#include "gssapiP_eap.h"
+#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+ gss_buffer_t outputToken);
+#endif
+
/*
* Mark a context as ready for cryptographic operations
*/
static OM_uint32
-acceptReady(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred)
+acceptReadyEap(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred)
{
- OM_uint32 major;
+ OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
VALUE_PAIR *vp;
gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
return major;
- vp = rc_avpair_get(ctx->acceptorCtx.avps, PW_USER_NAME, 0);
- if (vp != NULL) {
- nameBuf.length = vp->lvalue;
- nameBuf.value = vp->strvalue;
- } else if (ctx->initiatorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
+ gssEapReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &ctx->initiatorName);
+
+ major = gssEapRadiusGetRawAvp(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.vps,
+ PW_USER_NAME, 0, &vp);
+ if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ nameBuf.length = vp->length;
+ nameBuf.value = vp->vp_strvalue;
+ } else {
ctx->gssFlags |= GSS_C_ANON_FLAG;
}
- if (nameBuf.length != 0 || ctx->initiatorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
- major = gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
- &ctx->initiatorName);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- return major;
- }
+ major = gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
+ &ctx->initiatorName);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
- ctx->initiatorName->attrCtx = gssEapCreateAttrContext(cred, ctx);
+ major = gssEapRadiusGetRawAvp(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.vps,
+ PW_MS_MPPE_SEND_KEY, VENDORPEC_MS, &vp);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_KEY_UNAVAILABLE;
+ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
- vp = rc_avpair_get(ctx->acceptorCtx.avps,
- RADIUS_VENDOR_ATTR_MS_MPPE_SEND_KEY,
- RADIUS_VENDOR_ID_MICROSOFT);
- if (ctx->encryptionType != ENCTYPE_NULL && vp != NULL) {
- major = gssEapDeriveRfc3961Key(minor,
- (unsigned char *)vp->strvalue,
- vp->lvalue,
- ctx->encryptionType,
- &ctx->rfc3961Key);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- return major;
+ major = gssEapDeriveRfc3961Key(minor,
+ vp->vp_octets,
+ vp->length,
+ ctx->encryptionType,
+ &ctx->rfc3961Key);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
- major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key,
- &ctx->checksumType);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- return major;
- } else {
- /*
- * draft-howlett-eap-gss says that integrity/confidentialty should
- * always be advertised as available, but if we have no keying
- * material it seems confusing to the caller to advertise this.
- */
- ctx->gssFlags &= ~(GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_CONF_FLAG);
- ctx->encryptionType = ENCTYPE_NULL;
- }
+ major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key,
+ &ctx->checksumType);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
major = sequenceInit(minor,
&ctx->seqState, ctx->recvSeq,
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
return major;
+ ctx->initiatorName->attrCtx = gssEapCreateAttrContext(cred, ctx);
+
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
if (inputToken != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER && inputToken->length != 0)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- assert(ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle == NULL);
+ assert(ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME);
- major = gssEapRadiusAllocHandle(minor, cred, &ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- return major;
-
- if (ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME &&
- cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL &&
- cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
- major = gss_duplicate_name(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName);
+ if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
+ major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
return major;
}
}
static OM_uint32
-importInitiatorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
- gss_buffer_t inputToken,
- gss_buffer_t nameBuf)
+setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ VALUE_PAIR **vps)
{
- OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
- struct eap_hdr *pdu = (struct eap_hdr *)inputToken->value;
- unsigned char *pos = (unsigned char *)(pdu + 1);
- gss_name_t name;
+ OM_uint32 major;
+ gss_buffer_desc nameBuf;
+ krb5_context krbContext = NULL;
+ krb5_principal krbPrinc;
+ struct rs_handle *rh = ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle;
+
+ assert(rh != NULL);
+
+ /* Awaits further specification */
+ if (ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME)
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+
+ GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
+
+ krbPrinc = ctx->acceptorName->krbPrincipal;
+ assert(krbPrinc != NULL);
- assert(pdu->code == EAP_CODE_RESPONSE);
- assert(pos[0] == EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY);
+ if (krb5_princ_size(krbContext, krbPrinc) < 2)
+ return GSS_S_BAD_NAME;
- nameBuf->value = pos + 1;
- nameBuf->length = inputToken->length - sizeof(*pdu) - 1;
+ /* Acceptor-Service-Name */
+ krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_component(krbContext, krbPrinc, 0), &nameBuf);
- major = gssEapImportName(minor, nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &name);
+ major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps,
+ PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_NAME,
+ VENDORPEC_UKERNA,
+ &nameBuf);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
return major;
- gssEapReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &ctx->initiatorName);
- ctx->initiatorName = name;
+ /* Acceptor-Host-Name */
+ krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_component(krbContext, krbPrinc, 1), &nameBuf);
+
+ major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps,
+ PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_HOST_NAME,
+ VENDORPEC_UKERNA,
+ &nameBuf);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ if (krb5_princ_size(krbContext, krbPrinc) > 2) {
+ /* Acceptor-Service-Specific */
+ krb5_principal_data ssiPrinc = *krbPrinc;
+ char *ssi;
+
+ krb5_princ_size(krbContext, &ssiPrinc) -= 2;
+ krb5_princ_name(krbContext, &ssiPrinc) += 2;
+
+ *minor = krb5_unparse_name_flags(krbContext, &ssiPrinc,
+ KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &ssi);
+ if (*minor != 0)
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+ nameBuf.value = ssi;
+ nameBuf.length = strlen(ssi);
+
+ major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps,
+ PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_SPECIFIC,
+ VENDORPEC_UKERNA,
+ &nameBuf);
+
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi);
+ return major;
+ }
+ krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi);
+ }
+
+ krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_realm(krbContext, krbPrinc), &nameBuf);
+ if (nameBuf.length != 0) {
+ /* Acceptor-Realm-Name */
+ major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps,
+ PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_REALM_NAME,
+ VENDORPEC_UKERNA,
+ &nameBuf);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+ }
+
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+createRadiusHandle(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx)
+{
+ struct gss_eap_acceptor_ctx *actx = &ctx->acceptorCtx;
+ const char *configFile = RS_CONFIG_FILE;
+ const char *configStanza = "gss-eap";
+ struct rs_alloc_scheme ralloc;
+ struct rs_error *err;
+
+ assert(actx->radHandle == NULL);
+ assert(actx->radConn == NULL);
+
+ if (rs_context_create(&actx->radHandle, RS_DICT_FILE) != 0) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_RADSEC_INIT_FAILURE;
+ return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
+ if (cred->radiusConfigFile != NULL)
+ configFile = cred->radiusConfigFile;
+ if (cred->radiusConfigStanza != NULL)
+ configStanza = cred->radiusConfigStanza;
+ }
+
+ ralloc.calloc = GSSEAP_CALLOC;
+ ralloc.malloc = GSSEAP_MALLOC;
+ ralloc.free = GSSEAP_FREE;
+ ralloc.realloc = GSSEAP_REALLOC;
+
+ rs_context_set_alloc_scheme(actx->radHandle, &ralloc);
+
+ if (rs_context_read_config(actx->radHandle, configFile) != 0) {
+ err = rs_err_ctx_pop(actx->radHandle);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (rs_conn_create(actx->radHandle, &actx->radConn, configStanza) != 0) {
+ err = rs_err_conn_pop(actx->radConn);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ /* XXX TODO rs_conn_select_server does not exist yet */
+#if 0
+ if (actx->radServer != NULL) {
+ if (rs_conn_select_server(actx->radConn, actx->radServer) != 0) {
+ err = rs_err_conn_pop(actx->radConn);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ *minor = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+
+fail:
+ return gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, err);
}
static OM_uint32
gss_buffer_t outputToken)
{
OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
- int code;
- VALUE_PAIR *send = NULL;
- VALUE_PAIR *received = NULL;
- rc_handle *rh = ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle;
- char msgBuffer[4096];
- struct eap_hdr *pdu;
- unsigned char *pos;
- gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-
- pdu = (struct eap_hdr *)inputToken->value;
- pos = (unsigned char *)(pdu + 1);
-
- if (inputToken->length > sizeof(*pdu) &&
- pdu->code == EAP_CODE_RESPONSE &&
- pos[0] == EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY) {
- major = importInitiatorIdentity(minor, ctx, inputToken, &nameBuf);
+ struct rs_handle *rh;
+ struct rs_connection *rconn;
+ struct rs_request *request = NULL;
+ struct rs_packet *req = NULL, *resp = NULL;
+ struct radius_packet *frreq, *frresp;
+ int sendAcceptorIdentity = 0;
+
+ if (ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle == NULL) {
+ /* May be NULL from an imported partial context */
+ major = createRadiusHandle(minor, cred, ctx);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
- major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_USER_NAME, &nameBuf);
+ sendAcceptorIdentity = 1;
+ }
+
+ rh = ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle;
+ rconn = ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn;
+
+ if (rs_packet_create_acc_request(rconn, &req, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
+ major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ frreq = rs_packet_frpkt(req);
+
+ if (sendAcceptorIdentity) {
+ major = setAcceptorIdentity(minor, ctx, &frreq->vps);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
}
- major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, inputToken);
+ major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, &frreq->vps,
+ PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, inputToken);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
- if (ctx->acceptorCtx.lastStatus == CHALLENGE_RC) {
- major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_STATE,
- &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
+ if (ctx->acceptorCtx.state.length != 0) {
+ major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, &frreq->vps, PW_STATE, 0,
+ &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
}
- code = rc_auth(rh, 0, send, &received, msgBuffer);
- switch (code) {
- case OK_RC:
- case CHALLENGE_RC:
+ if (rs_request_create(rconn, &request) != 0 ||
+ rs_request_send(request, req, &resp) != 0) {
+ major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ assert(resp != NULL);
+
+ frresp = rs_packet_frpkt(resp);
+ switch (frresp->code) {
+ case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
+ case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
break;
- case TIMEOUT_RC:
- major = GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
- break;
- case REJECT_RC:
+ case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL;
+ goto cleanup;
break;
default:
major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
+ break;
}
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
-
- ctx->acceptorCtx.lastStatus = code;
-
- major = getBufferFromAvps(minor, received, PW_EAP_MESSAGE,
- outputToken, TRUE);
- if ((major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && code != OK_RC) ||
+ major = gssEapRadiusGetAvp(minor, frresp->vps, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0,
+ outputToken, TRUE);
+ if ((major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && frresp->code != PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK) ||
GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
- if (code == CHALLENGE_RC) {
- major = getBufferFromAvps(minor, received, PW_STATE,
- &ctx->acceptorCtx.state, TRUE);
+ if (frresp->code == PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE) {
+ major = gssEapRadiusGetAvp(minor, frresp->vps, PW_STATE, 0,
+ &ctx->acceptorCtx.state, TRUE);
if (major != GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
} else {
- ctx->acceptorCtx.avps = received;
- received = NULL;
+ ctx->acceptorCtx.vps = frresp->vps;
+ frresp->vps = NULL;
+
+ rs_conn_destroy(ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn);
+ ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn = NULL;
- major = acceptReady(minor, ctx, cred);
+ major = acceptReadyEap(minor, ctx, cred);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
- ctx->state = EAP_STATE_GSS_CHANNEL_BINDINGS;
+ ctx->state = EAP_STATE_EXTENSIONS_REQ;
}
major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
cleanup:
- if (received != NULL)
- rc_avpair_free(received);
+ rs_request_destroy(request);
return major;
}
static OM_uint32
-eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings(OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
- gss_cred_id_t cred,
- gss_buffer_t inputToken,
- gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
- gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsReq(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+ gss_buffer_t outputToken)
{
OM_uint32 major;
- gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[2];
+
+ major = gssEapVerifyExtensions(minor, cred, ctx, chanBindings, inputToken);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
outputToken->length = 0;
outputToken->value = NULL;
- if (chanBindings == GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS) {
- ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
- return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
- }
-
- if (inputToken->length < 14) {
- return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- }
-
- iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA;
- iov[0].buffer.length = 0;
- iov[0].buffer.value = NULL;
+ ctx->state = EAP_STATE_EXTENSIONS_RESP;
- if (chanBindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS)
- iov[0].buffer = chanBindings->application_data;
-
- iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_HEADER;
- iov[1].buffer.length = 16;
- iov[1].buffer.value = (unsigned char *)inputToken->value - 2;
-
- assert(load_uint16_be(iov[1].buffer.value) == TOK_TYPE_GSS_CB);
+ return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
+}
- iov[2].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_TRAILER;
- iov[2].buffer.length = inputToken->length - 14;
- iov[2].buffer.value = (unsigned char *)inputToken->value + 14;
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsResp(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+ gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major;
- major = gssEapUnwrapOrVerifyMIC(minor, ctx, NULL, NULL,
- iov, 3, TOK_TYPE_GSS_CB);
- if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
- }
+ major = gssEapMakeExtensions(minor, cred, ctx, chanBindings, outputToken);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
-#if 0
- gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &iov[0].buffer);
-#endif
+ ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
- return major;
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
static OM_uint32
gss_buffer_t outputToken)
{
/* Called with already established context */
- *minor = EINVAL;
+ *minor = GSSEAP_CONTEXT_ESTABLISHED;
return GSS_S_BAD_STATUS;
}
gss_channel_bindings_t,
gss_buffer_t);
} eapGssAcceptorSm[] = {
- { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, eapGssSmAcceptIdentity },
- { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate },
- { TOK_TYPE_GSS_CB, TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings },
- { TOK_TYPE_NONE, TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmAcceptEstablished },
+ { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, eapGssSmAcceptIdentity },
+ { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate },
+ { TOK_TYPE_EXT_REQ, TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsReq },
+ { TOK_TYPE_NONE, TOK_TYPE_EXT_RESP, eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsResp },
+ { TOK_TYPE_NONE, TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmAcceptEstablished },
+#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
+ { TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH, TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH, eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth },
+#endif
};
OM_uint32
struct gss_eap_acceptor_sm *sm = NULL;
gss_buffer_desc innerInputToken = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc innerOutputToken = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ enum gss_eap_token_type tokType;
+ int initialContextToken = 0;
*minor = 0;
output_token->length = 0;
output_token->value = NULL;
- if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && !(cred->flags & CRED_FLAG_ACCEPT)) {
- return GSS_S_NO_CRED;
- }
-
if (input_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER || input_token->length == 0) {
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
return major;
+ initialContextToken = 1;
*context_handle = ctx;
}
GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&ctx->mutex);
+ /* Validate and lock credentials */
+ if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
+ GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&cred->mutex);
+
+ if ((cred->flags & CRED_FLAG_ACCEPT) == 0) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_CRED_USAGE_MISMATCH;
+ major = GSS_S_NO_CRED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
sm = &eapGssAcceptorSm[ctx->state];
major = gssEapVerifyToken(minor, ctx, input_token,
- sm->inputTokenType, &innerInputToken);
+ &tokType, &innerInputToken);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
- /* If credentials were provided, check they're usable with this mech */
if (!gssEapCredAvailable(cred, ctx->mechanismUsed)) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_WRONG_MECH;
major = GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
goto cleanup;
}
+#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
+ /*
+ * If we're built with fast reauthentication support, it's valid
+ * for an initiator to send a GSS reauthentication token as its
+ * initial context token, causing us to short-circuit the state
+ * machine and process Kerberos GSS messages instead.
+ */
+ if (tokType == TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH && initialContextToken) {
+ ctx->state = EAP_STATE_KRB_REAUTH_GSS;
+ } else
+#endif
+ if (tokType != sm->inputTokenType) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_WRONG_TOK_ID;
+ major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
do {
sm = &eapGssAcceptorSm[ctx->state];
if (!gssEapInternalizeOid(ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type))
duplicateOid(&tmpMinor, ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type);
}
- if (innerOutputToken.length != 0) {
+ if (innerOutputToken.value != NULL) {
tmpMajor = gssEapMakeToken(&tmpMinor, ctx, &innerOutputToken,
sm->outputTokenType, output_token);
if (GSS_ERROR(tmpMajor)) {
if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
if (src_name != NULL && ctx->initiatorName != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
- major = gss_duplicate_name(&tmpMinor, ctx->initiatorName, src_name);
+ major = gssEapDuplicateName(&tmpMinor, ctx->initiatorName, src_name);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
}
if (time_rec != NULL)
- gss_context_time(&tmpMinor, ctx, time_rec);
+ gssEapContextTime(&tmpMinor, ctx, time_rec);
}
assert(ctx->state == EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED || major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
cleanup:
+ if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
+ GSSEAP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&cred->mutex);
GSSEAP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ctx->mutex);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
return major;
}
+#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
+static OM_uint32
+acceptReadyKrb(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ const gss_name_t initiator,
+ const gss_OID mech,
+ OM_uint32 timeRec)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major;
+
+ major = gssEapGlueToMechName(minor, initiator, &ctx->initiatorName);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
+ major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+ }
+
+ major = gssEapReauthComplete(minor, ctx, cred, mech, timeRec);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
+
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+ gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+ gss_cred_id_t krbCred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+ gss_name_t krbInitiator = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+ gss_OID mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
+ OM_uint32 gssFlags, timeRec = GSS_C_INDEFINITE;
+
+ ctx->flags |= CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH_GSS;
+
+ if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
+ krbCred = cred->krbCred;
+
+ major = gssAcceptSecContext(minor,
+ &ctx->kerberosCtx,
+ krbCred,
+ inputToken,
+ chanBindings,
+ &krbInitiator,
+ &mech,
+ outputToken,
+ &gssFlags,
+ &timeRec,
+ NULL);
+ if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ major = acceptReadyKrb(minor, ctx, cred,
+ krbInitiator, mech, timeRec);
+ }
+
+ ctx->gssFlags = gssFlags;
+
+ gssReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &krbInitiator);
+
+ return major;
+}
+#endif /* GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH */
projects / mech_eap.git / blobdiff