--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * EAP peer/server: EAP-SIM/AKA/AKA' shared routines
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+ *
+ * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
+ * See README for more details.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "wpabuf.h"
+#include "crypto/aes_wrap.h"
+#include "crypto/crypto.h"
+#include "crypto/sha1.h"
+#include "crypto/sha256.h"
+#include "crypto/random.h"
+#include "eap_common/eap_defs.h"
+#include "eap_common/eap_sim_common.h"
+
+
+static int eap_sim_prf(const u8 *key, u8 *x, size_t xlen)
+{
+ return fips186_2_prf(key, EAP_SIM_MK_LEN, x, xlen);
+}
+
+
+void eap_sim_derive_mk(const u8 *identity, size_t identity_len,
+ const u8 *nonce_mt, u16 selected_version,
+ const u8 *ver_list, size_t ver_list_len,
+ int num_chal, const u8 *kc, u8 *mk)
+{
+ u8 sel_ver[2];
+ const unsigned char *addr[5];
+ size_t len[5];
+
+ addr[0] = identity;
+ len[0] = identity_len;
+ addr[1] = kc;
+ len[1] = num_chal * EAP_SIM_KC_LEN;
+ addr[2] = nonce_mt;
+ len[2] = EAP_SIM_NONCE_MT_LEN;
+ addr[3] = ver_list;
+ len[3] = ver_list_len;
+ addr[4] = sel_ver;
+ len[4] = 2;
+
+ WPA_PUT_BE16(sel_ver, selected_version);
+
+ /* MK = SHA1(Identity|n*Kc|NONCE_MT|Version List|Selected Version) */
+ sha1_vector(5, addr, len, mk);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: MK", mk, EAP_SIM_MK_LEN);
+}
+
+
+void eap_aka_derive_mk(const u8 *identity, size_t identity_len,
+ const u8 *ik, const u8 *ck, u8 *mk)
+{
+ const u8 *addr[3];
+ size_t len[3];
+
+ addr[0] = identity;
+ len[0] = identity_len;
+ addr[1] = ik;
+ len[1] = EAP_AKA_IK_LEN;
+ addr[2] = ck;
+ len[2] = EAP_AKA_CK_LEN;
+
+ /* MK = SHA1(Identity|IK|CK) */
+ sha1_vector(3, addr, len, mk);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: IK", ik, EAP_AKA_IK_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: CK", ck, EAP_AKA_CK_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: MK", mk, EAP_SIM_MK_LEN);
+}
+
+
+int eap_sim_derive_keys(const u8 *mk, u8 *k_encr, u8 *k_aut, u8 *msk, u8 *emsk)
+{
+ u8 buf[EAP_SIM_K_ENCR_LEN + EAP_SIM_K_AUT_LEN +
+ EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN], *pos;
+ if (eap_sim_prf(mk, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "EAP-SIM: Failed to derive keys");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ pos = buf;
+ os_memcpy(k_encr, pos, EAP_SIM_K_ENCR_LEN);
+ pos += EAP_SIM_K_ENCR_LEN;
+ os_memcpy(k_aut, pos, EAP_SIM_K_AUT_LEN);
+ pos += EAP_SIM_K_AUT_LEN;
+ os_memcpy(msk, pos, EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN);
+ pos += EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN;
+ os_memcpy(emsk, pos, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
+
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: K_encr",
+ k_encr, EAP_SIM_K_ENCR_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: K_aut",
+ k_aut, EAP_SIM_K_AUT_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: keying material (MSK)",
+ msk, EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: EMSK", emsk, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
+ os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+int eap_sim_derive_keys_reauth(u16 _counter,
+ const u8 *identity, size_t identity_len,
+ const u8 *nonce_s, const u8 *mk, u8 *msk,
+ u8 *emsk)
+{
+ u8 xkey[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
+ u8 buf[EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN + 32];
+ u8 counter[2];
+ const u8 *addr[4];
+ size_t len[4];
+
+ while (identity_len > 0 && identity[identity_len - 1] == 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: Workaround - drop null "
+ "character from the end of identity");
+ identity_len--;
+ }
+ addr[0] = identity;
+ len[0] = identity_len;
+ addr[1] = counter;
+ len[1] = 2;
+ addr[2] = nonce_s;
+ len[2] = EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN;
+ addr[3] = mk;
+ len[3] = EAP_SIM_MK_LEN;
+
+ WPA_PUT_BE16(counter, _counter);
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: Deriving keying data from reauth");
+ wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: Identity",
+ identity, identity_len);
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: counter", counter, 2);
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: NONCE_S", nonce_s,
+ EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: MK", mk, EAP_SIM_MK_LEN);
+
+ /* XKEY' = SHA1(Identity|counter|NONCE_S|MK) */
+ sha1_vector(4, addr, len, xkey);
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: XKEY'", xkey, SHA1_MAC_LEN);
+
+ if (eap_sim_prf(xkey, buf, sizeof(buf)) < 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "EAP-SIM: Failed to derive keys");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (msk) {
+ os_memcpy(msk, buf, EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: keying material (MSK)",
+ msk, EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN);
+ }
+ if (emsk) {
+ os_memcpy(emsk, buf + EAP_SIM_KEYING_DATA_LEN, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: EMSK", emsk, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
+ }
+ os_memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+int eap_sim_verify_mac(const u8 *k_aut, const struct wpabuf *req,
+ const u8 *mac, const u8 *extra, size_t extra_len)
+{
+ unsigned char hmac[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
+ const u8 *addr[2];
+ size_t len[2];
+ u8 *tmp;
+
+ if (mac == NULL || wpabuf_len(req) < EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN ||
+ mac < wpabuf_head_u8(req) ||
+ mac > wpabuf_head_u8(req) + wpabuf_len(req) - EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN)
+ return -1;
+
+ tmp = os_malloc(wpabuf_len(req));
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ addr[0] = tmp;
+ len[0] = wpabuf_len(req);
+ addr[1] = extra;
+ len[1] = extra_len;
+
+ /* HMAC-SHA1-128 */
+ os_memcpy(tmp, wpabuf_head(req), wpabuf_len(req));
+ os_memset(tmp + (mac - wpabuf_head_u8(req)), 0, EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-SIM: Verify MAC - msg",
+ tmp, wpabuf_len(req));
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-SIM: Verify MAC - extra data",
+ extra, extra_len);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-SIM: Verify MAC - K_aut",
+ k_aut, EAP_SIM_K_AUT_LEN);
+ hmac_sha1_vector(k_aut, EAP_SIM_K_AUT_LEN, 2, addr, len, hmac);
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-SIM: Verify MAC: MAC",
+ hmac, EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN);
+ os_free(tmp);
+
+ return (os_memcmp_const(hmac, mac, EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN) == 0) ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+
+void eap_sim_add_mac(const u8 *k_aut, const u8 *msg, size_t msg_len, u8 *mac,
+ const u8 *extra, size_t extra_len)
+{
+ unsigned char hmac[SHA1_MAC_LEN];
+ const u8 *addr[2];
+ size_t len[2];
+
+ addr[0] = msg;
+ len[0] = msg_len;
+ addr[1] = extra;
+ len[1] = extra_len;
+
+ /* HMAC-SHA1-128 */
+ os_memset(mac, 0, EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-SIM: Add MAC - msg", msg, msg_len);
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-SIM: Add MAC - extra data",
+ extra, extra_len);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-SIM: Add MAC - K_aut",
+ k_aut, EAP_SIM_K_AUT_LEN);
+ hmac_sha1_vector(k_aut, EAP_SIM_K_AUT_LEN, 2, addr, len, hmac);
+ os_memcpy(mac, hmac, EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-SIM: Add MAC: MAC",
+ mac, EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN);
+}
+
+
+#if defined(EAP_AKA_PRIME) || defined(EAP_SERVER_AKA_PRIME)
+static void prf_prime(const u8 *k, const char *seed1,
+ const u8 *seed2, size_t seed2_len,
+ const u8 *seed3, size_t seed3_len,
+ u8 *res, size_t res_len)
+{
+ const u8 *addr[5];
+ size_t len[5];
+ u8 hash[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
+ u8 iter;
+
+ /*
+ * PRF'(K,S) = T1 | T2 | T3 | T4 | ...
+ * T1 = HMAC-SHA-256 (K, S | 0x01)
+ * T2 = HMAC-SHA-256 (K, T1 | S | 0x02)
+ * T3 = HMAC-SHA-256 (K, T2 | S | 0x03)
+ * T4 = HMAC-SHA-256 (K, T3 | S | 0x04)
+ * ...
+ */
+
+ addr[0] = hash;
+ len[0] = 0;
+ addr[1] = (const u8 *) seed1;
+ len[1] = os_strlen(seed1);
+ addr[2] = seed2;
+ len[2] = seed2_len;
+ addr[3] = seed3;
+ len[3] = seed3_len;
+ addr[4] = &iter;
+ len[4] = 1;
+
+ iter = 0;
+ while (res_len) {
+ size_t hlen;
+ iter++;
+ hmac_sha256_vector(k, 32, 5, addr, len, hash);
+ len[0] = SHA256_MAC_LEN;
+ hlen = res_len > SHA256_MAC_LEN ? SHA256_MAC_LEN : res_len;
+ os_memcpy(res, hash, hlen);
+ res += hlen;
+ res_len -= hlen;
+ }
+}
+
+
+void eap_aka_prime_derive_keys(const u8 *identity, size_t identity_len,
+ const u8 *ik, const u8 *ck, u8 *k_encr,
+ u8 *k_aut, u8 *k_re, u8 *msk, u8 *emsk)
+{
+ u8 key[EAP_AKA_IK_LEN + EAP_AKA_CK_LEN];
+ u8 keys[EAP_SIM_K_ENCR_LEN + EAP_AKA_PRIME_K_AUT_LEN +
+ EAP_AKA_PRIME_K_RE_LEN + EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN];
+ u8 *pos;
+
+ /*
+ * MK = PRF'(IK'|CK',"EAP-AKA'"|Identity)
+ * K_encr = MK[0..127]
+ * K_aut = MK[128..383]
+ * K_re = MK[384..639]
+ * MSK = MK[640..1151]
+ * EMSK = MK[1152..1663]
+ */
+
+ os_memcpy(key, ik, EAP_AKA_IK_LEN);
+ os_memcpy(key + EAP_AKA_IK_LEN, ck, EAP_AKA_CK_LEN);
+
+ prf_prime(key, "EAP-AKA'", identity, identity_len, NULL, 0,
+ keys, sizeof(keys));
+
+ pos = keys;
+ os_memcpy(k_encr, pos, EAP_SIM_K_ENCR_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA': K_encr",
+ k_encr, EAP_SIM_K_ENCR_LEN);
+ pos += EAP_SIM_K_ENCR_LEN;
+
+ os_memcpy(k_aut, pos, EAP_AKA_PRIME_K_AUT_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA': K_aut",
+ k_aut, EAP_AKA_PRIME_K_AUT_LEN);
+ pos += EAP_AKA_PRIME_K_AUT_LEN;
+
+ os_memcpy(k_re, pos, EAP_AKA_PRIME_K_RE_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA': K_re",
+ k_re, EAP_AKA_PRIME_K_RE_LEN);
+ pos += EAP_AKA_PRIME_K_RE_LEN;
+
+ os_memcpy(msk, pos, EAP_MSK_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA': MSK", msk, EAP_MSK_LEN);
+ pos += EAP_MSK_LEN;
+
+ os_memcpy(emsk, pos, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA': EMSK", emsk, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
+}
+
+
+int eap_aka_prime_derive_keys_reauth(const u8 *k_re, u16 counter,
+ const u8 *identity, size_t identity_len,
+ const u8 *nonce_s, u8 *msk, u8 *emsk)
+{
+ u8 seed3[2 + EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN];
+ u8 keys[EAP_MSK_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN];
+ u8 *pos;
+
+ /*
+ * MK = PRF'(K_re,"EAP-AKA' re-auth"|Identity|counter|NONCE_S)
+ * MSK = MK[0..511]
+ * EMSK = MK[512..1023]
+ */
+
+ WPA_PUT_BE16(seed3, counter);
+ os_memcpy(seed3 + 2, nonce_s, EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN);
+
+ prf_prime(k_re, "EAP-AKA' re-auth", identity, identity_len,
+ seed3, sizeof(seed3),
+ keys, sizeof(keys));
+
+ pos = keys;
+ os_memcpy(msk, pos, EAP_MSK_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA': MSK", msk, EAP_MSK_LEN);
+ pos += EAP_MSK_LEN;
+
+ os_memcpy(emsk, pos, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA': EMSK", emsk, EAP_EMSK_LEN);
+
+ os_memset(keys, 0, sizeof(keys));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+int eap_sim_verify_mac_sha256(const u8 *k_aut, const struct wpabuf *req,
+ const u8 *mac, const u8 *extra, size_t extra_len)
+{
+ unsigned char hmac[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
+ const u8 *addr[2];
+ size_t len[2];
+ u8 *tmp;
+
+ if (mac == NULL || wpabuf_len(req) < EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN ||
+ mac < wpabuf_head_u8(req) ||
+ mac > wpabuf_head_u8(req) + wpabuf_len(req) - EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN)
+ return -1;
+
+ tmp = os_malloc(wpabuf_len(req));
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ addr[0] = tmp;
+ len[0] = wpabuf_len(req);
+ addr[1] = extra;
+ len[1] = extra_len;
+
+ /* HMAC-SHA-256-128 */
+ os_memcpy(tmp, wpabuf_head(req), wpabuf_len(req));
+ os_memset(tmp + (mac - wpabuf_head_u8(req)), 0, EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-AKA': Verify MAC - msg",
+ tmp, wpabuf_len(req));
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-AKA': Verify MAC - extra data",
+ extra, extra_len);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-AKA': Verify MAC - K_aut",
+ k_aut, EAP_AKA_PRIME_K_AUT_LEN);
+ hmac_sha256_vector(k_aut, EAP_AKA_PRIME_K_AUT_LEN, 2, addr, len, hmac);
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-AKA': Verify MAC: MAC",
+ hmac, EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN);
+ os_free(tmp);
+
+ return (os_memcmp_const(hmac, mac, EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN) == 0) ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+
+void eap_sim_add_mac_sha256(const u8 *k_aut, const u8 *msg, size_t msg_len,
+ u8 *mac, const u8 *extra, size_t extra_len)
+{
+ unsigned char hmac[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
+ const u8 *addr[2];
+ size_t len[2];
+
+ addr[0] = msg;
+ len[0] = msg_len;
+ addr[1] = extra;
+ len[1] = extra_len;
+
+ /* HMAC-SHA-256-128 */
+ os_memset(mac, 0, EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-AKA': Add MAC - msg", msg, msg_len);
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-AKA': Add MAC - extra data",
+ extra, extra_len);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-AKA': Add MAC - K_aut",
+ k_aut, EAP_AKA_PRIME_K_AUT_LEN);
+ hmac_sha256_vector(k_aut, EAP_AKA_PRIME_K_AUT_LEN, 2, addr, len, hmac);
+ os_memcpy(mac, hmac, EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-AKA': Add MAC: MAC",
+ mac, EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN);
+}
+
+
+void eap_aka_prime_derive_ck_ik_prime(u8 *ck, u8 *ik, const u8 *sqn_ak,
+ const u8 *network_name,
+ size_t network_name_len)
+{
+ u8 key[EAP_AKA_CK_LEN + EAP_AKA_IK_LEN];
+ u8 hash[SHA256_MAC_LEN];
+ const u8 *addr[5];
+ size_t len[5];
+ u8 fc;
+ u8 l0[2], l1[2];
+
+ /* 3GPP TS 33.402 V8.0.0
+ * (CK', IK') = F(CK, IK, <access network identity>)
+ */
+ /* TODO: CK', IK' generation should really be moved into the actual
+ * AKA procedure with network name passed in there and option to use
+ * AMF separation bit = 1 (3GPP TS 33.401). */
+
+ /* Change Request 33.402 CR 0033 to version 8.1.1 from
+ * 3GPP TSG-SA WG3 Meeting #53 in September 2008:
+ *
+ * CK' || IK' = HMAC-SHA-256(Key, S)
+ * S = FC || P0 || L0 || P1 || L1 || ... || Pn || Ln
+ * Key = CK || IK
+ * FC = 0x20
+ * P0 = access network identity (3GPP TS 24.302)
+ * L0 = length of acceess network identity (2 octets, big endian)
+ * P1 = SQN xor AK (if AK is not used, AK is treaded as 000..0
+ * L1 = 0x00 0x06
+ */
+
+ fc = 0x20;
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA': Derive (CK',IK') from (CK,IK)");
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA': CK", ck, EAP_AKA_CK_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA': IK", ik, EAP_AKA_IK_LEN);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA': FC = 0x%x", fc);
+ wpa_hexdump_ascii(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA': P0 = Access network identity",
+ network_name, network_name_len);
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA': P1 = SQN xor AK", sqn_ak, 6);
+
+ os_memcpy(key, ck, EAP_AKA_CK_LEN);
+ os_memcpy(key + EAP_AKA_CK_LEN, ik, EAP_AKA_IK_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA': Key = CK || IK",
+ key, sizeof(key));
+
+ addr[0] = &fc;
+ len[0] = 1;
+ addr[1] = network_name;
+ len[1] = network_name_len;
+ WPA_PUT_BE16(l0, network_name_len);
+ addr[2] = l0;
+ len[2] = 2;
+ addr[3] = sqn_ak;
+ len[3] = 6;
+ WPA_PUT_BE16(l1, 6);
+ addr[4] = l1;
+ len[4] = 2;
+
+ hmac_sha256_vector(key, sizeof(key), 5, addr, len, hash);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA': KDF output (CK' || IK')",
+ hash, sizeof(hash));
+
+ os_memcpy(ck, hash, EAP_AKA_CK_LEN);
+ os_memcpy(ik, hash + EAP_AKA_CK_LEN, EAP_AKA_IK_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA': CK'", ck, EAP_AKA_CK_LEN);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA': IK'", ik, EAP_AKA_IK_LEN);
+}
+#endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME || EAP_SERVER_AKA_PRIME */
+
+
+int eap_sim_parse_attr(const u8 *start, const u8 *end,
+ struct eap_sim_attrs *attr, int aka, int encr)
+{
+ const u8 *pos = start, *apos;
+ size_t alen, plen, i, list_len;
+
+ os_memset(attr, 0, sizeof(*attr));
+ attr->id_req = NO_ID_REQ;
+ attr->notification = -1;
+ attr->counter = -1;
+ attr->selected_version = -1;
+ attr->client_error_code = -1;
+
+ while (pos < end) {
+ if (pos + 2 > end) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Attribute overflow(1)");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ wpa_printf(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-SIM: Attribute: Type=%d Len=%d",
+ pos[0], pos[1] * 4);
+ if (pos + pos[1] * 4 > end) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Attribute overflow "
+ "(pos=%p len=%d end=%p)",
+ pos, pos[1] * 4, end);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (pos[1] == 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Attribute underflow");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ apos = pos + 2;
+ alen = pos[1] * 4 - 2;
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-SIM: Attribute data",
+ apos, alen);
+
+ switch (pos[0]) {
+ case EAP_SIM_AT_RAND:
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: AT_RAND");
+ apos += 2;
+ alen -= 2;
+ if ((!aka && (alen % GSM_RAND_LEN)) ||
+ (aka && alen != EAP_AKA_RAND_LEN)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Invalid AT_RAND"
+ " (len %lu)",
+ (unsigned long) alen);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ attr->rand = apos;
+ attr->num_chal = alen / GSM_RAND_LEN;
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_AT_AUTN:
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: AT_AUTN");
+ if (!aka) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: "
+ "Unexpected AT_AUTN");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ apos += 2;
+ alen -= 2;
+ if (alen != EAP_AKA_AUTN_LEN) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: Invalid AT_AUTN"
+ " (len %lu)",
+ (unsigned long) alen);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ attr->autn = apos;
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_AT_PADDING:
+ if (!encr) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "EAP-SIM: Unencrypted "
+ "AT_PADDING");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: (encr) AT_PADDING");
+ for (i = 2; i < alen; i++) {
+ if (apos[i] != 0) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: (encr) "
+ "AT_PADDING used a non-zero"
+ " padding byte");
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: "
+ "(encr) padding bytes",
+ apos + 2, alen - 2);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_AT_NONCE_MT:
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: AT_NONCE_MT");
+ if (alen != 2 + EAP_SIM_NONCE_MT_LEN) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Invalid "
+ "AT_NONCE_MT length");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ attr->nonce_mt = apos + 2;
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ:
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: AT_PERMANENT_ID_REQ");
+ attr->id_req = PERMANENT_ID;
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_AT_MAC:
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: AT_MAC");
+ if (alen != 2 + EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Invalid AT_MAC "
+ "length");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ attr->mac = apos + 2;
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_AT_NOTIFICATION:
+ if (alen != 2) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Invalid "
+ "AT_NOTIFICATION length %lu",
+ (unsigned long) alen);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ attr->notification = apos[0] * 256 + apos[1];
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: AT_NOTIFICATION %d",
+ attr->notification);
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_AT_ANY_ID_REQ:
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: AT_ANY_ID_REQ");
+ attr->id_req = ANY_ID;
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_AT_IDENTITY:
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: AT_IDENTITY");
+ plen = WPA_GET_BE16(apos);
+ apos += 2;
+ alen -= 2;
+ if (plen > alen) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Invalid "
+ "AT_IDENTITY (Actual Length %lu, "
+ "remaining length %lu)",
+ (unsigned long) plen,
+ (unsigned long) alen);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ attr->identity = apos;
+ attr->identity_len = plen;
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_AT_VERSION_LIST:
+ if (aka) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: "
+ "Unexpected AT_VERSION_LIST");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ list_len = apos[0] * 256 + apos[1];
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: AT_VERSION_LIST");
+ if (list_len < 2 || list_len > alen - 2) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: Invalid "
+ "AT_VERSION_LIST (list_len=%lu "
+ "attr_len=%lu)",
+ (unsigned long) list_len,
+ (unsigned long) alen);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ attr->version_list = apos + 2;
+ attr->version_list_len = list_len;
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_AT_SELECTED_VERSION:
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: AT_SELECTED_VERSION");
+ if (alen != 2) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Invalid "
+ "AT_SELECTED_VERSION length %lu",
+ (unsigned long) alen);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ attr->selected_version = apos[0] * 256 + apos[1];
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: AT_SELECTED_VERSION "
+ "%d", attr->selected_version);
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ:
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: AT_FULLAUTH_ID_REQ");
+ attr->id_req = FULLAUTH_ID;
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_AT_COUNTER:
+ if (!encr) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "EAP-SIM: Unencrypted "
+ "AT_COUNTER");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (alen != 2) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: (encr) Invalid "
+ "AT_COUNTER (alen=%lu)",
+ (unsigned long) alen);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ attr->counter = apos[0] * 256 + apos[1];
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: (encr) AT_COUNTER %d",
+ attr->counter);
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL:
+ if (!encr) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "EAP-SIM: Unencrypted "
+ "AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (alen != 2) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: (encr) Invalid "
+ "AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL (alen=%lu)",
+ (unsigned long) alen);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: (encr) "
+ "AT_COUNTER_TOO_SMALL");
+ attr->counter_too_small = 1;
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_AT_NONCE_S:
+ if (!encr) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "EAP-SIM: Unencrypted "
+ "AT_NONCE_S");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: (encr) "
+ "AT_NONCE_S");
+ if (alen != 2 + EAP_SIM_NONCE_S_LEN) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: (encr) Invalid "
+ "AT_NONCE_S (alen=%lu)",
+ (unsigned long) alen);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ attr->nonce_s = apos + 2;
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE:
+ if (alen != 2) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Invalid "
+ "AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE length %lu",
+ (unsigned long) alen);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ attr->client_error_code = apos[0] * 256 + apos[1];
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: AT_CLIENT_ERROR_CODE "
+ "%d", attr->client_error_code);
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_AT_IV:
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: AT_IV");
+ if (alen != 2 + EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Invalid AT_IV "
+ "length %lu", (unsigned long) alen);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ attr->iv = apos + 2;
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_AT_ENCR_DATA:
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: AT_ENCR_DATA");
+ attr->encr_data = apos + 2;
+ attr->encr_data_len = alen - 2;
+ if (attr->encr_data_len % 16) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Invalid "
+ "AT_ENCR_DATA length %lu",
+ (unsigned long)
+ attr->encr_data_len);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM:
+ if (!encr) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "EAP-SIM: Unencrypted "
+ "AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: (encr) "
+ "AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM");
+ plen = apos[0] * 256 + apos[1];
+ if (plen > alen - 2) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: (encr) Invalid"
+ " AT_NEXT_PSEUDONYM (actual"
+ " len %lu, attr len %lu)",
+ (unsigned long) plen,
+ (unsigned long) alen);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ attr->next_pseudonym = pos + 4;
+ attr->next_pseudonym_len = plen;
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID:
+ if (!encr) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "EAP-SIM: Unencrypted "
+ "AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: (encr) "
+ "AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID");
+ plen = apos[0] * 256 + apos[1];
+ if (plen > alen - 2) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: (encr) Invalid"
+ " AT_NEXT_REAUTH_ID (actual"
+ " len %lu, attr len %lu)",
+ (unsigned long) plen,
+ (unsigned long) alen);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ attr->next_reauth_id = pos + 4;
+ attr->next_reauth_id_len = plen;
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_AT_RES:
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: AT_RES");
+ attr->res_len_bits = WPA_GET_BE16(apos);
+ apos += 2;
+ alen -= 2;
+ if (!aka || alen < EAP_AKA_MIN_RES_LEN ||
+ alen > EAP_AKA_MAX_RES_LEN) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Invalid AT_RES "
+ "(len %lu)",
+ (unsigned long) alen);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ attr->res = apos;
+ attr->res_len = alen;
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_AT_AUTS:
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: AT_AUTS");
+ if (!aka) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: "
+ "Unexpected AT_AUTS");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (alen != EAP_AKA_AUTS_LEN) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: Invalid AT_AUTS"
+ " (len %lu)",
+ (unsigned long) alen);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ attr->auts = apos;
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_AT_CHECKCODE:
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: AT_CHECKCODE");
+ if (!aka) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: "
+ "Unexpected AT_CHECKCODE");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ apos += 2;
+ alen -= 2;
+ if (alen != 0 && alen != EAP_AKA_CHECKCODE_LEN &&
+ alen != EAP_AKA_PRIME_CHECKCODE_LEN) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: Invalid "
+ "AT_CHECKCODE (len %lu)",
+ (unsigned long) alen);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ attr->checkcode = apos;
+ attr->checkcode_len = alen;
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_AT_RESULT_IND:
+ if (encr) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "EAP-SIM: Encrypted "
+ "AT_RESULT_IND");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (alen != 2) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Invalid "
+ "AT_RESULT_IND (alen=%lu)",
+ (unsigned long) alen);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: AT_RESULT_IND");
+ attr->result_ind = 1;
+ break;
+#if defined(EAP_AKA_PRIME) || defined(EAP_SERVER_AKA_PRIME)
+ case EAP_SIM_AT_KDF_INPUT:
+ if (aka != 2) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: Unexpected "
+ "AT_KDF_INPUT");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: AT_KDF_INPUT");
+ plen = WPA_GET_BE16(apos);
+ apos += 2;
+ alen -= 2;
+ if (plen > alen) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA': Invalid "
+ "AT_KDF_INPUT (Actual Length %lu, "
+ "remaining length %lu)",
+ (unsigned long) plen,
+ (unsigned long) alen);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ attr->kdf_input = apos;
+ attr->kdf_input_len = plen;
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_AT_KDF:
+ if (aka != 2) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: Unexpected "
+ "AT_KDF");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: AT_KDF");
+ if (alen != 2) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA': Invalid "
+ "AT_KDF (len %lu)",
+ (unsigned long) alen);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (attr->kdf_count == EAP_AKA_PRIME_KDF_MAX) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA': Too many "
+ "AT_KDF attributes - ignore this");
+ break;
+ }
+ attr->kdf[attr->kdf_count] = WPA_GET_BE16(apos);
+ attr->kdf_count++;
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_AT_BIDDING:
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-AKA: AT_BIDDING");
+ if (alen != 2) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-AKA: Invalid "
+ "AT_BIDDING (len %lu)",
+ (unsigned long) alen);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ attr->bidding = apos;
+ break;
+#endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME || EAP_SERVER_AKA_PRIME */
+ default:
+ if (pos[0] < 128) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Unrecognized "
+ "non-skippable attribute %d",
+ pos[0]);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: Unrecognized skippable"
+ " attribute %d ignored", pos[0]);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ pos += pos[1] * 4;
+ }
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-SIM: Attributes parsed successfully "
+ "(aka=%d encr=%d)", aka, encr);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+u8 * eap_sim_parse_encr(const u8 *k_encr, const u8 *encr_data,
+ size_t encr_data_len, const u8 *iv,
+ struct eap_sim_attrs *attr, int aka)
+{
+ u8 *decrypted;
+
+ if (!iv) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: Encrypted data, but no IV");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ decrypted = os_malloc(encr_data_len);
+ if (decrypted == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ os_memcpy(decrypted, encr_data, encr_data_len);
+
+ if (aes_128_cbc_decrypt(k_encr, iv, decrypted, encr_data_len)) {
+ os_free(decrypted);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_MSGDUMP, "EAP-SIM: Decrypted AT_ENCR_DATA",
+ decrypted, encr_data_len);
+
+ if (eap_sim_parse_attr(decrypted, decrypted + encr_data_len, attr,
+ aka, 1)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-SIM: (encr) Failed to parse "
+ "decrypted AT_ENCR_DATA");
+ os_free(decrypted);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return decrypted;
+}
+
+
+#define EAP_SIM_INIT_LEN 128
+
+struct eap_sim_msg {
+ struct wpabuf *buf;
+ size_t mac, iv, encr; /* index from buf */
+};
+
+
+struct eap_sim_msg * eap_sim_msg_init(int code, int id, int type, int subtype)
+{
+ struct eap_sim_msg *msg;
+ struct eap_hdr *eap;
+ u8 *pos;
+
+ msg = os_zalloc(sizeof(*msg));
+ if (msg == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ msg->buf = wpabuf_alloc(EAP_SIM_INIT_LEN);
+ if (msg->buf == NULL) {
+ os_free(msg);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ eap = wpabuf_put(msg->buf, sizeof(*eap));
+ eap->code = code;
+ eap->identifier = id;
+
+ pos = wpabuf_put(msg->buf, 4);
+ *pos++ = type;
+ *pos++ = subtype;
+ *pos++ = 0; /* Reserved */
+ *pos++ = 0; /* Reserved */
+
+ return msg;
+}
+
+
+struct wpabuf * eap_sim_msg_finish(struct eap_sim_msg *msg, int type,
+ const u8 *k_aut,
+ const u8 *extra, size_t extra_len)
+{
+ struct eap_hdr *eap;
+ struct wpabuf *buf;
+
+ if (msg == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ eap = wpabuf_mhead(msg->buf);
+ eap->length = host_to_be16(wpabuf_len(msg->buf));
+
+#if defined(EAP_AKA_PRIME) || defined(EAP_SERVER_AKA_PRIME)
+ if (k_aut && msg->mac && type == EAP_TYPE_AKA_PRIME) {
+ eap_sim_add_mac_sha256(k_aut, (u8 *) wpabuf_head(msg->buf),
+ wpabuf_len(msg->buf),
+ (u8 *) wpabuf_mhead(msg->buf) +
+ msg->mac, extra, extra_len);
+ } else
+#endif /* EAP_AKA_PRIME || EAP_SERVER_AKA_PRIME */
+ if (k_aut && msg->mac) {
+ eap_sim_add_mac(k_aut, (u8 *) wpabuf_head(msg->buf),
+ wpabuf_len(msg->buf),
+ (u8 *) wpabuf_mhead(msg->buf) + msg->mac,
+ extra, extra_len);
+ }
+
+ buf = msg->buf;
+ os_free(msg);
+ return buf;
+}
+
+
+void eap_sim_msg_free(struct eap_sim_msg *msg)
+{
+ if (msg) {
+ wpabuf_free(msg->buf);
+ os_free(msg);
+ }
+}
+
+
+u8 * eap_sim_msg_add_full(struct eap_sim_msg *msg, u8 attr,
+ const u8 *data, size_t len)
+{
+ int attr_len = 2 + len;
+ int pad_len;
+ u8 *start;
+
+ if (msg == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ pad_len = (4 - attr_len % 4) % 4;
+ attr_len += pad_len;
+ if (wpabuf_resize(&msg->buf, attr_len))
+ return NULL;
+ start = wpabuf_put(msg->buf, 0);
+ wpabuf_put_u8(msg->buf, attr);
+ wpabuf_put_u8(msg->buf, attr_len / 4);
+ wpabuf_put_data(msg->buf, data, len);
+ if (pad_len)
+ os_memset(wpabuf_put(msg->buf, pad_len), 0, pad_len);
+ return start;
+}
+
+
+u8 * eap_sim_msg_add(struct eap_sim_msg *msg, u8 attr, u16 value,
+ const u8 *data, size_t len)
+{
+ int attr_len = 4 + len;
+ int pad_len;
+ u8 *start;
+
+ if (msg == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ pad_len = (4 - attr_len % 4) % 4;
+ attr_len += pad_len;
+ if (wpabuf_resize(&msg->buf, attr_len))
+ return NULL;
+ start = wpabuf_put(msg->buf, 0);
+ wpabuf_put_u8(msg->buf, attr);
+ wpabuf_put_u8(msg->buf, attr_len / 4);
+ wpabuf_put_be16(msg->buf, value);
+ if (data)
+ wpabuf_put_data(msg->buf, data, len);
+ else
+ wpabuf_put(msg->buf, len);
+ if (pad_len)
+ os_memset(wpabuf_put(msg->buf, pad_len), 0, pad_len);
+ return start;
+}
+
+
+u8 * eap_sim_msg_add_mac(struct eap_sim_msg *msg, u8 attr)
+{
+ u8 *pos = eap_sim_msg_add(msg, attr, 0, NULL, EAP_SIM_MAC_LEN);
+ if (pos)
+ msg->mac = (pos - wpabuf_head_u8(msg->buf)) + 4;
+ return pos;
+}
+
+
+int eap_sim_msg_add_encr_start(struct eap_sim_msg *msg, u8 attr_iv,
+ u8 attr_encr)
+{
+ u8 *pos = eap_sim_msg_add(msg, attr_iv, 0, NULL, EAP_SIM_IV_LEN);
+ if (pos == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ msg->iv = (pos - wpabuf_head_u8(msg->buf)) + 4;
+ if (random_get_bytes(wpabuf_mhead_u8(msg->buf) + msg->iv,
+ EAP_SIM_IV_LEN)) {
+ msg->iv = 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ pos = eap_sim_msg_add(msg, attr_encr, 0, NULL, 0);
+ if (pos == NULL) {
+ msg->iv = 0;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ msg->encr = pos - wpabuf_head_u8(msg->buf);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+int eap_sim_msg_add_encr_end(struct eap_sim_msg *msg, u8 *k_encr, int attr_pad)
+{
+ size_t encr_len;
+
+ if (msg == NULL || k_encr == NULL || msg->iv == 0 || msg->encr == 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ encr_len = wpabuf_len(msg->buf) - msg->encr - 4;
+ if (encr_len % 16) {
+ u8 *pos;
+ int pad_len = 16 - (encr_len % 16);
+ if (pad_len < 4) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-SIM: "
+ "eap_sim_msg_add_encr_end - invalid pad_len"
+ " %d", pad_len);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " *AT_PADDING");
+ pos = eap_sim_msg_add(msg, attr_pad, 0, NULL, pad_len - 4);
+ if (pos == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ os_memset(pos + 4, 0, pad_len - 4);
+ encr_len += pad_len;
+ }
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, " (AT_ENCR_DATA data len %lu)",
+ (unsigned long) encr_len);
+ wpabuf_mhead_u8(msg->buf)[msg->encr + 1] = encr_len / 4 + 1;
+ return aes_128_cbc_encrypt(k_encr, wpabuf_head_u8(msg->buf) + msg->iv,
+ wpabuf_mhead_u8(msg->buf) + msg->encr + 4,
+ encr_len);
+}
+
+
+void eap_sim_report_notification(void *msg_ctx, int notification, int aka)
+{
+#ifndef CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG
+ const char *type = aka ? "AKA" : "SIM";
+#endif /* CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG */
+
+ switch (notification) {
+ case EAP_SIM_GENERAL_FAILURE_AFTER_AUTH:
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-%s: General failure "
+ "notification (after authentication)", type);
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_TEMPORARILY_DENIED:
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-%s: Failure notification: "
+ "User has been temporarily denied access to the "
+ "requested service", type);
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_NOT_SUBSCRIBED:
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-%s: Failure notification: "
+ "User has not subscribed to the requested service",
+ type);
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_GENERAL_FAILURE_BEFORE_AUTH:
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-%s: General failure "
+ "notification (before authentication)", type);
+ break;
+ case EAP_SIM_SUCCESS:
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-%s: Successful authentication "
+ "notification", type);
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (notification >= 32768) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-%s: Unrecognized "
+ "non-failure notification %d",
+ type, notification);
+ } else {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "EAP-%s: Unrecognized "
+ "failure notification %d",
+ type, notification);
+ }
+ }
+}
projects / mech_eap.git / blobdiff