/*
- * Copyright (c) 2010, JANET(UK)
+ * Copyright (c) 2011, JANET(UK)
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
+/*
+ * Fast reauthentication support.
+ */
+
#include "gssapiP_eap.h"
#include <dlfcn.h>
krb5_error_code
encode_krb5_ticket(const krb5_ticket *rep, krb5_data **code);
+static OM_uint32
+gssDisplayName(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_name_t name,
+ gss_buffer_t buffer,
+ gss_OID *name_type);
+
+static OM_uint32
+gssImportName(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_buffer_t buffer,
+ gss_OID name_type,
+ gss_name_t *name);
+
static krb5_error_code
getAcceptorKey(krb5_context krbContext,
gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_keytab keytab = NULL;
krb5_keytab_entry ktent = { 0 };
- krb5_kt_cursor cursor = NULL;
+ krb5_kt_cursor cursor;
*princ = NULL;
memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key));
+ memset(&cursor, 0, sizeof(cursor));
code = krb5_kt_default(krbContext, &keytab);
if (code != 0)
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else {
+ /*
+ * It's not clear that looking encrypting the ticket in the
+ * requested EAP enctype provides any value.
+ */
code = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(krbContext, keytab, &cursor);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
while ((code = krb5_kt_next_entry(krbContext, keytab,
&ktent, &cursor)) == 0) {
- if (ktent.key.enctype == ctx->encryptionType)
+ if (KRB_KEY_TYPE(KRB_KT_ENT_KEYBLOCK(&ktent)) == ctx->encryptionType)
break;
else
- krb5_free_keytab_entry_contents(krbContext, &ktent);
+ KRB_KT_ENT_FREE(krbContext, &ktent);
}
}
if (code == 0) {
*princ = ktent.principal;
- *key = ktent.key;
+ *key = *KRB_KT_ENT_KEYBLOCK(&ktent);
}
cleanup:
if (cred == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL || cred->name == GSS_C_NO_NAME)
krb5_kt_end_seq_get(krbContext, keytab, &cursor);
krb5_kt_close(krbContext, keytab);
-
if (code != 0)
- krb5_free_keytab_entry_contents(krbContext, &ktent);
+ KRB_KT_ENT_FREE(krbContext, &ktent);
return code;
}
gss_name_t initiatorName,
krb5_const_principal acceptorPrinc,
krb5_keyblock *session,
- krb5_authdata ***authdata)
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ krb5_authdata *kdcIssuedAuthData
+#else
+ krb5_authdata ***kdcIssuedAuthData
+#endif
+ )
{
OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
krb5_error_code code;
+ krb5_context krbContext;
gss_buffer_desc attrBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ krb5_authdata authDataBuf, *authData = &authDataBuf;
+ AuthorizationDataElement authDatum = { 0 };
+#else
krb5_authdata *authData[2], authDatum = { 0 };
- krb5_context krbContext;
+#endif
+
+ memset(kdcIssuedAuthData, 0, sizeof(*kdcIssuedAuthData));
GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
return major;
authDatum.ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_RADIUS_AVP;
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ authDatum.ad_data.length = attrBuf.length;
+ authDatum.ad_data.data = attrBuf.value;
+ authData->len = 1;
+ authData->val = &authDatum;
+#else
authDatum.length = attrBuf.length;
authDatum.contents = attrBuf.value;
authData[0] = &authDatum;
authData[1] = NULL;
+#endif
- code = krb5_make_authdata_kdc_issued(krbContext, session, acceptorPrinc,
- authData, authdata);
+ code = krbMakeAuthDataKdcIssued(krbContext, session, acceptorPrinc,
+ authData, kdcIssuedAuthData);
if (code != 0) {
major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
*minor = code;
return major;
}
+/*
+ * Fabricate a ticket to ourselves given a GSS EAP context.
+ */
OM_uint32
gssEapMakeReauthCreds(OM_uint32 *minor,
gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
OM_uint32 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_context krbContext = NULL;
- krb5_ticket ticket = { 0 };
krb5_keyblock session = { 0 }, acceptorKey = { 0 };
- krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_part = { 0 };
- krb5_data *ticketData = NULL, *credsData = NULL;
+ krb5_principal server = NULL;
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ Ticket ticket;
+ EncTicketPart enc_part;
+ AuthorizationData authData = { 0 };
+ krb5_crypto krbCrypto = NULL;
+ krb5_data ticketData = { 0 };
+ krb5_data encPartData = { 0 };
+ size_t len;
+#else
+ krb5_ticket ticket;
+ krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_part;
+ krb5_data *ticketData = NULL;
+#endif
+ krb5_data credsData = { 0 };
krb5_creds creds = { 0 };
krb5_auth_context authContext = NULL;
+ memset(&ticket, 0, sizeof(ticket));
+ memset(&enc_part, 0, sizeof(enc_part));
+
credBuf->length = 0;
credBuf->value = NULL;
GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
- code = getAcceptorKey(krbContext, ctx, cred,
- &ticket.server, &acceptorKey);
+ code = getAcceptorKey(krbContext, ctx, cred, &server, &acceptorKey);
if (code == KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND) {
- gss_buffer_desc emptyToken = { 0, "" };
-
- /*
- * If we can't produce the KRB-CRED message, we need to
- * return an empty (not NULL) token to the caller so we
- * don't change the number of authentication legs.
- */
- return duplicateBuffer(minor, &emptyToken, credBuf);
+ *minor = code;
+ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
} else if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
- enc_part.flags = TKT_FLG_INITIAL;
-
/*
* Generate a random session key to place in the ticket and
* sign the "KDC-Issued" authorization data element.
*/
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ ticket.realm = server->realm;
+ ticket.sname = server->name;
+
+ code = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(krbContext, ctx->encryptionType,
+ &session);
+ if (code != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ enc_part.flags.initial = 1;
+ enc_part.key = session;
+ enc_part.crealm = ctx->initiatorName->krbPrincipal->realm;
+ enc_part.cname = ctx->initiatorName->krbPrincipal->name;
+ enc_part.authtime = time(NULL);
+ enc_part.starttime = &enc_part.authtime;
+ enc_part.endtime = (ctx->expiryTime != 0)
+ ? ctx->expiryTime : KRB_TIME_FOREVER;
+ enc_part.renew_till = NULL;
+ enc_part.authorization_data = &authData;
+
+ major = freezeAttrContext(minor, ctx->initiatorName, server,
+ &session, &authData);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTicketPart, encPartData.data, encPartData.length,
+ &enc_part, &len, code);
+ if (code != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ code = krb5_crypto_init(krbContext, &acceptorKey, 0, &krbCrypto);
+ if (code != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ code = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(krbContext,
+ krbCrypto,
+ KRB5_KU_TICKET,
+ encPartData.data,
+ encPartData.length,
+ 0,
+ &ticket.enc_part);
+ if (code != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Ticket, ticketData.data, ticketData.length,
+ &ticket, &len, code);
+ if (code != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+#else
+ ticket.server = server;
+
code = krb5_c_make_random_key(krbContext, ctx->encryptionType,
&session);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
+ enc_part.flags = TKT_FLG_INITIAL;
enc_part.session = &session;
enc_part.client = ctx->initiatorName->krbPrincipal;
enc_part.times.authtime = time(NULL);
enc_part.times.starttime = enc_part.times.authtime;
- enc_part.times.endtime = ctx->expiryTime
+ enc_part.times.endtime = (ctx->expiryTime != 0)
? ctx->expiryTime
- : KRB5_INT32_MAX;
+ : KRB_TIME_FOREVER;
enc_part.times.renew_till = 0;
- major = freezeAttrContext(minor, ctx->initiatorName, ticket.server,
+ major = freezeAttrContext(minor, ctx->initiatorName, server,
&session, &enc_part.authorization_data);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
code = encode_krb5_ticket(&ticket, &ticketData);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
-
- creds.client = enc_part.client;
- creds.server = ticket.server;
+#endif /* HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION */
+
+ creds.client = ctx->initiatorName->krbPrincipal;
+ creds.server = server;
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ creds.session = session;
+ creds.times.authtime = enc_part.authtime;
+ creds.times.starttime = *enc_part.starttime;
+ creds.times.endtime = enc_part.endtime;
+ creds.times.renew_till = 0;
+ creds.flags.b = enc_part.flags;
+ creds.ticket = ticketData;
+ creds.authdata = authData;
+#else
creds.keyblock = session;
creds.times = enc_part.times;
creds.ticket_flags = enc_part.flags;
creds.ticket = *ticketData;
creds.authdata = enc_part.authorization_data;
+#endif
code = krb5_auth_con_init(krbContext, &authContext);
if (code != 0)
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
- code = krb5_mk_1cred(krbContext, authContext, &creds, &credsData, NULL);
+ code = krbMakeCred(krbContext, authContext, &creds, &credsData);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
- krbDataToGssBuffer(credsData, credBuf);
+ krbDataToGssBuffer(&credsData, credBuf);
cleanup:
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ if (krbCrypto != NULL)
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(krbContext, krbCrypto);
+ free_AuthorizationData(&authData);
+ free_EncryptedData(&ticket.enc_part);
+ krb5_data_free(&ticketData);
+ krb5_data_free(&encPartData);
+#else
+ krb5_free_authdata(krbContext, enc_part.authorization_data);
if (ticket.enc_part.ciphertext.data != NULL)
GSSEAP_FREE(ticket.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
+ krb5_free_data(krbContext, ticketData);
+#endif
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(krbContext, &session);
+ krb5_free_principal(krbContext, server);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(krbContext, &acceptorKey);
- krb5_free_data(krbContext, ticketData);
krb5_auth_con_free(krbContext, authContext);
- krb5_free_authdata(krbContext, enc_part.authorization_data);
- if (credsData != NULL)
- GSSEAP_FREE(credsData);
if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
*minor = code;
- major = code != 0 ? GSS_S_FAILURE : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ major = (code != 0) ? GSS_S_FAILURE : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
return major;
}
static int
-isTicketGrantingServiceP(krb5_context krbContext,
+isTicketGrantingServiceP(krb5_context krbContext GSSEAP_UNUSED,
krb5_const_principal principal)
{
- if (krb5_princ_size(krbContext, principal) == 2 &&
+ if (KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(principal) == 2 &&
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ strcmp(KRB_PRINC_NAME(principal)[0], "krbtgt") == 0
+#else
krb5_princ_component(krbContext, principal, 0)->length == 6 &&
memcmp(krb5_princ_component(krbContext,
- principal, 0)->data, "krbtgt", 6) == 0)
+ principal, 0)->data, "krbtgt", 6) == 0
+#endif
+ )
+ return TRUE;
+
+ return FALSE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns TRUE if the configuration variable reauth_use_ccache is
+ * set in krb5.conf for the eap_gss application and the client realm.
+ */
+static int
+reauthUseCredsCache(krb5_context krbContext,
+ krb5_principal principal)
+{
+ int reauthUseCCache;
+
+ /* if reauth_use_ccache, use default credentials cache if ticket is for us */
+ krb5_appdefault_boolean(krbContext, "eap_gss",
+ KRB_PRINC_REALM(principal),
+ "reauth_use_ccache", 0, &reauthUseCCache);
+
+ return reauthUseCCache;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Look in default credentials cache for reauthentication credentials,
+ * if policy allows.
+ */
+static OM_uint32
+getDefaultReauthCredentials(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ gss_name_t target,
+ time_t now,
+ OM_uint32 timeReq)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major = GSS_S_CRED_UNAVAIL;
+ krb5_context krbContext = NULL;
+ krb5_error_code code = 0;
+ krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+ krb5_creds match = { 0 };
+ krb5_creds creds = { 0 };
+
+ GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
+
+ assert(cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL);
+ assert(target != GSS_C_NO_NAME);
+
+ if (cred->name == GSS_C_NO_NAME ||
+ !reauthUseCredsCache(krbContext, cred->name->krbPrincipal))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ match.client = cred->name->krbPrincipal;
+ match.server = target->krbPrincipal;
+ if (timeReq != 0 && timeReq != GSS_C_INDEFINITE)
+ match.times.endtime = now + timeReq;
+
+ code = krb5_cc_default(krbContext, &ccache);
+ if (code != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ code = krb5_cc_retrieve_cred(krbContext, ccache, 0, &match, &creds);
+ if (code != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ cred->flags |= CRED_FLAG_DEFAULT_CCACHE;
+ cred->krbCredCache = ccache;
+ ccache = NULL;
+
+ major = gss_krb5_import_cred(minor, cred->krbCredCache, NULL, NULL,
+ &cred->krbCred);
+
+cleanup:
+ if (major == GSS_S_CRED_UNAVAIL)
+ *minor = code;
+
+ if (ccache != NULL)
+ krb5_cc_close(krbContext, ccache);
+ krb5_free_cred_contents(krbContext, &creds);
+
+ return major;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns TRUE if the credential handle's reauth credentials are
+ * valid or if we can use the default credentials cache. Credentials
+ * handle must be locked.
+ */
+int
+gssEapCanReauthP(gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ gss_name_t target,
+ OM_uint32 timeReq)
+{
+ time_t now, expiryReq;
+ OM_uint32 minor;
+
+ assert(cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL);
+
+ now = time(NULL);
+ expiryReq = now;
+ if (timeReq != GSS_C_INDEFINITE)
+ expiryReq += timeReq;
+
+ if (cred->krbCredCache != NULL && cred->expiryTime > expiryReq)
+ return TRUE;
+
+ if (getDefaultReauthCredentials(&minor, cred, target,
+ now, timeReq) == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
return TRUE;
return FALSE;
}
+/*
+ * Store re-authentication (Kerberos) credentials in a credential handle.
+ * Credentials handle must be locked.
+ */
OM_uint32
gssEapStoreReauthCreds(OM_uint32 *minor,
gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
gss_cred_id_t cred,
gss_buffer_t credBuf)
{
- OM_uint32 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE, code;
+ OM_uint32 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ krb5_error_code code;
krb5_context krbContext = NULL;
krb5_auth_context authContext = NULL;
krb5_data credData = { 0 };
krb5_creds **creds = NULL;
krb5_principal canonPrinc;
+ krb5_principal ccPrinc = NULL;
int i;
if (credBuf->length == 0 || cred == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
krb5_free_principal(krbContext, cred->name->krbPrincipal);
cred->name->krbPrincipal = canonPrinc;
- cred->expiryTime = creds[0]->times.endtime;
+ if (creds[0]->times.endtime == KRB_TIME_FOREVER)
+ cred->expiryTime = 0;
+ else
+ cred->expiryTime = creds[0]->times.endtime;
- code = krb5_cc_new_unique(krbContext, "MEMORY", NULL, &cred->krbCredCache);
- if (code != 0)
- goto cleanup;
+ if (cred->krbCredCache == NULL) {
+ if (reauthUseCredsCache(krbContext, creds[0]->client) &&
+ krb5_cc_default(krbContext, &cred->krbCredCache) == 0)
+ cred->flags |= CRED_FLAG_DEFAULT_CCACHE;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * If we already have an associated credentials cache, possibly from
+ * the last time we stored a reauthentication credential, then we
+ * need to clear it out and release the associated GSS credential.
+ */
+ if (cred->flags & CRED_FLAG_DEFAULT_CCACHE) {
+ krb5_cc_remove_cred(krbContext, cred->krbCredCache, 0, creds[0]);
+ } else {
+ krb5_cc_destroy(krbContext, cred->krbCredCache);
+ cred->krbCredCache = NULL;
+ }
+ gssReleaseCred(minor, &cred->krbCred);
+ }
- code = krb5_cc_initialize(krbContext, cred->krbCredCache,
- creds[0]->client);
- if (code != 0)
- goto cleanup;
+ if (cred->krbCredCache == NULL) {
+ code = krb5_cc_new_unique(krbContext, "MEMORY", NULL, &cred->krbCredCache);
+ if (code != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if ((cred->flags & CRED_FLAG_DEFAULT_CCACHE) == 0 ||
+ krb5_cc_get_principal(krbContext, cred->krbCredCache, &ccPrinc) != 0) {
+ code = krb5_cc_initialize(krbContext, cred->krbCredCache,
+ creds[0]->client);
+ if (code != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
for (i = 0; creds[i] != NULL; i++) {
krb5_creds kcred = *(creds[i]);
goto cleanup;
}
- /*
- * To turn a credentials cache into a GSS credentials handle, we
- * require the gss_krb5_import_cred() API (present in Heimdal, but
- * not shipped in MIT yet).
- */
major = gss_krb5_import_cred(minor, cred->krbCredCache, NULL, NULL,
&cred->krbCred);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
cleanup:
*minor = code;
+ krb5_free_principal(krbContext, ccPrinc);
krb5_auth_con_free(krbContext, authContext);
if (creds != NULL) {
for (i = 0; creds[i] != NULL; i++)
krb5_free_creds(krbContext, creds[i]);
+ GSSEAP_FREE(creds);
}
if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
major = *minor ? GSS_S_FAILURE : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
return major;
}
-static OM_uint32
-(*gssInitSecContextNext)(OM_uint32 *,
- gss_cred_id_t,
- gss_ctx_id_t *,
- gss_name_t,
- gss_OID,
- OM_uint32,
- OM_uint32,
- gss_channel_bindings_t,
- gss_buffer_t,
- gss_OID *,
- gss_buffer_t,
- OM_uint32 *,
- OM_uint32 *);
-
-static OM_uint32
-(*gssAcceptSecContextNext)(OM_uint32 *,
- gss_ctx_id_t *,
- gss_cred_id_t,
- gss_buffer_t,
- gss_channel_bindings_t,
- gss_name_t *,
- gss_OID *,
- gss_buffer_t,
- OM_uint32 *,
- OM_uint32 *,
- gss_cred_id_t *);
-
-static OM_uint32
-(*gssReleaseCredNext)(OM_uint32 *, gss_cred_id_t *);
-
-static OM_uint32
-(*gssReleaseNameNext)(OM_uint32 *, gss_name_t *);
-
-static OM_uint32
-(*gssInquireSecContextByOidNext)(OM_uint32 *,
- const gss_ctx_id_t,
- const gss_OID,
- gss_buffer_set_t *);
+#ifndef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+static gss_buffer_desc radiusAvpKrbAttr = {
+ sizeof("urn:authdata-radius-avp") - 1, "urn:authdata-radius-avp"
+};
+#endif
+/*
+ * Unfortunately extracting an AD-KDCIssued authorization data element
+ * is pretty implementation-dependent. It's not possible to verify the
+ * signature ourselves because the ticket session key is not exposed
+ * outside GSS. In an ideal world, all AD-KDCIssued elements would be
+ * verified by the Kerberos library and authentication would fail if
+ * verification failed. We're not quite there yet and as a result have
+ * to go through some hoops to get this to work. The alternative would
+ * be to sign the authorization data with our long-term key, but it
+ * seems a pity to compromise the design because of current implementation
+ * limitations.
+ *
+ * (Specifically, the hoops involve a libkrb5 authorisation data plugin
+ * that exposes the verified and serialised attribute context through
+ * the Kerberos GSS mechanism's naming extensions API.)
+ */
static OM_uint32
-(*gssDeleteSecContextNext)(OM_uint32 *,
- gss_ctx_id_t *,
- gss_buffer_t);
+defrostAttrContext(OM_uint32 *minor,
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ gss_ctx_id_t glueContext,
+#else
+ gss_ctx_id_t glueContext GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+#endif
+ gss_name_t glueName,
+ gss_name_t mechName)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ gss_OID_desc oid = { 0 };
+ gss_buffer_set_t authData = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
+#else
+ gss_buffer_desc authData = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ gss_buffer_desc authDataDisplay = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ int more = -1;
+ int authenticated, complete;
+#endif
-static OM_uint32
-(*gssDisplayNameNext)(OM_uint32 *,
- gss_name_t,
- gss_buffer_t,
- gss_OID *);
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ major = composeOid(minor,
+ GSS_KRB5_EXTRACT_AUTHZ_DATA_FROM_SEC_CONTEXT_X->elements,
+ GSS_KRB5_EXTRACT_AUTHZ_DATA_FROM_SEC_CONTEXT_X->length,
+ KRB5_AUTHDATA_RADIUS_AVP, &oid);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
-static OM_uint32
-(*gssImportNameNext)(OM_uint32 *,
- gss_buffer_t,
- gss_OID,
- gss_name_t *);
+ /* XXX we are assuming that this verifies AD-KDCIssued signature */
+ major = gssInquireSecContextByOid(minor, glueContext,
+ &oid, &authData);
+ if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ if (authData == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET || authData->count != 1)
+ major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ else
+ major = gssEapImportAttrContext(minor, authData->elements, mechName);
+ } else if (major == GSS_S_FAILURE && *minor == ENOENT) {
+ /* This is the equivalent of GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE for MIT attr APIs */
+ *minor = 0;
+ major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
-static OM_uint32
-(*gssStoreCredNext)(OM_uint32 *,
- const gss_cred_id_t,
- gss_cred_usage_t,
- const gss_OID,
- OM_uint32,
- OM_uint32,
- gss_OID_set *,
- gss_cred_usage_t *);
+ gss_release_buffer_set(&tmpMinor, &authData);
+ GSSEAP_FREE(oid.elements);
+#else
+ major = gssGetNameAttribute(minor, glueName, &radiusAvpKrbAttr,
+ &authenticated, &complete,
+ &authData, &authDataDisplay, &more);
+ if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ if (authenticated == 0)
+ major = GSS_S_BAD_NAME;
+ else
+ major = gssEapImportAttrContext(minor, &authData, mechName);
+ } else if (major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE) {
+ major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
-static OM_uint32
-(*gssGetNameAttributeNext)(OM_uint32 *,
- gss_name_t,
- gss_buffer_t,
- int *,
- int *,
- gss_buffer_t,
- gss_buffer_t,
- int *);
+ gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &authData);
+ gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &authDataDisplay);
+#endif /* HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION */
-#define NEXT_SYMBOL(local, global) ((local) = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, (global)))
+ return major;
+}
+/*
+ * Convert a mechanism glue to an EAP mechanism name by displaying and
+ * importing it. This also handles the RADIUS attributes.
+ */
OM_uint32
-gssEapReauthInitialize(OM_uint32 *minor)
+gssEapGlueToMechName(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_ctx_id_t glueContext,
+ gss_name_t glueName,
+ gss_name_t *pMechName)
{
- NEXT_SYMBOL(gssInitSecContextNext, "gss_init_sec_context");
- NEXT_SYMBOL(gssAcceptSecContextNext, "gss_accept_sec_context");
- NEXT_SYMBOL(gssReleaseCredNext, "gss_release_cred");
- NEXT_SYMBOL(gssReleaseNameNext, "gss_release_name");
- NEXT_SYMBOL(gssInquireSecContextByOidNext, "gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid");
- NEXT_SYMBOL(gssDeleteSecContextNext, "gss_delete_sec_context");
- NEXT_SYMBOL(gssDisplayNameNext, "gss_display_name");
- NEXT_SYMBOL(gssImportNameNext, "gss_import_name");
- NEXT_SYMBOL(gssStoreCredNext, "gss_store_cred");
- NEXT_SYMBOL(gssGetNameAttributeNext, "gss_get_name_attribute");
-
- return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-}
+ OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+ gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+
+ *pMechName = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+
+ major = gssDisplayName(minor, glueName, &nameBuf, NULL);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ major = gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
+ pMechName);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ major = defrostAttrContext(minor, glueContext, glueName, *pMechName);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+cleanup:
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+ gssReleaseName(&tmpMinor, pMechName);
+ *pMechName = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+ }
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &nameBuf);
+
+ return major;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert an EAP mechanism name to a mechanism glue name by displaying
+ * and importing it.
+ */
+OM_uint32
+gssEapMechToGlueName(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_name_t mechName,
+ gss_name_t *pGlueName)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+ gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+
+ *pGlueName = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+
+ major = gssEapDisplayName(minor, mechName, &nameBuf, NULL);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ major = gssImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
+ pGlueName);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+cleanup:
+ gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &nameBuf);
+
+ return major;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Suck out the analgous elements of a Kerberos GSS context into an EAP
+ * one so that the application doesn't know the difference.
+ */
+OM_uint32
+gssEapReauthComplete(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ const gss_OID mech,
+ OM_uint32 timeRec)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+ gss_buffer_set_t keyData = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
+ krb5_context krbContext = NULL;
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ krb5_storage *sp = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
+
+ if (!oidEqual(mech, gss_mech_krb5)) {
+ major = GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Get the raw subsession key and encryption type */
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+#define KRB_GSS_SUBKEY_COUNT 1 /* encoded session key */
+ major = gssInquireSecContextByOid(minor, ctx->kerberosCtx,
+ GSS_KRB5_GET_SUBKEY_X, &keyData);
+#else
+#define KRB_GSS_SUBKEY_COUNT 2 /* raw session key, enctype OID */
+ major = gssInquireSecContextByOid(minor, ctx->kerberosCtx,
+ GSS_C_INQ_SSPI_SESSION_KEY, &keyData);
+#endif
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ if (keyData == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET || keyData->count < KRB_GSS_SUBKEY_COUNT) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_KEY_UNAVAILABLE;
+ major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(keyData->elements[0].value,
+ keyData->elements[0].length);
+ if (sp == NULL) {
+ *minor = ENOMEM;
+ major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ *minor = krb5_ret_keyblock(sp, &ctx->rfc3961Key);
+ if (*minor != 0) {
+ major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+#else
+ {
+ gss_OID_desc oid;
+ int suffix;
+
+ oid.length = keyData->elements[1].length;
+ oid.elements = keyData->elements[1].value;
+
+ /* GSS_KRB5_SESSION_KEY_ENCTYPE_OID */
+ major = decomposeOid(minor,
+ "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x02\x04",
+ 10, &oid, &suffix);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ ctx->encryptionType = suffix;
+ }
+
+ {
+ krb5_keyblock key;
+
+ KRB_KEY_LENGTH(&key) = keyData->elements[0].length;
+ KRB_KEY_DATA(&key) = keyData->elements[0].value;
+ KRB_KEY_TYPE(&key) = ctx->encryptionType;
+
+ *minor = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(krbContext,
+ &key, &ctx->rfc3961Key);
+ if (*minor != 0) {
+ major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION */
+
+ major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key,
+ &ctx->checksumType);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ if (timeRec != GSS_C_INDEFINITE)
+ ctx->expiryTime = time(NULL) + timeRec;
+
+ /* Initialize our sequence state */
+ major = sequenceInit(minor,
+ &ctx->seqState, ctx->recvSeq,
+ ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG) != 0),
+ ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG) != 0),
+ TRUE);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+
+cleanup:
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ if (sp != NULL)
+ krb5_storage_free(sp);
+#endif
+ gss_release_buffer_set(&tmpMinor, &keyData);
+
+ return major;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The remainder of this file consists of wrappers so we can call into the
+ * mechanism glue without calling ourselves.
+ */
+static OM_uint32
+(*gssInitSecContextNext)(OM_uint32 *,
+ gss_cred_id_t,
+ gss_ctx_id_t *,
+ gss_name_t,
+ gss_OID,
+ OM_uint32,
+ OM_uint32,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t,
+ gss_buffer_t,
+ gss_OID *,
+ gss_buffer_t,
+ OM_uint32 *,
+ OM_uint32 *);
+
+static OM_uint32
+(*gssAcceptSecContextNext)(OM_uint32 *,
+ gss_ctx_id_t *,
+ gss_cred_id_t,
+ gss_buffer_t,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t,
+ gss_name_t *,
+ gss_OID *,
+ gss_buffer_t,
+ OM_uint32 *,
+ OM_uint32 *,
+ gss_cred_id_t *);
+
+static OM_uint32
+(*gssReleaseCredNext)(OM_uint32 *, gss_cred_id_t *);
+
+static OM_uint32
+(*gssReleaseNameNext)(OM_uint32 *, gss_name_t *);
+
+static OM_uint32
+(*gssInquireSecContextByOidNext)(OM_uint32 *,
+ const gss_ctx_id_t,
+ const gss_OID,
+ gss_buffer_set_t *);
+
+static OM_uint32
+(*gssDeleteSecContextNext)(OM_uint32 *,
+ gss_ctx_id_t *,
+ gss_buffer_t);
+
+static OM_uint32
+(*gssDisplayNameNext)(OM_uint32 *,
+ gss_name_t,
+ gss_buffer_t,
+ gss_OID *);
+
+static OM_uint32
+(*gssImportNameNext)(OM_uint32 *,
+ gss_buffer_t,
+ gss_OID,
+ gss_name_t *);
+
+static OM_uint32
+(*gssStoreCredNext)(OM_uint32 *,
+ const gss_cred_id_t,
+ gss_cred_usage_t,
+ const gss_OID,
+ OM_uint32,
+ OM_uint32,
+ gss_OID_set *,
+ gss_cred_usage_t *);
+
+static OM_uint32
+(*gssGetNameAttributeNext)(OM_uint32 *,
+ gss_name_t,
+ gss_buffer_t,
+ int *,
+ int *,
+ gss_buffer_t,
+ gss_buffer_t,
+ int *);
+
+#define NEXT_SYMBOL(local, global) do { \
+ ((local) = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, (global))); \
+ if ((local) == NULL) { \
+ *minor = GSSEAP_NO_MECHGLUE_SYMBOL; \
+ major = GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; \
+ /* but continue */ \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+
+OM_uint32
+gssEapReauthInitialize(OM_uint32 *minor)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+
+ NEXT_SYMBOL(gssInitSecContextNext, "gss_init_sec_context");
+ NEXT_SYMBOL(gssAcceptSecContextNext, "gss_accept_sec_context");
+ NEXT_SYMBOL(gssReleaseCredNext, "gss_release_cred");
+ NEXT_SYMBOL(gssReleaseNameNext, "gss_release_name");
+ NEXT_SYMBOL(gssInquireSecContextByOidNext, "gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid");
+ NEXT_SYMBOL(gssDeleteSecContextNext, "gss_delete_sec_context");
+ NEXT_SYMBOL(gssDisplayNameNext, "gss_display_name");
+ NEXT_SYMBOL(gssImportNameNext, "gss_import_name");
+ NEXT_SYMBOL(gssStoreCredNext, "gss_store_cred");
+#ifndef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ NEXT_SYMBOL(gssGetNameAttributeNext, "gss_get_name_attribute");
+#endif
+
+ return major;
+}
OM_uint32
gssInitSecContext(OM_uint32 *minor,
OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
OM_uint32 *time_rec)
{
- if (gssInitSecContextNext == NULL)
+ if (gssInitSecContextNext == NULL) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_NO_MECHGLUE_SYMBOL;
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
return gssInitSecContextNext(minor, cred, context_handle,
target_name, mech_type, req_flags,
OM_uint32 *time_rec,
gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle)
{
- if (gssAcceptSecContextNext == NULL)
+ if (gssAcceptSecContextNext == NULL) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_NO_MECHGLUE_SYMBOL;
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
return gssAcceptSecContextNext(minor, context_handle, cred,
input_token, input_chan_bindings,
gssReleaseCred(OM_uint32 *minor,
gss_cred_id_t *cred_handle)
{
- if (gssReleaseCredNext == NULL)
+ if (gssReleaseCredNext == NULL) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_NO_MECHGLUE_SYMBOL;
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
return gssReleaseCredNext(minor, cred_handle);
}
gssReleaseName(OM_uint32 *minor,
gss_name_t *name)
{
- if (gssReleaseName == NULL)
+ if (gssReleaseName == NULL) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_NO_MECHGLUE_SYMBOL;
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
return gssReleaseNameNext(minor, name);
}
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_buffer_t output_token)
{
- if (gssDeleteSecContextNext == NULL)
+ if (gssDeleteSecContextNext == NULL) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_NO_MECHGLUE_SYMBOL;
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
return gssDeleteSecContextNext(minor, context_handle, output_token);
}
gss_buffer_t buffer,
gss_OID *name_type)
{
- if (gssDisplayNameNext == NULL)
+ if (gssDisplayNameNext == NULL) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_NO_MECHGLUE_SYMBOL;
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
return gssDisplayNameNext(minor, name, buffer, name_type);
}
gss_OID name_type,
gss_name_t *name)
{
- if (gssImportNameNext == NULL)
+ if (gssImportNameNext == NULL) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_NO_MECHGLUE_SYMBOL;
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
return gssImportNameNext(minor, buffer, name_type, name);
}
const gss_OID desired_object,
gss_buffer_set_t *data_set)
{
- if (gssInquireSecContextByOidNext == NULL)
+ if (gssInquireSecContextByOidNext == NULL) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_NO_MECHGLUE_SYMBOL;
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
return gssInquireSecContextByOidNext(minor, context_handle,
desired_object, data_set);
gss_OID_set *elements_stored,
gss_cred_usage_t *cred_usage_stored)
{
- if (gssStoreCredNext == NULL)
+ if (gssStoreCredNext == NULL) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_NO_MECHGLUE_SYMBOL;
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
return gssStoreCredNext(minor, input_cred_handle, input_usage,
desired_mech, overwrite_cred, default_cred,
gss_buffer_t display_value,
int *more)
{
- if (gssGetNameAttributeNext == NULL)
+ if (gssGetNameAttributeNext == NULL) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_NO_MECHGLUE_SYMBOL;
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+ }
return gssGetNameAttributeNext(minor, name, attr, authenticated, complete,
value, display_value, more);
}
-
-static gss_buffer_desc radiusAvpKrbAttr = {
- sizeof("urn:authdata-radius-avp") - 1, "urn:authdata-radius-avp"
-};
-
-/*
- * Unfortunately extracting an AD-KDCIssued authorization data element
- * is pretty implementation-dependent. It's not possible to verify the
- * signature ourselves because the ticket session key is not exposed
- * outside GSS. In an ideal world, all AD-KDCIssued elements would be
- * verified by the Kerberos library and authentication would fail if
- * verification failed. We're not quite there yet and as a result have
- * to go through some hoops to get this to work. The alternative would
- * be to sign the authorization data with our long-term key, but it
- * seems a pity to compromise the design because of current implementation
- * limitations.
- *
- * (Specifically, the hoops involve a libkrb5 authorisation data plugin
- * that exposes the verified and serialised attribute context through
- * the Kerberos GSS mechanism's naming extensions API.)
- */
-static OM_uint32
-defrostAttrContext(OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_name_t glueName,
- gss_name_t mechName)
-{
- OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
- gss_buffer_desc authData = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
- gss_buffer_desc authDataDisplay = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
- int more = -1;
- int authenticated, complete;
-
- major = gssGetNameAttribute(minor, glueName, &radiusAvpKrbAttr,
- &authenticated, &complete,
- &authData, &authDataDisplay, &more);
- if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- if (authenticated == 0)
- major = GSS_S_BAD_NAME;
- else
- major = gssEapImportAttrContext(minor, &authData, mechName);
- } else if (major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE) {
- major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
- }
-
- gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &authData);
- gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &authDataDisplay);
-
- return major;
-}
-
-OM_uint32
-gssEapGlueToMechName(OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_name_t glueName,
- gss_name_t *pMechName)
-{
- OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
- gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-
- *pMechName = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-
- major = gssDisplayName(minor, glueName, &nameBuf, NULL);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
-
- major = gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
- pMechName);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
-
- major = defrostAttrContext(minor, glueName, *pMechName);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
-
-cleanup:
- if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
- gssReleaseName(&tmpMinor, pMechName);
- *pMechName = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
- }
-
- gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &nameBuf);
-
- return major;
-}
-
-OM_uint32
-gssEapMechToGlueName(OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_name_t mechName,
- gss_name_t *pGlueName)
-{
- OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
- gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-
- *pGlueName = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-
- major = gssEapDisplayName(minor, mechName, &nameBuf, NULL);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
-
- major = gssImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
- pGlueName);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
-
-cleanup:
- gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &nameBuf);
-
- return major;
-}
-
-/*
- * Suck out the analgous elements of a Kerberos GSS context into an EAP
- * one so that the application doesn't know the difference.
- */
-OM_uint32
-gssEapReauthComplete(OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
- gss_cred_id_t cred,
- const gss_OID mech,
- OM_uint32 timeRec)
-{
- OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
- gss_buffer_set_t keyData = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
-
- if (!oidEqual(mech, gss_mech_krb5)) {
- major = GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- /* Get the raw subsession key and encryptino type*/
- major = gssInquireSecContextByOid(minor, ctx->kerberosCtx,
- GSS_C_INQ_SSPI_SESSION_KEY, &keyData);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
-
- {
- gss_OID_desc oid;
- int suffix;
-
- oid.length = keyData->elements[1].length;
- oid.elements = keyData->elements[1].value;
-
- /* GSS_KRB5_SESSION_KEY_ENCTYPE_OID */
- major = decomposeOid(minor,
- "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x02\x04",
- 10, &oid, &suffix);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
-
- ctx->encryptionType = suffix;
- }
-
- {
- krb5_context krbContext = NULL;
- krb5_keyblock key;
-
- GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
-
- KRB_KEY_LENGTH(&key) = keyData->elements[0].length;
- KRB_KEY_DATA(&key) = keyData->elements[0].value;
- KRB_KEY_TYPE(&key) = ctx->encryptionType;
-
- *minor = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(krbContext,
- &key, &ctx->rfc3961Key);
- if (*minor != 0) {
- major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
- goto cleanup;
- }
- }
-
- major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key,
- &ctx->checksumType);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
-
- if (timeRec != GSS_C_INDEFINITE)
- ctx->expiryTime = time(NULL) + timeRec;
-
- major = sequenceInit(minor,
- &ctx->seqState, ctx->recvSeq,
- ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG) != 0),
- ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG) != 0),
- TRUE);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
-
- major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-
-cleanup:
- gss_release_buffer_set(&tmpMinor, &keyData);
-
- return major;
-}
projects / mech_eap.git / blobdiff