Prepare policy API for mix-in subclassing. Allow policy rules to distinguish success...

[shibboleth/cpp-opensaml.git] / saml / binding / impl / XMLSigningRule.cpp

diff --git a/saml/binding/impl/XMLSigningRule.cpp b/saml/binding/impl/XMLSigningRule.cpp
index 9fe67c1..5ebf1e2 100644 (file)
--- a/saml/binding/impl/XMLSigningRule.cpp
+++ b/saml/binding/impl/XMLSigningRule.cpp
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /*
- *  Copyright 2001-2007 Internet2
+ *  Copyright 2001-2009 Internet2
  * 
  * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
  * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
@@ -50,10 +50,10 @@ namespace opensaml {
         const char* getType() const {
             return XMLSIGNING_POLICY_RULE;
         }
-        void evaluate(const XMLObject& message, const GenericRequest* request, const XMLCh* protocol, SecurityPolicy& policy) const;
+        bool evaluate(const XMLObject& message, const GenericRequest* request, SecurityPolicy& policy) const;
 
     private:
-        bool m_errorsFatal;
+        bool m_errorFatal;
     };
 
     SecurityPolicyRule* SAML_DLLLOCAL XMLSigningRuleFactory(const DOMElement* const & e)
@@ -61,37 +61,35 @@ namespace opensaml {
         return new XMLSigningRule(e);
     }
     
-    static const XMLCh errorsFatal[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_11(e,r,r,o,r,s,F,a,t,a,l);
+    static const XMLCh errorFatal[] = UNICODE_LITERAL_10(e,r,r,o,r,F,a,t,a,l);
 };
 
-XMLSigningRule::XMLSigningRule(const DOMElement* e) : m_errorsFatal(false)
+XMLSigningRule::XMLSigningRule(const DOMElement* e) : m_errorFatal(false)
 {
     if (e) {
-        const XMLCh* flag = e->getAttributeNS(NULL, errorsFatal);
-        m_errorsFatal = (flag && (*flag==chLatin_t || *flag==chDigit_1)); 
+        const XMLCh* flag = e->getAttributeNS(NULL, errorFatal);
+        m_errorFatal = (flag && (*flag==chLatin_t || *flag==chDigit_1)); 
     }
 }
 
-void XMLSigningRule::evaluate(
-    const XMLObject& message, const GenericRequest* request, const XMLCh* protocol, SecurityPolicy& policy
-    ) const
+bool XMLSigningRule::evaluate(const XMLObject& message, const GenericRequest* request, SecurityPolicy& policy) const
 {
     Category& log=Category::getInstance(SAML_LOGCAT".SecurityPolicyRule.XMLSigning");
     
     if (!policy.getIssuerMetadata()) {
         log.debug("ignoring message, no issuer metadata supplied");
-        return;
+        return false;
     }
 
     const SignatureTrustEngine* sigtrust;
     if (!(sigtrust=dynamic_cast<const SignatureTrustEngine*>(policy.getTrustEngine()))) {
         log.debug("ignoring message, no SignatureTrustEngine supplied");
-        return;
+        return false;
     }
     
     const SignableObject* signable = dynamic_cast<const SignableObject*>(&message);
     if (!signable || !signable->getSignature())
-        return;
+        return false;
     
     log.debug("validating signature profile");
     try {
@@ -100,9 +98,9 @@ void XMLSigningRule::evaluate(
     }
     catch (ValidationException& ve) {
         log.error("signature profile failed to validate: %s", ve.what());
-        if (m_errorsFatal)
+        if (m_errorFatal)
             throw;
-        return;
+        return false;
     }
     
     // Set up criteria object.
@@ -110,11 +108,12 @@ void XMLSigningRule::evaluate(
 
     if (!sigtrust->validate(*(signable->getSignature()), *(policy.getMetadataProvider()), &cc)) {
         log.error("unable to verify message signature with supplied trust engine");
-        if (m_errorsFatal)
-            throw SignatureException("Message was signed, but signature could not be verified.");
-        return;
+        if (m_errorFatal)
+            throw SecurityPolicyException("Message was signed, but signature could not be verified.");
+        return false;
     }
 
     log.debug("signature verified against message issuer");
-    policy.setSecure(true);
+    policy.setAuthenticated(true);
+    return true;
 }