X-Git-Url: http://www.project-moonshot.org/gitweb/?p=mech_eap.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=accept_sec_context.c;h=5829ed9bda5f3f9653998e2b2a4526fac23ae539;hp=42c29c2e0b609e91e4173abe4421fcadfbb227b2;hb=ae79fdae047f980d01b2b4e84ccea52e24d8c7a0;hpb=b47c10882ea3409098780eb9608d3008c91f076d diff --git a/accept_sec_context.c b/accept_sec_context.c index 42c29c2..5829ed9 100644 --- a/accept_sec_context.c +++ b/accept_sec_context.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright (c) 2010, JANET(UK) + * Copyright (c) 2011, JANET(UK) * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without @@ -30,15 +30,35 @@ * SUCH DAMAGE. */ +/* + * Establish a security context on the acceptor (server). These functions + * wrap around libradsec and (thus) talk to a RADIUS server or proxy. + */ + #include "gssapiP_eap.h" +#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH +static OM_uint32 +eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_cred_id_t cred, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + gss_name_t target, + gss_OID mech, + OM_uint32 reqFlags, + OM_uint32 timeReq, + gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings, + gss_buffer_t inputToken, + gss_buffer_t outputToken, + OM_uint32 *smFlags); +#endif + /* - * Mark a context as ready for cryptographic operations + * Mark an acceptor context as ready for cryptographic operations */ static OM_uint32 -acceptReady(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred) +acceptReadyEap(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred) { - OM_uint32 major; + OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor; VALUE_PAIR *vp; gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; @@ -48,48 +68,43 @@ acceptReady(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred) if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; - vp = rc_avpair_get(ctx->acceptorCtx.avps, PW_USER_NAME, 0); - if (vp != NULL) { - nameBuf.length = vp->lvalue; - nameBuf.value = vp->strvalue; - } else if (ctx->initiatorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME) { + gssEapReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &ctx->initiatorName); + + major = gssEapRadiusGetRawAvp(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.vps, + PW_USER_NAME, 0, &vp); + if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + nameBuf.length = vp->length; + nameBuf.value = vp->vp_strvalue; + } else { ctx->gssFlags |= GSS_C_ANON_FLAG; } - if (nameBuf.length != 0 || ctx->initiatorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME) { - major = gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, - &ctx->initiatorName); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - return major; - } + major = gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf, + (ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_ANON_FLAG) ? + GSS_C_NT_ANONYMOUS : GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, + &ctx->initiatorName); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; - ctx->initiatorName->attrCtx = gssEapCreateAttrContext(cred, ctx); + major = gssEapRadiusGetRawAvp(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.vps, + PW_MS_MPPE_SEND_KEY, VENDORPEC_MS, &vp); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) { + *minor = GSSEAP_KEY_UNAVAILABLE; + return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; + } - vp = rc_avpair_get(ctx->acceptorCtx.avps, - RADIUS_VENDOR_ATTR_MS_MPPE_SEND_KEY, - RADIUS_VENDOR_ID_MICROSOFT); - if (ctx->encryptionType != ENCTYPE_NULL && vp != NULL) { - major = gssEapDeriveRfc3961Key(minor, - (unsigned char *)vp->strvalue, - vp->lvalue, - ctx->encryptionType, - &ctx->rfc3961Key); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - return major; + major = gssEapDeriveRfc3961Key(minor, + vp->vp_octets, + vp->length, + ctx->encryptionType, + &ctx->rfc3961Key); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; - major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key, - &ctx->checksumType); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - return major; - } else { - /* - * draft-howlett-eap-gss says that integrity/confidentialty should - * always be advertised as available, but if we have no keying - * material it seems confusing to the caller to advertise this. - */ - ctx->gssFlags &= ~(GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_CONF_FLAG); - ctx->encryptionType = ENCTYPE_NULL; - } + major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key, + &ctx->checksumType); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; major = sequenceInit(minor, &ctx->seqState, ctx->recvSeq, @@ -99,264 +114,679 @@ acceptReady(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred) if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; + major = gssEapCreateAttrContext(minor, cred, ctx, + &ctx->initiatorName->attrCtx, + &ctx->expiryTime); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; + + *minor = 0; return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } static OM_uint32 +eapGssSmAcceptAcceptorName(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_cred_id_t cred GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_buffer_t inputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_buffer_t outputToken, + OM_uint32 *smFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED) +{ + OM_uint32 major; + + /* XXX TODO import and validate name from inputToken */ + + if (ctx->acceptorName != GSS_C_NO_NAME) { + /* Send desired target name to acceptor */ + major = gssEapDisplayName(minor, ctx->acceptorName, + outputToken, NULL); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; + } + + return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; +} + +#ifdef GSSEAP_DEBUG +static OM_uint32 +eapGssSmAcceptVendorInfo(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_cred_id_t cred GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_buffer_t inputToken, + gss_buffer_t outputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 *smFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "GSS-EAP: vendor: %.*s\n", + (int)inputToken->length, (char *)inputToken->value); + + *minor = 0; + return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; +} +#endif + + +/* + * Emit a identity EAP request to force the initiator (peer) to identify + * itself. + */ +static OM_uint32 eapGssSmAcceptIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor, - gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED, gss_buffer_t inputToken, - gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings, - gss_buffer_t outputToken) + gss_buffer_t outputToken, + OM_uint32 *smFlags) { OM_uint32 major; - union { - struct eap_hdr pdu; - unsigned char data[5]; - } pkt; + struct wpabuf *reqData; gss_buffer_desc pktBuffer; - if (inputToken != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER && inputToken->length != 0) - return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; - - assert(ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle == NULL); - - major = gssEapRadiusAllocHandle(minor, cred, &ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - return major; + if (!gssEapCredAvailable(cred, ctx->mechanismUsed)) { + *minor = GSSEAP_CRED_MECH_MISMATCH; + return GSS_S_BAD_MECH; + } - if (ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME && - cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && - cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) { - major = gss_duplicate_name(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - return major; + if (inputToken != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER && inputToken->length != 0) { + *minor = GSSEAP_WRONG_SIZE; + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; } - pkt.pdu.code = EAP_CODE_REQUEST; - pkt.pdu.identifier = 0; - pkt.pdu.length = htons(sizeof(pkt.data)); - pkt.data[4] = EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY; + reqData = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY, 0, + EAP_CODE_REQUEST, 0); + if (reqData == NULL) { + *minor = ENOMEM; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } - pktBuffer.length = sizeof(pkt.data); - pktBuffer.value = pkt.data; + pktBuffer.length = wpabuf_len(reqData); + pktBuffer.value = (void *)wpabuf_head(reqData); major = duplicateBuffer(minor, &pktBuffer, outputToken); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; - ctx->state = EAP_STATE_AUTHENTICATE; + wpabuf_free(reqData); + + GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION_NEXT(ctx); + + *minor = 0; + *smFlags |= SM_FLAG_OUTPUT_TOKEN_CRITICAL; return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; } +/* + * Returns TRUE if the input token contains an EAP identity response. + */ +static int +isIdentityResponseP(gss_buffer_t inputToken) +{ + struct wpabuf respData; + + wpabuf_set(&respData, inputToken->value, inputToken->length); + + return (eap_get_type(&respData) == EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY); +} + +/* + * Save the asserted initiator identity from the EAP identity response. + */ static OM_uint32 importInitiatorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, - gss_buffer_t inputToken, - gss_buffer_t nameBuf) + gss_buffer_t inputToken) +{ + OM_uint32 tmpMinor; + struct wpabuf respData; + const unsigned char *pos; + size_t len; + gss_buffer_desc nameBuf; + + wpabuf_set(&respData, inputToken->value, inputToken->length); + + pos = eap_hdr_validate(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY, + &respData, &len); + if (pos == NULL) { + *minor = GSSEAP_PEER_BAD_MESSAGE; + return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; + } + + nameBuf.value = (void *)pos; + nameBuf.length = len; + + gssEapReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &ctx->initiatorName); + + return gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, + &ctx->initiatorName); +} + +/* + * Pass the asserted initiator identity to the authentication server. + */ +static OM_uint32 +setInitiatorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + VALUE_PAIR **vps) { OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor; - struct eap_hdr *pdu = (struct eap_hdr *)inputToken->value; - unsigned char *pos = (unsigned char *)(pdu + 1); - gss_name_t name; + gss_buffer_desc nameBuf; + + /* + * We should have got an EAP identity response, but if we didn't, then + * we will just avoid sending User-Name. Note that radsecproxy requires + * User-Name to be sent on every request (presumably so it can remain + * stateless). + */ + if (ctx->initiatorName != GSS_C_NO_NAME) { + major = gssEapDisplayName(minor, ctx->initiatorName, &nameBuf, NULL); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; + + major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps, PW_USER_NAME, 0, &nameBuf); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; + + gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &nameBuf); + } - assert(pdu->code == EAP_CODE_RESPONSE); - assert(pos[0] == EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY); + *minor = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} - nameBuf->value = pos + 1; - nameBuf->length = inputToken->length - sizeof(*pdu) - 1; +/* + * Pass the asserted acceptor identity to the authentication server. + */ +static OM_uint32 +setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + VALUE_PAIR **vps) +{ + OM_uint32 major; + gss_buffer_desc nameBuf; + krb5_context krbContext = NULL; + krb5_principal krbPrinc; + struct rs_context *rc = ctx->acceptorCtx.radContext; - major = gssEapImportName(minor, nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME, &name); + assert(rc != NULL); + + if (ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME) { + *minor = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + } + + if ((ctx->acceptorName->flags & NAME_FLAG_SERVICE) == 0) { + *minor = GSSEAP_BAD_SERVICE_NAME; + return GSS_S_BAD_NAME; + } + + GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext); + + krbPrinc = ctx->acceptorName->krbPrincipal; + assert(krbPrinc != NULL); + assert(KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(krbPrinc) >= 2); + + /* Acceptor-Service-Name */ + krbPrincComponentToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, 0, &nameBuf); + + major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps, + PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_NAME, + VENDORPEC_UKERNA, + &nameBuf); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) return major; - gssEapReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &ctx->initiatorName); - ctx->initiatorName = name; + /* Acceptor-Host-Name */ + krbPrincComponentToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, 1, &nameBuf); + + major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps, + PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_HOST_NAME, + VENDORPEC_UKERNA, + &nameBuf); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; + + if (KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(krbPrinc) > 2) { + /* Acceptor-Service-Specific */ + krb5_principal_data ssiPrinc = *krbPrinc; + char *ssi; + + KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(&ssiPrinc) -= 2; + KRB_PRINC_NAME(&ssiPrinc) += 2; + + *minor = krb5_unparse_name_flags(krbContext, &ssiPrinc, + KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &ssi); + if (*minor != 0) + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + + nameBuf.value = ssi; + nameBuf.length = strlen(ssi); + + major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps, + PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_SPECIFIC, + VENDORPEC_UKERNA, + &nameBuf); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) { + krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi); + return major; + } + krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi); + } + + krbPrincRealmToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, &nameBuf); + if (nameBuf.length != 0) { + /* Acceptor-Realm-Name */ + major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps, + PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_REALM_NAME, + VENDORPEC_UKERNA, + &nameBuf); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; + } + + *minor = 0; return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } +/* + * Allocate a RadSec handle + */ +static OM_uint32 +createRadiusHandle(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_cred_id_t cred, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx) +{ + struct gss_eap_acceptor_ctx *actx = &ctx->acceptorCtx; + const char *configFile = RS_CONFIG_FILE; + const char *configStanza = "gss-eap"; + struct rs_alloc_scheme ralloc; + struct rs_error *err; + + assert(actx->radContext == NULL); + assert(actx->radConn == NULL); + + if (rs_context_create(&actx->radContext, RS_DICT_FILE) != 0) { + *minor = GSSEAP_RADSEC_CONTEXT_FAILURE; + return GSS_S_FAILURE; + } + + if (cred->radiusConfigFile != NULL) + configFile = cred->radiusConfigFile; + if (cred->radiusConfigStanza != NULL) + configStanza = cred->radiusConfigStanza; + + ralloc.calloc = GSSEAP_CALLOC; + ralloc.malloc = GSSEAP_MALLOC; + ralloc.free = GSSEAP_FREE; + ralloc.realloc = GSSEAP_REALLOC; + + rs_context_set_alloc_scheme(actx->radContext, &ralloc); + + if (rs_context_read_config(actx->radContext, configFile) != 0) { + err = rs_err_ctx_pop(actx->radContext); + goto fail; + } + + if (rs_conn_create(actx->radContext, &actx->radConn, configStanza) != 0) { + err = rs_err_conn_pop(actx->radConn); + goto fail; + } + + if (actx->radServer != NULL) { + if (rs_conn_select_peer(actx->radConn, actx->radServer) != 0) { + err = rs_err_conn_pop(actx->radConn); + goto fail; + } + } + + *minor = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; + +fail: + return gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, err); +} + +/* + * Process a EAP response from the initiator. + */ static OM_uint32 eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate(OM_uint32 *minor, - gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED, gss_buffer_t inputToken, - gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings, - gss_buffer_t outputToken) + gss_buffer_t outputToken, + OM_uint32 *smFlags) { OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor; - int code; - VALUE_PAIR *send = NULL; - VALUE_PAIR *received = NULL; - rc_handle *rh = ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle; - char msgBuffer[4096]; - struct eap_hdr *pdu; - unsigned char *pos; - gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; - - pdu = (struct eap_hdr *)inputToken->value; - pos = (unsigned char *)(pdu + 1); - - if (inputToken->length > sizeof(*pdu) && - pdu->code == EAP_CODE_RESPONSE && - pos[0] == EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY) { - major = importInitiatorIdentity(minor, ctx, inputToken, &nameBuf); + struct rs_connection *rconn; + struct rs_request *request = NULL; + struct rs_packet *req = NULL, *resp = NULL; + struct radius_packet *frreq, *frresp; + + if (ctx->acceptorCtx.radContext == NULL) { + /* May be NULL from an imported partial context */ + major = createRadiusHandle(minor, cred, ctx); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; + } - major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_USER_NAME, &nameBuf); + if (isIdentityResponseP(inputToken)) { + major = importInitiatorIdentity(minor, ctx, inputToken); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - goto cleanup; + return major; } - major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, inputToken); + rconn = ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn; + + if (rs_packet_create_authn_request(rconn, &req, NULL, NULL) != 0) { + major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn)); + goto cleanup; + } + frreq = rs_packet_frpkt(req); + + major = setInitiatorIdentity(minor, ctx, &frreq->vps); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + goto cleanup; + + major = setAcceptorIdentity(minor, ctx, &frreq->vps); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; - if (ctx->acceptorCtx.lastStatus == CHALLENGE_RC) { - major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_STATE, - &ctx->acceptorCtx.state); + major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, &frreq->vps, + PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, inputToken); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + goto cleanup; + + if (ctx->acceptorCtx.state.length != 0) { + major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, &frreq->vps, PW_STATE, 0, + &ctx->acceptorCtx.state); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &ctx->acceptorCtx.state); } - code = rc_auth(rh, 0, send, &received, msgBuffer); - switch (code) { - case OK_RC: - case CHALLENGE_RC: - major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; - break; - case TIMEOUT_RC: - major = GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE; + if (rs_request_create(rconn, &request) != 0) { + major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn)); + goto cleanup; + } + + rs_request_add_reqpkt(request, req); + req = NULL; + + if (rs_request_send(request, &resp) != 0) { + major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn)); + goto cleanup; + } + + assert(resp != NULL); + + frresp = rs_packet_frpkt(resp); + switch (frresp->code) { + case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE: + case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK: break; - case REJECT_RC: + case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT: + *minor = GSSEAP_RADIUS_AUTH_FAILURE; major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL; + goto cleanup; break; default: + *minor = GSSEAP_UNKNOWN_RADIUS_CODE; major = GSS_S_FAILURE; goto cleanup; + break; } - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + major = gssEapRadiusGetAvp(minor, frresp->vps, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, + outputToken, TRUE); + if (major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && frresp->code == PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE) { + *minor = GSSEAP_MISSING_EAP_REQUEST; + major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; goto cleanup; - - ctx->acceptorCtx.lastStatus = code; - - major = getBufferFromAvps(minor, received, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, - outputToken, TRUE); - if ((major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && code != OK_RC) || - GSS_ERROR(major)) + } else if (GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; - if (code == CHALLENGE_RC) { - major = getBufferFromAvps(minor, received, PW_STATE, - &ctx->acceptorCtx.state, TRUE); - if (major != GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && GSS_ERROR(major)) + if (frresp->code == PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE) { + major = gssEapRadiusGetAvp(minor, frresp->vps, PW_STATE, 0, + &ctx->acceptorCtx.state, TRUE); + if (GSS_ERROR(major) && *minor != GSSEAP_NO_SUCH_ATTR) goto cleanup; } else { - ctx->acceptorCtx.avps = received; - received = NULL; + ctx->acceptorCtx.vps = frresp->vps; + frresp->vps = NULL; - major = acceptReady(minor, ctx, cred); + major = acceptReadyEap(minor, ctx, cred); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; - ctx->state = EAP_STATE_GSS_CHANNEL_BINDINGS; + GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION_NEXT(ctx); } major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; + *minor = 0; + *smFlags |= SM_FLAG_OUTPUT_TOKEN_CRITICAL; cleanup: - if (received != NULL) - rc_avpair_free(received); + if (request != NULL) + rs_request_destroy(request); + if (req != NULL) + rs_packet_destroy(req); + if (resp != NULL) + rs_packet_destroy(resp); + if (GSSEAP_SM_STATE(ctx) == GSSEAP_STATE_INITIATOR_EXTS) { + assert(major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); + + rs_conn_destroy(ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn); + ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn = NULL; + } return major; } static OM_uint32 eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_cred_id_t cred GSSEAP_UNUSED, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, - gss_cred_id_t cred, - gss_buffer_t inputToken, + gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED, gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings, - gss_buffer_t outputToken) + gss_buffer_t inputToken, + gss_buffer_t outputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 *smFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED) { - OM_uint32 major; + OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor; gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[2]; - outputToken->length = 0; - outputToken->value = NULL; - - if (chanBindings == GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS) { - ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED; - return GSS_S_COMPLETE; - } - - if (inputToken->length < 14) { - return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; - } - - iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA; + iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA | GSS_IOV_BUFFER_FLAG_ALLOCATE; iov[0].buffer.length = 0; iov[0].buffer.value = NULL; - if (chanBindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS) - iov[0].buffer = chanBindings->application_data; - - iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_HEADER; - iov[1].buffer.length = 16; - iov[1].buffer.value = (unsigned char *)inputToken->value - 2; - - assert(load_uint16_be(iov[1].buffer.value) == TOK_TYPE_GSS_CB); - - iov[2].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_TRAILER; - iov[2].buffer.length = inputToken->length - 14; - iov[2].buffer.value = (unsigned char *)inputToken->value + 14; + iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_STREAM; + iov[1].buffer = *inputToken; major = gssEapUnwrapOrVerifyMIC(minor, ctx, NULL, NULL, - iov, 3, TOK_TYPE_GSS_CB); - if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { - ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED; + iov, 2, TOK_TYPE_WRAP); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; + + if (chanBindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS && + !bufferEqual(&iov[0].buffer, &chanBindings->application_data)) { + major = GSS_S_BAD_BINDINGS; + *minor = GSSEAP_BINDINGS_MISMATCH; + } else { + major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; + *minor = 0; } -#if 0 gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &iov[0].buffer); -#endif return major; } +#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH static OM_uint32 -eapGssSmAcceptEstablished(OM_uint32 *minor, - gss_ctx_id_t ctx, +eapGssSmAcceptReauthCreds(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_cred_id_t cred, - gss_buffer_t inputToken, - gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings, - gss_buffer_t outputToken) + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_buffer_t inputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_buffer_t outputToken, + OM_uint32 *smFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED) +{ + OM_uint32 major; + + /* + * If we're built with fast reauthentication enabled, then + * fabricate a ticket from the initiator to ourselves. + */ + major = gssEapMakeReauthCreds(minor, ctx, cred, outputToken); + if (major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE) + major = GSS_S_COMPLETE; + if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) + major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; + + return major; +} +#endif + +static OM_uint32 +eapGssSmAcceptCompleteInitiatorExts(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_cred_id_t cred GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_buffer_t inputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_buffer_t outputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 *smFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED) { - /* Called with already established context */ - *minor = EINVAL; - return GSS_S_BAD_STATUS; + GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION_NEXT(ctx); + + *minor = 0; + + return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; } -static struct gss_eap_acceptor_sm { - enum gss_eap_token_type inputTokenType; - enum gss_eap_token_type outputTokenType; - OM_uint32 (*processToken)(OM_uint32 *, - gss_ctx_id_t, - gss_cred_id_t, - gss_buffer_t, - gss_channel_bindings_t, - gss_buffer_t); -} eapGssAcceptorSm[] = { - { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, eapGssSmAcceptIdentity }, - { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate }, - { TOK_TYPE_GSS_CB, TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings }, - { TOK_TYPE_NONE, TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmAcceptEstablished }, +static OM_uint32 +eapGssSmAcceptCompleteAcceptorExts(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_cred_id_t cred GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_OID mech GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_buffer_t inputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_buffer_t outputToken GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 *smFlags) +{ + GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION(ctx, GSSEAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED); + + *minor = 0; + *smFlags |= SM_FLAG_FORCE_SEND_TOKEN; + + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +static struct gss_eap_sm eapGssAcceptorSm[] = { + { + ITOK_TYPE_ACCEPTOR_NAME_REQ, + ITOK_TYPE_ACCEPTOR_NAME_RESP, + GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL, + 0, + eapGssSmAcceptAcceptorName + }, +#ifdef GSSEAP_DEBUG + { + ITOK_TYPE_VENDOR_INFO, + ITOK_TYPE_NONE, + GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL, + 0, + eapGssSmAcceptVendorInfo, + }, +#endif +#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH + { + ITOK_TYPE_REAUTH_REQ, + ITOK_TYPE_REAUTH_RESP, + GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL, + 0, + eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth, + }, +#endif + { + ITOK_TYPE_NONE, + ITOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, + GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL, + SM_ITOK_FLAG_REQUIRED, + eapGssSmAcceptIdentity, + }, + { + ITOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, + ITOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, + GSSEAP_STATE_AUTHENTICATE, + SM_ITOK_FLAG_REQUIRED, + eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate + }, + { + ITOK_TYPE_GSS_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, + ITOK_TYPE_NONE, + GSSEAP_STATE_INITIATOR_EXTS, + SM_ITOK_FLAG_REQUIRED, + eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings, + }, + { + ITOK_TYPE_NONE, + ITOK_TYPE_NONE, + GSSEAP_STATE_INITIATOR_EXTS, + 0, + eapGssSmAcceptCompleteInitiatorExts, + }, +#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH + { + ITOK_TYPE_NONE, + ITOK_TYPE_REAUTH_CREDS, + GSSEAP_STATE_ACCEPTOR_EXTS, + 0, + eapGssSmAcceptReauthCreds, + }, +#endif + { + ITOK_TYPE_NONE, + ITOK_TYPE_NONE, + GSSEAP_STATE_ACCEPTOR_EXTS, + 0, + eapGssSmAcceptCompleteAcceptorExts + }, }; OM_uint32 @@ -372,23 +802,19 @@ gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor, OM_uint32 *time_rec, gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle) { - OM_uint32 major; - OM_uint32 tmpMajor, tmpMinor; + OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor; gss_ctx_id_t ctx = *context_handle; - struct gss_eap_acceptor_sm *sm = NULL; - gss_buffer_desc innerInputToken = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; - gss_buffer_desc innerOutputToken = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; *minor = 0; output_token->length = 0; output_token->value = NULL; - if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && !(cred->flags & CRED_FLAG_ACCEPT)) { - return GSS_S_NO_CRED; - } + if (src_name != NULL) + *src_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; if (input_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER || input_token->length == 0) { + *minor = GSSEAP_TOK_TRUNC; return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; } @@ -402,45 +828,51 @@ gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor, GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&ctx->mutex); - sm = &eapGssAcceptorSm[ctx->state]; - - major = gssEapVerifyToken(minor, ctx, input_token, - sm->inputTokenType, &innerInputToken); - if (GSS_ERROR(major)) - goto cleanup; + if (cred == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) { + if (ctx->defaultCred == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) { + major = gssEapAcquireCred(minor, + GSS_C_NO_NAME, + GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, + GSS_C_INDEFINITE, + GSS_C_NO_OID_SET, + GSS_C_ACCEPT, + &ctx->defaultCred, + NULL, + NULL); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + goto cleanup; + } - /* If credentials were provided, check they're usable with this mech */ - if (!gssEapCredAvailable(cred, ctx->mechanismUsed)) { - major = GSS_S_BAD_MECH; - goto cleanup; + cred = ctx->defaultCred; } - do { - sm = &eapGssAcceptorSm[ctx->state]; + GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&cred->mutex); - major = (sm->processToken)(minor, - ctx, - cred, - &innerInputToken, - input_chan_bindings, - &innerOutputToken); + if (cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) { + major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; - } while (major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED && innerOutputToken.length == 0); + } + + major = gssEapSmStep(minor, + cred, + ctx, + GSS_C_NO_NAME, + GSS_C_NO_OID, + 0, + GSS_C_INDEFINITE, + input_chan_bindings, + input_token, + output_token, + eapGssAcceptorSm, + sizeof(eapGssAcceptorSm) / sizeof(eapGssAcceptorSm[0])); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + goto cleanup; if (mech_type != NULL) { if (!gssEapInternalizeOid(ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type)) duplicateOid(&tmpMinor, ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type); } - if (innerOutputToken.length != 0) { - tmpMajor = gssEapMakeToken(&tmpMinor, ctx, &innerOutputToken, - sm->outputTokenType, output_token); - if (GSS_ERROR(tmpMajor)) { - major = tmpMajor; - *minor = tmpMinor; - goto cleanup; - } - } if (ret_flags != NULL) *ret_flags = ctx->gssFlags; if (delegated_cred_handle != NULL) @@ -448,24 +880,108 @@ gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor, if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { if (src_name != NULL && ctx->initiatorName != GSS_C_NO_NAME) { - major = gss_duplicate_name(&tmpMinor, ctx->initiatorName, src_name); + major = gssEapDuplicateName(&tmpMinor, ctx->initiatorName, src_name); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + goto cleanup; + } + if (time_rec != NULL) { + major = gssEapContextTime(&tmpMinor, ctx, time_rec); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) goto cleanup; } - if (time_rec != NULL) - gss_context_time(&tmpMinor, ctx, time_rec); } - assert(ctx->state == EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED || major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); + assert(CTX_IS_ESTABLISHED(ctx) || major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED); cleanup: + if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) + GSSEAP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&cred->mutex); GSSEAP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ctx->mutex); if (GSS_ERROR(major)) gssEapReleaseContext(&tmpMinor, context_handle); - gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &innerOutputToken); - return major; } +#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH +static OM_uint32 +acceptReadyKrb(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + gss_cred_id_t cred, + const gss_name_t initiator, + const gss_OID mech, + OM_uint32 timeRec) +{ + OM_uint32 major; + + major = gssEapGlueToMechName(minor, ctx, initiator, &ctx->initiatorName); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; + + major = gssEapReauthComplete(minor, ctx, cred, mech, timeRec); + if (GSS_ERROR(major)) + return major; + + *minor = 0; + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; +} + +static OM_uint32 +eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor, + gss_cred_id_t cred, + gss_ctx_id_t ctx, + gss_name_t target GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_OID mech, + OM_uint32 reqFlags GSSEAP_UNUSED, + OM_uint32 timeReq GSSEAP_UNUSED, + gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings, + gss_buffer_t inputToken, + gss_buffer_t outputToken, + OM_uint32 *smFlags) +{ + OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor; + gss_name_t krbInitiator = GSS_C_NO_NAME; + OM_uint32 gssFlags, timeRec = GSS_C_INDEFINITE; + + /* + * If we're built with fast reauthentication support, it's valid + * for an initiator to send a GSS reauthentication token as its + * initial context token, causing us to short-circuit the state + * machine and process Kerberos GSS messages instead. + */ + + ctx->flags |= CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH; + + major = gssAcceptSecContext(minor, + &ctx->kerberosCtx, + cred->krbCred, + inputToken, + chanBindings, + &krbInitiator, + &mech, + outputToken, + &gssFlags, + &timeRec, + NULL); + if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + major = acceptReadyKrb(minor, ctx, cred, + krbInitiator, mech, timeRec); + if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { + GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION(ctx, GSSEAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED); + } + ctx->gssFlags = gssFlags; + } else if (GSS_ERROR(major) && + (*smFlags & SM_FLAG_INPUT_TOKEN_CRITICAL) == 0) { + /* pretend reauthentication attempt never happened */ + gssDeleteSecContext(&tmpMinor, &ctx->kerberosCtx, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); + ctx->flags &= ~(CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH); + GSSEAP_SM_TRANSITION(ctx, GSSEAP_STATE_INITIAL); + major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED; + } + + gssReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &krbInitiator); + + return major; +} +#endif /* GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH */