#include "gssapiP_eap.h"
+#ifdef BUILTIN_EAP
+#define EAP_KEY_AVAILABLE(ctx) ((ctx)->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapKeyAvailable)
+#define EAP_KEY_DATA(ctx) ((ctx)->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapKeyData)
+#define EAP_KEY_LENGTH(ctx) ((ctx)->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapKeyDataLen)
+#else
+#define EAP_KEY_AVAILABLE(ctx) 0
+#define EAP_KEY_DATA(ctx) NULL
+#define EAP_KEY_LENGTH(ctx) 0
+#endif /* BUILTIN_EAP */
+
+static OM_uint32
+acceptReady(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx);
+
+#ifdef BUILTIN_EAP
#define EAP_MAX_METHODS 8
#define EAP_TTLS_AUTH_PAP 1
#define EAP_TTLS_AUTH_MSCHAP 4
#define EAP_TTLS_AUTH_MSCHAPV2 8
-#if 1
struct eap_user {
struct {
int vendor;
const u8 * eap_get_identity(struct eap_sm *sm, size_t *len);
struct eap_eapol_interface * eap_get_interface(struct eap_sm *sm);
+#include <eap_server/eap_i.h>
+
static OM_uint32
initTls(OM_uint32 *minor,
gss_ctx_id_t ctx)
*len = 0;
return NULL;
}
-#endif
-
-static OM_uint32
-serverDeriveKey(OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_ctx_id_t ctx)
-{
- OM_uint32 major;
- krb5_context krbContext;
-
- GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
-
- /* Cache encryption type derived from selected mechanism OID */
- major = gssEapOidToEnctype(minor, ctx->mechanismUsed, &ctx->encryptionType);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- return major;
-
- if (ctx->encryptionType != ENCTYPE_NULL &&
- ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapKeyAvailable) {
- major = gssEapDeriveRFC3961Key(minor,
- ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapKeyData,
- ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapKeyDataLen,
- ctx->encryptionType,
- &ctx->rfc3961Key);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- return major;
- } else {
- /*
- * draft-howlett-eap-gss says that integrity/confidentialty should
- * always be advertised as available, but if we have no keying
- * material it seems confusing to the caller to advertise this.
- */
- ctx->gssFlags &= ~(GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_CONF_FLAG);
- }
-
- return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-}
static OM_uint32
eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate(OM_uint32 *minor,
gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
gss_buffer_t outputToken)
{
- OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor, tmpMajor;
+ OM_uint32 major;
+ OM_uint32 tmpMinor, tmpMajor;
int code;
struct wpabuf respData;
- struct eap_config *config = (struct eap_config *)&ctx->acceptorCtx.eapConfig;
static struct eapol_callbacks cb = { serverGetEapUser, serverGetEapReqIdText };
-
- wpabuf_set(&respData, inputToken->value, inputToken->length);
- ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapRespData = &respData;
- ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapResp = TRUE;
-
if (ctx->acceptorCtx.eap == NULL) {
- /* initial context token */
- config->eap_server = 1;
- config->ssl_ctx = ctx->acceptorCtx.tlsContext;
+ struct eap_config eapConfig;
major = initTls(minor, ctx);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
- ctx->acceptorCtx.eap = eap_server_sm_init(ctx, &cb, config);
+ memset(&eapConfig, 0, sizeof(eapConfig));
+ eapConfig.eap_server = 1;
+ eapConfig.ssl_ctx = ctx->acceptorCtx.tlsContext;
+
+ ctx->acceptorCtx.eap = eap_server_sm_init(ctx, &cb, &eapConfig);
if (ctx->acceptorCtx.eap == NULL) {
major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
goto cleanup;
ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapRestart = TRUE;
}
- if (ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME && cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
+ if (ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME &&
+ cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL &&
+ cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
major = gss_duplicate_name(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
}
+ wpabuf_set(&respData, inputToken->value, inputToken->length);
+ ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapRespData = &respData;
+ ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapResp = TRUE;
+
code = eap_server_sm_step(ctx->acceptorCtx.eap);
if (ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapReq) {
}
if (ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapSuccess) {
- major = serverDeriveKey(minor, ctx);
+ ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapSuccess = 0;
+ major = acceptReady(minor, ctx);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
- ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapSuccess = 0;
- ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
- major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ ctx->state = EAP_STATE_GSS_CHANNEL_BINDINGS;
+ major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
} else if (ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapFail) {
ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapFail = 0;
major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
tmpMajor = duplicateBuffer(&tmpMinor, &buf, outputToken);
if (GSS_ERROR(tmpMajor)) {
major = tmpMajor;
+ *minor = tmpMinor;
goto cleanup;
}
}
cleanup:
+ ctx->acceptorCtx.eapPolInterface->eapRespData = NULL;
+
+ return major;
+}
+#else
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+ gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+
+cleanup:
+ return major;
+}
+#endif /* BUILTIN_EAP */
+
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+ gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+ gss_iov_buffer_desc iov[2];
+
+ outputToken->length = 0;
+ outputToken->value = NULL;
+
+ if (chanBindings == GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS) {
+ ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+
+ if (inputToken->length < 14) {
+ return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+ }
+
+ iov[0].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_DATA;
+ iov[0].buffer.length = 0;
+ iov[0].buffer.value = NULL;
+
+ if (chanBindings != GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS)
+ iov[0].buffer = chanBindings->application_data;
+
+ iov[1].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_HEADER;
+ iov[1].buffer.length = 16;
+ iov[1].buffer.value = (unsigned char *)inputToken->value - 2;
+
+ assert(load_uint16_be(iov[1].buffer.value) == TOK_TYPE_GSS_CB);
+
+ iov[2].type = GSS_IOV_BUFFER_TYPE_TRAILER;
+ iov[2].buffer.length = inputToken->length - 14;
+ iov[2].buffer.value = (unsigned char *)inputToken->value + 14;
+
+ major = gssEapUnwrapOrVerifyMIC(minor, ctx, NULL, NULL,
+ iov, 3, TOK_TYPE_GSS_CB);
+ if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ ctx->state = EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
+ }
+
+#if 0
+ gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &iov[0].buffer);
+#endif
+
return major;
}
return GSS_S_BAD_STATUS;
}
-static struct eap_gss_acceptor_sm {
+static struct gss_eap_acceptor_sm {
enum gss_eap_token_type inputTokenType;
enum gss_eap_token_type outputTokenType;
OM_uint32 (*processToken)(OM_uint32 *,
gss_channel_bindings_t,
gss_buffer_t);
} eapGssAcceptorSm[] = {
- { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate },
- { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, NULL },
- { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, NULL },
- { TOK_TYPE_GSS_CB, TOK_TYPE_NONE, NULL },
- { TOK_TYPE_NONE, TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmAcceptEstablished },
+ { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate },
+#if 0
+ { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, NULL },
+ { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP, TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ, NULL },
+#endif
+ { TOK_TYPE_GSS_CB, TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmAcceptGssChannelBindings },
+ { TOK_TYPE_NONE, TOK_TYPE_NONE, eapGssSmAcceptEstablished },
};
OM_uint32
OM_uint32 *time_rec,
gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle)
{
- OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+ OM_uint32 major;
+ OM_uint32 tmpMajor, tmpMinor;
gss_ctx_id_t ctx = *context_handle;
- struct eap_gss_acceptor_sm *sm = NULL;
+ struct gss_eap_acceptor_sm *sm = NULL;
gss_buffer_desc innerInputToken, innerOutputToken;
*minor = 0;
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
+ /* If credentials were provided, check they're usable with this mech */
+ if (!gssEapCredAvailable(cred, ctx->mechanismUsed)) {
+ major = GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
do {
+ sm = &eapGssAcceptorSm[ctx->state];
+
major = (sm->processToken)(minor,
ctx,
cred,
goto cleanup;
} while (major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED && innerOutputToken.length == 0);
- if (src_name != NULL && ctx->initiatorName != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
- major = gss_duplicate_name(minor, ctx->initiatorName, src_name);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
- }
if (mech_type != NULL) {
if (!gssEapInternalizeOid(ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type))
duplicateOid(&tmpMinor, ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type);
}
if (innerOutputToken.length != 0) {
- major = gssEapMakeToken(minor, ctx, &innerOutputToken,
- sm->outputTokenType, output_token);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ tmpMajor = gssEapMakeToken(&tmpMinor, ctx, &innerOutputToken,
+ sm->outputTokenType, output_token);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(tmpMajor)) {
+ major = tmpMajor;
+ *minor = tmpMinor;
goto cleanup;
+ }
}
if (ret_flags != NULL)
*ret_flags = ctx->gssFlags;
- if (time_rec != NULL)
- gss_context_time(&tmpMinor, ctx, time_rec);
if (delegated_cred_handle != NULL)
*delegated_cred_handle = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+ if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ if (src_name != NULL && ctx->initiatorName != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
+ major = gss_duplicate_name(&tmpMinor, ctx->initiatorName, src_name);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (time_rec != NULL)
+ gss_context_time(&tmpMinor, ctx, time_rec);
+ }
+
assert(ctx->state == EAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED || major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
cleanup:
return major;
}
+
+/*
+ * Mark a context as ready for cryptographic operations
+ */
+static OM_uint32
+acceptReady(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major;
+
+ /* Cache encryption type derived from selected mechanism OID */
+ major = gssEapOidToEnctype(minor, ctx->mechanismUsed, &ctx->encryptionType);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ if (ctx->encryptionType != ENCTYPE_NULL &&
+ EAP_KEY_AVAILABLE(ctx)) {
+ major = gssEapDeriveRfc3961Key(minor,
+ EAP_KEY_DATA(ctx),
+ EAP_KEY_LENGTH(ctx),
+ ctx->encryptionType,
+ &ctx->rfc3961Key);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key,
+ &ctx->checksumType);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * draft-howlett-eap-gss says that integrity/confidentialty should
+ * always be advertised as available, but if we have no keying
+ * material it seems confusing to the caller to advertise this.
+ */
+ ctx->gssFlags &= ~(GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | GSS_C_CONF_FLAG);
+ }
+
+ major = sequenceInit(minor,
+ &ctx->seqState, ctx->recvSeq,
+ ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG) != 0),
+ ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG) != 0),
+ TRUE);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
projects / mech_eap.orig / blobdiff