* is unsigned, and the attacker can use resources on the server,
* even if the end request is rejected.
*/
-int librad_max_attributes = 0;
+int fr_max_attributes = 0;
+FILE *fr_log_fp = NULL;
typedef struct radius_packet_t {
uint8_t code;
static int fr_rand_initialized = 0;
static unsigned int salt_offset = 0;
-
-#define MAX_PACKET_CODE (52)
-static const char *packet_codes[] = {
+const char *fr_packet_codes[FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE] = {
"",
"Access-Request",
"Access-Accept",
};
+void fr_printf_log(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ if ((fr_debug_flag == 0) || !fr_log_fp) {
+ va_end(ap);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ vfprintf(fr_log_fp, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+
+ return;
+}
+
+static void print_hex(RADIUS_PACKET *packet)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (!packet->data) return;
+
+ printf(" Code:\t\t%u\n", packet->data[0]);
+ printf(" Id:\t\t%u\n", packet->data[1]);
+ printf(" Length:\t%u\n", ((packet->data[2] << 8) |
+ (packet->data[3])));
+ printf(" Vector:\t");
+ for (i = 4; i < 20; i++) {
+ printf("%02x", packet->data[i]);
+ }
+ printf("\n");
+
+ if (packet->data_len > 20) {
+ int total;
+ const uint8_t *ptr;
+ printf(" Data:");
+
+ total = packet->data_len - 20;
+ ptr = packet->data + 20;
+
+ while (total > 0) {
+ int attrlen;
+
+ printf("\t\t");
+ if (total < 2) { /* too short */
+ printf("%02x\n", *ptr);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (ptr[1] > total) { /* too long */
+ for (i = 0; i < total; i++) {
+ printf("%02x ", ptr[i]);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ printf("%02x %02x ", ptr[0], ptr[1]);
+ attrlen = ptr[1] - 2;
+ ptr += 2;
+ total -= 2;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < attrlen; i++) {
+ if ((i > 0) && ((i & 0x0f) == 0x00))
+ printf("\t\t\t");
+ printf("%02x ", ptr[i]);
+ if ((i & 0x0f) == 0x0f) printf("\n");
+ }
+
+ if ((attrlen & 0x0f) != 0x00) printf("\n");
+
+ ptr += attrlen;
+ total -= attrlen;
+ }
+ }
+ fflush(stdout);
+}
+
+
/*
* Wrapper for sendto which handles sendfromto, IPv6, and all
* possible combinations.
fr_ipaddr_t *dst_ipaddr, int dst_port)
{
struct sockaddr_storage dst;
- socklen_t sizeof_dst = sizeof(dst);
+ socklen_t sizeof_dst;
#ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
struct sockaddr_storage src;
- socklen_t sizeof_src = sizeof(src);
-
- memset(&src, 0, sizeof(src));
-#endif
- memset(&dst, 0, sizeof(dst));
-
- /*
- * IPv4 is supported.
- */
- if (dst_ipaddr->af == AF_INET) {
- struct sockaddr_in *s4;
-
- s4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&dst;
- sizeof_dst = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
-
- s4->sin_family = AF_INET;
- s4->sin_addr = dst_ipaddr->ipaddr.ip4addr;
- s4->sin_port = htons(dst_port);
-
-#ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
- s4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&src;
- sizeof_src = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+ socklen_t sizeof_src;
- s4->sin_family = AF_INET;
- s4->sin_addr = src_ipaddr->ipaddr.ip4addr;
- s4->sin_port = htons(src_port);
+ fr_ipaddr2sockaddr(src_ipaddr, src_port, &src, &sizeof_src);
#else
- src_port = src_port; /* -Wunused */
+ src_port = src_port; /* -Wunused */
#endif
- /*
- * IPv6 MAY be supported.
- */
-#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6
- } else if (dst_ipaddr->af == AF_INET6) {
- struct sockaddr_in6 *s6;
-
- s6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&dst;
- sizeof_dst = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
-
- s6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
- s6->sin6_addr = dst_ipaddr->ipaddr.ip6addr;
- s6->sin6_port = htons(dst_port);
-
-#ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
- return -1; /* UDPFROMTO && IPv6 are not supported */
-#if 0
- s6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&src;
- sizeof_src = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
-
- s6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
- s6->sin6_addr = src_ipaddr->ipaddr.ip6addr;
-#endif /* #if 0 */
-#endif /* WITH_UDPFROMTO */
-#endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 */
- } else return -1; /* Unknown address family, Die Die Die! */
+ if (!fr_ipaddr2sockaddr(dst_ipaddr, dst_port, &dst, &sizeof_dst)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
#ifdef WITH_UDPFROMTO
/*
* And if they don't specify a source IP address, don't
* use udpfromto.
*/
- if ((dst_ipaddr->af == AF_INET) ||
+ if ((dst_ipaddr->af == AF_INET) &&
(src_ipaddr->af != AF_UNSPEC)) {
return sendfromto(sockfd, data, data_len, flags,
(struct sockaddr *)&src, sizeof_src,
* No udpfromto, OR an IPv6 socket, fail gracefully.
*/
return sendto(sockfd, data, data_len, flags,
- (struct sockaddr *)&dst, sizeof_dst);
+ (struct sockaddr *) &dst, sizeof_dst);
}
}
}
- if (src.ss_family == AF_INET) {
- struct sockaddr_in *s4;
-
- s4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&src;
- src_ipaddr->af = AF_INET;
- src_ipaddr->ipaddr.ip4addr = s4->sin_addr;
- *src_port = ntohs(s4->sin_port);
-
-#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6
- } else if (src.ss_family == AF_INET6) {
- struct sockaddr_in6 *s6;
-
- s6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&src;
- src_ipaddr->af = AF_INET6;
- src_ipaddr->ipaddr.ip6addr = s6->sin6_addr;
- *src_port = ntohs(s6->sin6_port);
-
-#endif
- } else {
+ /*
+ * Convert AF. If unknown, discard packet.
+ */
+ if (!fr_sockaddr2ipaddr(&src, sizeof_src, src_ipaddr, src_port)) {
recvfrom(sockfd, header, sizeof(header), 0,
(struct sockaddr *)&src, &sizeof_src);
return 1;
uint8_t header[4];
void *buf;
size_t len;
+ int port;
memset(&src, 0, sizeof_src);
memset(&dst, 0, sizeof_dst);
return data_len;
}
- /*
- * Check address families, and update src/dst ports, etc.
- */
- if (src.ss_family == AF_INET) {
- struct sockaddr_in *s4;
-
- s4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&src;
- src_ipaddr->af = AF_INET;
- src_ipaddr->ipaddr.ip4addr = s4->sin_addr;
- *src_port = ntohs(s4->sin_port);
-
- s4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&dst;
- dst_ipaddr->af = AF_INET;
- dst_ipaddr->ipaddr.ip4addr = s4->sin_addr;
- *dst_port = ntohs(s4->sin_port);
-
-#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6
- } else if (src.ss_family == AF_INET6) {
- struct sockaddr_in6 *s6;
-
- s6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&src;
- src_ipaddr->af = AF_INET6;
- src_ipaddr->ipaddr.ip6addr = s6->sin6_addr;
- *src_port = ntohs(s6->sin6_port);
-
- s6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&dst;
- dst_ipaddr->af = AF_INET6;
- dst_ipaddr->ipaddr.ip6addr = s6->sin6_addr;
- *dst_port = ntohs(s6->sin6_port);
-#endif
- } else {
+ if (!fr_sockaddr2ipaddr(&src, sizeof_src, src_ipaddr, &port)) {
free(buf);
return -1; /* Unknown address family, Die Die Die! */
}
+ *src_port = port;
+
+ fr_sockaddr2ipaddr(&dst, sizeof_dst, dst_ipaddr, &port);
+ *dst_port = port;
/*
* Different address families should never happen.
}
#define MAX_PASS_LEN (128)
-static void make_passwd(uint8_t *output, int *outlen,
- const uint8_t *input, int inlen,
+static void make_passwd(uint8_t *output, size_t *outlen,
+ const uint8_t *input, size_t inlen,
const char *secret, const uint8_t *vector)
{
FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
* If the length is zero, round it up.
*/
len = inlen;
+
+ if (len > MAX_PASS_LEN) len = MAX_PASS_LEN;
+
+ memcpy(passwd, input, len);
+ memset(passwd + len, 0, sizeof(passwd) - len);
+
if (len == 0) {
len = AUTH_PASS_LEN;
}
- else if (len > MAX_PASS_LEN) len = MAX_PASS_LEN;
else if ((len & 0x0f) != 0) {
len += 0x0f;
}
*outlen = len;
- memcpy(passwd, input, len);
- memset(passwd + len, 0, sizeof(passwd) - len);
-
fr_MD5Init(&context);
fr_MD5Update(&context, (const uint8_t *) secret, strlen(secret));
old = context;
memcpy(output, passwd, len);
}
-static void make_tunnel_passwd(uint8_t *output, int *outlen,
- const uint8_t *input, int inlen, int room,
+static void make_tunnel_passwd(uint8_t *output, size_t *outlen,
+ const uint8_t *input, size_t inlen, size_t room,
const char *secret, const uint8_t *vector)
{
FR_MD5_CTX context, old;
}
fr_MD5Final(digest, &context);
+
for (i = 0; i < AUTH_PASS_LEN; i++) {
passwd[i + 2 + n] ^= digest[i];
}
memcpy(output, passwd, len + 2);
}
-
/*
- * Parse a data structure into a RADIUS attribute.
+ * Returns the end of the data.
*/
-int rad_vp2attr(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
- const char *secret, const VALUE_PAIR *vp, uint8_t *ptr)
+static int vp2data(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
+ const char *secret, const VALUE_PAIR *vp, uint8_t *start,
+ size_t room)
{
- int vendorcode;
- int offset, len, total_length;
- uint32_t lvalue;
- uint8_t *length_ptr, *vsa_length_ptr;
- const uint8_t *data = NULL;
- uint8_t array[4];
-
- vendorcode = total_length = 0;
- length_ptr = vsa_length_ptr = NULL;
-
- /*
- * For interoperability, always put vendor attributes
- * into their own VSA.
- */
- if ((vendorcode = VENDOR(vp->attribute)) == 0) {
- *(ptr++) = vp->attribute & 0xFF;
- length_ptr = ptr;
- *(ptr++) = 2;
- total_length += 2;
-
- } else {
- int vsa_tlen = 1;
- int vsa_llen = 1;
- DICT_VENDOR *dv = dict_vendorbyvalue(vendorcode);
-
- /*
- * This must be an RFC-format attribute. If it
- * wasn't, then the "decode" function would have
- * made a Vendor-Specific attribute (i.e. type
- * 26), and we would have "vendorcode == 0" here.
- */
- if (dv) {
- vsa_tlen = dv->type;
- vsa_llen = dv->length;
- }
-
- /*
- * Build a VSA header.
- */
- *ptr++ = PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
- vsa_length_ptr = ptr;
- *ptr++ = 6;
- lvalue = htonl(vendorcode);
- memcpy(ptr, &lvalue, 4);
- ptr += 4;
- total_length += 6;
-
- switch (vsa_tlen) {
- case 1:
- ptr[0] = (vp->attribute & 0xFF);
- break;
-
- case 2:
- ptr[0] = ((vp->attribute >> 8) & 0xFF);
- ptr[1] = (vp->attribute & 0xFF);
- break;
-
- case 4:
- ptr[0] = 0;
- ptr[1] = 0;
- ptr[2] = ((vp->attribute >> 8) & 0xFF);
- ptr[3] = (vp->attribute & 0xFF);
- break;
-
- default:
- return 0; /* silently discard it */
- }
- ptr += vsa_tlen;
-
- switch (vsa_llen) {
- case 0:
- length_ptr = vsa_length_ptr;
- vsa_length_ptr = NULL;
- break;
- case 1:
- ptr[0] = 0;
- length_ptr = ptr;
- break;
- case 2:
- ptr[0] = 0;
- ptr[1] = 0;
- length_ptr = ptr + 1;
- break;
-
- default:
- return 0; /* silently discard it */
- }
- ptr += vsa_llen;
-
- total_length += vsa_tlen + vsa_llen;
- if (vsa_length_ptr) *vsa_length_ptr += vsa_tlen + vsa_llen;
- *length_ptr += vsa_tlen + vsa_llen;
- }
-
- offset = 0;
- if (vp->flags.has_tag) {
- if (TAG_VALID(vp->flags.tag)) {
- ptr[0] = vp->flags.tag & 0xff;
- offset = 1;
-
- } else if (vp->flags.encrypt == FLAG_ENCRYPT_TUNNEL_PASSWORD) {
- /*
- * Tunnel passwords REQUIRE a tag, even
- * if don't have a valid tag.
- */
- ptr[0] = 0;
- offset = 1;
- } /* else don't write a tag */
- } /* else the attribute doesn't have a tag */
+ uint32_t lvalue;
+ size_t len;
+ const uint8_t *data;
+ uint8_t *ptr = start;
+ uint8_t array[4];
/*
* Set up the default sources for the data.
len = 1; /* just in case */
array[0] = vp->vp_integer & 0xff;
data = array;
- offset = 0;
break;
-
case PW_TYPE_SHORT:
len = 2; /* just in case */
array[0] = (vp->vp_integer >> 8) & 0xff;
array[1] = vp->vp_integer & 0xff;
data = array;
- offset = 0;
break;
case PW_TYPE_INTEGER:
len = 4; /* just in case */
lvalue = htonl(vp->vp_integer);
memcpy(array, &lvalue, sizeof(lvalue));
-
- /*
- * Perhaps discard the first octet.
- */
- data = &array[offset];
- len -= offset;
+ data = array;
break;
case PW_TYPE_IPADDR:
len = 4; /* just in case */
break;
+ case PW_TYPE_SIGNED:
+ {
+ int32_t slvalue;
+
+ len = 4; /* just in case */
+ slvalue = htonl(vp->vp_signed);
+ memcpy(array, &slvalue, sizeof(slvalue));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case PW_TYPE_TLV:
+ data = vp->vp_tlv;
+ if (!data) {
+ fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot encode NULL TLV");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (vp->length > room) return 0; /* can't chop TLVs to fit */
+ break;
+
default: /* unknown type: ignore it */
- librad_log("ERROR: Unknown attribute type %d", vp->type);
+ fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Unknown attribute type %d", vp->type);
return -1;
}
/*
- * Bound the data to 255 bytes.
+ * Bound the data to the calling size
*/
- if (len + offset + total_length > 255) {
- len = 255 - offset - total_length;
- }
+ if (len > room) len = room;
/*
* Encrypt the various password styles
*/
switch (vp->flags.encrypt) {
case FLAG_ENCRYPT_USER_PASSWORD:
- make_passwd(ptr + offset, &len,
- data, len,
+ make_passwd(ptr, &len, data, len,
secret, packet->vector);
break;
case FLAG_ENCRYPT_TUNNEL_PASSWORD:
+ lvalue = 0;
+ if (vp->flags.has_tag) lvalue = 1;
+
/*
- * Check if 255 - offset - total_length is less
- * than 18. If so, we can't fit the data into
- * the available space, and we discard the
- * attribute.
+ * Check if there's enough room. If there isn't,
+ * we discard the attribute.
*
* This is ONLY a problem if we have multiple VSA's
* in one Vendor-Specific, though.
*/
- if ((255 - offset - total_length) < 18) return 0;
+ if (room < (18 + lvalue)) return 0;
switch (packet->code) {
case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
default:
if (!original) {
- librad_log("ERROR: No request packet, cannot encrypt %s attribute in the vp.", vp->name);
+ fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: No request packet, cannot encrypt %s attribute in the vp.", vp->name);
return -1;
}
- make_tunnel_passwd(ptr + offset, &len,
- data, len, 255 - offset - total_length,
+
+ if (lvalue) ptr[0] = vp->flags.tag;
+ make_tunnel_passwd(ptr + lvalue, &len, data, len,
+ room - lvalue,
secret, original->vector);
break;
case PW_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
case PW_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
case PW_COA_REQUEST:
- make_tunnel_passwd(ptr + offset, &len,
- data, len, 255 - offset - total_length,
+ ptr[0] = vp->flags.tag;
+ make_tunnel_passwd(ptr + 1, &len, data, len - 1, room,
secret, packet->vector);
break;
}
* always fits.
*/
case FLAG_ENCRYPT_ASCEND_SECRET:
- make_secret(ptr + offset, packet->vector,
- secret, data);
+ make_secret(ptr, packet->vector, secret, data);
len = AUTH_VECTOR_LEN;
break;
default:
- /*
- * Just copy the data over
- */
- memcpy(ptr + offset, data, len);
+ if (vp->flags.has_tag && TAG_VALID(vp->flags.tag)) {
+ if (vp->type == PW_TYPE_STRING) {
+ if (len > (room - 1)) len = room - 1;
+ ptr[0] = vp->flags.tag;
+ ptr++;
+ } else if (vp->type == PW_TYPE_INTEGER) {
+ array[0] = vp->flags.tag;
+ } /* else it can't be any other type */
+ }
+ memcpy(ptr, data, len);
break;
} /* switch over encryption flags */
+ return len + (ptr - start);;
+}
+
+
+static int rad_vp2rfc(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
+ const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
+ const char *secret, const VALUE_PAIR *vp,
+ unsigned int attribute, uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
+{
+ int len;
+
+ if (room < 2) return 0;
+
+ ptr[0] = attribute & 0xff; /* NOT vp->attribute */
+ ptr[1] = 2;
+
+ if (room > (255 - ptr[1])) room = 255 - ptr[1];
+ len = vp2data(packet, original, secret, vp, ptr + 2, room);
+ if (len < 0) return len;
+
+ ptr[1] += len;
+
+ return ptr[1];
+}
+
+extern int fr_wimax_max_tlv;
+extern int fr_wimax_shift[];
+extern int fr_wimax_mask[];
+
+static int tlv2data(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
+ const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
+ const char *secret, const VALUE_PAIR *vp,
+ uint8_t *ptr, size_t room, int nest)
+{
+ int len;
+
+ if (nest > fr_wimax_max_tlv) return -1;
+
+ if (room < 2) return 0;
+ room -= 2;
+
+ ptr[0] = (vp->attribute >> fr_wimax_shift[nest]) & fr_wimax_mask[nest];
+ ptr[1] = 2;
+
+ /*
+ * No more nested TLVs: pack the data.
+ */
+ if ((nest == fr_wimax_max_tlv) ||
+ ((vp->attribute >> fr_wimax_shift[nest + 1]) == 0)) {
+ len = vp2data(packet, original, secret, vp, ptr + 2, room);
+ } else {
+ len = tlv2data(packet, original, secret, vp, ptr + 2, room,
+ nest + 1);
+ }
+ if (len <= 0) return len;
+
+ ptr[1] += len;
+
+ return ptr[1];
+}
+
+static int wimax2data(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
+ const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
+ const char *secret, const VALUE_PAIR *vp,
+ uint8_t *start, size_t room, uint8_t *ptr)
+{
+ int len;
+
+ /*
+ * Offsets to Vendor-Specific length, and to length of
+ * WiMAX attribute.
+ */
+#define VS_OFF (1)
+#define WM_OFF (7)
+
+ if (room < 1) return 0;
+ room--;
+
/*
- * Account for the tag (if any).
+ * Account for continuation bytes. The caller has
+ * already accounting for the continuation byte in the
+ * Vendor-Specific "length" field.
*/
- len += offset;
+ start[WM_OFF]++;
+ *(ptr++) = 0;
/*
- * RFC 2865 section 5 says that zero-length attributes
- * MUST NOT be sent.
+ * Chop everything to fit in one attribute.
*/
- if (len == 0) return 0;
+ if (room > (255 - 9)) room = (255 - 9);
/*
- * Update the various lengths.
+ * The attribute contains TLVs that we have NOT decoded
+ * properly, OR it contains TLV that the user has encoded
+ * manually. If it has no data, OR it's too long,
+ * discard it. We're not going to walk through its
+ * contents trying to figure out how to chop it across
+ * multiple continuations.
*/
- *length_ptr += len;
- if (vsa_length_ptr) *vsa_length_ptr += len;
+ if (vp->flags.has_tlv && (!vp->vp_tlv || (vp->length > room))) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The attribute is a top-level integer, ipaddr, etc.
+ * Encode it.
+ */
+ if (!vp->flags.is_tlv) {
+ len = vp2data(packet, original, secret, vp, ptr, room);
+ } else {
+ len = tlv2data(packet, original, secret, vp, ptr, room, 1);
+ }
+
+ if (len <= 0) return len;
+
+ start[VS_OFF] += len;
+ start[WM_OFF] += len;
+
+ return start[VS_OFF];
+}
+
+
+static int rad_vp2extended(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
+ const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
+ const char *secret, const VALUE_PAIR *vp,
+ unsigned int attribute, uint8_t *ptr, size_t room)
+{
+ int len = 2;
+
+ if (room < 3) return 0;
+
+ ptr[0] = attribute & 0xff; /* NOT vp->attribute */
+ ptr[1] = 3;
+
+ if (vp->flags.extended) {
+ ptr[2] = (attribute & 0xff00) >> 8;
+ len++;
+
+ } else if (vp->flags.extended_flags) {
+ if (room < 4) return 0;
+
+ ptr[1] = 4;
+ ptr[2] = (attribute & 0xff00) >> 8;
+ ptr[3] = 0;
+
+ len += 2;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For now, no extended attribute can be longer than the
+ * encapsulating attribute. Once we add support for the
+ * "M" bit, this restriction will be relaxed.
+ */
+ if (room > (255 - ptr[1])) room = 255 - ptr[1];
+
+ if (!vp->flags.is_tlv) {
+ len = vp2data(packet, original, secret, vp, ptr + ptr[1], room);
+ } else {
+ len = tlv2data(packet, original, secret, vp, ptr + ptr[1], room, 2);
+ }
+
+ if (len < 0) return len;
+
+ ptr[1] += len;
+
+ return ptr[1];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse a data structure into a RADIUS attribute.
+ */
+int rad_vp2attr(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
+ const char *secret, const VALUE_PAIR *vp, uint8_t *start,
+ size_t room)
+{
+ int len;
+ uint32_t lvalue;
+ uint8_t *ptr;
+ DICT_VENDOR *dv;
+
+ /*
+ * RFC format attributes take the fast path.
+ */
+ if (vp->vendor == 0) {
+ return rad_vp2rfc(packet, original, secret, vp,
+ vp->attribute, start, room);
+ }
+
+ if (vp->vendor == VENDORPEC_EXTENDED) {
+ return rad_vp2extended(packet, original, secret, vp,
+ vp->attribute, start, room);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Not enough room for:
+ * attr, len, vendor-id, vsa, vsalen
+ */
+ if (room < 8) return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Build the Vendor-Specific header
+ */
+ ptr = start;
+ *ptr++ = PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
+ *ptr++ = 6;
+ room -= 6;
+ lvalue = htonl(vp->vendor);
+ memcpy(ptr, &lvalue, 4);
+ ptr += 4;
+
+ /*
+ * Unknown vendors, and type=1,length=1,no-continuation
+ * are RFC format attributes.
+ */
+ dv = dict_vendorbyvalue(vp->vendor);
+ if (!dv ||
+ ((dv->type == 1) && (dv->length = 1) && !dv->flags)) {
+ len = rad_vp2rfc(packet, original, secret, vp,
+ vp->attribute, ptr, room);
+ if (len <= 0) return len;
+
+ start[1] += len;
+ return start[1];
+ }
+
+ if (room < (dv->type + dv->length + dv->flags)) return 0;
+ room -= (dv->type + dv->length + dv->flags);
+ start[1] += (dv->type + dv->length + dv->flags);
+
+ switch (dv->type) {
+ case 1:
+ ptr[0] = (vp->attribute & 0xFF);
+ break;
+
+ case 2:
+ ptr[0] = ((vp->attribute >> 8) & 0xFF);
+ ptr[1] = (vp->attribute & 0xFF);
+ break;
+
+ case 4:
+ ptr[0] = 0;
+ ptr[1] = ((vp->attribute >> 16) & 0xFF);
+ ptr[2] = ((vp->attribute >> 8) & 0xFF);
+ ptr[3] = (vp->attribute & 0xFF);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return 0; /* silently discard it */
+ }
+ ptr += dv->type;
+
+ switch (dv->length) {
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ ptr[0] = dv->type + 1;
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ ptr[0] = 0;
+ ptr[1] = dv->type + 2;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return 0; /* silently discard it */
+ }
+ ptr += dv->length;
+
+ /*
+ * WiMAX attributes take their own path through the
+ * system.
+ */
+ if (dv->flags) return wimax2data(packet, original, secret, vp,
+ start, room, ptr);
+
+ len = vp2data(packet, original, secret, vp, ptr, room);
+ if (len <= 0) return len;
+
+ if (dv->length != 0) ptr[-1] += len;
+
+ start[1] += len;
+
+ return start[1];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Swap 123a -> 0321
+ */
+#define REORDER(x) ((x & 0xff00) << 8) | ((x & 0xff0000) >> 8) | ((x & 0xff000000 >> 24))
+
+
+/*
+ * Encode a WiMAX sub-TLV. It must NOT be called for WiMAX
+ * attributes that are of type integer, string, etc.
+ */
+static int rad_encode_wimax(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
+ const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
+ const char *secret, VALUE_PAIR *reply,
+ uint8_t *start, size_t room)
+{
+ int len, redo;
+ uint32_t lvalue;
+ uint8_t *ptr = start, *vsa = start;
+ uint32_t maxattr;
+ VALUE_PAIR *vp = reply;
+
+ /*
+ * Swap the order of the WiMAX hacks, to make later
+ * comparisons easier.
+ */
+ maxattr = REORDER(vp->attribute);
+
+ /*
+ * Build the Vendor-Specific header
+ */
+ ptr = start;
+ redo = 0;
+
+redo_vsa:
+ vsa = ptr;
+
+ if (room < 9) return 0;
+ *ptr++ = PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC;
+ *ptr++ = 9;
+ room -= 9;
+ lvalue = htonl(vp->vendor);
+ memcpy(ptr, &lvalue, 4);
+ ptr += 4;
+ *(ptr++) = vp->attribute & 0xff;
+ *(ptr++) = 3;
+ *(ptr++) = 0; /* continuation */
+ room -= 9;
+
+redo_tlv:
+ len = tlv2data(packet, original, secret, vp, ptr, room, 1);
+ if (len < 0) return len;
+
+ /*
+ * Not enough room. Do a continuation.
+ */
+ if ((len == 0) || ((vsa[VS_OFF] + len) > 255)) {
+ if (redo) return (start - vsa);
+
+ vsa[8] = 0x80;
+ redo = 1;
+ goto redo_vsa;
+ }
+ redo = 0;
+
ptr += len;
- total_length += len;
+ vsa[VS_OFF] += len;
+ vsa[WM_OFF] += len;
+
+ vp->flags.encoded = 1;
+ vp = vp->next;
+
+ /*
+ * Look at the NEXT tlv. Ensure that we encode
+ * attributes into a common VSA *only* if they are for
+ * the same WiMAX VSA, AND if the TLVs are in numerically
+ * increasing order.
+ */
+ if (vp && vp->flags.is_tlv && (reply->vendor == vp->vendor) &&
+ ((reply->attribute & 0xff) == (vp->attribute & 0xff))) {
+ uint32_t attr;
- return total_length; /* of attribute */
+ attr = REORDER(vp->attribute);
+ if (attr >= maxattr) {
+ maxattr = attr;
+ goto redo_tlv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ptr - start;
}
char ip_buffer[128];
/*
- * For simplicity in the following logic, we allow
- * the attributes to "overflow" the 4k maximum
- * RADIUS packet size, by one attribute.
- *
- * It's uint32_t, for alignment purposes.
+ * A 4K packet, aligned on 64-bits.
*/
- uint32_t data[(MAX_PACKET_LEN + 256) / 4];
+ uint64_t data[MAX_PACKET_LEN / sizeof(uint64_t)];
- if ((packet->code > 0) && (packet->code < MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
- what = packet_codes[packet->code];
+ if ((packet->code > 0) && (packet->code < FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
+ what = fr_packet_codes[packet->code];
} else {
what = "Reply";
}
case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
if (!original) {
- librad_log("ERROR: Cannot sign response packet without a request packet.");
+ fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot sign response packet without a request packet.");
return -1;
}
break;
*/
for (reply = packet->vps; reply; reply = reply->next) {
/*
- * Ignore non-wire attributes
+ * Ignore non-wire attributes, but allow extended
+ * attributes.
*/
- if ((VENDOR(reply->attribute) == 0) &&
- ((reply->attribute & 0xFFFF) > 0xff)) {
+ if ((reply->vendor == 0) &&
+ ((reply->attribute & 0xFFFF) >= 256) &&
+ !reply->flags.extended && !reply->flags.extended_flags) {
#ifndef NDEBUG
/*
* Permit the admin to send BADLY formatted
*/
debug_pair(reply);
- len = rad_vp2attr(packet, original, secret, reply, ptr);
+ /*
+ * Skip attributes that are encoded.
+ */
+ if (reply->flags.encoded) continue;
+
+ if ((reply->vendor == VENDORPEC_WIMAX) && reply->flags.is_tlv) {
+ len = rad_encode_wimax(packet, original, secret,
+ reply, ptr,
+ ((uint8_t *) data) + sizeof(data) - ptr);
+ } else {
+
+ len = rad_vp2attr(packet, original, secret, reply, ptr,
+ ((uint8_t *) data) + sizeof(data) - ptr);
+ }
if (len < 0) return -1;
/*
- * Check that the packet is no more than 4k in
- * size, AFTER writing the attribute past the 4k
- * boundary, but BEFORE deciding to increase the
- * size of the packet. Note that the 'data'
- * buffer, above, is one attribute longer than
- * necessary, in order to permit this overflow.
+ * Failed to encode the attribute, likely because
+ * the packet is full.
*/
- if ((total_length + len) > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
+ if ((len == 0) &&
+ (total_length > (sizeof(data) - 2 - reply->length))) {
+ DEBUG("WARNING: Attributes are too long for packet. Discarding data past %d bytes", total_length);
break;
}
packet->data_len = total_length;
packet->data = (uint8_t *) malloc(packet->data_len);
if (!packet->data) {
- librad_log("Out of memory");
+ fr_strerror_printf("Out of memory");
return -1;
}
- memcpy(packet->data, data, packet->data_len);
+ memcpy(packet->data, hdr, packet->data_len);
hdr = (radius_packet_t *) packet->data;
total_length = htons(total_length);
* It wasn't assigned an Id, this is bad!
*/
if (packet->id < 0) {
- librad_log("ERROR: RADIUS packets must be assigned an Id.");
+ fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: RADIUS packets must be assigned an Id.");
return -1;
}
if (!packet->data || (packet->data_len < AUTH_HDR_LEN) ||
(packet->offset < 0)) {
- librad_log("ERROR: You must call rad_encode() before rad_sign()");
+ fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: You must call rad_encode() before rad_sign()");
return -1;
}
case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
if (!original) {
- librad_log("ERROR: Cannot sign response packet without a request packet.");
+ fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot sign response packet without a request packet.");
return -1;
}
memcpy(hdr->vector, original->vector,
return 0;
}
- if ((packet->code > 0) && (packet->code < MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
- what = packet_codes[packet->code];
+ if ((packet->code > 0) && (packet->code < FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
+ what = fr_packet_codes[packet->code];
} else {
what = "Reply";
}
* If packet->data points to data, then we print out
* the VP list again only for debugging.
*/
- } else if (librad_debug) {
+ } else if (fr_debug_flag) {
DEBUG("Sending %s of id %d to %s port %d\n", what, packet->id,
inet_ntop(packet->dst_ipaddr.af,
&packet->dst_ipaddr.ipaddr,
packet->dst_port);
for (reply = packet->vps; reply; reply = reply->next) {
- /* FIXME: ignore attributes > 0xff */
+ if ((reply->vendor == 0) &&
+ ((reply->attribute & 0xFFFF) > 0xff)) continue;
debug_pair(reply);
}
}
- /*
- * And send it on it's way.
- */
- return rad_sendto(packet->sockfd, packet->data, packet->data_len, 0,
- &packet->src_ipaddr, packet->src_port,
- &packet->dst_ipaddr, packet->dst_port);
+ /*
+ * And send it on it's way.
+ */
+ return rad_sendto(packet->sockfd, packet->data, packet->data_len, 0,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr, packet->src_port,
+ &packet->dst_ipaddr, packet->dst_port);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do a comparison of two authentication digests by comparing
+ * the FULL digest. Otehrwise, the server can be subject to
+ * timing attacks that allow attackers find a valid message
+ * authenticator.
+ *
+ * http://www.cs.rice.edu/~dwallach/pub/crosby-timing2009.pdf
+ */
+static int digest_cmp(const uint8_t *a, const uint8_t *b, size_t length)
+{
+ int result = 0;
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
+ result |= a[i] ^ b[i];
+ }
+
+ return result; /* 0 is OK, !0 is !OK, just like memcmp */
}
/*
* Return 0 if OK, 2 if not OK.
*/
- if (memcmp(digest, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) != 0) return 2;
+ if (digest_cmp(digest, packet->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) != 0) return 2;
return 0;
}
/*
* Return 0 if OK, 2 if not OK.
*/
- if (memcmp(packet->vector, calc_digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) != 0) return 2;
+ if (digest_cmp(packet->vector, calc_digest, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) != 0) return 2;
return 0;
}
* "The minimum length is 20 ..."
*/
if (packet->data_len < AUTH_HDR_LEN) {
- librad_log("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too short (received %d < minimum %d)",
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too short (received %d < minimum %d)",
inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
&packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
- packet->data_len, AUTH_HDR_LEN);
+ (int) packet->data_len, AUTH_HDR_LEN);
return 0;
}
* " ... and maximum length is 4096."
*/
if (packet->data_len > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
- librad_log("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too long (received %d > maximum %d)",
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too long (received %d > maximum %d)",
inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
&packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
- packet->data_len, MAX_PACKET_LEN);
+ (int) packet->data_len, MAX_PACKET_LEN);
return 0;
}
* Code of 16 or greate is not understood.
*/
if ((hdr->code == 0) ||
- (hdr->code >= MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
- librad_log("WARNING: Bad RADIUS packet from host %s: unknown packet code %d",
+ (hdr->code >= FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Bad RADIUS packet from host %s: unknown packet code%d ",
inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
&packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
* "The minimum length is 20 ..."
*/
if (totallen < AUTH_HDR_LEN) {
- librad_log("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too short (length %d < minimum %d)",
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too short (length %d < minimum %d)",
inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
&packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
* " ... and maximum length is 4096."
*/
if (totallen > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
- librad_log("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too long (length %d > maximum %d)",
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: too long (length %d > maximum %d)",
inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
&packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
* i.e. No response to the NAS.
*/
if (packet->data_len < totallen) {
- librad_log("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: received %d octets, packet length says %d",
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: received %d octets, packet length says %d",
inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
&packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
- packet->data_len, totallen);
+ (int) packet->data_len, totallen);
return 0;
}
while (count > 0) {
/*
+ * We need at least 2 bytes to check the
+ * attribute header.
+ */
+ if (count < 2) {
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: attribute header overflows the packet",
+ inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
* Attribute number zero is NOT defined.
*/
if (attr[0] == 0) {
- librad_log("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: Invalid attribute 0",
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: Invalid attribute 0",
inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
&packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
* fields. Anything shorter is an invalid attribute.
*/
if (attr[1] < 2) {
- librad_log("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: attribute %d too short",
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: attribute %u too short",
inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
&packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
}
/*
+ * If there are fewer bytes in the packet than in the
+ * attribute, it's a bad packet.
+ */
+ if (count < attr[1]) {
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: attribute %u data overflows the packet",
+ inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
+ attr[0]);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
* Sanity check the attributes for length.
*/
switch (attr[0]) {
case PW_MESSAGE_AUTHENTICATOR:
if (attr[1] != 2 + AUTH_VECTOR_LEN) {
- librad_log("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: Message-Authenticator has invalid length %d",
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: Message-Authenticator has invalid length %d",
inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
&packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
* If not, we complain, and throw the packet away.
*/
if (count != 0) {
- librad_log("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: packet attributes do NOT exactly fill the packet",
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Malformed RADIUS packet from host %s: packet attributes do NOT exactly fill the packet",
inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
&packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
* attributes, and we've seen more than that maximum,
* then throw the packet away, as a possible DoS.
*/
- if ((librad_max_attributes > 0) &&
- (num_attributes > librad_max_attributes)) {
- librad_log("WARNING: Possible DoS attack from host %s: Too many attributes in request (received %d, max %d are allowed).",
+ if ((fr_max_attributes > 0) &&
+ (num_attributes > fr_max_attributes)) {
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Possible DoS attack from host %s: Too many attributes in request (received %d, max %d are allowed).",
inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
&packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
- num_attributes, librad_max_attributes);
+ num_attributes, fr_max_attributes);
return 0;
}
* Message-Authenticator attributes.
*/
if (require_ma && ! seen_ma) {
- librad_log("WARNING: Insecure packet from host %s: Packet does not contain required Message-Authenticator attribute",
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Insecure packet from host %s: Packet does not contain required Message-Authenticator attribute",
inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
&packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)));
*/
RADIUS_PACKET *rad_recv(int fd, int flags)
{
+ int sock_flags = 0;
RADIUS_PACKET *packet;
/*
* Allocate the new request data structure
*/
if ((packet = malloc(sizeof(*packet))) == NULL) {
- librad_log("out of memory");
+ fr_strerror_printf("out of memory");
return NULL;
}
memset(packet, 0, sizeof(*packet));
- packet->data_len = rad_recvfrom(fd, &packet->data, 0,
+ if (flags & 0x02) {
+ sock_flags = MSG_PEEK;
+ flags &= ~0x02;
+ }
+
+ packet->data_len = rad_recvfrom(fd, &packet->data, sock_flags,
&packet->src_ipaddr, &packet->src_port,
&packet->dst_ipaddr, &packet->dst_port);
* Check for socket errors.
*/
if (packet->data_len < 0) {
- librad_log("Error receiving packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+ fr_strerror_printf("Error receiving packet: %s", strerror(errno));
/* packet->data is NULL */
free(packet);
return NULL;
* packet.
*/
if (packet->data_len > MAX_PACKET_LEN) {
- librad_log("Discarding packet: Larger than RFC limitation of 4096 bytes.");
+ fr_strerror_printf("Discarding packet: Larger than RFC limitation of 4096 bytes.");
/* packet->data is NULL */
free(packet);
return NULL;
* packet->data == NULL
*/
if ((packet->data_len == 0) || !packet->data) {
- librad_log("Empty packet: Socket is not ready.");
+ fr_strerror_printf("Empty packet: Socket is not ready.");
free(packet);
return NULL;
}
*/
packet->vps = NULL;
- if (librad_debug) {
+ if (fr_debug_flag) {
char host_ipaddr[128];
- if ((packet->code > 0) && (packet->code < MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
- printf("rad_recv: %s packet from host %s port %d",
- packet_codes[packet->code],
- inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
- &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
- host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
- packet->src_port);
+ if ((packet->code > 0) && (packet->code < FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
+ DEBUG("rad_recv: %s packet from host %s port %d",
+ fr_packet_codes[packet->code],
+ inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
+ packet->src_port);
} else {
- printf("rad_recv: Packet from host %s port %d code=%d",
- inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
- &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
- host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
- packet->src_port,
- packet->code);
+ DEBUG("rad_recv: Packet from host %s port %d code=%d",
+ inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
+ &packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
+ host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
+ packet->src_port,
+ packet->code);
}
- printf(", id=%d, length=%d\n", packet->id, packet->data_len);
+ DEBUG(", id=%d, length=%d\n",
+ packet->id, (int) packet->data_len);
}
return packet;
case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
if (!original) {
- librad_log("ERROR: Cannot validate Message-Authenticator in response packet without a request packet.");
+ fr_strerror_printf("ERROR: Cannot validate Message-Authenticator in response packet without a request packet.");
return -1;
}
memcpy(packet->data + 4, original->vector, AUTH_VECTOR_LEN);
fr_hmac_md5(packet->data, packet->data_len,
(const uint8_t *) secret, strlen(secret),
calc_auth_vector);
- if (memcmp(calc_auth_vector, msg_auth_vector,
+ if (digest_cmp(calc_auth_vector, msg_auth_vector,
sizeof(calc_auth_vector)) != 0) {
char buffer[32];
- librad_log("Received packet from %s with invalid Message-Authenticator! (Shared secret is incorrect.)",
+ fr_strerror_printf("Received packet from %s with invalid Message-Authenticator! (Shared secret is incorrect.)",
inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
&packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
buffer, sizeof(buffer)));
* It looks like a RADIUS packet, but we can't validate
* the signature.
*/
- if ((packet->code == 0) || packet->code >= MAX_PACKET_CODE) {
+ if ((packet->code == 0) || (packet->code >= FR_MAX_PACKET_CODE)) {
char buffer[32];
- librad_log("Received Unknown packet code %d"
- "from client %s port %d: Cannot validate signature",
+ fr_strerror_printf("Received Unknown packet code %d "
+ "from client %s port %d: Cannot validate signature.",
packet->code,
inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
&packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REQUEST:
case PW_STATUS_SERVER:
- case PW_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
/*
* The authentication vector is random
* nonsense, invented by the client.
*/
break;
+ case PW_COA_REQUEST:
+ case PW_DISCONNECT_REQUEST:
case PW_ACCOUNTING_REQUEST:
if (calc_acctdigest(packet, secret) > 1) {
- librad_log("Received Accounting-Request packet "
- "from %s with invalid signature! (Shared secret is incorrect.)",
+ fr_strerror_printf("Received %s packet "
+ "from client %s with invalid signature! (Shared secret is incorrect.)",
+ fr_packet_codes[packet->code],
inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
&packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
buffer, sizeof(buffer)));
case PW_COA_NAK:
rcode = calc_replydigest(packet, original, secret);
if (rcode > 1) {
- librad_log("Received %s packet "
- "from client %s port %d with invalid signature (err=%d)! (Shared secret is incorrect.)",
- packet_codes[packet->code],
+ fr_strerror_printf("Received %s packet "
+ "from home server %s port %d with invalid signature! (Shared secret is incorrect.)",
+ fr_packet_codes[packet->code],
inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
&packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
buffer, sizeof(buffer)),
- packet->src_port,
- rcode);
+ packet->src_port);
return -1;
}
break;
default:
- librad_log("Received Unknown packet code %d"
+ fr_strerror_printf("Received Unknown packet code %d "
"from client %s port %d: Cannot validate signature",
packet->code,
inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
}
-/*
- * Parse a RADIUS attribute into a data structure.
- */
-VALUE_PAIR *rad_attr2vp(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet, const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
- const char *secret, int attribute, int length,
- const uint8_t *data)
+static VALUE_PAIR *data2vp(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
+ const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
+ const char *secret, size_t length,
+ const uint8_t *data, VALUE_PAIR *vp)
{
int offset = 0;
- VALUE_PAIR *vp;
-
- if ((vp = paircreate(attribute, PW_TYPE_OCTETS)) == NULL) {
- return NULL;
- }
/*
* If length is greater than 253, something is SERIOUSLY
vp->next = NULL;
/*
+ * It's supposed to be a fixed length, but we found
+ * a different length instead. Make it type "octets",
+ * and do no more processing on it.
+ */
+ if ((vp->flags.length > 0) && (vp->flags.length != length)) {
+ goto raw;
+ }
+
+ /*
* Handle tags.
*/
if (vp->flags.has_tag) {
vp->flags.tag = data[0];
if ((vp->type == PW_TYPE_STRING) ||
- (vp->type == PW_TYPE_OCTETS)) offset = 1;
+ (vp->type == PW_TYPE_OCTETS)) {
+ if (length == 0) goto raw;
+ offset = 1;
+ }
}
}
*/
{
DICT_VALUE *dval;
- dval = dict_valbyattr(vp->attribute,
+ dval = dict_valbyattr(vp->attribute, vp->vendor,
vp->vp_integer);
if (dval) {
strlcpy(vp->vp_strvalue,
}
break;
- default:
- raw:
- vp->type = PW_TYPE_OCTETS;
+ case PW_TYPE_SIGNED:
+ if (vp->length != 4) goto raw;
+
+ /*
+ * Overload vp_integer for ntohl, which takes
+ * uint32_t, not int32_t
+ */
+ memcpy(&vp->vp_integer, vp->vp_octets, 4);
+ vp->vp_integer = ntohl(vp->vp_integer);
+ memcpy(&vp->vp_signed, &vp->vp_integer, 4);
+ break;
+
+ case PW_TYPE_TLV:
vp->length = length;
- memcpy(vp->vp_octets, data, length);
+ vp->vp_tlv = malloc(length);
+ if (!vp->vp_tlv) {
+ pairfree(&vp);
+ fr_strerror_printf("No memory");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ memcpy(vp->vp_tlv, data, length);
+ break;
+
+ case PW_TYPE_COMBO_IP:
+ if (vp->length == 4) {
+ vp->type = PW_TYPE_IPADDR;
+ memcpy(&vp->vp_ipaddr, vp->vp_octets, 4);
+ break;
+
+ } else if (vp->length == 16) {
+ vp->type = PW_TYPE_IPV6ADDR;
+ /* vp->vp_ipv6addr == vp->vp_octets */
+ break;
+ }
+ /* FALL-THROUGH */
+ default:
+ raw:
/*
- * Ensure there's no encryption or tag stuff,
- * we just pass the attribute as-is.
+ * Change the name to show the user that the
+ * attribute is not of the correct format.
*/
- memset(&vp->flags, 0, sizeof(vp->flags));
+ {
+ int attr = vp->attribute;
+ int vendor = vp->vendor;
+ VALUE_PAIR *vp2;
+
+ vp2 = pairalloc(NULL);
+ if (!vp2) {
+ pairfree(&vp);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ pairfree(&vp);
+ vp = vp2;
+
+ /*
+ * This sets "vp->flags" appropriately,
+ * and vp->type.
+ */
+ if (!paircreate_raw(attr, vendor, PW_TYPE_OCTETS, vp)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ vp->length = length;
+ memcpy(vp->vp_octets, data, length);
+ }
+ break;
}
return vp;
}
+static void rad_sortvp(VALUE_PAIR **head)
+{
+ int swapped;
+ VALUE_PAIR *vp, **tail;
+
+ /*
+ * Walk over the VP's, sorting them in order. Did I
+ * mention that I hate WiMAX continuations?
+ *
+ * And bubble sort! WTF is up with that?
+ */
+ do {
+ swapped = 0;
+ tail = head;
+ while (*tail) {
+ vp = *tail;
+ if (!vp->next) break;
+
+ if (vp->attribute > vp->next->attribute) {
+ *tail = vp->next;
+ vp->next = (*tail)->next;
+ (*tail)->next = vp;
+ swapped = 1;
+ }
+ tail = &(vp->next);
+ }
+ } while (swapped);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Walk the packet, looking for continuations of this attribute.
+ *
+ * This is (worst-case) O(N^2) in the number of RADIUS
+ * attributes. That happens only when perverse clients create
+ * continued attributes, AND separate the fragmented portions
+ * with a lot of other attributes.
+ *
+ * Sane clients should put the fragments next to each other, in
+ * which case this is O(N), in the number of fragments.
+ */
+static uint8_t *rad_coalesce(unsigned int attribute, int vendor,
+ size_t length, uint8_t *data,
+ size_t packet_length, size_t *ptlv_length)
+
+{
+ uint32_t lvalue;
+ size_t tlv_length = length;
+ uint8_t *ptr, *tlv, *tlv_data;
+
+ for (ptr = data + length;
+ ptr != (data + packet_length);
+ ptr += ptr[1]) {
+ /* FIXME: Check that there are 6 bytes of data here... */
+ if ((ptr[0] != PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) ||
+ (ptr[1] < (2 + 4 + 3)) || /* WiMAX VSA with continuation */
+ (ptr[2] != 0) || (ptr[3] != 0) || /* our requirement */
+ (ptr[4] != ((vendor >> 8) & 0xff)) ||
+ (ptr[5] != (vendor & 0xff))) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&lvalue, ptr + 2, 4); /* Vendor Id */
+ lvalue = ntohl(lvalue);
+ lvalue <<= 16;
+ lvalue |= ptr[2 + 4]; /* add in VSA number */
+ if (lvalue != attribute) continue;
+
+ /*
+ * If the vendor-length is too small, it's badly
+ * formed, so we stop.
+ */
+ if ((ptr[2 + 4 + 1]) < 3) break;
+
+ tlv_length += ptr[2 + 4 + 1] - 3;
+ if ((ptr[2 + 4 + 1 + 1] & 0x80) == 0) break;
+ }
+
+ tlv = tlv_data = malloc(tlv_length);
+ if (!tlv_data) return NULL;
+
+ memcpy(tlv, data, length);
+ tlv += length;
+
+ /*
+ * Now we walk the list again, copying the data over to
+ * our newly created memory.
+ */
+ for (ptr = data + length;
+ ptr != (data + packet_length);
+ ptr += ptr[1]) {
+ int this_length;
+
+ if ((ptr[0] != PW_VENDOR_SPECIFIC) ||
+ (ptr[1] < (2 + 4 + 3)) || /* WiMAX VSA with continuation */
+ (ptr[2] != 0) || (ptr[3] != 0)) { /* our requirement */
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&lvalue, ptr + 2, 4);
+ lvalue = ntohl(lvalue);
+ lvalue <<= 16;
+ lvalue |= ptr[2 + 4];
+ if (lvalue != attribute) continue;
+
+ /*
+ * If the vendor-length is too small, it's badly
+ * formed, so we stop.
+ */
+ if ((ptr[2 + 4 + 1]) < 3) break;
+
+ this_length = ptr[2 + 4 + 1] - 3;
+ memcpy(tlv, ptr + 2 + 4 + 3, this_length);
+ tlv += this_length;
+
+ ptr[2 + 4] = 0; /* What a hack! */
+ if ((ptr[2 + 4 + 1 + 1] & 0x80) == 0) break;
+ }
+
+ *ptlv_length = tlv_length;
+ return tlv_data;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Walk over Evil WIMAX TLVs, creating attributes.
+ */
+static VALUE_PAIR *tlv2wimax(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
+ const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
+ const char *secret,
+ int attribute, int vendor,
+ uint8_t *ptr, size_t len, int nest)
+{
+ VALUE_PAIR *head = NULL;
+ VALUE_PAIR **tail = &head;
+ VALUE_PAIR *vp;
+ uint8_t *y; /* why do I need to do this? */
+
+ if (nest > fr_wimax_max_tlv) return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Sanity check the attribute.
+ */
+ for (y = ptr; y < (ptr + len); y += y[1]) {
+ if ((y[0] == 0) || ((y + 2) > (ptr + len)) ||
+ (y[1] < 2) || ((y + y[1]) > (ptr + len))) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Attribute number is too large for us to
+ * represent it in our horrible internal
+ * representation.
+ */
+ if ((ptr[0] & ~fr_wimax_mask[nest]) != 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (y = ptr; y < (ptr + len); y += y[1]) {
+ DICT_ATTR *da;
+
+ da = dict_attrbyvalue(attribute | (ptr[0] << fr_wimax_shift[nest]), vendor);
+ if (da && (da->type == PW_TYPE_TLV)) {
+ vp = tlv2wimax(packet, original, secret,
+ attribute | (ptr[0] << fr_wimax_shift[nest]),
+ vendor, ptr + 2, ptr[1] - 2,
+ nest + 1);
+ if (!vp) goto error;
+ } else {
+ vp = paircreate(attribute | (ptr[0] << fr_wimax_shift[nest]), vendor,
+ PW_TYPE_OCTETS);
+ if (!vp) {
+ error:
+ pairfree(&head);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!data2vp(packet, original, secret,
+ y[1] - 2, y + 2, vp)) {
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *tail = vp;
+ while (*tail) tail = &((*tail)->next);
+ }
+
+ return head;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Start at the *data* portion of a continued attribute. search
+ * through the rest of the attributes to find a matching one, and
+ * add it's contents to our contents.
+ */
+static VALUE_PAIR *rad_continuation2vp(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
+ const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
+ const char *secret, int attribute,
+ int vendor,
+ int length, /* CANNOT be zero */
+ uint8_t *data, size_t packet_length,
+ int flag, DICT_ATTR *da)
+{
+ size_t tlv_length, left;
+ uint8_t *ptr;
+ uint8_t *tlv_data;
+ VALUE_PAIR *vp, *head, **tail;
+ DICT_ATTR *tlv_da;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure we have data that hasn't been split across
+ * multiple attributes.
+ */
+ if (flag) {
+ tlv_data = rad_coalesce(attribute, vendor, length,
+ data, packet_length, &tlv_length);
+ if (!tlv_data) return NULL;
+ } else {
+ tlv_data = data;
+ tlv_length = length;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Non-TLV types cannot be continued across multiple
+ * attributes. This is true even of keys that are
+ * encrypted with the tunnel-password method. The spec
+ * says that they can be continued... but also that the
+ * keys are 160 bits, which means that they CANNOT be
+ * continued. <sigh>
+ *
+ * Note that we don't check "flag" here. The calling
+ * code ensures that
+ */
+ if (!da || (da->type != PW_TYPE_TLV)) {
+ not_well_formed:
+ if (tlv_data == data) { /* true if we had 'goto' */
+ tlv_data = malloc(tlv_length);
+ if (!tlv_data) return NULL;
+ memcpy(tlv_data, data, tlv_length);
+ }
+
+ vp = paircreate(attribute, vendor, PW_TYPE_OCTETS);
+ if (!vp) return NULL;
+
+ vp->type = PW_TYPE_TLV;
+ vp->flags.encrypt = FLAG_ENCRYPT_NONE;
+ vp->flags.has_tag = 0;
+ vp->flags.is_tlv = 0;
+ vp->vp_tlv = tlv_data;
+ vp->length = tlv_length;
+ return vp;
+ } /* else it WAS a TLV, go decode the sub-tlv's */
+
+ /*
+ * Now (sigh) we walk over the TLV, seeing if it is
+ * well-formed.
+ */
+ left = tlv_length;
+ for (ptr = tlv_data;
+ ptr != (tlv_data + tlv_length);
+ ptr += ptr[1]) {
+ if ((left < 2) ||
+ (ptr[1] < 2) ||
+ (ptr[1] > left)) {
+ goto not_well_formed;
+ }
+
+ left -= ptr[1];
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now we walk over the TLV *again*, creating sub-tlv's.
+ */
+ head = NULL;
+ tail = &head;
+
+ for (ptr = tlv_data;
+ ptr != (tlv_data + tlv_length);
+ ptr += ptr[1]) {
+
+ tlv_da = dict_attrbyvalue(attribute | (ptr[0] << fr_wimax_shift[1]), vendor);
+ if (tlv_da && (tlv_da->type == PW_TYPE_TLV)) {
+ vp = tlv2wimax(packet, original, secret,
+ attribute | (ptr[0] << 8),
+ vendor, ptr + 2, ptr[1] - 2, 2);
+
+ if (!vp) goto error;
+ } else {
+ vp = paircreate(attribute | (ptr[0] << fr_wimax_shift[1]), vendor,
+ PW_TYPE_OCTETS);
+ if (!vp) {
+ error:
+ pairfree(&head);
+ goto not_well_formed;
+ }
+
+ if (!data2vp(packet, original, secret,
+ ptr[1] - 2, ptr + 2, vp)) {
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *tail = vp;
+
+ while (*tail) tail = &((*tail)->next);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * TLV's MAY be continued, but sometimes they're not.
+ */
+ if (tlv_data != data) free(tlv_data);
+
+ if (head->next) rad_sortvp(&head);
+
+ return head;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Extended attribute TLV to VP.
+ */
+static VALUE_PAIR *tlv2vp(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
+ const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
+ const char *secret, int attribute,
+ int length, const uint8_t *data)
+{
+ VALUE_PAIR *vp;
+
+ if ((length < 2) || (data[1] < 2)) return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * For now, only one TLV is allowed.
+ */
+ if (data[1] != length) return NULL;
+
+ attribute |= (data[0] << fr_wimax_shift[2]);
+
+ vp = paircreate(attribute, VENDORPEC_EXTENDED, PW_TYPE_OCTETS);
+ if (!vp) return NULL;
+
+ return data2vp(packet, original, secret, length - 2, data + 2, vp);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse a RADIUS attribute into a data structure.
+ */
+VALUE_PAIR *rad_attr2vp(const RADIUS_PACKET *packet,
+ const RADIUS_PACKET *original,
+ const char *secret, int attribute, int vendor,
+ int length, const uint8_t *data)
+{
+ VALUE_PAIR *vp;
+
+ /*
+ * Hard-coded values are bad...
+ */
+ if ((vendor == 0) && (attribute >= 241) && (attribute <= 246)) {
+ DICT_ATTR *da;
+
+ da = dict_attrbyvalue(attribute, VENDORPEC_EXTENDED);
+ if (da && (da->flags.extended || da->flags.extended_flags)) {
+
+ if (length == 0) return NULL;
+
+ attribute |= (data[0] << fr_wimax_shift[1]);
+ vendor = VENDORPEC_EXTENDED;
+
+ data++;
+ length--;
+
+ /*
+ * There may be a flag octet.
+ */
+ if (da->flags.extended_flags) {
+ if (length == 0) return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * If there's a flag, we can't
+ * handle it.
+ */
+ if (data[0] != 0) return NULL;
+ data++;
+ length--;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now look up the extended attribute, to
+ * see if it's a TLV carrying more data.
+ *
+ */
+ da = dict_attrbyvalue(attribute, VENDORPEC_EXTENDED);
+ if (da && da->flags.has_tlv) {
+ return tlv2vp(packet, original, secret,
+ attribute, length, data);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ vp = paircreate(attribute, vendor, PW_TYPE_OCTETS);
+ if (!vp) return NULL;
+
+ return data2vp(packet, original, secret, length, data, vp);
+}
+
/*
* Calculate/check digest, and decode radius attributes.
uint32_t vendorcode;
VALUE_PAIR **tail;
VALUE_PAIR *pair;
- uint8_t *ptr;
+ uint8_t *ptr, *vsa_ptr;
int packet_length;
int attribute;
int attrlen;
int vendorlen;
radius_packet_t *hdr;
- int vsa_tlen, vsa_llen;
+ int vsa_tlen, vsa_llen, vsa_offset;
DICT_VENDOR *dv = NULL;
int num_attributes = 0;
vendorcode = 0;
vendorlen = 0;
vsa_tlen = vsa_llen = 1;
+ vsa_offset = 0;
/*
* We have to read at least two bytes.
if (myvendor == 0) goto create_pair;
/*
- * This is an implementation issue.
- * We currently pack vendor into the upper
- * 16 bits of a 32-bit attribute number,
- * so we can't handle vendor numbers larger
- * than 16 bits.
+ * Allow vendors up to 2^24. Past that,
+ * get confused.
*/
- if (myvendor > 65535) goto create_pair;
+ if (myvendor > FR_MAX_VENDOR) goto create_pair;
vsa_tlen = vsa_llen = 1;
+ vsa_offset = 0;
dv = dict_vendorbyvalue(myvendor);
if (dv) {
vsa_tlen = dv->type;
vsa_llen = dv->length;
+ if (dv->flags) vsa_offset = 1;
}
/*
int myattr = 0;
/*
- * Don't have a type, it's bad.
+ * Not enough room for one more
+ * attribute. Die!
*/
- if (sublen < vsa_tlen) goto create_pair;
+ if (sublen < (vsa_tlen + vsa_llen + vsa_offset)) goto create_pair;
/*
* Ensure that the attribute number
goto create_pair;
}
- /*
- * Not enough room for one more
- * attribute. Die!
- */
- if (sublen < vsa_tlen + vsa_llen) goto create_pair;
switch (vsa_llen) {
case 0:
- attribute = (myvendor << 16) | myattr;
+ attribute = myattr;
ptr += 4 + vsa_tlen;
attrlen -= (4 + vsa_tlen);
packet_length -= 4 + vsa_tlen;
goto create_pair;
case 1:
- if (subptr[vsa_tlen] < (vsa_tlen + vsa_llen))
+ if (subptr[vsa_tlen] < (vsa_tlen + vsa_llen + vsa_offset))
goto create_pair;
if (subptr[vsa_tlen] > sublen)
goto create_pair;
+
+ /*
+ * WiMAX: 0bCrrrrrrr
+ * Reserved bits MUST be
+ * zero.
+ */
+ if (vsa_offset &&
+ ((subptr[vsa_tlen + vsa_llen] & 0x7f) != 0))
+ goto create_pair;
+
sublen -= subptr[vsa_tlen];
subptr += subptr[vsa_tlen];
break;
default: /* can't hit this. */
return -1;
}
- attribute |= (vendorcode << 16);
+ vsa_ptr = ptr;
ptr += vsa_tlen;
switch (vsa_llen) {
case 1:
- attrlen = ptr[0] - (vsa_tlen + vsa_llen);
+ attrlen = ptr[0] - (vsa_tlen + vsa_llen + vsa_offset);
break;
case 2:
default: /* can't hit this. */
return -1;
}
- ptr += vsa_llen;
- vendorlen -= vsa_tlen + vsa_llen + attrlen;
- if (vendorlen == 0) vendorcode = 0;
- packet_length -= (vsa_tlen + vsa_llen);
+
+ ptr += vsa_llen + vsa_offset;
+ vendorlen -= vsa_tlen + vsa_llen + vsa_offset + attrlen;
+ packet_length -= (vsa_tlen + vsa_llen + vsa_offset);
+
+ /*
+ * Ignore VSAs that have no data.
+ */
+ if (attrlen == 0) goto next;
+
+ /*
+ * WiMAX attributes of type 0 are ignored. They
+ * are a secret flag to us that the attribute has
+ * already been dealt with.
+ */
+ if ((vendorcode == VENDORPEC_WIMAX) && (attribute == 0)) {
+ goto next;
+ }
+
+ if (vsa_offset) {
+ DICT_ATTR *da;
+
+ da = dict_attrbyvalue(attribute, vendorcode);
+
+ /*
+ * If it's NOT continued, AND we know
+ * about it, AND it's not a TLV, we can
+ * create a normal pair.
+ */
+ if (((vsa_ptr[2] & 0x80) == 0) &&
+ da && (da->type != PW_TYPE_TLV)) goto create_pair;
+
+ /*
+ * Else it IS continued, or it's a TLV.
+ * Go do a lot of work to find the stuff.
+ */
+ pair = rad_continuation2vp(packet, original, secret,
+ attribute, vendorcode,
+ attrlen, ptr,
+ packet_length,
+ ((vsa_ptr[2] & 0x80) != 0),
+ da);
+ goto created_pair;
+ }
/*
* Create the attribute, setting the default type
* over-ride this one.
*
* If the attribute has no data, then discard it.
+ *
+ * Unless it's CUI. Damn you, CUI!
*/
create_pair:
- if (!attrlen) goto next;
+ if (!attrlen &&
+ (attribute != PW_CHARGEABLE_USER_IDENTITY)) goto next;
pair = rad_attr2vp(packet, original, secret,
- attribute, attrlen, ptr);
+ attribute, vendorcode, attrlen, ptr);
if (!pair) {
pairfree(&packet->vps);
- librad_log("out of memory");
+ fr_strerror_printf("out of memory");
return -1;
}
+ created_pair:
*tail = pair;
while (pair) {
num_attributes++;
* then without using the dictionary. We
* therefore enforce the limits here, too.
*/
- if ((librad_max_attributes > 0) &&
- (num_attributes > librad_max_attributes)) {
+ if ((fr_max_attributes > 0) &&
+ (num_attributes > fr_max_attributes)) {
char host_ipaddr[128];
pairfree(&packet->vps);
- librad_log("WARNING: Possible DoS attack from host %s: Too many attributes in request (received %d, max %d are allowed).",
+ fr_strerror_printf("WARNING: Possible DoS attack from host %s: Too many attributes in request (received %d, max %d are allowed).",
inet_ntop(packet->src_ipaddr.af,
&packet->src_ipaddr.ipaddr,
host_ipaddr, sizeof(host_ipaddr)),
- num_attributes, librad_max_attributes);
+ num_attributes, fr_max_attributes);
return -1;
}
- next:
+ next:
+ if (vendorlen == 0) vendorcode = 0;
ptr += attrlen;
packet_length -= attrlen;
}
* We need at least a salt.
*/
if (len < 2) {
- librad_log("tunnel password is too short");
+ fr_strerror_printf("tunnel password is too short");
return -1;
}
*/
reallen = passwd[2] ^ digest[0];
if (reallen >= len) {
- librad_log("tunnel password is too long for the attribute");
+ fr_strerror_printf("tunnel password is too long for the attribute");
return -1;
}
* Use Chap-Challenge pair if present,
* Request-Authenticator otherwise.
*/
- challenge = pairfind(packet->vps, PW_CHAP_CHALLENGE);
+ challenge = pairfind(packet->vps, PW_CHAP_CHALLENGE, 0);
if (challenge) {
memcpy(ptr, challenge->vp_strvalue, challenge->length);
i += challenge->length;
}
num = fr_rand_pool.randrsl[fr_rand_pool.randcnt++];
- if (fr_rand_pool.randcnt == 256) {
+ if (fr_rand_pool.randcnt >= 256) {
fr_rand_pool.randcnt = 0;
fr_isaac(&fr_rand_pool);
}
RADIUS_PACKET *rp;
if ((rp = malloc(sizeof(RADIUS_PACKET))) == NULL) {
- librad_log("out of memory");
+ fr_strerror_printf("out of memory");
return NULL;
}
memset(rp, 0, sizeof(*rp));
return rp;
}
+RADIUS_PACKET *rad_alloc_reply(RADIUS_PACKET *packet)
+{
+ RADIUS_PACKET *reply;
+
+ if (!packet) return NULL;
+
+ reply = rad_alloc(0);
+ if (!reply) return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize the fields from the request.
+ */
+ reply->sockfd = packet->sockfd;
+ reply->dst_ipaddr = packet->src_ipaddr;
+ reply->src_ipaddr = packet->dst_ipaddr;
+ reply->dst_port = packet->src_port;
+ reply->src_port = packet->dst_port;
+ reply->id = packet->id;
+ reply->code = 0; /* UNKNOWN code */
+ memcpy(reply->vector, packet->vector,
+ sizeof(reply->vector));
+ reply->vps = NULL;
+ reply->data = NULL;
+ reply->data_len = 0;
+
+ return reply;
+}
+
+
/*
* Free a RADIUS_PACKET
*/
projects / freeradius.git / blobdiff