krb5_error_code
encode_krb5_ticket(const krb5_ticket *rep, krb5_data **code);
+static OM_uint32
+gssDisplayName(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_name_t name,
+ gss_buffer_t buffer,
+ gss_OID *name_type);
+
+static OM_uint32
+gssImportName(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_buffer_t buffer,
+ gss_OID name_type,
+ gss_name_t *name);
+
static krb5_error_code
getAcceptorKey(krb5_context krbContext,
gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_keytab keytab = NULL;
- krb5_keytab_entry ktent;
+ krb5_keytab_entry ktent = { 0 };
krb5_kt_cursor cursor = NULL;
*princ = NULL;
memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key));
- memset(&ktent, 0, sizeof(ktent));
code = krb5_kt_default(krbContext, &keytab);
if (code != 0)
if (cred != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL && cred->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) {
code = krb5_kt_get_entry(krbContext, keytab,
- cred->name->krbPrincipal, 0,
+ cred->name->krbPrincipal, 0,
ctx->encryptionType, &ktent);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
} else {
+ /*
+ * It's not clear that looking encrypting the ticket in the
+ * requested EAP enctype provides any value.
+ */
code = krb5_kt_start_seq_get(krbContext, keytab, &cursor);
if (code != 0)
goto cleanup;
while ((code = krb5_kt_next_entry(krbContext, keytab,
&ktent, &cursor)) == 0) {
- if (ktent.key.enctype == ctx->encryptionType) {
+ if (ktent.key.enctype == ctx->encryptionType)
break;
- } else {
+ else
krb5_free_keytab_entry_contents(krbContext, &ktent);
- }
}
}
krb5_kt_end_seq_get(krbContext, keytab, &cursor);
krb5_kt_close(krbContext, keytab);
+ if (code != 0)
+ krb5_free_keytab_entry_contents(krbContext, &ktent);
+
+ return code;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+freezeAttrContext(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_name_t initiatorName,
+ krb5_const_principal acceptorPrinc,
+ krb5_keyblock *session,
+ krb5_authdata ***authdata)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+ krb5_error_code code;
+ gss_buffer_desc attrBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ krb5_authdata *authData[2], authDatum = { 0 };
+ krb5_context krbContext;
+
+ GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
+
+ major = gssEapExportAttrContext(minor, initiatorName, &attrBuf);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ return major;
+
+ authDatum.ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_RADIUS_AVP;
+ authDatum.length = attrBuf.length;
+ authDatum.contents = attrBuf.value;
+ authData[0] = &authDatum;
+ authData[1] = NULL;
+
+ code = krb5_make_authdata_kdc_issued(krbContext, session, acceptorPrinc,
+ authData, authdata);
if (code != 0) {
- if (*princ != NULL) {
- krb5_free_principal(krbContext, *princ);
- *princ = NULL;
- }
- krb5_free_keyblock_contents(krbContext, key),
- memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+ major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ *minor = code;
+ } else {
+ major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
- return code;
+ gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &attrBuf);
+
+ return major;
}
+/*
+ * Fabricate a ticket to ourselves given a GSS EAP context.
+ */
OM_uint32
gssEapMakeReauthCreds(OM_uint32 *minor,
gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
krb5_ticket ticket = { 0 };
krb5_keyblock session = { 0 }, acceptorKey = { 0 };
krb5_enc_tkt_part enc_part = { 0 };
- gss_buffer_desc attrBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
- krb5_authdata *authData[2], authDatum = { 0 };
krb5_data *ticketData = NULL, *credsData = NULL;
krb5_creds creds = { 0 };
krb5_auth_context authContext = NULL;
-
+
credBuf->length = 0;
credBuf->value = NULL;
-
+
GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
code = getAcceptorKey(krbContext, ctx, cred,
enc_part.flags = TKT_FLG_INITIAL;
+ /*
+ * Generate a random session key to place in the ticket and
+ * sign the "KDC-Issued" authorization data element.
+ */
code = krb5_c_make_random_key(krbContext, ctx->encryptionType,
&session);
if (code != 0)
: KRB5_INT32_MAX;
enc_part.times.renew_till = 0;
- major = gssEapExportAttrContext(minor, ctx->initiatorName,
- &attrBuf);
+ major = freezeAttrContext(minor, ctx->initiatorName, ticket.server,
+ &session, &enc_part.authorization_data);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
- authDatum.ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_RADIUS_AVP;
- authDatum.length = attrBuf.length;
- authDatum.contents = attrBuf.value;
- authData[0] = &authDatum;
- authData[1] = NULL;
- enc_part.authorization_data = authData;
-
ticket.enc_part2 = &enc_part;
code = krb5_encrypt_tkt_part(krbContext, &acceptorKey, &ticket);
creds.times = enc_part.times;
creds.ticket_flags = enc_part.flags;
creds.ticket = *ticketData;
- creds.authdata = authData;
+ creds.authdata = enc_part.authorization_data;
code = krb5_auth_con_init(krbContext, &authContext);
if (code != 0)
GSSEAP_FREE(ticket.enc_part.ciphertext.data);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(krbContext, &session);
krb5_free_keyblock_contents(krbContext, &acceptorKey);
- gss_release_buffer(minor, &attrBuf);
krb5_free_data(krbContext, ticketData);
krb5_auth_con_free(krbContext, authContext);
+ krb5_free_authdata(krbContext, enc_part.authorization_data);
if (credsData != NULL)
GSSEAP_FREE(credsData);
{
if (krb5_princ_size(krbContext, principal) == 2 &&
krb5_princ_component(krbContext, principal, 0)->length == 6 &&
- memcmp(krb5_princ_component(krbContext, principal, 0)->data, "krbtgt", 6) == 0)
+ memcmp(krb5_princ_component(krbContext,
+ principal, 0)->data, "krbtgt", 6) == 0)
return TRUE;
return FALSE;
}
+/*
+ * Store re-authentication (Kerberos) credentials in a credential handle.
+ */
OM_uint32
gssEapStoreReauthCreds(OM_uint32 *minor,
gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
/*
* Swap in the acceptor name the client asked for so
- * get_credentials() works
+ * get_credentials() works. We're making the assumption that
+ * any service tickets returned are for us. We'll need to
+ * reflect some more on whether that is a safe assumption.
*/
if (!isTicketGrantingServiceP(krbContext, kcred.server))
kcred.server = ctx->acceptorName->krbPrincipal;
goto cleanup;
}
+#ifdef HAVE_GSS_KRB5_IMPORT_CRED
+ /*
+ * To turn a credentials cache into a GSS credentials handle, we
+ * require the gss_krb5_import_cred() API (present in Heimdal, but
+ * not shipped in MIT yet).
+ */
major = gss_krb5_import_cred(minor, cred->krbCredCache, NULL, NULL,
&cred->krbCred);
if (GSS_ERROR(major))
goto cleanup;
+#else
+#warning Missing gss_krb5_import_cred() implementation
+#endif
cleanup:
*minor = code;
return major;
}
-static OM_uint32 (*gssInitSecContextNext)(
- OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_cred_id_t cred,
- gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
- gss_name_t target_name,
- gss_OID mech_type,
- OM_uint32 req_flags,
- OM_uint32 time_req,
- gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
- gss_buffer_t input_token,
- gss_OID *actual_mech_type,
- gss_buffer_t output_token,
- OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
- OM_uint32 *time_rec);
-
-static OM_uint32 (*gssAcceptSecContextNext)(
- OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
- gss_cred_id_t cred,
- gss_buffer_t input_token,
- gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
- gss_name_t *src_name,
- gss_OID *mech_type,
- gss_buffer_t output_token,
- OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
- OM_uint32 *time_rec,
- gss_cred_id_t *delegated_cred_handle);
-
-static OM_uint32 (*gssReleaseCredNext)(
- OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_cred_id_t *cred_handle);
-
-static OM_uint32 (*gssReleaseNameNext)(
- OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_name_t *name);
-
-static OM_uint32 (*gssInquireSecContextByOidNext)(
- OM_uint32 *minor,
- const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
- const gss_OID desired_object,
- gss_buffer_set_t *data_set);
-
-static OM_uint32 (*gssDeleteSecContextNext)(
- OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
- gss_buffer_t output_token);
-
-static OM_uint32 (*gssDisplayNameNext)(
- OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_name_t name,
- gss_buffer_t output_name_buffer,
- gss_OID *output_name_type);
-
-static OM_uint32 (*gssImportNameNext)(
- OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_buffer_t buffer,
- gss_OID nameType,
- gss_name_t *outputName);
-
-static OM_uint32 (*gssKrbExtractAuthzDataFromSecContextNext)(
- OM_uint32 *minor,
- const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
- int ad_type,
- gss_buffer_t ad_data);
-
-static OM_uint32 (*gssStoreCredNext)(
- OM_uint32 *minor,
- const gss_cred_id_t input_cred_handle,
- gss_cred_usage_t input_usage,
- const gss_OID desired_mech,
- OM_uint32 overwrite_cred,
- OM_uint32 default_cred,
- gss_OID_set *elements_stored,
- gss_cred_usage_t *cred_usage_stored);
+static gss_buffer_desc radiusAvpKrbAttr = {
+ sizeof("urn:authdata-radius-avp") - 1, "urn:authdata-radius-avp"
+};
+
+/*
+ * Unfortunately extracting an AD-KDCIssued authorization data element
+ * is pretty implementation-dependent. It's not possible to verify the
+ * signature ourselves because the ticket session key is not exposed
+ * outside GSS. In an ideal world, all AD-KDCIssued elements would be
+ * verified by the Kerberos library and authentication would fail if
+ * verification failed. We're not quite there yet and as a result have
+ * to go through some hoops to get this to work. The alternative would
+ * be to sign the authorization data with our long-term key, but it
+ * seems a pity to compromise the design because of current implementation
+ * limitations.
+ *
+ * (Specifically, the hoops involve a libkrb5 authorisation data plugin
+ * that exposes the verified and serialised attribute context through
+ * the Kerberos GSS mechanism's naming extensions API.)
+ */
+static OM_uint32
+defrostAttrContext(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_name_t glueName,
+ gss_name_t mechName)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+ gss_buffer_desc authData = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ gss_buffer_desc authDataDisplay = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ int more = -1;
+ int authenticated, complete;
+
+ major = gssGetNameAttribute(minor, glueName, &radiusAvpKrbAttr,
+ &authenticated, &complete,
+ &authData, &authDataDisplay, &more);
+ if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ if (authenticated == 0)
+ major = GSS_S_BAD_NAME;
+ else
+ major = gssEapImportAttrContext(minor, &authData, mechName);
+ } else if (major == GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE) {
+ major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &authData);
+ gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &authDataDisplay);
+
+ return major;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert a mechanism glue to an EAP mechanism name by displaying and
+ * importing it. This also handles the RADIUS attributes.
+ */
+OM_uint32
+gssEapGlueToMechName(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_name_t glueName,
+ gss_name_t *pMechName)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+ gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+
+ *pMechName = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+
+ major = gssDisplayName(minor, glueName, &nameBuf, NULL);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ major = gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
+ pMechName);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ major = defrostAttrContext(minor, glueName, *pMechName);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+cleanup:
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+ gssReleaseName(&tmpMinor, pMechName);
+ *pMechName = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+ }
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &nameBuf);
+
+ return major;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert an EAP mechanism name to a mechanism glue name by displaying
+ * and importing it.
+ */
+OM_uint32
+gssEapMechToGlueName(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_name_t mechName,
+ gss_name_t *pGlueName)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+ gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+
+ *pGlueName = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+
+ major = gssEapDisplayName(minor, mechName, &nameBuf, NULL);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ major = gssImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
+ pGlueName);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+cleanup:
+ gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &nameBuf);
+
+ return major;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Suck out the analgous elements of a Kerberos GSS context into an EAP
+ * one so that the application doesn't know the difference.
+ */
+OM_uint32
+gssEapReauthComplete(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
+ gss_cred_id_t cred,
+ const gss_OID mech,
+ OM_uint32 timeRec)
+{
+ OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
+ gss_buffer_set_t keyData = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
+
+ if (!oidEqual(mech, gss_mech_krb5)) {
+ major = GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Get the raw subsession key and encryption type*/
+ major = gssInquireSecContextByOid(minor, ctx->kerberosCtx,
+ GSS_C_INQ_SSPI_SESSION_KEY, &keyData);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ {
+ gss_OID_desc oid;
+ int suffix;
+
+ oid.length = keyData->elements[1].length;
+ oid.elements = keyData->elements[1].value;
+
+ /* GSS_KRB5_SESSION_KEY_ENCTYPE_OID */
+ major = decomposeOid(minor,
+ "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x02\x04",
+ 10, &oid, &suffix);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ ctx->encryptionType = suffix;
+ }
+
+ {
+ krb5_context krbContext = NULL;
+ krb5_keyblock key;
+
+ GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
+
+ KRB_KEY_LENGTH(&key) = keyData->elements[0].length;
+ KRB_KEY_DATA(&key) = keyData->elements[0].value;
+ KRB_KEY_TYPE(&key) = ctx->encryptionType;
+
+ *minor = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(krbContext,
+ &key, &ctx->rfc3961Key);
+ if (*minor != 0) {
+ major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
+ major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key,
+ &ctx->checksumType);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ if (timeRec != GSS_C_INDEFINITE)
+ ctx->expiryTime = time(NULL) + timeRec;
+
+ /* Initialize our sequence state */
+ major = sequenceInit(minor,
+ &ctx->seqState, ctx->recvSeq,
+ ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG) != 0),
+ ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG) != 0),
+ TRUE);
+ if (GSS_ERROR(major))
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+
+cleanup:
+ gss_release_buffer_set(&tmpMinor, &keyData);
+
+ return major;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The remainder of this file consists of wrappers so we can call into the
+ * mechanism glue without calling ourselves.
+ */
+static OM_uint32
+(*gssInitSecContextNext)(OM_uint32 *,
+ gss_cred_id_t,
+ gss_ctx_id_t *,
+ gss_name_t,
+ gss_OID,
+ OM_uint32,
+ OM_uint32,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t,
+ gss_buffer_t,
+ gss_OID *,
+ gss_buffer_t,
+ OM_uint32 *,
+ OM_uint32 *);
+
+static OM_uint32
+(*gssAcceptSecContextNext)(OM_uint32 *,
+ gss_ctx_id_t *,
+ gss_cred_id_t,
+ gss_buffer_t,
+ gss_channel_bindings_t,
+ gss_name_t *,
+ gss_OID *,
+ gss_buffer_t,
+ OM_uint32 *,
+ OM_uint32 *,
+ gss_cred_id_t *);
+
+static OM_uint32
+(*gssReleaseCredNext)(OM_uint32 *, gss_cred_id_t *);
+
+static OM_uint32
+(*gssReleaseNameNext)(OM_uint32 *, gss_name_t *);
+
+static OM_uint32
+(*gssInquireSecContextByOidNext)(OM_uint32 *,
+ const gss_ctx_id_t,
+ const gss_OID,
+ gss_buffer_set_t *);
+
+static OM_uint32
+(*gssDeleteSecContextNext)(OM_uint32 *,
+ gss_ctx_id_t *,
+ gss_buffer_t);
+
+static OM_uint32
+(*gssDisplayNameNext)(OM_uint32 *,
+ gss_name_t,
+ gss_buffer_t,
+ gss_OID *);
+
+static OM_uint32
+(*gssImportNameNext)(OM_uint32 *,
+ gss_buffer_t,
+ gss_OID,
+ gss_name_t *);
+
+static OM_uint32
+(*gssStoreCredNext)(OM_uint32 *,
+ const gss_cred_id_t,
+ gss_cred_usage_t,
+ const gss_OID,
+ OM_uint32,
+ OM_uint32,
+ gss_OID_set *,
+ gss_cred_usage_t *);
+
+static OM_uint32
+(*gssGetNameAttributeNext)(OM_uint32 *,
+ gss_name_t,
+ gss_buffer_t,
+ int *,
+ int *,
+ gss_buffer_t,
+ gss_buffer_t,
+ int *);
#define NEXT_SYMBOL(local, global) ((local) = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, (global)))
OM_uint32
gssEapReauthInitialize(OM_uint32 *minor)
{
- NEXT_SYMBOL(gssInitSecContextNext, "gss_init_sec_context");
- NEXT_SYMBOL(gssAcceptSecContextNext, "gss_accept_sec_context");
- NEXT_SYMBOL(gssReleaseCredNext, "gss_release_cred");
- NEXT_SYMBOL(gssReleaseNameNext, "gss_release_name");
- NEXT_SYMBOL(gssInquireSecContextByOidNext, "gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid");
- NEXT_SYMBOL(gssDeleteSecContextNext, "gss_delete_sec_context");
- NEXT_SYMBOL(gssDisplayNameNext, "gss_display_name");
- NEXT_SYMBOL(gssImportNameNext, "gss_import_name");
- NEXT_SYMBOL(gssKrbExtractAuthzDataFromSecContextNext, "gsskrb5_extract_authz_data_from_sec_context");
- NEXT_SYMBOL(gssStoreCredNext, "gss_store_cred");
+ NEXT_SYMBOL(gssInitSecContextNext, "gss_init_sec_context");
+ NEXT_SYMBOL(gssAcceptSecContextNext, "gss_accept_sec_context");
+ NEXT_SYMBOL(gssReleaseCredNext, "gss_release_cred");
+ NEXT_SYMBOL(gssReleaseNameNext, "gss_release_name");
+ NEXT_SYMBOL(gssInquireSecContextByOidNext, "gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid");
+ NEXT_SYMBOL(gssDeleteSecContextNext, "gss_delete_sec_context");
+ NEXT_SYMBOL(gssDisplayNameNext, "gss_display_name");
+ NEXT_SYMBOL(gssImportNameNext, "gss_import_name");
+ NEXT_SYMBOL(gssStoreCredNext, "gss_store_cred");
+ NEXT_SYMBOL(gssGetNameAttributeNext, "gss_get_name_attribute");
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
}
OM_uint32
-gssKrbExtractAuthzDataFromSecContext(OM_uint32 *minor,
- const gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
- int ad_type,
- gss_buffer_t ad_data)
-{
- if (gssKrbExtractAuthzDataFromSecContextNext == NULL)
- return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
-
- return gssKrbExtractAuthzDataFromSecContextNext(minor, ctx,
- ad_type, ad_data);
-}
-
-OM_uint32
gssStoreCred(OM_uint32 *minor,
const gss_cred_id_t input_cred_handle,
gss_cred_usage_t input_usage,
}
OM_uint32
-gssEapGlueToMechName(OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_name_t glueName,
- gss_name_t *pMechName)
+gssGetNameAttribute(OM_uint32 *minor,
+ gss_name_t name,
+ gss_buffer_t attr,
+ int *authenticated,
+ int *complete,
+ gss_buffer_t value,
+ gss_buffer_t display_value,
+ int *more)
{
- OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
- gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-
- *pMechName = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-
- major = gssDisplayName(minor, glueName, &nameBuf, NULL);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
-
- major = gssEapImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
- pMechName);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
-
-cleanup:
- gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &nameBuf);
-
- return major;
-}
-
-OM_uint32
-gssEapMechToGlueName(OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_name_t mechName,
- gss_name_t *pGlueName)
-{
- OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
- gss_buffer_desc nameBuf = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-
- *pGlueName = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-
- major = gssEapDisplayName(minor, mechName, &nameBuf, NULL);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
-
- major = gssImportName(minor, &nameBuf, GSS_C_NT_USER_NAME,
- pGlueName);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
-
-cleanup:
- gss_release_buffer(&tmpMinor, &nameBuf);
-
- return major;
-}
-
-OM_uint32
-gssEapReauthComplete(OM_uint32 *minor,
- gss_ctx_id_t ctx,
- gss_cred_id_t cred,
- const gss_OID mech,
- OM_uint32 timeRec)
-{
- OM_uint32 major, tmpMinor;
- gss_buffer_set_t keyData = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
-
- if (!oidEqual(mech, gss_mech_krb5)) {
- major = GSS_S_BAD_MECH;
- goto cleanup;
- }
-
- major = gssInquireSecContextByOid(minor, ctx->kerberosCtx,
- GSS_C_INQ_SSPI_SESSION_KEY, &keyData);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
-
- {
- gss_OID_desc oid;
- int suffix;
-
- oid.length = keyData->elements[1].length;
- oid.elements = keyData->elements[1].value;
-
- /* GSS_KRB5_SESSION_KEY_ENCTYPE_OID */
- major = decomposeOid(minor,
- "\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x02\x04",
- 10, &oid, &suffix);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
-
- ctx->encryptionType = suffix;
- }
-
- {
- krb5_context krbContext = NULL;
- krb5_keyblock key;
-
- GSSEAP_KRB_INIT(&krbContext);
-
- KRB_KEY_LENGTH(&key) = keyData->elements[0].length;
- KRB_KEY_DATA(&key) = keyData->elements[0].value;
- KRB_KEY_TYPE(&key) = ctx->encryptionType;
-
- *minor = krb5_copy_keyblock_contents(krbContext,
- &key, &ctx->rfc3961Key);
- if (*minor != 0) {
- major = GSS_S_FAILURE;
- goto cleanup;
- }
- }
-
- major = rfc3961ChecksumTypeForKey(minor, &ctx->rfc3961Key,
- &ctx->checksumType);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
-
- if (timeRec != GSS_C_INDEFINITE)
- ctx->expiryTime = time(NULL) + timeRec;
-
- major = sequenceInit(minor,
- &ctx->seqState, ctx->recvSeq,
- ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_REPLAY_FLAG) != 0),
- ((ctx->gssFlags & GSS_C_SEQUENCE_FLAG) != 0),
- TRUE);
- if (GSS_ERROR(major))
- goto cleanup;
-
- major = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-
-cleanup:
- gss_release_buffer_set(&tmpMinor, &keyData);
+ if (gssGetNameAttributeNext == NULL)
+ return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
- return major;
+ return gssGetNameAttributeNext(minor, name, attr, authenticated, complete,
+ value, display_value, more);
}
projects / mech_eap.orig / blobdiff