/*
- * Copyright (c) 2010, JANET(UK)
+ * Copyright (c) 2011, JANET(UK)
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
+/*
+ * Establish a security context on the acceptor (server). These functions
+ * wrap around libradsec and (thus) talk to a RADIUS server or proxy.
+ */
+
#include "gssapiP_eap.h"
+#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
static OM_uint32
-acceptReadyCommon(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred)
-{
- OM_uint32 major;
-
- major = sequenceInit(minor,
- &ctx->seqState, ctx->recvSeq,
- ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG) != 0),
- ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG) != 0),
- TRUE);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- return major;
-
- return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-}
-
+eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_name_t target,
+ gss_OID mech,
+ OM_uint32 reqFlags,
+ OM_uint32 timeReq,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+ gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+ gss_buffer_t outputToken,
+ OM_uint32 *smFlags);
+#endif
/*
- * Mark a context as ready for cryptographic operations
+ * Mark an acceptor context as ready for cryptographic operations
*/
static OM_uint32
acceptReadyEap(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred)
gssEapReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &ctx->initiatorName);
- vp = rc_avpair_get(ctx->acceptorCtx.avps, PW_USER_NAME, 0);
- if (vp != NULL) {
- nameBuf.length = vp->lvalue;
- nameBuf.value = vp->strvalue;
+ major = gssEapRadiusGetRawAvp(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.vps,
+ PW_USER_NAME, 0, &vp);
+ if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ nameBuf.length = vp->length;
+ nameBuf.value = vp->vp_strvalue;
} else {
ctx->gssFlags |= GSS_C_ANON_FLAG;
}
- major = gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
+ major = gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf,
+ (ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_ANON_FLAG) ?
+ GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS : GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
&ctx->initiatorName);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
return major;
- ctx->initiatorName->attrCtx = gssEapCreateAttrContext(cred, ctx);
-
- vp = rc_avpair_get(ctx->acceptorCtx.avps,
- VENDOR_ATTR_MS_MPPE_SEND_KEY,
- VENDOR_ID_MICROSOFT);
- if (ctx->encryptionType != ENCTYPE_NULL && vp != NULL) {
- major = gssEapDeriveRfc3961Key(minor,
- (unsigned char *)vp->strvalue,
- vp->lvalue,
- ctx->encryptionType,
- &ctx->rfc3961Key);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- return major;
+ major = gssEapRadiusGetRawAvp(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.vps,
+ PW_MS_MPPE_SEND_KEY, VENDORPEC_MS, &vp);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_KEY_UNAVAILABLE;
+ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
+
+ major = gssEapDeriveRfc3961Key(minor,
+ vp->vp_octets,
+ vp->length,
+ ctx->encryptionType,
+ &ctx->rfc3961Key);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key,
+ &ctx->checksumType);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ major = sequenceInit(minor,
+ &ctx->seqState, ctx->recvSeq,
+ ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG) != 0),
+ ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG) != 0),
+ TRUE);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ major = gssEapCreateAttrContext(minor, cred, ctx,
+ &ctx->initiatorName->attrCtx,
+ &ctx->expiryTime);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ *minor = 0;
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
- major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key,
- &ctx->checksumType);
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptAcceptorName(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_buffer_t inputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_buffer_t outputToken,
+ OM_uint32 *smFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major;
+
+ /* XXX TODO import and validate name from inputToken */
+
+ if (ctx->acceptorName != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
+ /* Send desired target name to acceptor */
+ major = gssEapDisplayName(minor, ctx->acceptorName,
+ outputToken, NULL);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
return major;
- } else {
- /*
- * draft-howlett-eap-gss says that integrity/confidentialty should
- * always be advertised as available, but if we have no keying
- * material it seems confusing to the caller to advertise this.
- */
- ctx->gssFlags &= ~(GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_CONF_FLAG);
- ctx->encryptionType = ENCTYPE_NULL;
}
- return acceptReadyCommon(minor, ctx, cred);
+ return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
+}
+
+#ifdef GSSEAP_DEBUG
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptVendorInfo(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+ gss_buffer_t outputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ OM_uint32 *smFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "GSS-EAP: vendor: %.*s\n",
+ (int)inputToken->length, (char *)inputToken->value);
+
+ *minor = 0;
+ return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Emit a identity EAP request to force the initiator (peer) to identify
+ * itself.
+ */
static OM_uint32
eapGssSmAcceptIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED,
gss_buffer_t inputToken,
- gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
- gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+ gss_buffer_t outputToken,
+ OM_uint32 *smFlags)
{
OM_uint32 major;
- union {
- struct eap_hdr pdu;
- unsigned char data[5];
- } pkt;
+ struct wpabuf *reqData;
gss_buffer_desc pktBuffer;
- if (inputToken != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER && inputToken->length != 0)
+ if (!gssEapCredAvailable(cred, ctx->mechanismUsed)) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_CRED_MECH_MISMATCH;
+ return GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
+ }
+
+ if (inputToken != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER && inputToken->length != 0) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_WRONG_SIZE;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
- assert(ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle == NULL);
+ reqData = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY, 0,
+ EAP_CODE_REQUEST, 0);
+ if (reqData == NULL) {
+ *minor = ENOMEM;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ pktBuffer.length = wpabuf_len(reqData);
+ pktBuffer.value = (void *)wpabuf_head(reqData);
- major = gssEapRadiusAllocHandle(minor, cred, &ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle);
+ major = duplicateBuffer(minor, &pktBuffer, outputToken);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
return major;
- assert(ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME);
+ wpabuf_free(reqData);
- if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
- major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- return major;
+ GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION_NEXT(ctx);
+
+ *minor = 0;
+ *smFlags |= SM_FLAG_OUTPUT_TOKEN_CRITICAL;
+
+ return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns TRUE if the input token contains an EAP identity response.
+ */
+static int
+isIdentityResponseP(gss_buffer_t inputToken)
+{
+ struct wpabuf respData;
+
+ wpabuf_set(&respData, inputToken->value, inputToken->length);
+
+ return (eap_get_type(&respData) == EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Save the asserted initiator identity from the EAP identity response.
+ */
+static OM_uint32
+importInitiatorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_buffer_t inputToken)
+{
+ OM_uint32 tmpMinor;
+ struct wpabuf respData;
+ const unsigned char *pos;
+ size_t len;
+ gss_buffer_desc nameBuf;
+
+ wpabuf_set(&respData, inputToken->value, inputToken->length);
+
+ pos = eap_hdr_validate(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY,
+ &respData, &len);
+ if (pos == NULL) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_PEER_BAD_MESSAGE;
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
- pkt.pdu.code = EAP_CODE_REQUEST;
- pkt.pdu.identifier = 0;
- pkt.pdu.length = htons(sizeof(pkt.data));
- pkt.data[4] = EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY;
+ nameBuf.value = (void *)pos;
+ nameBuf.length = len;
- pktBuffer.length = sizeof(pkt.data);
- pktBuffer.value = pkt.data;
+ gssEapReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &ctx->initiatorName);
- major = duplicateBuffer(minor, &pktBuffer, outputToken);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- return major;
+ return gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
+ &ctx->initiatorName);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Pass the asserted initiator identity to the authentication server.
+ */
+static OM_uint32
+setInitiatorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ VALUE_PAIR **vps)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+ gss_buffer_desc nameBuf;
- ctx->state = EAP_STATE_AUTHENTICATE;
+ /*
+ * We should have got an EAP identity response, but if we didn't, then
+ * we will just avoid sending User-Name. Note that radsecproxy requires
+ * User-Name to be sent on every request (presumably so it can remain
+ * stateless).
+ */
+ if (ctx->initiatorName != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
+ major = gssEapDisplayName(minor, ctx->initiatorName, &nameBuf, NULL);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
- return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
+ major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps, PW_USER_NAME, 0, &nameBuf);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &nameBuf);
+ }
+
+ *minor = 0;
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
+/*
+ * Pass the asserted acceptor identity to the authentication server.
+ */
static OM_uint32
setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
- VALUE_PAIR **avps)
+ VALUE_PAIR **vps)
{
OM_uint32 major;
gss_buffer_desc nameBuf;
krb5_context krbContext = NULL;
krb5_principal krbPrinc;
+ struct rs_context *rc = ctx->acceptorCtx.radContext;
+
+ assert(rc != NULL);
- /* Awaits further specification */
- if (ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME)
+ if (ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
+ *minor = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx->acceptorName->flags & NAME_FLAG_SERVICE) == 0) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_BAD_SERVICE_NAME;
+ return GSS_S_BAD_NAME;
+ }
GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
krbPrinc = ctx->acceptorName->krbPrincipal;
assert(krbPrinc != NULL);
-
- if (krb5_princ_size(krbContext, krbPrinc) < 2)
- return GSS_S_BAD_NAME;
+ assert(KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(krbPrinc) >= 2);
/* Acceptor-Service-Name */
- krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_component(krbContext, krbPrinc, 0), &nameBuf);
+ krbPrincComponentToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, 0, &nameBuf);
- major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps,
- VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_NAME,
- VENDOR_ID_UKERNA,
- &nameBuf);
+ major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps,
+ PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_NAME,
+ VENDORPEC_UKERNA,
+ &nameBuf);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
return major;
/* Acceptor-Host-Name */
- krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_component(krbContext, krbPrinc, 1), &nameBuf);
+ krbPrincComponentToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, 1, &nameBuf);
- major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps,
- VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_HOST_NAME,
- VENDOR_ID_UKERNA,
- &nameBuf);
+ major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps,
+ PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_HOST_NAME,
+ VENDORPEC_UKERNA,
+ &nameBuf);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
return major;
- if (krb5_princ_size(krbContext, krbPrinc) > 2) {
+ if (KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(krbPrinc) > 2) {
/* Acceptor-Service-Specific */
krb5_principal_data ssiPrinc = *krbPrinc;
char *ssi;
- krb5_princ_size(krbContext, &ssiPrinc) -= 2;
- krb5_princ_name(krbContext, &ssiPrinc) += 2;
+ KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(&ssiPrinc) -= 2;
+ KRB_PRINC_NAME(&ssiPrinc) += 2;
*minor = krb5_unparse_name_flags(krbContext, &ssiPrinc,
KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &ssi);
nameBuf.value = ssi;
nameBuf.length = strlen(ssi);
- major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps,
- VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_SPECIFIC,
- VENDOR_ID_UKERNA,
- &nameBuf);
+ major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps,
+ PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_SPECIFIC,
+ VENDORPEC_UKERNA,
+ &nameBuf);
if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi);
krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi);
}
- krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_realm(krbContext, krbPrinc), &nameBuf);
+ krbPrincRealmToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, &nameBuf);
if (nameBuf.length != 0) {
/* Acceptor-Realm-Name */
- major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps,
- VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_REALM_NAME,
- VENDOR_ID_UKERNA,
- &nameBuf);
+ major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps,
+ PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_REALM_NAME,
+ VENDORPEC_UKERNA,
+ &nameBuf);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
return major;
}
+ *minor = 0;
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate a RadSec handle
+ */
+static OM_uint32
+createRadiusHandle(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx)
+{
+ struct gss_eap_acceptor_ctx *actx = &ctx->acceptorCtx;
+ const char *configFile = RS_CONFIG_FILE;
+ const char *configStanza = "gss-eap";
+ struct rs_alloc_scheme ralloc;
+ struct rs_error *err;
+
+ assert(actx->radContext == NULL);
+ assert(actx->radConn == NULL);
+
+ if (rs_context_create(&actx->radContext, RS_DICT_FILE) != 0) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_RADSEC_CONTEXT_FAILURE;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ if (cred->radiusConfigFile != NULL)
+ configFile = cred->radiusConfigFile;
+ if (cred->radiusConfigStanza != NULL)
+ configStanza = cred->radiusConfigStanza;
+
+ ralloc.calloc = GSSEAP_CALLOC;
+ ralloc.malloc = GSSEAP_MALLOC;
+ ralloc.free = GSSEAP_FREE;
+ ralloc.realloc = GSSEAP_REALLOC;
+
+ rs_context_set_alloc_scheme(actx->radContext, &ralloc);
+
+ if (rs_context_read_config(actx->radContext, configFile) != 0) {
+ err = rs_err_ctx_pop(actx->radContext);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (rs_conn_create(actx->radContext, &actx->radConn, configStanza) != 0) {
+ err = rs_err_conn_pop(actx->radConn);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (actx->radServer != NULL) {
+ if (rs_conn_select_peer(actx->radConn, actx->radServer) != 0) {
+ err = rs_err_conn_pop(actx->radConn);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *minor = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+
+fail:
+ return gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, err);
}
+/*
+ * Process a EAP response from the initiator.
+ */
static OM_uint32
eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate(OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED,
gss_buffer_t inputToken,
- gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
- gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+ gss_buffer_t outputToken,
+ OM_uint32 *smFlags)
{
OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
- int code;
- VALUE_PAIR *send = NULL;
- VALUE_PAIR *received = NULL;
- rc_handle *rh = ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle;
- char msgBuffer[4096];
- struct eap_hdr *pdu;
- unsigned char *pos;
- gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-
- pdu = (struct eap_hdr *)inputToken->value;
- pos = (unsigned char *)(pdu + 1);
-
- if (inputToken->length > sizeof(*pdu) &&
- pdu->code == EAP_CODE_RESPONSE &&
- pos[0] == EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY) {
- /*
- * XXX TODO do we really need to set User-Name? FreeRADIUS does
- * not appear to require it.
- */
- major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_USER_NAME, 0, &nameBuf);
+ struct rs_connection *rconn;
+ struct rs_request *request = NULL;
+ struct rs_packet *req = NULL, *resp = NULL;
+ struct radius_packet *frreq, *frresp;
+
+ if (ctx->acceptorCtx.radContext == NULL) {
+ /* May be NULL from an imported partial context */
+ major = createRadiusHandle(minor, cred, ctx);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
+ }
- major = setAcceptorIdentity(minor, ctx, &send);
+ if (isIdentityResponseP(inputToken)) {
+ major = importInitiatorIdentity(minor, ctx, inputToken);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
+ return major;
+ }
+
+ rconn = ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn;
+
+ if (rs_packet_create_authn_request(rconn, &req, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
+ major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn));
+ goto cleanup;
}
+ frreq = rs_packet_frpkt(req);
+
+ major = setInitiatorIdentity(minor, ctx, &frreq->vps);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
- major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, inputToken);
+ major = setAcceptorIdentity(minor, ctx, &frreq->vps);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
- if (ctx->acceptorCtx.lastStatus == CHALLENGE_RC) {
- major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_STATE, 0,
- &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
+ major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, &frreq->vps,
+ PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, inputToken);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ if (ctx->acceptorCtx.state.length != 0) {
+ major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, &frreq->vps, PW_STATE, 0,
+ &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
}
- code = rc_auth(rh, 0, send, &received, msgBuffer);
- switch (code) {
- case OK_RC:
- case CHALLENGE_RC:
- major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
- break;
- case TIMEOUT_RC:
- major = GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+ if (rs_request_create(rconn, &request) != 0) {
+ major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ rs_request_add_reqpkt(request, req);
+ req = NULL;
+
+ if (rs_request_send(request, &resp) != 0) {
+ major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ assert(resp != NULL);
+
+ frresp = rs_packet_frpkt(resp);
+ switch (frresp->code) {
+ case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
+ case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
break;
- case REJECT_RC:
+ case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
+ *minor = GSSEAP_RADIUS_AUTH_FAILURE;
major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL;
+ goto cleanup;
break;
default:
+ *minor = GSSEAP_UNKNOWN_RADIUS_CODE;
major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
+ break;
}
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ major = gssEapRadiusGetAvp(minor, frresp->vps, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0,
+ outputToken, TRUE);
+ if (major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && frresp->code == PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_MISSING_EAP_REQUEST;
+ major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto cleanup;
-
- ctx->acceptorCtx.lastStatus = code;
-
- major = getBufferFromAvps(minor, received, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0,
- outputToken, TRUE);
- if ((major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && code != OK_RC) ||
- GSS_ERROR(major))
+ } else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
- if (code == CHALLENGE_RC) {
- major = getBufferFromAvps(minor, received, PW_STATE, 0,
- &ctx->acceptorCtx.state, TRUE);
- if (major != GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && GSS_ERROR(major))
+ if (frresp->code == PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE) {
+ major = gssEapRadiusGetAvp(minor, frresp->vps, PW_STATE, 0,
+ &ctx->acceptorCtx.state, TRUE);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major) && *minor != GSSEAP_NO_SUCH_ATTR)
goto cleanup;
} else {
- ctx->acceptorCtx.avps = received;
- received = NULL;
+ ctx->acceptorCtx.vps = frresp->vps;
+ frresp->vps = NULL;
major = acceptReadyEap(minor, ctx, cred);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
- ctx->state = EAP_STATE_GSS_CHANNEL_BINDINGS;
+ GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION_NEXT(ctx);
}
major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
+ *minor = 0;
+ *smFlags |= SM_FLAG_OUTPUT_TOKEN_CRITICAL;
cleanup:
- if (received != NULL)
- rc_avpair_free(received);
+ if (request != NULL)
+ rs_request_destroy(request);
+ if (req != NULL)
+ rs_packet_destroy(req);
+ if (resp != NULL)
+ rs_packet_destroy(resp);
+ if (GSSEAP_SM_STATE(ctx) == GSSEAP_STATE_INITIATOR_EXTS) {
+ assert(major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+
+ rs_conn_destroy(ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn);
+ ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn = NULL;
+ }
return major;
}
static OM_uint32
eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred GSSEAP_UNUSED,
gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
- gss_cred_id_t cred,
- gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+ gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED,
gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
- gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+ gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+ gss_buffer_t outputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ OM_uint32 *smFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED)
{
- OM_uint32 major;
+ OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[2];
- outputToken->length = 0;
- outputToken->value = NULL;
+ iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA | GSS_IOV_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATE;
+ iov[0].buffer.length = 0;
+ iov[0].buffer.value = NULL;
- if (chanBindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS) {
- if (inputToken->length < 14) {
- return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- }
-
- iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA;
- iov[0].buffer.length = 0;
- iov[0].buffer.value = NULL;
-
- if (chanBindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS)
- iov[0].buffer = chanBindings->application_data;
+ iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_STREAM;
+ iov[1].buffer = *inputToken;
- iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_HEADER;
- iov[1].buffer.length = 16;
- iov[1].buffer.value = (unsigned char *)inputToken->value - 2;
-
- assert(load_uint16_be(iov[1].buffer.value) == TOK_TYPE_GSS_CB);
-
- iov[2].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_TRAILER;
- iov[2].buffer.length = inputToken->length - 14;
- iov[2].buffer.value = (unsigned char *)inputToken->value + 14;
+ major = gssEapUnwrapOrVerifyMIC(minor, ctx, NULL, NULL,
+ iov, 2, TOK_TYPE_WRAP);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
- major = gssEapUnwrapOrVerifyMIC(minor, ctx, NULL, NULL,
- iov, 3, TOK_TYPE_GSS_CB);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- return major;
+ if (chanBindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS &&
+ !bufferEqual(&iov[0].buffer, &chanBindings->application_data)) {
+ major = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS;
+ *minor = GSSEAP_BINDINGS_MISMATCH;
+ } else {
+ major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
+ *minor = 0;
}
- ctx->state = EAP_STATE_KRB_REAUTH_CRED;
- return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
+ gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &iov[0].buffer);
+
+ return major;
}
+#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
static OM_uint32
-eapGssSmAcceptKrbReauthCred(OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
- gss_cred_id_t cred,
- gss_buffer_t inputToken,
- gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
- gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+eapGssSmAcceptReauthCreds(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_buffer_t inputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_buffer_t outputToken,
+ OM_uint32 *smFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED)
{
OM_uint32 major;
+ /*
+ * If we're built with fast reauthentication enabled, then
+ * fabricate a ticket from the initiator to ourselves.
+ */
major = gssEapMakeReauthCreds(minor, ctx, cred, outputToken);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- return major;
-
- ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
-
- return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-}
+ if (major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE)
+ major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
+ major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
-static OM_uint32
-eapGssSmAcceptEstablished(OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
- gss_cred_id_t cred,
- gss_buffer_t inputToken,
- gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
- gss_buffer_t outputToken)
-{
- /* Called with already established context */
- *minor = EINVAL;
- return GSS_S_BAD_STATUS;
+ return major;
}
+#endif
static OM_uint32
-acceptReadyKrb(OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
- gss_cred_id_t cred,
- const gss_name_t initiator,
- const gss_OID mech,
- OM_uint32 timeRec)
+eapGssSmAcceptCompleteInitiatorExts(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_buffer_t inputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_buffer_t outputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ OM_uint32 *smFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED)
{
- OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
- gss_buffer_set_t keyData = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
- gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-
- if (!oidEqual(mech, gss_mech_krb5)) {
- major = GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- major = gssInquireSecContextByOid(minor, ctx->kerberosCtx,
- GSS_C_INQ_SSPI_SESSION_KEY, &keyData);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
-
- {
- gss_OID_desc oid;
- int suffix;
-
- oid.length = keyData->elements[1].length;
- oid.elements = keyData->elements[1].value;
-
- /* GSS_KRB5_SESSION_KEY_ENCTYPE_OID */
- major = decomposeOid(minor,
- "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x02\x04",
- 10, &oid, &suffix);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
+ GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION_NEXT(ctx);
- ctx->encryptionType = suffix;
- }
-
- {
- krb5_context krbContext = NULL;
- krb5_keyblock key;
-
- GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
-
- KRB_KEY_LENGTH(&key) = keyData->elements[0].length;
- KRB_KEY_DATA(&key) = keyData->elements[0].value;
- KRB_KEY_TYPE(&key) = ctx->encryptionType;
-
- *minor = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(krbContext,
- &key, &ctx->rfc3961Key);
- if (*minor != 0) {
- major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
- goto cleanup;
- }
- }
-
- major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key,
- &ctx->checksumType);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
-
- major = gssDisplayName(minor, initiator, &nameBuf, NULL);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
-
- major = gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
- &ctx->initiatorName);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
-
- if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
- major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- if (timeRec != GSS_C_INDEFINITE)
- ctx->expiryTime = time(NULL) + timeRec;
-
- major = acceptReadyCommon(minor, ctx, cred);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
-
- ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
- ctx->mechanismUsed = GSS_EAP_MECHANISM;
-
-cleanup:
- gss_release_buffer_set(&tmpMinor, &keyData);
- gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &nameBuf);
+ *minor = 0;
- return major;
+ return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
}
static OM_uint32
-eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
- gss_cred_id_t cred,
- gss_buffer_t inputToken,
- gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
- gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+eapGssSmAcceptCompleteAcceptorExts(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_buffer_t inputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_buffer_t outputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ OM_uint32 *smFlags)
{
- OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
- gss_cred_id_t krbCred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
- gss_name_t krbInitiator = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
- gss_OID mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
- OM_uint32 timeRec = GSS_C_INDEFINITE;
-
- ctx->flags |= CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH_GSS;
-
- if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
- krbCred = cred->krbCred;
+ GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION(ctx, GSSEAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED);
- major = gssAcceptSecContext(minor,
- &ctx->kerberosCtx,
- krbCred,
- inputToken,
- chanBindings,
- &krbInitiator,
- &mech,
- outputToken,
- &ctx->gssFlags,
- &timeRec,
- NULL);
- if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- major = acceptReadyKrb(minor, ctx, cred,
- krbInitiator, mech, timeRec);
- }
-
- gssReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &krbInitiator);
+ *minor = 0;
+ *smFlags |= SM_FLAG_FORCE_SEND_TOKEN;
- return major;
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
-static struct gss_eap_acceptor_sm {
- enum gss_eap_token_type inputTokenType;
- enum gss_eap_token_type outputTokenType;
- OM_uint32 (*processToken)(OM_uint32 *,
- gss_ctx_id_t,
- gss_cred_id_t,
- gss_buffer_t,
- gss_channel_bindings_t,
- gss_buffer_t);
-} eapGssAcceptorSm[] = {
- { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, eapGssSmAcceptIdentity },
- { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate },
- { TOK_TYPE_GSS_CB, TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings },
- { TOK_TYPE_NONE, TOK_TYPE_KRB_CRED, eapGssSmAcceptKrbReauthCred },
- { TOK_TYPE_NONE, TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmAcceptEstablished },
- { TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH, TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH, eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth },
+static struct gss_eap_sm eapGssAcceptorSm[] = {
+ {
+ ITOK_TYPE_ACCEPTOR_NAME_REQ,
+ ITOK_TYPE_ACCEPTOR_NAME_RESP,
+ GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL,
+ 0,
+ eapGssSmAcceptAcceptorName
+ },
+#ifdef GSSEAP_DEBUG
+ {
+ ITOK_TYPE_VENDOR_INFO,
+ ITOK_TYPE_NONE,
+ GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL,
+ 0,
+ eapGssSmAcceptVendorInfo,
+ },
+#endif
+#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
+ {
+ ITOK_TYPE_REAUTH_REQ,
+ ITOK_TYPE_REAUTH_RESP,
+ GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL,
+ 0,
+ eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth,
+ },
+#endif
+ {
+ ITOK_TYPE_NONE,
+ ITOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ,
+ GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL,
+ SM_ITOK_FLAG_REQUIRED,
+ eapGssSmAcceptIdentity,
+ },
+ {
+ ITOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP,
+ ITOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ,
+ GSSEAP_STATE_AUTHENTICATE,
+ SM_ITOK_FLAG_REQUIRED,
+ eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate
+ },
+ {
+ ITOK_TYPE_GSS_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
+ ITOK_TYPE_NONE,
+ GSSEAP_STATE_INITIATOR_EXTS,
+ SM_ITOK_FLAG_REQUIRED,
+ eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings,
+ },
+ {
+ ITOK_TYPE_NONE,
+ ITOK_TYPE_NONE,
+ GSSEAP_STATE_INITIATOR_EXTS,
+ 0,
+ eapGssSmAcceptCompleteInitiatorExts,
+ },
+#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
+ {
+ ITOK_TYPE_NONE,
+ ITOK_TYPE_REAUTH_CREDS,
+ GSSEAP_STATE_ACCEPTOR_EXTS,
+ 0,
+ eapGssSmAcceptReauthCreds,
+ },
+#endif
+ {
+ ITOK_TYPE_NONE,
+ ITOK_TYPE_NONE,
+ GSSEAP_STATE_ACCEPTOR_EXTS,
+ 0,
+ eapGssSmAcceptCompleteAcceptorExts
+ },
};
OM_uint32
OM_uint32 *time_rec,
gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle)
{
- OM_uint32 major;
- OM_uint32 tmpMajor, tmpMinor;
+ OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
gss_ctx_id_t ctx = *context_handle;
- struct gss_eap_acceptor_sm *sm = NULL;
- gss_buffer_desc innerInputToken = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
- gss_buffer_desc innerOutputToken = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
- enum gss_eap_token_type tokType;
*minor = 0;
output_token->length = 0;
output_token->value = NULL;
- if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && !(cred->flags & CRED_FLAG_ACCEPT)) {
- return GSS_S_NO_CRED;
- }
+ if (src_name != NULL)
+ *src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
if (input_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER || input_token->length == 0) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_TOK_TRUNC;
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&ctx->mutex);
- sm = &eapGssAcceptorSm[ctx->state];
-
- major = gssEapVerifyToken(minor, ctx, input_token,
- sm->inputTokenType, &tokType,
- &innerInputToken);
- if (major == GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN && tokType == TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH) {
- ctx->state = EAP_STATE_KRB_REAUTH_GSS;
- } else if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
- goto cleanup;
- }
+ if (cred == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
+ if (ctx->defaultCred == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
+ major = gssEapAcquireCred(minor,
+ GSS_C_NO_NAME,
+ GSS_C_NO_BUFFER,
+ GSS_C_INDEFINITE,
+ GSS_C_NO_OID_SET,
+ GSS_C_ACCEPT,
+ &ctx->defaultCred,
+ NULL,
+ NULL);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
- /* If credentials were provided, check they're usable with this mech */
- if (!gssEapCredAvailable(cred, ctx->mechanismUsed)) {
- major = GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
- goto cleanup;
+ cred = ctx->defaultCred;
}
- do {
- sm = &eapGssAcceptorSm[ctx->state];
+ GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&cred->mutex);
- major = (sm->processToken)(minor,
- ctx,
- cred,
- &innerInputToken,
- input_chan_bindings,
- &innerOutputToken);
+ if (cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
+ major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
- } while (major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED && innerOutputToken.length == 0);
+ }
+
+ major = gssEapSmStep(minor,
+ cred,
+ ctx,
+ GSS_C_NO_NAME,
+ GSS_C_NO_OID,
+ 0,
+ GSS_C_INDEFINITE,
+ input_chan_bindings,
+ input_token,
+ output_token,
+ eapGssAcceptorSm,
+ sizeof(eapGssAcceptorSm) / sizeof(eapGssAcceptorSm[0]));
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
if (mech_type != NULL) {
if (!gssEapInternalizeOid(ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type))
duplicateOid(&tmpMinor, ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type);
}
- if (innerOutputToken.length != 0) {
- tmpMajor = gssEapMakeToken(&tmpMinor, ctx, &innerOutputToken,
- sm->outputTokenType, output_token);
- if (GSS_ERROR(tmpMajor)) {
- major = tmpMajor;
- *minor = tmpMinor;
- goto cleanup;
- }
- }
if (ret_flags != NULL)
*ret_flags = ctx->gssFlags;
if (delegated_cred_handle != NULL)
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
}
- if (time_rec != NULL)
- gssEapContextTime(&tmpMinor, ctx, time_rec);
+ if (time_rec != NULL) {
+ major = gssEapContextTime(&tmpMinor, ctx, time_rec);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
}
- assert(ctx->state == EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED || major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+ assert(CTX_IS_ESTABLISHED(ctx) || major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
cleanup:
+ if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
+ GSSEAP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&cred->mutex);
GSSEAP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ctx->mutex);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
gssEapReleaseContext(&tmpMinor, context_handle);
- gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &innerOutputToken);
-
return major;
}
+#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
+static OM_uint32
+acceptReadyKrb(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ const gss_name_t initiator,
+ const gss_OID mech,
+ OM_uint32 timeRec)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major;
+
+ major = gssEapGlueToMechName(minor, ctx, initiator, &ctx->initiatorName);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ major = gssEapReauthComplete(minor, ctx, cred, mech, timeRec);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ *minor = 0;
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_OID mech,
+ OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+ gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+ gss_buffer_t outputToken,
+ OM_uint32 *smFlags)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+ gss_name_t krbInitiator = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+ OM_uint32 gssFlags, timeRec = GSS_C_INDEFINITE;
+
+ /*
+ * If we're built with fast reauthentication support, it's valid
+ * for an initiator to send a GSS reauthentication token as its
+ * initial context token, causing us to short-circuit the state
+ * machine and process Kerberos GSS messages instead.
+ */
+
+ ctx->flags |= CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH;
+
+ major = gssAcceptSecContext(minor,
+ &ctx->kerberosCtx,
+ cred->krbCred,
+ inputToken,
+ chanBindings,
+ &krbInitiator,
+ &mech,
+ outputToken,
+ &gssFlags,
+ &timeRec,
+ NULL);
+ if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ major = acceptReadyKrb(minor, ctx, cred,
+ krbInitiator, mech, timeRec);
+ if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION(ctx, GSSEAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED);
+ }
+ ctx->gssFlags = gssFlags;
+ } else if (GSS_ERROR(major) &&
+ (*smFlags & SM_FLAG_INPUT_TOKEN_CRITICAL) == 0) {
+ /* pretend reauthentication attempt never happened */
+ gssDeleteSecContext(&tmpMinor, &ctx->kerberosCtx, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+ ctx->flags &= ~(CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH);
+ GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION(ctx, GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL);
+ major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
+ }
+
+ gssReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &krbInitiator);
+
+ return major;
+}
+#endif /* GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH */
projects / mech_eap.git / blobdiff