/*
- * Copyright (c) 2010, JANET(UK)
+ * Copyright (c) 2011, JANET(UK)
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_keytab keytab = NULL;
krb5_keytab_entry ktent = { 0 };
- krb5_kt_cursor cursor = NULL;
+ krb5_kt_cursor cursor;
*princ = NULL;
memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key));
+ memset(&cursor, 0, sizeof(cursor));
code = krb5_kt_default(krbContext, &keytab);
if (code != 0)
while ((code = krb5_kt_next_entry(krbContext, keytab,
&ktent, &cursor)) == 0) {
- if (ktent.key.enctype == ctx->encryptionType)
+ if (KRB_KEY_TYPE(KRB_KT_ENT_KEYBLOCK(&ktent)) == ctx->encryptionType)
break;
else
- krb5_free_keytab_entry_contents(krbContext, &ktent);
+ KRB_KT_ENT_FREE(krbContext, &ktent);
}
}
if (code == 0) {
*princ = ktent.principal;
- *key = ktent.key;
+ *key = *KRB_KT_ENT_KEYBLOCK(&ktent);
}
cleanup:
if (cred == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL || cred->name == GSS_C_NO_NAME)
krb5_kt_end_seq_get(krbContext, keytab, &cursor);
krb5_kt_close(krbContext, keytab);
-
if (code != 0)
- krb5_free_keytab_entry_contents(krbContext, &ktent);
+ KRB_KT_ENT_FREE(krbContext, &ktent);
return code;
}
gss_name_t initiatorName,
krb5_const_principal acceptorPrinc,
krb5_keyblock *session,
- krb5_authdata ***authdata)
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ krb5_authdata *kdcIssuedAuthData
+#else
+ krb5_authdata ***kdcIssuedAuthData
+#endif
+ )
{
OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
krb5_error_code code;
+ krb5_context krbContext;
gss_buffer_desc attrBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ krb5_authdata authDataBuf, *authData = &authDataBuf;
+ AuthorizationDataElement authDatum = { 0 };
+#else
krb5_authdata *authData[2], authDatum = { 0 };
- krb5_context krbContext;
+#endif
+
+ memset(kdcIssuedAuthData, 0, sizeof(*kdcIssuedAuthData));
GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
return major;
authDatum.ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_RADIUS_AVP;
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ authDatum.ad_data.length = attrBuf.length;
+ authDatum.ad_data.data = attrBuf.value;
+ authData->len = 1;
+ authData->val = &authDatum;
+#else
authDatum.length = attrBuf.length;
authDatum.contents = attrBuf.value;
authData[0] = &authDatum;
authData[1] = NULL;
+#endif
- code = krb5_make_authdata_kdc_issued(krbContext, session, acceptorPrinc,
- authData, authdata);
+ code = krbMakeAuthDataKdcIssued(krbContext, session, acceptorPrinc,
+ authData, kdcIssuedAuthData);
if (code != 0) {
major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
*minor = code;
OM_uint32 major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_context krbContext = NULL;
- krb5_ticket ticket = { 0 };
krb5_keyblock session = { 0 }, acceptorKey = { 0 };
- krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_part = { 0 };
- krb5_data *ticketData = NULL, *credsData = NULL;
+ krb5_principal server = NULL;
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ Ticket ticket;
+ EncTicketPart enc_part;
+ AuthorizationData authData = { 0 };
+ krb5_crypto krbCrypto = NULL;
+ krb5_data ticketData = { 0 };
+ krb5_data encPartData = { 0 };
+ size_t len;
+#else
+ krb5_ticket ticket;
+ krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_part;
+ krb5_data *ticketData = NULL;
+#endif
+ krb5_data credsData = { 0 };
krb5_creds creds = { 0 };
krb5_auth_context authContext = NULL;
+ memset(&ticket, 0, sizeof(ticket));
+ memset(&enc_part, 0, sizeof(enc_part));
+
credBuf->length = 0;
credBuf->value = NULL;
GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
- code = getAcceptorKey(krbContext, ctx, cred,
- &ticket.server, &acceptorKey);
+ code = getAcceptorKey(krbContext, ctx, cred, &server, &acceptorKey);
if (code == KRB5_KT_NOTFOUND) {
- gss_buffer_desc emptyToken = { 0, "" };
-
- /*
- * If we can't produce the KRB-CRED message, we need to
- * return an empty (not NULL) token to the caller so we
- * don't change the number of authentication legs.
- */
- return duplicateBuffer(minor, &emptyToken, credBuf);
+ *minor = code;
+ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
} else if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
- enc_part.flags = TKT_FLG_INITIAL;
-
/*
* Generate a random session key to place in the ticket and
* sign the "KDC-Issued" authorization data element.
*/
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ ticket.realm = server->realm;
+ ticket.sname = server->name;
+
+ code = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(krbContext, ctx->encryptionType,
+ &session);
+ if (code != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ enc_part.flags.initial = 1;
+ enc_part.key = session;
+ enc_part.crealm = ctx->initiatorName->krbPrincipal->realm;
+ enc_part.cname = ctx->initiatorName->krbPrincipal->name;
+ enc_part.authtime = time(NULL);
+ enc_part.starttime = &enc_part.authtime;
+ enc_part.endtime = (ctx->expiryTime != 0)
+ ? ctx->expiryTime : KRB_TIME_FOREVER;
+ enc_part.renew_till = NULL;
+ enc_part.authorization_data = &authData;
+
+ major = freezeAttrContext(minor, ctx->initiatorName, server,
+ &session, &authData);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTicketPart, encPartData.data, encPartData.length,
+ &enc_part, &len, code);
+ if (code != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ code = krb5_crypto_init(krbContext, &acceptorKey, 0, &krbCrypto);
+ if (code != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ code = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(krbContext,
+ krbCrypto,
+ KRB5_KU_TICKET,
+ encPartData.data,
+ encPartData.length,
+ 0,
+ &ticket.enc_part);
+ if (code != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(Ticket, ticketData.data, ticketData.length,
+ &ticket, &len, code);
+ if (code != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+#else
+ ticket.server = server;
+
code = krb5_c_make_random_key(krbContext, ctx->encryptionType,
&session);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
+ enc_part.flags = TKT_FLG_INITIAL;
enc_part.session = &session;
enc_part.client = ctx->initiatorName->krbPrincipal;
enc_part.times.authtime = time(NULL);
enc_part.times.starttime = enc_part.times.authtime;
enc_part.times.endtime = (ctx->expiryTime != 0)
? ctx->expiryTime
- : KRB5_INT32_MAX;
+ : KRB_TIME_FOREVER;
enc_part.times.renew_till = 0;
- major = freezeAttrContext(minor, ctx->initiatorName, ticket.server,
+ major = freezeAttrContext(minor, ctx->initiatorName, server,
&session, &enc_part.authorization_data);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
code = encode_krb5_ticket(&ticket, &ticketData);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
-
- creds.client = enc_part.client;
- creds.server = ticket.server;
+#endif /* HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION */
+
+ creds.client = ctx->initiatorName->krbPrincipal;
+ creds.server = server;
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ creds.session = session;
+ creds.times.authtime = enc_part.authtime;
+ creds.times.starttime = *enc_part.starttime;
+ creds.times.endtime = enc_part.endtime;
+ creds.times.renew_till = 0;
+ creds.flags.b = enc_part.flags;
+ creds.ticket = ticketData;
+ creds.authdata = authData;
+#else
creds.keyblock = session;
creds.times = enc_part.times;
creds.ticket_flags = enc_part.flags;
creds.ticket = *ticketData;
creds.authdata = enc_part.authorization_data;
+#endif
code = krb5_auth_con_init(krbContext, &authContext);
if (code != 0)
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
- code = krb5_mk_1cred(krbContext, authContext, &creds, &credsData, NULL);
+ code = krbMakeCred(krbContext, authContext, &creds, &credsData);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
- krbDataToGssBuffer(credsData, credBuf);
+ krbDataToGssBuffer(&credsData, credBuf);
cleanup:
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ if (krbCrypto != NULL)
+ krb5_crypto_destroy(krbContext, krbCrypto);
+ free_AuthorizationData(&authData);
+ free_EncryptedData(&ticket.enc_part);
+ krb5_data_free(&ticketData);
+ krb5_data_free(&encPartData);
+#else
+ krb5_free_authdata(krbContext, enc_part.authorization_data);
if (ticket.enc_part.ciphertext.data != NULL)
GSSEAP_FREE(ticket.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
+ krb5_free_data(krbContext, ticketData);
+#endif
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(krbContext, &session);
+ krb5_free_principal(krbContext, server);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(krbContext, &acceptorKey);
- krb5_free_data(krbContext, ticketData);
krb5_auth_con_free(krbContext, authContext);
- krb5_free_authdata(krbContext, enc_part.authorization_data);
- if (credsData != NULL)
- GSSEAP_FREE(credsData);
if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
*minor = code;
- major = code != 0 ? GSS_S_FAILURE : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ major = (code != 0) ? GSS_S_FAILURE : GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
return major;
}
static int
-isTicketGrantingServiceP(krb5_context krbContext,
+isTicketGrantingServiceP(krb5_context krbContext GSSEAP_UNUSED,
krb5_const_principal principal)
{
- if (krb5_princ_size(krbContext, principal) == 2 &&
+ if (KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(principal) == 2 &&
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ strcmp(KRB_PRINC_NAME(principal)[0], "krbtgt") == 0
+#else
krb5_princ_component(krbContext, principal, 0)->length == 6 &&
memcmp(krb5_princ_component(krbContext,
- principal, 0)->data, "krbtgt", 6) == 0)
+ principal, 0)->data, "krbtgt", 6) == 0
+#endif
+ )
return TRUE;
return FALSE;
/* if reauth_use_ccache, use default credentials cache if ticket is for us */
krb5_appdefault_boolean(krbContext, "eap_gss",
- krb5_princ_realm(krbContext, principal),
+ KRB_PRINC_REALM(principal),
"reauth_use_ccache", 0, &reauthUseCCache);
return reauthUseCCache;
krb5_free_principal(krbContext, cred->name->krbPrincipal);
cred->name->krbPrincipal = canonPrinc;
- if (creds[0]->times.endtime == KRB5_INT32_MAX)
+ if (creds[0]->times.endtime == KRB_TIME_FOREVER)
cred->expiryTime = 0;
else
cred->expiryTime = creds[0]->times.endtime;
return major;
}
+#ifndef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
static gss_buffer_desc radiusAvpKrbAttr = {
sizeof("urn:authdata-radius-avp") - 1, "urn:authdata-radius-avp"
};
+#endif
/*
* Unfortunately extracting an AD-KDCIssued authorization data element
*/
static OM_uint32
defrostAttrContext(OM_uint32 *minor,
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ gss_ctx_id_t glueContext,
+#else
+ gss_ctx_id_t glueContext GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+#endif
gss_name_t glueName,
gss_name_t mechName)
{
OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ gss_OID_desc oid = { 0 };
+ gss_buffer_set_t authData = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
+#else
gss_buffer_desc authData = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc authDataDisplay = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
int more = -1;
int authenticated, complete;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ major = composeOid(minor,
+ GSS_KRB5_EXTRACT_AUTHZ_DATA_FROM_SEC_CONTEXT_X->elements,
+ GSS_KRB5_EXTRACT_AUTHZ_DATA_FROM_SEC_CONTEXT_X->length,
+ KRB5_AUTHDATA_RADIUS_AVP, &oid);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+ /* XXX we are assuming that this verifies AD-KDCIssued signature */
+ major = gssInquireSecContextByOid(minor, glueContext,
+ &oid, &authData);
+ if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ if (authData == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET || authData->count != 1)
+ major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ else
+ major = gssEapImportAttrContext(minor, authData->elements, mechName);
+ } else if (major == GSS_S_FAILURE && *minor == ENOENT) {
+ /* This is the equivalent of GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE for MIT attr APIs */
+ *minor = 0;
+ major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+
+ gss_release_buffer_set(&tmpMinor, &authData);
+ GSSEAP_FREE(oid.elements);
+#else
major = gssGetNameAttribute(minor, glueName, &radiusAvpKrbAttr,
&authenticated, &complete,
&authData, &authDataDisplay, &more);
gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &authData);
gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &authDataDisplay);
+#endif /* HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION */
return major;
}
*/
OM_uint32
gssEapGlueToMechName(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_ctx_id_t glueContext,
gss_name_t glueName,
gss_name_t *pMechName)
{
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
- major = defrostAttrContext(minor, glueName, *pMechName);
+ major = defrostAttrContext(minor, glueContext, glueName, *pMechName);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
*/
OM_uint32
gssEapReauthComplete(OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
- gss_cred_id_t cred,
- const gss_OID mech,
- OM_uint32 timeRec)
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred GSSEAP_UNUSED,
+ const gss_OID mech,
+ OM_uint32 timeRec)
{
OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
gss_buffer_set_t keyData = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
+ krb5_context krbContext = NULL;
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ krb5_storage *sp = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
if (!oidEqual(mech, gss_mech_krb5)) {
major = GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
goto cleanup;
}
- /* Get the raw subsession key and encryption type*/
+ /* Get the raw subsession key and encryption type */
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+#define KRB_GSS_SUBKEY_COUNT 1 /* encoded session key */
+ major = gssInquireSecContextByOid(minor, ctx->kerberosCtx,
+ GSS_KRB5_GET_SUBKEY_X, &keyData);
+#else
+#define KRB_GSS_SUBKEY_COUNT 2 /* raw session key, enctype OID */
major = gssInquireSecContextByOid(minor, ctx->kerberosCtx,
GSS_C_INQ_SSPI_SESSION_KEY, &keyData);
+#endif
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
+ if (keyData == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET || keyData->count < KRB_GSS_SUBKEY_COUNT) {
+ *minor = GSSEAP_KEY_UNAVAILABLE;
+ major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ sp = krb5_storage_from_mem(keyData->elements[0].value,
+ keyData->elements[0].length);
+ if (sp == NULL) {
+ *minor = ENOMEM;
+ major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ *minor = krb5_ret_keyblock(sp, &ctx->rfc3961Key);
+ if (*minor != 0) {
+ major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+#else
{
gss_OID_desc oid;
int suffix;
}
{
- krb5_context krbContext = NULL;
krb5_keyblock key;
- GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
-
KRB_KEY_LENGTH(&key) = keyData->elements[0].length;
KRB_KEY_DATA(&key) = keyData->elements[0].value;
KRB_KEY_TYPE(&key) = ctx->encryptionType;
goto cleanup;
}
}
+#endif /* HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION */
major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key,
&ctx->checksumType);
major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
cleanup:
+#ifdef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
+ if (sp != NULL)
+ krb5_storage_free(sp);
+#endif
gss_release_buffer_set(&tmpMinor, &keyData);
return major;
NEXT_SYMBOL(gssDisplayNameNext, "gss_display_name");
NEXT_SYMBOL(gssImportNameNext, "gss_import_name");
NEXT_SYMBOL(gssStoreCredNext, "gss_store_cred");
+#ifndef HAVE_HEIMDAL_VERSION
NEXT_SYMBOL(gssGetNameAttributeNext, "gss_get_name_attribute");
+#endif
return major;
}
projects / mech_eap.git / blobdiff