Use AD-KDCIssued to protect RADIUS authdata. Cleanup.
[mech_eap.orig] / util_reauth.c
index a63ca06..63b12d9 100644 (file)
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ getAcceptorKey(krb5_context krbContext,
 
     if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
         code = krb5_kt_get_entry(krbContext, keytab,
-                                 cred->name->krbPrincipal, 0, 
+                                 cred->name->krbPrincipal, 0,
                                  ctx->encryptionType, &ktent);
         if (code != 0)
             goto cleanup;
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ cleanup:
         memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
     }
 
-    return code; 
+    return code;
 }
 
 OM_uint32
@@ -117,17 +117,17 @@ gssEapMakeReauthCreds(OM_uint32 *minor,
     krb5_error_code code;
     krb5_context krbContext = NULL;
     krb5_ticket ticket = { 0 };
-    krb5_keyblock session, acceptorKey = { 0 };
+    krb5_keyblock session = { 0 }, acceptorKey = { 0 };
     krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_part = { 0 };
     gss_buffer_desc attrBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
     krb5_authdata *authData[2], authDatum = { 0 };
     krb5_data *ticketData = NULL, *credsData = NULL;
     krb5_creds creds = { 0 };
     krb5_auth_context authContext = NULL;
+
     credBuf->length = 0;
     credBuf->value = NULL;
+
     GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
 
     code = getAcceptorKey(krbContext, ctx, cred,
@@ -170,7 +170,12 @@ gssEapMakeReauthCreds(OM_uint32 *minor,
     authDatum.contents = attrBuf.value;
     authData[0] = &authDatum;
     authData[1] = NULL;
-    enc_part.authorization_data = authData;
+
+    code = krb5_make_authdata_kdc_issued(krbContext, &session,
+                                         ticket.server, authData,
+                                         &enc_part.authorization_data);
+    if (code != 0)
+        goto cleanup;
 
     ticket.enc_part2 = &enc_part;
 
@@ -198,7 +203,8 @@ gssEapMakeReauthCreds(OM_uint32 *minor,
     if (code != 0)
         goto cleanup;
 
-    code = krb5_auth_con_setsendsubkey(krbContext, authContext, &ctx->rfc3961Key);
+    code = krb5_auth_con_setsendsubkey(krbContext, authContext,
+                                       &ctx->rfc3961Key);
     if (code != 0)
         goto cleanup;
 
@@ -216,6 +222,7 @@ cleanup:
     gss_release_buffer(minor, &attrBuf);
     krb5_free_data(krbContext, ticketData);
     krb5_auth_con_free(krbContext, authContext);
+    krb5_free_authdata(krbContext, enc_part.authorization_data);
     if (credsData != NULL)
         GSSEAP_FREE(credsData);
 
@@ -293,14 +300,18 @@ gssEapStoreReauthCreds(OM_uint32 *minor,
     if (code != 0)
         goto cleanup;
 
-    code = krb5_cc_initialize(krbContext, cred->krbCredCache, creds[0]->client);
+    code = krb5_cc_initialize(krbContext, cred->krbCredCache,
+                              creds[0]->client);
     if (code != 0)
         goto cleanup;
 
     for (i = 0; creds[i] != NULL; i++) {
         krb5_creds kcred = *(creds[i]);
 
-        /* Swap in the acceptor name the client asked for so get_credentials() works */
+        /*
+         * Swap in the acceptor name the client asked for so
+         * get_credentials() works
+         */
         if (!isTicketGrantingServiceP(krbContext, kcred.server))
             kcred.server = ctx->acceptorName->krbPrincipal;
 
@@ -393,18 +404,42 @@ static OM_uint32 (*gssKrbExtractAuthzDataFromSecContextNext)(
     int ad_type,
     gss_buffer_t ad_data);
 
+static OM_uint32 (*gssStoreCredNext)(
+    OM_uint32 *minor,
+    const gss_cred_id_t input_cred_handle,
+    gss_cred_usage_t input_usage,
+    const gss_OID desired_mech,
+    OM_uint32 overwrite_cred,
+    OM_uint32 default_cred,
+    gss_OID_set *elements_stored,
+    gss_cred_usage_t *cred_usage_stored);
+
+static OM_uint32 (*gssGetNameAttributeNext)(
+    OM_uint32 *minor,
+    gss_name_t name,
+    gss_buffer_t attr,
+    int *authenticated,
+    int *complete,
+    gss_buffer_t value,
+    gss_buffer_t display_value,
+    int *more);
+
+#define NEXT_SYMBOL(local, global)  ((local) = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, (global)))
+
 OM_uint32
 gssEapReauthInitialize(OM_uint32 *minor)
 {
-    gssInitSecContextNext = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "gss_init_sec_context");
-    gssAcceptSecContextNext = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "gss_accept_sec_context");
-    gssReleaseCredNext = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "gss_release_cred");
-    gssReleaseNameNext = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "gss_release_name");
-    gssInquireSecContextByOidNext = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid");
-    gssDeleteSecContextNext = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "gss_delete_sec_context");
-    gssDisplayNameNext = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "gss_display_name");
-    gssImportNameNext = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "gss_import_name");
-    gssKrbExtractAuthzDataFromSecContextNext = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "gsskrb5_extract_authz_data_from_sec_context");
+    NEXT_SYMBOL(gssInitSecContextNext,                    "gss_init_sec_context");
+    NEXT_SYMBOL(gssAcceptSecContextNext,                  "gss_accept_sec_context");
+    NEXT_SYMBOL(gssReleaseCredNext,                       "gss_release_cred");
+    NEXT_SYMBOL(gssReleaseNameNext,                       "gss_release_name");
+    NEXT_SYMBOL(gssInquireSecContextByOidNext,            "gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid");
+    NEXT_SYMBOL(gssDeleteSecContextNext,                  "gss_delete_sec_context");
+    NEXT_SYMBOL(gssDisplayNameNext,                       "gss_display_name");
+    NEXT_SYMBOL(gssImportNameNext,                        "gss_import_name");
+    NEXT_SYMBOL(gssKrbExtractAuthzDataFromSecContextNext, "gsskrb5_extract_authz_data_from_sec_context");
+    NEXT_SYMBOL(gssStoreCredNext,                         "gss_store_cred");
+    NEXT_SYMBOL(gssGetNameAttributeNext,                  "gss_get_name_attribute");
 
     return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
 }
@@ -533,7 +568,88 @@ gssKrbExtractAuthzDataFromSecContext(OM_uint32 *minor,
     if (gssKrbExtractAuthzDataFromSecContextNext == NULL)
         return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
 
-    return gssKrbExtractAuthzDataFromSecContextNext(minor, ctx, ad_type, ad_data);
+    return gssKrbExtractAuthzDataFromSecContextNext(minor, ctx,
+                                                    ad_type, ad_data);
+}
+
+OM_uint32
+gssStoreCred(OM_uint32 *minor,
+             const gss_cred_id_t input_cred_handle,
+             gss_cred_usage_t input_usage,
+             const gss_OID desired_mech,
+             OM_uint32 overwrite_cred,
+             OM_uint32 default_cred,
+             gss_OID_set *elements_stored,
+             gss_cred_usage_t *cred_usage_stored)
+{
+    if (gssStoreCredNext == NULL)
+        return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+
+    return gssStoreCredNext(minor, input_cred_handle, input_usage,
+                            desired_mech, overwrite_cred, default_cred,
+                            elements_stored, cred_usage_stored);
+}
+
+OM_uint32
+gssGetNameAttribute(OM_uint32 *minor,
+                    gss_name_t name,
+                    gss_buffer_t attr,
+                    int *authenticated,
+                    int *complete,
+                    gss_buffer_t value,
+                    gss_buffer_t display_value,
+                    int *more)
+{
+    if (gssGetNameAttributeNext == NULL)
+        return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
+
+    return gssGetNameAttributeNext(minor, name, attr, authenticated, complete,
+                                   value, display_value, more);
+}
+
+static gss_buffer_desc radiusAvpKrbAttr = {
+    sizeof("urn:authdata-radius-avp") - 1, "urn:authdata-radius-avp"
+};
+
+/*
+ * Unfortunately extracting an AD-KDCIssued authorization data element
+ * is pretty implementation-dependent. It's not possible to verify the
+ * signature ourselves because the ticket session key is not exposed
+ * outside GSS. In an ideal world, all AD-KDCIssued elements would be
+ * verified by the Kerberos library and authentication would fail if
+ * verification failed. We're not quite there yet and as a result have
+ * to go through some hoops to get this to work. The alternative would
+ * be to sign the authorization data with our long-term key, but it
+ * seems a pity to compromise the design because of current implementation
+ * limitations.
+ */
+OM_uint32
+defrostAttrContext(OM_uint32 *minor,
+                   gss_name_t glueName,
+                   gss_name_t mechName)
+{
+    OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+    gss_buffer_desc authData = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+    gss_buffer_desc authDataDisplay = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+    int more = -1;
+    int authenticated, complete;
+
+    major = gssGetNameAttribute(minor, glueName, &radiusAvpKrbAttr,
+                                &authenticated, &complete,
+                                &authData, &authDataDisplay, &more);
+    if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+        if (authenticated == 0)
+            major = GSS_S_BAD_NAME;
+        else
+            major = gssEapImportAttrContext(minor, &authData, mechName);
+    } else if (major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE) {
+        major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+    }
+
+    gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &authData);
+    gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &authDataDisplay);
+
+    return major;
 }
 
 OM_uint32
@@ -555,7 +671,16 @@ gssEapGlueToMechName(OM_uint32 *minor,
     if (GSS_ERROR(major))
         goto cleanup;
 
+    major = defrostAttrContext(minor, glueName, *pMechName);
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+        goto cleanup;
+
 cleanup:
+    if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+        gssReleaseName(&tmpMinor, pMechName);
+        *pMechName = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+    }
+
     gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &nameBuf);
 
     return major;
@@ -664,3 +789,4 @@ cleanup:
 
     return major;
 }
+