/*
- * EAP peer method: EAP-AKA (RFC 4187)
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2007, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+ * EAP peer method: EAP-AKA (RFC 4187) and EAP-AKA' (draft-arkko-eap-aka-kdf)
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
#include "includes.h"
#include "common.h"
-#include "eap_peer/eap_i.h"
#include "pcsc_funcs.h"
-#include "eap_common/eap_sim_common.h"
-#include "sha1.h"
-#include "crypto.h"
-#include "eap_peer/eap_config.h"
-#ifdef CONFIG_USIM_SIMULATOR
+#include "crypto/crypto.h"
+#include "crypto/sha1.h"
+#include "crypto/sha256.h"
#include "hlr_auc_gw/milenage.h"
-#endif /* CONFIG_USIM_SIMULATOR */
+#include "eap_common/eap_sim_common.h"
+#include "eap_config.h"
+#include "eap_i.h"
struct eap_aka_data {
size_t res_len;
u8 nonce_s[EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN];
u8 mk[EAP_SIM_MK_LEN];
- u8 k_aut[EAP_SIM_K_AUT_LEN];
+ u8 k_aut[EAP_AKA_PRIME_K_AUT_LEN];
u8 k_encr[EAP_SIM_K_ENCR_LEN];
+ u8 k_re[EAP_AKA_PRIME_K_RE_LEN]; /* EAP-AKA' only */
u8 msk[EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN];
u8 emsk[EAP_EMSK_LEN];
u8 rand[EAP_AKA_RAND_LEN], autn[EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN];
struct wpabuf *id_msgs;
int prev_id;
int result_ind, use_result_ind;
+ u8 eap_method;
+ u8 *network_name;
+ size_t network_name_len;
+ u16 kdf;
+ int kdf_negotiation;
};
if (data == NULL)
return NULL;
+ data->eap_method = EAP_TYPE_AKA;
+
eap_aka_state(data, CONTINUE);
data->prev_id = -1;
}
+#ifdef EAP_AKA_PRIME
+static void * eap_aka_prime_init(struct eap_sm *sm)
+{
+ struct eap_aka_data *data = eap_aka_init(sm);
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ data->eap_method = EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME;
+ return data;
+}
+#endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */
+
+
static void eap_aka_deinit(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
{
struct eap_aka_data *data = priv;
os_free(data->reauth_id);
os_free(data->last_eap_identity);
wpabuf_free(data->id_msgs);
+ os_free(data->network_name);
os_free(data);
}
}
{
const u8 *addr;
size_t len;
- u8 hash[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
+ u8 hash[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_CHECKCODE");
return;
}
- /* Checkcode is SHA1 hash over all EAP-AKA/Identity packets. */
+ /* Checkcode is SHA1/SHA256 hash over all EAP-AKA/Identity packets. */
addr = wpabuf_head(data->id_msgs);
len = wpabuf_len(data->id_msgs);
wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-AKA: AT_CHECKCODE data", addr, len);
- sha1_vector(1, &addr, &len, hash);
+#ifdef EAP_AKA_PRIME
+ if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME)
+ sha256_vector(1, &addr, &len, hash);
+ else
+#endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */
+ sha1_vector(1, &addr, &len, hash);
eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_CHECKCODE, 0, hash,
- EAP_AKA_CHECKCODE_LEN);
+ data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME ?
+ EAP_AKA_PRIME_CHECKCODE_LEN : EAP_AKA_CHECKCODE_LEN);
}
{
const u8 *addr;
size_t len;
- u8 hash[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
+ u8 hash[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
+ size_t hash_len;
if (checkcode == NULL)
return -1;
return 0;
}
- if (checkcode_len != EAP_AKA_CHECKCODE_LEN) {
+ hash_len = data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME ?
+ EAP_AKA_PRIME_CHECKCODE_LEN : EAP_AKA_CHECKCODE_LEN;
+
+ if (checkcode_len != hash_len) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Checkcode from server "
"indicates that AKA/Identity message were not "
"used, but they were");
return -1;
}
- /* Checkcode is SHA1 hash over all EAP-AKA/Identity packets. */
+ /* Checkcode is SHA1/SHA256 hash over all EAP-AKA/Identity packets. */
addr = wpabuf_head(data->id_msgs);
len = wpabuf_len(data->id_msgs);
- sha1_vector(1, &addr, &len, hash);
-
- if (os_memcmp(hash, checkcode, EAP_AKA_CHECKCODE_LEN) != 0) {
+#ifdef EAP_AKA_PRIME
+ if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME)
+ sha256_vector(1, &addr, &len, hash);
+ else
+#endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */
+ sha1_vector(1, &addr, &len, hash);
+
+ if (os_memcmp(hash, checkcode, hash_len) != 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Mismatch in AT_CHECKCODE");
return -1;
}
data->num_id_req = 0;
data->num_notification = 0;
- msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, EAP_TYPE_AKA,
+ msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, data->eap_method,
EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_CLIENT_ERROR);
eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE, err, NULL, 0);
return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, NULL, NULL, 0);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Generating EAP-AKA Authentication-Reject "
"(id=%d)", id);
- msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, EAP_TYPE_AKA,
+ msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, data->eap_method,
EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT);
return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Generating EAP-AKA Synchronization-Failure "
"(id=%d)", id);
- msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, EAP_TYPE_AKA,
+ msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, data->eap_method,
EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_SYNCHRONIZATION_FAILURE);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_AUTS");
eap_sim_msg_add_full(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_AUTS, data->auts,
eap_aka_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_EAP_ID);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Generating EAP-AKA Identity (id=%d)", id);
- msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, EAP_TYPE_AKA,
+ msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, data->eap_method,
EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_IDENTITY);
if (identity) {
struct eap_sim_msg *msg;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Generating EAP-AKA Challenge (id=%d)", id);
- msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, EAP_TYPE_AKA,
+ msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, data->eap_method,
EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_CHALLENGE);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_RES");
eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_RES, data->res_len * 8,
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Generating EAP-AKA Reauthentication (id=%d)",
id);
- msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, EAP_TYPE_AKA,
+ msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, data->eap_method,
EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_REAUTHENTICATION);
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_IV");
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_ENCR_DATA");
u8 *k_aut = (notification & 0x4000) == 0 ? data->k_aut : NULL;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Generating EAP-AKA Notification (id=%d)", id);
- msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, EAP_TYPE_AKA,
+ msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, data->eap_method,
EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_NOTIFICATION);
if (k_aut && data->reauth) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_IV");
}
+static int eap_aka_verify_mac(struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ const struct wpabuf *req,
+ const u8 *mac, const u8 *extra,
+ size_t extra_len)
+{
+ if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME)
+ return eap_sim_verify_mac_sha256(data->k_aut, req, mac, extra,
+ extra_len);
+ return eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, req, mac, extra, extra_len);
+}
+
+
+#ifdef EAP_AKA_PRIME
+static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_prime_kdf_select(struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ u8 id, u16 kdf)
+{
+ struct eap_sim_msg *msg;
+
+ data->kdf_negotiation = 1;
+ data->kdf = kdf;
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Generating EAP-AKA Challenge (id=%d) (KDF "
+ "select)", id);
+ msg = eap_sim_msg_init(EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, id, data->eap_method,
+ EAP_AKA_SUBTYPE_CHALLENGE);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " AT_KDF");
+ eap_sim_msg_add(msg, EAP_SIM_AT_KDF, kdf, NULL, 0);
+ return eap_sim_msg_finish(msg, NULL, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+
+static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_prime_kdf_neg(struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ u8 id, struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < attr->kdf_count; i++) {
+ if (attr->kdf[i] == EAP_AKA_PRIME_KDF)
+ return eap_aka_prime_kdf_select(data, id,
+ EAP_AKA_PRIME_KDF);
+ }
+
+ /* No matching KDF found - fail authentication as if AUTN had been
+ * incorrect */
+ return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, id);
+}
+
+
+static int eap_aka_prime_kdf_valid(struct eap_aka_data *data,
+ struct eap_sim_attrs *attr)
+{
+ size_t i, j;
+
+ if (attr->kdf_count == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* The only allowed (and required) duplication of a KDF is the addition
+ * of the selected KDF into the beginning of the list. */
+
+ if (data->kdf_negotiation) {
+ if (attr->kdf[0] != data->kdf) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA': The server did not "
+ "accept the selected KDF");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 1; i < attr->kdf_count; i++) {
+ if (attr->kdf[i] == data->kdf)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i == attr->kdf_count &&
+ attr->kdf_count < EAP_AKA_PRIME_KDF_MAX) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA': The server did not "
+ "duplicate the selected KDF");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* TODO: should check that the list is identical to the one
+ * used in the previous Challenge message apart from the added
+ * entry in the beginning. */
+ }
+
+ for (i = data->kdf ? 1 : 0; i < attr->kdf_count; i++) {
+ for (j = i + 1; j < attr->kdf_count; j++) {
+ if (attr->kdf[i] == attr->kdf[j]) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA': The server "
+ "included a duplicated KDF");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */
+
+
static struct wpabuf * eap_aka_process_challenge(struct eap_sm *sm,
struct eap_aka_data *data,
u8 id,
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
+#ifdef EAP_AKA_PRIME
+ if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) {
+ if (!attr->kdf_input || attr->kdf_input_len == 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA': Challenge message "
+ "did not include non-empty AT_KDF_INPUT");
+ /* Fail authentication as if AUTN had been incorrect */
+ return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, id);
+ }
+ os_free(data->network_name);
+ data->network_name = os_malloc(attr->kdf_input_len);
+ if (data->network_name == NULL) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA': No memory for "
+ "storing Network Name");
+ return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, id);
+ }
+ os_memcpy(data->network_name, attr->kdf_input,
+ attr->kdf_input_len);
+ data->network_name_len = attr->kdf_input_len;
+ wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA': Network Name "
+ "(AT_KDF_INPUT)",
+ data->network_name, data->network_name_len);
+ /* TODO: check Network Name per 3GPP.33.402 */
+
+ if (!eap_aka_prime_kdf_valid(data, attr))
+ return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, id);
+
+ if (attr->kdf[0] != EAP_AKA_PRIME_KDF)
+ return eap_aka_prime_kdf_neg(data, id, attr);
+
+ data->kdf = EAP_AKA_PRIME_KDF;
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA': KDF %d selected", data->kdf);
+ }
+
+ if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA && attr->bidding) {
+ u16 flags = WPA_GET_BE16(attr->bidding);
+ if ((flags & EAP_AKA_BIDDING_FLAG_D) &&
+ eap_allowed_method(sm, EAP_VENDOR_IETF,
+ EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Bidding down from "
+ "AKA' to AKA detected");
+ /* Fail authentication as if AUTN had been incorrect */
+ return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, id);
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */
+
data->reauth = 0;
if (!attr->mac || !attr->rand || !attr->autn) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Challenge message "
return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
}
+#ifdef EAP_AKA_PRIME
+ if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) {
+ /* Note: AUTN = (SQN ^ AK) || AMF || MAC which gives us the
+ * needed 6-octet SQN ^ AK for CK',IK' derivation */
+ u16 amf = WPA_GET_BE16(data->autn + 6);
+ if (!(amf & 0x8000)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA': AMF separation bit "
+ "not set (AMF=0x%4x)", amf);
+ return eap_aka_authentication_reject(data, id);
+ }
+ eap_aka_prime_derive_ck_ik_prime(data->ck, data->ik,
+ data->autn,
+ data->network_name,
+ data->network_name_len);
+ }
+#endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */
if (data->last_eap_identity) {
identity = data->last_eap_identity;
identity_len = data->last_eap_identity_len;
identity = eap_get_config_identity(sm, &identity_len);
wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Selected identity for MK "
"derivation", identity, identity_len);
- eap_aka_derive_mk(identity, identity_len, data->ik, data->ck,
- data->mk);
- eap_sim_derive_keys(data->mk, data->k_encr, data->k_aut, data->msk,
- data->emsk);
- if (eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, reqData, attr->mac, (u8 *) "", 0))
- {
+ if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) {
+ eap_aka_prime_derive_keys(identity, identity_len, data->ik,
+ data->ck, data->k_encr, data->k_aut,
+ data->k_re, data->msk, data->emsk);
+ } else {
+ eap_aka_derive_mk(identity, identity_len, data->ik, data->ck,
+ data->mk);
+ eap_sim_derive_keys(data->mk, data->k_encr, data->k_aut,
+ data->msk, data->emsk);
+ }
+ if (eap_aka_verify_mac(data, reqData, attr->mac, (u8 *) "", 0)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Challenge message "
"used invalid AT_MAC");
return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
return -1;
}
- if (eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, reqData, attr->mac, (u8 *) "", 0))
- {
+ if (eap_aka_verify_mac(data, reqData, attr->mac, (u8 *) "", 0)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Notification message "
"used invalid AT_MAC");
return -1;
}
data->reauth = 1;
- if (eap_sim_verify_mac(data->k_aut, reqData, attr->mac, (u8 *) "", 0))
- {
+ if (eap_aka_verify_mac(data, reqData, attr->mac, (u8 *) "", 0)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-AKA: Reauthentication "
"did not have valid AT_MAC");
return eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
"(%d <= %d)", eattr.counter, data->counter);
data->counter_too_small = eattr.counter;
- eap_sim_derive_keys_reauth(eattr.counter, data->reauth_id,
- data->reauth_id_len, eattr.nonce_s,
- data->mk, NULL, NULL);
-
/* Reply using Re-auth w/ AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL. The current
* reauth_id must not be used to start a new reauthentication.
* However, since it was used in the last EAP-Response-Identity
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: (encr) AT_NONCE_S",
data->nonce_s, EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN);
- eap_sim_derive_keys_reauth(data->counter,
- data->reauth_id, data->reauth_id_len,
- data->nonce_s, data->mk, data->msk,
- data->emsk);
+ if (data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) {
+ eap_aka_prime_derive_keys_reauth(data->k_re, data->counter,
+ data->reauth_id,
+ data->reauth_id_len,
+ data->nonce_s,
+ data->msk, data->emsk);
+ } else {
+ eap_sim_derive_keys_reauth(data->counter, data->reauth_id,
+ data->reauth_id_len,
+ data->nonce_s, data->mk,
+ data->msk, data->emsk);
+ }
eap_aka_clear_identities(data, CLEAR_REAUTH_ID | CLEAR_EAP_ID);
eap_aka_learn_ids(data, &eattr);
return NULL;
}
- pos = eap_hdr_validate(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_AKA, reqData, &len);
+ pos = eap_hdr_validate(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, data->eap_method, reqData,
+ &len);
if (pos == NULL || len < 1) {
ret->ignore = TRUE;
return NULL;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: Subtype=%d", subtype);
pos += 2; /* Reserved */
- if (eap_sim_parse_attr(pos, wpabuf_head_u8(reqData) + len, &attr, 1,
+ if (eap_sim_parse_attr(pos, wpabuf_head_u8(reqData) + len, &attr,
+ data->eap_method == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME ? 2 : 1,
0)) {
res = eap_aka_client_error(data, id,
EAP_AKA_UNABLE_TO_PROCESS_PACKET);
wpabuf_free(data->id_msgs);
data->id_msgs = NULL;
data->use_result_ind = 0;
+ data->kdf_negotiation = 0;
}
eap_peer_method_free(eap);
return ret;
}
+
+
+#ifdef EAP_AKA_PRIME
+int eap_peer_aka_prime_register(void)
+{
+ struct eap_method *eap;
+ int ret;
+
+ eap = eap_peer_method_alloc(EAP_PEER_METHOD_INTERFACE_VERSION,
+ EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME,
+ "AKA'");
+ if (eap == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ eap->init = eap_aka_prime_init;
+ eap->deinit = eap_aka_deinit;
+ eap->process = eap_aka_process;
+ eap->isKeyAvailable = eap_aka_isKeyAvailable;
+ eap->getKey = eap_aka_getKey;
+ eap->has_reauth_data = eap_aka_has_reauth_data;
+ eap->deinit_for_reauth = eap_aka_deinit_for_reauth;
+ eap->init_for_reauth = eap_aka_init_for_reauth;
+ eap->get_identity = eap_aka_get_identity;
+ eap->get_emsk = eap_aka_get_emsk;
+
+ ret = eap_peer_method_register(eap);
+ if (ret)
+ eap_peer_method_free(eap);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME */
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