Merged the hostap_2.6 updates, and the Leap of Faith work, from the hostap_update...
[mech_eap.git] / libeap / src / crypto / random.c
diff --git a/libeap/src/crypto/random.c b/libeap/src/crypto/random.c
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..3a86a93
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,439 @@
+/*
+ * Random number generator
+ * Copyright (c) 2010-2011, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+ *
+ * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
+ * See README for more details.
+ *
+ * This random number generator is used to provide additional entropy to the
+ * one provided by the operating system (os_get_random()) for session key
+ * generation. The os_get_random() output is expected to be secure and the
+ * implementation here is expected to provide only limited protection against
+ * cases where os_get_random() cannot provide strong randomness. This
+ * implementation shall not be assumed to be secure as the sole source of
+ * randomness. The random_get_bytes() function mixes in randomness from
+ * os_get_random() and as such, calls to os_get_random() can be replaced with
+ * calls to random_get_bytes() without reducing security.
+ *
+ * The design here follows partially the design used in the Linux
+ * drivers/char/random.c, but the implementation here is simpler and not as
+ * strong. This is a compromise to reduce duplicated CPU effort and to avoid
+ * extra code/memory size. As pointed out above, os_get_random() needs to be
+ * guaranteed to be secure for any of the security assumptions to hold.
+ */
+
+#include "utils/includes.h"
+#ifdef __linux__
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+
+#include "utils/common.h"
+#include "utils/eloop.h"
+#include "crypto/crypto.h"
+#include "sha1.h"
+#include "random.h"
+
+#define POOL_WORDS 32
+#define POOL_WORDS_MASK (POOL_WORDS - 1)
+#define POOL_TAP1 26
+#define POOL_TAP2 20
+#define POOL_TAP3 14
+#define POOL_TAP4 7
+#define POOL_TAP5 1
+#define EXTRACT_LEN 16
+#define MIN_READY_MARK 2
+
+static u32 pool[POOL_WORDS];
+static unsigned int input_rotate = 0;
+static unsigned int pool_pos = 0;
+static u8 dummy_key[20];
+#ifdef __linux__
+static size_t dummy_key_avail = 0;
+static int random_fd = -1;
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+static unsigned int own_pool_ready = 0;
+#define RANDOM_ENTROPY_SIZE 20
+static char *random_entropy_file = NULL;
+static int random_entropy_file_read = 0;
+
+#define MIN_COLLECT_ENTROPY 1000
+static unsigned int entropy = 0;
+static unsigned int total_collected = 0;
+
+
+static void random_write_entropy(void);
+
+
+static u32 __ROL32(u32 x, u32 y)
+{
+       return (x << (y & 31)) | (x >> (32 - (y & 31)));
+}
+
+
+static void random_mix_pool(const void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+       static const u32 twist[8] = {
+               0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
+               0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278
+       };
+       const u8 *pos = buf;
+       u32 w;
+
+       wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_EXCESSIVE, "random_mix_pool", buf, len);
+
+       while (len--) {
+               w = __ROL32(*pos++, input_rotate & 31);
+               input_rotate += pool_pos ? 7 : 14;
+               pool_pos = (pool_pos - 1) & POOL_WORDS_MASK;
+               w ^= pool[pool_pos];
+               w ^= pool[(pool_pos + POOL_TAP1) & POOL_WORDS_MASK];
+               w ^= pool[(pool_pos + POOL_TAP2) & POOL_WORDS_MASK];
+               w ^= pool[(pool_pos + POOL_TAP3) & POOL_WORDS_MASK];
+               w ^= pool[(pool_pos + POOL_TAP4) & POOL_WORDS_MASK];
+               w ^= pool[(pool_pos + POOL_TAP5) & POOL_WORDS_MASK];
+               pool[pool_pos] = (w >> 3) ^ twist[w & 7];
+       }
+}
+
+
+static void random_extract(u8 *out)
+{
+       unsigned int i;
+       u8 hash[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
+       u32 *hash_ptr;
+       u32 buf[POOL_WORDS / 2];
+
+       /* First, add hash back to pool to make backtracking more difficult. */
+       hmac_sha1(dummy_key, sizeof(dummy_key), (const u8 *) pool,
+                 sizeof(pool), hash);
+       random_mix_pool(hash, sizeof(hash));
+       /* Hash half the pool to extra data */
+       for (i = 0; i < POOL_WORDS / 2; i++)
+               buf[i] = pool[(pool_pos - i) & POOL_WORDS_MASK];
+       hmac_sha1(dummy_key, sizeof(dummy_key), (const u8 *) buf,
+                 sizeof(buf), hash);
+       /*
+        * Fold the hash to further reduce any potential output pattern.
+        * Though, compromise this to reduce CPU use for the most common output
+        * length (32) and return 16 bytes from instead of only half.
+        */
+       hash_ptr = (u32 *) hash;
+       hash_ptr[0] ^= hash_ptr[4];
+       os_memcpy(out, hash, EXTRACT_LEN);
+}
+
+
+void random_add_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+       struct os_time t;
+       static unsigned int count = 0;
+
+       count++;
+       if (entropy > MIN_COLLECT_ENTROPY && (count & 0x3ff) != 0) {
+               /*
+                * No need to add more entropy at this point, so save CPU and
+                * skip the update.
+                */
+               return;
+       }
+       wpa_printf(MSG_EXCESSIVE, "Add randomness: count=%u entropy=%u",
+                  count, entropy);
+
+       os_get_time(&t);
+       wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_EXCESSIVE, "random pool",
+                       (const u8 *) pool, sizeof(pool));
+       random_mix_pool(&t, sizeof(t));
+       random_mix_pool(buf, len);
+       wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_EXCESSIVE, "random pool",
+                       (const u8 *) pool, sizeof(pool));
+       entropy++;
+       total_collected++;
+}
+
+
+int random_get_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+       int ret;
+       u8 *bytes = buf;
+       size_t left;
+
+       wpa_printf(MSG_MSGDUMP, "Get randomness: len=%u entropy=%u",
+                  (unsigned int) len, entropy);
+
+       /* Start with assumed strong randomness from OS */
+       ret = os_get_random(buf, len);
+       wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_EXCESSIVE, "random from os_get_random",
+                       buf, len);
+
+       /* Mix in additional entropy extracted from the internal pool */
+       left = len;
+       while (left) {
+               size_t siz, i;
+               u8 tmp[EXTRACT_LEN];
+               random_extract(tmp);
+               wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_EXCESSIVE, "random from internal pool",
+                               tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+               siz = left > EXTRACT_LEN ? EXTRACT_LEN : left;
+               for (i = 0; i < siz; i++)
+                       *bytes++ ^= tmp[i];
+               left -= siz;
+       }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_FIPS
+       /* Mix in additional entropy from the crypto module */
+       bytes = buf;
+       left = len;
+       while (left) {
+               size_t siz, i;
+               u8 tmp[EXTRACT_LEN];
+               if (crypto_get_random(tmp, sizeof(tmp)) < 0) {
+                       wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "random: No entropy available "
+                                  "for generating strong random bytes");
+                       return -1;
+               }
+               wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_EXCESSIVE, "random from crypto module",
+                               tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+               siz = left > EXTRACT_LEN ? EXTRACT_LEN : left;
+               for (i = 0; i < siz; i++)
+                       *bytes++ ^= tmp[i];
+               left -= siz;
+       }
+#endif /* CONFIG_FIPS */
+
+       wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_EXCESSIVE, "mixed random", buf, len);
+
+       if (entropy < len)
+               entropy = 0;
+       else
+               entropy -= len;
+
+       return ret;
+}
+
+
+int random_pool_ready(void)
+{
+#ifdef __linux__
+       int fd;
+       ssize_t res;
+
+       /*
+        * Make sure that there is reasonable entropy available before allowing
+        * some key derivation operations to proceed.
+        */
+
+       if (dummy_key_avail == sizeof(dummy_key))
+               return 1; /* Already initialized - good to continue */
+
+       /*
+        * Try to fetch some more data from the kernel high quality
+        * /dev/random. There may not be enough data available at this point,
+        * so use non-blocking read to avoid blocking the application
+        * completely.
+        */
+       fd = open("/dev/random", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
+       if (fd < 0) {
+               wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "random: Cannot open /dev/random: %s",
+                          strerror(errno));
+               return -1;
+       }
+
+       res = read(fd, dummy_key + dummy_key_avail,
+                  sizeof(dummy_key) - dummy_key_avail);
+       if (res < 0) {
+               wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "random: Cannot read from /dev/random: "
+                          "%s", strerror(errno));
+               res = 0;
+       }
+       wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "random: Got %u/%u bytes from "
+                  "/dev/random", (unsigned) res,
+                  (unsigned) (sizeof(dummy_key) - dummy_key_avail));
+       dummy_key_avail += res;
+       close(fd);
+
+       if (dummy_key_avail == sizeof(dummy_key)) {
+               if (own_pool_ready < MIN_READY_MARK)
+                       own_pool_ready = MIN_READY_MARK;
+               random_write_entropy();
+               return 1;
+       }
+
+       wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "random: Only %u/%u bytes of strong "
+                  "random data available from /dev/random",
+                  (unsigned) dummy_key_avail, (unsigned) sizeof(dummy_key));
+
+       if (own_pool_ready >= MIN_READY_MARK ||
+           total_collected + 10 * own_pool_ready > MIN_COLLECT_ENTROPY) {
+               wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "random: Allow operation to proceed "
+                          "based on internal entropy");
+               return 1;
+       }
+
+       wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "random: Not enough entropy pool available for "
+                  "secure operations");
+       return 0;
+#else /* __linux__ */
+       /* TODO: could do similar checks on non-Linux platforms */
+       return 1;
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+}
+
+
+void random_mark_pool_ready(void)
+{
+       own_pool_ready++;
+       wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "random: Mark internal entropy pool to be "
+                  "ready (count=%u/%u)", own_pool_ready, MIN_READY_MARK);
+       random_write_entropy();
+}
+
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+
+static void random_close_fd(void)
+{
+       if (random_fd >= 0) {
+               eloop_unregister_read_sock(random_fd);
+               close(random_fd);
+               random_fd = -1;
+       }
+}
+
+
+static void random_read_fd(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
+{
+       ssize_t res;
+
+       if (dummy_key_avail == sizeof(dummy_key)) {
+               random_close_fd();
+               return;
+       }
+
+       res = read(sock, dummy_key + dummy_key_avail,
+                  sizeof(dummy_key) - dummy_key_avail);
+       if (res < 0) {
+               wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "random: Cannot read from /dev/random: "
+                          "%s", strerror(errno));
+               return;
+       }
+
+       wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "random: Got %u/%u bytes from /dev/random",
+                  (unsigned) res,
+                  (unsigned) (sizeof(dummy_key) - dummy_key_avail));
+       dummy_key_avail += res;
+
+       if (dummy_key_avail == sizeof(dummy_key)) {
+               random_close_fd();
+               if (own_pool_ready < MIN_READY_MARK)
+                       own_pool_ready = MIN_READY_MARK;
+               random_write_entropy();
+       }
+}
+
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+
+
+static void random_read_entropy(void)
+{
+       char *buf;
+       size_t len;
+
+       if (!random_entropy_file)
+               return;
+
+       buf = os_readfile(random_entropy_file, &len);
+       if (buf == NULL)
+               return; /* entropy file not yet available */
+
+       if (len != 1 + RANDOM_ENTROPY_SIZE) {
+               wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "random: Invalid entropy file %s",
+                          random_entropy_file);
+               os_free(buf);
+               return;
+       }
+
+       own_pool_ready = (u8) buf[0];
+       random_add_randomness(buf + 1, RANDOM_ENTROPY_SIZE);
+       random_entropy_file_read = 1;
+       os_free(buf);
+       wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "random: Added entropy from %s "
+                  "(own_pool_ready=%u)",
+                  random_entropy_file, own_pool_ready);
+}
+
+
+static void random_write_entropy(void)
+{
+       char buf[RANDOM_ENTROPY_SIZE];
+       FILE *f;
+       u8 opr;
+       int fail = 0;
+
+       if (!random_entropy_file)
+               return;
+
+       if (random_get_bytes(buf, RANDOM_ENTROPY_SIZE) < 0)
+               return;
+
+       f = fopen(random_entropy_file, "wb");
+       if (f == NULL) {
+               wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "random: Could not open entropy file %s "
+                          "for writing", random_entropy_file);
+               return;
+       }
+
+       opr = own_pool_ready > 0xff ? 0xff : own_pool_ready;
+       if (fwrite(&opr, 1, 1, f) != 1 ||
+           fwrite(buf, RANDOM_ENTROPY_SIZE, 1, f) != 1)
+               fail = 1;
+       fclose(f);
+       if (fail) {
+               wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "random: Could not write entropy data "
+                          "to %s", random_entropy_file);
+               return;
+       }
+
+       wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "random: Updated entropy file %s "
+                  "(own_pool_ready=%u)",
+                  random_entropy_file, own_pool_ready);
+}
+
+
+void random_init(const char *entropy_file)
+{
+       os_free(random_entropy_file);
+       if (entropy_file)
+               random_entropy_file = os_strdup(entropy_file);
+       else
+               random_entropy_file = NULL;
+       random_read_entropy();
+
+#ifdef __linux__
+       if (random_fd >= 0)
+               return;
+
+       random_fd = open("/dev/random", O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
+       if (random_fd < 0) {
+               wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "random: Cannot open /dev/random: %s",
+                          strerror(errno));
+               return;
+       }
+       wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "random: Trying to read entropy from "
+                  "/dev/random");
+
+       eloop_register_read_sock(random_fd, random_read_fd, NULL, NULL);
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+
+       random_write_entropy();
+}
+
+
+void random_deinit(void)
+{
+#ifdef __linux__
+       random_close_fd();
+#endif /* __linux__ */
+       random_write_entropy();
+       os_free(random_entropy_file);
+       random_entropy_file = NULL;
+}