Import moonshot-gss-eap_0.9.2.orig.tar.gz
[mech_eap.git] / libeap / src / eap_common / eap_pwd_common.c
diff --git a/libeap/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c b/libeap/src/eap_common/eap_pwd_common.c
deleted file mode 100644 (file)
index 3dbe9e4..0000000
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,345 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * EAP server/peer: EAP-pwd shared routines
- * Copyright (c) 2010, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the BSD license.
- *
- * Alternatively, this software may be distributed under the terms of the
- * GNU General Public License version 2 as published by the Free Software
- * Foundation.
- *
- * See README and COPYING for more details.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-#include "common.h"
-#include "eap_defs.h"
-#include "eap_pwd_common.h"
-
-/* The random function H(x) = HMAC-SHA256(0^32, x) */
-void H_Init(HMAC_CTX *ctx)
-{
-       u8 allzero[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-
-       os_memset(allzero, 0, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-       HMAC_Init(ctx, allzero, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, EVP_sha256());
-}
-
-
-void H_Update(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const u8 *data, int len)
-{
-       HMAC_Update(ctx, data, len);
-}
-
-
-void H_Final(HMAC_CTX *ctx, u8 *digest)
-{
-       unsigned int mdlen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
-
-       HMAC_Final(ctx, digest, &mdlen);
-       HMAC_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
-}
-
-
-/* a counter-based KDF based on NIST SP800-108 */
-void eap_pwd_kdf(u8 *key, int keylen, u8 *label, int labellen,
-                u8 *result, int resultbitlen)
-{
-       HMAC_CTX hctx;
-       unsigned char digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-       u16 i, ctr, L;
-       int resultbytelen, len = 0;
-       unsigned int mdlen = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
-       unsigned char mask = 0xff;
-
-       resultbytelen = (resultbitlen + 7)/8;
-       ctr = 0;
-       L = htons(resultbitlen);
-       while (len < resultbytelen) {
-               ctr++; i = htons(ctr);
-               HMAC_Init(&hctx, key, keylen, EVP_sha256());
-               if (ctr > 1)
-                       HMAC_Update(&hctx, digest, mdlen);
-               HMAC_Update(&hctx, (u8 *) &i, sizeof(u16));
-               HMAC_Update(&hctx, label, labellen);
-               HMAC_Update(&hctx, (u8 *) &L, sizeof(u16));
-               HMAC_Final(&hctx, digest, &mdlen);
-               if ((len + (int) mdlen) > resultbytelen)
-                       os_memcpy(result + len, digest, resultbytelen - len);
-               else
-                       os_memcpy(result + len, digest, mdlen);
-               len += mdlen;
-               HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx);
-       }
-
-       /* since we're expanding to a bit length, mask off the excess */
-       if (resultbitlen % 8) {
-               mask >>= ((resultbytelen * 8) - resultbitlen);
-               result[0] &= mask;
-       }
-}
-
-
-/*
- * compute a "random" secret point on an elliptic curve based
- * on the password and identities.
- */
-int compute_password_element(EAP_PWD_group *grp, u16 num,
-                            u8 *password, int password_len,
-                            u8 *id_server, int id_server_len,
-                            u8 *id_peer, int id_peer_len, u8 *token)
-{
-       BIGNUM *x_candidate = NULL, *rnd = NULL, *cofactor = NULL;
-       HMAC_CTX ctx;
-       unsigned char pwe_digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], *prfbuf = NULL, ctr;
-       int nid, is_odd, primebitlen, primebytelen, ret = 0;
-
-       switch (num) { /* from IANA registry for IKE D-H groups */
-        case 19:
-               nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
-               break;
-        case 20:
-               nid = NID_secp384r1;
-               break;
-        case 21:
-               nid = NID_secp521r1;
-               break;
-        case 25:
-               nid = NID_X9_62_prime192v1;
-               break;
-        case 26:
-               nid = NID_secp224r1;
-               break;
-        default:
-               wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unsupported group %d", num);
-               return -1;
-       }
-
-       grp->pwe = NULL;
-       grp->order = NULL;
-       grp->prime = NULL;
-
-       if ((grp->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid)) == NULL) {
-               wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to create EC_GROUP");
-               goto fail;
-       }
-
-       if (((rnd = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-           ((cofactor = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-           ((grp->pwe = EC_POINT_new(grp->group)) == NULL) ||
-           ((grp->order = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-           ((grp->prime = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-           ((x_candidate = BN_new()) == NULL)) {
-               wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to create bignums");
-               goto fail;
-       }
-
-       if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(grp->group, grp->prime, NULL, NULL, NULL))
-       {
-               wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to get prime for GFp "
-                          "curve");
-               goto fail;
-       }
-       if (!EC_GROUP_get_order(grp->group, grp->order, NULL)) {
-               wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to get order for curve");
-               goto fail;
-       }
-       if (!EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(grp->group, cofactor, NULL)) {
-               wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to get cofactor for "
-                          "curve");
-               goto fail;
-       }
-       primebitlen = BN_num_bits(grp->prime);
-       primebytelen = BN_num_bytes(grp->prime);
-       if ((prfbuf = os_malloc(primebytelen)) == NULL) {
-               wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to malloc space for prf "
-                          "buffer");
-               goto fail;
-       }
-       os_memset(prfbuf, 0, primebytelen);
-       ctr = 0;
-       while (1) {
-               if (ctr > 10) {
-                       wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: unable to find random "
-                                  "point on curve for group %d, something's "
-                                  "fishy", num);
-                       goto fail;
-               }
-               ctr++;
-
-               /*
-                * compute counter-mode password value and stretch to prime
-                *    pwd-seed = H(token | peer-id | server-id | password |
-                *                 counter)
-                */
-               H_Init(&ctx);
-               H_Update(&ctx, token, sizeof(u32));
-               H_Update(&ctx, id_peer, id_peer_len);
-               H_Update(&ctx, id_server, id_server_len);
-               H_Update(&ctx, password, password_len);
-               H_Update(&ctx, &ctr, sizeof(ctr));
-               H_Final(&ctx, pwe_digest);
-
-               BN_bin2bn(pwe_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, rnd);
-
-               eap_pwd_kdf(pwe_digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-                           (unsigned char *) "EAP-pwd Hunting and Pecking",
-                           os_strlen("EAP-pwd Hunting and Pecking"),
-                           prfbuf, primebitlen);
-
-               BN_bin2bn(prfbuf, primebytelen, x_candidate);
-               if (BN_ucmp(x_candidate, grp->prime) >= 0)
-                       continue;
-
-               wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: x_candidate",
-                           prfbuf, primebytelen);
-
-               /*
-                * need to unambiguously identify the solution, if there is
-                * one...
-                */
-               if (BN_is_odd(rnd))
-                       is_odd = 1;
-               else
-                       is_odd = 0;
-
-               /*
-                * solve the quadratic equation, if it's not solvable then we
-                * don't have a point
-                */
-               if (!EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(grp->group,
-                                                            grp->pwe,
-                                                            x_candidate,
-                                                            is_odd, NULL))
-                       continue;
-               /*
-                * If there's a solution to the equation then the point must be
-                * on the curve so why check again explicitly? OpenSSL code
-                * says this is required by X9.62. We're not X9.62 but it can't
-                * hurt just to be sure.
-                */
-               if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(grp->group, grp->pwe, NULL)) {
-                       wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: point is not on curve");
-                       continue;
-               }
-
-               if (BN_cmp(cofactor, BN_value_one())) {
-                       /* make sure the point is not in a small sub-group */
-                       if (!EC_POINT_mul(grp->group, grp->pwe, NULL, grp->pwe,
-                                         cofactor, NULL)) {
-                               wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: cannot "
-                                          "multiply generator by order");
-                               continue;
-                       }
-                       if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(grp->group, grp->pwe)) {
-                               wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: point is at "
-                                          "infinity");
-                               continue;
-                       }
-               }
-               /* if we got here then we have a new generator. */
-               break;
-       }
-       wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: found a PWE in %d tries", ctr);
-       grp->group_num = num;
-       if (0) {
- fail:
-               EC_GROUP_free(grp->group);
-               EC_POINT_free(grp->pwe);
-               BN_free(grp->order);
-               BN_free(grp->prime);
-               os_free(grp);
-               grp = NULL;
-               ret = 1;
-       }
-       /* cleanliness and order.... */
-       BN_free(cofactor);
-       BN_free(x_candidate);
-       BN_free(rnd);
-       free(prfbuf);
-
-       return ret;
-}
-
-
-int compute_keys(EAP_PWD_group *grp, BN_CTX *bnctx, BIGNUM *k,
-                EC_POINT *server_element, EC_POINT *peer_element,
-                BIGNUM *server_scalar, BIGNUM *peer_scalar, u32 *ciphersuite,
-                u8 *msk, u8 *emsk)
-{
-       BIGNUM *scalar_sum, *x;
-       EC_POINT *element_sum;
-       HMAC_CTX ctx;
-       u8 mk[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], *cruft;
-       u8 session_id[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1];
-       u8 msk_emsk[EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN];
-       int ret = -1;
-
-       if (((cruft = os_malloc(BN_num_bytes(grp->prime))) == NULL) ||
-           ((x = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-           ((scalar_sum = BN_new()) == NULL) ||
-           ((element_sum = EC_POINT_new(grp->group)) == NULL))
-               return -1;
-
-       /*
-        * first compute the session-id = TypeCode | H(ciphersuite | scal_p |
-        *      scal_s)
-        */
-       session_id[0] = EAP_TYPE_PWD;
-       H_Init(&ctx);
-       H_Update(&ctx, (u8 *)ciphersuite, sizeof(u32));
-       BN_bn2bin(peer_scalar, cruft);
-       H_Update(&ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(grp->order));
-       BN_bn2bin(server_scalar, cruft);
-       H_Update(&ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(grp->order));
-       H_Final(&ctx, &session_id[1]);
-
-       /*
-        * then compute MK = H(k | F(elem_p + elem_s) |
-        *                     (scal_p + scal_s) mod r)
-        */
-       H_Init(&ctx);
-
-       /* k */
-       os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(grp->prime));
-       BN_bn2bin(k, cruft);
-       H_Update(&ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(grp->prime));
-
-       /* x = F(elem_p + elem_s) */
-       if ((!EC_POINT_add(grp->group, element_sum, server_element,
-                          peer_element, bnctx)) ||
-           (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(grp->group, element_sum, x,
-                                                 NULL, bnctx)))
-               goto fail;
-
-       os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(grp->prime));
-       BN_bn2bin(x, cruft);
-       H_Update(&ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(grp->prime));
-
-       /* (scal_p + scal_s) mod r */
-       BN_add(scalar_sum, server_scalar, peer_scalar);
-       BN_mod(scalar_sum, scalar_sum, grp->order, bnctx);
-       os_memset(cruft, 0, BN_num_bytes(grp->prime));
-       BN_bn2bin(scalar_sum, cruft);
-       H_Update(&ctx, cruft, BN_num_bytes(grp->order));
-       H_Final(&ctx, mk);
-
-       /* stretch the mk with the session-id to get MSK | EMSK */
-       eap_pwd_kdf(mk, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
-                   session_id, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH+1,
-                   msk_emsk, (EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN) * 8);
-
-       os_memcpy(msk, msk_emsk, EAP_MSK_LEN);
-       os_memcpy(emsk, msk_emsk + EAP_MSK_LEN, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
-
-       ret = 1;
-
-fail:
-       BN_free(x);
-       BN_free(scalar_sum);
-       EC_POINT_free(element_sum);
-       os_free(cruft);
-
-       return ret;
-}