--- /dev/null
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.115 2011/06/23 23:35:42 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#else
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+# include <sys/poll.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SKEY
+#include <skey.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "key.h"
+#include "buffer.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#ifdef TARGET_OS_MAC /* XXX Broken krb5 headers on Mac */
+#undef TARGET_OS_MAC
+#include "zlib.h"
+#define TARGET_OS_MAC 1
+#else
+#include "zlib.h"
+#endif
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "sshlogin.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+#include "monitor_mm.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "jpake.h"
+#include "roaming.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
+#endif
+
+/* Imports */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern u_int utmp_len;
+extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
+extern z_stream incoming_stream;
+extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
+extern u_char session_id[];
+extern Buffer auth_debug;
+extern int auth_debug_init;
+extern Buffer loginmsg;
+
+/* State exported from the child */
+
+struct {
+ z_stream incoming;
+ z_stream outgoing;
+ u_char *keyin;
+ u_int keyinlen;
+ u_char *keyout;
+ u_int keyoutlen;
+ u_char *ivin;
+ u_int ivinlen;
+ u_char *ivout;
+ u_int ivoutlen;
+ u_char *ssh1key;
+ u_int ssh1keylen;
+ int ssh1cipher;
+ int ssh1protoflags;
+ u_char *input;
+ u_int ilen;
+ u_char *output;
+ u_int olen;
+ u_int64_t sent_bytes;
+ u_int64_t recv_bytes;
+} child_state;
+
+/* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
+
+int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_authrole(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_jpake_step1(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_jpake_step2(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int, Buffer *);
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+int mm_answer_pam_start(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pam_account(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pam_query(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pam_respond(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_gss_sign(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int, Buffer *);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *);
+#endif
+
+static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
+
+static Authctxt *authctxt;
+static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
+
+/* local state for key verify */
+static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
+static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
+static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
+static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
+static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
+static char *auth_method = "unknown";
+static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
+static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
+static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
+
+struct mon_table {
+ enum monitor_reqtype type;
+ int flags;
+ int (*f)(int, Buffer *);
+};
+
+#define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */
+#define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */
+#define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */
+#define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
+
+#define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
+
+#define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
+
+struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
+ {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authrole},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
+#endif
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+#endif
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+ {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
+#endif
+#ifdef SKEY
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
+#endif
+ {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_sign},
+#endif
+#ifdef JPAKE
+ {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_jpake_step1},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_step2},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm},
+#endif
+ {0, 0, NULL}
+};
+
+struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 0, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 0, mm_answer_gss_sign},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 0, mm_answer_gss_updatecreds},
+#endif
+ {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
+#endif
+ {0, 0, NULL}
+};
+
+struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+ {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
+#endif
+#ifdef SKEY
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
+#endif
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+#endif
+ {0, 0, NULL}
+};
+
+struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
+#endif
+ {0, 0, NULL}
+};
+
+struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
+
+/* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
+
+static void
+monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
+{
+ while (ent->f != NULL) {
+ if (ent->type == type) {
+ ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
+ ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
+ return;
+ }
+ ent++;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
+{
+ struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
+
+ while (ent->f != NULL) {
+ if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
+ ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
+ ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
+ }
+ ent++;
+ }
+}
+
+void
+monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+ struct mon_table *ent;
+ int authenticated = 0;
+
+ debug3("preauth child monitor started");
+
+ close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
+ close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
+ pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
+
+ authctxt = _authctxt;
+ memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
+
+ authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg;
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
+
+ /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
+#endif
+ } else {
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
+
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
+ }
+
+ /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
+ while (!authenticated) {
+ auth_method = "unknown";
+ authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
+ if (authenticated) {
+ if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
+ fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
+ __func__, ent->type);
+ if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+ !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
+ authenticated = 0;
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ /* PAM needs to perform account checks after auth */
+ if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
+ Buffer m;
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,
+ MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m);
+ authenticated = mm_answer_pam_account(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
+ if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
+ auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, auth_method,
+ compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
+ if (!authenticated)
+ authctxt->failures++;
+ }
+#ifdef JPAKE
+ /* Cleanup JPAKE context after authentication */
+ if (ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE) {
+ if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL) {
+ jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
+ authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
+ /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
+ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+ ;
+
+ if (!authctxt->valid)
+ fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
+ if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
+ fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
+
+ debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
+ __func__, authctxt->user);
+
+ mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
+
+ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+ close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
+ pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
+}
+
+static void
+monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
+{
+ monitor_child_pid = pid;
+}
+
+static void
+monitor_child_handler(int sig)
+{
+ kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
+}
+
+void
+monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+ close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
+ pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
+
+ monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
+ signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
+ signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
+ signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
+
+ if (compat20) {
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
+
+ /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ /* and for the GSSAPI key exchange */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, 1);
+#endif
+ } else {
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+ }
+ if (!no_pty_flag) {
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
+ }
+
+ for (;;)
+ monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
+
+ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+ pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
+}
+
+void
+monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+ if (options.compression) {
+ /* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
+ mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback);
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+ Buffer logmsg;
+ u_int len, level;
+ char *msg;
+
+ buffer_init(&logmsg);
+
+ /* Read length */
+ buffer_append_space(&logmsg, 4);
+ if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
+ buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg)) {
+ if (errno == EPIPE) {
+ debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__);
+ close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
+ pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ len = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
+ if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
+ fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len);
+
+ /* Read severity, message */
+ buffer_clear(&logmsg);
+ buffer_append_space(&logmsg, len);
+ if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd,
+ buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg))
+ fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+ /* Log it */
+ level = buffer_get_int(&logmsg);
+ msg = buffer_get_string(&logmsg, NULL);
+ if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
+ __func__, level);
+ do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
+
+ buffer_free(&logmsg);
+ xfree(msg);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
+ struct mon_table **pent)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ int ret;
+ u_char type;
+ struct pollfd pfd[2];
+
+ for (;;) {
+ bzero(&pfd, sizeof(pfd));
+ pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
+ pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
+ pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
+ pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN;
+ if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
+ if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
+ continue;
+ fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ if (pfd[1].revents) {
+ /*
+ * Drain all log messages before processing next
+ * monitor request.
+ */
+ monitor_read_log(pmonitor);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (pfd[0].revents)
+ break; /* Continues below */
+ }
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+
+ mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
+ type = buffer_get_char(&m);
+
+ debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
+
+ while (ent->f != NULL) {
+ if (ent->type == type)
+ break;
+ ent++;
+ }
+
+ if (ent->f != NULL) {
+ if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
+ fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
+ type);
+ ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
+ buffer_free(&m);
+
+ /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
+ if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
+ debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__,
+ type);
+ ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
+ }
+
+ if (pent != NULL)
+ *pent = ent;
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type);
+
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ return (-1);
+}
+
+/* allowed key state */
+static int
+monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
+{
+ /* make sure key is allowed */
+ if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
+ timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
+ return (0);
+ return (1);
+}
+
+static void
+monitor_reset_key_state(void)
+{
+ /* reset state */
+ if (key_blob != NULL)
+ xfree(key_blob);
+ if (hostbased_cuser != NULL)
+ xfree(hostbased_cuser);
+ if (hostbased_chost != NULL)
+ xfree(hostbased_chost);
+ key_blob = NULL;
+ key_bloblen = 0;
+ key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
+ hostbased_cuser = NULL;
+ hostbased_chost = NULL;
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ DH *dh;
+ int min, want, max;
+
+ min = buffer_get_int(m);
+ want = buffer_get_int(m);
+ max = buffer_get_int(m);
+
+ debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
+ __func__, min, want, max);
+ /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
+ if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
+ fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
+ __func__, min, want, max);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+
+ dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
+ if (dh == NULL) {
+ buffer_put_char(m, 0);
+ return (0);
+ } else {
+ /* Send first bignum */
+ buffer_put_char(m, 1);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
+
+ DH_free(dh);
+ }
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ Key *key;
+ u_char *p;
+ u_char *signature;
+ u_int siglen, datlen;
+ int keyid;
+
+ debug3("%s", __func__);
+
+ keyid = buffer_get_int(m);
+ p = buffer_get_string(m, &datlen);
+
+ /*
+ * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
+ * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
+ */
+ if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64)
+ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %u", __func__, datlen);
+
+ /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
+ if (session_id2_len == 0) {
+ session_id2_len = datlen;
+ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
+ memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
+ }
+
+ if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
+ if (key_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen) < 0)
+ fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__);
+
+ debug3("%s: signature %p(%u)", __func__, signature, siglen);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_string(m, signature, siglen);
+
+ xfree(p);
+ xfree(signature);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
+
+ /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+/* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
+
+int
+mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ char *username;
+ struct passwd *pwent;
+ int allowed = 0;
+ u_int i;
+
+ debug3("%s", __func__);
+
+ if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
+ fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
+
+ username = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+
+ pwent = getpwnamallow(username);
+
+ authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
+ setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
+ xfree(username);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+
+ if (pwent == NULL) {
+ buffer_put_char(m, 0);
+ authctxt->pw = fakepw();
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ allowed = 1;
+ authctxt->pw = pwent;
+ authctxt->valid = 1;
+
+ buffer_put_char(m, 1);
+ buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd));
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name);
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, "*");
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos);
+#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class);
+#endif
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
+
+ out:
+ buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));
+
+#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
+ if (options.x != NULL) \
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x); \
+ } while (0)
+#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
+ for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) \
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x[i]); \
+ } while (0)
+ /* See comment in servconf.h */
+ COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
+#undef M_CP_STROPT
+#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
+
+ debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
+
+ /* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
+ if (!compat20)
+ monitor_permit_authentications(1);
+ else {
+ /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
+ }
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam)
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1);
+#endif
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ char *banner;
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ banner = auth2_read_banner();
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "");
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
+
+ if (banner != NULL)
+ xfree(banner);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ monitor_permit_authentications(1);
+
+ authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s, role=%s",
+ __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style, authctxt->role);
+
+ if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
+ xfree(authctxt->style);
+ authctxt->style = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
+ xfree(authctxt->role);
+ authctxt->role = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_authrole(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ monitor_permit_authentications(1);
+
+ authctxt->role = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ debug3("%s: role=%s",
+ __func__, authctxt->role);
+
+ if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
+ xfree(authctxt->role);
+ authctxt->role = NULL;
+ }
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ static int call_count;
+ char *passwd;
+ int authenticated;
+ u_int plen;
+
+ passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
+ /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
+ authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
+ auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
+ memset(passwd, 0, strlen(passwd));
+ xfree(passwd);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
+
+ debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
+
+ call_count++;
+ if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
+ auth_method = "none";
+ else
+ auth_method = "password";
+
+ /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
+ return (authenticated);
+}
+
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+int
+mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ char *name, *infotxt;
+ u_int numprompts;
+ u_int *echo_on;
+ char **prompts;
+ u_int success;
+
+ success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
+ &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, success);
+ if (success)
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]);
+
+ debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
+
+ if (success) {
+ xfree(name);
+ xfree(infotxt);
+ xfree(prompts);
+ xfree(echo_on);
+ }
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ char *response;
+ int authok;
+
+ if (authctxt->as == 0)
+ fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
+
+ response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
+ auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
+ authctxt->as = NULL;
+ debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
+ xfree(response);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, authok);
+
+ debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
+
+ auth_method = "bsdauth";
+
+ return (authok != 0);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SKEY
+int
+mm_answer_skeyquery(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ struct skey skey;
+ char challenge[1024];
+ u_int success;
+
+ success = _compat_skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge,
+ sizeof(challenge)) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, success);
+ if (success)
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, challenge);
+
+ debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY, m);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_skeyrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ char *response;
+ int authok;
+
+ response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+
+ authok = (options.challenge_response_authentication &&
+ authctxt->valid &&
+ skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 &&
+ skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, response) != -1);
+
+ xfree(response);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, authok);
+
+ debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, m);
+
+ auth_method = "skey";
+
+ return (authok != 0);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+int
+mm_answer_pam_start(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ if (!options.use_pam)
+ fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
+
+ start_pam(authctxt);
+
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 1);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pam_account(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ u_int ret;
+
+ if (!options.use_pam)
+ fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
+
+ ret = do_pam_account();
+
+ buffer_put_int(m, ret);
+ buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
+
+ return (ret);
+}
+
+static void *sshpam_ctxt, *sshpam_authok;
+extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device;
+
+int
+mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+
+ debug3("%s", __func__);
+ authctxt->user = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt);
+ sshpam_authok = NULL;
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) {
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 1);
+ buffer_put_int(m, 1);
+ } else {
+ buffer_put_int(m, 0);
+ }
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pam_query(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ char *name = NULL, *info = NULL, **prompts = NULL;
+ u_int i, num = 0, *echo_on = 0;
+ int ret;
+
+ debug3("%s", __func__);
+ sshpam_authok = NULL;
+ ret = (sshpam_device.query)(sshpam_ctxt, &name, &info, &num, &prompts, &echo_on);
+ if (ret == 0 && num == 0)
+ sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
+ if (num > 1 || name == NULL || info == NULL)
+ ret = -1;
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, ret);
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, name);
+ xfree(name);
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, info);
+ xfree(info);
+ buffer_put_int(m, num);
+ for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[i]);
+ xfree(prompts[i]);
+ buffer_put_int(m, echo_on[i]);
+ }
+ if (prompts != NULL)
+ xfree(prompts);
+ if (echo_on != NULL)
+ xfree(echo_on);
+ auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pam_respond(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ char **resp;
+ u_int i, num;
+ int ret;
+
+ debug3("%s", __func__);
+ sshpam_authok = NULL;
+ num = buffer_get_int(m);
+ if (num > 0) {
+ resp = xcalloc(num, sizeof(char *));
+ for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
+ resp[i] = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, resp);
+ for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
+ xfree(resp[i]);
+ xfree(resp);
+ } else {
+ ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, NULL);
+ }
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, ret);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m);
+ auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
+ if (ret == 0)
+ sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+
+ debug3("%s", __func__);
+ (sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
+ auth_method = "keyboard-interactive/pam";
+ return (sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt);
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ Key *key;
+ char *cuser, *chost;
+ u_char *blob;
+ u_int bloblen;
+ enum mm_keytype type = 0;
+ int allowed = 0;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ type = buffer_get_int(m);
+ cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
+
+ key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+
+ if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
+ (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
+ fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__);
+
+ debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
+
+ if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
+ switch (type) {
+ case MM_USERKEY:
+ allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
+ user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
+ auth_method = "publickey";
+ if (options.pubkey_authentication && allowed != 1)
+ auth_clear_options();
+ break;
+ case MM_HOSTKEY:
+ allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
+ hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
+ cuser, chost, key);
+ auth_method = "hostbased";
+ break;
+ case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
+ key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
+ allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
+ auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
+ cuser, chost, key);
+ if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1)
+ auth_clear_options();
+ auth_method = "rsa";
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (key != NULL)
+ key_free(key);
+
+ /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
+ monitor_reset_key_state();
+
+ if (allowed) {
+ /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
+ key_blob = blob;
+ key_bloblen = bloblen;
+ key_blobtype = type;
+ hostbased_cuser = cuser;
+ hostbased_chost = chost;
+ } else {
+ /* Log failed attempt */
+ auth_log(authctxt, 0, auth_method, compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
+ xfree(blob);
+ xfree(cuser);
+ xfree(chost);
+ }
+
+ debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
+ __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
+ buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
+
+ if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ char *p;
+ u_int len;
+ int fail = 0;
+
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
+
+ if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
+ p = buffer_ptr(&b);
+ len = buffer_len(&b);
+ if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
+ (len < session_id2_len) ||
+ (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
+ fail++;
+ buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
+ } else {
+ p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
+ if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
+ (len != session_id2_len) ||
+ (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
+ fail++;
+ xfree(p);
+ }
+ if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
+ fail++;
+ p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+ if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
+ logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
+ authctxt->user, p);
+ fail++;
+ }
+ xfree(p);
+ buffer_skip_string(&b);
+ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
+ if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
+ fail++;
+ } else {
+ p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+ if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0)
+ fail++;
+ xfree(p);
+ if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
+ fail++;
+ buffer_skip_string(&b);
+ }
+ buffer_skip_string(&b);
+ if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
+ fail++;
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ return (fail == 0);
+}
+
+static int
+monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
+ char *chost)
+{
+ Buffer b;
+ char *p;
+ u_int len;
+ int fail = 0;
+
+ buffer_init(&b);
+ buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
+
+ p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
+ if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
+ (len != session_id2_len) ||
+ (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
+ fail++;
+ xfree(p);
+
+ if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
+ fail++;
+ p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+ if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
+ logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
+ authctxt->user, p);
+ fail++;
+ }
+ xfree(p);
+ buffer_skip_string(&b); /* service */
+ p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+ if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0)
+ fail++;
+ xfree(p);
+ buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkalg */
+ buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkblob */
+
+ /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
+ p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+ if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.')
+ p[len - 1] = '\0';
+ if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0)
+ fail++;
+ xfree(p);
+
+ /* verify client user */
+ p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
+ if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0)
+ fail++;
+ xfree(p);
+
+ if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
+ fail++;
+ buffer_free(&b);
+ return (fail == 0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ Key *key;
+ u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
+ u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
+ int verified = 0;
+ int valid_data = 0;
+
+ blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
+ signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
+ data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
+
+ if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
+ !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
+ fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
+
+ key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+ if (key == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
+
+ switch (key_blobtype) {
+ case MM_USERKEY:
+ valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
+ break;
+ case MM_HOSTKEY:
+ valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
+ hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
+ break;
+ default:
+ valid_data = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!valid_data)
+ fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
+
+ verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
+ debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
+ __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
+
+ key_free(key);
+ xfree(blob);
+ xfree(signature);
+ xfree(data);
+
+ auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
+
+ monitor_reset_key_state();
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, verified);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
+
+ return (verified == 1);
+}
+
+static void
+mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
+{
+ socklen_t fromlen;
+ struct sockaddr_storage from;
+
+ /*
+ * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
+ * the address be 0.0.0.0.
+ */
+ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+ fromlen = sizeof(from);
+ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
+ if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) {
+ debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+ cleanup_exit(255);
+ }
+ }
+ /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
+ record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
+ get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+ (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
+}
+
+static void
+mm_session_close(Session *s)
+{
+ debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
+ if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+ debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
+ session_pty_cleanup2(s);
+ }
+ session_unused(s->self);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
+ Session *s;
+ int res, fd0;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ s = session_new();
+ if (s == NULL)
+ goto error;
+ s->authctxt = authctxt;
+ s->pw = authctxt->pw;
+ s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
+ res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
+ if (res == 0)
+ goto error;
+ pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty, authctxt->role);
+
+ buffer_put_int(m, 1);
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
+
+ /* We need to trick ttyslot */
+ if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
+
+ mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw);
+
+ /* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
+ close(0);
+
+ /* send messages generated by record_login */
+ buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg));
+ buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
+
+ if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
+ mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
+
+ /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
+ if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
+ fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if (fd0 != 0)
+ error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
+
+ /* slave is not needed */
+ close(s->ttyfd);
+ s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
+ /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
+ s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
+
+ debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
+
+ return (0);
+
+ error:
+ if (s != NULL)
+ mm_session_close(s);
+ buffer_put_int(m, 0);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ Session *s;
+ char *tty;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
+ mm_session_close(s);
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ xfree(tty);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ BIGNUM *p;
+ int rsafail;
+
+ /* Turn off permissions */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0);
+
+ if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+
+ buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
+
+ rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
+
+ BN_clear_free(p);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
+
+ /* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
+ fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__);
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
+
+ /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ BIGNUM *client_n;
+ Key *key = NULL;
+ u_char *blob = NULL;
+ u_int blen = 0;
+ int allowed = 0;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ auth_method = "rsa";
+ if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
+ if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
+ allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
+ BN_clear_free(client_n);
+ }
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
+ buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
+
+ /* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
+ monitor_reset_key_state();
+
+ if (allowed && key != NULL) {
+ key->type = KEY_RSA; /* cheat for key_to_blob */
+ if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
+ fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
+ buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
+
+ /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
+ key_blob = blob;
+ key_bloblen = blen;
+ key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
+ }
+ if (key != NULL)
+ key_free(key);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
+
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ Key *key = NULL;
+ u_char *blob;
+ u_int blen;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ if (!authctxt->valid)
+ fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
+ blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
+ if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
+ fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
+ if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
+ fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__);
+ if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
+ if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
+ fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type);
+ key->type = KEY_RSA1;
+ if (ssh1_challenge)
+ BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
+ ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
+
+ debug3("%s sending reply", __func__);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
+
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
+
+ xfree(blob);
+ key_free(key);
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ Key *key = NULL;
+ u_char *blob, *response;
+ u_int blen, len;
+ int success;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ if (!authctxt->valid)
+ fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
+ if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__);
+
+ blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
+ if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
+ fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
+ if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
+ fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype);
+ if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
+ response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ if (len != 16)
+ fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
+ success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
+
+ xfree(blob);
+ key_free(key);
+ xfree(response);
+
+ auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
+
+ /* reset state */
+ BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
+ ssh1_challenge = NULL;
+ monitor_reset_key_state();
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, success);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
+
+ return (success);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
+{
+ extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
+ int res, status;
+
+ debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
+
+ /* The child is terminating */
+ session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ if (options.use_pam)
+ sshpam_cleanup();
+#endif
+
+ while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
+ if (errno != EINTR)
+ exit(1);
+
+ res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
+
+ /* Terminate process */
+ exit(res);
+}
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+/* Report that an audit event occurred */
+int
+mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ ssh_audit_event_t event;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+ event = buffer_get_int(m);
+ switch(event) {
+ case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
+ case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
+ case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
+ case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
+ case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
+ case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
+ case SSH_INVALID_USER:
+ audit_event(event);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("Audit event type %d not permitted", event);
+ }
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ u_int len;
+ char *cmd;
+
+ debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+ cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ /* sanity check command, if so how? */
+ audit_run_command(cmd);
+ xfree(cmd);
+ return (0);
+}
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+
+void
+monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+ if (compat20) {
+ set_newkeys(MODE_IN);
+ set_newkeys(MODE_OUT);
+ } else {
+ packet_set_protocol_flags(child_state.ssh1protoflags);
+ packet_set_encryption_key(child_state.ssh1key,
+ child_state.ssh1keylen, child_state.ssh1cipher);
+ xfree(child_state.ssh1key);
+ }
+
+ /* for rc4 and other stateful ciphers */
+ packet_set_keycontext(MODE_OUT, child_state.keyout);
+ xfree(child_state.keyout);
+ packet_set_keycontext(MODE_IN, child_state.keyin);
+ xfree(child_state.keyin);
+
+ if (!compat20) {
+ packet_set_iv(MODE_OUT, child_state.ivout);
+ xfree(child_state.ivout);
+ packet_set_iv(MODE_IN, child_state.ivin);
+ xfree(child_state.ivin);
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&incoming_stream, &child_state.incoming,
+ sizeof(incoming_stream));
+ memcpy(&outgoing_stream, &child_state.outgoing,
+ sizeof(outgoing_stream));
+
+ /* Update with new address */
+ if (options.compression)
+ mm_init_compression(pmonitor->m_zlib);
+
+ /* Network I/O buffers */
+ /* XXX inefficient for large buffers, need: buffer_init_from_string */
+ buffer_clear(packet_get_input());
+ buffer_append(packet_get_input(), child_state.input, child_state.ilen);
+ memset(child_state.input, 0, child_state.ilen);
+ xfree(child_state.input);
+
+ buffer_clear(packet_get_output());
+ buffer_append(packet_get_output(), child_state.output,
+ child_state.olen);
+ memset(child_state.output, 0, child_state.olen);
+ xfree(child_state.output);
+
+ /* Roaming */
+ if (compat20)
+ roam_set_bytes(child_state.sent_bytes, child_state.recv_bytes);
+}
+
+static Kex *
+mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
+{
+ Kex *kex;
+ void *blob;
+ u_int bloblen;
+
+ kex = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*kex));
+ kex->session_id = buffer_get_string(m, &kex->session_id_len);
+ if (session_id2 == NULL ||
+ kex->session_id_len != session_id2_len ||
+ timingsafe_bcmp(kex->session_id, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)
+ fatal("mm_get_get: internal error: bad session id");
+ kex->we_need = buffer_get_int(m);
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ if (options.gss_keyex) {
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
+ }
+#endif
+ kex->server = 1;
+ kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
+ kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
+ blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
+ buffer_init(&kex->my);
+ buffer_append(&kex->my, blob, bloblen);
+ xfree(blob);
+ blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
+ buffer_init(&kex->peer);
+ buffer_append(&kex->peer, blob, bloblen);
+ xfree(blob);
+ kex->done = 1;
+ kex->flags = buffer_get_int(m);
+ kex->client_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ kex->server_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
+ kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
+ kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
+
+ return (kex);
+}
+
+/* This function requries careful sanity checking */
+
+void
+mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+ Buffer m;
+ u_char *blob, *p;
+ u_int bloblen, plen;
+ u_int32_t seqnr, packets;
+ u_int64_t blocks, bytes;
+
+ debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
+
+ buffer_init(&m);
+ mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m);
+ if (!compat20) {
+ child_state.ssh1protoflags = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ child_state.ssh1cipher = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ child_state.ssh1key = buffer_get_string(&m,
+ &child_state.ssh1keylen);
+ child_state.ivout = buffer_get_string(&m,
+ &child_state.ivoutlen);
+ child_state.ivin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ivinlen);
+ goto skip;
+ } else {
+ /* Get the Kex for rekeying */
+ *pmonitor->m_pkex = mm_get_kex(&m);
+ }
+
+ blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
+ current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+ xfree(blob);
+
+ debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__);
+ blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
+ current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+ xfree(blob);
+
+ /* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
+ seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
+ packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
+ packet_set_state(MODE_OUT, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
+ seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m);
+ packets = buffer_get_int(&m);
+ bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
+ packet_set_state(MODE_IN, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes);
+
+ skip:
+ /* Get the key context */
+ child_state.keyout = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyoutlen);
+ child_state.keyin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyinlen);
+
+ debug3("%s: Getting compression state", __func__);
+ /* Get compression state */
+ p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
+ if (plen != sizeof(child_state.outgoing))
+ fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
+ memcpy(&child_state.outgoing, p, sizeof(child_state.outgoing));
+ xfree(p);
+
+ p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
+ if (plen != sizeof(child_state.incoming))
+ fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
+ memcpy(&child_state.incoming, p, sizeof(child_state.incoming));
+ xfree(p);
+
+ /* Network I/O buffers */
+ debug3("%s: Getting Network I/O buffers", __func__);
+ child_state.input = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ilen);
+ child_state.output = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.olen);
+
+ /* Roaming */
+ if (compat20) {
+ child_state.sent_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
+ child_state.recv_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m);
+ }
+
+ buffer_free(&m);
+}
+
+
+/* Allocation functions for zlib */
+void *
+mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
+{
+ size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount;
+ void *address;
+
+ if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_T_MAX / size)
+ fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
+
+ address = mm_malloc(mm, len);
+
+ return (address);
+}
+
+void
+mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
+{
+ mm_free(mm, address);
+}
+
+void
+mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *mm)
+{
+ outgoing_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
+ outgoing_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
+ outgoing_stream.opaque = mm;
+
+ incoming_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
+ incoming_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
+ incoming_stream.opaque = mm;
+}
+
+/* XXX */
+
+#define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
+ if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \
+ fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
+} while (0)
+
+static void
+monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
+{
+ int pair[2];
+
+ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
+ FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
+ mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
+ mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
+
+ if (do_logfds) {
+ if (pipe(pair) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
+ FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
+ mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
+ mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1];
+ } else
+ mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1;
+}
+
+#define MM_MEMSIZE 65536
+
+struct monitor *
+monitor_init(void)
+{
+ struct monitor *mon;
+
+ mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
+
+ monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
+
+ /* Used to share zlib space across processes */
+ if (options.compression) {
+ mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
+ mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
+
+ /* Compression needs to share state across borders */
+ mm_init_compression(mon->m_zlib);
+ }
+
+ return mon;
+}
+
+void
+monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
+{
+ monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
+}
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+int
+mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ gss_OID_desc goid;
+ OM_uint32 major;
+ u_int len;
+
+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
+
+ goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ goid.length = len;
+
+ major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
+
+ xfree(goid.elements);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, major);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
+
+ /* Now we have a context, enable the step */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ gss_buffer_desc in;
+ gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
+ OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
+ u_int len;
+
+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
+
+ in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ in.length = len;
+ major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
+ xfree(in.value);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, major);
+ buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length);
+ buffer_put_int(m, flags);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
+
+ if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN, 1);
+ }
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
+ OM_uint32 ret;
+ u_int len;
+
+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
+
+ gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ gssbuf.length = len;
+ mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ mic.length = len;
+
+ ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
+
+ xfree(gssbuf.value);
+ xfree(mic.value);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, ret);
+
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
+
+ if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ int authenticated;
+
+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
+
+ authenticated = authctxt->valid &&
+ ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
+
+ debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
+
+ auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
+
+ /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
+ return (authenticated);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_gss_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
+{
+ gss_buffer_desc data;
+ gss_buffer_desc hash = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ OM_uint32 major, minor;
+ u_int len;
+
+ if (!options.gss_authentication && !options.gss_keyex)
+ fatal("In GSSAPI monitor when GSSAPI is disabled");
+
+ data.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
+ data.length = len;
+ if (data.length != 20)
+ fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %d", __func__,
+ (int) data.length);
+
+ /* Save the session ID on the first time around */
+ if (session_id2_len == 0) {
+ session_id2_len = data.length;
+ session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
+ memcpy(session_id2, data.value, session_id2_len);
+ }
+ major = ssh_gssapi_sign(gsscontext, &data, &hash);
+
+ xfree(data.value);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, major);
+ buffer_put_string(m, hash.value, hash.length);
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN, m);
+
+ gss_release_buffer(&minor, &hash);
+
+ /* Turn on getpwnam permissions */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
+
+ /* And credential updating, for when rekeying */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS, 1);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_gss_updatecreds(int socket, Buffer *m) {
+ ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
+ int ok;
+
+ store.filename = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ store.envvar = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+ store.envval = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
+
+ ok = ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&store);
+
+ xfree(store.filename);
+ xfree(store.envvar);
+ xfree(store.envval);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, ok);
+
+ mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS, m);
+
+ return(0);
+}
+
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+#ifdef JPAKE
+int
+mm_answer_jpake_step1(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ struct jpake_ctx *pctx;
+ u_char *x3_proof, *x4_proof;
+ u_int x3_proof_len, x4_proof_len;
+
+ if (!options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication)
+ fatal("zero_knowledge_password_authentication disabled");
+
+ if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL)
+ fatal("%s: authctxt->jpake_ctx already set (%p)",
+ __func__, authctxt->jpake_ctx);
+ authctxt->jpake_ctx = pctx = jpake_new();
+
+ jpake_step1(pctx->grp,
+ &pctx->server_id, &pctx->server_id_len,
+ &pctx->x3, &pctx->x4, &pctx->g_x3, &pctx->g_x4,
+ &x3_proof, &x3_proof_len,
+ &x4_proof, &x4_proof_len);
+
+ JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step1 done in %s", __func__));
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+
+ buffer_put_string(m, pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x3);
+ buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x4);
+ buffer_put_string(m, x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
+ buffer_put_string(m, x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
+
+ debug3("%s: sending step1", __func__);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1, m);
+
+ bzero(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
+ bzero(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
+ xfree(x3_proof);
+ xfree(x4_proof);
+
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 0);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_jpake_get_pwdata(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
+ char *hash_scheme, *salt;
+
+ if (pctx == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
+
+ auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(authctxt, &pctx->s, &hash_scheme, &salt);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ /* pctx->s is sensitive, not returned to slave */
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, hash_scheme);
+ buffer_put_cstring(m, salt);
+
+ debug3("%s: sending pwdata", __func__);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, m);
+
+ bzero(hash_scheme, strlen(hash_scheme));
+ bzero(salt, strlen(salt));
+ xfree(hash_scheme);
+ xfree(salt);
+
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP2, 1);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_jpake_step2(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
+ u_char *x1_proof, *x2_proof, *x4_s_proof;
+ u_int x1_proof_len, x2_proof_len, x4_s_proof_len;
+
+ if (pctx == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
+
+ if ((pctx->g_x1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (pctx->g_x2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x1);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->g_x2);
+ pctx->client_id = buffer_get_string(m, &pctx->client_id_len);
+ x1_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x1_proof_len);
+ x2_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_proof_len);
+
+ jpake_step2(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->g_x3,
+ pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2, pctx->x4,
+ pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
+ pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
+ x1_proof, x1_proof_len,
+ x2_proof, x2_proof_len,
+ &pctx->b,
+ &x4_s_proof, &x4_s_proof_len);
+
+ JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step2 done in %s", __func__));
+
+ bzero(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
+ bzero(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
+ xfree(x1_proof);
+ xfree(x2_proof);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+
+ buffer_put_bignum2(m, pctx->b);
+ buffer_put_string(m, x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
+
+ debug3("%s: sending step2", __func__);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP2, m);
+
+ bzero(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
+ xfree(x4_s_proof);
+
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, 1);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_jpake_key_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
+ u_char *x2_s_proof;
+ u_int x2_s_proof_len;
+
+ if (pctx == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
+
+ if ((pctx->a = BN_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
+ buffer_get_bignum2(m, pctx->a);
+ x2_s_proof = buffer_get_string(m, &x2_s_proof_len);
+
+ jpake_key_confirm(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->a,
+ pctx->x4, pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4, pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2,
+ pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
+ pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
+ session_id2, session_id2_len,
+ x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len,
+ &pctx->k,
+ &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
+
+ JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "key_confirm done in %s", __func__));
+
+ bzero(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
+ buffer_clear(m);
+
+ /* pctx->k is sensitive, not sent */
+ buffer_put_string(m, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
+
+ debug3("%s: sending confirmation hash", __func__);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_KEY_CONFIRM, m);
+
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, 1);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_jpake_check_confirm(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+ int authenticated = 0;
+ u_char *peer_confirm_hash;
+ u_int peer_confirm_hash_len;
+ struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
+
+ if (pctx == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: pctx == NULL", __func__);
+
+ peer_confirm_hash = buffer_get_string(m, &peer_confirm_hash_len);
+
+ authenticated = jpake_check_confirm(pctx->k,
+ pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
+ session_id2, session_id2_len,
+ peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len) && authctxt->valid;
+
+ JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "check_confirm done in %s", __func__));
+
+ bzero(peer_confirm_hash, peer_confirm_hash_len);
+ xfree(peer_confirm_hash);
+
+ buffer_clear(m);
+ buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
+
+ debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
+ mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_CHECK_CONFIRM, m);
+
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, 1);
+
+ auth_method = "jpake-01@openssh.com";
+ return authenticated;
+}
+
+#endif /* JPAKE */
projects / openssh.git / blobdiff