* License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
*
- * Copyright 2000-2003 The FreeRADIUS server project
+ * Copyright 2000-2003,2006 The FreeRADIUS server project
*/
-static const char rcsid[] = "$Id$";
+#include <freeradius-devel/ident.h>
+RCSID("$Id$")
-#include "autoconf.h"
-#include "md5.h"
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-
-#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
-#include <unistd.h>
-#endif
+#include <freeradius-devel/libradius.h>
+#include <freeradius-devel/md5.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <string.h>
#include <ctype.h>
-#include "libradius.h"
#ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
-#include "udpfromto.h"
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#endif
-
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-
-#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H
-#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <freeradius-devel/udpfromto.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_MALLOC_H
#include <malloc.h>
#endif
-#ifdef WIN32
-#include <process.h>
-#endif
-
/*
* The RFC says 4096 octets max, and most packets are less than 256.
*/
* is unsigned, and the attacker can use resources on the server,
* even if the end request is rejected.
*/
-int librad_max_attributes = 0;
+int fr_max_attributes = 0;
+FILE *fr_log_fp = NULL;
typedef struct radius_packet_t {
uint8_t code;
uint8_t data[1];
} radius_packet_t;
-static lrad_randctx lrad_rand_pool; /* across multiple calls */
-static volatile int lrad_rand_index = -1;
+static fr_randctx fr_rand_pool; /* across multiple calls */
+static int fr_rand_initialized = 0;
static unsigned int salt_offset = 0;
-static const char *packet_codes[] = {
+const char *fr_packet_codes[FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE] = {
"",
"Access-Request",
"Access-Accept",
};
+void fr_printf_log(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ if ((fr_debug_flag == 0) || !fr_log_fp) {
+ va_end(ap);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ vfprintf(fr_log_fp, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+
+ return;
+}
+
+static void print_hex(RADIUS_PACKET *packet)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (!packet->data) return;
+
+ printf(" Code:\t\t%u\n", packet->data[0]);
+ printf(" Id:\t\t%u\n", packet->data[1]);
+ printf(" Length:\t%u\n", ((packet->data[2] << 8) |
+ (packet->data[3])));
+ printf(" Vector:\t");
+ for (i = 4; i < 20; i++) {
+ printf("%02x", packet->data[i]);
+ }
+ printf("\n");
+
+ if (packet->data_len > 20) {
+ int total;
+ const uint8_t *ptr;
+ printf(" Data:");
+
+ total = packet->data_len - 20;
+ ptr = packet->data + 20;
+
+ while (total > 0) {
+ int attrlen;
+
+ printf("\t\t");
+ if (total < 2) { /* too short */
+ printf("%02x\n", *ptr);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (ptr[1] > total) { /* too long */
+ for (i = 0; i < total; i++) {
+ printf("%02x ", ptr[i]);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ printf("%02x %02x ", ptr[0], ptr[1]);
+ attrlen = ptr[1] - 2;
+ ptr += 2;
+ total -= 2;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < attrlen; i++) {
+ if ((i > 0) && ((i & 0x0f) == 0x00))
+ printf("\t\t\t");
+ printf("%02x ", ptr[i]);
+ if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x0f) printf("\n");
+ }
+
+ if ((attrlen & 0x0f) != 0x00) printf("\n");
+
+ ptr += attrlen;
+ total -= attrlen;
+ }
+ }
+ fflush(stdout);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Wrapper for sendto which handles sendfromto, IPv6, and all
+ * possible combinations.
+ */
+static int rad_sendto(int sockfd, void *data, size_t data_len, int flags,
+ fr_ipaddr_t *src_ipaddr, int src_port,
+ fr_ipaddr_t *dst_ipaddr, int dst_port)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_storage dst;
+ socklen_t sizeof_dst;
+
+#ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
+ struct sockaddr_storage src;
+ socklen_t sizeof_src;
+
+ fr_ipaddr2sockaddr(src_ipaddr, src_port, &src, &sizeof_src);
+#else
+ src_port = src_port; /* -Wunused */
+#endif
+
+ if (!fr_ipaddr2sockaddr(dst_ipaddr, dst_port, &dst, &sizeof_dst)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+#ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
+ /*
+ * Only IPv4 is supported for udpfromto.
+ *
+ * And if they don't specify a source IP address, don't
+ * use udpfromto.
+ */
+ if ((dst_ipaddr->af == AF_INET) &&
+ (src_ipaddr->af != AF_UNSPEC)) {
+ return sendfromto(sockfd, data, data_len, flags,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&src, sizeof_src,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&dst, sizeof_dst);
+ }
+#else
+ src_ipaddr = src_ipaddr; /* -Wunused */
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * No udpfromto, OR an IPv6 socket, fail gracefully.
+ */
+ return sendto(sockfd, data, data_len, flags,
+ (struct sockaddr *) &dst, sizeof_dst);
+}
+
+
+void rad_recv_discard(int sockfd)
+{
+ uint8_t header[4];
+ struct sockaddr_storage src;
+ socklen_t sizeof_src = sizeof(src);
+
+ recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), 0,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
+}
+
+
+ssize_t rad_recv_header(int sockfd, fr_ipaddr_t *src_ipaddr, int *src_port,
+ int *code)
+{
+ ssize_t data_len, packet_len;
+ uint8_t header[4];
+ struct sockaddr_storage src;
+ socklen_t sizeof_src = sizeof(src);
+
+ data_len = recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), MSG_PEEK,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
+ if (data_len < 0) {
+ if ((errno == EAGAIN) || (errno == EINTR)) return 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Too little data is available, discard the packet.
+ */
+ if (data_len < 4) {
+ recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), 0,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
+ return 1;
+
+ } else { /* we got 4 bytes of data. */
+ /*
+ * See how long the packet says it is.
+ */
+ packet_len = (header[2] * 256) + header[3];
+
+ /*
+ * The length in the packet says it's less than
+ * a RADIUS header length: discard it.
+ */
+ if (packet_len < AUTH_HDR_LEN) {
+ recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), 0,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
+ return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Enforce RFC requirements, for sanity.
+ * Anything after 4k will be discarded.
+ */
+ } else if (packet_len > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
+ recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), 0,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert AF. If unknown, discard packet.
+ */
+ if (!fr_sockaddr2ipaddr(&src, sizeof_src, src_ipaddr, src_port)) {
+ recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), 0,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ *code = header[0];
+
+ /*
+ * The packet says it's this long, but the actual UDP
+ * size could still be smaller.
+ */
+ return packet_len;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * wrapper for recvfrom, which handles recvfromto, IPv6, and all
+ * possible combinations.
+ */
+static ssize_t rad_recvfrom(int sockfd, uint8_t **pbuf, int flags,
+ fr_ipaddr_t *src_ipaddr, uint16_t *src_port,
+ fr_ipaddr_t *dst_ipaddr, uint16_t *dst_port)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_storage src;
+ struct sockaddr_storage dst;
+ socklen_t sizeof_src = sizeof(src);
+ socklen_t sizeof_dst = sizeof(dst);
+ ssize_t data_len;
+ uint8_t header[4];
+ void *buf;
+ size_t len;
+ int port;
+
+ memset(&src, 0, sizeof_src);
+ memset(&dst, 0, sizeof_dst);
+
+ /*
+ * Get address family, etc. first, so we know if we
+ * need to do udpfromto.
+ *
+ * FIXME: udpfromto also does this, but it's not
+ * a critical problem.
+ */
+ if (getsockname(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&dst,
+ &sizeof_dst) < 0) return -1;
+
+ /*
+ * Read the length of the packet, from the packet.
+ * This lets us allocate the buffer to use for
+ * reading the rest of the packet.
+ */
+ data_len = recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), MSG_PEEK,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
+ if (data_len < 0) {
+ if ((errno == EAGAIN) || (errno == EINTR)) return 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Too little data is available, discard the packet.
+ */
+ if (data_len < 4) {
+ recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), flags,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
+ return 0;
+
+ } else { /* we got 4 bytes of data. */
+ /*
+ * See how long the packet says it is.
+ */
+ len = (header[2] * 256) + header[3];
+
+ /*
+ * The length in the packet says it's less than
+ * a RADIUS header length: discard it.
+ */
+ if (len < AUTH_HDR_LEN) {
+ recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), flags,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Enforce RFC requirements, for sanity.
+ * Anything after 4k will be discarded.
+ */
+ } else if (len > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
+ recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), flags,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
+ return len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ buf = malloc(len);
+ if (!buf) return -1;
+
+ /*
+ * Receive the packet. The OS will discard any data in the
+ * packet after "len" bytes.
+ */
+#ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
+ if (dst.ss_family == AF_INET) {
+ data_len = recvfromto(sockfd, buf, len, flags,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&dst, &sizeof_dst);
+ } else
+#endif
+ /*
+ * No udpfromto, OR an IPv6 socket. Fail gracefully.
+ */
+ data_len = recvfrom(sockfd, buf, len, flags,
+ (struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
+ if (data_len < 0) {
+ free(buf);
+ return data_len;
+ }
+
+ if (!fr_sockaddr2ipaddr(&src, sizeof_src, src_ipaddr, &port)) {
+ free(buf);
+ return -1; /* Unknown address family, Die Die Die! */
+ }
+ *src_port = port;
+
+ fr_sockaddr2ipaddr(&dst, sizeof_dst, dst_ipaddr, &port);
+ *dst_port = port;
+
+ /*
+ * Different address families should never happen.
+ */
+ if (src.ss_family != dst.ss_family) {
+ free(buf);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Tell the caller about the data
+ */
+ *pbuf = buf;
+
+ return data_len;
+}
+
+
#define AUTH_PASS_LEN (AUTH_VECTOR_LEN)
/*************************************************************************
*
static void make_secret(uint8_t *digest, const uint8_t *vector,
const char *secret, const uint8_t *value)
{
- MD5_CTX context;
+ FR_MD5_CTX context;
int i;
- MD5Init(&context);
- MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
- MD5Update(&context, secret, strlen(secret));
- MD5Final(digest, &context);
+ fr_MD5Init(&context);
+ fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+ fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret, strlen(secret));
+ fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
for ( i = 0; i < AUTH_VECTOR_LEN; i++ ) {
digest[i] ^= value[i];
}
#define MAX_PASS_LEN (128)
-static void make_passwd(uint8_t *output, int *outlen,
- const uint8_t *input, int inlen,
+static void make_passwd(uint8_t *output, size_t *outlen,
+ const uint8_t *input, size_t inlen,
const char *secret, const uint8_t *vector)
{
- MD5_CTX context, old;
+ FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
uint8_t passwd[MAX_PASS_LEN];
int i, n;
* If the length is zero, round it up.
*/
len = inlen;
+
+ if (len > MAX_PASS_LEN) len = MAX_PASS_LEN;
+
+ memcpy(passwd, input, len);
+ memset(passwd + len, 0, sizeof(passwd) - len);
+
if (len == 0) {
len = AUTH_PASS_LEN;
}
- else if (len > MAX_PASS_LEN) len = MAX_PASS_LEN;
else if ((len & 0x0f) != 0) {
len += 0x0f;
}
*outlen = len;
- memcpy(passwd, input, len);
- memset(passwd + len, 0, sizeof(passwd) - len);
-
- MD5Init(&context);
- MD5Update(&context, secret, strlen(secret));
+ fr_MD5Init(&context);
+ fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret, strlen(secret));
old = context;
/*
* Do first pass.
*/
- MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
+ fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
for (n = 0; n < len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
if (n > 0) {
context = old;
- MD5Update(&context,
+ fr_MD5Update(&context,
passwd + n - AUTH_PASS_LEN,
AUTH_PASS_LEN);
}
- MD5Final(digest, &context);
+ fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
passwd[i + n] ^= digest[i];
}
memcpy(output, passwd, len);
}
-static void make_tunnel_passwd(uint8_t *output, int *outlen,
- const uint8_t *input, int inlen, int room,
+static void make_tunnel_passwd(uint8_t *output, size_t *outlen,
+ const uint8_t *input, size_t inlen, size_t room,
const char *secret, const uint8_t *vector)
{
- MD5_CTX context, old;
+ FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
uint8_t passwd[MAX_STRING_LEN + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
int i, n;
int len;
/*
+ * Be paranoid.
+ */
+ if (room > 253) room = 253;
+
+ /*
* Account for 2 bytes of the salt, and round the room
* available down to the nearest multiple of 16. Then,
* subtract one from that to account for the length byte,
* add in some CSPRNG data. should be OK..
*/
passwd[0] = (0x80 | ( ((salt_offset++) & 0x0f) << 3) |
- (lrad_rand() & 0x07));
- passwd[1] = lrad_rand();
+ (fr_rand() & 0x07));
+ passwd[1] = fr_rand();
passwd[2] = inlen; /* length of the password string */
- MD5Init(&context);
- MD5Update(&context, secret, strlen(secret));
+ fr_MD5Init(&context);
+ fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret, strlen(secret));
old = context;
- MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
- MD5Update(&context, &passwd[0], 2);
+ fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+ fr_MD5Update(&context, &passwd[0], 2);
for (n = 0; n < len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
if (n > 0) {
context = old;
- MD5Update(&context,
+ fr_MD5Update(&context,
passwd + 2 + n - AUTH_PASS_LEN,
AUTH_PASS_LEN);
}
- MD5Final(digest, &context);
+ fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
+
for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
passwd[i + 2 + n] ^= digest[i];
}
memcpy(output, passwd, len + 2);
}
-
/*
- * Parse a data structure into a RADIUS attribute.
+ * Returns the end of the data.
*/
-int rad_vp2attr(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
- const char *secret, const VALUE_PAIR *vp, uint8_t *ptr)
+static int vp2data(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
+ const char *secret, const VALUE_PAIR *vp, uint8_t *start,
+ size_t room)
{
- int vendorcode;
- int offset, len, total_length;
- uint32_t lvalue;
- uint8_t *length_ptr, *vsa_length_ptr;
- const uint8_t *data = NULL;
- uint8_t array[4];
-
- vendorcode = total_length = 0;
- length_ptr = vsa_length_ptr = NULL;
-
- /*
- * For interoperability, always put vendor attributes
- * into their own VSA.
- */
- if ((vendorcode = VENDOR(vp->attribute)) != 0) {
- /*
- * Build a VSA header.
- */
- *ptr++ = PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
- vsa_length_ptr = ptr;
- *ptr++ = 6;
- lvalue = htonl(vendorcode);
- memcpy(ptr, &lvalue, 4);
- ptr += 4;
- total_length += 6;
-
- if (vendorcode == VENDORPEC_USR) {
- lvalue = htonl(vp->attribute & 0xFFFF);
- memcpy(ptr, &lvalue, 4);
-
- length_ptr = vsa_length_ptr;
-
- total_length += 4;
- *length_ptr += 4;
- ptr += 4;
-
- /*
- * We don't have two different lengths.
- */
- vsa_length_ptr = NULL;
-
- } else if (vendorcode == VENDORPEC_LUCENT) {
- /*
- * 16-bit attribute, 8-bit length
- */
- *ptr++ = ((vp->attribute >> 8) & 0xFF);
- *ptr++ = (vp->attribute & 0xFF);
- length_ptr = ptr;
- *vsa_length_ptr += 3;
- *ptr++ = 3;
- total_length += 3;
-
- } else if (vendorcode == VENDORPEC_STARENT) {
- /*
- * 16-bit attribute, 16-bit length
- * with the upper 8 bits of the length
- * always zero!
- */
- *ptr++ = ((vp->attribute >> 8) & 0xFF);
- *ptr++ = (vp->attribute & 0xFF);
- *ptr++ = 0;
- length_ptr = ptr;
- *vsa_length_ptr += 4;
- *ptr++ = 4;
- total_length += 4;
- } else {
- /*
- * All other VSA's are encoded the same
- * as RFC attributes.
- */
- *vsa_length_ptr += 2;
- goto rfc;
- }
- } else {
- rfc:
- /*
- * All other attributes are encoded as
- * per the RFC.
- */
- *ptr++ = (vp->attribute & 0xFF);
- length_ptr = ptr;
- *ptr++ = 2;
- total_length += 2;
- }
+ uint32_t lvalue;
+ size_t len;
+ const uint8_t *data;
+ uint8_t *ptr = start;
+ uint8_t array[4];
- offset = 0;
- if (vp->flags.has_tag) {
- if (TAG_VALID(vp->flags.tag)) {
- ptr[0] = vp->flags.tag & 0xff;
- offset = 1;
-
- } else if (vp->flags.encrypt == FLAG_ENCRYPT_TUNNEL_PASSWORD) {
- /*
- * Tunnel passwords REQUIRE a tag, even
- * if don't have a valid tag.
- */
- ptr[0] = 0;
- offset = 1;
- } /* else don't write a tag */
- } /* else the attribute doesn't have a tag */
-
/*
* Set up the default sources for the data.
*/
- data = vp->strvalue;
+ data = vp->vp_octets;
len = vp->length;
- /*
- * Encrypted passwords can't be very long.
- * This check also ensures that the hashed version
- * of the password + attribute header fits into one
- * attribute.
- *
- * FIXME: Print a warning message if it's too long?
- */
- if (vp->flags.encrypt && (len > MAX_PASS_LEN)) {
- len = MAX_PASS_LEN;
- }
-
switch(vp->type) {
case PW_TYPE_STRING:
case PW_TYPE_OCTETS:
case PW_TYPE_ABINARY:
/* nothing more to do */
break;
-
+
+ case PW_TYPE_BYTE:
+ len = 1; /* just in case */
+ array[0] = vp->vp_integer & 0xff;
+ data = array;
+ break;
+
+ case PW_TYPE_SHORT:
+ len = 2; /* just in case */
+ array[0] = (vp->vp_integer >> 8) & 0xff;
+ array[1] = vp->vp_integer & 0xff;
+ data = array;
+ break;
+
case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
len = 4; /* just in case */
- lvalue = htonl(vp->lvalue);
+ lvalue = htonl(vp->vp_integer);
memcpy(array, &lvalue, sizeof(lvalue));
-
- /*
- * Perhaps discard the first octet.
- */
- data = &array[offset];
- len -= offset;
+ data = array;
break;
-
+
case PW_TYPE_IPADDR:
- data = (const uint8_t *) &vp->lvalue;
+ data = (const uint8_t *) &vp->vp_ipaddr;
len = 4; /* just in case */
break;
* There are no tagged date attributes.
*/
case PW_TYPE_DATE:
- lvalue = htonl(vp->lvalue);
+ lvalue = htonl(vp->vp_date);
data = (const uint8_t *) &lvalue;
len = 4; /* just in case */
break;
+ case PW_TYPE_SIGNED:
+ {
+ int32_t slvalue;
+
+ len = 4; /* just in case */
+ slvalue = htonl(vp->vp_signed);
+ memcpy(array, &slvalue, sizeof(slvalue));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case PW_TYPE_TLV:
+ data = vp->vp_tlv;
+ if (!data) {
+ fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot encode NULL TLV");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (vp->length > room) return 0; /* can't chop TLVs to fit */
+ break;
+
default: /* unknown type: ignore it */
- librad_log("ERROR: Unknown attribute type %d", vp->type);
+ fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Unknown attribute type %d", vp->type);
return -1;
}
/*
- * Bound the data to 255 bytes.
+ * Bound the data to the calling size
*/
- if (len + offset + total_length > 255) {
- len = 255 - offset - total_length;
- }
+ if (len > room) len = room;
/*
* Encrypt the various password styles
*/
switch (vp->flags.encrypt) {
case FLAG_ENCRYPT_USER_PASSWORD:
- make_passwd(ptr + offset, &len,
- data, len,
+ make_passwd(ptr, &len, data, len,
secret, packet->vector);
break;
-
+
case FLAG_ENCRYPT_TUNNEL_PASSWORD:
- if (!original) {
- librad_log("ERROR: No request packet, cannot encrypt %s attribute in the vp.", vp->name);
- return -1;
- }
+ lvalue = 0;
+ if (vp->flags.has_tag) lvalue = 1;
/*
- * Check if 255 - offset - total_length is less
- * than 18. If so, we can't fit the data into
- * the available space, and we discard the
- * attribute.
+ * Check if there's enough room. If there isn't,
+ * we discard the attribute.
*
* This is ONLY a problem if we have multiple VSA's
* in one Vendor-Specific, though.
*/
- if ((255 - offset - total_length) < 18) return 0;
+ if (room < (18 + lvalue)) return 0;
- /*
- * Can't make the password, suppress it.
- */
- make_tunnel_passwd(ptr + offset, &len,
- data, len, 255 - offset - total_length,
- secret, original->vector);
+ switch (packet->code) {
+ case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
+ case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
+ case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
+ default:
+ if (!original) {
+ fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: No request packet, cannot encrypt %s attribute in the vp.", vp->name);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (lvalue) ptr[0] = vp->flags.tag;
+ make_tunnel_passwd(ptr + lvalue, &len, data, len,
+ room - lvalue,
+ secret, original->vector);
+ break;
+ case PW_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
+ case PW_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
+ case PW_COA_REQUEST:
+ ptr[0] = vp->flags.tag;
+ make_tunnel_passwd(ptr + 1, &len, data, len - 1, room,
+ secret, packet->vector);
+ break;
+ }
break;
/*
* always fits.
*/
case FLAG_ENCRYPT_ASCEND_SECRET:
- make_secret(ptr + offset, packet->vector,
- secret, data);
+ make_secret(ptr, packet->vector, secret, data);
len = AUTH_VECTOR_LEN;
break;
-
+
default:
- /*
- * Just copy the data over
- */
- memcpy(ptr + offset, data, len);
+ if (vp->flags.has_tag && TAG_VALID(vp->flags.tag)) {
+ if (vp->type == PW_TYPE_STRING) {
+ if (len > (room - 1)) len = room - 1;
+ ptr[0] = vp->flags.tag;
+ ptr++;
+ } else if (vp->type == PW_TYPE_INTEGER) {
+ array[0] = vp->flags.tag;
+ } /* else it can't be any other type */
+ }
+ memcpy(ptr, data, len);
break;
} /* switch over encryption flags */
- /*
- * Account for the tag (if any).
- */
- len += offset;
+ return len + (ptr - start);;
+}
- /*
- * RFC 2865 section 5 says that zero-length attributes
- * MUST NOT be sent.
- */
- if (len == 0) return 0;
- /*
- * Update the various lengths.
- */
- *length_ptr += len;
- if (vsa_length_ptr) *vsa_length_ptr += len;
- ptr += len;
- total_length += len;
+static int rad_vp2rfc(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
+ const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
+ const char *secret, const VALUE_PAIR *vp,
+ unsigned int attribute, uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
+{
+ int len;
+
+ if (room < 2) return 0;
- return total_length; /* of attribute */
+ ptr[0] = attribute & 0xff; /* NOT vp->attribute */
+ ptr[1] = 2;
+
+ if (room > (255 - ptr[1])) room = 255 - ptr[1];
+ len = vp2data(packet, original, secret, vp, ptr + 2, room);
+ if (len < 0) return len;
+
+ ptr[1] += len;
+
+ return ptr[1];
}
+extern int fr_wimax_max_tlv;
+extern int fr_wimax_shift[];
+extern int fr_wimax_mask[];
-/*
- * Encode a packet.
- */
-int rad_encode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
- const char *secret)
+static int tlv2data(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
+ const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
+ const char *secret, const VALUE_PAIR *vp,
+ uint8_t *ptr, size_t room, int nest)
+{
+ int len;
+
+ if (nest > fr_wimax_max_tlv) return -1;
+
+ if (room < 2) return 0;
+ room -= 2;
+
+ ptr[0] = (vp->attribute >> fr_wimax_shift[nest]) & fr_wimax_mask[nest];
+ ptr[1] = 2;
+
+ /*
+ * No more nested TLVs: pack the data.
+ */
+ if ((nest == fr_wimax_max_tlv) ||
+ ((vp->attribute >> fr_wimax_shift[nest + 1]) == 0)) {
+ len = vp2data(packet, original, secret, vp, ptr + 2, room);
+ } else {
+ len = tlv2data(packet, original, secret, vp, ptr + 2, room,
+ nest + 1);
+ }
+ if (len <= 0) return len;
+
+ ptr[1] += len;
+
+ return ptr[1];
+}
+
+static int wimax2data(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
+ const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
+ const char *secret, const VALUE_PAIR *vp,
+ uint8_t *start, size_t room, uint8_t *ptr)
+{
+ int len;
+
+ /*
+ * Offsets to Vendor-Specific length, and to length of
+ * WiMAX attribute.
+ */
+#define VS_OFF (1)
+#define WM_OFF (7)
+
+ if (room < 1) return 0;
+ room--;
+
+ /*
+ * Account for continuation bytes. The caller has
+ * already accounting for the continuation byte in the
+ * Vendor-Specific "length" field.
+ */
+ start[WM_OFF]++;
+ *(ptr++) = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Chop everything to fit in one attribute.
+ */
+ if (room > (255 - 9)) room = (255 - 9);
+
+ /*
+ * The attribute contains TLVs that we have NOT decoded
+ * properly, OR it contains TLV that the user has encoded
+ * manually. If it has no data, OR it's too long,
+ * discard it. We're not going to walk through its
+ * contents trying to figure out how to chop it across
+ * multiple continuations.
+ */
+ if (vp->flags.has_tlv && (!vp->vp_tlv || (vp->length > room))) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The attribute is a top-level integer, ipaddr, etc.
+ * Encode it.
+ */
+ if (!vp->flags.is_tlv) {
+ len = vp2data(packet, original, secret, vp, ptr, room);
+ } else {
+ len = tlv2data(packet, original, secret, vp, ptr, room, 1);
+ }
+
+ if (len <= 0) return len;
+
+ start[VS_OFF] += len;
+ start[WM_OFF] += len;
+
+ return start[VS_OFF];
+}
+
+
+static int rad_vp2extended(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
+ const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
+ const char *secret, const VALUE_PAIR *vp,
+ unsigned int attribute, uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
+{
+ int len = 2;
+
+ if (room < 3) return 0;
+
+ ptr[0] = attribute & 0xff; /* NOT vp->attribute */
+ ptr[1] = 3;
+
+ if (vp->flags.extended) {
+ ptr[2] = (attribute & 0xff00) >> 8;
+ len++;
+
+ } else if (vp->flags.extended_flags) {
+ if (room < 4) return 0;
+
+ ptr[1] = 4;
+ ptr[2] = (attribute & 0xff00) >> 8;
+ ptr[3] = 0;
+
+ len += 2;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For now, no extended attribute can be longer than the
+ * encapsulating attribute. Once we add support for the
+ * "M" bit, this restriction will be relaxed.
+ */
+ if (room > (255 - ptr[1])) room = 255 - ptr[1];
+
+ if (!vp->flags.is_tlv) {
+ len = vp2data(packet, original, secret, vp, ptr + ptr[1], room);
+ } else {
+ len = tlv2data(packet, original, secret, vp, ptr + ptr[1], room, 2);
+ }
+
+ if (len < 0) return len;
+
+ ptr[1] += len;
+
+ return ptr[1];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse a data structure into a RADIUS attribute.
+ */
+int rad_vp2attr(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
+ const char *secret, const VALUE_PAIR *vp, uint8_t *start,
+ size_t room)
+{
+ int len;
+ uint32_t lvalue;
+ uint8_t *ptr;
+ DICT_VENDOR *dv;
+
+ /*
+ * RFC format attributes take the fast path.
+ */
+ if (vp->vendor == 0) {
+ return rad_vp2rfc(packet, original, secret, vp,
+ vp->attribute, start, room);
+ }
+
+ if (vp->vendor == VENDORPEC_EXTENDED) {
+ return rad_vp2extended(packet, original, secret, vp,
+ vp->attribute, start, room);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Not enough room for:
+ * attr, len, vendor-id, vsa, vsalen
+ */
+ if (room < 8) return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Build the Vendor-Specific header
+ */
+ ptr = start;
+ *ptr++ = PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
+ *ptr++ = 6;
+ room -= 6;
+ lvalue = htonl(vp->vendor);
+ memcpy(ptr, &lvalue, 4);
+ ptr += 4;
+
+ /*
+ * Unknown vendors, and type=1,length=1,no-continuation
+ * are RFC format attributes.
+ */
+ dv = dict_vendorbyvalue(vp->vendor);
+ if (!dv ||
+ ((dv->type == 1) && (dv->length = 1) && !dv->flags)) {
+ len = rad_vp2rfc(packet, original, secret, vp,
+ vp->attribute, ptr, room);
+ if (len <= 0) return len;
+
+ start[1] += len;
+ return start[1];
+ }
+
+ if (room < (dv->type + dv->length + dv->flags)) return 0;
+ room -= (dv->type + dv->length + dv->flags);
+ start[1] += (dv->type + dv->length + dv->flags);
+
+ switch (dv->type) {
+ case 1:
+ ptr[0] = (vp->attribute & 0xFF);
+ break;
+
+ case 2:
+ ptr[0] = ((vp->attribute >> 8) & 0xFF);
+ ptr[1] = (vp->attribute & 0xFF);
+ break;
+
+ case 4:
+ ptr[0] = 0;
+ ptr[1] = ((vp->attribute >> 16) & 0xFF);
+ ptr[2] = ((vp->attribute >> 8) & 0xFF);
+ ptr[3] = (vp->attribute & 0xFF);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return 0; /* silently discard it */
+ }
+ ptr += dv->type;
+
+ switch (dv->length) {
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ ptr[0] = dv->type + 1;
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ ptr[0] = 0;
+ ptr[1] = dv->type + 2;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return 0; /* silently discard it */
+ }
+ ptr += dv->length;
+
+ /*
+ * WiMAX attributes take their own path through the
+ * system.
+ */
+ if (dv->flags) return wimax2data(packet, original, secret, vp,
+ start, room, ptr);
+
+ len = vp2data(packet, original, secret, vp, ptr, room);
+ if (len <= 0) return len;
+
+ if (dv->length != 0) ptr[-1] += len;
+
+ start[1] += len;
+
+ return start[1];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Swap 123a -> 0321
+ */
+#define REORDER(x) ((x & 0xff00) << 8) | ((x & 0xff0000) >> 8) | ((x & 0xff000000 >> 24))
+
+
+/*
+ * Encode a WiMAX sub-TLV. It must NOT be called for WiMAX
+ * attributes that are of type integer, string, etc.
+ */
+static int rad_encode_wimax(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
+ const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
+ const char *secret, VALUE_PAIR *reply,
+ uint8_t *start, size_t room)
+{
+ int len, redo;
+ uint32_t lvalue;
+ uint8_t *ptr = start, *vsa = start;
+ uint32_t maxattr;
+ VALUE_PAIR *vp = reply;
+
+ /*
+ * Swap the order of the WiMAX hacks, to make later
+ * comparisons easier.
+ */
+ maxattr = REORDER(vp->attribute);
+
+ /*
+ * Build the Vendor-Specific header
+ */
+ ptr = start;
+ redo = 0;
+
+redo_vsa:
+ vsa = ptr;
+
+ if (room < 9) return 0;
+ *ptr++ = PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
+ *ptr++ = 9;
+ room -= 9;
+ lvalue = htonl(vp->vendor);
+ memcpy(ptr, &lvalue, 4);
+ ptr += 4;
+ *(ptr++) = vp->attribute & 0xff;
+ *(ptr++) = 3;
+ *(ptr++) = 0; /* continuation */
+ room -= 9;
+
+redo_tlv:
+ len = tlv2data(packet, original, secret, vp, ptr, room, 1);
+ if (len < 0) return len;
+
+ /*
+ * Not enough room. Do a continuation.
+ */
+ if ((len == 0) || ((vsa[VS_OFF] + len) > 255)) {
+ if (redo) return (start - vsa);
+
+ vsa[8] = 0x80;
+ redo = 1;
+ goto redo_vsa;
+ }
+ redo = 0;
+
+ ptr += len;
+ vsa[VS_OFF] += len;
+ vsa[WM_OFF] += len;
+
+ vp->flags.encoded = 1;
+ vp = vp->next;
+
+ /*
+ * Look at the NEXT tlv. Ensure that we encode
+ * attributes into a common VSA *only* if they are for
+ * the same WiMAX VSA, AND if the TLVs are in numerically
+ * increasing order.
+ */
+ if (vp && vp->flags.is_tlv && (reply->vendor == vp->vendor) &&
+ ((reply->attribute & 0xff) == (vp->attribute & 0xff))) {
+ uint32_t attr;
+
+ attr = REORDER(vp->attribute);
+ if (attr >= maxattr) {
+ maxattr = attr;
+ goto redo_tlv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ptr - start;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Encode a packet.
+ */
+int rad_encode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
+ const char *secret)
{
radius_packet_t *hdr;
uint8_t *ptr;
uint16_t total_length;
int len;
VALUE_PAIR *reply;
-
+ const char *what;
+ char ip_buffer[128];
+
/*
- * For simplicity in the following logic, we allow
- * the attributes to "overflow" the 4k maximum
- * RADIUS packet size, by one attribute.
- *
- * It's uint32_t, for alignment purposes.
+ * A 4K packet, aligned on 64-bits.
*/
- uint32_t data[(MAX_PACKET_LEN + 256) / 4];
+ uint64_t data[MAX_PACKET_LEN / sizeof(uint64_t)];
+
+ if ((packet->code > 0) && (packet->code < FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
+ what = fr_packet_codes[packet->code];
+ } else {
+ what = "Reply";
+ }
+
+ DEBUG("Sending %s of id %d to %s port %d\n",
+ what, packet->id,
+ inet_ntop(packet->dst_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->dst_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ ip_buffer, sizeof(ip_buffer)),
+ packet->dst_port);
/*
* Double-check some things based on packet code.
case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
if (!original) {
- librad_log("ERROR: Cannot sign response packet without a request packet.");
+ fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot sign response packet without a request packet.");
return -1;
}
break;
-
+
/*
* These packet vectors start off as all zero.
*/
case PW_COA_REQUEST:
memset(packet->vector, 0, sizeof(packet->vector));
break;
-
+
default:
break;
}
-
+
/*
* Use memory on the stack, until we know how
* large the packet will be.
*/
hdr = (radius_packet_t *) data;
-
+
/*
* Build standard header
*/
hdr->code = packet->code;
hdr->id = packet->id;
-
+
memcpy(hdr->vector, packet->vector, sizeof(hdr->vector));
total_length = AUTH_HDR_LEN;
- packet->verified = 0;
-
+
/*
* Load up the configuration values for the user
*/
ptr = hdr->data;
+ packet->offset = 0;
/*
* FIXME: Loop twice over the reply list. The first time,
* Hmm... this may be slower than just doing a small
* memcpy.
*/
-
+
/*
* Loop over the reply attributes for the packet.
*/
for (reply = packet->vps; reply; reply = reply->next) {
/*
- * Ignore non-wire attributes
+ * Ignore non-wire attributes, but allow extended
+ * attributes.
*/
- if ((VENDOR(reply->attribute) == 0) &&
- ((reply->attribute & 0xFFFF) > 0xff)) {
+ if ((reply->vendor == 0) &&
+ ((reply->attribute & 0xFFFF) >= 256) &&
+ !reply->flags.extended && !reply->flags.extended_flags) {
+#ifndef NDEBUG
+ /*
+ * Permit the admin to send BADLY formatted
+ * attributes with a debug build.
+ */
+ if (reply->attribute == PW_RAW_ATTRIBUTE) {
+ memcpy(ptr, reply->vp_octets, reply->length);
+ len = reply->length;
+ goto next;
+ }
+#endif
continue;
}
-
+
/*
* Set the Message-Authenticator to the correct
* length and initial value.
*/
if (reply->attribute == PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR) {
reply->length = AUTH_VECTOR_LEN;
- memset(reply->strvalue, 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
- packet->verified = total_length; /* HACK! */
+ memset(reply->vp_strvalue, 0, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+
+ /*
+ * Cache the offset to the
+ * Message-Authenticator
+ */
+ packet->offset = total_length;
}
-
+
/*
* Print out ONLY the attributes which
* we're sending over the wire, and print
*/
debug_pair(reply);
- len = rad_vp2attr(packet, original, secret, reply, ptr);
+ /*
+ * Skip attributes that are encoded.
+ */
+ if (reply->flags.encoded) continue;
+
+ if ((reply->vendor == VENDORPEC_WIMAX) && reply->flags.is_tlv) {
+ len = rad_encode_wimax(packet, original, secret,
+ reply, ptr,
+ ((uint8_t *) data) + sizeof(data) - ptr);
+ } else {
+
+ len = rad_vp2attr(packet, original, secret, reply, ptr,
+ ((uint8_t *) data) + sizeof(data) - ptr);
+ }
+
if (len < 0) return -1;
/*
- * Check that the packet is no more than 4k in
- * size, AFTER writing the attribute past the 4k
- * boundary, but BEFORE deciding to increase the
- * size of the packet. Note that the 'data'
- * buffer, above, is one attribute longer than
- * necessary, in order to permit this overflow.
+ * Failed to encode the attribute, likely because
+ * the packet is full.
*/
- if ((total_length + len) > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
+ if ((len == 0) &&
+ (total_length > (sizeof(data) - 2 - reply->length))) {
+ DEBUG("WARNING: Attributes are too long for packet. Discarding data past %d bytes", total_length);
break;
}
+ next:
ptr += len;
total_length += len;
} /* done looping over all attributes */
-
+
/*
* Fill in the rest of the fields, and copy the data over
* from the local stack to the newly allocated memory.
packet->data_len = total_length;
packet->data = (uint8_t *) malloc(packet->data_len);
if (!packet->data) {
- librad_log("Out of memory");
+ fr_strerror_printf("Out of memory");
return -1;
}
- memcpy(packet->data, data, packet->data_len);
+ memcpy(packet->data, hdr, packet->data_len);
hdr = (radius_packet_t *) packet->data;
-
+
total_length = htons(total_length);
memcpy(hdr->length, &total_length, sizeof(total_length));
* It wasn't assigned an Id, this is bad!
*/
if (packet->id < 0) {
- librad_log("ERROR: RADIUS packets must be assigned an Id.");
+ fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: RADIUS packets must be assigned an Id.");
return -1;
}
if (!packet->data || (packet->data_len < AUTH_HDR_LEN) ||
- (packet->verified < 0)) {
- librad_log("ERROR: You must call rad_encode() before rad_sign()");
+ (packet->offset < 0)) {
+ fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: You must call rad_encode() before rad_sign()");
return -1;
}
/*
* If there's a Message-Authenticator, update it
* now, BEFORE updating the authentication vector.
- *
- * This is a hack...
*/
- if (packet->verified > 0) {
+ if (packet->offset > 0) {
uint8_t calc_auth_vector[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
-
+
switch (packet->code) {
case PW_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
case PW_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE:
case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
if (!original) {
- librad_log("ERROR: Cannot sign response packet without a request packet.");
+ fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot sign response packet without a request packet.");
return -1;
}
memcpy(hdr->vector, original->vector,
default: /* others have vector already set to zero */
break;
-
+
}
-
+
/*
* Set the authentication vector to zero,
* calculate the signature, and put it
* into the Message-Authenticator
* attribute.
*/
- lrad_hmac_md5(packet->data, packet->data_len,
- secret, strlen(secret),
- calc_auth_vector);
- memcpy(packet->data + packet->verified + 2,
+ fr_hmac_md5(packet->data, packet->data_len,
+ (const uint8_t *) secret, strlen(secret),
+ calc_auth_vector);
+ memcpy(packet->data + packet->offset + 2,
calc_auth_vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
-
+
/*
* Copy the original request vector back
* to the raw packet.
*/
memcpy(hdr->vector, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
}
-
+
/*
* Switch over the packet code, deciding how to
* sign the packet.
case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REQUEST:
case PW_STATUS_SERVER:
break;
-
+
/*
* Reply packets are signed with the
* authentication vector of the request.
default:
{
uint8_t digest[16];
-
- MD5_CTX context;
- MD5Init(&context);
- MD5Update(&context, packet->data, packet->data_len);
- MD5Update(&context, secret, strlen(secret));
- MD5Final(digest, &context);
-
+
+ FR_MD5_CTX context;
+ fr_MD5Init(&context);
+ fr_MD5Update(&context, packet->data, packet->data_len);
+ fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret,
+ strlen(secret));
+ fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
+
memcpy(hdr->vector, digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
memcpy(packet->vector, digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
break;
VALUE_PAIR *reply;
const char *what;
char ip_buffer[128];
- struct sockaddr_in saremote;
- struct sockaddr_in *sa;
/*
* Maybe it's a fake packet. Don't send it.
return 0;
}
- if ((packet->code > 0) && (packet->code < 52)) {
- what = packet_codes[packet->code];
+ if ((packet->code > 0) && (packet->code < FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
+ what = fr_packet_codes[packet->code];
} else {
what = "Reply";
}
* First time through, allocate room for the packet
*/
if (!packet->data) {
- DEBUG("Sending %s of id %d to %s port %d\n",
- what, packet->id,
- ip_ntoa(ip_buffer, packet->dst_ipaddr),
- packet->dst_port);
-
/*
* Encode the packet.
*/
if (rad_encode(packet, original, secret) < 0) {
return -1;
}
-
+
/*
* Re-sign it, including updating the
* Message-Authenticator.
* If packet->data points to data, then we print out
* the VP list again only for debugging.
*/
- } else if (librad_debug) {
- DEBUG("Re-sending %s of id %d to %s port %d\n", what, packet->id,
- ip_ntoa(ip_buffer, packet->dst_ipaddr),
+ } else if (fr_debug_flag) {
+ DEBUG("Sending %s of id %d to %s port %d\n", what, packet->id,
+ inet_ntop(packet->dst_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->dst_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ ip_buffer, sizeof(ip_buffer)),
packet->dst_port);
for (reply = packet->vps; reply; reply = reply->next) {
- /* FIXME: ignore attributes > 0xff */
+ if ((reply->vendor == 0) &&
+ ((reply->attribute & 0xFFFF) > 0xff)) continue;
debug_pair(reply);
}
}
/*
* And send it on it's way.
*/
- sa = (struct sockaddr_in *) &saremote;
- memset ((char *) sa, '\0', sizeof (saremote));
- sa->sin_family = AF_INET;
- sa->sin_addr.s_addr = packet->dst_ipaddr;
- sa->sin_port = htons(packet->dst_port);
-#ifndef WITH_UDPFROMTO
- return sendto(packet->sockfd, packet->data, (int)packet->data_len, 0,
- (struct sockaddr *)&saremote, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
-#else
- {
- struct sockaddr_in salocal;
- memset ((char *) &salocal, '\0', sizeof (salocal));
- salocal.sin_family = AF_INET;
- salocal.sin_addr.s_addr = packet->src_ipaddr;
-
- return sendfromto(packet->sockfd, packet->data, (int)packet->data_len, 0,
- (struct sockaddr *)&salocal, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in),
- (struct sockaddr *)&saremote, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
+ return rad_sendto(packet->sockfd, packet->data, packet->data_len, 0,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr, packet->src_port,
+ &packet->dst_ipaddr, packet->dst_port);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do a comparison of two authentication digests by comparing
+ * the FULL digest. Otehrwise, the server can be subject to
+ * timing attacks that allow attackers find a valid message
+ * authenticator.
+ *
+ * http://www.cs.rice.edu/~dwallach/pub/crosby-timing2009.pdf
+ */
+static int digest_cmp(const uint8_t *a, const uint8_t *b, size_t length)
+{
+ int result = 0;
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
+ result |= a[i] ^ b[i];
}
-#endif
+
+ return result; /* 0 is OK, !0 is !OK, just like memcmp */
}
*/
static int calc_acctdigest(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const char *secret)
{
- u_char digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
- MD5_CTX context;
-
- /*
- * Older clients have the authentication vector set to
- * all zeros. Return `1' in that case.
- */
- memset(digest, 0, sizeof(digest));
- if (memcmp(packet->vector, digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) == 0) {
- packet->verified = 1;
- return 1;
- }
+ uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
+ FR_MD5_CTX context;
/*
* Zero out the auth_vector in the received packet.
/*
* MD5(packet + secret);
*/
- MD5Init(&context);
- MD5Update(&context, packet->data, packet->data_len);
- MD5Update(&context, secret, strlen(secret));
- MD5Final(digest, &context);
+ fr_MD5Init(&context);
+ fr_MD5Update(&context, packet->data, packet->data_len);
+ fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret, strlen(secret));
+ fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
/*
* Return 0 if OK, 2 if not OK.
*/
- packet->verified =
- memcmp(digest, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) ? 2 : 0;
-
- return packet->verified;
+ if (digest_cmp(digest, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) != 0) return 2;
+ return 0;
}
+
/*
* Validates the requesting client NAS. Calculates the
* signature based on the clients private key.
const char *secret)
{
uint8_t calc_digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
- MD5_CTX context;
+ FR_MD5_CTX context;
/*
* Very bad!
/*
* MD5(packet + secret);
*/
- MD5Init(&context);
- MD5Update(&context, packet->data, packet->data_len);
- MD5Update(&context, secret, strlen(secret));
- MD5Final(calc_digest, &context);
+ fr_MD5Init(&context);
+ fr_MD5Update(&context, packet->data, packet->data_len);
+ fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret, strlen(secret));
+ fr_MD5Final(calc_digest, &context);
/*
* Copy the packet's vector back to the packet.
/*
* Return 0 if OK, 2 if not OK.
*/
- packet->verified =
- memcmp(packet->vector, calc_digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) ? 2 : 0;
- return packet->verified;
+ if (digest_cmp(packet->vector, calc_digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) != 0) return 2;
+ return 0;
}
+
/*
- * Receive UDP client requests, and fill in
- * the basics of a RADIUS_PACKET structure.
+ * See if the data pointed to by PTR is a valid RADIUS packet.
+ *
+ * packet is not 'const * const' because we may update data_len,
+ * if there's more data in the UDP packet than in the RADIUS packet.
*/
-RADIUS_PACKET *rad_recv(int fd)
+int rad_packet_ok(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, int flags)
{
- RADIUS_PACKET *packet;
- struct sockaddr_in saremote;
- int totallen;
- socklen_t salen;
uint8_t *attr;
+ int totallen;
int count;
radius_packet_t *hdr;
- char host_ipaddr[16];
+ char host_ipaddr[128];
int require_ma = 0;
int seen_ma = 0;
- uint8_t data[MAX_PACKET_LEN];
int num_attributes;
/*
- * Allocate the new request data structure
+ * Check for packets smaller than the packet header.
+ *
+ * RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
+ *
+ * "The minimum length is 20 ..."
*/
- if ((packet = malloc(sizeof(RADIUS_PACKET))) == NULL) {
- librad_log("out of memory");
- return NULL;
+ if (packet->data_len < AUTH_HDR_LEN) {
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too short (received %d < minimum %d)",
+ inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
+ (int) packet->data_len, AUTH_HDR_LEN);
+ return 0;
}
- memset(packet, 0, sizeof(RADIUS_PACKET));
/*
- * Receive the packet.
+ * RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
+ *
+ * " ... and maximum length is 4096."
*/
- salen = sizeof(saremote);
- memset(&saremote, 0, sizeof(saremote));
-#ifndef WITH_UDPFROMTO
- packet->data_len = recvfrom(fd, data, sizeof(data),
- 0, (struct sockaddr *)&saremote, &salen);
- packet->dst_ipaddr = htonl(INADDR_ANY); /* i.e. unknown */
-#else
- {
- socklen_t salen_local;
- struct sockaddr_in salocal;
- salen_local = sizeof(salocal);
- memset(&salocal, 0, sizeof(salocal));
- packet->data_len = recvfromto(fd, data, sizeof(data), 0,
- (struct sockaddr *)&saremote, &salen,
- (struct sockaddr *)&salocal, &salen_local);
- packet->dst_ipaddr = salocal.sin_addr.s_addr;
- }
-#endif
-
- /*
- * Check for socket errors.
- */
- if (packet->data_len < 0) {
- librad_log("Error receiving packet: %s", strerror(errno));
- free(packet);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- /*
- * Fill IP header fields. We need these for the error
- * messages which may come later.
- */
- packet->sockfd = fd;
- packet->src_ipaddr = saremote.sin_addr.s_addr;
- packet->src_port = ntohs(saremote.sin_port);
-
- /*
- * FIXME: Do even more filtering by only permitting
- * certain IP's. The problem is that we don't know
- * how to do this properly for all possible clients...
- */
-
- /*
- * Explicitely set the VP list to empty.
- */
- packet->vps = NULL;
-
- /*
- * Check for packets smaller than the packet header.
- *
- * RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
- *
- * "The minimum length is 20 ..."
- */
- if (packet->data_len < AUTH_HDR_LEN) {
- librad_log("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too short (received %d < minimum %d)",
- ip_ntoa(host_ipaddr, packet->src_ipaddr),
- packet->data_len, AUTH_HDR_LEN);
- free(packet);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- /*
- * RFC 2865, Section 3., subsection 'length' says:
- *
- * " ... and maximum length is 4096."
- */
- if (packet->data_len > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
- librad_log("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too long (received %d > maximum %d)",
- ip_ntoa(host_ipaddr, packet->src_ipaddr),
- packet->data_len, MAX_PACKET_LEN);
- free(packet);
- return NULL;
+ if (packet->data_len > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too long (received %d > maximum %d)",
+ inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
+ (int) packet->data_len, MAX_PACKET_LEN);
+ return 0;
}
/*
* i.e. We've received 128 bytes, and the packet header
* says it's 256 bytes long.
*/
- totallen = (data[2] << 8) | data[3];
- hdr = (radius_packet_t *)data;
+ totallen = (packet->data[2] << 8) | packet->data[3];
+ hdr = (radius_packet_t *)packet->data;
/*
* Code of 0 is not understood.
* Code of 16 or greate is not understood.
*/
if ((hdr->code == 0) ||
- (hdr->code >= 52)) {
- librad_log("WARNING: Bad RADIUS packet from host %s: unknown packet code %d",
- ip_ntoa(host_ipaddr, packet->src_ipaddr),
+ (hdr->code >= FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Bad RADIUS packet from host %s: unknown packet code%d ",
+ inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
hdr->code);
- free(packet);
- return NULL;
+ return 0;
}
/*
if (hdr->code == PW_STATUS_SERVER) require_ma = 1;
/*
+ * It's also required if the caller asks for it.
+ */
+ if (flags) require_ma = 1;
+
+ /*
* Repeat the length checks. This time, instead of
* looking at the data we received, look at the value
* of the 'length' field inside of the packet.
* "The minimum length is 20 ..."
*/
if (totallen < AUTH_HDR_LEN) {
- librad_log("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too short (length %d < minimum %d)",
- ip_ntoa(host_ipaddr, packet->src_ipaddr),
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too short (length %d < minimum %d)",
+ inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
totallen, AUTH_HDR_LEN);
- free(packet);
- return NULL;
+ return 0;
}
/*
* " ... and maximum length is 4096."
*/
if (totallen > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
- librad_log("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too long (length %d > maximum %d)",
- ip_ntoa(host_ipaddr, packet->src_ipaddr),
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too long (length %d > maximum %d)",
+ inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
totallen, MAX_PACKET_LEN);
- free(packet);
- return NULL;
+ return 0;
}
/*
* i.e. No response to the NAS.
*/
if (packet->data_len < totallen) {
- librad_log("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: received %d octets, packet length says %d",
- ip_ntoa(host_ipaddr, packet->src_ipaddr),
- packet->data_len, totallen);
- free(packet);
- return NULL;
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: received %d octets, packet length says %d",
+ inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
+ (int) packet->data_len, totallen);
+ return 0;
}
/*
* We're shortening the packet below, but just
* to be paranoid, zero out the extra data.
*/
- memset(data + totallen, 0, packet->data_len - totallen);
+ memset(packet->data + totallen, 0, packet->data_len - totallen);
packet->data_len = totallen;
}
while (count > 0) {
/*
+ * We need at least 2 bytes to check the
+ * attribute header.
+ */
+ if (count < 2) {
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: attribute header overflows the packet",
+ inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
* Attribute number zero is NOT defined.
*/
if (attr[0] == 0) {
- librad_log("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: Invalid attribute 0",
- ip_ntoa(host_ipaddr, packet->src_ipaddr));
- free(packet);
- return NULL;
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: Invalid attribute 0",
+ inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
+ return 0;
}
/*
* fields. Anything shorter is an invalid attribute.
*/
if (attr[1] < 2) {
- librad_log("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: attribute %d too short",
- ip_ntoa(host_ipaddr, packet->src_ipaddr),
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: attribute %u too short",
+ inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
attr[0]);
- free(packet);
- return NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If there are fewer bytes in the packet than in the
+ * attribute, it's a bad packet.
+ */
+ if (count < attr[1]) {
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: attribute %u data overflows the packet",
+ inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
+ attr[0]);
+ return 0;
}
/*
default: /* don't do anything by default */
break;
-
/*
* If there's an EAP-Message, we require
* a Message-Authenticator.
case PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR:
if (attr[1] != 2 + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) {
- librad_log("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: Message-Authenticator has invalid length %d",
- ip_ntoa(host_ipaddr, packet->src_ipaddr),
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: Message-Authenticator has invalid length %d",
+ inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
attr[1] - 2);
- free(packet);
- return NULL;
+ return 0;
}
seen_ma = 1;
break;
* If not, we complain, and throw the packet away.
*/
if (count != 0) {
- librad_log("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: packet attributes do NOT exactly fill the packet",
- ip_ntoa(host_ipaddr, packet->src_ipaddr));
- free(packet);
- return NULL;
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: packet attributes do NOT exactly fill the packet",
+ inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
+ return 0;
}
/*
* attributes, and we've seen more than that maximum,
* then throw the packet away, as a possible DoS.
*/
- if ((librad_max_attributes > 0) &&
- (num_attributes > librad_max_attributes)) {
- librad_log("WARNING: Possible DoS attack from host %s: Too many attributes in request (received %d, max %d are allowed).",
- ip_ntoa(host_ipaddr, packet->src_ipaddr),
- num_attributes, librad_max_attributes);
- free(packet);
- return NULL;
+ if ((fr_max_attributes > 0) &&
+ (num_attributes > fr_max_attributes)) {
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Possible DoS attack from host %s: Too many attributes in request (received %d, max %d are allowed).",
+ inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
+ num_attributes, fr_max_attributes);
+ return 0;
}
/*
* Message-Authenticator attributes.
*/
if (require_ma && ! seen_ma) {
- librad_log("WARNING: Insecure packet from host %s: Packet does not contain required Message-Authenticator attribute",
- ip_ntoa(host_ipaddr, packet->src_ipaddr));
- free(packet);
- return NULL;
- }
-
- if (librad_debug) {
- if ((hdr->code > 0) && (hdr->code < 52)) {
- printf("rad_recv: %s packet from host %s:%d",
- packet_codes[hdr->code],
- ip_ntoa(host_ipaddr, packet->src_ipaddr), packet->src_port);
- } else {
- printf("rad_recv: Packet from host %s:%d code=%d",
- ip_ntoa(host_ipaddr, packet->src_ipaddr), packet->src_port,
- hdr->code);
- }
- printf(", id=%d, length=%d\n", hdr->id, totallen);
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Insecure packet from host %s: Packet does not contain required Message-Authenticator attribute",
+ inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
+ return 0;
}
/*
packet->id = hdr->id;
memcpy(packet->vector, hdr->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Receive UDP client requests, and fill in
+ * the basics of a RADIUS_PACKET structure.
+ */
+RADIUS_PACKET *rad_recv(int fd, int flags)
+{
+ int sock_flags = 0;
+ RADIUS_PACKET *packet;
+
/*
- * Now that we've sanity checked the packet, we can allocate
- * memory for it, and copy the data from the local area to
- * the packet buffer.
+ * Allocate the new request data structure
*/
- if ((packet->data = malloc(packet->data_len)) == NULL) {
- free(packet);
- librad_log("out of memory");
- return NULL;
+ if ((packet = malloc(sizeof(*packet))) == NULL) {
+ fr_strerror_printf("out of memory");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ memset(packet, 0, sizeof(*packet));
+
+ if (flags & 0x02) {
+ sock_flags = MSG_PEEK;
+ flags &= ~0x02;
+ }
+
+ packet->data_len = rad_recvfrom(fd, &packet->data, sock_flags,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr, &packet->src_port,
+ &packet->dst_ipaddr, &packet->dst_port);
+
+ /*
+ * Check for socket errors.
+ */
+ if (packet->data_len < 0) {
+ fr_strerror_printf("Error receiving packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+ /* packet->data is NULL */
+ free(packet);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the packet is too big, then rad_recvfrom did NOT
+ * allocate memory. Instead, it just discarded the
+ * packet.
+ */
+ if (packet->data_len > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
+ fr_strerror_printf("Discarding packet: Larger than RFC limitation of 4096 bytes.");
+ /* packet->data is NULL */
+ free(packet);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Read no data. Continue.
+ * This check is AFTER the MAX_PACKET_LEN check above, because
+ * if the packet is larger than MAX_PACKET_LEN, we also have
+ * packet->data == NULL
+ */
+ if ((packet->data_len == 0) || !packet->data) {
+ fr_strerror_printf("Empty packet: Socket is not ready.");
+ free(packet);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * See if it's a well-formed RADIUS packet.
+ */
+ if (!rad_packet_ok(packet, flags)) {
+ rad_free(&packet);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Remember which socket we read the packet from.
+ */
+ packet->sockfd = fd;
+
+ /*
+ * FIXME: Do even more filtering by only permitting
+ * certain IP's. The problem is that we don't know
+ * how to do this properly for all possible clients...
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Explicitely set the VP list to empty.
+ */
+ packet->vps = NULL;
+
+ if (fr_debug_flag) {
+ char host_ipaddr[128];
+
+ if ((packet->code > 0) && (packet->code < FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
+ DEBUG("rad_recv: %s packet from host %s port %d",
+ fr_packet_codes[packet->code],
+ inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
+ packet->src_port);
+ } else {
+ DEBUG("rad_recv: Packet from host %s port %d code=%d",
+ inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
+ packet->src_port,
+ packet->code);
+ }
+ DEBUG(", id=%d, length=%d\n",
+ packet->id, (int) packet->data_len);
}
- memcpy(packet->data, data, packet->data_len);
return packet;
}
case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
if (!original) {
- librad_log("ERROR: Cannot validate Message-Authenticator in response packet without a request packet.");
+ fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot validate Message-Authenticator in response packet without a request packet.");
return -1;
}
memcpy(packet->data + 4, original->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
break;
}
- lrad_hmac_md5(packet->data, packet->data_len,
- secret, strlen(secret), calc_auth_vector);
- if (memcmp(calc_auth_vector, msg_auth_vector,
+ fr_hmac_md5(packet->data, packet->data_len,
+ (const uint8_t *) secret, strlen(secret),
+ calc_auth_vector);
+ if (digest_cmp(calc_auth_vector, msg_auth_vector,
sizeof(calc_auth_vector)) != 0) {
char buffer[32];
- librad_log("Received packet from %s with invalid Message-Authenticator! (Shared secret is incorrect.)",
- ip_ntoa(buffer, packet->src_ipaddr));
+ fr_strerror_printf("Received packet from %s with invalid Message-Authenticator! (Shared secret is incorrect.)",
+ inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ buffer, sizeof(buffer)));
/* Silently drop packet, according to RFC 3579 */
- return -2;
+ return -1;
} /* else the message authenticator was good */
/*
} /* loop over the packet, sanity checking the attributes */
/*
+ * It looks like a RADIUS packet, but we can't validate
+ * the signature.
+ */
+ if ((packet->code == 0) || (packet->code >= FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
+ char buffer[32];
+ fr_strerror_printf("Received Unknown packet code %d "
+ "from client %s port %d: Cannot validate signature.",
+ packet->code,
+ inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ buffer, sizeof(buffer)),
+ packet->src_port);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /*
* Calculate and/or verify digest.
*/
switch(packet->code) {
int rcode;
+ char buffer[32];
case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REQUEST:
case PW_STATUS_SERVER:
- case PW_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
/*
* The authentication vector is random
* nonsense, invented by the client.
*/
break;
+ case PW_COA_REQUEST:
+ case PW_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
case PW_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
if (calc_acctdigest(packet, secret) > 1) {
- char buffer[32];
- librad_log("Received Accounting-Request packet "
- "from %s with invalid signature! (Shared secret is incorrect.)",
- ip_ntoa(buffer, packet->src_ipaddr));
+ fr_strerror_printf("Received %s packet "
+ "from client %s with invalid signature! (Shared secret is incorrect.)",
+ fr_packet_codes[packet->code],
+ inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ buffer, sizeof(buffer)));
return -1;
}
break;
case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
case PW_ACCOUNTING_RESPONSE:
+ case PW_DISCONNECT_ACK:
+ case PW_DISCONNECT_NAK:
+ case PW_COA_ACK:
+ case PW_COA_NAK:
rcode = calc_replydigest(packet, original, secret);
if (rcode > 1) {
- char buffer[32];
- librad_log("Received %s packet "
- "from client %s port %d with invalid signature (err=%d)! (Shared secret is incorrect.)",
- packet_codes[packet->code],
- ip_ntoa(buffer, packet->src_ipaddr),
- packet->src_port,
- rcode);
+ fr_strerror_printf("Received %s packet "
+ "from home server %s port %d with invalid signature! (Shared secret is incorrect.)",
+ fr_packet_codes[packet->code],
+ inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ buffer, sizeof(buffer)),
+ packet->src_port);
return -1;
}
- break;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ fr_strerror_printf("Received Unknown packet code %d "
+ "from client %s port %d: Cannot validate signature",
+ packet->code,
+ inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ buffer, sizeof(buffer)),
+ packet->src_port);
+ return -1;
}
return 0;
}
-/*
- * Parse a RADIUS attribute into a data structure.
- */
-static VALUE_PAIR *rad_attr2vp(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
- const char *secret, int attribute, int length,
- const uint8_t *data)
+static VALUE_PAIR *data2vp(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
+ const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
+ const char *secret, size_t length,
+ const uint8_t *data, VALUE_PAIR *vp)
{
int offset = 0;
- VALUE_PAIR *vp;
- if ((vp = paircreate(attribute, PW_TYPE_OCTETS)) == NULL) {
- return NULL;
- }
-
/*
* If length is greater than 253, something is SERIOUSLY
* wrong.
vp->next = NULL;
/*
+ * It's supposed to be a fixed length, but we found
+ * a different length instead. Make it type "octets",
+ * and do no more processing on it.
+ */
+ if ((vp->flags.length > 0) && (vp->flags.length != length)) {
+ goto raw;
+ }
+
+ /*
* Handle tags.
*/
if (vp->flags.has_tag) {
vp->flags.tag = data[0];
if ((vp->type == PW_TYPE_STRING) ||
- (vp->type == PW_TYPE_OCTETS)) offset = 1;
+ (vp->type == PW_TYPE_OCTETS)) {
+ if (length == 0) goto raw;
+ offset = 1;
+ }
}
}
/*
* Copy the data to be decrypted
*/
- memcpy(&vp->strvalue[0], data + offset, length - offset);
+ memcpy(&vp->vp_octets[0], data + offset, length - offset);
vp->length -= offset;
/*
*/
case FLAG_ENCRYPT_USER_PASSWORD:
if (original) {
- rad_pwdecode((char *)vp->strvalue,
+ rad_pwdecode((char *)vp->vp_strvalue,
vp->length, secret,
original->vector);
} else {
- rad_pwdecode((char *)vp->strvalue,
+ rad_pwdecode((char *)vp->vp_strvalue,
vp->length, secret,
packet->vector);
}
if (vp->attribute == PW_USER_PASSWORD) {
- vp->length = strlen(vp->strvalue);
+ vp->length = strlen(vp->vp_strvalue);
}
break;
-
+
/*
* Tunnel-Password's may go ONLY
* in response packets.
*/
case FLAG_ENCRYPT_TUNNEL_PASSWORD:
if (!original) goto raw;
-
- if (rad_tunnel_pwdecode(vp->strvalue, &vp->length,
+
+ if (rad_tunnel_pwdecode(vp->vp_octets, &vp->length,
secret, original->vector) < 0) {
goto raw;
}
break;
-
+
/*
* Ascend-Send-Secret
* Ascend-Receive-Secret
make_secret(my_digest,
original->vector,
secret, data);
- memcpy(vp->strvalue, my_digest,
+ memcpy(vp->vp_strvalue, my_digest,
AUTH_VECTOR_LEN );
- vp->strvalue[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN] = '\0';
- vp->length = strlen(vp->strvalue);
+ vp->vp_strvalue[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN] = '\0';
+ vp->length = strlen(vp->vp_strvalue);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ } /* switch over encryption flags */
+
+
+ switch (vp->type) {
+ case PW_TYPE_STRING:
+ case PW_TYPE_OCTETS:
+ case PW_TYPE_ABINARY:
+ /* nothing more to do */
+ break;
+
+ case PW_TYPE_BYTE:
+ if (vp->length != 1) goto raw;
+
+ vp->vp_integer = vp->vp_octets[0];
+ break;
+
+
+ case PW_TYPE_SHORT:
+ if (vp->length != 2) goto raw;
+
+ vp->vp_integer = (vp->vp_octets[0] << 8) | vp->vp_octets[1];
+ break;
+
+ case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
+ if (vp->length != 4) goto raw;
+
+ memcpy(&vp->vp_integer, vp->vp_octets, 4);
+ vp->vp_integer = ntohl(vp->vp_integer);
+
+ if (vp->flags.has_tag) vp->vp_integer &= 0x00ffffff;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to get named VALUEs
+ */
+ {
+ DICT_VALUE *dval;
+ dval = dict_valbyattr(vp->attribute, vp->vendor,
+ vp->vp_integer);
+ if (dval) {
+ strlcpy(vp->vp_strvalue,
+ dval->name,
+ sizeof(vp->vp_strvalue));
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case PW_TYPE_DATE:
+ if (vp->length != 4) goto raw;
+
+ memcpy(&vp->vp_date, vp->vp_octets, 4);
+ vp->vp_date = ntohl(vp->vp_date);
+ break;
+
+
+ case PW_TYPE_IPADDR:
+ if (vp->length != 4) goto raw;
+
+ memcpy(&vp->vp_ipaddr, vp->vp_octets, 4);
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * IPv6 interface ID is 8 octets long.
+ */
+ case PW_TYPE_IFID:
+ if (vp->length != 8) goto raw;
+ /* vp->vp_ifid == vp->vp_octets */
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * IPv6 addresses are 16 octets long
+ */
+ case PW_TYPE_IPV6ADDR:
+ if (vp->length != 16) goto raw;
+ /* vp->vp_ipv6addr == vp->vp_octets */
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * IPv6 prefixes are 2 to 18 octets long.
+ *
+ * RFC 3162: The first octet is unused.
+ * The second is the length of the prefix
+ * the rest are the prefix data.
+ *
+ * The prefix length can have value 0 to 128.
+ */
+ case PW_TYPE_IPV6PREFIX:
+ if (vp->length < 2 || vp->length > 18) goto raw;
+ if (vp->vp_octets[1] > 128) goto raw;
+
+ /*
+ * FIXME: double-check that
+ * (vp->vp_octets[1] >> 3) matches vp->length + 2
+ */
+ if (vp->length < 18) {
+ memset(vp->vp_octets + vp->length, 0,
+ 18 - vp->length);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case PW_TYPE_SIGNED:
+ if (vp->length != 4) goto raw;
+
+ /*
+ * Overload vp_integer for ntohl, which takes
+ * uint32_t, not int32_t
+ */
+ memcpy(&vp->vp_integer, vp->vp_octets, 4);
+ vp->vp_integer = ntohl(vp->vp_integer);
+ memcpy(&vp->vp_signed, &vp->vp_integer, 4);
+ break;
+
+ case PW_TYPE_TLV:
+ vp->length = length;
+ vp->vp_tlv = malloc(length);
+ if (!vp->vp_tlv) {
+ pairfree(&vp);
+ fr_strerror_printf("No memory");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ memcpy(vp->vp_tlv, data, length);
+ break;
+
+ case PW_TYPE_COMBO_IP:
+ if (vp->length == 4) {
+ vp->type = PW_TYPE_IPADDR;
+ memcpy(&vp->vp_ipaddr, vp->vp_octets, 4);
+ break;
+
+ } else if (vp->length == 16) {
+ vp->type = PW_TYPE_IPV6ADDR;
+ /* vp->vp_ipv6addr == vp->vp_octets */
+ break;
+
+ }
+ /* FALL-THROUGH */
+
+ default:
+ raw:
+ /*
+ * Change the name to show the user that the
+ * attribute is not of the correct format.
+ */
+ {
+ int attr = vp->attribute;
+ int vendor = vp->vendor;
+ VALUE_PAIR *vp2;
+
+ vp2 = pairalloc(NULL);
+ if (!vp2) {
+ pairfree(&vp);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ pairfree(&vp);
+ vp = vp2;
+
+ /*
+ * This sets "vp->flags" appropriately,
+ * and vp->type.
+ */
+ if (!paircreate_raw(attr, vendor, PW_TYPE_OCTETS, vp)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ vp->length = length;
+ memcpy(vp->vp_octets, data, length);
}
break;
+ }
+
+ return vp;
+}
+
+static void rad_sortvp(VALUE_PAIR **head)
+{
+ int swapped;
+ VALUE_PAIR *vp, **tail;
+
+ /*
+ * Walk over the VP's, sorting them in order. Did I
+ * mention that I hate WiMAX continuations?
+ *
+ * And bubble sort! WTF is up with that?
+ */
+ do {
+ swapped = 0;
+ tail = head;
+ while (*tail) {
+ vp = *tail;
+ if (!vp->next) break;
+
+ if (vp->attribute > vp->next->attribute) {
+ *tail = vp->next;
+ vp->next = (*tail)->next;
+ (*tail)->next = vp;
+ swapped = 1;
+ }
+ tail = &(vp->next);
+ }
+ } while (swapped);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Walk the packet, looking for continuations of this attribute.
+ *
+ * This is (worst-case) O(N^2) in the number of RADIUS
+ * attributes. That happens only when perverse clients create
+ * continued attributes, AND separate the fragmented portions
+ * with a lot of other attributes.
+ *
+ * Sane clients should put the fragments next to each other, in
+ * which case this is O(N), in the number of fragments.
+ */
+static uint8_t *rad_coalesce(unsigned int attribute, int vendor,
+ size_t length, uint8_t *data,
+ size_t packet_length, size_t *ptlv_length)
+
+{
+ uint32_t lvalue;
+ size_t tlv_length = length;
+ uint8_t *ptr, *tlv, *tlv_data;
+
+ for (ptr = data + length;
+ ptr != (data + packet_length);
+ ptr += ptr[1]) {
+ /* FIXME: Check that there are 6 bytes of data here... */
+ if ((ptr[0] != PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) ||
+ (ptr[1] < (2 + 4 + 3)) || /* WiMAX VSA with continuation */
+ (ptr[2] != 0) || (ptr[3] != 0) || /* our requirement */
+ (ptr[4] != ((vendor >> 8) & 0xff)) ||
+ (ptr[5] != (vendor & 0xff))) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&lvalue, ptr + 2, 4); /* Vendor Id */
+ lvalue = ntohl(lvalue);
+ lvalue <<= 16;
+ lvalue |= ptr[2 + 4]; /* add in VSA number */
+ if (lvalue != attribute) continue;
+
+ /*
+ * If the vendor-length is too small, it's badly
+ * formed, so we stop.
+ */
+ if ((ptr[2 + 4 + 1]) < 3) break;
+
+ tlv_length += ptr[2 + 4 + 1] - 3;
+ if ((ptr[2 + 4 + 1 + 1] & 0x80) == 0) break;
+ }
+
+ tlv = tlv_data = malloc(tlv_length);
+ if (!tlv_data) return NULL;
+
+ memcpy(tlv, data, length);
+ tlv += length;
+
+ /*
+ * Now we walk the list again, copying the data over to
+ * our newly created memory.
+ */
+ for (ptr = data + length;
+ ptr != (data + packet_length);
+ ptr += ptr[1]) {
+ int this_length;
+
+ if ((ptr[0] != PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) ||
+ (ptr[1] < (2 + 4 + 3)) || /* WiMAX VSA with continuation */
+ (ptr[2] != 0) || (ptr[3] != 0)) { /* our requirement */
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&lvalue, ptr + 2, 4);
+ lvalue = ntohl(lvalue);
+ lvalue <<= 16;
+ lvalue |= ptr[2 + 4];
+ if (lvalue != attribute) continue;
+
+ /*
+ * If the vendor-length is too small, it's badly
+ * formed, so we stop.
+ */
+ if ((ptr[2 + 4 + 1]) < 3) break;
+
+ this_length = ptr[2 + 4 + 1] - 3;
+ memcpy(tlv, ptr + 2 + 4 + 3, this_length);
+ tlv += this_length;
+
+ ptr[2 + 4] = 0; /* What a hack! */
+ if ((ptr[2 + 4 + 1 + 1] & 0x80) == 0) break;
+ }
+
+ *ptlv_length = tlv_length;
+ return tlv_data;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Walk over Evil WIMAX TLVs, creating attributes.
+ */
+static VALUE_PAIR *tlv2wimax(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
+ const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
+ const char *secret,
+ int attribute, int vendor,
+ uint8_t *ptr, size_t len, int nest)
+{
+ VALUE_PAIR *head = NULL;
+ VALUE_PAIR **tail = &head;
+ VALUE_PAIR *vp;
+ uint8_t *y; /* why do I need to do this? */
+
+ if (nest > fr_wimax_max_tlv) return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Sanity check the attribute.
+ */
+ for (y = ptr; y < (ptr + len); y += y[1]) {
+ if ((y[0] == 0) || ((y + 2) > (ptr + len)) ||
+ (y[1] < 2) || ((y + y[1]) > (ptr + len))) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Attribute number is too large for us to
+ * represent it in our horrible internal
+ * representation.
+ */
+ if ((ptr[0] & ~fr_wimax_mask[nest]) != 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (y = ptr; y < (ptr + len); y += y[1]) {
+ DICT_ATTR *da;
+
+ da = dict_attrbyvalue(attribute | (ptr[0] << fr_wimax_shift[nest]), vendor);
+ if (da && (da->type == PW_TYPE_TLV)) {
+ vp = tlv2wimax(packet, original, secret,
+ attribute | (ptr[0] << fr_wimax_shift[nest]),
+ vendor, ptr + 2, ptr[1] - 2,
+ nest + 1);
+ if (!vp) goto error;
+ } else {
+ vp = paircreate(attribute | (ptr[0] << fr_wimax_shift[nest]), vendor,
+ PW_TYPE_OCTETS);
+ if (!vp) {
+ error:
+ pairfree(&head);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!data2vp(packet, original, secret,
+ y[1] - 2, y + 2, vp)) {
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *tail = vp;
+ while (*tail) tail = &((*tail)->next);
+ }
+
+ return head;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Start at the *data* portion of a continued attribute. search
+ * through the rest of the attributes to find a matching one, and
+ * add it's contents to our contents.
+ */
+static VALUE_PAIR *rad_continuation2vp(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
+ const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
+ const char *secret, int attribute,
+ int vendor,
+ int length, /* CANNOT be zero */
+ uint8_t *data, size_t packet_length,
+ int flag, DICT_ATTR *da)
+{
+ size_t tlv_length, left;
+ uint8_t *ptr;
+ uint8_t *tlv_data;
+ VALUE_PAIR *vp, *head, **tail;
+ DICT_ATTR *tlv_da;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure we have data that hasn't been split across
+ * multiple attributes.
+ */
+ if (flag) {
+ tlv_data = rad_coalesce(attribute, vendor, length,
+ data, packet_length, &tlv_length);
+ if (!tlv_data) return NULL;
+ } else {
+ tlv_data = data;
+ tlv_length = length;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Non-TLV types cannot be continued across multiple
+ * attributes. This is true even of keys that are
+ * encrypted with the tunnel-password method. The spec
+ * says that they can be continued... but also that the
+ * keys are 160 bits, which means that they CANNOT be
+ * continued. <sigh>
+ *
+ * Note that we don't check "flag" here. The calling
+ * code ensures that
+ */
+ if (!da || (da->type != PW_TYPE_TLV)) {
+ not_well_formed:
+ if (tlv_data == data) { /* true if we had 'goto' */
+ tlv_data = malloc(tlv_length);
+ if (!tlv_data) return NULL;
+ memcpy(tlv_data, data, tlv_length);
+ }
+
+ vp = paircreate(attribute, vendor, PW_TYPE_OCTETS);
+ if (!vp) return NULL;
+
+ vp->type = PW_TYPE_TLV;
+ vp->flags.encrypt = FLAG_ENCRYPT_NONE;
+ vp->flags.has_tag = 0;
+ vp->flags.is_tlv = 0;
+ vp->vp_tlv = tlv_data;
+ vp->length = tlv_length;
+ return vp;
+ } /* else it WAS a TLV, go decode the sub-tlv's */
+
+ /*
+ * Now (sigh) we walk over the TLV, seeing if it is
+ * well-formed.
+ */
+ left = tlv_length;
+ for (ptr = tlv_data;
+ ptr != (tlv_data + tlv_length);
+ ptr += ptr[1]) {
+ if ((left < 2) ||
+ (ptr[1] < 2) ||
+ (ptr[1] > left)) {
+ goto not_well_formed;
+ }
+
+ left -= ptr[1];
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now we walk over the TLV *again*, creating sub-tlv's.
+ */
+ head = NULL;
+ tail = &head;
+
+ for (ptr = tlv_data;
+ ptr != (tlv_data + tlv_length);
+ ptr += ptr[1]) {
+
+ tlv_da = dict_attrbyvalue(attribute | (ptr[0] << fr_wimax_shift[1]), vendor);
+ if (tlv_da && (tlv_da->type == PW_TYPE_TLV)) {
+ vp = tlv2wimax(packet, original, secret,
+ attribute | (ptr[0] << 8),
+ vendor, ptr + 2, ptr[1] - 2, 2);
+
+ if (!vp) goto error;
+ } else {
+ vp = paircreate(attribute | (ptr[0] << fr_wimax_shift[1]), vendor,
+ PW_TYPE_OCTETS);
+ if (!vp) {
+ error:
+ pairfree(&head);
+ goto not_well_formed;
+ }
+
+ if (!data2vp(packet, original, secret,
+ ptr[1] - 2, ptr + 2, vp)) {
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *tail = vp;
+
+ while (*tail) tail = &((*tail)->next);
+ }
- default:
- break;
- } /* switch over encryption flags */
+ /*
+ * TLV's MAY be continued, but sometimes they're not.
+ */
+ if (tlv_data != data) free(tlv_data);
+ if (head->next) rad_sortvp(&head);
- switch (vp->type) {
- case PW_TYPE_STRING:
- case PW_TYPE_OCTETS:
- case PW_TYPE_ABINARY:
- /* nothing more to do */
- break;
+ return head;
+}
- case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
- if (vp->length != 4) goto raw;
- memcpy(&vp->lvalue, vp->strvalue, 4);
- vp->lvalue = ntohl(vp->lvalue);
+/*
+ * Extended attribute TLV to VP.
+ */
+static VALUE_PAIR *tlv2vp(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
+ const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
+ const char *secret, int attribute,
+ int length, const uint8_t *data)
+{
+ VALUE_PAIR *vp;
- if (vp->flags.has_tag) vp->lvalue &= 0x00ffffff;
+ if ((length < 2) || (data[1] < 2)) return NULL;
- /*
- * Try to get named VALUEs
- */
- {
- DICT_VALUE *dval;
- dval = dict_valbyattr(vp->attribute,
- vp->lvalue);
- if (dval) {
- strNcpy(vp->strvalue,
- dval->name,
- sizeof(vp->strvalue));
- }
- }
- break;
+ /*
+ * For now, only one TLV is allowed.
+ */
+ if (data[1] != length) return NULL;
- case PW_TYPE_DATE:
- if (vp->length != 4) goto raw;
+ attribute |= (data[0] << fr_wimax_shift[2]);
- memcpy(&vp->lvalue, vp->strvalue, 4);
- vp->lvalue = ntohl(vp->lvalue);
- break;
+ vp = paircreate(attribute, VENDORPEC_EXTENDED, PW_TYPE_OCTETS);
+ if (!vp) return NULL;
- /*
- * IPv4 address. Keep it in network byte order in
- * vp->lvalue and put ASCII IP address in standard
- * dot notation into vp->strvalue.
- */
- case PW_TYPE_IPADDR:
- if (vp->length != 4) goto raw;
+ return data2vp(packet, original, secret, length - 2, data + 2, vp);
+}
- memcpy(&vp->lvalue, vp->strvalue, 4);
- ip_ntoa(vp->strvalue, vp->lvalue);
- break;
+/*
+ * Parse a RADIUS attribute into a data structure.
+ */
+VALUE_PAIR *rad_attr2vp(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
+ const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
+ const char *secret, int attribute, int vendor,
+ int length, const uint8_t *data)
+{
+ VALUE_PAIR *vp;
- /*
- * IPv6 interface ID is 8 octets long.
- */
- case PW_TYPE_IFID:
- if (vp->length != 8) goto raw;
- /* vp->vp_ifid == vp->strvalue */
- break;
-
- /*
- * IPv6 addresses are 16 octets long
- */
- case PW_TYPE_IPV6ADDR:
- if (vp->length != 16) goto raw;
- /* vp->vp_ipv6addr == vp->strvalue */
- break;
-
- /*
- * IPv6 prefixes are 2 to 18 octets long.
- *
- * RFC 3162: The first octet is unused.
- * The second is the length of the prefix
- * the rest are the prefix data.
- *
- * The prefix length can have value 0 to 128.
- */
- case PW_TYPE_IPV6PREFIX:
- if (vp->length < 2 || vp->length > 18) goto raw;
- if (vp->strvalue[1] > 128) goto raw;
+ /*
+ * Hard-coded values are bad...
+ */
+ if ((vendor == 0) && (attribute >= 241) && (attribute <= 246)) {
+ DICT_ATTR *da;
- /*
- * FIXME: double-check that
- * (vp->strvalue[1] >> 3) matches vp->length + 2
- */
- if (vp->length < 18) {
- memset(vp->strvalue + vp->length, 0,
- 18 - vp->length);
- }
- break;
+ da = dict_attrbyvalue(attribute, VENDORPEC_EXTENDED);
+ if (da && (da->flags.extended || da->flags.extended_flags)) {
- default:
- raw:
- vp->type = PW_TYPE_OCTETS;
- vp->length = length;
- memcpy(vp->strvalue, data, length);
-
+ if (length == 0) return NULL;
- /*
- * Ensure there's no encryption or tag stuff,
- * we just pass the attribute as-is.
- */
- memset(&vp->flags, 0, sizeof(vp->flags));
+ attribute |= (data[0] << fr_wimax_shift[1]);
+ vendor = VENDORPEC_EXTENDED;
+
+ data++;
+ length--;
+
+ /*
+ * There may be a flag octet.
+ */
+ if (da->flags.extended_flags) {
+ if (length == 0) return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * If there's a flag, we can't
+ * handle it.
+ */
+ if (data[0] != 0) return NULL;
+ data++;
+ length--;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now look up the extended attribute, to
+ * see if it's a TLV carrying more data.
+ *
+ */
+ da = dict_attrbyvalue(attribute, VENDORPEC_EXTENDED);
+ if (da && da->flags.has_tlv) {
+ return tlv2vp(packet, original, secret,
+ attribute, length, data);
+ }
+ }
}
+ vp = paircreate(attribute, vendor, PW_TYPE_OCTETS);
+ if (!vp) return NULL;
- return vp;
+ return data2vp(packet, original, secret, length, data, vp);
}
/*
* Calculate/check digest, and decode radius attributes.
+ * Returns:
+ * -1 on decoding error
+ * 0 on success
*/
int rad_decode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, RADIUS_PACKET *original,
const char *secret)
uint32_t vendorcode;
VALUE_PAIR **tail;
VALUE_PAIR *pair;
- uint8_t *ptr;
+ uint8_t *ptr, *vsa_ptr;
int packet_length;
int attribute;
int attrlen;
int vendorlen;
radius_packet_t *hdr;
- int vsa_tlen, vsa_llen;
+ int vsa_tlen, vsa_llen, vsa_offset;
DICT_VENDOR *dv = NULL;
+ int num_attributes = 0;
/*
* Extract attribute-value pairs
vendorcode = 0;
vendorlen = 0;
vsa_tlen = vsa_llen = 1;
+ vsa_offset = 0;
/*
* We have to read at least two bytes.
packet_length -= 2;
if (attribute != PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) goto create_pair;
-
+
/*
* No vendor code, or ONLY vendor code.
*/
vendorlen = 0;
}
-
+
/*
* Handle Vendor-Specific
*/
uint8_t *subptr;
int sublen;
int myvendor;
-
+
/*
* attrlen was checked above.
*/
* Zero isn't allowed.
*/
if (myvendor == 0) goto create_pair;
-
+
/*
- * This is an implementation issue.
- * We currently pack vendor into the upper
- * 16 bits of a 32-bit attribute number,
- * so we can't handle vendor numbers larger
- * than 16 bits.
+ * Allow vendors up to 2^24. Past that,
+ * get confused.
*/
- if (myvendor > 65535) goto create_pair;
-
+ if (myvendor > FR_MAX_VENDOR) goto create_pair;
+
vsa_tlen = vsa_llen = 1;
+ vsa_offset = 0;
dv = dict_vendorbyvalue(myvendor);
if (dv) {
vsa_tlen = dv->type;
vsa_llen = dv->length;
+ if (dv->flags) vsa_offset = 1;
}
-
+
/*
* Sweep through the list of VSA's,
* seeing if they exactly fill the
int myattr = 0;
/*
- * Don't have a type, it's bad.
+ * Not enough room for one more
+ * attribute. Die!
*/
- if (sublen < vsa_tlen) goto create_pair;
-
+ if (sublen < (vsa_tlen + vsa_llen + vsa_offset)) goto create_pair;
+
/*
* Ensure that the attribute number
* is OK.
case 1:
myattr = subptr[0];
break;
-
+
case 2:
myattr = (subptr[0] << 8) | subptr[1];
break;
-
+
case 4:
if ((subptr[0] != 0) ||
(subptr[1] != 0)) goto create_pair;
-
+
myattr = (subptr[2] << 8) | subptr[3];
break;
-
+
/*
* Our dictionary is broken.
*/
default:
goto create_pair;
}
-
- /*
- * Not enough room for one more
- * attribute. Die!
- */
- if (sublen < vsa_tlen + vsa_llen) goto create_pair;
+
switch (vsa_llen) {
case 0:
- attribute = (myvendor << 16) | myattr;
+ attribute = myattr;
ptr += 4 + vsa_tlen;
attrlen -= (4 + vsa_tlen);
packet_length -= 4 + vsa_tlen;
goto create_pair;
case 1:
- if (subptr[vsa_tlen] < (vsa_tlen + vsa_llen))
+ if (subptr[vsa_tlen] < (vsa_tlen + vsa_llen + vsa_offset))
goto create_pair;
if (subptr[vsa_tlen] > sublen)
goto create_pair;
+
+ /*
+ * WiMAX: 0bCrrrrrrr
+ * Reserved bits MUST be
+ * zero.
+ */
+ if (vsa_offset &&
+ ((subptr[vsa_tlen + vsa_llen] & 0x7f) != 0))
+ goto create_pair;
+
sublen -= subptr[vsa_tlen];
subptr += subptr[vsa_tlen];
break;
case 1:
attribute = ptr[0];
break;
-
+
case 2:
attribute = (ptr[0] << 8) | ptr[1];
break;
default: /* can't hit this. */
return -1;
}
- attribute |= (vendorcode << 16);
+ vsa_ptr = ptr;
ptr += vsa_tlen;
switch (vsa_llen) {
case 1:
- attrlen = ptr[0] - (vsa_tlen + vsa_llen);
+ attrlen = ptr[0] - (vsa_tlen + vsa_llen + vsa_offset);
break;
-
+
case 2:
attrlen = ptr[1] - (vsa_tlen + vsa_llen);
break;
default: /* can't hit this. */
return -1;
}
- ptr += vsa_llen;
- vendorlen -= vsa_tlen + vsa_llen + attrlen;
- if (vendorlen == 0) vendorcode = 0;
- packet_length -= (vsa_tlen + vsa_llen);
+
+ ptr += vsa_llen + vsa_offset;
+ vendorlen -= vsa_tlen + vsa_llen + vsa_offset + attrlen;
+ packet_length -= (vsa_tlen + vsa_llen + vsa_offset);
+
+ /*
+ * Ignore VSAs that have no data.
+ */
+ if (attrlen == 0) goto next;
+
+ /*
+ * WiMAX attributes of type 0 are ignored. They
+ * are a secret flag to us that the attribute has
+ * already been dealt with.
+ */
+ if ((vendorcode == VENDORPEC_WIMAX) && (attribute == 0)) {
+ goto next;
+ }
+
+ if (vsa_offset) {
+ DICT_ATTR *da;
+
+ da = dict_attrbyvalue(attribute, vendorcode);
+
+ /*
+ * If it's NOT continued, AND we know
+ * about it, AND it's not a TLV, we can
+ * create a normal pair.
+ */
+ if (((vsa_ptr[2] & 0x80) == 0) &&
+ da && (da->type != PW_TYPE_TLV)) goto create_pair;
+
+ /*
+ * Else it IS continued, or it's a TLV.
+ * Go do a lot of work to find the stuff.
+ */
+ pair = rad_continuation2vp(packet, original, secret,
+ attribute, vendorcode,
+ attrlen, ptr,
+ packet_length,
+ ((vsa_ptr[2] & 0x80) != 0),
+ da);
+ goto created_pair;
+ }
/*
* Create the attribute, setting the default type
- * to 'octects'. If the type in the dictionary
+ * to 'octets'. If the type in the dictionary
* is different, then the dictionary type will
* over-ride this one.
+ *
+ * If the attribute has no data, then discard it.
+ *
+ * Unless it's CUI. Damn you, CUI!
*/
create_pair:
+ if (!attrlen &&
+ (attribute != PW_CHARGEABLE_USER_IDENTITY)) goto next;
+
pair = rad_attr2vp(packet, original, secret,
- attribute, attrlen, ptr);
+ attribute, vendorcode, attrlen, ptr);
if (!pair) {
pairfree(&packet->vps);
- librad_log("out of memory");
+ fr_strerror_printf("out of memory");
return -1;
}
- debug_pair(pair);
+ created_pair:
*tail = pair;
- tail = &pair->next;
+ while (pair) {
+ num_attributes++;
+ debug_pair(pair);
+ tail = &pair->next;
+ pair = pair->next;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * VSA's may not have been counted properly in
+ * rad_packet_ok() above, as it is hard to count
+ * then without using the dictionary. We
+ * therefore enforce the limits here, too.
+ */
+ if ((fr_max_attributes > 0) &&
+ (num_attributes > fr_max_attributes)) {
+ char host_ipaddr[128];
+
+ pairfree(&packet->vps);
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Possible DoS attack from host %s: Too many attributes in request (received %d, max %d are allowed).",
+ inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
+ num_attributes, fr_max_attributes);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ next:
+ if (vendorlen == 0) vendorcode = 0;
ptr += attrlen;
packet_length -= attrlen;
}
* Merge information from the outside world into our
* random pool.
*/
- lrad_rand_seed(packet->data, AUTH_HDR_LEN);
-
+ fr_rand_seed(packet->data, AUTH_HDR_LEN);
+
return 0;
}
* int *pwlen is updated to the new length of the encrypted
* password - a multiple of 16 bytes.
*/
-int rad_pwencode(char *passwd, int *pwlen, const char *secret,
- const char *vector)
+int rad_pwencode(char *passwd, size_t *pwlen, const char *secret,
+ const uint8_t *vector)
{
- uint8_t buffer[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN + MAX_STRING_LEN + 1];
- char digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
+ FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
+ uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
int i, n, secretlen;
int len;
/*
- * Pad password to multiple of AUTH_PASS_LEN bytes.
+ * RFC maximum is 128 bytes.
+ *
+ * If length is zero, pad it out with zeros.
+ *
+ * If the length isn't aligned to 16 bytes,
+ * zero out the extra data.
*/
len = *pwlen;
+
if (len > 128) len = 128;
- *pwlen = len;
- if (len % AUTH_PASS_LEN != 0) {
- n = AUTH_PASS_LEN - (len % AUTH_PASS_LEN);
- for (i = len; n > 0; n--, i++)
- passwd[i] = 0;
- len = *pwlen = i;
- } else if (len == 0) {
+ if (len == 0) {
memset(passwd, 0, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
- *pwlen = len = AUTH_PASS_LEN;
+ len = AUTH_PASS_LEN;
+ } else if ((len % AUTH_PASS_LEN) != 0) {
+ memset(&passwd[len], 0, AUTH_PASS_LEN - (len % AUTH_PASS_LEN));
+ len += AUTH_PASS_LEN - (len % AUTH_PASS_LEN);
}
+ *pwlen = len;
/*
* Use the secret to setup the decryption digest
*/
secretlen = strlen(secret);
- memcpy(buffer, secret, secretlen);
- memcpy(buffer + secretlen, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
- librad_md5_calc((u_char *)digest, buffer, secretlen + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
-
- /*
- * Now we can encode the password *in place*
- */
- for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++)
- passwd[i] ^= digest[i];
- if (len <= AUTH_PASS_LEN) return 0;
+ fr_MD5Init(&context);
+ fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret, secretlen);
+ old = context; /* save intermediate work */
/*
- * Length > AUTH_PASS_LEN, so we need to use the extended
- * algorithm.
+ * Encrypt it in place. Don't bother checking
+ * len, as we've ensured above that it's OK.
*/
- for (n = 0; n < 128 && n <= (len - AUTH_PASS_LEN); n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
- memcpy(buffer + secretlen, passwd + n, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
- librad_md5_calc((u_char *)digest, buffer, secretlen + AUTH_PASS_LEN);
- for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++)
- passwd[i + n + AUTH_PASS_LEN] ^= digest[i];
+ for (n = 0; n < len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
+ if (n == 0) {
+ fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
+ fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
+ } else {
+ context = old;
+ fr_MD5Update(&context,
+ (uint8_t *) passwd + n - AUTH_PASS_LEN,
+ AUTH_PASS_LEN);
+ fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
+ passwd[i + n] ^= digest[i];
+ }
}
return 0;
/*
* Decode password.
*/
-int rad_pwdecode(char *passwd, int pwlen, const char *secret,
- const char *vector)
+int rad_pwdecode(char *passwd, size_t pwlen, const char *secret,
+ const uint8_t *vector)
{
- uint8_t buffer[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN + MAX_STRING_LEN + 1];
- char digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
- char r[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
- char *s;
- int i, n, secretlen;
- int rlen;
+ FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
+ uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
+ int i;
+ size_t n, secretlen;
/*
- * Use the secret to setup the decryption digest
+ * The RFC's say that the maximum is 128.
+ * The buffer we're putting it into above is 254, so
+ * we don't need to do any length checking.
*/
- secretlen = strlen(secret);
- memcpy(buffer, secret, secretlen);
- memcpy(buffer + secretlen, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
- librad_md5_calc((u_char *)digest, buffer, secretlen + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+ if (pwlen > 128) pwlen = 128;
/*
- * Now we can decode the password *in place*
+ * Catch idiots.
*/
- memcpy(r, passwd, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
- for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN && i < pwlen; i++)
- passwd[i] ^= digest[i];
+ if (pwlen == 0) goto done;
- if (pwlen <= AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
- passwd[pwlen+1] = 0;
- return pwlen;
- }
+ /*
+ * Use the secret to setup the decryption digest
+ */
+ secretlen = strlen(secret);
+
+ fr_MD5Init(&context);
+ fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret, secretlen);
+ old = context; /* save intermediate work */
/*
- * Length > AUTH_PASS_LEN, so we need to use the extended
- * algorithm.
+ * The inverse of the code above.
*/
- rlen = ((pwlen - 1) / AUTH_PASS_LEN) * AUTH_PASS_LEN;
+ for (n = 0; n < pwlen; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
+ if (n == 0) {
+ fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+ fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
+
+ context = old;
+ if (pwlen > AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
+ fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t *) passwd,
+ AUTH_PASS_LEN);
+ }
+ } else {
+ fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
+
+ context = old;
+ if (pwlen > (n + AUTH_PASS_LEN)) {
+ fr_MD5Update(&context, (uint8_t *) passwd + n,
+ AUTH_PASS_LEN);
+ }
+ }
- for (n = rlen; n > 0; n -= AUTH_PASS_LEN ) {
- s = (n == AUTH_PASS_LEN) ? r : (passwd + n - AUTH_PASS_LEN);
- memcpy(buffer + secretlen, s, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
- librad_md5_calc((u_char *)digest, buffer, secretlen + AUTH_PASS_LEN);
- for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN && (i + n) < pwlen; i++)
+ for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
passwd[i + n] ^= digest[i];
+ }
}
- passwd[pwlen] = 0;
- return pwlen;
+ done:
+ passwd[pwlen] = '\0';
+ return strlen(passwd);
}
* This is per RFC-2868 which adds a two char SALT to the initial intermediate
* value MD5 hash.
*/
-int rad_tunnel_pwencode(char *passwd, int *pwlen, const char *secret,
- const char *vector)
+int rad_tunnel_pwencode(char *passwd, size_t *pwlen, const char *secret,
+ const uint8_t *vector)
{
uint8_t buffer[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN + MAX_STRING_LEN + 3];
unsigned char digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
len = *pwlen;
if (len > 127) len = 127;
+
/*
* Shift the password 3 positions right to place a salt and original
* length, tag will be added automatically on packet send
* add in some CSPRNG data. should be OK..
*/
salt[0] = (0x80 | ( ((salt_offset++) & 0x0f) << 3) |
- (lrad_rand() & 0x07));
- salt[1] = lrad_rand();
+ (fr_rand() & 0x07));
+ salt[1] = fr_rand();
/*
* Padd password to multiple of AUTH_PASS_LEN bytes.
if (!n2) {
memcpy(buffer + secretlen, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
memcpy(buffer + secretlen + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN, salt, 2);
- librad_md5_calc(digest, buffer, secretlen + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN + 2);
+ fr_md5_calc(digest, buffer, secretlen + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN + 2);
} else {
memcpy(buffer + secretlen, passwd + n2 - AUTH_PASS_LEN, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
- librad_md5_calc(digest, buffer, secretlen + AUTH_PASS_LEN);
+ fr_md5_calc(digest, buffer, secretlen + AUTH_PASS_LEN);
}
for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
* initial intermediate value, to differentiate it from the
* above.
*/
-int rad_tunnel_pwdecode(uint8_t *passwd, int *pwlen, const char *secret,
- const char *vector)
+int rad_tunnel_pwdecode(uint8_t *passwd, size_t *pwlen, const char *secret,
+ const uint8_t *vector)
{
- uint8_t buffer[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN + MAX_STRING_LEN + 3];
+ FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
uint8_t digest[AUTH_VECTOR_LEN];
- uint8_t decrypted[MAX_STRING_LEN + 1];
int secretlen;
- unsigned i, n, len;
+ unsigned i, n, len, reallen;
len = *pwlen;
* We need at least a salt.
*/
if (len < 2) {
- librad_log("tunnel password is too short");
+ fr_strerror_printf("tunnel password is too short");
return -1;
}
*/
secretlen = strlen(secret);
+ fr_MD5Init(&context);
+ fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret, secretlen);
+ old = context; /* save intermediate work */
+
/*
* Set up the initial key:
*
* b(1) = MD5(secret + vector + salt)
*/
- memcpy(buffer, secret, secretlen);
- memcpy(buffer + secretlen, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
- memcpy(buffer + secretlen + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN, passwd, 2);
- librad_md5_calc(digest, buffer, secretlen + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN + 2);
-
- /*
- * A quick check: decrypt the first octet of the password,
- * which is the 'data_len' field. Ensure it's sane.
- *
- * 'n' doesn't include the 'data_len' octet
- * 'len' does.
- */
- n = passwd[2] ^ digest[0];
- if (n >= len) {
- librad_log("tunnel password is too long for the attribute");
- return -1;
- }
+ fr_MD5Update(&context, vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
+ fr_MD5Update(&context, passwd, 2);
- /*
- * Loop over the data, decrypting it, and generating
- * the key for the next round of decryption.
- */
+ reallen = 0;
for (n = 0; n < len; n += AUTH_PASS_LEN) {
- for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
- decrypted[n + i] = passwd[n + i + 2] ^ digest[i];
+ int base = 0;
+
+ if (n == 0) {
+ fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
+
+ context = old;
/*
- * Encrypted password may not be aligned
- * on 16 octets, so we catch that here...
+ * A quick check: decrypt the first octet
+ * of the password, which is the
+ * 'data_len' field. Ensure it's sane.
*/
- if ((n + i) == len) break;
+ reallen = passwd[2] ^ digest[0];
+ if (reallen >= len) {
+ fr_strerror_printf("tunnel password is too long for the attribute");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ fr_MD5Update(&context, passwd + 2, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
+
+ base = 1;
+ } else {
+ fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
+
+ context = old;
+ fr_MD5Update(&context, passwd + n + 2, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
}
- /*
- * Update the digest, based on
- *
- * b(n) = MD5(secret + cleartext(n-1)
- *
- * but only if there's more data...
- */
- memcpy(buffer + secretlen, passwd + n + 2, AUTH_PASS_LEN);
- librad_md5_calc(digest, buffer, secretlen + AUTH_PASS_LEN);
+ for (i = base; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
+ passwd[n + i - 1] = passwd[n + i + 2] ^ digest[i];
+ }
}
/*
- * We've already validated the length of the decrypted
- * password. Copy it back to the caller.
+ * See make_tunnel_password, above.
*/
- memcpy(passwd, decrypted + 1, decrypted[0]);
- passwd[decrypted[0]] = 0;
- *pwlen = decrypted[0];
+ if (reallen > 239) reallen = 239;
- return decrypted[0];
+ *pwlen = reallen;
+ passwd[reallen] = 0;
+
+ return reallen;
}
/*
* we use vp->length, and Ascend gear likes
* to send an extra '\0' in the string!
*/
-int rad_chap_encode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, char *output, int id,
+int rad_chap_encode(RADIUS_PACKET *packet, uint8_t *output, int id,
VALUE_PAIR *password)
{
int i;
- char *ptr;
- char string[MAX_STRING_LEN * 2 + 1];
+ uint8_t *ptr;
+ uint8_t string[MAX_STRING_LEN * 2 + 1];
VALUE_PAIR *challenge;
/*
*ptr++ = id;
i++;
- memcpy(ptr, password->strvalue, password->length);
+ memcpy(ptr, password->vp_strvalue, password->length);
ptr += password->length;
i += password->length;
* Use Chap-Challenge pair if present,
* Request-Authenticator otherwise.
*/
- challenge = pairfind(packet->vps, PW_CHAP_CHALLENGE);
+ challenge = pairfind(packet->vps, PW_CHAP_CHALLENGE, 0);
if (challenge) {
- memcpy(ptr, challenge->strvalue, challenge->length);
+ memcpy(ptr, challenge->vp_strvalue, challenge->length);
i += challenge->length;
} else {
memcpy(ptr, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
}
*output = id;
- librad_md5_calc((u_char *)output + 1, (u_char *)string, i);
+ fr_md5_calc((uint8_t *)output + 1, (uint8_t *)string, i);
return 0;
}
*
* May be called any number of times.
*/
-void lrad_rand_seed(const void *data, size_t size)
+void fr_rand_seed(const void *data, size_t size)
{
uint32_t hash;
/*
* Ensure that the pool is initialized.
*/
- if (lrad_rand_index < 0) {
+ if (!fr_rand_initialized) {
int fd;
-
- memset(&lrad_rand_pool, 0, sizeof(lrad_rand_pool));
+
+ memset(&fr_rand_pool, 0, sizeof(fr_rand_pool));
fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
if (fd >= 0) {
ssize_t this;
total = this = 0;
- while (total < sizeof(lrad_rand_pool.randrsl)) {
- this = read(fd, lrad_rand_pool.randrsl,
- sizeof(lrad_rand_pool.randrsl) - total);
+ while (total < sizeof(fr_rand_pool.randrsl)) {
+ this = read(fd, fr_rand_pool.randrsl,
+ sizeof(fr_rand_pool.randrsl) - total);
if ((this < 0) && (errno != EINTR)) break;
if (this > 0) total += this;
}
close(fd);
} else {
- lrad_rand_pool.randrsl[0] = fd;
- lrad_rand_pool.randrsl[1] = time(NULL);
- lrad_rand_pool.randrsl[2] = errno;
+ fr_rand_pool.randrsl[0] = fd;
+ fr_rand_pool.randrsl[1] = time(NULL);
+ fr_rand_pool.randrsl[2] = errno;
}
- lrad_randinit(&lrad_rand_pool, 1);
- lrad_rand_index = 0;
+ fr_randinit(&fr_rand_pool, 1);
+ fr_rand_pool.randcnt = 0;
+ fr_rand_initialized = 1;
}
if (!data) return;
/*
* Hash the user data
*/
- hash = lrad_hash(data, size);
-
- lrad_rand_pool.randrsl[lrad_rand_index & 0xff] ^= hash;
- lrad_rand_index++;
- lrad_rand_index &= 0xff;
+ hash = fr_rand();
+ if (!hash) hash = fr_rand();
+ hash = fr_hash_update(data, size, hash);
- /*
- * Churn the pool every so often after seeding it.
- */
- if (((int) (hash & 0xff)) == lrad_rand_index) {
- lrad_isaac(&lrad_rand_pool);
- }
+ fr_rand_pool.randmem[fr_rand_pool.randcnt] ^= hash;
}
/*
* Return a 32-bit random number.
*/
-uint32_t lrad_rand(void)
+uint32_t fr_rand(void)
{
uint32_t num;
/*
* Ensure that the pool is initialized.
*/
- if (lrad_rand_index < 0) {
- lrad_rand_seed(NULL, 0);
+ if (!fr_rand_initialized) {
+ fr_rand_seed(NULL, 0);
}
- /*
- * We don't return data directly from the pool.
- * Rather, we return a summary of the data.
- */
- num = lrad_rand_pool.randrsl[lrad_rand_index & 0xff];
- lrad_rand_index++;
- lrad_rand_index &= 0xff;
-
- /*
- * Every so often, churn the pool.
- */
- if (((int) (num & 0xff)) == lrad_rand_index) {
- lrad_isaac(&lrad_rand_pool);
+ num = fr_rand_pool.randrsl[fr_rand_pool.randcnt++];
+ if (fr_rand_pool.randcnt >= 256) {
+ fr_rand_pool.randcnt = 0;
+ fr_isaac(&fr_rand_pool);
}
return num;
}
+
/*
* Allocate a new RADIUS_PACKET
*/
RADIUS_PACKET *rp;
if ((rp = malloc(sizeof(RADIUS_PACKET))) == NULL) {
- librad_log("out of memory");
+ fr_strerror_printf("out of memory");
return NULL;
}
- memset(rp, 0, sizeof(RADIUS_PACKET));
+ memset(rp, 0, sizeof(*rp));
+ rp->id = -1;
+ rp->offset = -1;
+
if (newvector) {
int i;
uint32_t hash, base;
* Don't expose the actual contents of the random
* pool.
*/
- base = lrad_rand();
+ base = fr_rand();
for (i = 0; i < AUTH_VECTOR_LEN; i += sizeof(uint32_t)) {
- hash = lrad_rand() ^ base;
+ hash = fr_rand() ^ base;
memcpy(rp->vector + i, &hash, sizeof(hash));
}
}
- lrad_rand();
+ fr_rand(); /* stir the pool again */
return rp;
}
+RADIUS_PACKET *rad_alloc_reply(RADIUS_PACKET *packet)
+{
+ RADIUS_PACKET *reply;
+
+ if (!packet) return NULL;
+
+ reply = rad_alloc(0);
+ if (!reply) return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize the fields from the request.
+ */
+ reply->sockfd = packet->sockfd;
+ reply->dst_ipaddr = packet->src_ipaddr;
+ reply->src_ipaddr = packet->dst_ipaddr;
+ reply->dst_port = packet->src_port;
+ reply->src_port = packet->dst_port;
+ reply->id = packet->id;
+ reply->code = 0; /* UNKNOWN code */
+ memcpy(reply->vector, packet->vector,
+ sizeof(reply->vector));
+ reply->vps = NULL;
+ reply->data = NULL;
+ reply->data_len = 0;
+
+ return reply;
+}
+
+
/*
* Free a RADIUS_PACKET
*/
{
RADIUS_PACKET *radius_packet;
- if (!radius_packet_ptr) return;
+ if (!radius_packet_ptr || !*radius_packet_ptr) return;
radius_packet = *radius_packet_ptr;
- if (radius_packet->data) free(radius_packet->data);
- if (radius_packet->vps) pairfree(&radius_packet->vps);
+ free(radius_packet->data);
+
+ pairfree(&radius_packet->vps);
free(radius_packet);