Heimdal portability fixes (except for reauth)
[mech_eap.orig] / accept_sec_context.c
index fe2c8dd..d7a4708 100644 (file)
  * SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 
+/*
+ * Establish a security context on the acceptor (server). These functions
+ * wrap around libradsec and (thus) talk to a RADIUS server or proxy.
+ */
+
 #include "gssapiP_eap.h"
 
+#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor,
+                        gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+                        gss_cred_id_t cred,
+                        gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+                        gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+                        gss_buffer_t outputToken);
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Mark an acceptor context as ready for cryptographic operations
+ */
+static OM_uint32
+acceptReadyEap(OM_uint32 *minor, gss_ctx_id_t ctx, gss_cred_id_t cred)
+{
+    OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+    VALUE_PAIR *vp;
+    gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+
+    /* Cache encryption type derived from selected mechanism OID */
+    major = gssEapOidToEnctype(minor, ctx->mechanismUsed,
+                               &ctx->encryptionType);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
+
+    gssEapReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &ctx->initiatorName);
+
+    major = gssEapRadiusGetRawAvp(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.vps,
+                                  PW_USER_NAME, 0, &vp);
+    if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+        nameBuf.length = vp->length;
+        nameBuf.value = vp->vp_strvalue;
+    } else {
+        ctx->gssFlags |= GSS_C_ANON_FLAG;
+    }
+
+    major = gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
+                             &ctx->initiatorName);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
+
+    major = gssEapRadiusGetRawAvp(minor, ctx->acceptorCtx.vps,
+                                  PW_MS_MPPE_SEND_KEY, VENDORPEC_MS, &vp);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+        *minor = GSSEAP_KEY_UNAVAILABLE;
+        return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+    }
+
+    major = gssEapDeriveRfc3961Key(minor,
+                                   vp->vp_octets,
+                                   vp->length,
+                                   ctx->encryptionType,
+                                   &ctx->rfc3961Key);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
+
+    major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key,
+                                       &ctx->checksumType);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
+
+    major = sequenceInit(minor,
+                         &ctx->seqState, ctx->recvSeq,
+                         ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG) != 0),
+                         ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG) != 0),
+                         TRUE);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
+
+    major = gssEapCreateAttrContext(minor, cred, ctx,
+                                    &ctx->initiatorName->attrCtx,
+                                    &ctx->expiryTime);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
+
+    *minor = 0;
+    return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Emit a identity EAP request to force the initiator (peer) to identify
+ * itself.
+ */
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
+                       gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+                       gss_cred_id_t cred,
+                       gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+                       gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+                       gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+{
+    OM_uint32 major;
+    union {
+        struct eap_hdr pdu;
+        unsigned char data[5];
+    } pkt;
+    gss_buffer_desc pktBuffer;
+
+    if (inputToken != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER && inputToken->length != 0) {
+        *minor = GSSEAP_WRONG_SIZE;
+        return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+    }
+
+    assert(ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME);
+
+    if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
+        major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+            return major;
+    }
+
+    pkt.pdu.code = EAP_CODE_REQUEST;
+    pkt.pdu.identifier = 0;
+    pkt.pdu.length = htons(sizeof(pkt.data));
+    pkt.data[4] = EAP_TYPE_IDENTITY;
+
+    pktBuffer.length = sizeof(pkt.data);
+    pktBuffer.value = pkt.data;
+
+    major = duplicateBuffer(minor, &pktBuffer, outputToken);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
+
+    ctx->state = GSSEAP_STATE_AUTHENTICATE;
+
+    *minor = 0;
+    return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Pass the asserted acceptor identity to the authentication server.
+ */
+static OM_uint32
+setAcceptorIdentity(OM_uint32 *minor,
+                    gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+                    VALUE_PAIR **vps)
+{
+    OM_uint32 major;
+    gss_buffer_desc nameBuf;
+    krb5_context krbContext = NULL;
+    krb5_principal krbPrinc;
+    struct rs_context *rc = ctx->acceptorCtx.radContext;
+
+    assert(rc != NULL);
+
+    if (ctx->acceptorName == GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
+        *minor = 0;
+        return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+    }
+
+    if ((ctx->acceptorName->flags & NAME_FLAG_SERVICE) == 0) {
+        *minor = GSSEAP_BAD_SERVICE_NAME;
+        return GSS_S_BAD_NAME;
+    }
+
+    GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
+
+    krbPrinc = ctx->acceptorName->krbPrincipal;
+    assert(krbPrinc != NULL);
+    assert(KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(krbPrinc) >= 2);
+
+    /* Acceptor-Service-Name */
+    krbPrincComponentToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, 0, &nameBuf);
+
+    major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps,
+                               PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_NAME,
+                               VENDORPEC_UKERNA,
+                               &nameBuf);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
+
+    /* Acceptor-Host-Name */
+    krbPrincComponentToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, 1, &nameBuf);
+
+    major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps,
+                               PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_HOST_NAME,
+                               VENDORPEC_UKERNA,
+                               &nameBuf);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
+
+    if (KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(krbPrinc) > 2) {
+        /* Acceptor-Service-Specific */
+        krb5_principal_data ssiPrinc = *krbPrinc;
+        char *ssi;
+
+        KRB_PRINC_LENGTH(&ssiPrinc) -= 2;
+        KRB_PRINC_NAME(&ssiPrinc) += 2;
+
+        *minor = krb5_unparse_name_flags(krbContext, &ssiPrinc,
+                                         KRB5_PRINCIPAL_UNPARSE_NO_REALM, &ssi);
+        if (*minor != 0)
+            return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+        nameBuf.value = ssi;
+        nameBuf.length = strlen(ssi);
+
+        major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps,
+                                   PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_SERVICE_SPECIFIC,
+                                   VENDORPEC_UKERNA,
+                                   &nameBuf);
+
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+            krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi);
+            return major;
+        }
+        krb5_free_unparsed_name(krbContext, ssi);
+    }
+
+    krbPrincRealmToGssBuffer(krbPrinc, &nameBuf);
+    if (nameBuf.length != 0) {
+        /* Acceptor-Realm-Name */
+        major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, vps,
+                                   PW_GSS_ACCEPTOR_REALM_NAME,
+                                   VENDORPEC_UKERNA,
+                                   &nameBuf);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+            return major;
+    }
+
+    *minor = 0;
+    return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate a RadSec handle
+ */
+static OM_uint32
+createRadiusHandle(OM_uint32 *minor,
+                   gss_cred_id_t cred,
+                   gss_ctx_id_t ctx)
+{
+    struct gss_eap_acceptor_ctx *actx = &ctx->acceptorCtx;
+    const char *configFile = RS_CONFIG_FILE;
+    const char *configStanza = "gss-eap";
+    struct rs_alloc_scheme ralloc;
+    struct rs_error *err;
+
+    assert(actx->radContext == NULL);
+    assert(actx->radConn == NULL);
+
+    if (rs_context_create(&actx->radContext, RS_DICT_FILE) != 0) {
+        *minor = GSSEAP_RADSEC_CONTEXT_FAILURE;
+        return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+    }
+
+    if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
+        if (cred->radiusConfigFile != NULL)
+            configFile = cred->radiusConfigFile;
+        if (cred->radiusConfigStanza != NULL)
+            configStanza = cred->radiusConfigStanza;
+    }
+
+    ralloc.calloc  = GSSEAP_CALLOC;
+    ralloc.malloc  = GSSEAP_MALLOC;
+    ralloc.free    = GSSEAP_FREE;
+    ralloc.realloc = GSSEAP_REALLOC;
+
+    rs_context_set_alloc_scheme(actx->radContext, &ralloc);
+
+    if (rs_context_read_config(actx->radContext, configFile) != 0) {
+        err = rs_err_ctx_pop(actx->radContext);
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    if (rs_conn_create(actx->radContext, &actx->radConn, configStanza) != 0) {
+        err = rs_err_conn_pop(actx->radConn);
+        goto fail;
+    }
+
+    if (actx->radServer != NULL) {
+        if (rs_conn_select_server(actx->radConn, actx->radServer) != 0) {
+            err = rs_err_conn_pop(actx->radConn);
+            goto fail;
+        }
+    }
+
+    *minor = 0;
+    return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+
+fail:
+    return gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, err);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process a EAP response from the initiator.
+ */
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate(OM_uint32 *minor,
+                           gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+                           gss_cred_id_t cred,
+                           gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+                           gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+                           gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+{
+    OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+    struct rs_connection *rconn;
+    struct rs_request *request = NULL;
+    struct rs_packet *req = NULL, *resp = NULL;
+    struct radius_packet *frreq, *frresp;
+    int sendAcceptorIdentity = 0;
+
+    if (ctx->acceptorCtx.radContext == NULL) {
+        /* May be NULL from an imported partial context */
+        major = createRadiusHandle(minor, cred, ctx);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+            goto cleanup;
+
+        sendAcceptorIdentity = 1;
+    }
+
+    rconn = ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn;
+
+    if (rs_packet_create_acc_request(rconn, &req, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
+        major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn));
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+    frreq = rs_packet_frpkt(req);
+
+    if (sendAcceptorIdentity) {
+        major = setAcceptorIdentity(minor, ctx, &frreq->vps);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+            goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, &frreq->vps,
+                               PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0, inputToken);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        goto cleanup;
+
+    if (ctx->acceptorCtx.state.length != 0) {
+        major = gssEapRadiusAddAvp(minor, &frreq->vps, PW_STATE, 0,
+                                   &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+            goto cleanup;
+
+        gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &ctx->acceptorCtx.state);
+    }
+
+    if (rs_request_create(rconn, &request) != 0 ||
+        rs_request_send(request, req, &resp) != 0) {
+        major = gssEapRadiusMapError(minor, rs_err_conn_pop(rconn));
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    assert(resp != NULL);
+
+    frresp = rs_packet_frpkt(resp);
+    switch (frresp->code) {
+    case PW_AUTHENTICATION_ACK:
+    case PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE:
+        major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
+        break;
+    case PW_AUTHENTICATION_REJECT:
+        *minor = GSSEAP_RADIUS_AUTH_FAILURE;
+        major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_CREDENTIAL;
+        goto cleanup;
+        break;
+    default:
+        *minor = GSSEAP_UNKNOWN_RADIUS_CODE;
+        major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+        goto cleanup;
+        break;
+    }
+
+    major = gssEapRadiusGetAvp(minor, frresp->vps, PW_EAP_MESSAGE, 0,
+                               outputToken, TRUE);
+    if (major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE && frresp->code == PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE) {
+        *minor = GSSEAP_MISSING_EAP_REQUEST;
+        major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+        goto cleanup;
+    } else if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        goto cleanup;
+
+    if (frresp->code == PW_ACCESS_CHALLENGE) {
+        major = gssEapRadiusGetAvp(minor, frresp->vps, PW_STATE, 0,
+                                   &ctx->acceptorCtx.state, TRUE);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major) && *minor != GSSEAP_NO_SUCH_ATTR)
+            goto cleanup;
+    } else {
+        ctx->acceptorCtx.vps = frresp->vps;
+        frresp->vps = NULL;
+
+        rs_conn_destroy(ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn);
+        ctx->acceptorCtx.radConn = NULL;
+
+        major = acceptReadyEap(minor, ctx, cred);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+            goto cleanup;
+
+        ctx->state = GSSEAP_STATE_EXTENSIONS_REQ;
+    }
+
+    *minor = 0;
+    major = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
+
+cleanup:
+    rs_request_destroy(request);
+
+    return major;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsReq(OM_uint32 *minor,
+                            gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+                            gss_cred_id_t cred,
+                            gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+                            gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+                            gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+{
+    OM_uint32 major;
+
+    major = gssEapVerifyExtensions(minor, cred, ctx, chanBindings, inputToken);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
+
+    outputToken->length = 0;
+    outputToken->value = NULL;
+
+    ctx->state = GSSEAP_STATE_EXTENSIONS_RESP;
+
+    *minor = 0;
+    return GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsResp(OM_uint32 *minor,
+                             gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+                             gss_cred_id_t cred,
+                             gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+                             gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+                             gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+{
+    OM_uint32 major;
+
+    major = gssEapMakeExtensions(minor, cred, ctx, chanBindings, outputToken);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
+
+    ctx->state = GSSEAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
+
+    *minor = 0;
+    return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptEstablished(OM_uint32 *minor,
+                          gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+                          gss_cred_id_t cred,
+                          gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+                          gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+                          gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+{
+    /* Called with already established context */
+    *minor = GSSEAP_CONTEXT_ESTABLISHED;
+    return GSS_S_BAD_STATUS;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+makeErrorToken(OM_uint32 *minor,
+               OM_uint32 majorStatus,
+               OM_uint32 minorStatus,
+               gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+{
+    unsigned char errorData[8];
+    gss_buffer_desc errorBuffer;
+
+    assert(GSS_ERROR(majorStatus));
+
+    /*
+     * Only return error codes that the initiator could have caused,
+     * to avoid information leakage.
+     */
+    if (IS_RADIUS_ERROR(minorStatus)) {
+        /* Squash RADIUS error codes */
+        minorStatus = GSSEAP_RADIUS_PROT_FAILURE;
+    } else if (!IS_WIRE_ERROR(minorStatus)) {
+        /* Don't return non-wire error codes */
+        return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+    }
+
+    minorStatus -= ERROR_TABLE_BASE_eapg;
+
+    store_uint32_be(majorStatus, &errorData[0]);
+    store_uint32_be(minorStatus, &errorData[4]);
+
+    errorBuffer.length = sizeof(errorData);
+    errorBuffer.value = errorData;
+
+    return duplicateBuffer(minor, &errorBuffer, outputToken);
+}
+
+static struct gss_eap_acceptor_sm {
+    enum gss_eap_token_type inputTokenType;
+    enum gss_eap_token_type outputTokenType;
+    OM_uint32 (*processToken)(OM_uint32 *,
+                              gss_ctx_id_t,
+                              gss_cred_id_t,
+                              gss_buffer_t,
+                              gss_channel_bindings_t,
+                              gss_buffer_t);
+} eapGssAcceptorSm[] = {
+    { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP,    TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ,       eapGssSmAcceptIdentity           },
+    { TOK_TYPE_EAP_RESP,    TOK_TYPE_EAP_REQ,       eapGssSmAcceptAuthenticate       },
+    { TOK_TYPE_EXT_REQ,     TOK_TYPE_NONE,          eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsReq      },
+    { TOK_TYPE_NONE,        TOK_TYPE_EXT_RESP,      eapGssSmAcceptExtensionsResp     },
+    { TOK_TYPE_NONE,        TOK_TYPE_NONE,          eapGssSmAcceptEstablished        },
+    { TOK_TYPE_NONE,        TOK_TYPE_CONTEXT_ERR,   NULL                             },
+#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
+    { TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH,  TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH,    eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth          },
+#endif
+};
+
 OM_uint32
 gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor,
                        gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
-                       gss_cred_id_t acceptor_cred_handle,
-                       gss_buffer_t input_token_buffer,
+                       gss_cred_id_t cred,
+                       gss_buffer_t input_token,
                        gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
                        gss_name_t *src_name,
                        gss_OID *mech_type,
@@ -45,5 +564,217 @@ gss_accept_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor,
                        OM_uint32 *time_rec,
                        gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle)
 {
-    GSSEAP_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
+    OM_uint32 major;
+    OM_uint32 tmpMajor, tmpMinor;
+    gss_ctx_id_t ctx = *context_handle;
+    struct gss_eap_acceptor_sm *sm = NULL;
+    gss_buffer_desc innerInputToken = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+    gss_buffer_desc innerOutputToken = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+    enum gss_eap_token_type tokType;
+    int initialContextToken = 0;
+
+    *minor = 0;
+
+    output_token->length = 0;
+    output_token->value = NULL;
+
+    if (input_token == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER || input_token->length == 0) {
+        *minor = GSSEAP_TOK_TRUNC;
+        return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+    }
+
+    if (ctx == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
+        major = gssEapAllocContext(minor, &ctx);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+            return major;
+
+        initialContextToken = 1;
+        *context_handle = ctx;
+    }
+
+    GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&ctx->mutex);
+
+    /* Validate and lock credentials */
+    if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
+        GSSEAP_MUTEX_LOCK(&cred->mutex);
+
+        if ((cred->flags & CRED_FLAG_ACCEPT) == 0) {
+            *minor = GSSEAP_CRED_USAGE_MISMATCH;
+            major = GSS_S_NO_CRED;
+            goto cleanup;
+        }
+    }
+
+    sm = &eapGssAcceptorSm[ctx->state];
+
+    major = gssEapVerifyToken(minor, ctx, input_token,
+                              &tokType, &innerInputToken);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        goto cleanup;
+
+    if (!gssEapCredAvailable(cred, ctx->mechanismUsed)) {
+        *minor = GSSEAP_CRED_MECH_MISMATCH;
+        major = GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
+    /*
+     * If we're built with fast reauthentication support, it's valid
+     * for an initiator to send a GSS reauthentication token as its
+     * initial context token, causing us to short-circuit the state
+     * machine and process Kerberos GSS messages instead.
+     */
+    if (tokType == TOK_TYPE_GSS_REAUTH && initialContextToken) {
+        ctx->state = GSSEAP_STATE_KRB_REAUTH;
+    } else
+#endif
+    if (tokType != sm->inputTokenType) {
+        *minor = GSSEAP_WRONG_TOK_ID;
+        major = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    do {
+        sm = &eapGssAcceptorSm[ctx->state];
+
+        major = (sm->processToken)(minor,
+                                   ctx,
+                                   cred,
+                                   &innerInputToken,
+                                   input_chan_bindings,
+                                   &innerOutputToken);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+            /* Possibly generate an error token */
+            tmpMajor = makeErrorToken(&tmpMinor, major, *minor, &innerOutputToken);
+            if (GSS_ERROR(tmpMajor)) {
+                major = tmpMajor;
+                goto cleanup;
+            }
+
+            sm = &eapGssAcceptorSm[GSSEAP_STATE_ERROR];
+            goto send_token;
+        }
+    } while (major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED && innerOutputToken.length == 0);
+
+    if (mech_type != NULL) {
+        if (!gssEapInternalizeOid(ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type))
+            duplicateOid(&tmpMinor, ctx->mechanismUsed, mech_type);
+    }
+    if (ret_flags != NULL)
+        *ret_flags = ctx->gssFlags;
+    if (delegated_cred_handle != NULL)
+        *delegated_cred_handle = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+
+    if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+        if (src_name != NULL && ctx->initiatorName != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
+            major = gssEapDuplicateName(&tmpMinor, ctx->initiatorName, src_name);
+            if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+                goto cleanup;
+        }
+        if (time_rec != NULL) {
+            major = gssEapContextTime(&tmpMinor, ctx, time_rec);
+            if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+                goto cleanup;
+        }
+    }
+
+    assert(ctx->state == GSSEAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED || major == GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
+
+send_token:
+    if (innerOutputToken.value != NULL) {
+        tmpMajor = gssEapMakeToken(&tmpMinor, ctx, &innerOutputToken,
+                                   sm->outputTokenType, output_token);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(tmpMajor)) {
+            major = tmpMajor;
+            *minor = tmpMinor;
+            goto cleanup;
+        }
+    }
+
+cleanup:
+    if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
+        GSSEAP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&cred->mutex);
+    GSSEAP_MUTEX_UNLOCK(&ctx->mutex);
+
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        gssEapReleaseContext(&tmpMinor, context_handle);
+
+    gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &innerOutputToken);
+
+    return major;
+}
+
+#ifdef GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH
+static OM_uint32
+acceptReadyKrb(OM_uint32 *minor,
+               gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+               gss_cred_id_t cred,
+               const gss_name_t initiator,
+               const gss_OID mech,
+               OM_uint32 timeRec)
+{
+    OM_uint32 major;
+
+    major = gssEapGlueToMechName(minor, initiator, &ctx->initiatorName);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
+
+    if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
+        major = gssEapDuplicateName(minor, cred->name, &ctx->acceptorName);
+        if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+            return major;
+    }
+
+    major = gssEapReauthComplete(minor, ctx, cred, mech, timeRec);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        return major;
+
+    ctx->state = GSSEAP_STATE_ESTABLISHED;
+
+    *minor = 0;
+    return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+eapGssSmAcceptGssReauth(OM_uint32 *minor,
+                        gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+                        gss_cred_id_t cred,
+                        gss_buffer_t inputToken,
+                        gss_channel_bindings_t chanBindings,
+                        gss_buffer_t outputToken)
+{
+    OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+    gss_cred_id_t krbCred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+    gss_name_t krbInitiator = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+    gss_OID mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
+    OM_uint32 gssFlags, timeRec = GSS_C_INDEFINITE;
+
+    ctx->flags |= CTX_FLAG_KRB_REAUTH;
+
+    if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
+        krbCred = cred->krbCred;
+
+    major = gssAcceptSecContext(minor,
+                                &ctx->kerberosCtx,
+                                krbCred,
+                                inputToken,
+                                chanBindings,
+                                &krbInitiator,
+                                &mech,
+                                outputToken,
+                                &gssFlags,
+                                &timeRec,
+                                NULL);
+    if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+        major = acceptReadyKrb(minor, ctx, cred,
+                               krbInitiator, mech, timeRec);
+    }
+
+    ctx->gssFlags = gssFlags;
+
+    gssReleaseName(&tmpMinor, &krbInitiator);
+
+    return major;
 }
+#endif /* GSSEAP_ENABLE_REAUTH */