X-Git-Url: http://www.project-moonshot.org/gitweb/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=saml%2Fsaml2%2Fprofile%2Fimpl%2FBearerConfirmationRule.cpp;fp=saml%2Fsaml2%2Fprofile%2Fimpl%2FBearerConfirmationRule.cpp;h=b197226f02fff6760957deb78170fbaeead54674;hb=69a716dedfd9e239bcc9206a7b8dc137b43f5f89;hp=0000000000000000000000000000000000000000;hpb=df39928338a40f7a2980406e9737893289673611;p=shibboleth%2Fcpp-opensaml.git

diff --git a/saml/saml2/profile/impl/BearerConfirmationRule.cpp b/saml/saml2/profile/impl/BearerConfirmationRule.cpp
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+++ b/saml/saml2/profile/impl/BearerConfirmationRule.cpp
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+/*
+ *  Copyright 2009 Internet2
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * BearerConfirmationRule.cpp
+ *
+ * SAML 2.0 Bearer SubjectConfirmation SecurityPolicyRule
+ */
+
+#include "internal.h"
+#include "exceptions.h"
+#include "binding/SecurityPolicyRule.h"
+#include "saml2/core/Assertions.h"
+#include "saml2/profile/SAML2AssertionPolicy.h"
+
+#include <xmltooling/logging.h>
+#include <xmltooling/io/HTTPRequest.h>
+
+using namespace opensaml::saml2;
+using namespace xmltooling;
+using namespace std;
+
+namespace opensaml {
+    namespace saml2 {
+
+        class SAML_DLLLOCAL BearerConfirmationRule : public opensaml::SecurityPolicyRule
+        {
+        public:
+            BearerConfirmationRule(const DOMElement* e);
+
+            virtual ~BearerConfirmationRule() {
+            }
+            const char* getType() const {
+                return BEARER_POLICY_RULE;
+            }
+            bool evaluate(const XMLObject& message, const GenericRequest* request, opensaml::SecurityPolicy& policy) const;
+        
+        private:
+            bool m_validity, m_recipient, m_correlation, m_fatal;
+        };
+
+        opensaml::SecurityPolicyRule* SAML_DLLLOCAL BearerConfirmationRuleFactory(const DOMElement* const & e)
+        {
+            return new BearerConfirmationRule(e);
+        }
+        
+        static const XMLCh checkValidity[] =    UNICODE_LITERAL_13(c,h,e,c,k,V,a,l,i,d,i,t,y);
+        static const XMLCh checkRecipient[] =   UNICODE_LITERAL_14(c,h,e,c,k,R,e,c,i,p,i,e,n,t);
+        static const XMLCh checkCorrelation[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_16(c,h,e,c,k,C,o,r,r,e,l,a,t,i,o,n);
+        static const XMLCh missingFatal[] =     UNICODE_LITERAL_12(m,i,s,s,i,n,g,F,a,t,a,l);
+    };
+};
+
+BearerConfirmationRule::BearerConfirmationRule(const DOMElement* e) : m_validity(true), m_recipient(true), m_correlation(true), m_fatal(true)
+{
+    const XMLCh* flag = e ? e->getAttributeNS(NULL, checkValidity) : NULL;
+    m_validity = (!flag || (*flag != chLatin_f && *flag != chDigit_0));
+    flag = e ? e->getAttributeNS(NULL, checkRecipient) : NULL;
+    m_recipient = (!flag || (*flag != chLatin_f && *flag != chDigit_0));
+    flag = e ? e->getAttributeNS(NULL, checkCorrelation) : NULL;
+    m_correlation = (!flag || (*flag != chLatin_f && *flag != chDigit_0));
+    flag = e ? e->getAttributeNS(NULL, missingFatal) : NULL;
+    m_fatal = (!flag || (*flag != chLatin_f && *flag != chDigit_0));
+}
+
+bool BearerConfirmationRule::evaluate(const XMLObject& message, const GenericRequest* request, opensaml::SecurityPolicy& policy) const
+{
+    const Assertion* a=dynamic_cast<const Assertion*>(&message);
+    if (!a)
+        return false;
+
+    logging::Category& log = logging::Category::getInstance(SAML_LOGCAT".SecurityPolicyRule.BearerConfirmation");
+
+    const char* msg=NULL;
+    const Subject* subject = a->getSubject();
+    if (subject) {
+        const vector<SubjectConfirmation*>& confs = subject->getSubjectConfirmations();
+        for (vector<SubjectConfirmation*>::const_iterator sc = confs.begin(); sc!=confs.end(); ++sc) {
+            if (XMLString::equals((*sc)->getMethod(), SubjectConfirmation::BEARER)) {
+
+                const SubjectConfirmationDataType* data = dynamic_cast<const SubjectConfirmationDataType*>((*sc)->getSubjectConfirmationData());
+
+                if (m_recipient) {
+                    const HTTPRequest* httpRequest = dynamic_cast<const HTTPRequest*>(request);
+                    if (httpRequest && httpRequest->getRequestURL()) {
+                        string dest = httpRequest->getRequestURL();
+                        auto_ptr_XMLCh destination(dest.substr(0,dest.find('?')).c_str());
+                        if (!XMLString::equals(destination.get(), data ? data->getRecipient() : NULL)) {
+                            msg = "bearer confirmation failed with recipient mismatch";
+                            continue;
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+
+                if (m_correlation && policy.getCorrelationID()) {
+                    if (!XMLString::equals(policy.getCorrelationID(), data ? data->getInResponseTo() : NULL)) {
+                        msg = "bearer confirmation failed with request correlation mismatch";
+                        continue;
+                    }
+                }
+
+                if (m_validity) {
+                    if (!data || !data->getNotOnOrAfter()) {
+                        msg = "bearer SubjectConfirmationData missing NotOnOrAfter attribute";
+                        continue;
+                    }
+                    else if (data->getNotOnOrAfterEpoch() <= policy.getTime() - XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().clock_skew_secs) {
+                        msg = "bearer confirmation has expired";
+                        continue;
+                    }
+
+                    if (data && data->getNotBefore() && policy.getTime() + XMLToolingConfig::getConfig().clock_skew_secs < data->getNotBeforeEpoch()) {
+                        msg = "bearer confirmation not yet valid";
+                        continue;
+                    }
+                }
+
+                SAML2AssertionPolicy* saml2policy = dynamic_cast<SAML2AssertionPolicy*>(&policy);
+                if (saml2policy)
+                    saml2policy->setSubjectConfirmation(*sc);
+                log.debug("assertion satisfied bearer confirmation requirements");
+                return true;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    log.error(msg);
+    if (m_fatal)
+        throw SecurityPolicyException("Unable to locate satisfiable bearer SubjectConfirmation in assertion.");
+    return false;
+}