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + goto cleanup; + + if (keyData == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET || keyData->count < KRB_GSS_SUBKEY_COUNT) { + *minor = GSSEAP_KEY_UNAVAILABLE; + major = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto cleanup; + } + +#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION + sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(keyData->elements[0].value, + keyData->elements[0].length); + if (sp == NULL) { + *minor = ENOMEM; + major = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto cleanup; + } + + *minor = krb5_ret_keyblock(sp, &ctx->rfc3961Key); + if (*minor != 0) { + major = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto cleanup; + } +#else + { + gss_OID_desc oid; + int suffix; + + oid.length = keyData->elements[1].length; + oid.elements = keyData->elements[1].value; + + /* GSS_KRB5_SESSION_KEY_ENCTYPE_OID */ + major = decomposeOid(minor, + "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x02\x04", + 10, &oid, &suffix); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + goto cleanup; + + ctx->encryptionType = suffix; + } + + { + krb5_keyblock key; + + KRB_KEY_LENGTH(&key) = keyData->elements[0].length; + KRB_KEY_DATA(&key) = keyData->elements[0].value; + KRB_KEY_TYPE(&key) = ctx->encryptionType; + + *minor = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(krbContext, + &key, &ctx->rfc3961Key); + if (*minor != 0) { + major = GSS_S_FAILURE; + goto cleanup; + } + } +#endif /* HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION */ + + major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key, + &ctx->checksumType); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + goto cleanup; + + if (timeRec != GSS_C_INDEFINITE) + ctx->expiryTime = time(NULL) + timeRec; + + /* Initialize our sequence state */ + major = sequenceInit(minor, + &ctx->seqState, ctx->recvSeq, + ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG) != 0), + ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG) != 0), + TRUE); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + goto cleanup; + + major = GSS_S_COMPLETE; + +cleanup: +#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION + if (sp != NULL) + krb5_storage_free(sp); +#endif + gss_release_buffer_set(&tmpMinor, &keyData); + + return major; +} + +/* + * The remainder of this file consists of wrappers so we can call into the + * mechanism glue without calling ourselves. + */ +static OM_uint32 +(*gssInitSecContextNext)(OM_uint32 *, + gss_cred_id_t, + gss_ctx_id_t *, + gss_name_t, + gss_OID, + OM_uint32, + OM_uint32, + gss_channel_bindings_t, + gss_buffer_t, + gss_OID *, + gss_buffer_t, + OM_uint32 *, + OM_uint32 *); + +static OM_uint32 +(*gssAcceptSecContextNext)(OM_uint32 *, + gss_ctx_id_t *, + gss_cred_id_t, + gss_buffer_t, + gss_channel_bindings_t, + gss_name_t *, + gss_OID *, + gss_buffer_t, + OM_uint32 *, + OM_uint32 *, + gss_cred_id_t *); + +static OM_uint32 +(*gssReleaseCredNext)(OM_uint32 *, gss_cred_id_t *); + +static OM_uint32 +(*gssReleaseNameNext)(OM_uint32 *, gss_name_t *); + +static OM_uint32 +(*gssInquireSecContextByOidNext)(OM_uint32 *, + const gss_ctx_id_t, + const gss_OID, + gss_buffer_set_t *); + +static OM_uint32 +(*gssDeleteSecContextNext)(OM_uint32 *, + gss_ctx_id_t *, + gss_buffer_t); + +static OM_uint32 +(*gssDisplayNameNext)(OM_uint32 *, + gss_name_t, + gss_buffer_t, + gss_OID *); + +static OM_uint32 +(*gssImportNameNext)(OM_uint32 *, + gss_buffer_t, + gss_OID, + gss_name_t *); + +static OM_uint32 +(*gssStoreCredNext)(OM_uint32 *, + const gss_cred_id_t, + gss_cred_usage_t, + const gss_OID, + OM_uint32, + OM_uint32, + gss_OID_set *, + gss_cred_usage_t *); + +static OM_uint32 +(*gssGetNameAttributeNext)(OM_uint32 *, + gss_name_t, + gss_buffer_t, + int *, + int *, + gss_buffer_t, + gss_buffer_t, + int *); + +#define NEXT_SYMBOL(local, global) do { \ + ((local) = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, (global))); \ + if ((local) == NULL) { \ + *minor = GSSEAP_NO_MECHGLUE_SYMBOL; \ + major = GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; \ + /* but continue */ \ + } \ + } while (0) OM_uint32 gssEapReauthInitialize(OM_uint32 *minor) { - NEXT_SYMBOL(gssInitSecContextNext, "gss_init_sec_context"); - NEXT_SYMBOL(gssAcceptSecContextNext, "gss_accept_sec_context"); - NEXT_SYMBOL(gssReleaseCredNext, "gss_release_cred"); - NEXT_SYMBOL(gssReleaseNameNext, "gss_release_name"); - NEXT_SYMBOL(gssInquireSecContextByOidNext, "gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid"); - NEXT_SYMBOL(gssDeleteSecContextNext, "gss_delete_sec_context"); - NEXT_SYMBOL(gssDisplayNameNext, "gss_display_name"); - NEXT_SYMBOL(gssImportNameNext, "gss_import_name"); - NEXT_SYMBOL(gssKrbExtractAuthzDataFromSecContextNext, "gsskrb5_extract_authz_data_from_sec_context"); - NEXT_SYMBOL(gssStoreCredNext, "gss_store_cred"); - - return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + OM_uint32 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE; + + NEXT_SYMBOL(gssInitSecContextNext, "gss_init_sec_context"); + NEXT_SYMBOL(gssAcceptSecContextNext, "gss_accept_sec_context"); + NEXT_SYMBOL(gssReleaseCredNext, "gss_release_cred"); + NEXT_SYMBOL(gssReleaseNameNext, "gss_release_name"); + NEXT_SYMBOL(gssInquireSecContextByOidNext, "gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid"); + NEXT_SYMBOL(gssDeleteSecContextNext, "gss_delete_sec_context"); + NEXT_SYMBOL(gssDisplayNameNext, "gss_display_name"); + NEXT_SYMBOL(gssImportNameNext, "gss_import_name"); + NEXT_SYMBOL(gssStoreCredNext, "gss_store_cred"); +#ifndef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION + NEXT_SYMBOL(gssGetNameAttributeNext, "gss_get_name_attribute"); +#endif + + return major; } OM_uint32 @@ -442,8 +1034,10 @@ gssInitSecContext(OM_uint32 *minor, OM_uint32 *ret_flags, OM_uint32 *time_rec) { - if (gssInitSecContextNext == NULL) + if (gssInitSecContextNext == NULL) { + *minor = GSSEAP_NO_MECHGLUE_SYMBOL; return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; + } return gssInitSecContextNext(minor, cred, context_handle, target_name, mech_type, req_flags, @@ -465,8 +1059,10 @@ gssAcceptSecContext(OM_uint32 *minor, OM_uint32 *time_rec, gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle) { - if (gssAcceptSecContextNext == NULL) + if (gssAcceptSecContextNext == NULL) { + *minor = GSSEAP_NO_MECHGLUE_SYMBOL; return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; + } return gssAcceptSecContextNext(minor, context_handle, cred, input_token, input_chan_bindings, @@ -478,8 +1074,10 @@ OM_uint32 gssReleaseCred(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_cred_id_t *cred_handle) { - if (gssReleaseCredNext == NULL) + if (gssReleaseCredNext == NULL) { + *minor = GSSEAP_NO_MECHGLUE_SYMBOL; return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; + } return gssReleaseCredNext(minor, cred_handle); } @@ -488,8 +1086,10 @@ OM_uint32 gssReleaseName(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_name_t *name) { - if (gssReleaseName == NULL) + if (gssReleaseName == NULL) { + *minor = GSSEAP_NO_MECHGLUE_SYMBOL; return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; + } return gssReleaseNameNext(minor, name); } @@ -499,8 +1099,10 @@ gssDeleteSecContext(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle, gss_buffer_t output_token) { - if (gssDeleteSecContextNext == NULL) + if (gssDeleteSecContextNext == NULL) { + *minor = GSSEAP_NO_MECHGLUE_SYMBOL; return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; + } return gssDeleteSecContextNext(minor, context_handle, output_token); } @@ -511,8 +1113,10 @@ gssDisplayName(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_OID *name_type) { - if (gssDisplayNameNext == NULL) + if (gssDisplayNameNext == NULL) { + *minor = GSSEAP_NO_MECHGLUE_SYMBOL; return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; + } return gssDisplayNameNext(minor, name, buffer, name_type); } @@ -523,8 +1127,10 @@ gssImportName(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_OID name_type, gss_name_t *name) { - if (gssImportNameNext == NULL) + if (gssImportNameNext == NULL) { + *minor = GSSEAP_NO_MECHGLUE_SYMBOL; return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; + } return gssImportNameNext(minor, buffer, name_type, name); } @@ -535,27 +1141,16 @@ gssInquireSecContextByOid(OM_uint32 *minor, const gss_OID desired_object, gss_buffer_set_t *data_set) { - if (gssInquireSecContextByOidNext == NULL) + if (gssInquireSecContextByOidNext == NULL) { + *minor = GSSEAP_NO_MECHGLUE_SYMBOL; return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; + } return gssInquireSecContextByOidNext(minor, context_handle, desired_object, data_set); } OM_uint32 -gssKrbExtractAuthzDataFromSecContext(OM_uint32 *minor, - const gss_ctx_id_t ctx, - int ad_type, - gss_buffer_t ad_data) -{ - if (gssKrbExtractAuthzDataFromSecContextNext == NULL) - return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; - - return gssKrbExtractAuthzDataFromSecContextNext(minor, ctx, - ad_type, ad_data); -} - -OM_uint32 gssStoreCred(OM_uint32 *minor, const gss_cred_id_t input_cred_handle, gss_cred_usage_t input_usage, @@ -565,8 +1160,10 @@ gssStoreCred(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_OID_set *elements_stored, gss_cred_usage_t *cred_usage_stored) { - if (gssStoreCredNext == NULL) + if (gssStoreCredNext == NULL) { + *minor = GSSEAP_NO_MECHGLUE_SYMBOL; return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; + } return gssStoreCredNext(minor, input_cred_handle, input_usage, desired_mech, overwrite_cred, default_cred, @@ -574,130 +1171,20 @@ gssStoreCred(OM_uint32 *minor, } OM_uint32 -gssEapGlueToMechName(OM_uint32 *minor, - gss_name_t glueName, - gss_name_t *pMechName) -{ - OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor; - gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; - - *pMechName = GSS_C_NO_NAME; - - major = gssDisplayName(minor, glueName, &nameBuf, NULL); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - goto cleanup; - - major = gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, - pMechName); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - goto cleanup; - -cleanup: - gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &nameBuf); - - return major; -} - -OM_uint32 -gssEapMechToGlueName(OM_uint32 *minor, - gss_name_t mechName, - gss_name_t *pGlueName) +gssGetNameAttribute(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_name_t name, + gss_buffer_t attr, + int *authenticated, + int *complete, + gss_buffer_t value, + gss_buffer_t display_value, + int *more) { - OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor; - gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; - - *pGlueName = GSS_C_NO_NAME; - - major = gssEapDisplayName(minor, mechName, &nameBuf, NULL); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - goto cleanup; - - major = gssImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, - pGlueName); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - goto cleanup; - -cleanup: - gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &nameBuf); - - return major; -} - -OM_uint32 -gssEapReauthComplete(OM_uint32 *minor, - gss_ctx_id_t ctx, - gss_cred_id_t cred, - const gss_OID mech, - OM_uint32 timeRec) -{ - OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor; - gss_buffer_set_t keyData = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET; - - if (!oidEqual(mech, gss_mech_krb5)) { - major = GSS_S_BAD_MECH; - goto cleanup; - } - - major = gssInquireSecContextByOid(minor, ctx->kerberosCtx, - GSS_C_INQ_SSPI_SESSION_KEY, &keyData); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - goto cleanup; - - { - gss_OID_desc oid; - int suffix; - - oid.length = keyData->elements[1].length; - oid.elements = keyData->elements[1].value; - - /* GSS_KRB5_SESSION_KEY_ENCTYPE_OID */ - major = decomposeOid(minor, - "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x02\x04", - 10, &oid, &suffix); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - goto cleanup; - - ctx->encryptionType = suffix; - } - - { - krb5_context krbContext = NULL; - krb5_keyblock key; - - GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext); - - KRB_KEY_LENGTH(&key) = keyData->elements[0].length; - KRB_KEY_DATA(&key) = keyData->elements[0].value; - KRB_KEY_TYPE(&key) = ctx->encryptionType; - - *minor = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(krbContext, - &key, &ctx->rfc3961Key); - if (*minor != 0) { - major = GSS_S_FAILURE; - goto cleanup; - } + if (gssGetNameAttributeNext == NULL) { + *minor = GSSEAP_NO_MECHGLUE_SYMBOL; + return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; } - major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key, - &ctx->checksumType); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - goto cleanup; - - if (timeRec != GSS_C_INDEFINITE) - ctx->expiryTime = time(NULL) + timeRec; - - major = sequenceInit(minor, - &ctx->seqState, ctx->recvSeq, - ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG) != 0), - ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG) != 0), - TRUE); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - goto cleanup; - - major = GSS_S_COMPLETE; - -cleanup: - gss_release_buffer_set(&tmpMinor, &keyData); - - return major; + return gssGetNameAttributeNext(minor, name, attr, authenticated, complete, + value, display_value, more); }