Policy rule redesign for factor out issuer handling.

[shibboleth/cpp-opensaml.git] / saml / binding / impl / ClientCertAuthRule.cpp

diff --git a/saml/binding/impl/ClientCertAuthRule.cpp b/saml/binding/impl/ClientCertAuthRule.cpp
index f13e25e..6337b19 100644 (file)
--- a/saml/binding/impl/ClientCertAuthRule.cpp
+++ b/saml/binding/impl/ClientCertAuthRule.cpp
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@
 #include "saml2/metadata/MetadataProvider.h"
 
 #include <xmltooling/security/X509TrustEngine.h>
-#include <xmltooling/util/NDC.h>
 #include <xmltooling/util/ReplayCache.h>
 #include <log4cpp/Category.hh>
 
@@ -44,95 +43,37 @@ namespace opensaml {
     }
 };
 
-pair<saml2::Issuer*,const RoleDescriptor*> ClientCertAuthRule::evaluate(
-    const XMLObject& message,
-    const GenericRequest* request,
-    const MetadataProvider* metadataProvider,
-    const QName* role,
-    const TrustEngine* trustEngine
-    ) const
+void ClientCertAuthRule::evaluate(const XMLObject& message, const GenericRequest* request, SecurityPolicy& policy) const
 {
     Category& log=Category::getInstance(SAML_LOGCAT".SecurityPolicyRule.ClientCertAuth");
     log.debug("evaluating client certificate authentication policy");
     
-    pair<saml2::Issuer*,const RoleDescriptor*> ret = pair<saml2::Issuer*,const RoleDescriptor*>(NULL,NULL);
     if (!request) {
         log.debug("ignoring message, no protocol request available");
-        return ret;
-    }  
-    
+        return;
+    }
+    else if (!policy.getIssuerMetadata()) {
+        log.debug("ignoring message, no issuer metadata supplied");
+        return;
+    }
+
     const X509TrustEngine* x509trust;
-    if (!metadataProvider || !role || !(x509trust=dynamic_cast<const X509TrustEngine*>(trustEngine))) {
-        log.debug("ignoring message, no metadata or X509TrustEngine supplied");
-        return ret;
+    if (!(x509trust=dynamic_cast<const X509TrustEngine*>(policy.getTrustEngine()))) {
+        log.debug("ignoring message, no X509TrustEngine supplied");
+        return;
     }
     
     const std::vector<XSECCryptoX509*>& chain = request->getClientCertificates();
     if (chain.empty()) {
         log.debug("ignoring message, no client certificates in request");
-        return ret;
+        return;
     }
     
-    try {
-        log.debug("extracting issuer from message");
-        pair<saml2::Issuer*,const XMLCh*> issuerInfo = getIssuerAndProtocol(message);
-        
-        auto_ptr<saml2::Issuer> issuer(issuerInfo.first);
-        if (!issuerInfo.first || !issuerInfo.second ||
-                (issuer->getFormat() && !XMLString::equals(issuer->getFormat(), saml2::NameIDType::ENTITY))) {
-            log.warn("issuer identity not estabished, or was not an entityID");
-            return ret;
-        }
-        
-        log.debug("searching metadata for message issuer...");
-        const EntityDescriptor* entity = metadataProvider->getEntityDescriptor(issuer->getName());
-        if (!entity) {
-            auto_ptr_char temp(issuer->getName());
-            log.warn("no metadata found, can't establish identity of issuer (%s)", temp.get());
-            return ret;
-        }
-
-        log.debug("matched message issuer against metadata, searching for applicable role...");
-        const RoleDescriptor* roledesc=entity->getRoleDescriptor(*role, issuerInfo.second);
-        if (!roledesc) {
-            log.warn("unable to find compatible role (%s) in metadata", role->toString().c_str());
-            return ret;
-        }
-
-        if (!x509trust->validate(chain.front(), chain, *roledesc, true, metadataProvider->getKeyResolver())) {
-            log.error("unable to verify certificate chain with supplied trust engine");
-            return ret;
-        }
-
-        if (log.isDebugEnabled()) {
-            auto_ptr_char iname(entity->getEntityID());
-            log.debug("message from (%s), signature verified", iname.get());
-        }
-        
-        ret.first = issuer.release();
-        ret.second = roledesc;
+    if (!x509trust->validate(chain.front(), chain, *(policy.getIssuerMetadata()), true,
+            policy.getMetadataProvider()->getKeyResolver())) {
+        log.error("unable to verify certificate chain with supplied trust engine");
+        return;
     }
-    catch (bad_cast&) {
-        // Just trap it.
-        log.warn("caught a bad_cast while extracting issuer");
-    }
-    return ret;
-}
-
-pair<saml2::Issuer*,const XMLCh*> ClientCertAuthRule::getIssuerAndProtocol(const XMLObject& message) const
-{
-    // We just let any bad casts throw here.
-
-    // Shortcuts some of the casting.
-    const XMLCh* ns = message.getElementQName().getNamespaceURI();
-    if (ns) {
-        if (XMLString::equals(ns, samlconstants::SAML20P_NS)) {
-            // 2.0 namespace should be castable to a specialized 2.0 root.
-            const saml2::RootObject& root = dynamic_cast<const saml2::RootObject&>(message);
-            saml2::Issuer* issuer = root.getIssuer();
-            if (issuer && issuer->getName())
-                return make_pair(issuer->cloneIssuer(), samlconstants::SAML20P_NS);
-        }
-    }
-    return pair<saml2::Issuer*,const XMLCh*>(NULL,NULL);
+    
+    log.debug("client certificate verified against message issuer");
 }