X-Git-Url: http://www.project-moonshot.org/gitweb/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=saml%2Fbinding%2Fimpl%2FXMLSigningRule.cpp;h=bd2c5e673735bbe48da0e7ebb71e163aa4989c36;hb=bf32f9265ac717ee1537ec442e5a2d54e169d486;hp=552cef88a12e453febfac70e7f4c908361a9f467;hpb=b951e528ad7d0764ddc4ced037a8bd53bd3c9890;p=shibboleth%2Fcpp-opensaml.git

diff --git a/saml/binding/impl/XMLSigningRule.cpp b/saml/binding/impl/XMLSigningRule.cpp
index 552cef8..bd2c5e6 100644
--- a/saml/binding/impl/XMLSigningRule.cpp
+++ b/saml/binding/impl/XMLSigningRule.cpp
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- *  Copyright 2001-2006 Internet2
+ *  Copyright 2001-2007 Internet2
  * 
  * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
  * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
@@ -22,14 +22,12 @@
 
 #include "internal.h"
 #include "exceptions.h"
-#include "binding/XMLSigningRule.h"
+#include "binding/SecurityPolicyRule.h"
 #include "saml2/core/Assertions.h"
 #include "saml2/metadata/Metadata.h"
 #include "saml2/metadata/MetadataProvider.h"
-#include "security/TrustEngine.h"
+#include "signature/SignatureProfileValidator.h"
 
-#include <xmltooling/util/NDC.h>
-#include <xmltooling/util/ReplayCache.h>
 #include <log4cpp/Category.hh>
 
 using namespace opensaml::saml2md;
@@ -38,80 +36,75 @@ using namespace xmltooling;
 using namespace log4cpp;
 using namespace std;
 
+using xmlsignature::SignatureException;
+
 namespace opensaml {
+    class SAML_DLLLOCAL XMLSigningRule : public SecurityPolicyRule
+    {
+    public:
+        XMLSigningRule(const DOMElement* e);
+        virtual ~XMLSigningRule() {}
+        
+        void evaluate(const xmltooling::XMLObject& message, const GenericRequest* request, SecurityPolicy& policy) const;
+
+    private:
+        bool m_errorsFatal;
+    };
+
     SecurityPolicyRule* SAML_DLLLOCAL XMLSigningRuleFactory(const DOMElement* const & e)
     {
         return new XMLSigningRule(e);
     }
+    
+    static const XMLCh errorsFatal[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_11(e,r,r,o,r,s,F,a,t,a,l);
 };
 
-pair<saml2::Issuer*,const RoleDescriptor*> XMLSigningRule::evaluate(
-    const GenericRequest& request,
-    const XMLObject& message,
-    const MetadataProvider* metadataProvider,
-    const QName* role,
-    const opensaml::TrustEngine* trustEngine,
-    const MessageExtractor& extractor
-    ) const
+XMLSigningRule::XMLSigningRule(const DOMElement* e) : m_errorsFatal(false)
+{
+    if (e) {
+        const XMLCh* flag = e->getAttributeNS(NULL, errorsFatal);
+        m_errorsFatal = (flag && (*flag==chLatin_t || *flag==chDigit_1)); 
+    }
+}
+
+void XMLSigningRule::evaluate(const XMLObject& message, const GenericRequest* request, SecurityPolicy& policy) const
 {
     Category& log=Category::getInstance(SAML_LOGCAT".SecurityPolicyRule.XMLSigning");
-    log.debug("evaluating message signing policy");
-    
-    pair<saml2::Issuer*,const RoleDescriptor*> ret = pair<saml2::Issuer*,const RoleDescriptor*>(NULL,NULL);  
     
-    if (!metadataProvider || !role || !trustEngine) {
-        log.debug("ignoring message, no metadata or trust information supplied");
-        return ret;
+    if (!policy.getIssuerMetadata()) {
+        log.debug("ignoring message, no issuer metadata supplied");
+        return;
+    }
+    else if (!policy.getTrustEngine()) {
+        log.debug("ignoring message, no TrustEngine supplied");
+        return;
     }
     
+    const SignableObject* signable = dynamic_cast<const SignableObject*>(&message);
+    if (!signable || !signable->getSignature())
+        return;
+    
+    log.debug("validating signature profile");
     try {
-        const RootObject& root = dynamic_cast<const RootObject&>(message);
-        if (!root.getSignature()) {
-            log.debug("ignoring unsigned message");
-            return ret;
-        }
-        
-        log.debug("extracting issuer from message");
-        pair<saml2::Issuer*,const XMLCh*> issuerInfo = extractor.getIssuerAndProtocol(message);
-        
-        auto_ptr<saml2::Issuer> issuer(issuerInfo.first);
-        if (!issuerInfo.first || !issuerInfo.second ||
-                (issuer->getFormat() && !XMLString::equals(issuer->getFormat(), saml2::NameIDType::ENTITY))) {
-            log.warn("issuer identity not estabished, or was not an entityID");
-            return ret;
-        }
-        
-        log.debug("searching metadata for message issuer...");
-        const EntityDescriptor* entity = metadataProvider->getEntityDescriptor(issuer->getName());
-        if (!entity) {
-            auto_ptr_char temp(issuer->getName());
-            log.warn("no metadata found, can't establish identity of issuer (%s)", temp.get());
-            return ret;
-        }
-
-        log.debug("matched message issuer against metadata, searching for applicable role...");
-        const RoleDescriptor* roledesc=entity->getRoleDescriptor(*role, issuerInfo.second);
-        if (!roledesc) {
-            log.warn("unable to find compatible role (%s) in metadata", role->toString().c_str());
-            return ret;
-        }
-
-        if (!trustEngine->validate(*(root.getSignature()), *roledesc, metadataProvider->getKeyResolver())) {
-            log.error("unable to verify signature on message with supplied trust engine");
-            return ret;
-        }
-
-        if (log.isDebugEnabled()) {
-            auto_ptr_char iname(entity->getEntityID());
-            log.debug("message from (%s), signature verified", iname.get());
-        }
-        
-        ret.first = issuer.release();
-        ret.second = roledesc;
+        SignatureProfileValidator sigval;
+        sigval.validateSignature(*(signable->getSignature()));
     }
-    catch (bad_cast&) {
-        // Just trap it.
-        log.warn("caught a bad_cast while extracting issuer");
+    catch (ValidationException& ve) {
+        log.error("signature profile failed to validate: %s", ve.what());
+        if (m_errorsFatal)
+            throw;
+        return;
     }
-    return ret;
+    
+    if (!policy.getTrustEngine()->validate(
+            *(signable->getSignature()), *(policy.getIssuerMetadata()), policy.getMetadataProvider()->getKeyResolver()
+            )) {
+        log.error("unable to verify message signature with supplied trust engine");
+        if (m_errorsFatal)
+            throw SignatureException("Message was signed, but signature could not be verified.");
+        return;
+    }
+
+    log.debug("signature verified against message issuer");
+    policy.setSecure(true);
 }