#define MESH_AUTH_TIMEOUT 10
#define MESH_AUTH_RETRY 3
-#define MESH_AUTH_BLOCK_DURATION 3600
void mesh_auth_timer(void *eloop_ctx, void *user_data)
{
struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s = eloop_ctx;
struct sta_info *sta = user_data;
+ struct hostapd_data *hapd;
if (sta->sae->state != SAE_ACCEPTED) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "AUTH: Re-authenticate with " MACSTR
if (sta->sae_auth_retry < MESH_AUTH_RETRY) {
mesh_rsn_auth_sae_sta(wpa_s, sta);
} else {
+ hapd = wpa_s->ifmsh->bss[0];
+
if (sta->sae_auth_retry > MESH_AUTH_RETRY) {
- ap_free_sta(wpa_s->ifmsh->bss[0], sta);
+ ap_free_sta(hapd, sta);
return;
}
/* block the STA if exceeded the number of attempts */
wpa_mesh_set_plink_state(wpa_s, sta, PLINK_BLOCKED);
sta->sae->state = SAE_NOTHING;
- if (wpa_s->mesh_auth_block_duration <
- MESH_AUTH_BLOCK_DURATION)
- wpa_s->mesh_auth_block_duration += 60;
- eloop_register_timeout(wpa_s->mesh_auth_block_duration,
- 0, mesh_auth_timer, wpa_s, sta);
wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO, MESH_SAE_AUTH_BLOCKED "addr="
MACSTR " duration=%d",
MAC2STR(sta->addr),
- wpa_s->mesh_auth_block_duration);
+ hapd->conf->ap_max_inactivity);
}
sta->sae_auth_retry++;
}
}
-static int __mesh_rsn_auth_init(struct mesh_rsn *rsn, const u8 *addr)
+static int __mesh_rsn_auth_init(struct mesh_rsn *rsn, const u8 *addr,
+ enum mfp_options ieee80211w)
{
struct wpa_auth_config conf;
struct wpa_auth_callbacks cb;
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "AUTH: Initializing group state machine");
os_memset(&conf, 0, sizeof(conf));
- conf.wpa = 2;
+ conf.wpa = WPA_PROTO_RSN;
conf.wpa_key_mgmt = WPA_KEY_MGMT_SAE;
- conf.wpa_pairwise = WPA_CIPHER_CCMP;
- conf.rsn_pairwise = WPA_CIPHER_CCMP;
- conf.wpa_group = WPA_CIPHER_CCMP;
+ conf.wpa_pairwise = rsn->pairwise_cipher;
+ conf.rsn_pairwise = rsn->pairwise_cipher;
+ conf.wpa_group = rsn->group_cipher;
conf.eapol_version = 0;
conf.wpa_group_rekey = -1;
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ conf.ieee80211w = ieee80211w;
+ if (ieee80211w != NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION)
+ conf.group_mgmt_cipher = rsn->mgmt_group_cipher;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
os_memset(&cb, 0, sizeof(cb));
cb.ctx = rsn;
}
/* TODO: support rekeying */
- if (random_get_bytes(rsn->mgtk, 16) < 0) {
- wpa_deinit(rsn->auth);
+ rsn->mgtk_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(conf.wpa_group);
+ if (random_get_bytes(rsn->mgtk, rsn->mgtk_len) < 0)
return -1;
- }
+ rsn->mgtk_key_id = 1;
- /* group mgmt */
- wpa_drv_set_key(rsn->wpa_s, WPA_ALG_IGTK, NULL, 4, 1,
- seq, sizeof(seq), rsn->mgtk, sizeof(rsn->mgtk));
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ if (ieee80211w != NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION) {
+ rsn->igtk_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(conf.group_mgmt_cipher);
+ if (random_get_bytes(rsn->igtk, rsn->igtk_len) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ rsn->igtk_key_id = 4;
+
+ /* group mgmt */
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: Own TX IGTK",
+ rsn->igtk, rsn->igtk_len);
+ wpa_drv_set_key(rsn->wpa_s,
+ wpa_cipher_to_alg(rsn->mgmt_group_cipher), NULL,
+ rsn->igtk_key_id, 1,
+ seq, sizeof(seq), rsn->igtk, rsn->igtk_len);
+ }
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
/* group privacy / data frames */
- wpa_drv_set_key(rsn->wpa_s, WPA_ALG_CCMP, NULL, 1, 1,
- seq, sizeof(seq), rsn->mgtk, sizeof(rsn->mgtk));
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: Own TX MGTK",
+ rsn->mgtk, rsn->mgtk_len);
+ wpa_drv_set_key(rsn->wpa_s, wpa_cipher_to_alg(rsn->group_cipher), NULL,
+ rsn->mgtk_key_id, 1, seq, sizeof(seq),
+ rsn->mgtk, rsn->mgtk_len);
return 0;
}
static void mesh_rsn_deinit(struct mesh_rsn *rsn)
{
os_memset(rsn->mgtk, 0, sizeof(rsn->mgtk));
+ rsn->mgtk_len = 0;
+ os_memset(rsn->igtk, 0, sizeof(rsn->igtk));
+ rsn->igtk_len = 0;
if (rsn->auth)
wpa_deinit(rsn->auth);
}
if (mesh_rsn == NULL)
return NULL;
mesh_rsn->wpa_s = wpa_s;
+ mesh_rsn->pairwise_cipher = conf->pairwise_cipher;
+ mesh_rsn->group_cipher = conf->group_cipher;
+ mesh_rsn->mgmt_group_cipher = conf->mgmt_group_cipher;
- if (__mesh_rsn_auth_init(mesh_rsn, wpa_s->own_addr) < 0) {
+ if (__mesh_rsn_auth_init(mesh_rsn, wpa_s->own_addr,
+ conf->ieee80211w) < 0) {
mesh_rsn_deinit(mesh_rsn);
os_free(mesh_rsn);
return NULL;
{
struct hostapd_data *hapd = wpa_s->ifmsh->bss[0];
struct wpa_ssid *ssid = wpa_s->current_ssid;
+ struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *pmksa;
unsigned int rnd;
int ret;
return -1;
}
+ pmksa = wpa_auth_pmksa_get(hapd->wpa_auth, sta->addr);
+ if (pmksa) {
+ if (!sta->wpa_sm)
+ sta->wpa_sm = wpa_auth_sta_init(hapd->wpa_auth,
+ sta->addr, NULL);
+ if (!sta->wpa_sm) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
+ "mesh: Failed to initialize RSN state machine");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "AUTH: Mesh PMKSA cache entry found for " MACSTR
+ " - try to use PMKSA caching instead of new SAE authentication",
+ MAC2STR(sta->addr));
+ wpa_auth_pmksa_set_to_sm(pmksa, sta->wpa_sm, hapd->wpa_auth,
+ sta->sae->pmkid, sta->sae->pmk);
+ sae_accept_sta(hapd, sta);
+ sta->mesh_sae_pmksa_caching = 1;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ sta->mesh_sae_pmksa_caching = 0;
+
if (mesh_rsn_build_sae_commit(wpa_s, ssid, sta))
return -1;
"AUTH: started authentication with SAE peer: " MACSTR,
MAC2STR(sta->addr));
- wpa_supplicant_set_state(wpa_s, WPA_AUTHENTICATING);
ret = auth_sae_init_committed(hapd, sta);
if (ret)
return ret;
void mesh_rsn_get_pmkid(struct mesh_rsn *rsn, struct sta_info *sta, u8 *pmkid)
{
- /* don't expect wpa auth to cache the pmkid for now */
- rsn_pmkid(sta->sae->pmk, PMK_LEN, rsn->wpa_s->own_addr,
- sta->addr, pmkid,
- wpa_key_mgmt_sha256(wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(sta->wpa_sm)));
+ os_memcpy(pmkid, sta->sae->pmkid, SAE_PMKID_LEN);
}
{
u8 *myaddr = rsn->wpa_s->own_addr;
u8 *peer = sta->addr;
- u8 *addr1 = peer, *addr2 = myaddr;
- u8 context[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u8 *addr1, *addr2;
+ u8 context[RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 * ETH_ALEN], *ptr = context;
- /* SAE */
- RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(context, wpa_cipher_to_suite(0, WPA_CIPHER_GCMP));
+ /*
+ * AEK = KDF-Hash-256(PMK, "AEK Derivation", Selected AKM Suite ||
+ * min(localMAC, peerMAC) || max(localMAC, peerMAC))
+ */
+ /* Selected AKM Suite: SAE */
+ RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(ptr, RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_SAE);
+ ptr += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
if (os_memcmp(myaddr, peer, ETH_ALEN) < 0) {
addr1 = myaddr;
addr2 = peer;
+ } else {
+ addr1 = peer;
+ addr2 = myaddr;
}
- os_memcpy(context + 4, addr1, ETH_ALEN);
- os_memcpy(context + 10, addr2, ETH_ALEN);
+ os_memcpy(ptr, addr1, ETH_ALEN);
+ ptr += ETH_ALEN;
+ os_memcpy(ptr, addr2, ETH_ALEN);
sha256_prf(sta->sae->pmk, sizeof(sta->sae->pmk), "AEK Derivation",
context, sizeof(context), sta->aek, sizeof(sta->aek));
{
u8 *ptr;
u8 *min, *max;
- u16 min_lid, max_lid;
- size_t nonce_len = sizeof(sta->my_nonce);
- size_t lid_len = sizeof(sta->my_lid);
u8 *myaddr = wpa_s->own_addr;
u8 *peer = sta->addr;
- /* 2 nonces, 2 linkids, akm suite, 2 mac addrs */
- u8 context[64 + 4 + 4 + 12];
-
+ u8 context[2 * WPA_NONCE_LEN + 2 * 2 + RSN_SELECTOR_LEN + 2 * ETH_ALEN];
+
+ /*
+ * MTK = KDF-Hash-Length(PMK, "Temporal Key Derivation", min(localNonce,
+ * peerNonce) || max(localNonce, peerNonce) || min(localLinkID,
+ * peerLinkID) || max(localLinkID, peerLinkID) || Selected AKM Suite ||
+ * min(localMAC, peerMAC) || max(localMAC, peerMAC))
+ */
ptr = context;
- if (os_memcmp(sta->my_nonce, sta->peer_nonce, nonce_len) < 0) {
+ if (os_memcmp(sta->my_nonce, sta->peer_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) < 0) {
min = sta->my_nonce;
max = sta->peer_nonce;
} else {
min = sta->peer_nonce;
max = sta->my_nonce;
}
- os_memcpy(ptr, min, nonce_len);
- os_memcpy(ptr + nonce_len, max, nonce_len);
- ptr += 2 * nonce_len;
+ os_memcpy(ptr, min, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+ ptr += WPA_NONCE_LEN;
+ os_memcpy(ptr, max, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+ ptr += WPA_NONCE_LEN;
if (sta->my_lid < sta->peer_lid) {
- min_lid = host_to_le16(sta->my_lid);
- max_lid = host_to_le16(sta->peer_lid);
+ WPA_PUT_LE16(ptr, sta->my_lid);
+ ptr += 2;
+ WPA_PUT_LE16(ptr, sta->peer_lid);
+ ptr += 2;
} else {
- min_lid = host_to_le16(sta->peer_lid);
- max_lid = host_to_le16(sta->my_lid);
+ WPA_PUT_LE16(ptr, sta->peer_lid);
+ ptr += 2;
+ WPA_PUT_LE16(ptr, sta->my_lid);
+ ptr += 2;
}
- os_memcpy(ptr, &min_lid, lid_len);
- os_memcpy(ptr + lid_len, &max_lid, lid_len);
- ptr += 2 * lid_len;
- /* SAE */
- RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(ptr, wpa_cipher_to_suite(0, WPA_CIPHER_GCMP));
- ptr += 4;
+ /* Selected AKM Suite: SAE */
+ RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(ptr, RSN_AUTH_KEY_MGMT_SAE);
+ ptr += RSN_SELECTOR_LEN;
if (os_memcmp(myaddr, peer, ETH_ALEN) < 0) {
min = myaddr;
max = myaddr;
}
os_memcpy(ptr, min, ETH_ALEN);
- os_memcpy(ptr + ETH_ALEN, max, ETH_ALEN);
+ ptr += ETH_ALEN;
+ os_memcpy(ptr, max, ETH_ALEN);
- sha256_prf(sta->sae->pmk, sizeof(sta->sae->pmk),
+ sta->mtk_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_s->mesh_rsn->pairwise_cipher);
+ sha256_prf(sta->sae->pmk, SAE_PMK_LEN,
"Temporal Key Derivation", context, sizeof(context),
- sta->mtk, sizeof(sta->mtk));
+ sta->mtk, sta->mtk_len);
return 0;
}
void mesh_rsn_init_ampe_sta(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, struct sta_info *sta)
{
- if (random_get_bytes(sta->my_nonce, 32) < 0) {
+ if (random_get_bytes(sta->my_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "mesh: Failed to derive random nonce");
/* TODO: How to handle this more cleanly? */
}
- os_memset(sta->peer_nonce, 0, 32);
+ os_memset(sta->peer_nonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
mesh_rsn_derive_aek(wpa_s->mesh_rsn, sta);
}
{
struct ieee80211_ampe_ie *ampe;
u8 const *ie = wpabuf_head_u8(buf) + wpabuf_len(buf);
- u8 *ampe_ie = NULL, *mic_ie = NULL, *mic_payload;
+ u8 *ampe_ie, *pos, *mic_payload;
const u8 *aad[] = { rsn->wpa_s->own_addr, sta->addr, cat };
const size_t aad_len[] = { ETH_ALEN, ETH_ALEN, ie - cat };
int ret = 0;
+ size_t len;
+
+ len = sizeof(*ampe);
+ if (cat[1] == PLINK_OPEN)
+ len += rsn->mgtk_len + WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN + 4;
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ if (cat[1] == PLINK_OPEN && rsn->igtk_len)
+ len += 2 + 6 + rsn->igtk_len;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
- if (AES_BLOCK_SIZE + 2 + sizeof(*ampe) + 2 > wpabuf_tailroom(buf)) {
+ if (2 + AES_BLOCK_SIZE + 2 + len > wpabuf_tailroom(buf)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "protect frame: buffer too small");
return -EINVAL;
}
- ampe_ie = os_zalloc(2 + sizeof(*ampe));
+ ampe_ie = os_zalloc(2 + len);
if (!ampe_ie) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "protect frame: out of memory");
return -ENOMEM;
}
- mic_ie = os_zalloc(2 + AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- if (!mic_ie) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "protect frame: out of memory");
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto free;
- }
-
/* IE: AMPE */
ampe_ie[0] = WLAN_EID_AMPE;
- ampe_ie[1] = sizeof(*ampe);
+ ampe_ie[1] = len;
ampe = (struct ieee80211_ampe_ie *) (ampe_ie + 2);
RSN_SELECTOR_PUT(ampe->selected_pairwise_suite,
- wpa_cipher_to_suite(WPA_PROTO_RSN, WPA_CIPHER_CCMP));
- os_memcpy(ampe->local_nonce, sta->my_nonce, 32);
- os_memcpy(ampe->peer_nonce, sta->peer_nonce, 32);
- /* incomplete: see 13.5.4 */
+ RSN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP);
+ os_memcpy(ampe->local_nonce, sta->my_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+ os_memcpy(ampe->peer_nonce, sta->peer_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+
+ pos = (u8 *) (ampe + 1);
+ if (cat[1] != PLINK_OPEN)
+ goto skip_keys;
+
+ /* TODO: Key Replay Counter[8] optionally for
+ * Mesh Group Key Inform/Acknowledge frames */
+
/* TODO: static mgtk for now since we don't support rekeying! */
- os_memcpy(ampe->mgtk, rsn->mgtk, 16);
- /* TODO: Populate Key RSC */
- /* expire in 13 decades or so */
- os_memset(ampe->key_expiration, 0xff, 4);
+ /*
+ * GTKdata[variable]:
+ * MGTK[variable] || Key RSC[8] || GTKExpirationTime[4]
+ */
+ os_memcpy(pos, rsn->mgtk, rsn->mgtk_len);
+ pos += rsn->mgtk_len;
+ wpa_drv_get_seqnum(rsn->wpa_s, NULL, rsn->mgtk_key_id, pos);
+ pos += WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN;
+ /* Use fixed GTKExpirationTime for now */
+ WPA_PUT_LE32(pos, 0xffffffff);
+ pos += 4;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ /*
+ * IGTKdata[variable]:
+ * Key ID[2], IPN[6], IGTK[variable]
+ */
+ if (rsn->igtk_len) {
+ WPA_PUT_LE16(pos, rsn->igtk_key_id);
+ pos += 2;
+ wpa_drv_get_seqnum(rsn->wpa_s, NULL, rsn->igtk_key_id, pos);
+ pos += 6;
+ os_memcpy(pos, rsn->igtk, rsn->igtk_len);
+ }
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+
+skip_keys:
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: Plaintext AMPE element",
+ ampe_ie, 2 + len);
/* IE: MIC */
- mic_ie[0] = WLAN_EID_MIC;
- mic_ie[1] = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
- wpabuf_put_data(buf, mic_ie, 2);
+ wpabuf_put_u8(buf, WLAN_EID_MIC);
+ wpabuf_put_u8(buf, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
/* MIC field is output ciphertext */
/* encrypt after MIC */
- mic_payload = (u8 *) wpabuf_put(buf, 2 + sizeof(*ampe) +
- AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ mic_payload = wpabuf_put(buf, 2 + len + AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- if (aes_siv_encrypt(sta->aek, ampe_ie, 2 + sizeof(*ampe), 3,
+ if (aes_siv_encrypt(sta->aek, ampe_ie, 2 + len, 3,
aad, aad_len, mic_payload)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "protect frame: failed to encrypt");
ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto free;
}
-free:
os_free(ampe_ie);
- os_free(mic_ie);
return ret;
}
int mesh_rsn_process_ampe(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s, struct sta_info *sta,
struct ieee802_11_elems *elems, const u8 *cat,
+ const u8 *chosen_pmk,
const u8 *start, size_t elems_len)
{
int ret = 0;
struct ieee80211_ampe_ie *ampe;
- u8 null_nonce[32] = {};
+ u8 null_nonce[WPA_NONCE_LEN] = {};
u8 ampe_eid;
u8 ampe_ie_len;
- u8 *ampe_buf, *crypt = NULL;
+ u8 *ampe_buf, *crypt = NULL, *pos, *end;
size_t crypt_len;
const u8 *aad[] = { sta->addr, wpa_s->own_addr, cat };
const size_t aad_len[] = { ETH_ALEN, ETH_ALEN,
(elems->mic - 2) - cat };
+ size_t key_len;
+
+ if (!sta->sae) {
+ struct hostapd_data *hapd = wpa_s->ifmsh->bss[0];
+
+ if (!wpa_auth_pmksa_get(hapd->wpa_auth, sta->addr)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
+ "Mesh RSN: SAE is not prepared yet");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ mesh_rsn_auth_sae_sta(wpa_s, sta);
+ }
+
+ if (chosen_pmk && os_memcmp(chosen_pmk, sta->sae->pmkid, PMKID_LEN)) {
+ wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "Mesh RSN: Invalid PMKID (Chosen PMK did not match calculated PMKID)");
+ return -1;
+ }
if (!elems->mic || elems->mic_len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, "Mesh RSN: missing mic ie");
return -1;
crypt_len = elems_len - (elems->mic - start);
- if (crypt_len < 2) {
+ if (crypt_len < 2 + AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, "Mesh RSN: missing ampe ie");
return -1;
}
if (aes_siv_decrypt(sta->aek, crypt, crypt_len, 3,
aad, aad_len, ampe_buf)) {
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Mesh RSN: frame verification failed!");
- ret = -1;
+ ret = -2;
goto free;
}
+ crypt_len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: Decrypted AMPE element",
+ ampe_buf, crypt_len);
+
ampe_eid = *ampe_buf++;
ampe_ie_len = *ampe_buf++;
if (ampe_eid != WLAN_EID_AMPE ||
+ (size_t) 2 + ampe_ie_len > crypt_len ||
ampe_ie_len < sizeof(struct ieee80211_ampe_ie)) {
wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, "Mesh RSN: invalid ampe ie");
ret = -1;
}
ampe = (struct ieee80211_ampe_ie *) ampe_buf;
- if (os_memcmp(ampe->peer_nonce, null_nonce, 32) != 0 &&
- os_memcmp(ampe->peer_nonce, sta->my_nonce, 32) != 0) {
+ pos = (u8 *) (ampe + 1);
+ end = ampe_buf + ampe_ie_len;
+ if (os_memcmp(ampe->peer_nonce, null_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 &&
+ os_memcmp(ampe->peer_nonce, sta->my_nonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) {
wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, "Mesh RSN: invalid peer nonce");
ret = -1;
goto free;
}
os_memcpy(sta->peer_nonce, ampe->local_nonce,
sizeof(ampe->local_nonce));
- os_memcpy(sta->mgtk, ampe->mgtk, sizeof(ampe->mgtk));
- /* todo parse mgtk expiration */
+ /* TODO: Key Replay Counter[8] in Mesh Group Key Inform/Acknowledge
+ * frames */
+
+ /*
+ * GTKdata shall not be included in Mesh Peering Confirm. While the
+ * standard does not state the same about IGTKdata, that same constraint
+ * needs to apply for it. It makes no sense to include the keys in Mesh
+ * Peering Close frames either, so while the standard does not seem to
+ * have a shall statement for these, they are described without
+ * mentioning GTKdata.
+ *
+ * An earlier implementation used to add GTKdata to both Mesh Peering
+ * Open and Mesh Peering Confirm frames, so ignore the possibly present
+ * GTKdata frame without rejecting the frame as a backwards
+ * compatibility mechanism.
+ */
+ if (cat[1] != PLINK_OPEN) {
+ if (end > pos) {
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "mesh: Ignore unexpected GTKdata(etc.) fields in the end of AMPE element in Mesh Peering Confirm/Close",
+ pos, end - pos);
+ }
+ goto free;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * GTKdata[variable]:
+ * MGTK[variable] || Key RSC[8] || GTKExpirationTime[4]
+ */
+ sta->mgtk_key_id = 1; /* FIX: Where to get Key ID? */
+ key_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_s->mesh_rsn->group_cipher);
+ if ((int) key_len + WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN + 4 > end - pos) {
+ wpa_dbg(wpa_s, MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: Truncated AMPE element");
+ ret = -1;
+ goto free;
+ }
+ sta->mgtk_len = key_len;
+ os_memcpy(sta->mgtk, pos, sta->mgtk_len);
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: GTKdata - MGTK",
+ sta->mgtk, sta->mgtk_len);
+ pos += sta->mgtk_len;
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: GTKdata - MGTK - Key RSC",
+ pos, WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN);
+ os_memcpy(sta->mgtk_rsc, pos, sizeof(sta->mgtk_rsc));
+ pos += WPA_KEY_RSC_LEN;
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "mesh: GTKdata - MGTK - GTKExpirationTime: %u seconds",
+ WPA_GET_LE32(pos));
+ pos += 4;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ /*
+ * IGTKdata[variable]:
+ * Key ID[2], IPN[6], IGTK[variable]
+ */
+ key_len = wpa_cipher_key_len(wpa_s->mesh_rsn->mgmt_group_cipher);
+ if (end - pos >= (int) (2 + 6 + key_len)) {
+ sta->igtk_key_id = WPA_GET_LE16(pos);
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: IGTKdata - Key ID %u",
+ sta->igtk_key_id);
+ pos += 2;
+ os_memcpy(sta->igtk_rsc, pos, sizeof(sta->igtk_rsc));
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: IGTKdata - IPN",
+ sta->igtk_rsc, sizeof(sta->igtk_rsc));
+ pos += 6;
+ os_memcpy(sta->igtk, pos, key_len);
+ sta->igtk_len = key_len;
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "mesh: IGTKdata - IGTK",
+ sta->igtk, sta->igtk_len);
+ }
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+
free:
os_free(crypt);
return ret;
projects / mech_eap.git / blobdiff