#include "gssapiP_eap.h"
+/*
+ * Mark a context as ready for cryptographic operations
+ */
+static OM_uint32
+acceptReady(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+ VALUE_PAIR *vp;
+ gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+
+ /* Cache encryption type derived from selected mechanism OID */
+ major = gssEapOidToEnctype(minor, ctx->mechanismUsed,
+ &ctx->encryptionType);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ gssEapReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &ctx->initiatorName);
+
+ vp = rc_avpair_get(ctx->acceptorCtx.avps, PW_USER_NAME, 0);
+ if (vp != NULL) {
+ nameBuf.length = vp->lvalue;
+ nameBuf.value = vp->strvalue;
+ } else {
+ ctx->gssFlags |= GSS_C_ANON_FLAG;
+ }
+
+ major = gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
+ &ctx->initiatorName);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ ctx->initiatorName->attrCtx = gssEapCreateAttrContext(cred, ctx);
+
+ vp = rc_avpair_get(ctx->acceptorCtx.avps,
+ VENDOR_ATTR_MS_MPPE_SEND_KEY,
+ VENDOR_ID_MICROSOFT);
+ if (ctx->encryptionType != ENCTYPE_NULL && vp != NULL) {
+ major = gssEapDeriveRfc3961Key(minor,
+ (unsigned char *)vp->strvalue,
+ vp->lvalue,
+ ctx->encryptionType,
+ &ctx->rfc3961Key);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key,
+ &ctx->checksumType);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * draft-howlett-eap-gss says that integrity/confidentialty should
+ * always be advertised as available, but if we have no keying
+ * material it seems confusing to the caller to advertise this.
+ */
+ ctx->gssFlags &= ~(GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_CONF_FLAG);
+ ctx->encryptionType = ENCTYPE_NULL;
+ }
+
+ major = sequenceInit(minor,
+ &ctx->seqState, ctx->recvSeq,
+ ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG) != 0),
+ ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG) != 0),
+ TRUE);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+ gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major;
+ union {
+ struct eap_hdr pdu;
+ unsigned char data[5];
+ } pkt;
+ gss_buffer_desc pktBuffer;
+
+ if (inputToken != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER && inputToken->length != 0)
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+
+ assert(ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle == NULL);
+
+ major = gssEapRadiusAllocHandle(minor, cred, &ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ assert(ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME);
+
+ if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
+ major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+ }
+
+ pkt.pdu.code = EAP_CODE_REQUEST;
+ pkt.pdu.identifier = 0;
+ pkt.pdu.length = htons(sizeof(pkt.data));
+ pkt.data[4] = EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY;
+
+ pktBuffer.length = sizeof(pkt.data);
+ pktBuffer.value = pkt.data;
+
+ major = duplicateBuffer(minor, &pktBuffer, outputToken);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ ctx->state = EAP_STATE_AUTHENTICATE;
+
+ return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ VALUE_PAIR **avps)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major;
+ gss_buffer_desc nameBuf;
+ krb5_context krbContext = NULL;
+ krb5_principal krbPrinc;
+
+ /* Awaits further specification */
+ if (ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME)
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+
+ GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
+
+ krbPrinc = ctx->acceptorName->krbPrincipal;
+ assert(krbPrinc != NULL);
+
+ if (krb5_princ_size(krbContext, krbPrinc) < 2)
+ return GSS_S_BAD_NAME;
+
+ /* Acceptor-Service-Name */
+ krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_component(krbContext, krbPrinc, 0), &nameBuf);
+
+ major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps,
+ VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_NAME,
+ VENDOR_ID_UKERNA,
+ &nameBuf);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ /* Acceptor-Host-Name */
+ krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_component(krbContext, krbPrinc, 1), &nameBuf);
+
+ major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps,
+ VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_HOST_NAME,
+ VENDOR_ID_UKERNA,
+ &nameBuf);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ if (krb5_princ_size(krbContext, krbPrinc) > 2) {
+ /* Acceptor-Service-Specific */
+ krb5_principal_data ssiPrinc = *krbPrinc;
+ char *ssi;
+
+ krb5_princ_size(krbContext, &ssiPrinc) -= 2;
+ krb5_princ_name(krbContext, &ssiPrinc) += 2;
+
+ *minor = krb5_unparse_name_flags(krbContext, &ssiPrinc,
+ KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &ssi);
+ if (*minor != 0)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ nameBuf.value = ssi;
+ nameBuf.length = strlen(ssi);
+
+ major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps,
+ VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_SPECIFIC,
+ VENDOR_ID_UKERNA,
+ &nameBuf);
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi);
+ return major;
+ }
+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi);
+ }
+
+ krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_realm(krbContext, krbPrinc), &nameBuf);
+ if (nameBuf.length != 0) {
+ /* Acceptor-Realm-Name */
+ major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps,
+ VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_REALM_NAME,
+ VENDOR_ID_UKERNA,
+ &nameBuf);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+ }
+
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+ gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+ int code;
+ VALUE_PAIR *send = NULL;
+ VALUE_PAIR *received = NULL;
+ rc_handle *rh = ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle;
+ char msgBuffer[4096];
+ struct eap_hdr *pdu;
+ unsigned char *pos;
+ gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+
+ pdu = (struct eap_hdr *)inputToken->value;
+ pos = (unsigned char *)(pdu + 1);
+
+ if (inputToken->length > sizeof(*pdu) &&
+ pdu->code == EAP_CODE_RESPONSE &&
+ pos[0] == EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY) {
+ /*
+ * XXX TODO do we really need to set User-Name? FreeRADIUS does
+ * not appear to require it.
+ */
+ major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_USER_NAME, 0, &nameBuf);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ major = setAcceptorIdentity(minor, ctx, &send);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, inputToken);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ if (ctx->acceptorCtx.lastStatus == CHALLENGE_RC) {
+ major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_STATE, 0,
+ &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
+ }
+
+ code = rc_auth(rh, 0, send, &received, msgBuffer);
+ switch (code) {
+ case OK_RC:
+ case CHALLENGE_RC:
+ major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
+ break;
+ case TIMEOUT_RC:
+ major = GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+ break;
+ case REJECT_RC:
+ major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ ctx->acceptorCtx.lastStatus = code;
+
+ major = getBufferFromAvps(minor, received, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0,
+ outputToken, TRUE);
+ if ((major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && code != OK_RC) ||
+ GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ if (code == CHALLENGE_RC) {
+ major = getBufferFromAvps(minor, received, PW_STATE, 0,
+ &ctx->acceptorCtx.state, TRUE);
+ if (major != GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+ } else {
+ ctx->acceptorCtx.avps = received;
+ received = NULL;
+
+ major = acceptReady(minor, ctx, cred);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ ctx->state = EAP_STATE_GSS_CHANNEL_BINDINGS;
+ }
+
+ major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
+
+cleanup:
+ if (received != NULL)
+ rc_avpair_free(received);
+
+ return major;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+ gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major;
+ gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[2];
+
+ outputToken->length = 0;
+ outputToken->value = NULL;
+
+ if (chanBindings == GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS) {
+ ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+
+ if (inputToken->length < 14) {
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
+
+ iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA;
+ iov[0].buffer.length = 0;
+ iov[0].buffer.value = NULL;
+
+ if (chanBindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS)
+ iov[0].buffer = chanBindings->application_data;
+
+ iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_HEADER;
+ iov[1].buffer.length = 16;
+ iov[1].buffer.value = (unsigned char *)inputToken->value - 2;
+
+ assert(load_uint16_be(iov[1].buffer.value) == TOK_TYPE_GSS_CB);
+
+ iov[2].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_TRAILER;
+ iov[2].buffer.length = inputToken->length - 14;
+ iov[2].buffer.value = (unsigned char *)inputToken->value + 14;
+
+ major = gssEapUnwrapOrVerifyMIC(minor, ctx, NULL, NULL,
+ iov, 3, TOK_TYPE_GSS_CB);
+ if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
+ }
+
+#if 0
+ gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &iov[0].buffer);
+#endif
+
+ return major;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptKrbCred(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+ gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+{
+ /* Called with already established context */
+ *minor = EINVAL;
+ return GSS_S_BAD_STATUS;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptEstablished(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+ gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+{
+ /* Called with already established context */
+ *minor = EINVAL;
+ return GSS_S_BAD_STATUS;
+}
+
+static struct gss_eap_acceptor_sm {
+ enum gss_eap_token_type inputTokenType;
+ enum gss_eap_token_type outputTokenType;
+ OM_uint32 (*processToken)(OM_uint32 *,
+ gss_ctx_id_t,
+ gss_cred_id_t,
+ gss_buffer_t,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t,
+ gss_buffer_t);
+} eapGssAcceptorSm[] = {
+ { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, eapGssSmAcceptIdentity },
+ { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate },
+ { TOK_TYPE_GSS_CB, TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings },
+ { TOK_TYPE_NONE, TOK_TYPE_KRB_CRED, eapGssSmAcceptKrbCred },
+ { TOK_TYPE_NONE, TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmAcceptEstablished },
+};
+
+OM_uint32
+gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ gss_buffer_t input_token,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
+ gss_name_t *src_name,
+ gss_OID *mech_type,
+ gss_buffer_t output_token,
+ OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
+ OM_uint32 *time_rec,
+ gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major;
+ OM_uint32 tmpMajor, tmpMinor;
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx = *context_handle;
+ struct gss_eap_acceptor_sm *sm = NULL;
+ gss_buffer_desc innerInputToken = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ gss_buffer_desc innerOutputToken = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+
+ *minor = 0;
+
+ output_token->length = 0;
+ output_token->value = NULL;
+
+ if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && !(cred->flags & CRED_FLAG_ACCEPT)) {
+ return GSS_S_NO_CRED;
+ }
+
+ if (input_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER || input_token->length == 0) {
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
+ major = gssEapAllocContext(minor, &ctx);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ *context_handle = ctx;
+ }
+
+ GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&ctx->mutex);
+
+ sm = &eapGssAcceptorSm[ctx->state];
+
+ major = gssEapVerifyToken(minor, ctx, input_token,
+ sm->inputTokenType, &innerInputToken);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /* If credentials were provided, check they're usable with this mech */
+ if (!gssEapCredAvailable(cred, ctx->mechanismUsed)) {
+ major = GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ do {
+ sm = &eapGssAcceptorSm[ctx->state];
+
+ major = (sm->processToken)(minor,
+ ctx,
+ cred,
+ &innerInputToken,
+ input_chan_bindings,
+ &innerOutputToken);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+ } while (major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED && innerOutputToken.length == 0);
+
+ if (mech_type != NULL) {
+ if (!gssEapInternalizeOid(ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type))
+ duplicateOid(&tmpMinor, ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type);
+ }
+ if (innerOutputToken.length != 0) {
+ tmpMajor = gssEapMakeToken(&tmpMinor, ctx, &innerOutputToken,
+ sm->outputTokenType, output_token);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(tmpMajor)) {
+ major = tmpMajor;
+ *minor = tmpMinor;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+ if (ret_flags != NULL)
+ *ret_flags = ctx->gssFlags;
+ if (delegated_cred_handle != NULL)
+ *delegated_cred_handle = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+
+ if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ if (src_name != NULL && ctx->initiatorName != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
+ major = gssEapDuplicateName(&tmpMinor, ctx->initiatorName, src_name);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (time_rec != NULL)
+ gssEapContextTime(&tmpMinor, ctx, time_rec);
+ }
+
+ assert(ctx->state == EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED || major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+
+cleanup:
+ GSSEAP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ctx->mutex);
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ gssEapReleaseContext(&tmpMinor, context_handle);
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &innerOutputToken);
+
+ return major;
+}
+
projects / mech_eap.git / blobdiff