--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * EAP server/peer: EAP-EKE shared routines
+ * Copyright (c) 2011-2013, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+ *
+ * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
+ * See README for more details.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "crypto/aes.h"
+#include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
+#include "crypto/crypto.h"
+#include "crypto/dh_groups.h"
+#include "crypto/random.h"
+#include "crypto/sha1.h"
+#include "crypto/sha256.h"
+#include "eap_common/eap_defs.h"
+#include "eap_eke_common.h"
+
+
+static int eap_eke_dh_len(u8 group)
+{
+ switch (group) {
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_2:
+ return 128;
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_5:
+ return 192;
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_14:
+ return 256;
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_15:
+ return 384;
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_16:
+ return 512;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_dhcomp_len(u8 dhgroup, u8 encr)
+{
+ int dhlen;
+
+ dhlen = eap_eke_dh_len(dhgroup);
+ if (dhlen < 0 || encr != EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
+ return -1;
+ return AES_BLOCK_SIZE + dhlen;
+}
+
+
+static const struct dh_group * eap_eke_dh_group(u8 group)
+{
+ switch (group) {
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_2:
+ return dh_groups_get(2);
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_5:
+ return dh_groups_get(5);
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_14:
+ return dh_groups_get(14);
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_15:
+ return dh_groups_get(15);
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_16:
+ return dh_groups_get(16);
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_dh_generator(u8 group)
+{
+ switch (group) {
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_2:
+ return 5;
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_5:
+ return 31;
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_14:
+ return 11;
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_15:
+ return 5;
+ case EAP_EKE_DHGROUP_EKE_16:
+ return 5;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_pnonce_len(u8 mac)
+{
+ int mac_len;
+
+ if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA1)
+ mac_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
+ else if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA2_256)
+ mac_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
+ else
+ return -1;
+
+ return AES_BLOCK_SIZE + 16 + mac_len;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_pnonce_ps_len(u8 mac)
+{
+ int mac_len;
+
+ if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA1)
+ mac_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
+ else if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA2_256)
+ mac_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
+ else
+ return -1;
+
+ return AES_BLOCK_SIZE + 2 * 16 + mac_len;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_prf_len(u8 prf)
+{
+ if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
+ return 20;
+ if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
+ return 32;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_nonce_len(u8 prf)
+{
+ int prf_len;
+
+ prf_len = eap_eke_prf_len(prf);
+ if (prf_len < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (prf_len > 2 * 16)
+ return (prf_len + 1) / 2;
+
+ return 16;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_auth_len(u8 prf)
+{
+ switch (prf) {
+ case EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1:
+ return SHA1_MAC_LEN;
+ case EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256:
+ return SHA256_MAC_LEN;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+
+int eap_eke_dh_init(u8 group, u8 *ret_priv, u8 *ret_pub)
+{
+ int generator;
+ u8 gen;
+ const struct dh_group *dh;
+ size_t pub_len, i;
+
+ generator = eap_eke_dh_generator(group);
+ dh = eap_eke_dh_group(group);
+ if (generator < 0 || generator > 255 || !dh)
+ return -1;
+ gen = generator;
+
+ /* x = random number 2 .. p-1 */
+ if (random_get_bytes(ret_priv, dh->prime_len))
+ return -1;
+ if (os_memcmp(ret_priv, dh->prime, dh->prime_len) > 0) {
+ /* Make sure private value is smaller than prime */
+ ret_priv[0] = 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < dh->prime_len - 1; i++) {
+ if (ret_priv[i])
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i == dh->prime_len - 1 && (ret_priv[i] == 0 || ret_priv[i] == 1))
+ return -1;
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: DH private value",
+ ret_priv, dh->prime_len);
+
+ /* y = g ^ x (mod p) */
+ pub_len = dh->prime_len;
+ if (crypto_mod_exp(&gen, 1, ret_priv, dh->prime_len,
+ dh->prime, dh->prime_len, ret_pub, &pub_len) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (pub_len < dh->prime_len) {
+ size_t pad = dh->prime_len - pub_len;
+ os_memmove(ret_pub + pad, ret_pub, pub_len);
+ os_memset(ret_pub, 0, pad);
+ }
+
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: DH public value",
+ ret_pub, dh->prime_len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_prf(u8 prf, const u8 *key, size_t key_len, const u8 *data,
+ size_t data_len, const u8 *data2, size_t data2_len,
+ u8 *res)
+{
+ const u8 *addr[2];
+ size_t len[2];
+ size_t num_elem = 1;
+
+ addr[0] = data;
+ len[0] = data_len;
+ if (data2) {
+ num_elem++;
+ addr[1] = data2;
+ len[1] = data2_len;
+ }
+
+ if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
+ return hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, num_elem, addr, len, res);
+ if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
+ return hmac_sha256_vector(key, key_len, num_elem, addr, len,
+ res);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha1(const u8 *key, size_t key_len, const u8 *data,
+ size_t data_len, u8 *res, size_t len)
+{
+ u8 hash[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
+ u8 idx;
+ const u8 *addr[3];
+ size_t vlen[3];
+ int ret;
+
+ idx = 0;
+ addr[0] = hash;
+ vlen[0] = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
+ addr[1] = data;
+ vlen[1] = data_len;
+ addr[2] = &idx;
+ vlen[2] = 1;
+
+ while (len > 0) {
+ idx++;
+ if (idx == 1)
+ ret = hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, 2, &addr[1],
+ &vlen[1], hash);
+ else
+ ret = hmac_sha1_vector(key, key_len, 3, addr, vlen,
+ hash);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (len > SHA1_MAC_LEN) {
+ os_memcpy(res, hash, SHA1_MAC_LEN);
+ res += SHA1_MAC_LEN;
+ len -= SHA1_MAC_LEN;
+ } else {
+ os_memcpy(res, hash, len);
+ len = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha256(const u8 *key, size_t key_len, const u8 *data,
+ size_t data_len, u8 *res, size_t len)
+{
+ u8 hash[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
+ u8 idx;
+ const u8 *addr[3];
+ size_t vlen[3];
+ int ret;
+
+ idx = 0;
+ addr[0] = hash;
+ vlen[0] = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
+ addr[1] = data;
+ vlen[1] = data_len;
+ addr[2] = &idx;
+ vlen[2] = 1;
+
+ while (len > 0) {
+ idx++;
+ if (idx == 1)
+ ret = hmac_sha256_vector(key, key_len, 2, &addr[1],
+ &vlen[1], hash);
+ else
+ ret = hmac_sha256_vector(key, key_len, 3, addr, vlen,
+ hash);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (len > SHA256_MAC_LEN) {
+ os_memcpy(res, hash, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
+ res += SHA256_MAC_LEN;
+ len -= SHA256_MAC_LEN;
+ } else {
+ os_memcpy(res, hash, len);
+ len = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_prfplus(u8 prf, const u8 *key, size_t key_len,
+ const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *res, size_t len)
+{
+ if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
+ return eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha1(key, key_len, data, data_len, res,
+ len);
+ if (prf == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
+ return eap_eke_prf_hmac_sha256(key, key_len, data, data_len,
+ res, len);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+
+int eap_eke_derive_key(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
+ const u8 *password, size_t password_len,
+ const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len, const u8 *id_p,
+ size_t id_p_len, u8 *key)
+{
+ u8 zeros[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
+ u8 temp[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
+ size_t key_len = 16; /* Only AES-128-CBC is used here */
+ u8 *id;
+
+ /* temp = prf(0+, password) */
+ os_memset(zeros, 0, sess->prf_len);
+ if (eap_eke_prf(sess->prf, zeros, sess->prf_len,
+ password, password_len, NULL, 0, temp) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: temp = prf(0+, password)",
+ temp, sess->prf_len);
+
+ /* key = prf+(temp, ID_S | ID_P) */
+ id = os_malloc(id_s_len + id_p_len);
+ if (id == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ os_memcpy(id, id_s, id_s_len);
+ os_memcpy(id + id_s_len, id_p, id_p_len);
+ wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: ID_S | ID_P",
+ id, id_s_len + id_p_len);
+ if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, temp, sess->prf_len,
+ id, id_s_len + id_p_len, key, key_len) < 0) {
+ os_free(id);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ os_free(id);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: key = prf+(temp, ID_S | ID_P)",
+ key, key_len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+int eap_eke_dhcomp(struct eap_eke_session *sess, const u8 *key, const u8 *dhpub,
+ u8 *ret_dhcomp)
+{
+ u8 pub[EAP_EKE_MAX_DH_LEN];
+ int dh_len;
+ u8 iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+ dh_len = eap_eke_dh_len(sess->dhgroup);
+ if (dh_len < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /*
+ * DHComponent = Encr(key, y)
+ *
+ * All defined DH groups use primes that have length devisible by 16, so
+ * no need to do extra padding for y (= pub).
+ */
+ if (sess->encr != EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
+ return -1;
+ if (random_get_bytes(iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
+ return -1;
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: IV for Encr(key, y)",
+ iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ os_memcpy(pub, dhpub, dh_len);
+ if (aes_128_cbc_encrypt(key, iv, pub, dh_len) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ os_memcpy(ret_dhcomp, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ os_memcpy(ret_dhcomp + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, pub, dh_len);
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: DHComponent = Encr(key, y)",
+ ret_dhcomp, AES_BLOCK_SIZE + dh_len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+int eap_eke_shared_secret(struct eap_eke_session *sess, const u8 *key,
+ const u8 *dhpriv, const u8 *peer_dhcomp)
+{
+ u8 zeros[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
+ u8 peer_pub[EAP_EKE_MAX_DH_LEN];
+ u8 modexp[EAP_EKE_MAX_DH_LEN];
+ size_t len;
+ const struct dh_group *dh;
+
+ dh = eap_eke_dh_group(sess->dhgroup);
+ if (sess->encr != EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC || !dh)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Decrypt peer DHComponent */
+ os_memcpy(peer_pub, peer_dhcomp + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, dh->prime_len);
+ if (aes_128_cbc_decrypt(key, peer_dhcomp, peer_pub, dh->prime_len) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Failed to decrypt DHComponent");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Decrypted peer DH pubkey",
+ peer_pub, dh->prime_len);
+
+ /* SharedSecret = prf(0+, g ^ (x_s * x_p) (mod p)) */
+ len = dh->prime_len;
+ if (crypto_mod_exp(peer_pub, dh->prime_len, dhpriv, dh->prime_len,
+ dh->prime, dh->prime_len, modexp, &len) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (len < dh->prime_len) {
+ size_t pad = dh->prime_len - len;
+ os_memmove(modexp + pad, modexp, len);
+ os_memset(modexp, 0, pad);
+ }
+
+ os_memset(zeros, 0, sess->auth_len);
+ if (eap_eke_prf(sess->prf, zeros, sess->auth_len, modexp, dh->prime_len,
+ NULL, 0, sess->shared_secret) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: SharedSecret",
+ sess->shared_secret, sess->auth_len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+int eap_eke_derive_ke_ki(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
+ const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len,
+ const u8 *id_p, size_t id_p_len)
+{
+ u8 buf[EAP_EKE_MAX_KE_LEN + EAP_EKE_MAX_KI_LEN];
+ size_t ke_len, ki_len;
+ u8 *data;
+ size_t data_len;
+ const char *label = "EAP-EKE Keys";
+ size_t label_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Ke | Ki = prf+(SharedSecret, "EAP-EKE Keys" | ID_S | ID_P)
+ * Ke = encryption key
+ * Ki = integrity protection key
+ * Length of each key depends on the selected algorithms.
+ */
+
+ if (sess->encr == EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
+ ke_len = 16;
+ else
+ return -1;
+
+ if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
+ ki_len = 20;
+ else if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
+ ki_len = 32;
+ else
+ return -1;
+
+ label_len = os_strlen(label);
+ data_len = label_len + id_s_len + id_p_len;
+ data = os_malloc(data_len);
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ os_memcpy(data, label, label_len);
+ os_memcpy(data + label_len, id_s, id_s_len);
+ os_memcpy(data + label_len + id_s_len, id_p, id_p_len);
+ if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, sess->shared_secret, sess->prf_len,
+ data, data_len, buf, ke_len + ki_len) < 0) {
+ os_free(data);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ os_memcpy(sess->ke, buf, ke_len);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ke", sess->ke, ke_len);
+ os_memcpy(sess->ki, buf + ke_len, ki_len);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ki", sess->ki, ki_len);
+
+ os_free(data);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+int eap_eke_derive_ka(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
+ const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len,
+ const u8 *id_p, size_t id_p_len,
+ const u8 *nonce_p, const u8 *nonce_s)
+{
+ u8 *data, *pos;
+ size_t data_len;
+ const char *label = "EAP-EKE Ka";
+ size_t label_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Ka = prf+(SharedSecret, "EAP-EKE Ka" | ID_S | ID_P | Nonce_P |
+ * Nonce_S)
+ * Ka = authentication key
+ * Length of the key depends on the selected algorithms.
+ */
+
+ label_len = os_strlen(label);
+ data_len = label_len + id_s_len + id_p_len + 2 * sess->nonce_len;
+ data = os_malloc(data_len);
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ pos = data;
+ os_memcpy(pos, label, label_len);
+ pos += label_len;
+ os_memcpy(pos, id_s, id_s_len);
+ pos += id_s_len;
+ os_memcpy(pos, id_p, id_p_len);
+ pos += id_p_len;
+ os_memcpy(pos, nonce_p, sess->nonce_len);
+ pos += sess->nonce_len;
+ os_memcpy(pos, nonce_s, sess->nonce_len);
+ if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, sess->shared_secret, sess->prf_len,
+ data, data_len, sess->ka, sess->prf_len) < 0) {
+ os_free(data);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ os_free(data);
+
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ka", sess->ka, sess->prf_len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+int eap_eke_derive_msk(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
+ const u8 *id_s, size_t id_s_len,
+ const u8 *id_p, size_t id_p_len,
+ const u8 *nonce_p, const u8 *nonce_s,
+ u8 *msk, u8 *emsk)
+{
+ u8 *data, *pos;
+ size_t data_len;
+ const char *label = "EAP-EKE Exported Keys";
+ size_t label_len;
+ u8 buf[EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN];
+
+ /*
+ * MSK | EMSK = prf+(SharedSecret, "EAP-EKE Exported Keys" | ID_S |
+ * ID_P | Nonce_P | Nonce_S)
+ */
+
+ label_len = os_strlen(label);
+ data_len = label_len + id_s_len + id_p_len + 2 * sess->nonce_len;
+ data = os_malloc(data_len);
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ pos = data;
+ os_memcpy(pos, label, label_len);
+ pos += label_len;
+ os_memcpy(pos, id_s, id_s_len);
+ pos += id_s_len;
+ os_memcpy(pos, id_p, id_p_len);
+ pos += id_p_len;
+ os_memcpy(pos, nonce_p, sess->nonce_len);
+ pos += sess->nonce_len;
+ os_memcpy(pos, nonce_s, sess->nonce_len);
+ if (eap_eke_prfplus(sess->prf, sess->shared_secret, sess->prf_len,
+ data, data_len, buf, EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN) <
+ 0) {
+ os_free(data);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ os_free(data);
+
+ os_memcpy(msk, buf, EAP_MSK_LEN);
+ os_memcpy(emsk, buf + EAP_MSK_LEN, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
+ os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: MSK", msk, EAP_MSK_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: EMSK", msk, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int eap_eke_mac(u8 mac, const u8 *key, const u8 *data, size_t data_len,
+ u8 *res)
+{
+ if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA1)
+ return hmac_sha1(key, SHA1_MAC_LEN, data, data_len, res);
+ if (mac == EAP_EKE_MAC_HMAC_SHA2_256)
+ return hmac_sha256(key, SHA256_MAC_LEN, data, data_len, res);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+
+int eap_eke_prot(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
+ const u8 *data, size_t data_len,
+ u8 *prot, size_t *prot_len)
+{
+ size_t block_size, icv_len, pad;
+ u8 *pos, *iv, *e;
+
+ if (sess->encr == EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
+ block_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ else
+ return -1;
+
+ if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
+ icv_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
+ else if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
+ icv_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
+ else
+ return -1;
+
+ pad = data_len % block_size;
+ if (pad)
+ pad = block_size - pad;
+
+ if (*prot_len < block_size + data_len + pad + icv_len) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Not enough room for Prot() data");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ pos = prot;
+
+ if (random_get_bytes(pos, block_size))
+ return -1;
+ iv = pos;
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: IV for Prot()", iv, block_size);
+ pos += block_size;
+
+ e = pos;
+ os_memcpy(pos, data, data_len);
+ pos += data_len;
+ if (pad) {
+ if (random_get_bytes(pos, pad))
+ return -1;
+ pos += pad;
+ }
+
+ if (aes_128_cbc_encrypt(sess->ke, iv, e, data_len + pad) < 0 ||
+ eap_eke_mac(sess->mac, sess->ki, e, data_len + pad, pos) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ pos += icv_len;
+
+ *prot_len = pos - prot;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+int eap_eke_decrypt_prot(struct eap_eke_session *sess,
+ const u8 *prot, size_t prot_len,
+ u8 *data, size_t *data_len)
+{
+ size_t block_size, icv_len;
+ u8 icv[EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN];
+
+ if (sess->encr == EAP_EKE_ENCR_AES128_CBC)
+ block_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ else
+ return -1;
+
+ if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA1)
+ icv_len = SHA1_MAC_LEN;
+ else if (sess->mac == EAP_EKE_PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256)
+ icv_len = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
+ else
+ return -1;
+
+ if (prot_len < 2 * block_size + icv_len ||
+ (prot_len - icv_len) % block_size)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (eap_eke_mac(sess->mac, sess->ki, prot + block_size,
+ prot_len - block_size - icv_len, icv) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ if (os_memcmp_const(icv, prot + prot_len - icv_len, icv_len) != 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: ICV mismatch in Prot() data");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (*data_len < prot_len - block_size - icv_len) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Not enough room for decrypted Prot() data");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ *data_len = prot_len - block_size - icv_len;
+ os_memcpy(data, prot + block_size, *data_len);
+ if (aes_128_cbc_decrypt(sess->ke, prot, data, *data_len) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-EKE: Failed to decrypt Prot() data");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Decrypted Prot() data",
+ data, *data_len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+int eap_eke_auth(struct eap_eke_session *sess, const char *label,
+ const struct wpabuf *msgs, u8 *auth)
+{
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Auth(%s)", label);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-EKE: Ka for Auth",
+ sess->ka, sess->auth_len);
+ wpa_hexdump_buf(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-EKE: Messages for Auth", msgs);
+ return eap_eke_prf(sess->prf, sess->ka, sess->auth_len,
+ (const u8 *) label, os_strlen(label),
+ wpabuf_head(msgs), wpabuf_len(msgs), auth);
+}
+
+
+int eap_eke_session_init(struct eap_eke_session *sess, u8 dhgroup, u8 encr,
+ u8 prf, u8 mac)
+{
+ sess->dhgroup = dhgroup;
+ sess->encr = encr;
+ sess->prf = prf;
+ sess->mac = mac;
+
+ sess->prf_len = eap_eke_prf_len(prf);
+ sess->nonce_len = eap_eke_nonce_len(prf);
+ sess->auth_len = eap_eke_auth_len(prf);
+ sess->dhcomp_len = eap_eke_dhcomp_len(sess->dhgroup, sess->encr);
+ sess->pnonce_len = eap_eke_pnonce_len(sess->mac);
+ sess->pnonce_ps_len = eap_eke_pnonce_ps_len(sess->mac);
+ if (sess->prf_len < 0 || sess->nonce_len < 0 || sess->auth_len < 0 ||
+ sess->dhcomp_len < 0 || sess->pnonce_len < 0 ||
+ sess->pnonce_ps_len < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+void eap_eke_session_clean(struct eap_eke_session *sess)
+{
+ os_memset(sess->shared_secret, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_HASH_LEN);
+ os_memset(sess->ke, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_KE_LEN);
+ os_memset(sess->ki, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_KI_LEN);
+ os_memset(sess->ka, 0, EAP_EKE_MAX_KA_LEN);
+}
projects / mech_eap.git / blobdiff