#include "gssapiP_eap.h"
+#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+ gss_buffer_t outputToken);
+#endif
+
/*
* Mark a context as ready for cryptographic operations
*/
gssEapReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &ctx->initiatorName);
- vp = rc_avpair_get(ctx->acceptorCtx.avps, PW_USER_NAME, 0);
+ vp = pairfind(ctx->acceptorCtx.avps, PW_USER_NAME);
if (vp != NULL) {
- nameBuf.length = vp->lvalue;
- nameBuf.value = vp->strvalue;
+ nameBuf.length = vp->length;
+ nameBuf.value = vp->vp_strvalue;
} else {
ctx->gssFlags |= GSS_C_ANON_FLAG;
}
ctx->initiatorName->attrCtx = gssEapCreateAttrContext(cred, ctx);
- vp = rc_avpair_get(ctx->acceptorCtx.avps,
- VENDOR_ATTR_MS_MPPE_SEND_KEY,
- VENDOR_ID_MICROSOFT);
- if (ctx->encryptionType != ENCTYPE_NULL && vp != NULL) {
+ major = gssEapRadiusGetRawAvp(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.avps,
+ PW_MS_MPPE_SEND_KEY, VENDORPEC_MS, &vp);
+ if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE && ctx->encryptionType != ENCTYPE_NULL) {
major = gssEapDeriveRfc3961Key(minor,
- (unsigned char *)vp->strvalue,
- vp->lvalue,
+ vp->vp_octets,
+ vp->length,
ctx->encryptionType,
&ctx->rfc3961Key);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
if (inputToken != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER && inputToken->length != 0)
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
- assert(ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle == NULL);
-
- major = gssEapRadiusAllocHandle(minor, cred, &ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- return major;
-
assert(ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME);
if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
gss_buffer_desc nameBuf;
krb5_context krbContext = NULL;
krb5_principal krbPrinc;
+ struct rs_handle *rh = ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle;
+
+ assert(rh != NULL);
/* Awaits further specification */
if (ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME)
/* Acceptor-Service-Name */
krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_component(krbContext, krbPrinc, 0), &nameBuf);
- major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps,
- VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_NAME,
- VENDOR_ID_UKERNA,
- &nameBuf);
+ major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, rh, avps,
+ PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_NAME,
+ VENDORPEC_UKERNA,
+ &nameBuf);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
return major;
/* Acceptor-Host-Name */
krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_component(krbContext, krbPrinc, 1), &nameBuf);
- major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps,
- VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_HOST_NAME,
- VENDOR_ID_UKERNA,
- &nameBuf);
+ major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, rh, avps,
+ PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_HOST_NAME,
+ VENDORPEC_UKERNA,
+ &nameBuf);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
return major;
nameBuf.value = ssi;
nameBuf.length = strlen(ssi);
- major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps,
- VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_SPECIFIC,
- VENDOR_ID_UKERNA,
- &nameBuf);
+ major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, rh, avps,
+ PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_SPECIFIC,
+ VENDORPEC_UKERNA,
+ &nameBuf);
if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi);
krbDataToGssBuffer(krb5_princ_realm(krbContext, krbPrinc), &nameBuf);
if (nameBuf.length != 0) {
/* Acceptor-Realm-Name */
- major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle, avps,
- VENDOR_ATTR_GSS_ACCEPTOR_REALM_NAME,
- VENDOR_ID_UKERNA,
- &nameBuf);
+ major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, rh, avps,
+ PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_REALM_NAME,
+ VENDORPEC_UKERNA,
+ &nameBuf);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
return major;
}
gss_buffer_t outputToken)
{
OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
- int code;
- VALUE_PAIR *send = NULL;
- VALUE_PAIR *received = NULL;
- rc_handle *rh = ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle;
- char msgBuffer[4096];
- struct eap_hdr *pdu;
- unsigned char *pos;
- gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-
- pdu = (struct eap_hdr *)inputToken->value;
- pos = (unsigned char *)(pdu + 1);
-
- if (inputToken->length > sizeof(*pdu) &&
- pdu->code == EAP_CODE_RESPONSE &&
- pos[0] == EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY) {
- /*
- * XXX TODO do we really need to set User-Name? FreeRADIUS does
- * not appear to require it.
- */
- major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_USER_NAME, 0, &nameBuf);
+ struct rs_handle *rh;
+ struct rs_connection *rconn;
+ struct rs_packet *req = NULL, *resp = NULL;
+ struct radius_packet *frreq, *frresp;
+ int sendAcceptorIdentity = 0;
+
+ if (ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle == NULL) {
+ /* May be NULL from an imported partial context */
+ major = gssEapRadiusAllocConn(minor, cred, ctx);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
- major = setAcceptorIdentity(minor, ctx, &send);
+ sendAcceptorIdentity = 1;
+ }
+
+ rh = ctx->acceptorCtx.radHandle;
+ rconn = ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn;
+
+ if (rs_packet_create_acc_request(rconn, &req, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
+ major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ frreq = rs_packet_frpkt(req);
+
+ if (sendAcceptorIdentity) {
+ major = setAcceptorIdentity(minor, ctx, &frreq->vps);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
}
- major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, inputToken);
+ major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, rh, &frreq->vps, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, inputToken);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
- if (ctx->acceptorCtx.lastStatus == CHALLENGE_RC) {
- major = addAvpFromBuffer(minor, rh, &send, PW_STATE, 0,
- &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
+ if (ctx->acceptorCtx.state.length != 0) {
+ major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, rh, &frreq->vps, PW_STATE, 0,
+ &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
}
- code = rc_auth(rh, 0, send, &received, msgBuffer);
- switch (code) {
- case OK_RC:
- case CHALLENGE_RC:
+ if (rs_packet_send(req, NULL) != 0) {
+ major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ req = NULL;
+
+ if (rs_conn_receive_packet(rconn, &resp) != 0) {
+ major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn));
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ frresp = rs_packet_frpkt(resp);
+ switch (frresp->code) {
+ case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
+ case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
break;
- case TIMEOUT_RC:
- major = GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
- break;
- case REJECT_RC:
+ case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL;
+ goto cleanup;
break;
default:
major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
+ break;
}
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
-
- ctx->acceptorCtx.lastStatus = code;
-
- major = getBufferFromAvps(minor, received, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0,
- outputToken, TRUE);
- if ((major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && code != OK_RC) ||
+ major = gssEapRadiusGetAvp(minor, frresp->vps, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0,
+ outputToken, TRUE);
+ if ((major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && frresp->code != PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK) ||
GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
- if (code == CHALLENGE_RC) {
- major = getBufferFromAvps(minor, received, PW_STATE, 0,
- &ctx->acceptorCtx.state, TRUE);
+ if (frresp->code == PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE) {
+ major = gssEapRadiusGetAvp(minor, frresp->vps, PW_STATE, 0,
+ &ctx->acceptorCtx.state, TRUE);
if (major != GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
} else {
- ctx->acceptorCtx.avps = received;
- received = NULL;
+ ctx->acceptorCtx.avps = frresp->vps;
+ frresp->vps = NULL;
major = acceptReadyEap(minor, ctx, cred);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
cleanup:
- if (received != NULL)
- rc_avpair_free(received);
+ rs_packet_destroy(req);
+ rs_packet_destroy(resp);
return major;
}
OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
gss_buffer_desc credsToken = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
+ /*
+ * If we're built with fast reauthentication enabled, then
+ * fabricate a ticket from the initiator to ourselves.
+ * Otherwise return an empty token.
+ */
major = gssEapMakeReauthCreds(minor, ctx, cred, &credsToken);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
return major;
-
- ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
+#else
+ credsToken.value = "";
+#endif /* GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH */
major = duplicateBuffer(minor, &credsToken, outputToken);
if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
return major;
}
+#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &credsToken);
+#endif
+
+ ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
return GSS_S_BAD_STATUS;
}
-static OM_uint32
-acceptReadyKrb(OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
- gss_cred_id_t cred,
- const gss_name_t initiator,
- const gss_OID mech,
- OM_uint32 timeRec)
-{
- OM_uint32 major;
-
- major = gssEapGlueToMechName(minor, initiator, &ctx->initiatorName);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- return major;
-
- if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
- major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- return major;
- }
-
- major = gssEapReauthComplete(minor, ctx, cred, mech, timeRec);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- return major;
-
- ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
-
- return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-}
-
-static OM_uint32
-eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
- gss_cred_id_t cred,
- gss_buffer_t inputToken,
- gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
- gss_buffer_t outputToken)
-{
- OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
- gss_cred_id_t krbCred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
- gss_name_t krbInitiator = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
- gss_OID mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
- OM_uint32 gssFlags, timeRec = GSS_C_INDEFINITE;
-
- ctx->flags |= CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH_GSS;
-
- if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
- krbCred = cred->krbCred;
-
- major = gssAcceptSecContext(minor,
- &ctx->kerberosCtx,
- krbCred,
- inputToken,
- chanBindings,
- &krbInitiator,
- &mech,
- outputToken,
- &gssFlags,
- &timeRec,
- NULL);
- if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
- major = acceptReadyKrb(minor, ctx, cred,
- krbInitiator, mech, timeRec);
- }
-
- ctx->gssFlags = gssFlags & ~(GSS_C_DCE_STYLE);
-
- gssReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &krbInitiator);
-
- return major;
-}
-
static struct gss_eap_acceptor_sm {
enum gss_eap_token_type inputTokenType;
enum gss_eap_token_type outputTokenType;
{ TOK_TYPE_EXT_REQ, TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsReq },
{ TOK_TYPE_NONE, TOK_TYPE_EXT_RESP, eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsResp },
{ TOK_TYPE_NONE, TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmAcceptEstablished },
+#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
{ TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH, TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH, eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth },
+#endif
};
OM_uint32
output_token->length = 0;
output_token->value = NULL;
- if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && !(cred->flags & CRED_FLAG_ACCEPT)) {
- return GSS_S_NO_CRED;
- }
-
if (input_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER || input_token->length == 0) {
return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
}
GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&ctx->mutex);
+ /* Validate and lock credentials */
+ if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
+ GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&cred->mutex);
+
+ if ((cred->flags & CRED_FLAG_ACCEPT) == 0) {
+ major = GSS_S_NO_CRED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
sm = &eapGssAcceptorSm[ctx->state];
major = gssEapVerifyToken(minor, ctx, input_token,
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
- if (tokType == TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH && initialContextToken) {
- ctx->state = EAP_STATE_KRB_REAUTH_GSS;
- } else if (tokType != sm->inputTokenType) {
- major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ if (!gssEapCredAvailable(cred, ctx->mechanismUsed)) {
+ major = GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
goto cleanup;
}
- /* If credentials were provided, check they're usable with this mech */
- if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL &&
- !gssEapCredAvailable(cred, ctx->mechanismUsed)) {
- major = GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
+#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
+ /*
+ * If we're built with fast reauthentication support, it's valid
+ * for an initiator to send a GSS reauthentication token as its
+ * initial context token, causing us to short-circuit the state
+ * machine and process Kerberos GSS messages instead.
+ */
+ if (tokType == TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH && initialContextToken) {
+ ctx->state = EAP_STATE_KRB_REAUTH_GSS;
+ } else
+#endif
+ if (tokType != sm->inputTokenType) {
+ major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
goto cleanup;
}
assert(ctx->state == EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED || major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
cleanup:
+ if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
+ GSSEAP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&cred->mutex);
GSSEAP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ctx->mutex);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
return major;
}
+
+#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
+static OM_uint32
+acceptReadyKrb(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ const gss_name_t initiator,
+ const gss_OID mech,
+ OM_uint32 timeRec)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major;
+
+ major = gssEapGlueToMechName(minor, initiator, &ctx->initiatorName);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
+ major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+ }
+
+ major = gssEapReauthComplete(minor, ctx, cred, mech, timeRec);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
+
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+ gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+ gss_cred_id_t krbCred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+ gss_name_t krbInitiator = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+ gss_OID mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
+ OM_uint32 gssFlags, timeRec = GSS_C_INDEFINITE;
+
+ ctx->flags |= CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH_GSS;
+
+ if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
+ krbCred = cred->krbCred;
+
+ major = gssAcceptSecContext(minor,
+ &ctx->kerberosCtx,
+ krbCred,
+ inputToken,
+ chanBindings,
+ &krbInitiator,
+ &mech,
+ outputToken,
+ &gssFlags,
+ &timeRec,
+ NULL);
+ if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ major = acceptReadyKrb(minor, ctx, cred,
+ krbInitiator, mech, timeRec);
+ }
+
+ ctx->gssFlags = gssFlags;
+
+ gssReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &krbInitiator);
+
+ return major;
+}
+#endif /* GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH */
projects / mech_eap.orig / blobdiff