From: Jouni Malinen Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 16:46:41 +0000 (+0200) Subject: Reject psk parameter set with invalid passphrase character X-Git-Tag: hostap_2_6~519 X-Git-Url: http://www.project-moonshot.org/gitweb/?p=mech_eap.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=73e4abb24a936014727924d8b0b2965edfc117dd Reject psk parameter set with invalid passphrase character WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control characters. Reject a passphrase configuration attempt if that passphrase includes an invalid passphrase. This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the configuration file psk parameter with arbitrary data from the control interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that an untrusted user has access to a management software component that does not validate the passphrase value before passing it to wpa_supplicant. This could allow such an untrusted user to inject up to 63 characters of almost arbitrary data into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path, pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges. Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen --- diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c index b1c7870..fdd9643 100644 --- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c +++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c @@ -478,6 +478,12 @@ static int wpa_config_parse_psk(const struct parse_data *data, } wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PSK (ASCII passphrase)", (u8 *) value, len); + if (has_ctrl_char((u8 *) value, len)) { + wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, + "Line %d: Invalid passphrase character", + line); + return -1; + } if (ssid->passphrase && os_strlen(ssid->passphrase) == len && os_memcmp(ssid->passphrase, value, len) == 0) { /* No change to the previously configured value */